ADVANCING EUROPEAN UNION ACTION TO ADDRESS CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS

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I. Introduction

Climate-related security risks are transnational. Countries are increasingly relying on international, regional and security organizations to formulate policies and solutions to address such risks. The European Union (EU) has acknowledged climate change as a security concern since the early 2000s. In contrast to debates in other international forums, such as the United Nations Security Council, all EU member states—even those that do not prioritize climate policy—acknowledge the potential for security risks to emerge from climate change. This consensus has led to the adoption of a ‘comprehensive security approach’ that includes climate change and environmental degradation, as well as a growing base of policies on which the EU and its member states can build to respond to climate-related security risks.

Nonetheless, an ‘action gap’ remains. Progressing common responses to climate-related security risks at EU level will be dependent on multiple factors from the extent to which member states prioritize climate-related security concerns to the distribution of their preferences, the strategies available for pursuing priorities and the possibility of coalition building or level of reliance on groups of like-minded countries. Complementing previous research on initiatives by the European Commission and the European External Action Service and the European External Action Service and the European Commission, and collaborating with like-minded member states. The paper recommends additional steps for action, but in order to make effective adjustments to EU processes, climate security will need greater prominence on the EU agenda.


6 Remling and Barnhoorn (note 1).
Action Service (EEAS), this research policy paper explores member states’ priorities and strategies for tackling climate-related security risks. It has three objectives: first, to analyse the priorities selected countries have pursued within the EU to address climate-related security risks; second, to explore the strategies they have relied on to do so, focusing particularly on the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union (Council Presidency); and third, to identify additional entry points in the EU for addressing climate-related security risks. The aim is to help member states reflect on how to deepen action at EU level.

Identifying member states’ policy preferences related to climate security at EU level presents a number of challenges. Council discussions are held behind closed doors and negotiating stances are sensitive, particularly on foreign and security policy. Officials at the EEAS and in the Council Secretariat cannot reveal member states’ positions, and government officials do not readily talk about member states’ priorities. It is also difficult to trace where or when climate-related security risks have been actively discussed in the Council. Even though Council agendas are public, they do not necessarily mention climate-related security risks. Finally, researching a cross-cutting issue such as climate security, which has no clear institutional home at either national or EU level, can be cumbersome.

Hence, this research draws many of its conclusions from member states’ domestic priorities and initiatives and deduces entry points for deepening common responses to climate-related security risks from public statements on Council deliberations. It is based on nine qualitative case studies: on Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden. The selected countries differ in terms of size, financial resources, time of EU accession, approach to European integration, identity, record on reducing carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions and level of public concern about climate change.

The analysis relies on an extensive document review; 45 semi-structured interviews with experts, and national and EU officials; and a workshop involving 34 policymakers, practitioners and experts at the 2022 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. The focus on member states is not meant to downplay the important agency of EU institutions or existing EU policies in this area. Instead, it seeks to add a distinct and original focus to existing work.

Section II analyses the EU’s decision-making structures on climate security. Section III assesses member state priorities on climate security and provides insights into their strategies for pursuing action to reduce climate-related security risks. Section IV makes suggestions on how to enhance EU responses to climate-related security risks. Section V provides some conclusions.
II. Climate security decision making in the European Union

Climate security currently falls within the EU’s ‘external action’, that is, its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and external relations. Decision making in these areas is by consensus, but the system that supports it is no longer fully controlled by the member states.

Cooperation on addressing climate-related security risks primarily involves member states in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which prepares the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) meetings. However, it also closely involves the EEAS, the EU’s diplomatic service which brings together European civil servants, diplomats from member states and local staff. The EEAS supports the High Representative of the EU’s Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). Since implementation of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty in late 2009/early 2010, the HR/VP has chaired the FAC and has also been one of the European Commission’s vice presidents. Coordination on addressing climate security can also involve the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER II). Although the coordination of cross-cutting issues ahead of the summits by the European heads of state or government is formally the responsibility of the General Affairs Council (GAC), COREPER (I and II) has increasingly stepped in to the role of preparing European Council meetings.

The PSC comprises the ambassadors from the EU member states and is chaired by representatives of the EEAS. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS replaced the rotating Council Presidency in this role in order to provide greater continuity and a longer-term decision-making perspective. Although the EU lacks a formal institutional home for climate security, the EEAS has taken on the task of coordinating policies, liaising with PSC ambassadors and creating new tools to address climate-related security risks. Activism on climate security by the EEAS was particularly visible under HR/VP Federica Mogherini in 2014–19.

