

This (unedited) annex supports the SIPRI publications *Mapping European Union Member States' Responses to Climate-related Security Risks* and *Advancing European Union Action to Address Climate-related Security Risks* by Simone Bunse, Elise Remling, Anniek Barnhoorn, Manon du Bus de Warnaffe, Karen Meijer and Dominik Rehbaum. It contains four unpublished case studies on Belgium, France, Germany and Ireland. It provides additional information and practical examples from different country contexts.

Belgium's responses to climate-related security risks
by Manon du Bus de Warnaffe and Simone Bunse

France's responses to climate-related security risks
by Dominik Rehbaum and Simone Bunse

Germany's responses to climate-related security risks
by Simone Bunse

Ireland's responses to climate-related security risks
by Elise Remling

BELGIUM'S RESPONSES TO CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS

MANON DUBUS AND SIMONE BUNSE

I. Introduction

Belgium's understanding of peace and security is 'global and multidimensional' and has evolved since the 1990s to encompass non-traditional threats stemming from non-state actors.¹ As such, Belgium's priorities in security, development and foreign policy include human, economic and environmental considerations. Since the 2016 Brussels attacks, the fight against terrorism has been a core issue of Belgian security policy.² While climate and security are only partially integrated into national policies and programs, three developments have pushed climate action to the top of the political agenda.

First is the strength of the 'Fridays for Future' movement among youth in Belgium.³ Second, political pressure rose with the climate litigation. The court case "VZW Klimaatzaak v. Kingdom of Belgium & Others" has been ongoing since 2015. It accuses the federal state and Belgium's three Regions (Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Capital) of breaching 'their climate obligations' by failing to reduce Belgium's GHG emissions.⁴ Third, as in neighboring Germany, devastating floods in July 2021 brought climate change to the forefront of public debate.⁵ In his speech at COP26, Belgium's Prime Minister called the forty-one victims as the first Belgian casualties of climate change.⁶

¹ Criekemans, D. et al., *Security Environment 2021-2030*, (Belgian Defence: June 2021) <<https://www.defence-institute.be/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/200622-Security-environment-2021-2030-EN.pdf>>. Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs, Peace and security, Royaume de Belgique - Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au Développement, <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security>, accessed 27 Oct. 2021.

² Hardt, J. N. and Viehoff, A., *A Climate for Change in the UN Security Council? Member States' Approaches to the Climate-Security Nexus*, Research Report 005 (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg: July 2020). Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs (note 1). Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs, Striving for global solidarity, Royaume de Belgique - Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au Développement, <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/striving_for_global_solidarity>, accessed 27 Oct. 2021.

³ Rankin, J., 'School strikers try to unite divided Belgium over climate crisis', *The Guardian*, 12 Nov. 2019, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/12/belgium-climate-crisis-school-strikers-activists>>.

⁴ Klimaatzaak - L'Affaire Climat, L'Affaire Climat, L'Affaire Climat, <<https://affaire-climat.be>>, accessed 13 Dec. 2021.

⁵ Belga, Intempéries - Le réchauffement climatique en cause dans les inondations de juillet, La Libre.be, <<https://www.lalibre.be/dernieres-depeches/belga/2021/08/24/intemperies-le-rechauffement-climatique-en-cause-dans-les-inondations-de-juillet-S4RM6QIRUFAVTK55PYA6E7METE/>>, accessed 5 Nov. 2021.

⁶ De Croo, A., 'Statement by PM Alexander De Croo at UN Climate Change Conference #COP26 in Glasgow', Speech at the COP26, Glasgow, 2 Nov. 2021, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5guSINSN6w8>>.

2 BELGIUM CASE STUDY

The current government took office on 30 September 2020.⁷ It consists of the liberal (Open Vld and MR), the socialist (Vooruit and PS), green (Groen and Ecolo) and the Christian Democratic parties (CD&V). The Greens hold the ministerial portfolios of climate, environment, sustainable development, energy, mobility and gender equality.⁸

Since 2003, Belgium's National Climate Commission (NCC) has coordinated and implemented environmental and climate action.⁹ In addition to federal and regional representatives, the NCC includes Belgium's Deputy Prime Minister and Internal Affairs and Security Minister.¹⁰ The government's emission reduction targets mirror the European Green Deal.¹¹ But according to the latest progress report from the European Commission, Belgium will miss its climate targets in 2030.¹²

This analysis maps Belgian policies and initiatives responding to Climate related security risks (CRSRs). It shows that Belgium has pursued a so-called '3D approach' to integrate diplomacy, defense and development perspectives into its policies and programming on cross-cutting issues. It has contributed to evidence and knowledge building on CSRs and strengthening the work of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on climate and security.¹³ In the EU, Belgium is highly supportive of the 2021 *Integrated Concept on Climate Change and Security*, as well as the 2020 *Climate Change and Defence Roadmap*. Given its own limited resources and to ensure policy coherence, Belgium favors EEAS leadership on initiatives stemming CSRs and is keen to reinforce its coordinating and capacity building role.¹⁴

⁷ 'Il y a un an naissait le gouvernement 'Vivaldi' d'Alexander De Croo: il était six heures du matin, comment tout a commencé?', *RTBF Info*, 30 Sep. 2021, <https://www.rtb.be/info/belgique/detail_il-y-a-un-an-naissait-le-gouvernement-vivaldi-d-alexander-de-croo-il-etait-six-heures-du-matin-comment-tout-a-commence?id=10848879>.

⁸ Dupouey, V., The Belgian Greens become the sixth Green party in government in the EU, European Greens, <<https://europeangreens.eu/content/belgian-greens-become-sixth-green-party-government-eu>>, accessed 25 Oct. 2021.

⁹ Commission Nationale Climat, À Propos de la commission nationale climat, Commission Nationale Climat, <<https://www.cnc-nkc.be/fr/propos-de-la-commission-nationale-climat>>, accessed 28 Oct. 2021. <https://www.cnc-nkc.be/en/about-national-climate-commission>

¹⁰ Commission Nationale Climat (note 9).

¹¹ Federal Government of Belgium, *Accord de Gouvernement*, (Federal Government of Belgium: Brussels, Sep. 2020) <https://www.belgium.be/sites/default/files/Accord_de_gouvernement_2020.pdf>.

¹² European Commission (note 12).

¹³ Hardt and Viehoff (note 2).

¹⁴ Interview, Senior Official, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Cooperation, 2nd Dec. 2021. Interview, Belgian Expert, 18th Jan. 2022.

II. Belgium's national policies and initiatives to respond to climate-related security risks

Belgium started linking climate and security in recognition of its domestic 'vulnerability to climate change', particularly sea level rise.¹⁵¹⁶ Security concerns related to climate change first appeared in the country's national climate and environmental policies. As early as 2009 Belgium identified climate change as a 'source of instability' linked to food (in)security, biodiversity loss, migration, public health and conflict.¹⁷ Its 2017-2020 National Adaptation Plan talks about human security more broadly and includes energy security and economic development.¹⁸

The link between climate change and security gradually started to be mainstreamed in other policy areas, including foreign affairs, defense, and development. Crucial and unique in this regard was the integration of the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD) into the Federal Public Service (FPS) Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, as part of a broader reform to transform Belgium's federal administration.¹⁹ Between the two structures, security concerns, including related to climate change, cut across both policy domains and 'were common ground' and thus 'got promoted higher up in the agenda'.²⁰ The merged Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation now has an environment and climate unit with staff responsible for synthesizing development and foreign affairs goals through climate finance efforts, COP commitments, EU external climate policy, as well as progress towards the SDGs.²¹

CRSRs first appeared in bilateral aid for developing countries including climate adaptation involving food and water security projects.²² Climate diplomacy and both mitigation and adaptation gained in importance with the

¹⁵ National Climate Commission, *Belgian National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy*, (National Climate Commission: Brussels, Dec. 2010) <https://www.cnc-nkc.be/sites/default/files/report/file/be_nas_2010.pdf>.

¹⁶ Commission Nationale Climat, *National Adaptation Plan for Belgium*, National Adaptation Plan (Commission Nationale Climat: Brussels, 19 Apr. 2017) <https://climat.be/doc/NAP_FR.pdf>. National Climate Commission (note 17).

¹⁷ NCC - National Climate Commission, *Belgium's Fifth National Communication on Climate Change - Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, (Brussels, 2009) <https://www.cnc-nkc.be/sites/default/files/report/file/nc5_en.pdf>.

¹⁸ Commission Nationale Climat (note 18).

¹⁹ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Introduction, Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/development_cooperation/who_we_are/our_organisation/dgd/introduction>, accessed 18 Jan. 2022. Interview, Belgian Expert, 14.1.2022.

²⁰ Interview, Belgian Expert, 14.1.2022.

²¹ Interview, Senior Belgian Official, 2.12.2021.

²² NCC - National Climate Commission (note 19). National Climate Commission, *Belgium's Sixth National Communication on Climate Change - Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, (National Climate Commission: 2013); National Climate Commission, *Belgium's Seventh National Communication and Third Biennial Report on Climate Change - Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, (National Climate Commission: 2017).

4 BELGIUM CASE STUDY

2015 Paris Agreement. The 2019 Belgian defense strategy explicitly relates climate change to the stability of states, through an increase of both the competition for natural resources and migration. Climate change is seen as an important driver for migration, a topic qualified by one interviewee as ‘very much alive in Belgium’.²³ Overall, the ministry now pursues an ‘integrated 3D approach gathering the different actors from diplomacy, defense, and development.’²⁴

In 2019, during its elected UNSC membership, Belgium also advocated for linking climate and security.²⁵ Echoing the country’s advocacy in the UNSC, Belgium’s Foreign Minister stressed that ‘security is not just armed conflicts’ but needs to consider climate change, especially in vulnerable countries.²⁶ Despite lower levels of visible activism on mainstreaming climate security at the policy level after concluding its UNSC membership, one interviewee argued that ‘the UNSC expertise and experience helped to keep CRSRs on the radar’ and deepened Belgium’s understanding of climate and environmental factors as ‘risk multipliers of conflict’.^{27,28}

At the project implementation level, Belgium has mostly been active in knowledge and evidence building, to fill gaps on the linkages between climate and conflict and how to reduce countries’ vulnerability to climate change.²⁹ The country uses ‘policy-supporting-research’ mechanisms, consisting of consortia of Belgian academics and research institutes to help develop evidence-based policies. Between 2020 and 2022, the Directorate-General for Development financed the so-called KLIMSEC research group, led by the Catholic University of Leuven (KU Leuven) to support the government in developing policy initiatives sensitive to the link between climate and security. It consists of five research groups across different Belgian universities and focuses specifically on the Great Lakes regions.³⁰ It investigates how Belgian development can reduce CRSRs and how investments in resilience and adaptation could contribute to sustainable development.³¹ The KLIMSEC group revised the so-called FRAME (Fragility Resilience Assessment Management Exercise) Methodology toolbox,

²³ Belgian Defence, *2019 Security Environment Review*, (Belgian Defence: 2019) <<https://www.belgianarmy.be/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Security-environment-review-1.pdf>>. Interview with Belgian Expert, 14.1.2022.

²⁴ Interview, Senior Belgian Official, 2.12.2021.

²⁵ Hardt and Viehoff (note 2).

²⁶ Reynders, D., Security is about much more than just armed conflicts, *Climate Diplomacy*, <<https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/security-about-much-more-just-armed-conflicts-didier-reynders-belgium-foreign-minister>>, accessed 28 Oct. 2021.

²⁷ Interview, Senior Belgian Official, 2.12.2021.

²⁸ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Climate and security, a clear priority for Belgium, Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/highlighted/peace_and_security/climate_and_security_clear_priority_belgium>, accessed 11 Nov. 2021.

²⁹ Interview, Senior Official, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Cooperation, 2nd Dec. 2021.

³⁰ Verbist, B., KLIMSEC, KU Leuven - KLIMSEC Research Group, <<https://ees.kuleuven.be/klimsec/research-groups-involved/>>, accessed 16 Nov. 2021.

³¹ Verbist (note 29).

used in Belgian development cooperation partner countries.³² It sought to add a security dimension to the environmental section of the toolbox.³³ Furthermore, the group updated a toolkit used to mainstream environmental concerns into development cooperation created by a former and similar research consortium (KLIMOS), adding ‘a security twist’ and simplifying the use of the toolkit.³⁴ Aside from knowledge and tool building, Belgium has pursued policy initiatives encompassing bilateral and multilateral climate diplomacy in the foreign policy realm, climate finance and context-specific approaches in the development realm and crisis monitoring in security and defense.

The following Table summarizes key policy initiatives Belgium has, is proposing or could fine-tune to address CRSRs across different policy areas. It identifies the time horizon of policy initiatives, as well as whether they prevent or react to CRSRs. Short-term policy responses are those expected to show their effects within three years, medium-term policy responses within three to five years and long-term policy responses after five years.

Table 1. Inventory of relevant policies and initiatives promoted and implemented by Belgium responding to climate-related security risks

Policy	Initiative	Explicit link to CRSRs	Used	Proposed	Required fine-tuning	Type of Policy Response
Foreign Policy	Multilateral climate-security diplomacy and initiatives in the UNSC					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Open Debates. Arria Formula Meetings. UN Group of Friends. Finances JPO position in CSM. 	X	X	-	-	Long-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integration of ‘ecological fragility’ in MONUSCO. Systematic integration of environmental and climate concerns in UNSC security actions. ‘Greening’ of UN Peacekeeping missions in Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic. Systemic information and knowledge gathering with the UN to guide work of UNSC on climate and security. UN SG global report on climate – security every two years. 	X	-	X	-	Medium to long-term prevention
	National Special Envoys <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region. Special Envoy for the Sahel 	-	X	-	Sensitize to climate and security link	Short-to-medium-term prevention

³² ACROPOLIS and Vervisch, T., *FRAME 2.0 Guidelines*, (ACROPOLIS - Academic Research Organization for Policy Support:) <https://ees.kuleuven.be/klimsec/toolkit/FRAME%202.0_Guidelines.pdf>. Partner countries of Belgium in Development Cooperation are the following: Benin - Burkina Faso - Burundi - DR Congo - Guinea - Mali - Morocco - Mozambique - Niger - Palestinian Territory - Rwanda - Senegal - Tanzania - Uganda.

³³ ACROPOLIS and Vervisch (note 31).

³⁴ Verbist (note 29). Interview with Belgian expert, 14th January 2022.

6 BELGIUM CASE STUDY

Security and Defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognition of need for integration of 'climate crisis and its multiplying effects within Belgium's security environment. • Recognition of need to monitor impacts of climate change on security of fragile regions. 	X	-	X	-	Medium to long-term.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signatory of the Climate Change and the Armed Forces Initiative launched by France at the 2021 Paris Peace Forum³⁵ 	X	X	-	requires implementation	Long-term prevention
Development Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal obligation to consider the protection of natural resources and the environment in development initiatives. (cfr. 2013 Law on Development) • Mainstreaming of climate change and environmental issues into development action. • Development of needs-based support to partner countries. • Enhance coherence among different development cooperation policies 	-	X	-	Sensitize to climate and security link;	Long-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional program for the Sahel with a climate change focus. 	X	X	-	Integrate goal to stem CRSRs	Short- to-medium term prevention.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate Finance (ODA – 38,1% mitigation; 42,4% adaptation; 19,5% adaptation and mitigation) 	-	X	-	Increase quality of climate finance by targeting it specifically to the most climate vulnerable, fragile, conflict contexts. Sensitize to climate and security link.	Medium-term prevention.
Conflict Prevention/Peacebuilding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peacebuilding Priority for 2021: Supporting efforts that aim to mitigate the effects of climate change on the safety of people. 	X	-	X	-	Medium-term prevention.
Disaster Risk Management/Crisis Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • B-Fast: Emergency Aid Tool to offer a rapid answer to man-made or natural disasters. 	-	X	-	Sensitize to climate-security link.	Short-term-reaction.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal obligation to integrate protection of natural resources and the environment within humanitarian aid. 	-	X	-	Sensitize to climate-security link.	
Research	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KLIMOS Toolkit (Updated by KLIMSEC) • FRAME Toolkit (Updated by KLIMSEC) • KLIMSEC Research Group 	X	X			Knowledge building; Policy development support (long-term prevention)

³⁵ <https://parispeaceforum.org/en/initiatives/the-armed-forces-pledge-to-reduce-their-impact-on-the-climate/>

Migration	N/a: Migration policy is not seen as a tool to stem CRSRs but acts as a driver to address them. Belgium does currently not grant asylum to climate refugees.	-	-			
Issue emphasis	Food and water scarcity, migration, terrorism, agriculture, biodiversity, natural resources.					
Regional emphasis	Great Lakes – Sahel Region – Bilateral Development Partner countries.					

Source: Authors’ own compilation.

The most promising initiatives to stem CRSRs are those that do not only focus *explicitly* on CRSRs, are *currently* implemented, cut across different policy domains, but have a *short-to-medium* term impact to respond to risks already visible.

Most promising short-to-medium term policy initiatives

The most promising policy initiative to respond to climate-related security risks currently pursued by the Belgium government is a regional program for the Sahel, announced in October 2021 by the Development Minister and implemented by ENABEL, the Belgian Development Agency responsible for operationalizing Belgian development cooperation.³⁶ The five-year, 50M€ program explicitly recognizes the link between climate and security and seeks prevention in the short-to-medium-term.³⁷ Focusing on Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, this program pays special attention to agriculture and ecological restoration.³⁸ Belgium’s goal is to develop targeted regional approaches rather than generic policies.³⁹ To coordinate its integrated 3D approach in the Sahel, Belgium appointed a Special Envoy for the Sahel as focal point.⁴⁰ The Sahel Region is a key priority, because it is seen as a potential hub for international terrorism, and because of Belgium’s development focus on ‘fragile’ countries.⁴¹ Additionally, Belgium has regional expertise due to its historical presence in Central Africa.⁴² Similarly, the Great Lakes region has a special Belgian envoy.

³⁶ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Meryame Kitir présente le programme climatique belge pour le Sahel au Burkina Faso, Service public fédéral Affaires étrangères, <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/fr/newsroom/nouvelles/2021/meryame_kitir_presente_programme_climatique_belge_pour_sahel>, accessed 17 Nov. 2021.

³⁷ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (note 34).

³⁸ Interview, Senior Official, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Cooperation, 2.12.2021.

³⁹ Interview, Senior Official, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Cooperation, 2.12.2021.

⁴⁰ De Groof, B., Special Envoy for the Sahel, Interview with FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Brussels, 26 Oct. 2021, <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/fr/politique/themes_politiques/sous_la_loupe/paix_et_securite/la_belgique_sengage_pleinement_pour_la>.

⁴¹ De Groof (note 39).

⁴² De Groof (note 39).

