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STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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Foreword

The need for balancing military expenditure so it does not hurt investment in social progress is not new. It encapsulates the age-old debate that, already at the founding of the United Nations in 1945, resulted in the adoption of Article 26 of the UN Charter, calling for the 'least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources'. In essence, it means finding a governance model by which governments should ensure the security of the state without compromising the socio-economic development and well-being of its people. Yet states have never succeeded in adopting common measures to balance military expenditures.

The steady increase in military spending over the past two decades has revigorated calls for limiting military expenditure. In his recent report, *Our Common Agenda*, the UN secretary-general, António Guterres, has called for a New Agenda for Peace 'to update our vision for disarmament so as to guarantee human, national and collective security', 'reduce excessive military budgets and ensure adequate social spending', and 'link disarmament to development opportunities'.

The present publication is therefore timely in providing food-for-thought for the United Nations. Its proposal for a human security framework is commendable and auspicious in showing that military spending can be redirected to contribute to a more human-centred approach. By the same measure, state security complements human security. The authors make the important observation that human security does not need to come at the expense of state security and have made suggestions for pathways to reduce military expenditure through, for example, eliminating excesses and creating sustaining conditions for security by other means.

The authors are to be commended not only for outlining the potential of a people-centred approach to military expenditure, but also its challenges. Let us be inspired by the former and alert to the latter in a collective effort to rethink and refocus security to the benefit of both states and societies.

Izumi Nakamitsu
United Nations Under-Secretary-General and
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
New York, May 2022

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Summary

Hundreds of millions of people face non-traditional 'vital' risks and threats to their security—threats to their lives, livelihoods and dignity. Accelerating climate change and growing loss of biodiversity are increasing such vital risks and threats and adding unprecedented urgency to investing in people's security. While the international community has committed itself in principle to improve the lot of the most afflicted people, a large funding gap for tackling non-traditional security risks exists. The Covid-19 crisis has increased the stakes in substantial ways, by worsening both the situation for millions of people and the state of government budgets. At the same time, global military expenditure has reached record levels, having exceeded the heights of the cold war. Contrasting these two realities adds urgency to calls for reductions in military expenditure and reallocation of money to promote human security.

The failure of past international initiatives for military expenditure reductions indicates that the juxtaposition of non-military funding needs with spending on the military is not sufficient to motivate governments into action. A prime reason for the lack of progress has been governments' fear, justified or not, that reducing military expenditure will reduce their security. This paper argues for an expanded conception of security beyond the security of states and state order, with an emphasis on human security—defined as the security of individuals and communities from threats to lives, livelihoods and dignity, such as extreme poverty, persistent hunger, natural disasters, armed conflict, and political and criminal violence, as well as future fatal consequences from climate change and other environmental changes.

The concept of human security has been accepted as a guide for action by the governments of the world in the United Nations. Yet, there are large gaps in the funding available to tackle the vital threats to human security. This paper argues that to take human security seriously must logically lead to a reassessment of spending on the military in the light of the needs for human security since all vital risks and threats are security threats, regardless of their cause. However, this reassessment—and any reallocation of funds from military to human security—need not lead to a reduction in overall security.

It will not be easy to build the political will to adapt global military spending to the reality that the scope of non-traditional vital threats is growing. Russia's armed attack on Ukraine that started in February 2022 has added to the rationales for military spending. To facilitate moves towards rebalancing military expenditure and spending on human security, a step-by-step process may be useful. Among the priority fields of activity to free resources through reductions in military expenditure are (*a*) arms control and disarmament negotiations and agreements; (*b*) sector-wide security sector reform for conflict prevention; and (*c*) financial responsibility in military expenditure and arms procurement. Steps in these areas can be taken without impairing the security of states and state order. If these are successful, they should lead to discussion about additional ways to link military expenditure reductions with improvements of the human condition in an increasingly dangerous Anthropocene.