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9 The CFSP/CSDP is implemented through the adoption of ‘general guidelines’ and ‘decisions defining actions to be taken and positions to be adopted’, as well as the ‘strengthening of systematic cooperation between the member states in the conduct of policy’. See Treaty of Lisbon, Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the European Union, 17 Dec. 2009, Article 25.

10 European Union, European External Action Service (EEAS), Overview.

11 Treaty of Lisbon (note 9).

12 COREPER II is responsible for foreign affairs, general affairs, justice and home affairs, and economic and financial affairs, see Council of the European Union, ‘Coreper II’, Updated 5 Oct. 2020.

13 COREPER I comprises member states’ Deputy Permanent Representatives to the EU and is responsible for agriculture and fisheries, competitiveness, education/youth/culture/sport, employment/social policy/health/consumer affairs; the environment; and transport/telecommunications/energy, see: Council of the European Union, ‘Coreper I’, Updated 5 Oct. 2020.


15 Mogherini, F., ‘Mogherini at the high-level event “Climate, peace and security: The time for action”’, HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the high-level event “Climate, peace and security: The time for action”, 22 June 2018. Prior to Mogherini’s term, High Representative Javier Solana and the European Commission submitted a paper on climate change and international security to the
Figure 1. Relevant institutions and decision structures on climate security in the European Union since the Lisbon Treaty

Notes: Blue fields highlight the institutions currently involved in EU decision making on climate security; black arrows indicate who chairs which Council configuration; blue arrows indicate bottom-up decision flows. COREPER = Committee of Permanent Representatives; CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; EEAS = European External Action Service; EU = European Union; FAC = Foreign Affairs Council; GAC = General Affairs Council; HR/VP = High Representative/Vice President; PSC = Political and Security Committee.

a The FAC is chaired by the HR/VP unless it discusses common commercial policy issues (not security) in which case the rotating Council presidency chairs the meeting.

Source: Adapted from Helwig, N. et al., The New EU Foreign Policy Architecture: Reviewing the First Two Years of the EEAS (Centre for European Policy Studies: 2013), p. 17.
While the EEAS chair has become a ‘driving force’ of PSC meetings and been crucial to coordinating member states’ input on climate security, the overall significance of the PSC and its ability to contribute to Council Conclusions on climate security seem to be declining. At least three developments account for the PSC’s gradual loss of foreign and security policy decision-making power.

First, the FAC has declined in importance, and the significance of the European Council has grown under a permanent president. Now that COREPER II prepares issues related to foreign and security policy for the Council and the PSC is no longer ‘automatically involved in drafting foreign policy elements of European Council conclusions’, the PSC is less able to shape them. Second, ending the rotating presidency across the Council system has meant, among other things, that the prestige and drive of the PSC chair, which was previously a member state with its own projects and under pressure to produce results in a six-month term, has been lost. Third, even though the links between climate and insecurity are currently not contested in the PSC, the consensus culture that characterized PSC decision making before Eastern enlargement is no longer a given with the growing number of member states. This has contributed to a perception that it has become less effective at preparing foreign policy decisions.

Unsurprisingly, some interviewees questioned whether the PSC is the right place to tackle climate-related security risks. A review of all FAC agendas and minutes from 2017 to 2021 suggests that meetings focus on broad links between climate change and security but that climate-related security risks have thus far not been specifically discussed as a standalone item. Between 2017 and 2021, only on one occasion do FAC minutes explicitly note that ‘climate action is not just about greenhouse gas emissions, but also addressing the implications of climate change on peace and security’. Given the already heavy workload of the PSC, which is largely driven by current events and member states prioritizing issues other than climate security, it may be unable to take the lead on addressing climate-related security risks. Several practitioners suggested that the Council’s geographic regional working groups could become the preparatory bodies for systematic follow-up of initiatives to improve climate security policy. Since the Lisbon Treaty, these have also been chaired by EEAS officials. Figure 1 illustrates the diminished role of the rotating Council Presidency in the institutions involved in linking climate change and security by introducing permanent chairs and separating FAC and GAC under the Lisbon Treaty.
Regardless of where in the Council system climate-related security risks are discussed, and the responses to them developed, given the ‘transgovernmental’ nature of the CSFP/CSDP, close collaboration between EU member states, the EEAS and the European Commission is crucial to enhancing mutually reinforcing initiatives to counter climate-related security risks.\(^\text{24}\)