Promising long-term policy initiatives

The most promising long-term initiatives to address CRSRs is Belgium's work to anchor CRSRs in the UNSC, especially in 2007-2008 and 2019-2020. This was achieved through different strategies, including initiating Open Debates and Arria Formula Meetings.⁴³ In addition, Belgium is part of the UN Group of Friends on Climate and Security. Together with nine other UNSC members (including Germany, France and Estonia) Belgium created the Informal Expert Group (IEG) of Members of the UNSC on Climate and Security.⁴⁴ Belgium also supports the UN Climate Security Mechanism by financing a Junior Professional Officer in this unit.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Belgium has called for systematically integrating environmental and climate concerns in relevant action of the UNSC, including national, regional or thematic mandates.⁴⁶ As such, it has also worked to ensure considerations of climatic hazards in UN Peacekeeping missions in Mali, Somalia, and the Central African Republic.⁴⁷ To this end, Belgium has successfully advocated for the inclusion of the ecological fragility of the Democratic Republic of Congo, such as extreme weather events, in the UN Peacekeeping Missions in the DRC (MONUSCO).⁴⁸

In addition, Belgium has advocated for systemic information and knowledge gathering on climate and security within the UN, possibly through a 'Clearing House', which could guide the work of the UNSC on climate and security.⁴⁹ Finally, Belgium support the position shared by several other Member States of calling for the presentation of a UN Secretary General global report on climate and security every two years.⁵⁰ Belgium aims to raise more awareness around the issue, and to this end organized a high-level seminar on 'The Security Implications of Emerging Climate Altering Technologies' in 2019.⁵¹ Domestically, the Foreign Affairs Minister has vowed to continue the work started during Belgium's UNSC membership through 'preventive diplomacy'

⁴³ Kingdom of the Netherlands et al., *United Nations Security Council Arria-Formula Meeting 'Water, Peace and Security'*, (26 Oct. 2018) <https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/upload.teamup.com/908040/FeEycdtgSsaof9I39Kpd_Concept-Note%20Arria%20Water%20Peace%20Security.pdf>. Climate Security Expert Network, 'Climate Security at the UNSC - A Short History', Climate Security Expert Network, 10 Sep. 2015, <<https://climate-security-expert-network.org/unsc-engagement>>.

⁴⁴ Security Council Report, *In Hindsight: The UN Security Council and Climate Change*, (July 2021) <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2021_07_forecast.pdf>.

⁴⁵ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (note 27).

⁴⁶ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (note 27).

⁴⁷ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (note 27).

⁴⁸ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (note 27).

⁴⁹ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (note 27).

⁵⁰ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (note 27).

⁵¹ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (note 27).

and the systemic integration of climate change and biodiversity in other areas such as trade.⁵²

Promising policy initiatives if they come to fruition

Belgium has proposed different medium-to-long-term prevention policy initiatives that if implemented, could help stem CRSRs. These initiatives signal political will but lack concrete implementation. For example, the defense sector has called for putting ‘the climate crisis and its multiplying effects’ at the center of Belgium’s ‘security environment’.⁵³ This was first highlighted in the ‘2019 Security Environment Review’.⁵⁴ The Defense Minister echoed the report in her 2020 policy orientation speech by mentioning the importance of monitoring the impacts of climate change on the security of fragile regions.⁵⁵ In addition, she stressed the link between climate change and migration and between climate change and terrorism, within regions of geopolitical interest such as the Sahel and the Middle East.⁵⁶ In 2021, the link between climate and security was made explicit in the ‘Security Environment 2021-2030 report’.⁵⁷ In that report, climate change is understood as a ‘threat multiplier’, and alongside environmental degradation and scarcity of resources, is seen to represent a clear security threat with both individual and societal impacts.⁵⁸ Climate change is mentioned throughout as a potential driver for conflict in other regions, especially in combination with other factors such as food insecurity or demographic growth.⁵⁹

In addition, Belgium has identified six thematic as well as a number of geographic priorities for 2021 in peacebuilding.⁶⁰ The former include ‘Support for efforts that aim to mitigate the effects of climate change on the safety of people, particularly the most vulnerable populations’.⁶¹ The latter are aligned with Belgium’s development approach.⁶² As such, the Sahel and the Great Lakes

⁵² Wilmès, S., *Exposé d’Orientation Politique: Affaires étrangères, Affaires européennes, Commerce extérieur et Institutions culturelles fédérales*, DOC 55 1610/019 (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique: Brussels, 5 Nov. 2020) <<https://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/55/1610/55K1610019.pdf>>.

⁵³ Belgian Defence (note 24).

⁵⁴ Belgian Defence (note 24).

⁵⁵ Dedonder, L., *Exposé d’Orientation Politique: Défense*, (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique: Brussels, 4 Nov. 2020) <<https://www.lachambre.be/doc/flwb/pdf/55/1610/55k1610017.pdf#search=%22doc%2055%201610/017%20%2055k%20%3Cin%3E%20keywords%22>>.

⁵⁶ Dedonder (note 54).

⁵⁷ Criekemans et al. (note 1).

⁵⁸ Criekemans et al. (note 1).

⁵⁹ Criekemans et al. (note 1).

⁶⁰ Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs, Peacebuilding grants, Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/peace_and_security/conflict_prevention_and_peacebuilding>, accessed 16 Nov. 2021.

⁶¹ Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs (note 59).

⁶² European External Action Service, *Concept on EU Peace Mediation*, (Dec. 2020) <https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eeas_20201336_working_document_on_concept_on_eu_peace_mediation.pdf>.

Regions are top priorities, along with Syria and Iraq.⁶³ However, there are no explanations on how the thematic will be implemented.

Initiatives that need fine-tuning

Belgium has adopted a range of policy initiatives related to climate change, including long-term, medium to long-term and short-term tools, that lack explicit links to CRSRs and require fine-tuning to respond to them. For example, Belgium's 2013 National Law on Development Cooperation requires the integration of protecting the environment and natural resources as a cross-cutting topic in all development projects.⁶⁴ The integration is implemented through three main objectives: mainstreaming of climate and environmental issues; needs-based environmental support to partner countries; seeking coherence among the different development cooperation policies, both at national and European level.⁶⁵ The Law focuses on environmental protection more broadly, but could address CRSRs specifically.

Belgium's development policy is supported by its climate finance, which focuses mainly on climate adaptation in Africa.⁶⁶ While not specifically addressing CRSRs, it is used more broadly to 'respond to different expectations of developing countries'.⁶⁷ Thus, Belgium's climate finance could be finetuned by increasing the quality of climate finance specifically targeting climate vulnerable conflict contexts.

Belgium also developed a short-term rapid response mechanism, called B-FAST, which requires fine-tuning to respond to CRSRs. B-FAST aims at offering a rapid emergency aid in the event of natural or manmade disasters in other countries.⁶⁸ Three requirements condition the use of B-FAST: the scale of the disaster must prevent the aid services of the affected countries to provide the required assistance; the affected country must seek aid from Belgium or from the international community; and there must be no armed conflict in the

⁶³ Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs (note 59).

⁶⁴ Moniteur Belge, *Loi Relative à La Coopération Belge Au Développement Du 19 Mars 2013, Parue Au Moniteur Belge Le 12 Avril 2013 et Telle Que Modifiée Par La Loi Du 10 Décembre 2013*, Belgian law of 12 April 2013 (Moniteur Belge: Brussels, 23 Dec. 2013) <<https://www.acodev.be/sites/default/files/ressources/loicoopdev2013-coordonnees-dec2013-b.pdf>>.

⁶⁵ Coopération Belge au Développement, *Note Stratégique: L'environnement Dans La Coopération Belge Au Développement*, (Direction Générale de la Coopération au Développement et Aide Humanitaire: Brussels, 28 Apr. 2014) <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/Strategy_note_Environment.pdf>.

⁶⁶ FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, *Special Evaluation of the Belgian Development Cooperation/SEO*, (FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation: Brussels, Sep. 2021) <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/ade_ses_climate_finance_evaluation_final_report_volume_i-main.pdf>.

⁶⁷ Interview, Senior Official, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Cooperation, 2nd Dec. 2021.

⁶⁸ Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs, B-FAST, Royaume de Belgique - Affaires étrangères, Commerce extérieur et Coopération au Développement, <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/about_the_organisation/specific_services/b-fast>, accessed 28 Oct. 2021.

affected regions.⁶⁹ The last condition seems contradictory to responding to CRSRs which tend to be most severe in conflict-affected countries.⁷⁰

III. Belgium's priorities and strategies on climate-related security risks in the EU

At European level, Belgium seeks to strengthen the coordination and leadership role of the EEAS regarding climate and security and apply existing knowledge from other organizations, such as the UN, to the EU. In addition to supporting the EEAS, Belgium seeks to increase 'capacity building in partner countries and in the EU', specifically in fragile regions such as the Sahel. Furthermore, the country pays particular attention to biodiversity and the protection of natural resources.⁷¹ Belgium's main strategy is to 'reinforce the EU institutions in their capacity and their coordinating role'.⁷²

Knowledge and evidence building

Complementing 'policy-supporting-research' initiatives at national level, Belgium is pushing for improved knowledge and evidence gathering on climate and security at EU-level. One interviewee said that the EU should be 'a convener for good practices, and divulge, and help grow expertise on this topic'.⁷³ Belgium considers expertise, grassroot experience, and conceptual clarity on the topic necessary for further policy development.⁷⁴ Specifically, Belgium 'encourages the coordinating role of the EEAS in increasing capacity in data collection and coordination'⁷⁵ and in integrating the results in proposals on conflict prevention or crisis management. One interviewee argued that the EEAS should involve the Member States in building knowledge and evidence 'to avoid duplication'.⁷⁶

To facilitate knowledge and evidence building in the Council, Belgium does not call for a specific working group on climate and security, but prefers integrating it into the Council's conflict prevention work.⁷⁷ While the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is currently responsible, one interviewee

⁶⁹ Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs (note 67).

⁷⁰ von Uexkull, N. and Buhaug, H., 'Security implications of climate change: A decade of scientific progress', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 58, no. 1, SAGE Publications Ltd (1 Jan. 2021).

⁷¹ Interview, Junior Official, Permanent Representation of Belgium in the European Union, 16.12.2021.

⁷² Interview, Junior Official, Permanent Representation of Belgium in the European Union, 16.12.2021.

⁷³ Interview, Senior Official, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Cooperation, 2.12.2021.

⁷⁴ Interview, Senior Official, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Cooperation, 2.12.2021. Interview, Junior Official, Permanent Representation of Belgium in the European Union, 16.12.2021.

⁷⁵ Interview, Junior Official, Permanent Representation of Belgium in the European Union, 16.12.2021.

⁷⁶ Interview, Junior Official, Permanent Representation of Belgium in the European Union, 16.12.2021.

⁷⁷ Interview, Junior Official, Permanent Representation of Belgium in the European Union, 16.12.2021.

stressed the difficulties this brought with it, because of competing immediate external crises and a heavy workload tied to current events.⁷⁸

Collaboration with the EEAS and the European Commission

Belgium supported the EEAS' *Concept for an Integrated Approach to Climate Change and Security* published in October 2021. However, Belgium initially preferred a 'higher-level document', akin to Council Conclusions.⁷⁹ The 'Concept' is a working document, not legally binding that provides guidance. Nonetheless, Belgium sees it as an opportunity to put the link between climate and security on the agendas across relevant working groups and committees in the Council.⁸⁰ Furthermore, it provides a shared and clear definition of what the topic 'climate and security' implies that can guide national policies.⁸¹ Regarding the integration of environmental and climate-related concerns, and environmental advisors in CSDP missions and operations, Belgium did not have a 'strong position'.⁸² According to one interviewee, the country is waiting on the first results on this initiative to draw conclusions, but it 'welcomed the proposal'.⁸³

In the climate and defence realm, Belgium has strongly supported the *Climate and Defence Roadmap*, described by one interviewee as 'very detailed and very good [...] with specific goals and means, and [clarity] who is responsible for what'.⁸⁴ Belgium provided input based on its specific national interests and priorities, such as geographic points of interests. Belgium's regional priorities at national level are aligned with regional priorities at the EU level and its 'Global Strategy for Foreign Policy'.⁸⁵ Regarding the Strategic Compass adopted in March 2022, one interviewee described it as 'very strategic and about defence', but not the most promising initiative to address CRSRs.⁸⁶

Cooperation on CRSRs with other Member States

While Belgium does not specifically work with other EU members to address CRSRs, the resource constraints faced by the country could serve as common ground for cooperation. As one interviewee suggested middle-sized countries should pool their limited resources to generate greater expertise and collaborate

⁷⁸ Interview, Junior Official, Permanent Representation of Belgium in the European Union, 16.12.2021.

⁷⁹ Interview, Senior Official, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Cooperation, 2.12.2021.

⁸⁰ Interview, Senior Official, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Cooperation, 2.12.2021.

⁸¹ Interview, Junior Official, Permanent Representation of Belgium in the European Union, 16.12.2021.

⁸² Interview, Junior Official, Permanent Representation of Belgium in the European Union, 16.12.2021.

⁸³ Interview, Junior Official, Permanent Representation of Belgium in the European Union, 16.12.2021.

⁸⁴ Interview, Senior Official, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Cooperation, 2.12.2021

⁸⁵ European External Action Service (note 61).

⁸⁶ Interview, Senior Official, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Cooperation, 2.12.2021

with the EEAS.⁸⁷ In addition, when policy visions differ domestically in Belgian Regions, federal officials have frequently used EU policy to align national policy makers. One interviewee confirmed: ‘This has been the policy for decades now, of [moving issues] into the EU.’⁸⁸

IV. Conclusions and outlook

Belgium’s ‘global and multidimensional’ approach to peace and security seeks to include human, economic and environmental concerns into foreign, security and development policies. To achieve this, Belgium relies on knowledge and evidence building, as well as climate diplomacy in bilateral and multilateral fora.

While there are promising initiatives to mainstream the link between climate change and security at national policy level, several relevant initiatives lack an explicit link to CRSRs. The political will to address climate and security exists, but implementation of concrete projects to stem CRSRs lags behind. Indeed, various policy strategies hold potential, such as the peacebuilding thematic priority on mitigating climate change, or the monitoring of climate change impacts on the security of fragile regions. But operationalization of the rhetoric recognizing the links between climate change and security risks (and hence mainstreaming efforts at the implementation level) is in its early stages.

In the international sphere, Belgium has mostly been active on climate and security in the UNSC and seeks to bring lessons from UN initiatives into the EU. Belgium favors greater leadership by the EEAS on developing initiatives to stem CRSRs in the EU. It supported the ‘Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security’ and views the ‘Climate Change and Defense Roadmap’ as useful in responding to the CRSRs. In the future, it hopes for closer dialogue with NATO, ‘especially with climate and defense’ and with the UN on climate and security.⁸⁹

It will be interesting to follow to what extent Belgium focuses on responding to CRSRs during its 2024 Council Presidency.

⁸⁷ Interview, Belgian Expert, 18.1.2022.

⁸⁸ Interview, Belgian Expert, 18.1.2022.

⁸⁹ Interview, Junior Official, Permanent Representation of Belgium in the European Union, 16th Dec. 2021.

FRANCE'S RESPONSES TO CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS

DOMINIK REHBAUM AND SIMONE BUNSE

I. Introduction

In the run-up to the French Presidential elections in April 2022, thousands of protesters rallied the cities under the slogan “Paix, climat, même combat” (Peace and climate, the same struggle).¹ Although the link between climate and security is gaining increasing momentum in both public and policy debates, France has long struggled to address the relationship between climate impacts, human security and the deterioration of social stability.

The national security concept of France has traditionally emphasised hard security issues.² The French White Paper on National Security in 2008 was the first strategic policy document to introduce a comprehensive understanding of security, explicitly recognising the long-term effects of global warming and the deterioration of the biosphere as amplifying the environmental crisis.³ However, neither the White Paper in 2008 nor the most recent White Paper on national security in 2013 explicitly linked climate change to national security.

Yet only since the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP21), the French government and explicitly the defence ministry has begun to gradually increase its ambitions and commitment to address climate-related security risks through the sustainable defence strategy (2016-2020) in the areas of environmental safety and protection. The election of President Emmanuel Macron in 2017, who had relied on climate action as an important pillar of his presidential campaign, provide the public debate on climate and security with further impetus.⁴ By recognising the impact of climate change as creating regional vulnerabilities and destabilisation in the 2017 review of the national security strategy⁵ and supporting the climate and security agenda within the United Nations Security Council (USNC), France succeeded in positioning itself as a military leader on combatting CRSRs.⁶

¹ Tens of thousands march in climate protests across France, France 24, <<https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220312-tens-of-thousands-march-in-climate-protests-across-france>>, accessed 31 Mar. 2022.

² Liberti, F. and Blain, C., ‘France’s National Security Strategy’, *Elcano Royal Institute*, vol. Working Paper 3/2011.

³ Major, C., ‘The French White Paper on Defense and National Security’, , vol. 3, no. 46 (2008).

⁴ Emmanuel Macron vows climate action as French president, Climate Home News, <<https://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/05/08/emmanuel-macron-vows-climate-action-french-president/>>, accessed 29 Apr. 2022.

⁵ Understanding the Implications of France’s Strategic Review on Defense and National Security, <<https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-implications-frances-strategic-review-defense-and-national-security>>, accessed 31 Mar. 2022.

⁶ *The World Climate and Security Report 2021*, (International Military Council on Climate and Security: June 2021) <<https://imccs.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/World-Climate-and-Security-Report-2021.pdf>>.

2 FRANCE CASE STUDY

While France subsequently spearheaded military cooperation on climate-related security risks (CRSRs), notably through the Climate Change and the Armed Forces Initiative launched at the Paris Peace Forum in 2021, policy mainstreaming beyond the military sphere remain limited. Despite publishing a comprehensive strategy on vulnerabilities to crises and resilience (2017-2021), most of France's development initiatives failed to mainstream climate and security issues. Similarly, France refrained from advancing CRSRs throughout its Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) as a priority agenda point beyond the adoption of the strategic compass.

The following analysis maps France's policies and policy initiatives on climate-related security risks. Although France has repeatedly emphasised its ambition of leading global actions on climate and security concerns, most of its strategic assessments only imply the climate and security link without specific qualification or explanation. As a consequence, mainstreaming efforts across different policy domains remain incomplete. In light of the growing momentum for advancing CRSRs both in the public and the policy debate, France should move from reactive to concrete preventive policy tools to advance climate and security mainstreaming both nationally and in the global arena.

II. France's national policies and initiatives to respond to climate-related security risks

Based on the National Strategy for Sustainable Development⁷ and the first action plan on the environment, the French Ministry of Defence has addressed the issue of climate and security in 2002.⁸ In doing so, France was among the first countries to tackle environmental issues in the area of military procurement and operational capabilities. The publication of the first sustainable development report of the defence ministry in 2008 explicitly linked several actions to climate change, including carbon footprints on pilot sites and energy management objectives. Furthermore, the national sustainable development strategy (2010-2013) advanced generalisation of carbon assessment and energy audits of state sites under the "Grenelle 1" law⁹ and the French White Paper on national security in 2008 acknowledged the consequences of climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁰

Although France sought to advance the discussion on CRSR, it mainly emphasised the impact of climate change on the operability of the French armed forces in climate-sensitive environments. Yet only the prospect of hosting the

⁷ Stratégie nationale de développement durable 2003-2008. Récapitulatif. Editions des rapports 2002 à 2009. - Temis - Ministère de l'Environnement, de l'Énergie et de la Mer, <<http://temis.documentation.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/document.html?id=Temis-0055105>>, accessed 29 Apr. 2022.

⁸ Asencio, M. et al., *Réflexion stratégique sur le changement climatique et les implications pour la défense.*, (July 2011) <<https://www.frstrategie.org/web/documents/publications/autres/2011/2011-taithe-irsem-changement-climatique.pdf>>.