Abbreviations

AU	African Union
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNI	Gross national income
G20	Group of Twenty
ODA	Official development assistance
SSR	Security sector reform
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

1. Introduction and rationale

World military spending is increasing, with new historical record levels year by year. In 2020 it amounted to nearly US$2 trillion, close to double the level of 2000 (see figure 1.1). The reasons that governments put forward to justify the levels of their military expenditure are often based on concern about military threats to their states and peoples. These need to be taken seriously. Yet a large and increasing number of the threats facing people and states across the world are not military in nature. Extreme poverty, persisting hunger, natural disasters, political and criminal violence, the consequences of armed conflict, climate change and other environmental changes cannot be addressed by military means. These are still threats to security—in the first place the security of people but also that of states, communities and societies.

While military spending in 2020 corresponded to about 2.4 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) or $254 dollars per capita of the world's population, there was simultaneously a major gap in the funding available to address threats and risks to the lives, livelihoods and dignity of hundreds of millions of people.[1] For instance, to eliminate extreme poverty by 2030, available estimates suggest a need for $222 billion per year in additional international aid for those countries that cannot raise the required funds on their own. At the same time, less than half of the money asked for in international calls for humanitarian assistance in 2021 was actually made available, while international development assistance continues to be far below the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) to which donors have committed.[2] The juxtaposition of these two drastically different funding realities makes a case for revisiting opportunities for redirecting expenditure from military purposes to address other types of threat and risk.

The case for revisiting opportunities for rebalancing global military expenditure is supported by recent changes in the thinking about security—what it is about and who is to be secured by what institution. This thinking has evolved and advanced in two directions. The first concerns the nature of threats. In addition to the traditional conception of threats from external military and terrorist attacks, security from a wide range of other risks and threats is now considered relevant. The second line of thinking expands the focus of security with respect to what or who is to be secured. In the traditional conception of security, the prime concern is with the territory and political order of a state. However, as states are comprised of people, the traditional conception also includes the protection of citizens from military threats. Among alternative conceptions of security, those putting the prime emphasis on the security of individuals have attained the most attention.

This paper treats military expenditure as part of a broad spectrum of spending on security. Military expenditure should be assessed and adjusted with respect to the overall balance of risks and threats, including military threats, within what can be considered as a 'single security space'.[3] The paper emphasizes the importance of risks and threats to individuals, or human security, which was first developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in *Human Development Report 1994* (and is further discussed in chapter 4 of this paper).[4] It stimulated a lively debate in both academic and policy circles which has continued. Although references are now more

[1] On military spending in 2020 see Tian, N. et al., 'Military expenditure', *SIPRI Yearbook 2021: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2021).

[2] For references and more data on this see the second section of chapter 5 below.

[3] Smith, D., 'The security space in the Anthropocene epoch', eds E. Lövbrand, and W. Mobjörk, *Anthropocene (In) securities: Reflections on Collective Survival 50 Years After the Stockholm Conference*, SIPRI Research Report no. 26 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2021), pp. 74–76.

[4] UN Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 1994* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994).



Figure 1.1. World military expenditure, 1990–2020

Notes: The absence of data for 1991 is due to the absence of data for the Soviet Union for that year. The world totals for 2015–20 are based on estimated figures for the Middle East.

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Apr. 2021.

often made to partial, more concretely defined concepts within the human security sphere—such as food security, water security or climate security—the idea persists of thinking in terms of a wider security space that includes but extends beyond military security. The report has also been the basis for various international activities, including several resolutions in the United Nations that have been accepted by UN member states. The world's states have thus recognized the concept of human security and thereby agreed in principle to move beyond seeing security as limited to state security.

So far, the political will to explicitly consider a broader spectrum of security has not had much impact on countries' military spending. However, discussions on rebalancing different types of security spending are under way in several countries. For instance, the German government elected in September 2021 decided on a target of 3 per cent of GDP for the combined spending on diplomacy, development assistance and defence.[5]

A prime consideration in recent discussions on a broader perception of security are the funding needs of the non-military dimensions of human security. The Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated the need to improve health sectors and their preparedness worldwide. Internationally, additional funding is needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which were adopted by all UN member states in 2015 to address poverty, hunger and other deprivations as well as to contain climate change and other long-term threats to future living conditions on our planet.[6]