Even though 27 Council Conclusions acknowledged the links between climate change and security between 2017 and 2021, recent studies highlight an ‘action gap in the EU when it comes to preventing the adverse security implications of climate change’.\(^\text{25}\) This may in part be related to the fact that coordination on cross-cutting issues such as climate security has become more cumbersome following the abolition of the rotating presidency at the European Council and Council of Ministers levels, and to the division of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) into the FAC and the GAC with separate chairs. Abolishing the rotating presidency at European Council level and in foreign affairs, defence and development ‘broke the chain of command’ across the Council structure.\(^\text{26}\) The GAC, in turn, has struggled to coordinate cross-cutting issues effectively without the active participation and prestige of the EU’s national foreign ministers.\(^\text{27}\)

Any current shortfalls in EU policies are, of course, not exclusively due to institutional factors. To close the gap between policy and action on initiatives to tackle climate-related security risks, the various chairs must work closely together, and national and EEAS officials must understand member state priorities, vested interests and strategies on climate security.\(^\text{28}\) All of the potential institutional disconnects highlighted above can only be overcome if climate security is given greater priority and entrenched power interests can be aligned in order to do so.

The next section examines member states’ priorities in the climate and security policy realm and how these have been pursued, and the lessons this offers in terms of closing the gaps between the EU’s rhetoric on mainstreaming climate security in all of its policies and the implementation of concrete actions and programmes to do so. Particular attention is paid to the role or opportunities that might be left for the rotating Council Presidency to advance the EU’s climate security agenda.

III. Member state priorities and strategies on climate security in the European Union

There has been visible activism among various EU member states to frame climate change as a security issue in international forums such as the UN Security Council. However, member state priorities and strategies for


\(^{25}\) See e.g. Remling and Barnhoorn (note 1).


\(^{27}\) Kaczyński and Byrne (note 26).

\(^{28}\) Foreign policy decision making requires unanimity unless there are ‘coalitions of the able and willing’ or countries agree unanimously to use qualified majority voting for particular aspects of CFSP implementation.
addressing climate-related security risks in the EU are less clear. Five findings stand out from the interviews and document review.

From variations in priorities and red lines to synergies and external pressures for action

First, the appetite to do more on climate-related security risks at EU level varies. Some countries, such as Poland and Slovenia, while broadly acknowledging the impact of climate change on conflict contexts in developing countries and not opposed to further action, are more concerned about immediate national security threats in the current geopolitical climate. Climate-related security risks are seen as less of an issue for the ‘European security theatre’. Another group of countries (e.g. Ireland, Sweden and Germany) is keen to shift the debate on climate security towards more practical or technical discussions, and tangible actions that can counter climate-related security risks. One interviewee noted that this would require concrete resources to be dedicated to the topic. Another highlighted a knowledge and practice gap—that thinking in the EU is still at such an initial stage that no one has come up with specific policy initiatives aimed solely at improving climate-related security issues.

Second, operational efficiency is a red line in defence. Poland and France appear aligned in ensuring that climate-related goals do not impinge on the operational effectiveness of their armed forces. France’s emphasis on climate security in the defence realm has been transferred to the EU level. Since 2007, France has been coordinating the Energy Operational Function (EOF) project within the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The EOF aims to jointly develop new systems of energy supply for deployed joint operations and soldier-connected devices and equipment, and to ensure ‘that the energy issue is taken into account’ in the conception of combat systems and the implementation of support operations, ‘including in the framework of operational planning’. France also participates in the European Defence Agency’s Consultation Forum on Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector and initiated the Defence Infrastructure Service’s ENSSURE project on decarbonizing energy needs while preserving operational capacity. While some of the initiatives in the defence realm seek to ‘do no [environmental] harm’ that could add to conflict in the short term, the main focus is long-term emission reductions. In this context, some policy delegates stressed the importance of having environmental advisers in the CSDP military missions.

29 Interview, Senior Polish official, 31 Mar. 2022.
32 Interview, Senior Polish official, 31 Mar. 2022.
33 Interview, Junior EU official, 30 Sep. 2021; and Interview, Senior Polish official, 31 Mar. 2022.
36 See also French Ministry for the Armed Forces, *Climate & Defence Strategy*, Apr. 2022.
37 Senior officials, Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development workshop, 23 May 2022.
Measuring the environmental footprint of military missions and making environmental advisers part of such missions are two key operational dimensions of the 2020 EU Climate Change and Defence Roadmap. A mechanism for monitoring energy, water and waste management in CSDP missions is currently being piloted by the EU and environmental advisers are expected to become the default. However, no CSDP mission to date has been deployed to address a climate-related conflict. This is currently the focus of much debate and a much broader question than improving energy use and the climate impacts of missions. Member states’ stances on this issue merit further systematic investigation.