⁹ Premier Ministre, *La Stratégie Nationale de La Développement Durable (2010-2013)*, 1er rapport au Parlement (Délégue interministérielle au développement durable: Oct. 2011) <www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/sndd>.

¹⁰ Présidence de la République, *The French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, (Odile Jacob Publishing Corp: 2008) <<https://media.nti.org/pdfs/15-Fr.pdf>>.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2015 (COP21) fostered new momentum about advancing climate and security cooperation beyond the French national military perspective.¹¹ Ahead of the COP21 summit in 2015, France hosted the first international conference of defence ministers and high officials on the implications of climate change on defence policy.¹² Subsequently, the French armed forces developed environmental risk analysis capacity, engaged in regional and international dialogue bodies and supported scientific research programmes on climate-security.

Above all, the defence ministry launched the Observatory on Defence and Climate in 2016 to cover climate change issues related to security and raise awareness on climate impacts on defence missions through risk mapping and joint international studies. In the Prevention, Resilience and Sustainable Peace Strategy in 2018,¹³ the ministry of foreign affairs defines climate-related and environmental factors both as part of the problem and the solution to fragile and conflict situations. Moreover, the 2021 ministerial strategy for the preservation of biodiversity of the armed forces underlines how the irrevocable loss of ecosystems exacerbates existing tensions between countries, regions, and populations and even generates new conflicts around scarce resources.¹⁴ Thus, the Observatory's work helped France to gradually integrate CRSRs throughout both its domestic and international climate engagement.¹⁵

France has been vocal in advancing the link between climate and security at the UNSC, calling the “the fight against climate change and for the protection of the environment [...] a matter of peace and security” and hence an important part of the Council's mandate.¹⁶ At the same time, France engaged in several cooperation initiatives on greening the armed forces, for example at the Munich Security Conference in 2018 as well as the Paris Peace Forum in 2021.¹⁷ More recently, the French ministry of the armed forces has emphasised effective ecological management through cooperation with biodiversity stakeholders in the strategy for the preservation of biodiversity.¹⁸ In this regard, the Minister of the armed forces explicitly reiterated the link between defence and the environment by highlighting that “tomorrow's conflicts will be catalysed and

¹¹ French Senior Expert, informal virtual conversation concluded on 14 Apr. 2022.

¹² Climate Security in the Western Indian Ocean | IRIS, <<https://www.iris-france.org/notes/climate-security-in-the-western-indian-ocean/>>, accessed 19 Apr. 2022.

¹³ Oulaye, É. et al., *Prevention, Resilience and Sustainable Peace (2018-2022) A Comprehensive Approach to the Fragilization of States and Societies*, (French Ministry for European and Foreign Affairs: 2018).

¹⁴ Le ministère des Armées, *Stratégie Ministérielle de Préservation de La Biodiversité À l'horizon 2030*, (Centre media du ministère des Armées: Sep. 2021) <https://www.lifeterrainsmilitaires.fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Ministere-des-Armees_La-premiere-strategie-de-preservation-de-la-biodiversite-du-ministere-des-Armees-1.pdf>.

¹⁵ DGRIS, Ministry of the Armed Forces, 'Defence and Climate: France is Committed', (DICOd: 2018).

¹⁶ Emmanuel Macron speech at the United Nations Security Council on climate-related risks to international peace and security in 2021.

¹⁷ French Senior Expert, informal virtual conversation concluded on 14 Apr. 2022.

¹⁸ Le ministère des Armées, 'Stratégie ministérielle de préservation de la biodiversité À l'horizon 2030', (Centre media du ministère des Armées: 2021), <https://www.lifeterrainsmilitaires.fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Ministere-des-Armees_La-premiere-strategie-de-preservation-de-la-biodiversite-du-ministere-des-Armees-1.pdf>.

4 FRANCE CASE STUDY

amplified by the consequences of ecosystem degradation and climate change” at the IUCN Congress in Marseille.¹⁹

France further concentrated its international CRSRs cooperation initiatives on the Indo-Pacific.²⁰ Chairing the South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting (SPDMM) in 2021, France prioritised climate and security aspects²¹ and during its membership of the FRANZ Agreement on Military cooperation or the Pacific Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group (QUAD). The Sahel region presents the second French geographic priority for addressing CRSRs. Despite several concrete projects on sustainable development and food security such as the Great Green Wall initiative, however, most of France’s efforts in the Sahel merely consist of climate forecasting elements and lack explicit references of CRSRs. While most of the above efforts contribute to mainstreaming the link between climate and security, almost all of them share an exclusive military lens on climate and security issues. Apart from the French overseas territories and departments, the sources of climate-related insecurities emerge exclusively from outside France mainland territory, referring to vulnerable or conflict-affected regions of the world. France thereby frames climate change as a source of instability in the Global South with repercussions for international stability.

Although France has recently advanced CRSRs through a military lens on the global arena, mainstreaming efforts across various French ministries remain rather limited. The partial and somewhat incoherent CRSRs mainstreaming efforts throughout French foreign and development policy initiatives are further exacerbated by the highly centralised political system. As the commander in chief of the armed forces, the French President often furthers more military perspectives on cross-dimensional topics. As a consequence, other ministries have struggled to address CRSRs through a human security perspective and various foreign and development policy tools lack explicit and coherent CRSRs aspects.²² The following Table summarises key policy initiatives France has, is proposing or could fine-tune in order to address CRSRs across policy domains.

Table 1. France: Relevant Policy Initiatives to address CRSRs table

Policy	Initiative	Explicit link to CRSRs	Used	Proposed	Required fine-tuning	Type of Policy Response
Foreign Policy	Bilateral climate-security engagements					
	• Australia-France Environmental Risk Mapping for the Indian and the Southern Oceans (AFinti program)	Yes	Yes	-	implementation of research projects	knowledge-building
	• Franco-Japanese working group on the Indo-Pacific and Maritime Dialog	Yes	Yes	-	-	medium to long-term adaptation

¹⁹ ‘Florence Parly dévoile la stratégie ministérielle de préservation de la biodiversité’, Armée et Biodiversité, 15 Sep. 2021, <<https://www.lifeterrainsmilitaires.fr/florence-parly-devoile-la-strategie-ministerielle-de-preservation-de-la-biodiversite/>>.

²⁰ Guittou, A., Durbec, N. and Pontoni, M., *France and Security in the Indo-Pacific*, (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy: May 2019) <www.defense.gouv.fr>

²¹ French Senior Expert, informal virtual conversation concluded on 14 Apr. 2022.

²² French Senior Expert (note 21).

	UN peacekeeping and military missions					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS): France emphasised CRSRs throughout its 2022-2022 Chairmanship 	Yes	Yes	-	requires further action points	medium to long-term adaptation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> France supports integrating climate and security aspects in peacekeeping mission, especially the MINUSMA mission throughout Resolution 2480 	Yes	-	Yes	requires pro-active mainstreaming and concrete action points	medium to long-term adaptation and reaction
	United Nations Security Council (UNSC)					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Member of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security and support for the Climate-Security Mechanism through JPO 	Yes	Yes	-	pro-active French engagement	long-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> co-initiator of the Arria Formula on Climate Change (2017), the Informal Expert Group (IEG) and the Open Debate on Climate and Security (2020) 	Yes	Yes	-	requires concrete action points	long-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> France supports making climate change a permanent item on the UNSC agenda 	Yes	No	Yes	needs political will implementation	awareness raising
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> President Macron proposed creating a United Nations Climate Security Envoy 	Yes	No	Yes	needs political will implementation	long-term prevention
	French Climate Ambassador <ul style="list-style-type: none"> primary focus on UNFCCC negotiations 	Partially	Yes	-	climate security not prioritised	medium-term prevention
Security/ Defence	Domestic Strategies on climate-security					
	Sustainable Defence Strategy (2016-2020) of the Ministry of the Armed Forces <ul style="list-style-type: none"> preserve environments and territories, eco-design and control the environmental footprint of infrastructure and equipment 	Yes	Yes	-	requires more comprehensive implementation with a rather long-term effect	medium to long-term adaptation
	Strategy for Biodiversity Preservation of the Ministry of Armed Forces (2021) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MAF-EU LIFE Défense Nature 2mil (2012-2017), LIFE La Valbonne (2019-2026), LIFE Gouvernance et Information NaturArmy (2019-2023) 	Yes	Yes	-	foreign policy dimension could be strengthened	medium to long-term prevention adaptation
	Multilateral climate-security diplomacy and initiatives					
	Australia-France-New Zealand FRANZ Agreement on Military Cooperation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> cooperation initiative in the South Pacific on humanitarian and maritime surveillance 	Partially	Yes	-	-	short to medium-term reaction and adaptation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5+5 Defence Initiative (South-Western European and North African Countries) on security and defence issues in the Western Mediterranean 	Partially	Yes	-	climate security dimension could be strengthened	medium to long-term adaptation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> International Conference on “Defence and Climate: What are the Stakes?” in 2015 	Yes	Yes	-	requires concrete actions	long-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Climate Change and the Armed Forces Initiative at the Paris Peace Forum (2021) 	Yes	Yes	-	requires implementation	long-term adaptation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pacific Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group (QUAD) to strengthen security and coordination on maritime surveillance 	Partially	Yes	-	link/French role could be further strengthened	medium-term adaptation
	Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	Partially	Yes	-	French role and climate security	medium to long-term adaptation

6 FRANCE CASE STUDY

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> cooperation on maritime security, support for peacekeeping operations training centres and transnational crime 				dimensions should be strengthened	
	South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting (SPDMM) on defence engagement and regional cooperation	Yes	Yes	-	-	medium-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIVI KUAKA Programme Early Warning Alerts for Cyclones 	No	Yes	-	strengthen climate and security link	medium-term prevention
	France wants to support climate and security cooperation at the Indo-Pacific Command's Pacific Environment Security Forum <ul style="list-style-type: none"> proposed a Security Information Fusion Centre in the Indian Ocean (IFC-IOR) 	Yes	No	Yes	requires concrete action points	medium to long term-prevention
Development Policy	Domestic Strategies on Climate Related Security Risks					
	AFD strategy on vulnerabilities to crises and resilience (2017-2021) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minka Peace and Resilience Fund as a part of France's 3D strategy (Prevention, Resilience and Sustainable Peace) 	Yes	Yes	-	could benefit from further CRSR streamlining	medium to long-term adaptation
	National Maritime Space Security Strategy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> explicitly recognised the link between climate change and maritime security Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) 	Partially	Yes	-	requires concrete action points	medium to long-term prevention
	Multilateral Development Initiatives					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adapt' Action: Addressing Climate Impacts Together (AFD) 	No	Yes	-	climate-security mainstreaming	long-term adaptation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pacific Initiative for Adaptation and Biodiversity (KIWA Initiative) by France, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and EU The Great Green Wall Accelerator across the Sahel-Sahara Strip French-Indian International Solar Alliance (ISA) and the French/World Bank Solar Risk Mitigation Initiative 	No	Yes	-	requires CSRS mainstreaming	medium to long-term adaptation
Conflict Prevention/ Peacebuilding	Early Warning and Conflict Prevention					
	Climate Risk and Early Warning System (CREWS) to integrate multi-risk warning systems in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS)	Partially	Yes	-	link to CRSR could be strengthened	short to medium-term prevention
	Group of Friends of the Environment at the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)	Yes	Yes	-	Depends on the organisation's functionality	medium-to-long-term prevention
Disaster Risk Management/ Crisis Management	Civilian-Military cooperation in disaster management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> France engages in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) as a part of operational missions of the military 	Yes	Yes	-		short to medium-term reaction
Research	Climate and Security Research					
	Climate and Defence Observatory of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MAF) and Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CEMS: Climate Change Evaluation Methodology for Military Camps 	Yes	Yes	-	Streamlines and gives political momentum	knowledge-building

	Research projects during the French Presidency of the 5+5 Defence Initiative for the Western Mediterranean and SPDMM Presidency	Yes	Yes	-	requires concrete action plans	knowledge-building
	International Military Council on Climate and Security (the Hague)	Yes	Yes	-	-	
Migration	N/a: In December 2020, France recognised its first climate refugee in December 2020. While policy documents recognise climate refugees, it does not seem to be a priority entry-point.	na	na	na	na	na
Issue emphasis	Energy Resilience, Training and Equipment Adaptation of the Armed Forces, Maritime Spaces (EU Level)					
Regional emphasis	Overseas Territories, Indo-Pacific (specifically South-East Asia, Pacific Islands and the Indian Ocean), Sahel and Mali, Arctic					

Source: Authors' own compilation.

Note: Dark green colouring represents a strong and explicit link to CRSRs while light green denotes a weaker link. Gold indicates that the respective policy tool could potentially integrate CRSRs, however, the link is not yet made specifically.

The summary table illustrates that while France addresses CRSRs through various policy angles and multilateral initiatives, most of the policy initiatives explicitly linked to climate and security are deployed through a military or defence lens. Furthermore, France lacks concrete policy tools that mitigate CRSRs in the short to medium-term. Instead, the vast majority of initiatives only seek to adapt to CRSRs in the medium to long-term. Here, the most promising policy tools relate to military cooperation, especially in the Indo-Pacific, and France's engagement in the USNC. While France has launched several promising research projects on CRSRs since the Paris Agreement, many of the findings must now be translated into concrete action points. Overall, explicit climate and security mainstreaming across foreign and development policy appears to be less consistent and coordinated than in the defence policy realm. In this respect, several of the findings are discussed in more detail.

First, the only responses to CRSRs that might show short-term effects are civil and military cooperation missions to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). In this regard, the military cooperation arrangement between Australia, France and New Zealand (FRANZ) coordinates disaster reconnaissance and relief assistance in the Pacific, for instance through post-natural disaster rescue operations and military cooperation related to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).²³ Moreover, the Climate Risk and Early Warning System (CREWS) on integrating multi-risk warning in least developed countries and small island developing states can prove effective on warning about climate-related risks in the short term. However, both initiatives lack explicit mainstreaming of CRSRs and require further finetuning.

Second, the most promising medium-term adaptation initiatives are related to the Prevention, Resilience and Sustainable Peace strategy of the French development agency (AFD). The Minka Peace and Resilience Fund supports

²³ Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires, France's Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, France Diplomacy - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, <<https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/photos-publications-and-graphics/publications/article/france-s-partnerships-in-the-indo-pacific-apr-2021>>, accessed 28 Apr. 2022.

the AFD's commitment to sustainable peace, climate and social cohesion through projects in crisis or violent conflict-affected regions, namely the Sahel region, countries around Lake Chad, the Central African Republic, as well as in the Middle East.²⁴ It serves as a financing means to tackle the root causes of crises, dedicated to medium to long-term financing operations in region that are affected by crisis or violent conflict. In Lebanon, the AFD has led the post-flood emergency action of the Crisis and Support Centre (CDCS) and finances risk prevention projects.²⁵ The Kivi Kuaka programme presents another promising medium-term prevention initiative. The early warning project seeks to contribute to human security in the Indo-Pacific by preparing people and armed forces for climate-induced natural catastrophes through studying the possible behavioural responses of birds to cyclones, earthquakes and tsunamis.²⁶

Third, the most promising long-term adaptation initiatives on CRSRs are primarily in the military and defence realm. France has pursued tools to green their armed forces and ensure their operability in climate-sensitive areas over the past two decades. The sustainable defence strategy after the Paris Agreement further refined these efforts, focusing on eco-friendly military equipment and dual technology innovations related to materials and sustainable energy consumption.²⁷ More recently, France sought to advance military cooperation on CRSRs throughout multilateral defence initiatives. After organising the first international conference on "Defence and Climate" in 2015, the "Climate Change and the Armed Forces" initiative at the Paris Peace Forum in 2021 presents the most promising multilateral cooperation initiative on climate change and defence issues.²⁸ Next to the armed forces of the United States and the United Kingdom, France is among the countries that published climate change evaluation methodologies for military camps (CEMS).²⁹ While France currently implements the methodology in military camps in Western Africa, it seeks to cooperate with its partners on advancing lessons learned and sharing best practices on climate-sensitive defence policy.³⁰

The most promising medium to long-term prevention initiatives explicitly linked to CRSRs relate to France's engagement in the United Nations Security Council. As a permanent member of the UNSC (P5), France co-initiated the Arria Formula on climate change, the open debate climate and security and actively participates in the Group of Friends on Climate and Security as a discussion platform for tackling CRSRs. Moreover, France co-established the UNSC Informal Expert Group (IEG) on Climate and Security to support the

²⁴ Minka Peace and Resilience Fund - 2020 Activity Report, <<https://www.afd.fr/en/ressources/minka-peace-and-resilience-fund-2020-activity-report>>, accessed 26 Apr. 2022.

²⁵ Mothes, J.-B., Development for Peacebuilding: Four Years of Crisis and Conflict Response, *Défis Humanitaires*, <<https://defishumanitaires.com/en/2021/05/31/minka-development-fund/>>, accessed 28 Apr. 2022.

²⁶ Guitton, Durbec and Pontoni (note 20).

²⁷ DGRIS, Ministry of the Armed Forces (note 15).

²⁸ Ministère des Armées and Paris Peace Forum, Joint Statement on Climate Change and the Armed Forces, <<https://parispeaceforum.org/en/initiatives/the-armed-forces-pledge-to-reduce-their-impact-on-the-climate/>>, accessed 28 Apr. 2022.

²⁹ DGRIS, Observatoire Défense & Climat, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, *Climate Change Evaluation Methodology for Military Camps*, .

³⁰ French Policy Officer, Ministry of the Armed Forces, informal virtual conversation concluded on 26 April 2022.

Council in developing a more systematic approach to CRSRs.³¹ It is also among a group of countries that argues for making climate change a permanent item on the UNSC agenda. In this respect, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed creating of an official UN Climate Security Envoy.

In the UNSC discussions, France underlined the importance of integrated and multidimensional peacekeeping operations. In the UNSC discussion on the situation in Mali in June 2019, the French Ambassador stressed the importance for the United Nations and local governments to “fully consider the impact of climate change [...] even further develop the climate and security agenda within the Council.”³² France further recognises the necessity of reducing the environmental footprint of military and peacekeeping operations, encouraging the UN departments of Peace Operations and Operational Support to consider climate aspect in the deployment and planning of operations.³³ Yet, CRSRs have not consistently featured throughout its interventions in the UNSC. Although France has encouraged the Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) to advance the mandate of the MINUSCA mission in the Central African Republic, climate change has not featured in these discussions.³⁴ At the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), France has launched the Group of Friends of Environment to recognise the close connection between the environment and security and strengthen cooperation on environmental issues as a part of conflict prevention and building neighbourly relations.³⁵

France has recently widened the scope and actions of military initiatives through the 2021 Strategy for Biodiversity Preservation of the Ministry of Armed Forces, dedicating 3,6 million Euro of the annual budget to tackle deterioration of ecosystems which could exacerbate tensions and generate new conflicts.³⁶ In this regard, the bilateral Franco-Japanese working group and the Maritime Dialogue in the Indo-Pacific presents another promising medium to long-term adaptation initiative. The priorities of the first session in 2020 included areas of maritime safety and security, climate, environment and biodiversity. Next to joint military exercises, the two countries fostered climate change adaptation through joint projects between their development agencies (AFD-JICA). Moreover, the two countries cooperate on responding to natural disaster, water and energy supplies in South-East Asia.³⁷

Fourth, France supports medium to long-term climate change adaptation initiatives in the Indo-Pacific. With its overseas territories in the Indian and

³¹ Security Council Report, *In Hindsight: The UN Security Council and Climate Change*, (July 2021) <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2021_07_forecast.pdf>.