This paper aims to strengthen the arguments for a reassessment of military expenditure by placing it within a broader conception of security. Taking human security seriously as a standard of security necessarily leads to a reconsideration of

[5] German Social Democratic Party (SPD), Bündnis 90/The Greens and Free Democratic Party (FDP), *Mehr Fortschritt wagen: Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit* [Daring more progress: Alliance for freedom, justice and sustainability], Coalition agreement (SDP/The Greens/FDP: Berlin, 26 Nov. 2021), p. 144; and Besch, S., Gordon, N. and Odendahl, C., 'Six questions on Germany's new coalition agreement', Centre for European Reform, 26 Nov. 2021.

[6] UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1, 'Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development', 25 Sep. 2015; and United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sustainable Development, 'The 17 goals'.

the levels and compositions of military expenditure in relation to spending on other means of protecting people's security.

The human security perspective proposed here, which encompasses also military security as a legitimate component, sheds a different light on the security implications of reductions in military expenditure. Past attempts to reduce military expenditure failed to result in any agreements on reductions, partly because their security implications were not acceptable to governments (as explained in chapter 2). Suggestions for the reconsideration and reallocation of a state's military expenditure, therefore, need to show that it would lead to improvement of the security—in the broader sense—of its citizens. This paper suggests ways to reduce military expenditure that do not impair traditional state security, while freeing financial resources to further human security. To a major extent, military threats result from mutual fear of the military preparation of potential adversaries, and so the perception of threat can be reduced through cooperative arms control, allowing military spending to be reallocated within the single security space. Furthermore, wasteful spending, for instance resulting from lack of transparency and corruption, can be reduced, freeing up further funds (see chapter 6). There is also a need to rethink the international dimension of the link between military expenditure and human security. Money spent on the military cannot be spent for other purposes, either domestically or internationally. Comparing levels of global military expenditure and the lack of funding to address the global dimensions of the current and likely deficits in human security justifies renewed worldwide efforts for military expenditure reductions with the goal of improving human security.

The paper sets out the human security case for military expenditure reductions and provides arguments to back it up. Chapter 2 reviews previous international initiatives for the reduction of military expenditure. Chapter 3 outlines some of the main aspects of the state of global (in)security today. Chapter 4 describes how human security has been conceptualized and how it relates to other security concepts, particularly military security. Chapter 5 discusses financial aspects of the responsibility of governments for human security. Chapter 6 then presents priority fields of activity for military expenditure reductions. The paper closes with conclusions in chapter 7.

2. International initiatives to reduce military expenditure

For several decades, the United Nations has been the forum for international initiatives with the objective of limiting military expenditure. According to its Charter, one of the main purposes of the UN is to 'maintain international peace and security' and this should be pursued 'with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources'.[7]

The rapid growth of world military expenditure as a result of the arms race during the early decades of the cold war raised concern among member states, initially about the impact on peace and security and subsequently also about the economic and social consequences.[8] In 1959 consensus was reached within the UN General Assembly to achieve general and complete disarmament.[9] In 1970 the General Assembly adopted a resolution emphasizing the negative economic and social consequences of military expenditure.[10] In parallel, the call for military expenditure reductions was linked to development assistance, based on initiatives from developing countries. This was followed up, in 1973, by a resolution recommending that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—should reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent and appealing to them 'to allot 10 per cent of the funds released . . . for the provision of assistance to developing countries'.[11] China, France, the UK and the USA abstained from the vote on this resolution, the latter referring to the absence of any means of verification since there was 'no standard concept for measuring military expenditures'.[12]

Considering the need for verification of any future decision to reduce military expenditure, this resolution set in motion a long process for an expert group to develop a means for measuring and comparing military expenditure across countries. In 1976 the expert group completed its report, which presented an international reporting instrument for military expenditure and recommended further work on its operationalization and testing.[13]

In a parallel development, initiatives were made to link military expenditure reductions with development. The 10th special session of the UN General Assembly, in 1978, was the first in a series devoted to disarmament. At this session, the assembly declared that 'resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations' and proposed the establishment of a disarmament fund for this purpose.[14] Its plan of action stated that gradual and agreed reduction of military budgets 'would be a

[7] Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 Oct. 2015, articles 1(1) and 26.