Third, focusing current efforts on research, development and peacekeeping suits countries that do not prioritize climate insecurity. Even countries that are currently bystanders in the climate security debate (e.g. Poland) generally support EU measures to further integrate climate-related security considerations into development cooperation with fragile states, research on the topic, or taking climate change more actively and concretely into account in peacekeeping missions. In this context, some countries (e.g. Ireland and Sweden) promote a positive approach to debates on climate security (a ‘positive framing’), in the sense that climate action is highlighted as a tool for peacebuilding and tackling instability. Sweden and Ireland also prefer a broader framing than the narrow focus on ‘climate’ to a wider emphasis on ‘the environment’. This could help prevent the debate from continuing to be sidetracked by concerns over reframing climate change from an environmental or development issue to a matter of existential security. It could also help shift the focus to how member states are allocating their climate aid and the extent to which it contributes to peacebuilding and security. Together, the EU, its member states and the European Investment Bank are both the largest aid provider and the largest climate finance donor; 30 per cent of the EU budget for 2021–27 is to be directed at climate-related action.

Fourth, there is growing recognition of the need to prioritize preventative initiatives on climate-related security risks rather than responses to crises after they have happened. This is emphasized in both the Irish and the German approaches to climate security. In Germany, the aim to mitigate the causes of displacement and irregular migration, and to develop measures to strengthen ‘the effectiveness of external crisis prevention and crisis management instruments of EU institutions and member states’ plays a key role in this context. While chairing the Council Working Party on Humanitarian and Food Aid, Germany prioritized ‘the role of anticipatory humanitarian action—pre-determined/pre-financed activities that, based on a credible forecast, enable action ahead of crises, in order to save lives

38 Council of the European Union, Climate Change and Defence Roadmap, 12741/20, 9 Nov. 2020.
39 Interview, Senior Polish official, 31 Mar. 2022.
41 Senior officials, Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development workshop, 23 May 2022.
and mitigate the impact of crises—and its relevance for pressing global issues like climate change and disaster risk reduction’. Germany assessed ‘the current state of anticipatory approaches’ and held a discussion on the role that member states and the EU can play in them. However, it did not prove possible to agree a common EU position on anticipatory humanitarian action.

As co-chair with Niger of the Informal Expert Group of Members of the Security Council on Climate and Security, Ireland hosted meetings on climate-related security risks in relation to the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel and the UN Mission in South Sudan. Two interviewees mentioned the importance of integrating local expertise into these missions, and of better resourcing and skills development. This reflects Ireland’s broader aim to move away from largely conceptual discussions at the UN to practical approaches to climate-related security risks. The need to prioritize prevention over reaction was also stressed by EU officials.

Fifth, policy practitioners were divided over whether Russia’s war against Ukraine will give further momentum to, or rather overshadowed, the climate security agenda. The war has dominated the Council’s foreign policy agenda and overshadowed debates on climate change since February 2022. However, it is adding external pressure to accelerate the EU’s clean energy transition and phase out Russian fossil fuels—given the links between the environment, management of natural resources and conflict—and also to implement the proposals in the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap on operations, capability development and partnerships. In the short term though, EU member states are reactivating coal-fired power stations (e.g. in France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) to reduce their dependency on Russian gas. While the EU’s decarbonization goals have not been abandoned, such emergency measures reduce the leverage of EU member states over the Global South to give up coal.

**Strategic constraints and opportunities**

With regard to the concrete strategies available to member states to mainstream the links between climate change and security at EU level, interviewees highlighted both institutional constraints and opportunities in the EU’s shared leadership structure.

**Limited agenda-setting power of the rotating presidency**

The permanent chair structure for foreign, development and security policy created by the Lisbon Treaty means that the member state holding the rotating presidency is more constrained when pursuing its own foreign policy

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48 See e.g. Interview, Senior EU official, 19 Oct. 2021.
49 Senior officials, Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development workshop, 23 May 2022.
50 For a more detailed discussion on how the Ukraine war is affecting the climate and security see Vogler, A. and Webeler, M., ‘Climate security and Europe: What are the direct and indirect consequences of climate change?’, Perspectives, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, June 2020.
objectives than in the past. Impetus can nonetheless be given to climate security through its inclusion in the 18-month trio presidency programme, as the agenda of the PSC is guided by the trio presidency.\footnote{Interview, Senior EU Official, 23 Sep. 2021; and Interview, Senior EU Official, 8 Oct. 2021.} To date, however, any links between climate change and security in the trio presidency priorities have been indirect.