³² United Nations Security Council Report, *UNSC Report S/PV.8568*, (United Nations: New York, 28 June 2019) <<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N19/199/81/PDF/N1919981.pdf?OpenElement>>.

³³ See Ambassador speech in UNSC. “Reducing the environmental footprint of peacekeeping operations is not only a question of ethics and accountability, but also a matter of cost and efficiency. Often, alternatives to fossil fuels are not only less polluting but also less expensive for an operation than the establishment of heavy logistics chains.”

³⁴ Security Council Report (note 31).

³⁵ Statement on behalf of the Informal Group of Friends of Environment, <<https://www.osce.org/secretariat/430058>>, accessed 1 May 2022.

³⁶ Le ministère des Armées (note 14).

³⁷ Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires (note 23).

Pacific Oceans and more than 7,000 French soldiers in the region, France is compelled to address the regional impacts of climate change.³⁸ Throughout multilateral cooperation formats such as the Pacific Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group (QUAD) and the South Pacific Defence Ministers Meetings (SPDMM), France addresses climate change adaptation in the Pacific oceans. In 2018, the French ministry of the armed forces coordinated a study at the SPDMM on climate change's implications for security and defence in the South Pacific by 2030.³⁹ At the same time, France cooperates with Australia throughout the AFinti Programme, which is an environmental risk mapping for the Indian and Southern Oceans to anticipate climate change's impact in the areas of security and defence.⁴⁰

Yet, most of France's cooperation initiatives in the Indo-Pacific require mainstreaming CRSRs and concrete action points. Although France's Indo-Pacific strategy stipulates tools for "anticipating security risks brought about by climate change" (p.54), the Defence Ministers' Meeting and ADMM+ and ASEANPOL of ASEAN as well as the Pacific Environmental Security Forum have not yet considered CRSRs coherently. In this regard, France's deployment of an International Liaison Officer (ILO) to the Indian Fusion Centre and the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) and creating a Security Information Centre in the Indian Ocean (SIFCIO)⁴¹ constitute promising suggestions.

Fifth, France has various relevant foreign and development policy tools that lack explicit links to CRSRs and require substantial elaboration to increase their effectiveness in climate-sensitive conflict settings. While the AFD's mandate has been extended to Small Island and Developing States (SIDS) for actions related to adaptation to climate change and the protection of biodiversity throughout the strategy on vulnerabilities to crises and resilience, concrete initiatives on CSR remain scarce. The Adapt'Action tool assists countries' capacity building for more resilient development to implement their respective Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) at COP21. As such, concrete projects focus for instance on disaster risk reduction in Côte d'Ivoire or risk prevention and management in the Eastern Caribbean through risk analysis and weather forecasting. Pacific Initiative for Adaptation and Biodiversity (KIWA) seeks to strengthen climate resilience of ecosystems and specifically food security in the Pacific Island Countries. However, like the Great Green Wall Accelerator in the Sahel Sahara Strip or the French-Indian Solar Alliance (ISA), the project would benefit from more systematic CSR mainstreaming. Similarly, France has launched the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) to integrate multi-risk warning systems in LFC and SIDS and subsequently conducted a cooperation event with Germany event at the 2020

³⁸ Guitton, Durbec and Pontoni (note 20). French overseas territories in the region include Mayotte, La Reunion, the French Southern and Antarctic territories, New Caledonia, Wallis & Futuna, and French Polynesia.

³⁹ Climate Security in the Western Indian Ocean | IRIS (note 12).

⁴⁰ Australia's break off from the partnership of trust with France on the Future Submarine Program (FSP) has led both countries to re-evaluate their cooperation priorities.

⁴¹ From the Pacific Fusion Center to the Security Information Fusion Center in the Indian Ocean?, <<https://www.irsem.fr/publications-de-l-irsem/breves-strategiques/strategic-brief-no-11-2020.html>>, accessed 26 Apr. 2022.

Peacebuilding Review. Despite its important impact on climate change foresight, the initiative would benefit from more consistent mainstreaming of CRSRs.

Nonetheless, several shortcomings and contradictions should be pointed out in France's current responses to CRSRs.

Whereas France is commonly considered as one of the most proactive countries to integrate climate issues into their defence and military doctrine and practice,⁴² these efforts are not yet consistently streamlined throughout foreign and development policies. In fact, the majority of the French green military projects will only contribute to long-term climate change adaptation, whereas CRSRs are not yet thoroughly mainstreamed.

Throughout France's engagement on climate change and defence, most policy initiatives represent either short-term reactions or medium to long-term adaptation strategies. Although such approaches are valuable and important for responding to French military challenges, they fail to address security issues in the near future. Instead, the root causes and consequences of climate-related impacts on human security and viable paths for societal instability should be priorities through mitigating climate-related insecurity.

Although French President Emmanuel Macron has been outspoken in recognising the link between climate and security at the UNSC, for example by proposing an official UN Climate and Security Envoy, this engagement is yet to translate into concrete actions. While France supported various initiatives on climate and security as a permanent member of the UNSC, it has usually left it to other non-permanent members to advance the climate-security agenda, for example Germany and Ireland during their non-permanent memberships.

III. France's Priorities and Strategies on Climate-Related Security Risks in the EU

At the European level, France prioritises cooperation with international partners.⁴³ France's chief strategy to mainstream climate and security relates to implementing the EEAS roadmap on climate change and defence. While the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2022 committed to "prioritise better incorporation of their impact of climate change and environmental issues into humanitarian action," CRSRs are not explicitly mentioned in the programme.⁴⁴ Instead, the main focus is on achieving climate neutrality in the Union by 2050 and adopting the Strategic Compass, which invites member states to develop national action plans on climate security. In their trio presidency programme, France together with Sweden and the Czech Republic pledged to consider "cross-border dependencies and vulnerabilities, new risks as well as climate change related impacts, and address increasing

⁴² van Schaik, L. et al., 'Military responses to climate change', *The Clingendael Institute* (Mar. 2020).

⁴³ French Policy Officer, Ministry of the Armed Forces, informal virtual conversation concluded on 26 April 2022.

⁴⁴ Programme of the Presidency - French Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2022, French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, <<http://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/programme/programme-of-the-presidency/>>, accessed 1 May 2022.

challenges in the area of crisis management and critical infrastructures' resilience."⁴⁵ Furthermore, the three countries committed to making climate diplomacy a central feature of the EU's foreign policy agenda. However, they refrained from making CRSRs an explicitly priority.

Cooperation with the European Commission and the EEAS

Overall, France relies on the Climate Change and Defence roadmap⁴⁶ to guide its strategic priorities and national actions on the topic. In line with France's overall environmental agenda points of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, adopting the carbon adjustment mechanism and the so-called mirror clauses, the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union prioritised adopting the strategic compass to advance climate security mainstreaming across the European Union. As the Strategic Compass invites all EU member states to develop national strategies, the Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (DGRIS) together with the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs currently translates the strategic compass into a national climate security adaptation strategy for the armed forces.⁴⁷ In doing so, all French ministries were invited provide their input on the implementation on the national strategy, suggesting improved CRSRs mainstreaming efforts across the French ministries.⁴⁸

Beyond its focus on the strategic compass, France has likely provided input and supported the Concept for an Integrated Approach to Climate Change and Security. It further supports the Commission's climate diplomacy efforts.⁴⁹

Since 2007, France coordinates the Energy Operational Function (EOF) project within the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), diversifying the sources of operational energy of inter-allied camps and integrating energy into the planning and conduct of joint operations.⁵⁰ France further participates in the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (SEDSS) by the European Agency for Defence (EAD) and initiated the Defence Infrastructure Service's (SID) ENSSURE project on decarbonising energy needs while preserving operational capacity.

France aims to advance the visibility and activities of the European Union in the Indo-Pacific. More specifically, it seeks to implement an ambitious EU strategy based on the EU's joint communication on the Indo-Pacific.⁵¹ In this

⁴⁵ Trio Programme - French Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2022, French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, <<http://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/programme/trio-programme/>>, accessed 1 May 2022.

⁴⁶ European External Action Service, *Climate Change and Defence Roadmap*, (Council of the European Union: 9 Nov. 2020) <<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12741-2020-INIT/en/pdf>>.

⁴⁷ French Policy Officer, Ministry of the Armed Forces, informal virtual conversation concluded on 26 April 2022.

⁴⁸ French Policy Officer (note 47).

⁴⁹ This needs further verification with French Policy Officers in the foreign affairs ministry.

⁵⁰ David, A. and Frédéric, P., *Rapport d'Information Dérèglements climatiques et conflits*, 3813 (Enregistré à la Présidence de l'Assemblée nationale : 27 Jan. 2021) <https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/rapports/cion_def/115b5054_rapport-information#>.

⁵¹ Joint communication on the Indo-Pacific | EEAS Website, <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-indo-pacific_en>, accessed 1 May 2022.

context, France specifically aims to promote EU partnerships with regional organisations such as the Indian Ocean Commission, the Pacific Community and the Pacific Island Forum.⁵²

Biodiversity Preservation

Beyond macro-level strategic policy documents, France cooperates with the European Union on funding biodiversity preservation actions. The Financial Instruments for the Environment (LIFE - L'Instrument Financier pour l'Environnement) co-finances projects on European ecological sites that benefit from the Natura 2000 classification. The LIFE Défense Nature 2mil (2012-2017) was the first European project on conserving biodiversity of French military sites and fostered a national and European network linking the army with managers of natural areas. Subsequently, the LIFE NaturArmy project (2019-2023) implements military side methods integrating biodiversity by applying Natura 2000 regulations on military land. It sets out to create a biodiversity group in the DEFNET army network, developing a European intervention strategy from the Federation of Conservatories of Natural Spaces and the Ministry of the Armed Forces, awareness and training programmes for the army and training schools for future military executives.

Cooperation with other European Union Member States

Together with the United States, the United Kingdom and other European member states, France often leads humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. The climate crisis is going to augment their frequency, which puts delivering military assistance during fires, hurricanes, or other natural disasters under stress.⁵³ The challenging coordination among the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom after Hurricane Irma on the Caribbean in 2017 serves as a prominent example. France should thus foster flexible cooperation to better coordinate their capabilities with its partners.

Furthermore, France cooperates with Germany and Italy on preventing violence and reducing irregular migration throughout the EU's high-level dialogue with Niger. It further co-organised an event on greening humanitarian responses in the context of forced displacement of populations with Norway and Jordan during the first Refugee Forum.⁵⁴ Reducing fuel consumption of the joint French-Italian FREMM programme (Frégate Européenne Multi-Missions or Frigate Europee Multi-Missione) serves as another example on how France wants to integrate climate change in defence matters.⁵⁵

⁵² Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires (note 23).

⁵³ Gemeine, F. et al., *Intégration des enjeux climato-environnementaux par les forces armées étrangères*, Rapport d'étude N°15 (Observatoire Défense & Climate, DGRIS, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique : 2021).

⁵⁴ Reference

⁵⁵ Security, M. and Team, D. E., 'FREMM Design: A Success in Modern Naval Development', *Maritime Defence Monitor*, 6 Apr. 2021, <<https://msd-mag.com/2021/04/articles/ship-design-technologies/22530/fremm-design-a-success-in-modern-naval-development/>>.

IV. Conclusions and Outlook

The French defence ministry was among the first European militaries to work on green defence, namely the armed forces' impact on the environment. In particular the adoption of the Paris Agreement and the creation of the Climate and Defence Observatory gave the work on CRSRs additional impetus in the military and defence realm. In this respect, France remains a vocal and leading actor on addressing climate and defence at the international level. The climate change and the armed forces initiative serves as a prominent example for the French leadership on green defence.

However, the analysis has demonstrated that France still lacks a clear and decisive mainstreaming process on CRSRs. Despite initial attempts to include CRSRs in French foreign and development policy, such as the AFD's strategy on vulnerabilities to crises and resilience, the link is often rather implied than explicitly emphasised. Instead of effective short to medium-term mitigation strategies, France's main attention lays hereby on long-term defence adaptation initiatives on CRSRs. Furthermore, territorial assessments confined to French overseas department and territories has not yet translated into understanding the potential adverse implications of its engagement for others. Only focusing on one specific kind of climate change impact risks neglecting other aspects, but it rather requires cross-dimensional strategies to address the root causes of the climate-related impacts on human security.

In order to build on the current momentum and mainstream emerging risks of climate change for security more systematically in ongoing policy activities, France offers several promising entry points for cooperation and finetuning. The engagement in the Indo-Pacific could serve as a promising entry-point to share lessons learned with other European countries. Moreover, France's focus on foresight in the Sahel region could be extended to explicitly include CRSRs and advance civil-military cooperation to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) in response to natural disasters and other climate-related insecurities. Lastly, security and defence cooperation on climate-related insecurities presents the most promising short-term entry point for EU member states to advance their efforts addressing CRSRs.

GERMANY'S RESPONSES TO CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS

SIMONE BUNSE

I. Introduction

Germany added human security, including concerns about climate change, environmental degradation and the spread of disease, to its traditional security concept in the 1990s.¹ Yet, not until its 2016 Whitepaper did climate change feature explicitly among risks to Germany's national security policy and started to be mainstreamed across foreign, development, defense and security policies.²

Some regard climate action during Angela Merkel's 16-year chancellorship as lackluster.³ Others point to her reputation as 'Climate Chancellor' based on her leadership committing the EU to concrete climate and energy targets by 2020 under the 2007 German Presidency of the Council or securing a global climate treaty and international climate finance.⁴

By the 2021 election, pressure to address human security risks related to climate change mounted from three sources. First, devastating floods in July 2021 killing over 140 people moved climate-related human security into focus.⁵ Second, a ground-breaking Constitutional Court ruling in April 2021 rejected parts of the 2019 Federal Climate Change Act for irreversibly off-loading the emission reduction burden to future generations violating plaintiffs' fundamental freedoms.⁶ Third, the Fridays for Future movement pushed climate action to the top of the political agenda.⁷

Merkel responded by promising a net reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 65 per cent below 1990s levels by 2030 (up from the EU target of 55 per

¹ Nieberg, T., Human Security, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Kurzdossiers, <<https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdossiers/164896/human-security>>, accessed 10 Nov. 2021.

² Federal Ministry of Defence, *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, (Federal Ministry of Defence: 13 July 2016) <<https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/111704/2027268/2016%20White%20Paper.pdf>>.

³ Loss, R. and Busse, C., 'Why Germany lost its way on climate policy – European Council on Foreign Relations', ECFR, 14 Oct. 2020, <https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_why_germany_lost_its_way_on_climate_policy/>.

Germany is currently not on track to meet its emission reduction targets. European Commission, *Commission Staff Working Document, Assessment of the Final National Energy and Climate Plan of Germany, SWD(2020)*, 904 final (European Commission: 14 Oct. 2020)

<https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/default/files/documents/staff_working_document_assessment_necp_germany_en.pdf>.

⁴ <https://www.aicgs.org/2021/08/aicgs-asks-what-is-angela-merkels-climate-policy-legacy/>

⁵ Chazan, G., 'Floods drive climate to heart of German election campaign', *Financial Times*, 17 July 2021, <<https://www.ft.com/content/7e4ab1bd-b3dd-49bc-b903-166eb4c45977>>.

⁶ The Economist, 'A court ruling triggers a big change in Germany's climate policy', *The Economist*, 8 May 2021, <<https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/05/08/a-court-ruling-triggers-a-big-change-in-germanys-climate-policy>>.

⁷ Interview, Senior German official, 21.10.2021.

2 GERMANY CASE STUDY

cent) and greenhouse gas neutrality by 2045.⁸ Since her party's electoral defeat in September 2021, the left-leaning Social Democrats have formed a coalition government that includes the Green Party, which will lead Germany's foreign ministry, a newly formed ministry for the economy and climate protection, and the ministries for agriculture and environmental conservation.⁹ With the nomination of a state secretary and special envoy for international climate action in 2022, climate security is expected to gain prominence in national and international policymaking.¹⁰ Since the Russian invasion in Ukraine in early 2022, calls have mounted to accelerate Germany's transition to renewable energy sources, reduce dependency on Russian fossil fuels and pay attention to climate security.¹¹

This analysis maps German policies and initiatives on climate-related security risks (CRSRs). It shows that Germany has sought to 'mainstream the idea that climate change poses a security risk in [its] ministries' and anchor climate change firmly on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agenda.¹² Mainstreaming efforts are not only visible at the policy level, but also at the program implementation level where a number of initiatives with an explicit focus on CSRs can be identified.

Germany also favours framing climate change as a security issue in the EU. It supported the European External Action Service (EEAS) in the development of the 2021 Integrated Concept on Climate Change and Security and the Commission in incorporating climate security in the EU's Post-Cotonou Agreement. The Strategic Compass, launched during Germany's 2020 EU Presidency, is seen as key to generate a common understanding among Member States of security challenges to Europe, including CSRs.¹³

II. Germany's national policies and initiatives to respond to climate-related security risks

Germany pursues an integrated approach to climate change. The government sees climate change not only as an environmental problem, but also as a development and security challenge requiring cooperation in early crisis

⁸ The Climate Action Tracker rates German overall climate action as "Insufficient". According to its projections Germany needs to reduce emissions by at least 69% below 1990 levels by 2030 to meet its Paris Agreement obligations. See: Climate Action Tracker, Climate Action Tracker, Germany, <<https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/germany/>>, accessed 10 Nov. 2021.

⁹ Nugent, C., 'How Germany's New Government Plans to Be the Greenest One Yet', *Time*, 26 Nov. 2021, <<https://time.com/6124079/Germany-government-green/>>.

¹⁰ Interview, Senior German Official, 16.9.2021. Interview, Senior German Official, 21.10.2021. Berger, M., 'Speech by German State Secretary Miguel Berger', Speech at the The Challenges Annual Forum Day 1, Berlin, 1 Dec. 2021, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMDwO4r556o&list=PLbc6S3n4LMHHeDiNHbIZrABQrYkJNwZgt>>.

¹¹ <https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/germany-aims-get-100-energy-renewable-sources-by-2035-2022-02-28/>

¹² Interview, Senior German official, 13.10.2021.