[8] For an overview of international efforts to reduce, limit and report on military expenditure in changing security environments see Omitoogun, W. and Sköns, E., 'Military expenditure data: A 40-year overview', *SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006). For a comprehensive report on these initiatives see Spies, M., *United Nations Efforts to Reduce Military Expenditures: A Historical Overview*, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Occasional Papers no. 33 (United Nations: New York, Oct 2019).

[9] UN General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV), 'General and complete disarmament', 20 Nov. 1959.

[10] UN General Assembly Resolution 2667 (XXV), 'Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security', 7 Dec. 1970.

[11] UN General Assembly Resolution 3093 (XXVIII), 'Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries', 7 Dec. 1973.

[12] Spies (note 8), p. 26.

[13] United Nations, General Assembly, 'Reduction of military budgets: Measurement and international reporting of military expenditures', Report prepared by the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets/Report of the Secretary-General, A/31/222, 20 Oct. 1976.

[14] United Nations, General Assembly, Final document of the 10th special session, A/RES/S-10/2, 30 June 1978, para. 35. See also Spies (note 8), pp. xiv, 50–51.

measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development'.[15] In line with a decision at the next regular session of the General Assembly, later that year, the reporting instrument was subsequently successfully tested on a group of countries from different regions and with different budgeting and accounting systems and was recommended for implementation.[16]

This long process finally prepared the ground for the adoption, in 1980, of a resolution on the reduction of military budgets that reaffirmed 'the urgent need to reinforce the endeavours of all States and international action in the area of the reduction of military budgets', and recommended that all member states should annually report their military expenditure to the UN secretary-general, making use of the standardized instrument.[17] While the resolution recommended further work on the reporting instrument by the expert group, no further steps were agreed for reducing military budgets, apart from a general appeal to all states: pending an agreement, the General Assembly appealed for states to exercise self-restraint in military expenditure, with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development.[18]

Since then, no further progress towards an international agreement on military expenditure reductions has been achieved. One of the remaining results of these efforts is the annual reporting since 1981 by member states on their military expenditure. Without any link to reductions in military expenditure, the reporting serves primarily as a mechanism for international transparency. The level of reporting has been low: after peaking in 2002 with 81 states reporting for 2001, it has dropped to 30–44 states reporting during the years since 2017.[19]

The dormant state of the earlier initiatives can be attributed to several factors. These included the low rate of reporting and the limited use of military expenditure data in confidence-building processes. However, one of the most important factors has been a major resistance to military expenditure reductions by major powers, related to the international political and security environment: during the bipolar confrontation of the cold war, it was difficult to achieve any agreement on arms control and disarmament among the great powers. Underlying this resistance was a fear that such agreements would lead to a reduction in military power and, therefore, in traditional state security. This fear was fed by high levels of mistrust between adversaries and concern about being seen as weak. After the end of the cold war, global military expenditure reduced substantially (see figure 1.1). These reductions were made primarily by the core participants of the cold war East–West arms race—the Soviet Union and the USA and their respective allies in Europe and North America. However, the public expenditure savings from these reductions were rarely shifted towards national or international development needs, but were primarily driven by the financial interest of reducing national budget deficits or improving government finances more generally.[20] Rapid downsizing of militaries and arms industries also required investment in conversion of military assets and retraining of soldiers and workers. As a result, effects of cuts in military spending ranged from considerable 'peace dividends' in some countries, such as the USA and Germany, to contributions to the overall downturn of economic activity in other countries, such as Russia and other

[15] United Nations, A/RES/S-10/2 (note 14), para 89.

[16] United Nations, General Assembly, 'Reduction of military budgets', Report of the Secretary-General, A/35/479, 21 Oct. 1980. See also Spies (note 8), pp. 21–32.

[17] UN General Assembly Resolution 35/142 A and B, 'Reduction of military budgets', 12 Dec. 1980.

[18] UN General Assembly Resolution 35/142 (note 17).

[19] Wezeman, P. D. and Wezeman, S. T., 'Transparency in military expenditure', *SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2020), p. 265.