The Germany–Portugal–Slovenia trio (July 2020 to December 2021), for example, promised to work for ‘sustained peace and security on the African continent as well as sustainable and inclusive growth, investment, job creation and human development, while at the same time seeking joint and positive solutions to ... climate, migration and mobility issues’.\footnote{Council of the European Union, ‘Taking forward the strategic agenda: 18-month programme of the Council (1 July to 31 Dec. 2021)’, 8086/1/20 Rev. 1, Brussels, 9 June 2020.} The current trio presidency programme of France, Czechia and Sweden (January 2022 to July 2023) does not explicitly mention the links between climate change and security, but it does recognize the need to incorporate ‘new risks and climate change related impacts’ more broadly into its ‘crisis management and civil protection’.\footnote{French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Trio Programme, Updated 7 Mar. 2022, p. 7.} It also emphasizes that climate diplomacy will be a central feature of foreign policy and a standing item on the agenda of all major summits.

Similarly, individual Council Presidency programmes tend to focus only implicitly on climate security. For example, Germany’s six-month Council Presidency programme ‘Together for Europe’s recovery’ does not explicitly mention climate security.\footnote{Council of the European Union (note 52).} Attempts during the 2020 German Council Presidency to specifically spotlight climate-related security risks were derailed by the Covid-19 pandemic. Objectives in the international realm were somewhat vague, stressing Germany’s support for the HR/VP and the EEAS. This is in stark contrast to environmental matters, where the German Council Presidency set concrete goals, such as adopting the conclusions on the Commission’s Circular Economy Action Plan, launching Council conclusions on a new EU Biodiversity Strategy or concluding deliberations on the draft European Climate Law which enshrines climate neutrality by 2050 in law.


Instead of using formal Council Presidency programmes and agendas on assuming the rotating presidency, countries might spotlight the issue of climate security in side events, workshops or conferences ahead of or during their term.\footnote{Interview, EU Official, 19 Oct. 2021.} Two interviewees mentioned the possibility of developing non-papers on the issue to feed policy options into Council or European Coun-
For example, a non-paper on enhancing the EU’s external action on climate, peace, security and conflict prevention has been drafted by Luxembourg.  

Opportunities to advance or fine-tune existing responses to climate-related security risks by working closely with the EEAS and the European Commission

During their respective Council presidencies, member states might be able to advance or fine-tune relevant existing initiatives on addressing climate-related security risks by working in close partnership with the EEAS and the European Commission. Prominent examples include incorporating climate spending targets into the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which is drafted by the European Commission; prioritizing fragile states in the EU’s new external development financing tool, the Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI); enshrining climate security in regional development partnerships, such as the post-Cotonou Agreement; developing the Concept for an Integrated Approach to Climate Change and Security; and pushing implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, as well as the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap.  

Each is examined in turn below.

Incorporating climate spending targets and prioritizing fragile states.

The long-term MFF, which was concluded under the 2020 German Council Presidency, contains a target that 30 per cent of spending will be on climate-related measures. This is 5 per cent higher than the 25 per cent quota that Germany had suggested as a minimum starting point and that the Commission had recommended.  

The 30 per cent target applies equally to the NDICI. The NDICI’s international partnerships address good governance, democracy and human rights, climate change, and migration and mobility.  

Countries most in need—the fragile and crisis-affected—are to be given particular priority.

Enshrining climate security in regional development partnerships and the post-Cotonou Agreement.

The conclusion of the post-Cotonou agreement in 2021 was crucial to mainstreaming climate security in the EU’s develop-

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60 European Union, ‘Partnership agreement between the [European Union/ European Union and its Member States], of the one part, and members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States [OACPS], of the other part’, Negotiated agreement text initialled by the EU and OACPS chief negotiators on 15 April 2021; Council of the European Union (note 5); A Strategic Compass: For Security and Defence (European Union: Brussels, Mar. 2022); Council of the European Union (note 38); and Zandee, D., Stoetman, A. and Deen, B., The EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence: Squaring Ambition with Reality (Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations: The Hague, 2021).


ment policy. It sets the framework for EU cooperation with the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States for the next 20 years. The political agreement reached under the German Council Presidency in December 2020 allowed for the formal conclusion of negotiations by the Portuguese Council Presidency in April 2021. Negotiations were led by Jutta Urpilainen, Commissioner for the Directorate General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA). The German Council Presidency put its full political weight behind reaching an agreement that covers peace and security, human development, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, environmental sustainability, climate change and migration.\(^63\) Climate security features prominently in the overarching protocol, as well as regional protocols on Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The overarching protocol calls on parties to ‘address the security threats that climate change and environmental degradation pose, particularly in situations of fragility and in the most vulnerable countries’ and to ‘develop resilience strategies’.\(^64\) This is reiterated in the regional protocols, together with the need for adaptation measures that contribute to conflict prevention, conflict early warning systems, and risk and impact assessments.\(^65\)