¹³ Interview, Senior German official, 21.10.2021. Scazzieri, L., 'Can the EU's Strategic Compass steer European defence?', *CER Bulletin*, vol. Oct/Nov. 2020, no. 134 (30 Sep. 2020).

warning and prevention, humanitarian aid and development cooperation, and stabilization and peacebuilding.¹⁴ Germany's defense minister called the effects of climate change 'a central challenge for global stability and security'.¹⁵ Hence, climate change features in national security strategies, conflict prevention guidelines or climate diplomacy reports by the ministries of Foreign Policy, Development Cooperation, and Defense.¹⁶

Government guidelines explicitly recognize that climate change can contribute to state failure, violent conflicts, and migration.¹⁷ They describe it as a threat to peace, stability, and sustainable development.¹⁸ Climate change is linked to an increased risk of humanitarian crisis, resource scarcity (drinking water and food in particular), shrinking habitats, migration (particularly of people from small island states or coastal areas), conflict and instability.^{19,20}

Other specific climate-related challenges Germany pays particular attention to are: the threat of rising sea levels to mega cities (especially in Asia); conflicts of interest between major powers over resources and trade routes (for example in the Arctic); and power shifts away from fossil fuel exporters to hydrogen economies.²¹

To reduce countries' vulnerability to the negative effects of climate change, Germany pursues policy initiatives spanning bilateral and multilateral climate diplomacy in the foreign policy realm, crisis monitoring, training, and restructuring in security and defense, and climate finance and local resilience building in the development realm. Furthermore, Germany funds disaster risk and crisis management and climate insurance projects, as well as early warning tools and research on climate and security. The latter includes the Climate Security Expert Network (CSEN) a hub for research on the linkages between climate and security run by the Berlin-based think tank Adelphi, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) and the annual Berlin Climate and Security Conference. The Foreign Ministry launched a Global Climate Security Risk and Foresight Assessment at the 2021 edition of the conference.²²

¹⁴ Deutscher Bundestag, *Leitlinien Der Bundesregierung – Krisen Verhindern, Konflikte Bewältigen, Frieden Fördern*, Drucksache 18/12813 (Deutscher Bundestag: 19 June 2017) <<https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/18/128/1812813.pdf>>.

¹⁵ Whermann, B., 'German military needs to adapt to momentous climate change challenges – defence minister', *Clean Energy Wire*, 6 Oct. 2020, <<https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/german-military-needs-adapt-momentous-climate-change-challenges-defence-minister>>.

¹⁶ See, for example, White Paper on German Security and the future of the Bundeswehr (2016), Conflict Prevention Guidelines (2017) and the evaluation of their implementation (2020), Climate Diplomacy Report (2019), National Sustainability Reports (2018 and 2021), and the BMZ 2030 Development Report Strategy (2020).

¹⁷ Deutscher Bundestag (note 12).

¹⁸ Deutscher Bundestag (note 12).

¹⁹ Deutscher Bundestag (note 12).

²⁰ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Reform Strategy BMZ 2030*, (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development: 2020) <<https://www.bmz.de/en/development-policy/reform-strategy-bmz-2030>>.

²¹ Federal Foreign Office, *Climate Diplomacy Report*, (Federal Foreign Office: Dec. 2019) <<https://climate-diplomacy.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/AA%20Climate%20Diplomacy%20Report%202019.pdf>>.

²² 'Climate Security Expert Network', Climate Security Expert Network, , <<https://climate-security-expert-network.org/>>, accessed 10 Nov. 2021. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Berlin Climate and Security

4 GERMANY CASE STUDY

Similarly, the German Defense ministry has financed studies on the security implications of climate change. Prevention is given clear priority.

The following Table summarizes key policy initiatives Germany has, is proposing or could fine-tune to address CRSRs across different policy areas. It identifies the time horizon of policy initiatives, as well as whether they prevent or react to CRSRs. Short-term policy responses are those expected to show their effects within three years, medium-term policy responses within three to five years and long-term policy responses after five years.

Table 1. Inventory of relevant policies and initiatives promoted and implemented by Germany responding to climate-related security risks

Policy	Tool/Initiative	Explicit link to CRSRs	Used	Proposed	Required fine-tuning	Time Horizon and Type of Policy Response (Prevention vs. Reaction)
Foreign Policy	Bilateral climate-security engagements/diplomacy					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Somalia, Nigeria or Northern Mali: Finding local solutions to climate-related conflict issues Mali, Chad and Niger: Financing, together with the EU a project that involves local stakeholders in improving security and climate resilience through 'peaceful management of natural resources' 	X	X	-	-	Short-to-medium term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Green Central Asia: Cross-border dialogue on climate, environment and security issues in Central Asia and Afghanistan 	X	X	-	-	Short-to-medium term prevention
	Bilateral Climate Partnership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> China 	-	X	-	Sensitize to climate and security link	Medium to long-term prevention
	Bilateral Climate and Energy Partnership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> US 	-	-	X	Sensitize to climate and security link	Medium to long-term prevention
	Multilateral climate-security diplomacy and initiatives in the UNSC					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Open Debates, Arria Formula Meetings Group of Friends Creation of IEG Financial support of the Climate Security Mechanism 	X	X	-	-	Long-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Make climate change a permanent item on the UNSC agenda Regular SG reports on CRSRs to the UNSC Add climate security issues in country-specific reports to the UNSC 	X	-	X	-	Long-term prevention

Conference Kicks Off Major New Risk Assessment, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, <<https://www.pik-potsdam.de/en/news/latest-news/berlin-climate-and-security-conference-kicks-off-major-new-risk-assessment>>, accessed 10 Nov. 2021.; 'Berlin Climate Security Conference', Berlin Climate Security Conference, 2021, <<https://berlin-climate-security-conference.de/>>.

GERMANY CASE STUDIES 5

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advisory role for Peacebuilding Commission to UNSC on climate security concerns 					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN environment and security expert (Somalia) Pilot project determining the impact of climate change as a conflict factor (Horn of Africa) 	X	X	-	-	Medium-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Special Envoy for Climate Security improve early warning, local capacity, mediation 	X	-	X	-	Medium-to long-term prevention
Security/ Defense	<p>Early Crisis Recognition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Informal inter-ministerial coordination to identify threat scenarios 	X	-	X	Institutionalize dialogue between diplomatic, peacebuilding and the hard security sector	Short-to-medium term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advanced analytics and expertise sharing by state and non-state actors to improve early crisis recognition Crisis monitoring, training and restructuring of Germany's armed forces 	X	-	X	-	Short-to-medium term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Green technology by the military 	X	-	X	-	Medium-to-long-term prevention
Development Policy	<p>Local initiatives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security, peacebuilding and disaster risk management to increase resilience in Chad 	X	X	-	-	Short-to-medium-term prevention
	<p>Bilateral Climate and SDG Partnerships/Global Partnerships²³</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> E.g. Pakistan, India, Peru E.g. Brazil 	-	X	-	Sensitize to climate and security link	Medium to long-term prevention
	<p>Nexus and Peace Partners</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Africa MENA 	-	X	-	Integrate goal to stem CRSRs and coordinate initiatives and priority countries with Foreign Ministry	Medium-term prevention
	Climate Finance (Adaptation)	-	X	X	Increase quality of climate finance by targeting it specifically to the most climate vulnerable, fragile, conflict contexts	Medium-term prevention
	Climate Impact Assessments	-	X	-	Incorporate conflict sensitivity	Medium-term prevention
Conflict Prevention/ Peacebuilding	<p>Early Warning</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate Risk and Early Warning System (CREWS) Forecast-based mechanisms for risk financing in the humanitarian system 	-	X	-	Feed results of forecasts into foreign and security policy discussions	Short-term reaction

²³<https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/99794/31a9e8ca939cc1ea45e68886f74acdd0/globale-partner-en.pdf>;
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/997532/2029828/6a4f226c3e696417d110e0651ea26d77/2022-05-02-joint-declaration-ger-ind-data.pdf>;
https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/29026/a73123a6094263264e921881d6b76f90/Materialie520_BMZ%202030%20reform%20strategy;
https://www.kas.de/documents/259121/13447291/DE_kas_ai_02-2021_ertl_web.pdf/c038ac75-7026-b7d3-e6e9-ffbb0fa801c?version=1.0&t=1625213427060

6 GERMANY CASE STUDY

Disaster Risk Management/ Crisis Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate and Disaster Risk Finance/Insurance 	-	X	-	Target to conflict-affected or fragile context	Short-term reaction
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening of the Indian Ocean Rim Association in Disaster Risk Management, Maritime Security and Blue Economy (i.e. sustainable use of the maritime ecosystem)²⁴ 	X	X	-	-	Short-to-medium-term reaction
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partnerships to strengthen resilience against environmental disasters 	-	X	-	Target to conflict-affected or fragile contexts	Medium-term prevention
Research	Climate and Security Research <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSEN, Adelphi, PIK, Berlin Climate and Security Conference, etc. 	X	X	-	-	Knowledge building (long-term prevention)
Migration	N/a: Migration policy is not seen as a tool to stem CRSRs but acts as a driver to address them. Germany does currently not grant asylum to climate refugees, for example. However, some of its development initiatives seek to help governments in affected areas to develop human rights-based approaches to climate-related mobility issues. ²⁵	X	na	na	na	na
Issue emphasis	Water and food scarcity, sea level rise, migration, resource conflicts, power shifts away from fossil fuel exporters					
Regional emphasis	Contradictory: While the Foreign ministry stresses the Sahel and Central Asia, most climate finance goes to adaptation in middle income countries and the development reform foresees a shift away from Asia.					

Source: Authors' own compilation.

The most promising initiatives to stem CRSRs are those that do not only focus *explicitly* on CRSRs, are *currently* implemented, *cut across/integrate* different policy dimensions but also have a *short-to-medium* term impact to respond to risks already visible.

Most promising short-to-medium-term policy initiatives

The most promising short-to-medium-term initiatives Germany is currently pursuing to address CRSRs include a regional political dialogue program on climate, environment and security in Central Asia and Afghanistan in response to increasing water shortages, droughts and desertification²⁶ and bilateral engagements with Somalia, Nigeria and Northern Mali to find local solutions to climate-related conflict issues.²⁷ The former is accompanied by research designed for policy makers to apply 'international instruments for security-relevant environmental and climate policy [...] more confidently and quickly' and ensuring 'successful methods [are] used across borders and regionally.'²⁸ The political dialogue is further complemented by media and

²⁴ <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/80297.html>

²⁵ <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/67177.html>

²⁶ <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/93896.html>

²⁷ Deutscher Bundestag, *Leitlinien Der Bundesregierung – Krisen Verhindern, Konflikte Bewältigen, Frieden Fördern*, Drucksache 18/12813 (Deutscher Bundestag: June 19, 2017) <<https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/18/128/1812813.pdf>>.

²⁸ <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/93896.html>

communication work to enhance cooperation and trust between the participating countries. These initiatives are encouraging because they explicitly recognize the link between climate change and security, are currently undertaken by Germany and allow for short-to-medium-term prevention of CRSRs in conflict contexts. In Mali, Chad and Niger, Germany further finances, together with the EU, the so-called FREXUS Project which involves local stakeholders in attempts to improve security and climate resilience through ‘peaceful management of natural resources’.²⁹ The emphasis on local stakeholders and resilience building is central to another project in Chad co-financed with the EU aimed at improving food security, local governance, access to basic services, local conflict management structure, as well as ‘sustainable safeguarding of natural and productive raw materials in the Sila region’ by improving disaster risk management.³⁰

Noteworthy is also a project aimed at strengthening the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to enhance disaster risk management, maritime security and economic concepts for sustainable use of the maritime ecosystem (i.e. blue economy) in the Indian Ocean Rim.³¹ To stem the risks climate change poses to Indian Ocean security, the program includes hiring local specialists on the different dimensions of the project (disaster risk, maritime security, sustainability), establishing a blue economy working group, and regional maritime security training.³² Given its focus on disaster risk management, this initiative appears a short-to-medium term reactive policy. However, if a strengthened IORA contributes to enhancing regional stability, it can also help prevent CRSRs.³³

Promising medium-to-long-term policy initiatives

Germany’s most relevant longer- or medium-term international prevention policy is its engagement on CRSRs in the UNSC. Germany is part of a group of countries advocating for climate change as a permanent item on the UNSC agenda. It has pursued this goal during its elected UNSC memberships through two (out of ten) ministerial level open debates on climate change and security, two (out of six) Arria formula meetings, and the formalization of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security (together with the Pacific Island state of Nauru) - a platform of discussion how to tackle CRSRs.³⁴ Together with nine other

²⁹ Planetary Security Initiative, Climate Security Practice Spotlight - FREXUS project in the Sahel, Planetary Security Initiative, <https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/news/climate-security-practice-spotlight-frexus-project-sahel?utm_source=Adreslijst+PSI&utm_campaign=5e15aa9ae2-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_07_17_08_51_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_bee8b307c4-5e15aa9ae2-79992741>, accessed 10 Nov. 2021.

³⁰ <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/24829.html>

³¹ <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/80297.html>

³² <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/80297.html>

³³ <https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/climate-change-is-the-biggest-threat-to-indian-ocean-security/>

³⁴ Kingdom of the Netherlands et al., *United Nations Security Council Arria-Formula Meeting ‘Water, Peace and Security’*, (UNHQ Ecosoc Chamber, 26 Oct. 2018) <<https://s3-eu-west->

8 GERMANY CASE STUDY

Security Council members (including Belgium, France and Estonia) Germany also created the Informal Expert Group (IEG) of Members of the Security Council on Climate and Security to support the UNSC in generating ‘a more systematic approach to climate-related security risks’.³⁵

Since anchoring discussion about CRSRs in the UNSC, the Foreign Ministry has contributed to fund several concrete initiatives to respond to CRSRs. These include the first UN environment and security expert in the Somalia office, the UN’s Climate Security Mechanism, and a pilot project on CRSRs in the Horn of Africa to determine the impact of climate change as a conflict factor.³⁶

Other initiatives Germany supports politically in the UN are enhanced early warning and risk analyses, local capacity building, and mediation in situations where climate change has triggered resource competition. German proposals have included the creation of a special envoy for climate security, regular reports on CRSRs to the Security Council by the Secretary General, adding climate security issues into country-specific reports to the UNSC, and an advisory role for the Peacebuilding Commission to the UNSC on climate security concerns.³⁷ With these initiatives, Germany seeks to ‘streamline the question of climate and security within the whole UN system’.³⁸

Promising policy initiatives if they come to fruition

Several short-to-medium-term prevention initiatives that explicitly address the link between climate change and security are promising but remain at proposal stage. These include, for example, crisis monitoring and training or restructuring of Germany’s armed forces to enable them ‘to react to the consequences of climate change’ in the defense realm.³⁹

1.amazonaws.com/upload.teamup.com/908040/FeEycdtgSsaof9I39Kpd_Concept-Note%20Arria%20Water%20Peace%20Security.pdf>. ³⁴ Auswärtiges Amt, United Nations: Germany initiates Group of Friends on Climate and Security, German Federal Foreign Office, <<https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/klima/climate-and-security-new-group-of-friends/2125682>>, accessed 3 Aug. 2021. Federal Foreign Office, Climate change – a threat to international security, German Federal Foreign Office, <<https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/klima/group-of-friends-on-climate-and-security/2142038>>, accessed 10 Nov. 2021.

³⁵ Security Council Report, *In Hindsight: The UN Security Council and Climate Change*, (July 2021) <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2021_07_forecast.pdf>.

³⁶ Die Bundesregierung, *Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern. Bericht über die Umsetzung der Leitlinien der Bundesregierung*, (Die Bundesregierung: March 2021,) <<https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2451522/d63bc74e7deedbced83872f674c83eca/210330-umsetzungsbericht-krisenleitlinien-data.pdf>>. Federal Foreign Office (note 19). The UN Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), established in 2018 as a joint initiative by DPPA, UNDP and UNEP, seeks to connect resources and expertise across the UN system to address CRSRs.

³⁷ Given the lack of support from China, Russia, and the US, none of the proposals was approved and to date no resolution on climate security has been adopted. Talmon, S., ‘Germany Fails to Integrate Climate Security Concerns Into the Work of the Security Council’, GPIL - German Practice in International Law, 31 Aug. 2021, <<https://gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/2021/08/germany-fails-to-integrate-climate-security-concerns-into-the-work-of-the-security-council/>>.

³⁸ Berger (note 9).

³⁹ Federal Ministry of Defence (note 2).

Identifying crises early by connecting expertise from national and international, state and non-state actors (including industry and the scientific community), as well as relying on advanced analytics is also stressed in Germany's security and defense policy.⁴⁰ So is the need for enhanced inter-ministerial coordination by the Federal Security Council to identify threat scenarios and coordinate crisis management priorities and interventions accordingly. This may also require more regular institutionalized dialogue between diplomatic, peacebuilding and the hard security sector.

Initiatives that need finetuning

Various relevant foreign and development policy tools lack explicit links to CRSRs. Therefore, they are likely to be less effective in stemming them unless finetuned and addressing CRSRs becomes an explicit objective. Germany's new bilateral climate partnerships and partnerships on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (for example with Pakistan, India, and Peru) do not address CRSRs specifically.⁴¹ Instead, they focus mainly on the implementation of the Paris Agreement and supporting third countries in their transition to climate-neutral economies as well as adaptation efforts.⁴² The same is true for climate cooperation with China and a proposed climate and energy partnership with the USA.⁴³

Although climate and energy, food security, environment and natural resources, together with peacebuilding are core themes in German development cooperation, the climate and security link is not explicit.⁴⁴ Germany's key focus on reducing emissions contrasts with the need to invest in climate adaptation in fragile contexts which one interviewee stressed: 'Tackling climate-related-security risks is a question of adaptation – for mitigation it is too late. So now it becomes an issue of funding adaptation and through funding adaptation to prevent conflict'.⁴⁵ However, increased adaptation funding does not automatically reduce CRSRs. Thus far, many adaptation interventions, even in

⁴⁰ Federal Ministry of Defence (note 2).

⁴¹ Deutscher Bundestag, *Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Lisa Badum, Jürgen Trittin, Magarete Bause, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN - Drucksache 19/27537-*, Drucksache 19/28639 (Deutscher Bundestag: 19 Apr. 2021) <<https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/286/1928639.pdf>>.

⁴² <https://www.bmz.de/en/development-policy/climate-change-and-development>

⁴³ AP News Wire, 'Germany, China to increase cooperation on climate change', *The Independent*, 26 Apr. 2021, <<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/germany-china-to-increase-cooperation-on-climate-change-germany-beijing-berlin-china-united-states-b1837904.html>>. Tänzler, D. and Schulz, K., Summary – A Transatlantic Climate Bridge for Ambitious Climate Protection: Perspectives and Alliances | Climate-Diplomacy, Climate Diplomacy, <<https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/cooperation/summary-transatlantic-climate-bridge-ambitious-climate-protection-perspectives>>, accessed 10 Nov. 2021.

⁴⁴ See: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (note 18).

⁴⁵ Interview, Senior German official, 16.9.2021. See also German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Adaptation to Climate Change*, (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development: Jan. 2021) <https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/57178/a103db7fc20a31d4b898945b15fb0abc/BMZ_adaptation%20to%20climate%20change_en.pdf>.

fragile and conflict-affected situations, ignore maladaptation risks and their potential repercussions for conflict.⁴⁶ Unless they explicitly aim at decreasing CRSRs, they might even contribute to conflict dynamics.

Similarly, partnerships with fragile and least developed countries - the so-called ‘nexus and peace partners’ - mostly in Africa (CAR, Chad, DR Congo, Somalia, South Sudan) and the MENA region (Syria, Lybia, Yemen, Iraq) where Germany seeks to address root causes of conflict and support stabilization – do not mention CRSRs.⁴⁷ At the same time, two of the so-called ‘quality criteria’ underlying Germany’s new direction of development cooperation include environmental and climate impact assessment and conflict sensitivity.⁴⁸ Applying these criteria systematically and simultaneously with the implementation of Germany’s BMZ 2030 reform strategy is a step towards addressing current shortcomings.