**Europeanizing national policies through the EU’s Concept for an Integrated Approach to Climate Change and Security.** Some countries see the Concept for an Integrated Approach to Climate Change and Security, which was published in October 2021, as a key opportunity to mainstream the climate security nexus not only at the EU level but also at the national level.\(^66\) The concept proposes strengthening the links between early warning, analysis and action; mainstreaming climate and environmental aspects into the CSDP missions and operations; the deployment of environmental advisers; equipping peace mediators with climate expertise; mitigating the negative aspects of climate change on natural and cultural heritage; monitoring conflict and climate sensitivity in humanitarian aid funding; taking a human rights-based approach to climate change and sensitivity; drawing on experience from the UN Climate Security Mechanism (CSM); and closer cooperation with other multilateral actors.\(^67\) States such as Belgium, among others, are supportive of the EEAS playing a leadership role on climate-related security risks.\(^68\) Others mentioned that mandate and capacity constraints might prevent it from assuming such a role.\(^69\) At the heart of this debate is the extent to which member states are ready to prioritize the development of a common EU-level climate security strategy and empower the EU with a leadership

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\(^63\) European Union, Partnership Agreement (note 60).

\(^64\) European Union, Partnership Agreement (note 60).

\(^65\) European Union, Partnership Agreement (note 60).

\(^66\) Council of the European Union (note 5); and Interview, Senior German official, 21 Oct. 2021.

\(^67\) The CSM is a joint initiative by the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UN DPPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). It is financed by Sweden, Germany, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom, as well as the Netherlands and Belgium. See e.g. *UN Climate Security Mechanism Progress Report (UN DPPA, UNDP and UNEP: New York, 2021)*; *UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office, Partners Gateway, ‘Climate Security Mechanism: Overview’, 2 Aug. 2021*; and Council of the European Union (note 5).


role in this area with funds for implementation. To date, they have pursued their own security and power interests in ways that cut across any common commitment to climate security. Thus far, climate security has had a low profile compared to other issues on Council agendas.

**Closing gaps between rhetoric and action in security and defence through the Strategic Compass.** Unlike the 2016 Global Strategy for the CFSP, the development of the Strategic Compass was member state-driven rather than Commission-driven. The Strategic Compass invites all EU member states to develop national climate security adaptation strategies for their armed forces.70 One interviewee explained that:

[The Strategic Compass] is a very concrete policy project . . . concerned with operationalizing the EU’s Global Strategy. The threats have changed over the years. Climate is part of it and we want to make sure that climate and security are properly reflected in the Strategic Compass. Security is also about how we make sure that climate does not become an additional threat factor in international relations . . . One basket of the Strategic Compass is about resilience, also against climate change, by mitigating climate change, but also through partnerships to mainstream climate security.71

The multilateral partners highlighted in this context are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN, but not the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The bilateral partnerships in which climate change is mentioned are those with the United States, and African and Latin American partners. The Sahel, the Amazon and the Arctic region are identified as crucial in the context of climate security. Others, however, lament the lack of prominence in the Strategic Compass of detailed operational steps to address climate insecurity compared, for example, to the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap.72

**Implementing the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap.** The Climate Change and Defence Roadmap seeks to address the implications of climate change for security and defence by proposing more than 30 concrete actions in the areas of operations, capability development and partnerships. Reflecting individual national policies, it proposes enhancing early warning, mainstreaming environmental aspects into the planning and implementation of CSDP missions (civilian and military), strengthening the energy efficiency of CSDP engagements and working more closely with the UN and NATO on climate change and defence.73 As a result, environmental advisers have already been deployed in some CSDP missions, and mechanisms for assessing missions’ environmental footprints have been piloted. Furthermore, the roadmap advocates that the EU take a leadership role on international and environmental climate policy, as stipulated in the European Green Deal, and suggests enhanced cooperation among EU member states and with international organizations and multilateral partners.74

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70 Informal conversation, Senior French official, 26 Apr. 2022.
72 Expert review, 10 July 2022.
74 Council of the European Union (note 38).
Opportunities to advance or fine-tune existing responses to climate-related security risks by working closely with like-minded member states

Finally, like-minded EU member states are cooperating on addressing climate-related security risks. The Netherlands and Germany founded the informal EU Early Warning Early Action Forum to facilitate twice-yearly exchanges on early identification of crises and crisis prevention among both EU member states and EU institutions, as well as joint analyses of at-risk countries. EU member states also created the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management in Berlin to strengthen civilian crisis management within the CSDP, seeking to share good practice between member states, the EEAS and NATO. Climate security is one of the centre’s priorities. Finally, a partnership between France, Italy and Germany focuses on preventing violence and reducing irregular migration within the framework of the EU’s high-level dialogue with Niger.

Under the 2020 German Council Presidency, agreement was reached on third state participation in PESCO projects, allowing like-minded countries to cooperate in the military domain. Germany hopes the agreement will benefit attempts to mainstream climate security into EU–NATO relations and provide an entry point to bring climate policy into security dialogues with the USA. One interviewee mentioned that an EU group of friends on climate security might be emerging, which would be similar to initiatives at the UN.

IV. Towards further collaborative action on climate-related security risks

To remain credible and effectively tackle climate-related security risks, the EU and its member states need to advance and coordinate their efforts to close the gap between rhetoric and practice. This can be done by building on current policies, initiatives and analytical work to begin implementing concrete projects in the field, in close cooperation with each other. Consistency within the EU and across its member states carries great promise for successfully reducing climate-related security risks. This may even require an inventory of domestic risks to the EU and its member states, which would include an assessment of transnational risks, for example to trade and global supply chains, and risks arising from the EU’s energy transition. Climate insecurity is not merely a foreign policy issue. As concerns over migratory pressures demonstrate, it can also trigger political, economic and societal instability within the EU.

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76 European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management, ‘About the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management (CoE)’.
77 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, ‘Africa’.
78 Interview, Senior German official, 21 Oct. 2021.
79 Informal conversation, Senior EU official, 15 Feb. 2022.
80 Expert, Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development workshop, 23 May 2022
Entry points for additional collaborative action at EU level to respond to climate-related security risks in the short to medium term include, but are not limited to, pooling resources, exchanging good practice, facilitating long-term cooperation on the ground, coordinating initiatives and geographical desks, building on existing agendas and tools, and developing interregional dialogues on climate security.

**Pooling resources**

Small and medium-sized states in particular face constraints when it comes to dedicating resources to climate security (e.g. Ireland, Belgium and Slovenia). Italy also highlighted a lack of resources dedicated to and staff capacity on climate-related security risks. Numerous interviewees suggested that EU member states should pool their resources to achieve greater knowledge building and exchange, more impact and improved collaboration at EU level. Strengthening the capacity of the EEAS and the possibility of giving it a coordinating role similar to that of the UN CSM were also mentioned in this context. At the same time, however, effective oversight of such a mechanism might be a concern.

**Exchanging lessons on good practice**

Any lessons learned from dedicated climate-related security initiatives could be shared more systematically. This could be facilitated by the EU to close knowledge gaps on good practice and support efforts to address climate-related security risks in relevant policy areas. This would help to ensure that responses to such risks avoid unintended or adverse consequences.

**Facilitating long-term cooperation on the ground**

Efforts to respond to the risks of conflict that arise from climate change and environmental degradation, and to address climate-related and environmental factors in peacebuilding are still relatively new. They require those working on the ground, such as engineers, development non-governmental organizations, peacebuilders and military operators, to learn new disciplines. Putting processes in place that enhance long-term cross-disciplinary cooperation and capacity building should encourage the type of cross-fertilization needed to address climate-related security risks. As one interviewee asked, ‘Where can you bridge what a soldier and a diplomat mean by climate and security?’

**Coordinating initiatives and geographical desks**

Several interviewees mentioned the opportunity to improve coordination of action on the ground to avoid parallel initiatives, for example on climate-related security risks in the Sahel. Bringing together relevant

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82 Interview, expert, 16 Mar. 2022.
83 Interview, Senior Belgian official, 2 Dec. 2021; and Interview, Senior Belgian official, 16 Dec. 2021.
84 Interview, Senior Belgian official, 16 Dec. 2021.
86 Interview, Senior German official, 13 Oct. 2021.
87 Interview, Senior Belgian official, 16 Dec. 2021. Research recommends a ‘one stop shop’ in the European Commission to coordinate climate security, see e.g. Vogler and Webeler (note 50).
EEAS thematic officers with the geographical desks, as well as the respective geographical working groups from the Council’s preparatory bodies could facilitate exchange on and coordination of various EU member state initiatives on tackling climate-related security risks in the same region. One senior official recommended replicating the ‘Team Europe’ approach to ‘joint programming, joint implementation’ in climate change and security, which involves not only the EU and its member states, but also their implementing agencies and development banks.88 Team Europe was launched to ‘improve the coherence and coordination of the EU’s global response to the Covid-19 pandemic’.89 Such efforts could also lead to the development of specific country priorities to reduce climate-related social, economic and political pressures.90

Building on existing agendas and tools

Some interviewees recommended strengthening the climate security agenda by generating synergies with the Women Peace and Security and Youth Peace and Security agendas.91 Other ideas involved climate and conflict sensitizing funding mechanisms, such as the NDICI, or climate sensitizing the European Peace Facility. Practitioners also emphasized that the EU could work more closely with and learn from the experiences of other organizations, such as the UN CSM and the OSCE.92

More systematic interregional dialogues

Discussions need to go beyond the EU and its member states. More effective and systematic interregional dialogues are needed between the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the UN on the links between climate change and security. In this way, a common understanding can emerge on the climate-related security risks that need to be addressed, and where and how it would be best to do so.