Shortcomings and contradictions

Several other contradictions stand out in Germany’s current initiatives on CRSRs:

- German climate finance currently focuses on middle income countries and its new bilateral partnership model seeks to link development cooperation to good governance indicators, countries’ willingness to reform and private investment.⁴⁹ Yet a history of fragility and conflict in poorly governed places is the main predictor of climate insecurity. If a significant part of Germany’s development cooperation with bilateral partners will upon implementation of the 2030 strategy indeed be tied to good governance, it is unlikely to contribute to addressing CRSRs.
- All projects undergo safeguard checks including a peace and conflict assessment and an environmental and climate assessment. However, upon implementation, such risks are not followed up or monitored.⁵⁰
- Although the concept of ‘early warning, early action’ is firmly enshrined in Germany’s policy and specific projects and Germany is one of the members of, and contributors to the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) Initiative delivering early warning systems in least developed countries and small island developing states, it is not clear

⁴⁶ <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2022/other-publications/environment-peace-security-new-era-risk>

⁴⁷ https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/29026/a73123a6094263264e921881d6b76f90/Materialie520_BMZ%202030%20reform%20strategy

⁴⁸ https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/29026/a73123a6094263264e921881d6b76f90/Materialie520_BMZ%202030%20reform%20strategy

⁴⁹ Atteridge, A. et al., Atlas Aid, Detailed profile for Germany to All Recipients for Climate Change (total) during 2015–2019, <https://aid-atlas.org/profile/germany/all/climate-change-total/2015-2019?usdType=usd_disbursement>. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (note 18).

⁵⁰ Informal conversations, Senior German official, 19.11.2021 and Senior German official, 4.5.2022.

that the results are systematically integrated into broader strategic foreign and security policy discussions.⁵¹

- While Germany's Foreign and Defence ministries have relied on alliances and partnerships to strengthen international crisis management and resilience to environmental disasters, and support climate risk insurance schemes, unless such financial tools and funds are specifically targeted for conflict-affected or fragile contexts, they will hardly stem CRSRs effectively.⁵²
- Finally, a lack of inter-ministerial coordination can be identified when it comes to climate security. For example, while the unit at the Foreign Ministry working on climate and security emphasizes Central Asia and the Sahel in their work, the development reform foresees a shift away from Asia.⁵³

Green Party members criticized Merkel's government for lacking a coherent climate and security policy approach and failing to comply with the EU's January 2021 Council Conclusions which called for strengthening and mainstreaming the work on the climate and security nexus.⁵⁴ Despite the narrative of an integrated, preventative approach, the climate security unit at the Foreign Ministry works separately within the ministry and from other ministries, including the ministries in charge of economic cooperation and development. According to one interviewee, the respective ministries responsible for foreign, economic, environmental, and energy affairs, as well as economic cooperation and development have started coordinating activities related to climate security since the Constitutional Court's rejection of parts of Germany's climate laws in 2021 and at secretary of state level and below.⁵⁵

While this informal coordination is promising, greater efforts at ministerial level are necessary to rectify existing contradictions.⁵⁶ Germany's incoming Green Foreign Minister highlighted the need to overhaul current shortcomings where 'every ministry does what they want'.⁵⁷ Initiatives to increase climate competences at Germany's embassies is another positive recent development.

⁵¹ See for example: German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (note 35); Die Bundesregierung (note 27). World Meteorological Organization, 2021, on behalf of Climate Risks and Early Warning Systems (note 39).

⁵² They support, for example, the Central United National Emergency Relief Fund (CERF), the Disaster Relief Fund of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (DREF), and the START fund by the START network of humanitarian agencies. See: Start Network, 'About Us: A New Era of Humanitarian Action', Start Network, <<https://startnetwork.org/home>>, accessed 10 Nov. 2021.

⁵³ Interview, Senior German Official, 13.10.2021. Atteridge et al. (note 36).

⁵⁴ Deutscher Bundestag, *Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Lisa Badum, Jürgen Trittin, Magarete Bause, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN - Drucksache 19/27537* :Council of the European Union, 'Council adopts conclusions on climate and energy diplomacy', Press Release (2021), 25 Jan. 2021, <<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/01/25/council-adopts-conclusions-on-climate-and-energy-diplomacy/>>. Deutscher Bundestag (note 32).

⁵⁵ Interview, Senior German official, 13.10.2021.

⁵⁶ German ministers are semi-autonomous and no formal climate security coordination mechanism was planned by the outgoing government. Deutscher Bundestag (note 32).

⁵⁷ [Time.com/6124079/germany-government-green/](https://time.com/6124079/germany-government-green/)

III. Germany's priorities and strategies on climate-related security risks in the EU

At European level, Germany seeks 'to anchor [its] holistic, networked and prevention-focused approach [to the security dimension of climate change] in the EU's foreign policy'.⁵⁸ In addition to generating Council conclusions, Germany supports embedding climate risks firmly into the EEAS' Global Strategy and the EU Neighbourhood Policy. It advocates for 'a new foreign policy toolbox [...providing] partners with targeted support to deal with the security risks resulting from climate change'.⁵⁹ One interviewee explained: 'Germany wants to make sure climate change not only becomes part of the [EU's] technological and economic policies, but also features in its foreign policy'.⁶⁰

Strategies to mainstream climate security across the EU's foreign and security policy have included using the 2020 German Council Presidency and its trio structure to advance the issue, collaboration with the EEAS and the European Commission, and seeking out like-minded countries to strengthen existing tools or launch new initiatives. Each is examined in turn.

Climate security during the German 2020 Council Presidency: Agenda-setting constraints and progress

The trio-Presidency program which Germany elaborated together with Portugal, Slovenia and the High Representative, stressed a commitment 'to enhance climate action both domestically and through external action'.⁶¹ Africa and the conclusion of the Post-Cotonou Agreement were key priorities.⁶² The trio presidency promised to work towards 'sustained peace and security on the African continent as well as sustainable and inclusive growth, investment, job creation and human development, while at the same time seeking joint and positive solutions to the climate, migration and mobility issues'.⁶³ Furthermore, it pledged to intensify 'intercontinental efforts to fulfil the commitments to the Paris Agreement' and advance the development of the EU's Strategic Compass to facilitate more rapid response in the event of a security crisis.⁶⁴

Attempts to spotlight CRSRs specifically during the German Presidency were derailed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Germany's six-month presidency program 'Together for Europe's recovery' did not explicitly mention climate

⁵⁸ Federal Foreign Office (note 19).

⁵⁹ Federal Foreign Office (note 19).

⁶⁰ Interview, Senior EU official, 8.10.2021.

⁶¹ Council of the European Union, *Taking Forward the Strategic Agenda 18-Month Programme of the Council (1-July - 31 December 2021)*, (Council of the European Union: Brussels, 9 June 2020) <<https://www.eu2020.de/blob/2354332/d2f4bc33ade0af634ae79552060d6332/06-19-pdf-trioprogramme-en-data.pdf>>.

⁶² Council of the European Union (note 50).

⁶³ Council of the European Union (note 50).

⁶⁴ Council of the European Union (note 50).

security.⁶⁵ Objectives in the international realm were somewhat vague stressing Germany's support to the HR and the EEAS. This is in stark contrast to environmental matters, where - as chair - the German Presidency could set very concrete goals (adopting conclusions on the Commission's Circular Economy Action Plan, launching Council conclusions on the new EU Biodiversity Strategy, or concluding deliberation on the draft European Climate Law enshrining climate neutrality into law by 2050).⁶⁶

Nonetheless, the 2020 German Presidency program highlighted the EU's role in implementing the European Green Deal, emphasized the need to raise Paris climate goals, improve national climate contributions, prevent CO2 emissions and avoid carbon leakage to third countries.⁶⁷ In this context, the German Presidency arranged a top-level virtual meeting between the EU (Commission President von der Leyen, President of the European Council Michel and Chancellor Merkel) and China (President Xi Jinping) in September 2020.

Rather than softening China's stance on linking climate and security, climate protection, biodiversity, global health and cooperation in Africa featured heavily.⁶⁸ The EU delegation used the meeting to pressure China to: strengthen its climate commitments, set a climate neutrality goal, discontinue building or financing coal-fired power plants, and speed up the launch of its national emissions trading system. Agreement was reached on a high-level environment and climate dialogue to 'pursue joint commitments on these issues'.⁶⁹

Climate change, energy transition, biodiversity and health alongside peace and security, good governance, economic cooperation for sustainable development, employment and migration were also on the agenda of the October 2020 EU-Africa Summit. However, due to COVID-19, the Summit was postponed to 2021. Nonetheless, Germany could pursue some concrete initiatives to advance climate security at EU level during its Presidency.

⁶⁵ Council of the European Union (note 50).

⁶⁶ While the presidency succeeded in these three efforts, it failed to start negotiations on the EU's 8th Environment Action Program which had also been a Presidency priority.

⁶⁷ Auswärtiges Amt, *Together for Europe's Recovery*, (Federal Foreign Office: 2020) <<https://www.eu2020.de/blob/2360248/e0312c50f910931819ab67f630d15b2f/06-30-pdf-programm-en-data.pdf>>.

⁶⁸ Originally, an EU-China Leaders' meeting had been planned with participation of all EU member states. (See: 'EU-China Leaders' Meeting: Upholding EU values and interests at the highest level', Press Release (2020), 14 Sep. 2020, <<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/09/14/eu-china-leaders-meeting-upholding-eu-values-and-interests-at-the-highest-level-joint-press-release-by-president-michel-president-von-der-leyen-and-chancellor-merkel/>>.

⁶⁹ 'EU-China Leaders' Meeting: Upholding EU values and interests at the highest level', Press Release (2020), 14 Sep. 2020, <<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/09/14/eu-china-leaders-meeting-upholding-eu-values-and-interests-at-the-highest-level-joint-press-release-by-president-michel-president-von-der-leyen-and-chancellor-merkel/>>.

The EU budget: Adopting climate spending targets

The German 2020 Council Presidency's main achievement was finishing the negotiations of the EU's long-term Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) which includes a climate spending target of 30 per cent, 5 per cent higher than the 25 per cent Germany had set as a minimum starting point.⁷⁰ The 30 per cent target applied equally to the EU's new external development financing tool "Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe" (NDICI) – the main financing instrument of EU external action. Its international partnerships address good governance, democracy and human rights, climate change and migration and mobilities.⁷¹ Countries most in need, fragile and crisis struck, are to be given particular priority.

Enshrining Climate Security in EU Development Policy: The Post-Cotonou Agreement

Crucial to mainstream climate security in the EU's development policy was the political deal reached in December 2020 on the Post-Cotonou agreement – a key German priority. It provides the framework of EU cooperation with the Organisation of African Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) for the next 20 years. The deal allowed for the formal conclusion of negotiations (ongoing since 2018) by Portugal in April 2021. Negotiations on the EU's side were led by Jutta Urpilainen, Commissioner for DG INTPA. The German Presidency lend its full political weight to reaching an agreement that covers peace and security, human development, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, environmental sustainability, climate change, and migration.

Climate security features prominently in the overarching protocol, as well as regional protocols on Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. The overarching protocol calls on parties to 'address the security threat that climate change and environmental degradation pose, particularly in situations of fragility and in the most vulnerable countries' and 'develop resilience strategies'.⁷² This is reiterated in the regional protocols, together with mention of adaptation measures to ensure conflict prevention and early warning systems, risks and impact assessments.⁷³

The emphasis on early warning is a recurring theme in Germany's national policy stances, its 2020 Council Presidency program, as well as its positions within the EU's external action more broadly. The wish to mitigate the causes of displacement and irregular migration and develop measures to strengthen 'the

⁷⁰ Federal Foreign Office (note 19). See also Interview, Senior German Official, 21.10.2021.

⁷¹ European Commission, *Global Europe - The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument*, (European Commission: 9 June 2021) <https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/factsheet-global-europe-ndici-june-2021_en.pdf>.

⁷² European Union, *Negotiated Agreement Text Initialled by the EU and OACPS Chief Negotiators on 15th April 2021*, (European Union: 15 Apr. 2021) <https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/negotiated-agreement-text-initialled-by-eu-oacps-chief-negotiators-20210415_en.pdf>.

⁷³ European Union (note 61).

effectiveness of external crisis prevention and crisis management instruments of EU institutions and Member states' plays a key role within this context.⁷⁴

Adapting humanitarian action to climate change

Humanitarian aid is among those instruments. While chairing the Council Working Party on Humanitarian and Food Aid (COHAFA), Germany prioritized 'the role of anticipatory humanitarian action – pre-determined/pre-financed activities that, based on a credible forecast, enable action ahead of crises, in order to save lives and mitigate the impact of crises – and its relevance for pressing global issues like climate change and disaster risk reduction'.⁷⁵ Germany took stock of 'the current state of anticipatory approaches' and held a discussion on the role that Member States and the EU as a whole can play in them. A common EU position on 'anticipatory humanitarian action' was not reached, however.⁷⁶

Advancing the Strategic Compass

In the security realm, the German Presidency's main priority was advancing the Development of the EU's Strategic Compass which seeks to close gaps between rhetoric and action in security and defence.⁷⁷ To do so, the EU's first threat analysis was conducted and presented by the HR in December 2020.⁷⁸ Unlike the development of the 2016 Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, this effort is Member State- rather than Commission-driven. EU Member states now deliberate what the EU 'should - or should not - be able to do in terms of crisis management, capacity building for partner states and protecting the Union and its citizens'.⁷⁹ The process is to be finalized during the 2022 French Council Presidency.

The reasons why Germany considers the Strategic Compass a key operationalizing tool to address climate security concerns were stressed in interviews: '[The Strategic Compass] is a very concrete policy project [...] concerned with operationalizing the EU's Global Strategy. The threats have changed over the years. Climate is part of it and we want to make sure that climate and security are properly reflected in Strategic Compass. Security is also about how we make sure that climate does not become an additional threat factor in international relations. But we should not simply see it as an additional

⁷⁴ Auswärtiges Amt (note 56).

⁷⁵ Council of the European Union, *Work Programme of the German Presidency for the Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA) - July-December 2020*, (Council of the European Union: Brussels, 25 June 2020) <<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9134-2020-INIT/en/pdf>>.

⁷⁶ Council of the European Union (note 64).

⁷⁷ Zandee, D., Stoetman, A. and Deen, B., *The EU's Strategic Compass for Security and Defence*, (Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations: May 2021) <<https://www.clingendael.org/publication/eus-strategic-compass-security-and-defence>>.

⁷⁸ The results are classified, so we do not know to what extent the climate security nexus may features in the analysis.

⁷⁹ Federal Ministry of Defence, *The Strategic Compass: Developing Strategic Principles*, Federal Ministry of Defence, <<https://www.bmvg.de/en/news/the-strategic-compass-5058518>>, accessed 10 Nov. 2021.

threat, we should try to mitigate this threat and explore how. One basket of the Strategic Compass is about resilience, also against climate change, by mitigating climate change, but also through partnerships, to mainstream climate security'.⁸⁰

Furthermore, under the German Presidency agreement was reached on third-state participation in so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects allowing like-minded countries to cooperate in the military domain. Germany hopes the agreement will benefit its attempts to mainstream climate security into EU-NATO relations and provide an entry point to bring climate into security dialogues with the US.⁸¹

Collaboration with the EEAS and the European Commission

Germany's collaboration with the EEAS on CRSRs has, inter alia, consisted in providing input on the Concept for an Integrated Approach to Climate Change and Security published in October 2021.⁸² One interviewee described close working relations with the EEAS: 'The paper had our full support. [The EEAS...] has to aim for consensus [and] knows that they can rely on Germany to push and have strong support from us [on climate security]'.⁸³

Germany does not only see the concept as an opportunity to mainstream the climate and security nexus and shape it in line with its own prevention-focused, networked national approach. It also regards it as an instrument for change at national level, for example to reduce the environmental footprint of foreign security operations.⁸⁴ To address CRSRs, the concept proposes: strengthening the links between early warning, analysis and action; mainstreaming climate and environmental aspects into CSDP missions and operations; deploying environmental advisors; equipping peace mediators with climate expertise; mitigating the negative aspects of climate change on natural and cultural heritage; monitor conflict and climate sensitivity in humanitarian aid funding; taking a human rights based approach to climate change and sensitivity; drawing on experiences from the UN and its Climate Security Mechanism (CSM); and closer cooperation with other multilateral actors.⁸⁵

In terms of cooperation with the Commission, Germany supports the Commission's climate diplomacy efforts, for example by supporting negotiations with China.⁸⁶ However, these contribute to mitigation efforts and are not designed to stem CRSRs.

⁸⁰ Interview, Senior German Official, 21.10.2021.

⁸¹ Interview, Senior German Official, 21.10.2021.

⁸² European External Action Service, *Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security*, (Council of the European Union: 5 Oct. 2021) <<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12537-2021-INIT/en/pdf>>.

⁸³ Interview, Senior German official, 21.10.2021.

⁸⁴ Interview, Senior German official, 21.10.2021.

⁸⁵ European External Action Service (note 71).

⁸⁶ Deutscher Bundestag (note 32).

Cooperation on CRSRs with other Member States

Finally, Germany works with other EU members to address CRSRs. Together with the Netherlands it founded the informal EU Early Warning Early Action Forum to facilitate a twice-yearly exchange on early identification of crises and crisis prevention between EU Member States, as well as the EU institutions and to jointly analyse at-risk countries.

Other initiatives have included the creation of the European Center of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management in Berlin to strengthen civilian crisis management within the EU's CSDP through sharing good practices between its Member States, the EEAS and NATO.⁸⁷ Climate and security is among the Center's priorities.

Noteworthy is also Germany's partnership with Italy and France focused on preventing violence and reducing irregular migration within the framework of the EU's high-level dialogue with Niger.

IV. Conclusions and outlook: Towards comprehensive, networked security to prevent climate risks

Germany's 'comprehensive' security concept seeks to integrate climate change into foreign, security, and development policies. To do so Germany pursues a 'networked' approach relying on partnerships with state and non-state actors at both bilateral and multilateral level.

Despite successful attempts to mainstream the link between climate change and security at both policy and implementation level, several relevant policies lack explicit links to CRSRs. To boost medium-term prevention, for example, Germany's "Nexus and Peace Partnerships" could integrate the goal to stem CRSRs explicitly. In addition, initiatives and priority countries should be coordinated between different ministries. Climate financing should be targeted to the most climate vulnerable, fragile, conflict contexts and the results of early warning systems should be fed into regular dialogues bridging diplomatic foreign policy, development and security actors. Germany's announcement, in June 2021, to increase both the quantity and quality of its climate financing could be a step into this direction.⁸⁸

At international level, most of Germany's initiatives on climate security have centered on the UNSC where discussions are more advanced – if more controversial - than in the EU. At EU level, Germany has tried to mainstream climate security into external action during its 2020 Council Presidency and

⁸⁷ European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management, 'About the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management (CoE)', <<https://www.coe-civ.eu/about>>, accessed 10 Nov. 2021.