V. Conclusions

The extent to which member states and EU institutions can develop common responses to climate-related security risks is dependent on multiple factors. This paper examined member states’ priorities on climate-related security risks and their strategies for pursuing them at EU level. In the light of the findings, the paper recommends additional steps to advance efforts to tackle climate-related security risks, including pooling resources, exchanging good practice, facilitating long-term cooperation on the ground, coordinating initiatives and geographical desks, building on existing agendas and tools, and developing interregional dialogues on climate security.

However, these proposals and incremental steps to adjust internal EU processes and dialogues are unlikely to come to fruition—or, crucially, to have

88 Senior official, Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development workshop, 23 May 2022.
89 European Union, Capacity4dev, ‘Working better together as Team Europe: Through joint programming and joint implementation’, [n. d.].
91 Interview, Senior Swedish official, 16 Mar. 2022.
92 Senior officials, Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development workshop, 23 May 2022.
the impact needed—if climate-related security risks remain low on the EU agenda, vested national interests continue to trump climate security concerns, or other issues are given greater priority. Whether the Ukraine crisis will help or hinder the EU’s climate security agenda remains to be seen. Thus far, it seems to have somewhat overshadowed debates on the links between climate change and security rather than driven efforts to mainstream it in the EU’s external action and close the current action gap.
Appendix A. Analytical framework and methodological considerations

This research relies on qualitative case studies that compare member states’ national approaches to climate-related security risks. It involves a diverse sub-set of nine member states: Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden.

The countries differ according to key parameters that might influence their policy approaches generally, and to climate security in particular. These are size, financial resources, identity, time of EU accession, approach to European integration, record in reducing carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions, and public concern about climate change (see appendix B).

Comparability between the nine cases was ensured by structuring each case around three questions: To what extent does this country recognize the link between climate change (or the environment) and security across its policies? What initiatives does this country rely on or plan to address climate-related security risks? Which policies does this country have in place that do not address climate-related security risks explicitly, but could be refined to do so?

Based on insights from the existing literature, the analytical framework for mapping responses to climate-related security risks spans foreign policy, security/defence, development, peace and conflict, disaster risk reduction/crisis management and migration.¹

The analysis covers the period from 2017 (when the European Council decided on a long-term approach to global challenges, including climate-related pressures and shocks) to May 2022. It relies on a thorough review of both primary and secondary sources. A total of 45 semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials from relevant national ministries, their Permanent Representations in Brussels, the Council Secretariat, the European External Action Service and the European Commission, as well as external experts. In addition, a workshop was held with 34 policymakers, practitioners and experts at the Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development in May 2022.

Researching a cross-cutting issue with no clear institutional home, as is the case with climate security, can be cumbersome. In addition, limiting the analysis to certain policy areas means that there is a possibility that relevant documents or initiatives on responding to climate-related security risks in other policy areas (such as the environment or education) could be overlooked.

Appendix B. Similarities and differences between selected European Union member states across various dimensions

The table below illustrates the similarities and differences across seven dimensions for the nine selected EU member states whose policies and initiatives on climate-related security risks were mapped for this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU member state</th>
<th>Population (2020)</th>
<th>GDP (euros per capita)</th>
<th>CO₂ emissions reduction target</th>
<th>Accession year</th>
<th>EU approach to integration</th>
<th>EU geographic identity</th>
<th>Per cent of population that considers climate change the most serious problem facing the word (as of April 2021)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Underachiever</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Overachiever</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Underachiever</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>On track</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Overachiever</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Underachiever</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Underachiever</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Reluctant</td>
<td>Central and Eastern</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Overachiever</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Central and Eastern</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Overachiever</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CO₂ = carbon dioxide; EU = European Union, GDP = gross domestic product.


Sorted by mainstream, pragmatic and reluctant.

ADVANCING EUROPEAN UNION ACTION TO ADDRESS CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS

SIMONE BUNSE, ELISE REMLING, ANNIEK BARNHOORN, MANON DU BUS DE WARNAFFE, KAREN MEIJER AND DOMINIK REHBAUM

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