⁸⁸ Kowalzig, J., 'G7 Summit: Germany pledges to increase climate finance', The German contribution to International Climate Finance, 15 June 2021, <<https://www.germanclimatefinance.de/2021/06/15/g7-summit-germany-pledges-to-increase-climate-finance/>>. Walsh, S., 'Comprehensive Security to Weather the Storm: Regional Responses to Sustaining Peace in a Changing Climate', Closing Session of Berlin Climate Security Conference, 7 Oct. 2021, <<https://berlin-climate-security-conference.de/bcsc-2021/closing-session-hosted-osce-adelphi>>.

through close cooperation with the EEAS, the Commission and individual member states. The German 2020 Council Presidency fostered agreement on the EU's new MFF and NDICI containing horizontal climate targets of 30 per cent. Working closely with the Commission, it also contributed to the political deal reached on the Post-Cotonou Agreement which enshrines climate security into the EU's development cooperation with OACPS. Germany supported the EEAS' *Concept for an integrated approach on climate change and security* and advancing the EU's *Strategic Compass* and hopes to generate closer dialogue with NATO on climate security. Specific tools to address CRSRs Germany has advocated at EU level include early warning systems and equipping peace mediators with climate expertise.

Despite Germany's advances in mainstreaming the link between climate change and security into national and EU policies and its activism within the UNSC, in terms of concrete domestic policy action important gaps remain. Its national implementation of the Paris Agreement, quantity and quality of climate finance (in terms of targeting the most fragile contexts), as well as coherence of its climate security policy lack somewhat behind its leading discourse. It remains to be seen if the new government, including the Greens, gives CRSRs greater prominence and creates the structures and cross-cutting coordination mechanisms needed to address them at a time when Europe's security crisis triggered by Russia's invasion into Ukraine risks to overshadow climate security efforts.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Informal conversation, Senior German official, 16.9.2021.

IRELAND'S RESPONSES TO CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS

ELISE REMLING

I. Introduction

Ireland's understanding of peace and security challenges is comprehensive and includes environmental and climate aspects.¹ As elsewhere, the country's national security concept has broadened since the end of the Cold War. Security risks from natural disasters, cyber security, pandemics and threats to the states' economy through financial crises were built in over time.² In addition, climate change and increased competition over resources related to climate change have become increasingly recognised in Irish security policy over the past decade and a half.³

While a signatory of the Paris Agreement, and its predecessor the Kyoto Protocol, actual progress on cutting emissions in Ireland has been slow. One interviewee described Ireland as a 'clever laggard' on climate change in the international arena, not pressing forward with new topics or innovative ideas but not blocking them either to avoid becoming unpopular.⁴ The country relies heavily on agriculture, and recent years have seen a state-backed expansion of the national dairy industry.⁵ In Europe, Ireland remains among the worst performing counties on overall climate action. Second last after Malta, it is furthest off to missing set EU targets on emission reductions.⁶ The Climate Change Performance Index 2022 ranks it 22nd in the EU27, seven ranks down from 2021.⁷

¹ Department of Foreign Affairs, *'A Better World', Ireland's New Policy for International Development*, (Government of Ireland: Dublin, 28 Feb. 2019) <<https://www.irishaid.ie/about-us/policy-for-international-development/aboutthenewpolicy/>>, p. 18.

² Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence 2015*, White Paper (2015) <<https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/1b0dc6-white-paper-on-defence/>>.

³ Rather than a formal security strategy, Ireland has a sequence of Green and White Papers on Defence that represent the Government's policy on defence. See Department of Defence, *Green Paper on Defence 2013*, (Dublin, 30 June 2013) <<https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/560177-green-paper-on-defence-2013/>>; Department of Defence (note 1); Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence: Update 2019*, (Dublin, 12 Dec. 2019) <<https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/a519cf-white-paper-on-defence-update-2019/>>.

⁴ Senior Expert 1 on Irish and European defense and environmental policy, informal virtual conversation via Zoom, 5 Oct. 2021.

⁵ Burck, J. et al., *Climate Change Performance Index 2021*, (Germanwatch e.V.: Bonn, 7 Dec. 2020) <<https://ccpi.org/download/the-climate-change-performance-index-2021/>>.

⁶ European Environment Agency, *Trends and Projections in Europe 2020. Tracking Progress towards Europe's Climate and Energy Targets*, EEA Report No 13/2020 (Nov. 2020) <<https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/trends-and-projections-in-europe-2020>>.

⁷ Burck, J. et al., *Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) 2022*, (Germanwatch e.V. and the NewClimate Institute: Bonn, 9 Nov. 2021) <<https://ccpi.org/ranking/>>.

2 IRELAND CASE STUDY

Measures proposed in the first Irish climate strategy in 2000 were never implemented, and climate change only started to play a bigger role in domestic politics when a citizen's assembly on climate change, the replacement of the Minister for Communications, Climate Action and Environment, and a growing domestic school strike movement converged in 2017/2018 and placed climate change more firmly on the Irish agenda.⁸

With the Green Party part of the tripartite government coalition since 2020, Ireland indicated ambition to make a step-change on climate change and transform its position as a real 'climate laggard' to catch up on climate action.⁹ As part of this change, the Government's 2021 Climate Act commits the country to legally binding net-Zero emissions no later than 2050, and to a 51% reduction in emissions by the end of 2030.¹⁰

Some see Ireland's policy change on climate as being motivated not only by concerns over climate change, but also by an ambition to leverage its 'soft power' positions, in the EU and elsewhere.¹¹

The following analysis maps Ireland's positions and initiatives on climate-related security risks (CRSRs). It shows that Irish efforts to mainstream the link between climate and security are in the very early stages. Attention to the topic has so far mainly been rhetorical and real efforts to mainstream the link between climate and security in practice are only beginning. Ireland has made climate-related security risks a focus of its 2021-2022 UNSC elected membership and the country's development cooperation policy has a clear focus on climate change and fragile and conflict-affected contexts. However, these important emphases are not yet brought together effectively in an integrated approach that addresses CSRs systematically across relevant policy domains, including Irish foreign policy/diplomacy, security/defence, development, peace and conflict, and disaster risk reduction/crisis management and migration, nor has Ireland taken efforts to advance climate security debates in international fora beyond the UNSC, such as the European Union.

⁸ Senior Expert 4 on Irish climate policy, informal virtual conversation via Zoom, 22 Nov. 2021.

⁹ Senior Experts 2 & 3 on Irish climate, energy and foreign policy, virtual interview via Zoom, 2 Nov. 2021.

¹⁰ Houses of the Oireachtas, *Climate Action and Low Carbon Development (Amendment) Act 2021*, Act 32 of 2021 (Government of Ireland: Dublin, 23 July 2021) <<https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/bills/bill/2021/39>>; Note that the Irish target refers to a baseline for annual greenhouse gas emissions from 2018, whereas the EU's target of 55% net greenhouse gas emission reductions by 2030 is based on emission levels from 1990s, so the two figures are not directly comparable.

¹¹ Senior Experts 2 & 3 on Irish climate, energy and foreign policy (note 9).

II. Ireland's national policies and initiatives to respond to climate-related security risks

Ireland explicitly recognises the relation between climate change and security.¹² For example, the current Government's Programme declared climate change '*an increasing security threat across the world, and a significant factor in the incidences of war, famine, forced migration and disaster management*'.¹³ However, climate-related security concerns have only become more pronounced on Ireland's foreign policy agenda in the years 2019-2021, ahead of Ireland's UNSC elected membership in 2021-2022.

Interestingly, interest in the topic seems largely driven by four *external* factors. First, were ongoing climate security debates within the UNSC. One interviewee explained that although Ireland '*had a strong platform*' in its development and foreign policy on climate change and protracted crisis, CRSRs as such were '*not articulated before*'.¹⁴

Second, were increasingly alarming scientific insights into the climate crisis from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). A third factor were priorities brought to the table by Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the context of Ireland's bilateral talks during its UNSC campaign; and, fourth, conversations in the European Council around the *Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security*.¹⁵ In addition to these external drivers, one interviewee suggested that Ireland's recent interest in the topic also stems from an *internally* felt need to present a 'good news story' in relation to

¹² Foreign Minister of Ireland Simon Coveney, 'Statement from the Tánaiste and Foreign Minister of Ireland Simon Coveney for the BCSC 2020', Berlin Climate Security Conference 2020, 25 June 2020, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QdaN5uY-LvI>>; Irish Aid, *Minister Brophy Launches Ireland's Climate Finance Report 2019*, Press release (Department of Foreign Affairs: Dublin, 8 Mar. 2021) <<https://www.irishaid.ie/news-publications/press/pressreleasearchive/2021/march/minister-brophy-launches-irelands-climate-finance-report-2019.html>>; Taoiseach Micheál Martin, 'Ireland's National Statement to the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2021', 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA76), New York, 24 Sep. 2021, <<https://www.gov.ie/en/speech/bda36-national-statement-delivered-by-taoiseach-micheal-martin-at-unga/>>; Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, Simon Coveney TD, 'Ireland's Priorities for the UN Security Council, 2021-2022', Speech at the Institute of International and European Affairs, 22 Jan. 2021, <<https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/speeches/speeches-archive/2021/january/irelands-priorities-for-the-un-security-council-2021-2022.php>>; Department of Foreign Affairs, *Press Release: Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney Addresses UN Security Council Meeting on Climate*, Press release (Dublin, 23 Feb. 2021) <<https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-release-archive/2021/february/minister-for-foreign-affairs-simon-coveney-addresses-un-security-council-meeting-on-climate.php>>; Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, Simon Coveney TD, 'Statement at the United Nations Security Council Open Debate on Addressing Climate Related Risks', Speech at the United Nations Security Council Open Debate on Addressing Climate Related Risks to International Peace and Security, 23 Feb. 2021, <<https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-release-archive/2021/february/united-nations-security-council-open-debate-on-addressing-climate-related-risks.php>>.

¹³ Department of the Taoiseach, *Programme for Government: Our Shared Future*, (Dublin, 29 Oct. 2020) <<https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/7e05d-programme-for-government-our-shared-future/>>, p. 115.

¹⁴ Senior Official 1 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, virtual interview via Zoom, 15 Oct. 2021.

¹⁵ Senior Official 1 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 14); Senior Expert 1 on Irish and European defense and environmental policy (note 4).

4 IRELAND CASE STUDY

climate change, as the country's track record on climate change action remains poor.¹⁶

The importance of external drivers in contributing to the national agenda setting on CRSRs does not mean Ireland's interest in CRSRs is disingenuous. In fact, considering the adverse impacts of environmental and climate change on conflict and fragility aligns well with core principles enshrined in national development cooperation policy, such as the country's broader interest in humanitarian assistance, protracted and forgotten crisis and assisting the most in need first.¹⁷ While not proposing any concrete responses to CRSRs, Ireland's two central foreign policy statements mention climate change as a risk to security as part of a broader changing security landscape.¹⁸ They describe climate change as '*a catalyst, exacerbating tensions over land, water, food and energy prices and creating migratory pressures and threatening food and nutrition security and public health*'.¹⁹

When it comes to CRSRs, the concern for Ireland appears to be largely human rights-based, with a focus on poverty reduction and socio-economic development, and not fears that these insecurities will 'spill over' into Ireland. For example, the pathways by which climate change is seen as exacerbating insecurity are '*slow[ing] down economic growth, exacerbat[ing] gender inequality, intensify[ing] fragility, further erod[ing] food security, and prolong[ing] existing and creat[ing] new poverty traps*'.²⁰

The Irish position on CRSRs is distinct in two ways. First, it emphasises the need for *preventative* initiatives on CRSRs rather than reacting and responding to crises after they happen, and on tangible things that can be done. Second, Ireland promotes a *positive* approach to climate-security debates. This means it highlights that addressing climate change can have positive effects on peace and tackling instability.²¹ This is deliberate; '*The debates of climate-security have been conceptual, and divisive. Ireland's approach has been to shift that away from large conceptual debate to more technical, evidence-based, to point out the 'peace dividends of climate action'*'.²²

¹⁶ Senior Expert 1 on Irish and European defense and environmental policy (note 4).

¹⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs (note 3).

¹⁸ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *The Global Island: Ireland's Foreign Policy for a Changing World*, (Government of Ireland: Dublin, Jan. 2015) <<https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebstimedia/ourrolesandpolicies/ourwork/global-island/the-global-island-irelands-foreign-policy.pdf>>; Department of Foreign Affairs (note 3).

¹⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (note 18), p. 42.

²⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs (note 3), p. 10.

²¹ Sinéad Walsh, Climate Envoy & Deputy Director General of Development Cooperation and Africa Division, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Presentation at Closing session: Regional Responses to Sustaining Peace in a Changing Climate', Berlin Climate Security Conference 2021, virtual, 18 Oct. 2021, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RPEjsJjgvCM&list=PL1ArCHLaLKSm2Wvfo85Iuoio0Xe-NYpzS&index=15>>.

²² Senior Experts 2 & 3 on Irish climate, energy and foreign policy (note 9).

Institutionally, the topic of climate security is part of the portfolio of the Climate Unit within the Development Cooperation and Africa Division of the Department for Foreign Affairs, newly established in October 2020.

To build knowledge on CRSRs, Ireland supports a research initiative on CRSRs.²³ This initiative, the Weathering Risk Project, aims to develop ‘*integrated approaches for climate and security risk and foresight assessments in order to facilitate risk informed planning, enhance capacity for action and improve operational responses that promote climate resilience and peace*’.²⁴ This research hold promise to build long-term knowledge and contribute to the prevention of CRSRs.

Due to its relative novelty as an explicit interest on the Irish policy agenda, the topic of CRSRs has not yet evolved into any coherent approach, and the recognition of climate-security interactions has not been systematically integrated into the different foreign, development, security and defense policy realms. It also seems that much of the Ireland’s recent efforts has been on the UNSC. It remains to be seen whether Ireland’s leadership momentum continues beyond its current two-year term on the UNSC, and whether engagement with the topic will be extended to other multilateral fora such as the EU.

The following Table 1 summarises the key policies Ireland has, is proposing or could fine-tune to address CRSRs.

Table 1. Inventory of relevant policies and initiatives promoted and implemented by Ireland responding to climate-related security risks

Policy	Initiative	Link to CRSRs explicit	Used	Proposed	Required fine-tuning	Time Horizon and Type of Policy Response (Prevention vs. Reaction)
Foreign Policy	Bilateral climate-security diplomacy/engagements					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate security no clear bilateral foreign policy priority, some cooperation with Germany, Norway and Niger but mainly around UNSC 	-	X	-	Expand to other bilateral engagements	Medium to long-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate Diplomacy Strategy to include climate security 	X	-	X ^a	-	Medium to long-term prevention
	Multilateral climate-security diplomacy and initiatives in the UNSC					
	UN agenda setting					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Open Debates, Arria Formula Meetings 	X	X	-	-	Long-term prevention	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Like-minded formal and informal groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Group of Friends Informal Expert Group (IEG) of Members of the 	X	X	-	-	Long-term prevention	

²³ Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, Simon Coveney TD (note 12); adelphi and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Supporters of Weathering Risk, <<https://weatheringrisk.org/en/about-us>>, accessed 9 Sep. 2021.

²⁴ adelphi and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), The Project Weathering Risk, <<https://weatheringrisk.org/en/project>>, accessed 20 Dec. 2021.

6 IRELAND CASE STUDY

	Security Council on Climate and Security (2021 co-chair with Niger)					
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make climate change a permanent item on the UNSC agenda • Thematic UNSC resolution on climate and security • Establish a Special Representative of the SG to coordinate the UN's response to climate-related security risks • Regular SG reports on climate and security 	X	-	X	-	Long-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working across established agendas (e.g. UN Women Peace and Security agenda) and with other regional organisations (e.g. African Union) 	X	-	X	Further integrate climate-insecurity into Ireland's own WPS national action plan	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Co-chair of the Informal Expert Group (IEG) on WPS 	-	X	-	Integrate climate security	Long-term prevention
UN peacekeeping and military missions						
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peacekeeping operations must be aware of own environmental footprint as well as environmental drivers of insecurity, environmental strategy for UN missions 	X	-	X	-	Long-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systematic assessment of CRSRs, opportunities and responses in UN peacekeeping operations; integration of climate perspective into special political missions, mediation efforts and peace negotiations to climate-proof settlements 	X	-	X	Could hold promise, Ireland could also integrate demands into own defence forces	Mid-to-long term
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funding UN climate security advisor in South Sudan through the UN Climate Security Mechanism 	X	X ^b	-	-	Medium-term prevention
UN capacity building						
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build UN capacity to analyse and synthesize climate security risks and response opportunities • Train UN and member state staff on climate security risk assessment and management • Enhance the requisite knowledge and capacity within the Mediation Unit of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs • Systematically consider climate-related risks and opportunities across UN early warning, assessment, and planning processes as well as conflict prevention tools, stabilization plans and regional strategies and actions 	X	-	X	-	Medium-to long-term prevention

IRELAND CASE STUDY 7

Security/Defence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Signatory of the Climate Change and the Armed Forces Initiative launched by France at the 2021 Paris Peace Forum²⁵ Limited available information on CRSR specific tools/initiatives 	X	X	-	requires implementation	Long-term prevention
Development Policy	Climate and development finance to Least Developed Countries and fragile states <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate finance (99% for adaptation) Specific focus on countering fragility by reducing poverty, inequality and exclusion Targeted specifically to LDC and fragile places, esp. Africa and SIDS Funding the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) 	-	X	-	Sensitize to climate and security link	Mid-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate-proofing ODA 	-	X ^c	-	Sensitize to climate and security link	Mid-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishment of informal Champions Group on Adaptation Finance 	-	X	-	Sensitize to climate and security link	Mid-term prevention
Conflict Prevention/Peacebuilding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mainstream climate-related security risks into missions Reduce carbon footprint of Irish military 	X	-	X	-	Long-term prevention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) 	-	X	-	Sensitize to climate and security link	Long-term prevention
Disaster Risk Management/Crisis Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> New trust fund for Pacific SIDS through ADB 	-	X	-	Integrate climate-security awareness into programming	Short-to-midterm prevention
Research	Climate and Security Research <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weathering Risk Programme (PIK/adelphi) 	X	X	-	-	Knowledge building (long-term prevention)
Migration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No available information on CRSRs specific tools 					
Issue emphasis	No available information on specific issues in focus/priorities for CRSRs.					
Regional emphasis	In development policy in general: gender equality, reducing humanitarian need, climate action, strengthening governance.					
	No specific regional focus for CRSRs.					
	In development policy in general: focus on LDCs, fragile countries and contexts, especially in Africa, recently also on SIDS.					

ADB = Asian Development Bank; CRSRs = Climate-related security risks; ODA = Overseas Development Aid; PIK = Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; SG = Secretary General; SIDS = Small Island Developing States; UN = United Nations; UNSC = United Nations Security Council

^a Forthcoming in the first quarter of 2022.

^b Announced in mid-2021, no available information on when this will be operational.

^c Forthcoming in the first half of 2022.

Source: Authors' own compilation.

²⁵ <https://parispeaceforum.org/en/initiatives/the-armed-forces-pledge-to-reduce-their-impact-on-the-climate/>

The most promising initiatives to stem CRSRs are those that do not only focus *explicitly* on CRSRs, are *currently* implemented, cut across different policy domains, but have a *short-to-medium* term impact to respond to risks already visible. None of the above mapped initiatives currently used by Ireland fall into this category. In the medium-to-long term, several policy initiatives stand out.

Most promising medium-term policy initiatives

The most promising medium term initiative with an explicit focus on CRSRs that Ireland currently pursues, is providing financial support for a dedicated climate security advisor to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) through the UN CSM.²⁶ Announced in 2021, and modelled on the German support for a Climate Security and Environmental Advisor to the UN Assistance Mission to Somalia (UNSOM), this initiative is encouraging because it strengthens the capacities of UN and other regional organisations working on the ground in this conflict and climate change-affected area to conduct CRSR analysis.²⁷

Promising long-term policy initiatives

Ireland's most relevant longer-term initiatives that address CRSRs preventatively, include the country's efforts in the UNSC. During its current two-year term (2021-2022) as one of the ten non-permanent members, Ireland has vowed to contribute to the work on CRSRs and thereby joins countries that have advocated for climate change as a permanent item on the UNSC agenda for a while.²⁸ As part of this commitment, during 2021 Ireland co-chaired along with Niger the Informal Expert Group (IEG) of Members of the Security Council on Climate and Security.²⁹ Under their co-chairmanship, the IEG hosted meetings on the Sahel and South Sudan, the focus of which was on tangible things UN peacekeeping missions in the region (UNOWAS and UNMISS) are doing to mitigate CRSRs, including integrating local expertise in the missions, better resourcing and increasing skill development.³⁰ This is in line with

²⁶ Senior Official 1 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 14).

²⁷ Sinéad Walsh, Climate Envoy & Deputy Director General of Development Cooperation and Africa Division, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 21).

²⁸ Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, Simon Coveney TD (note 12); Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland on the UN Security Council, <<https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/international-priorities/our-international-partners/united-nations/>>, accessed 15 Nov. 2021; Department of the Taoiseach, *Ireland's Presidency of the UN Security Council*, Press release (Government of Ireland: Dublin, 1 Sep. 2021) <<https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/61587-irelands-presidency-of-the-un-security-council/>>.

²⁹ According to the Minister, this is 'a vital platform for sharing information on the why and how of climate action in the context of building and sustaining peace', see Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, Simon Coveney TD (note 12).

³⁰ Senior Experts 2 & 3 on Irish climate, energy and foreign policy (note 9); Security Council Report, *The UN Security Council and Climate Change*, Research Report 2 (Security Council Report: New York, 21 June 2021) <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/climate_security_2021.pdf>.

Ireland's broader commitment to move to largely conceptual discussions at the UN towards practical approaches to CRSRs.³¹

Ireland, which is part of the informal UN Group of Friends on Climate and Security, has also vowed to '*partner*' with other members on the topic.³²

As part of its UNSC presidency during September 2021, Ireland hosted an Open Debate on the '*Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Climate and Security*' chaired by Taoiseach (head of government) Micheál Martin with the objective to '*deepen substantive awareness of how climate security risks are relevant to the work of the Security Council, and explore what tangible actions can be taken*'.³³

Collectively, all these strategies are efforts to place the topic more firmly onto the UNSC agenda and therefore hold promise to help address CRSRs in the long-term.

Promising policy initiatives, if they come to fruition

Ireland has proposed different medium to long-term prevention policy initiatives that if implemented, hold potential to address CRSRs. In Irish proposals oriented at the multilateral level, '*[t]he emphasis is on early warning and prevention, rather than reacting and responding to crises after they happen*'.³⁴ Ireland has joined calls for appointing a UN special representative on climate and security.³⁵ In addition, Ireland proposes i) the systematic assessment of CRSRs in peacekeeping operations, ii) the integration of a climate perspective into special political missions, mediation efforts and peace negotiations and iii) the systematic consideration of climate-related risks and opportunities in UN conflict prevention efforts.³⁶

Ireland expressed ambition to have a thematic resolution on climate change and security adopted in the UNSC during its presidency.³⁷ Co-authored by Ireland and Niger and modelled on an earlier draft resolution by then-Council member Germany, the resolution eventually failed to be adopted on 13 December 2021 due to a veto from Russia.³⁸

³¹ Senior Experts 2 & 3 on Irish climate, energy and foreign policy (note 9); Senior Official 2 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, virtual interview via Zoom, 14 Dec. 2021.

³² Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, Simon Coveney TD (note 12).

³³ Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, *Open Debate on the Maintenance of International Peace and Security Climate and Security, Thursday, 23 September 2021 08.00, Concept Note*, (Department of Foreign Affairs: New York, 9 Sep. 2021).

³⁴ Senior Experts 2 & 3 on Irish climate, energy and foreign policy (note 9).

³⁵ Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations, 'Annex 24. Statement by the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations', ed. President of the Security Council, *Letter Dated 21 September 2020 from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the Members of the Security Council, S/2020/929* (21 Sep. 2020), p. 48.

³⁶ Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations (note 32), p. 3f.

³⁷ Sinéad Walsh, Climate Envoy & Deputy Director General of Development Cooperation and Africa Division, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 21).

³⁸ The draft resolution received 12 votes in favour, two against (India and Russia) and one abstention (China). It was co-sponsored by 113 member states. See, Security Council Report, *Climate Change and*

Domestically, as part of its Climate Action Plan, Ireland committed to developing a Climate Finance Roadmap and a Climate Diplomacy Strategy in early 2022 [both forthcoming in Q1 2022].³⁹ The Action Plan suggests that CRSRs will feed into the Climate Diplomacy Strategy, which would help complement Ireland's current efforts at the UN level. While there has been some cooperation with Germany, Norway and Niger around efforts in the UNSC, there is no evidence that CRSRs are currently a clear bilateral foreign policy priority for Ireland.⁴⁰ Incorporating climate insecurity into the forthcoming Diplomacy Strategy would be an important step to streamline current efforts.

In addition, Ireland's 2019 Strategy for Partnerships with SIDS commits the country to '*commission analytical work on the relationship between climate impacts and security in the Pacific region*'.⁴¹ This is promising, but as yet it remains unclear how it will be implemented in practice and what the focus of this analytical work will be.

All initiatives that need fine-tuning

There are several existing tools used by Ireland that could be fine-tuned to address CRSRs, but currently lack explicit reference to these risks and therefore are unlikely to be effective in stemming them. Most prominently among them is Ireland's international development cooperation policy and Overseas Development Aid (ODA). The country's current policy provides a clear mandate to focus on fragility and protracted crisis as well as climate change, and provides good ground for integrated work.⁴² Rather than having a fixed list of partner countries, Ireland takes a needs-based approach by prioritizing '*reaching the furthest behind first*', which translates to directing large proportion of bilateral ODA to Least Developed Countries (LDCs), especially fragile and conflict-affected states.⁴³ It is the OECD DAC member that '*allocates the largest share of its allocable bilateral ODA to fragile countries and contexts (55% in 2018, against a DAC average of 35%)*'.⁴⁴ As a result, what

Security: Vote on a Resolution, What's in Blue (New York, 11 Dec. 2021) <<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/12/climate-change-and-security-vote-on-a-resolution.php>>.

³⁹ Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, *Climate Action Plan 2021*, (Government of Ireland: Dublin, 4 Nov. 2021) <<https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/6223e-climate-action-plan-2021/>>.

⁴⁰ Senior Official 2 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 30).

⁴¹ Government of Ireland, *Strategy for Partnership with Small Island Developing States*, (Dublin, June 2019)

<<https://www.dfa.ie/media/irishaid/aboutus/strategyforpartnershipwithsmallislanddevelopingstates/Strategy-for-Partnership-with-Small-Island-Developing-States.pdf>>, p. 12.

⁴² Department of Foreign Affairs (note 3).

⁴³ Department of Foreign Affairs (note 3), p. 2.

⁴⁴ OECD, *OECD Development Co-Operation Peer Reviews: Ireland 2020*, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews (OECD: 20 May 2020) <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-ireland-2020_c20f6995-en>.

Ireland ‘*advocate[s] on and spend[s] on is pretty similar*’.⁴⁵ This is significant, as fragile countries are often the most susceptible to the adverse effects of climate change as well as coping with fragile governance or conflict.

However, at present there is no evidence that climate adaptation programmes funded by Ireland are accounting for conflict sensitivity in practice (or that peacebuilding projects are climate-sensitised). A clear emphasis in reported and spent ODA on climate security objectives in past years cannot be discerned.⁴⁶ For instance, there is no mention of *security*, *conflict* or *fragility* in Ireland’s recent Climate and Environmental Finance Report 2019 – but the reported spending of course preceded the recent policy shift.⁴⁷ Ireland could further integrate its policy priorities of climate action *and* conflict prevention as well as its unique development expenditure by taking climate-insecurity more explicitly into account. It could also—together with other EU member states and OECD DAC donor countries—develop climate and conflict-sensitive planning tools. This is particularly paramount in fragile and conflict-affected settings, where Ireland spends a lot of its ODA.

Relatedly, Ireland is currently looking at climate-proofing its ODA—essentially integrating climate awareness into all its development interventions—which is an important step.⁴⁸ And while there is interest in layering it in peace elements as well, integrating climate-proofing *and* conflict-proofing at the same time is seen as a challenge.⁴⁹ Because of Ireland’s commitment to support the bulk of its ODA to LDCs, integrating conflict sensitivity into this (or similar) exercises, would be another important opportunity for Ireland to finetune existing efforts, with potentially significant benefits in terms of medium-term prevention of CRSRs.

Ireland could also take a lead on this in the new informal Champions Group on Adaptation Finance, which Ireland, together with the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Finland launched at the 2021 UN General Assembly.⁵⁰ Set to improve the quantity and quality of adaptation finance flowing to developing countries, especially LDCs and SIDS, this would be an additional platform to sensitise adaptation and CRSRs.

⁴⁵ Senior Official 2 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 30).

⁴⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland’s Climate and Environmental Finance Report 2019, <https://www.irishaid.ie/media/irishaid/publications/21-008-Climate-Finance-Report_Final---digital.pdf>, accessed 21 Oct. 2021; Atteridge, A. et al., Detailed Profile for Ireland to All Recipients for Climate Change (total) during 2014–2019, Aid Atlas, <https://aid-atlas.org/profile/ireland/all/climate-change-total/2014-2018?usdType=usd_commitment>, accessed 24 Aug. 2021.

⁴⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs (note 45).

⁴⁸ Senior Expert 1 on Irish and European defense and environmental policy (note 4); Senior Official 1 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 14).

⁴⁹ Senior Official 1 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 14).

⁵⁰ IIED, New Champions Group on Adaptation Finance launched amid call to accelerate adaptation finance, International Institute for Environment and Development, <<https://www.iied.org/new-champions-group-adaptation-finance-launched-amid-call-accelerate-adaptation-finance>>, accessed 22 Dec. 2021.

Shortcomings and contradictions

Finally, several shortcomings and contradictions stand out in Ireland's current initiatives on CRSRs, mainly related to what Ireland proposes the international community should do and what actions the country takes at national level, where several relevant policies lack explicit links to CRSRs. For example, while Ireland called for climate change considerations to be made integral to UN peacekeeping efforts, domestically CRSRs are not systematically integrated into the Irish defence forces' operations or trainings.⁵¹ The current (2021-2023) Strategy Statement of the Department of Defense mentions the need for Defence forces to take into account climate change, only in terms of reducing the forces' greenhouse gas emissions.⁵² One interviewee suggested that there is an interest to increase knowledge and training for staff on these risks, and this is an area where Ireland could improve in terms of internal capacity building and action.⁵³

Ireland also emphasises the need to build synergies with other areas of development and instruments of foreign policy, such as the UN Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, and working with regional partners to address the root causes of instability.⁵⁴ Yet, neither Ireland's 2019 WPS National Action Plan (NAP) nor its 2021 annual review integrate CRSRs consistently, only the need for more '*research and programming on gender and security impacts of climate change*'.⁵⁵ Incorporating concrete goals and actions in the WPS NAP to address CRSRs would be an obvious area for Ireland to step up its own commitments.

Lastly, in addition to Ireland's policy for international development *A Better World*, its development cooperation is guided by two other strategic documents, in which climate-related security concerns do not feature strongly. The 2018 *Strategy for Africa to 2025* does not make any mention of CRSRs, nor does its 2021 evaluation.⁵⁶ The risks are mentioned only once in the *2019 Strategy for*

⁵¹ Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations (note 32); Senior expert 1 on Irish and European defense and environmental policy, informal virtual conversation via Zoom, 5 Oct. 2021; Two senior experts on Irish climate, energy and foreign policy, virtual interview via Zoom, 2 Nov. 2021.

⁵² Department of Defence, *Department of Defence and Defence Forces Strategy Statement 2021 - 2023*, (Department of Defence: Dublin, 22 Apr. 2021) <<https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/114cb-department-of-defence-and-defence-forces-strategy-statement-2021-2023/>>.

⁵³ Senior Experts 2 & 3 on Irish climate, energy and foreign policy (note 9).

⁵⁴ Senior Experts 2 & 3 on Irish climate, energy and foreign policy (note 9); Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, Simon Coveney TD (note 12).

⁵⁵ Irish Government, *Women, Peace and Security: Ireland's Third National Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions (2019-2024)*, (Government of Ireland: Dublin, June 2019), p. 29; Irish Government, *First Annual Report on Women Peace and Security: Ireland's Third National Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions (2019-2024)*, (Government of Ireland: Dublin, Jan. 2021); see also Smith, E. S., *Climate Change in Women, Peace and Security National Action Plans*, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security No. 2020/7 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Stockholm, June 2020).

⁵⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs, *Global Ireland. Ireland's Strategy for Africa to 2025*, (June 2018) <<https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/publications/Global-Ireland---Irelands-Strategy-for-Africa-to-2025.pdf>>; Government of Ireland, *Implementation of 'Global Ireland: Ireland's Strategy for Africa to 2025' Report to Government – Year 1*, (Dublin, May 2021) <<https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/publications/21-017-Africa-Strategy-Memorandum-WEB-final.pdf>>.

Partnerships with SIDS.⁵⁷ This seems an important oversight where Ireland could develop more consistent policy.

III. Ireland's priorities and strategies on climate-related security risks in the European Union

When it comes to Ireland's positions and strategies on CRSRs in the EU, the country's position is less clear. There is no publicly available information on Ireland's positions, priorities or strategies regarding climate-related security issues within the EU, nor is there available information to infer Irish leadership ambitions at EU level in this space.⁵⁸ One informant suggested that Ireland has simply not had the capacity to work on the topic in the EU due to a relatively small government compared to other member states.⁵⁹ Others proposed that Ireland has more soft, influencing power in the UNSC due to its UN peacekeeping record and that in the EU Brexit has taken up much of the focus.⁶⁰

However, interviewees indicated that CRSRs are an issue Ireland would like to work on more in the EU.⁶¹ Expectations are that Ireland's focus in the EU would be similar to that in the UNSC; '*The next step is to take what we have done in the UN context and bring that down to other contexts [including in the EU]*'.⁶² If this was the case, Ireland would likely support a) making climate change a permanent item on the PSC agenda, b) establishing a special representative for Climate and Security in the EEAS ideally in collaboration with DG INTPA and others and c) the integration of climate security into the CSDP. In addition, two key strategies by Ireland here will be to discuss climate action as a tool for peacebuilding (a 'positive framing'⁶³) and arguing for resources to be dedicated to the topic so that it moves beyond pure rhetoric.⁶⁴ So while Ireland is perhaps less likely to take a lead on CRSRs in the EU, any initiative that is *concrete* (rather than conceptual), *preventative* and that highlights the *peacebuilding potential* of climate-related development interventions will likely be supported by Ireland.⁶⁵

As a potential hurdle for Irish leadership on CRSRs in the EU, interviewees mentioned that there is a general unease domestically within Ireland with tackling security issues at EU-level. Ireland sees itself as one of the few

⁵⁷ Government of Ireland (note 40).

⁵⁸ The Irish permanent representation in Brussels was contacted, but not available for an interview.

⁵⁹ Senior Official 1 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 14).

⁶⁰ Senior Experts 2 & 3 on Irish climate, energy and foreign policy (note 9).

⁶¹ Senior Official 2 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 30).

⁶² Senior Official 1 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 14).

⁶³ Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, Simon Coveney, 'Statement at the IIEA Security Council Stakeholder Forum', 21 May 2021, <<https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/international-priorities/our-international-partners/united-nations/speeches/2021/statement-by-minister-coveney-at-the-iiia-security-council-stakeholder-forum.php>>.

⁶⁴ Senior Official 1 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 14).

⁶⁵ Senior Official, Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development workshop, 23 June 2022.

remaining ‘neutral’ powers in EU and loosening this stance was a red line for the Green party in the 2020 coalition talks. It is unclear if Ireland would be able to lead on climate and security efforts in the EU without facing domestic backlash.⁶⁶

In terms of potential agenda-setting capacity, Ireland is not due to hold the rotating presidency of the Council until July-December 2026.

IV. Conclusions and outlook

Political momentum in Ireland around CRSRs is building and Ireland is increasingly involved in international discussions on the topic. Since the change in government in 2020 and the country’s UNSC campaign, Ireland has significantly stepped up its commitment to climate action. CRSRs have featured prominently in the country’s efforts in the UNSC. In its UNSC activism, it seems Ireland is leaning heavily on initiatives of Germany and other states that have been active on this topic for a while, for example with the establishment of a Special Envoy for South Sudan and building on Germany’s earlier draft resolution on climate security from 2020.⁶⁷ However, Ireland’s approach is distinct in two ways: it emphasises a *positive* approach to peace, and the need for *preventative* action, instead of short-term reactive responses such as Early Warning Systems or humanitarian responses.

To ramp up medium-term prevention, Ireland could lead by example by climate *and* conflict sensitizing its own development cooperation. While a smaller donor country in terms of total USD spent, Ireland’s development expenditure is unique in its explicit focus the most vulnerable, fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Integrating CRSRs more systematically into these existing ODA flows would be a significant step in tackling emerging climate-related insecurities. This would also signal a clear commitment to operationalise the position advocated for by Ireland – that climate action can positively support peacebuilding efforts. Ireland’s announcement, in November 2021, to more than double its climate finance by 2025 as well as ongoing climate-proofing exercises of all Irish development expenditure and the development of a Climate Diplomacy Strategy are important entry points for taking concrete steps into this direction. At international level, Ireland’s efforts could be extended into the EU.

⁶⁶ Senior Expert 1 on Irish and European defense and environmental policy (note 4); Senior Experts 2 & 3 on Irish climate, energy and foreign policy (note 9); This has to do with the principle of neutrality being a constituent part of the Irish approach to international affairs, foreign and security policy, see e.g. Tonra, B., ‘Irish Foreign Policy’, eds W. J. Crotty and D. E. Schmitt, *Ireland on the World Stage* (Longman: Harlow, England; New York, 2002); Devine, K., ‘Irish Political Parties’ Attitudes towards Neutrality and the Evolution of the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policies’, , Dec. 2009, <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07907180903274776>>; Quain, C., ‘Committed neutrality: Ireland’s approach to European Defence cooperation’, *Ambiguous Alliance: Neutrality, Opt-Outs, and European Defence*, ECFR/402 (European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR): June 2021).

⁶⁷ see e.g. statements made by Sinéad Walsh, Climate Envoy & Deputy Director General of Development Cooperation and Africa Division, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (note 21).

It remains to be seen whether Ireland's momentum continues beyond its current two-year term on the UNSC, and whether engagement with the topic will be extended to other multilateral fora such as the EU. Despite Ireland's recent efforts on placing climate change and security onto the multilateral agenda at UN level, it needs to integrate these demands more consistently into its national actions. Its national implementation of the Paris Agreement, as well as coherence of its climate security policy lack behind its discourse.