[20] Brömmelhörster, J. (ed.), *Demystifying the Peace Dividend* (Nomos: Baden-Baden. 2000).

countries in the former Eastern bloc.[21] Moreover, these reductions were not linked to international agreements on arms control or any mechanism for the reallocation of the savings. As a result, there was nothing to prevent or discourage future increases in global military spending.

While during the cold war the focus of military expenditure reductions had been on the major powers, in the 1990s it shifted to developing countries, motivated by concerns about the burden of military expenditure on their economic development.[22] This was manifested in donor policies imposing a ceiling on military expenditure by recipient states. However, in the early 2000s there was again a shift in international policy debates that was related to the recognition of a linkage between security and development.[23] To address the economic burden of military expenditure, devastating armed conflict (which constituted a danger to development and development actors), and the complicity of the armed forces of many developing countries in these wars, the international donor community introduced security sector reform (SSR) programmes.[24] Since SSR was based in part on the legitimate right of each state to decide on its military spending, focus shifted from the size of military expenditure and ceilings on spending to the decision-making and management processes for military expenditure.[25]

The issue of military expenditure reductions is now being revived within the UN General Assembly and in line with the Women and Peace and Security Agenda.[26] This is occurring in an international security environment that, while fundamentally different from both the cold war and early post-cold war periods, is increasingly marked by great power confrontation, as re-enforced by Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022. World military expenditure is at a record level. At the same time, non-military threats and risks are rapidly increasing, as chapter 3 shows. While there have been important international initiatives to address non-military security threats and risks and to raise funding for such initiatives, progress is slow and new sources of financing are needed.

[21] Brzoska, M., 'Military conversion: The balance sheet', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 2 (Mar. 1999). On the experience from post-cold war conversion in the USA see also Pemberton, M. and Hartung, W. D., 'From swords to ploughshares: Lessons from conversion movements', *Rethinking Unconstrained Military Spending*, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Occasional Papers no. 35 (United Nations: New York, Apr. 2020). On the experience in the former Eastern bloc see e.g., Kiss, Y., SIPRI, *Arms Industry Transformation and Integration: The Choices of East Central Europe* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2014).

[22] Dunne, J. P., 'Economic effects of military expenditure in developing countries: A survey', eds N. P. Gleditsch et al., *The Peace Dividend* (Elsevier: Amsterdam, 1996).

[23] Ball, N., 'Transforming security sectors: The IMF and World Bank approaches', *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol 1, no 1 (Apr. 2001).

[24] Hendrickson, D., British Department for International Development (DFID), *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform* (DFID: London, 2002).

[25] Omitoogun, W., 'The processes of budgeting for the military sector in Africa', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003); and Hendrickson (note 24), box 9.1, p. 32.

[26] UN General Assembly Resolution 75/43, 'Relationship between disarmament and development', 7 Dec. 2020; Nakamitsu, I., 'Foreword', *Rethinking Unconstrained Military Spending* (note 21); Acheson, R. and Rees, M., 'A feminist approach for addressing excessive military spending', *Rethinking Unconstrained Military Spending* (note 21); United Nations, *Our Common Agenda*, Report of the Secretary-General (United Nations: New York, 2021), para 89(d); and United Nations, Security Council, 'Women and peace and security', Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/827, 27 Sep. 2021.

3. Global insecurities

As global military expenditure reaches record levels, the threats and risks to human lives are becoming increasingly challenging. Only a selection of threats and risks can be presented here, but they indicate the extent of the dangers and how these are interrelated, reinforcing each other. Extreme poverty, hunger, natural disasters, and armed conflict and other types of lethal violence are major global insecurities, causing death, suffering and population displacement, albeit with great differences among regions (as illustrated below). Environmental changes, such as in climate and biodiversity, are reinforcing these long-standing insecurities, with the risk of taking a devastating toll on humans and livelihoods in the not-too-distant future unless determined mitigating and preventative action is taken.[27] Overall, these insecurities are concentrated in low-income countries and regions.

Poverty, hunger and natural disasters

Global extreme poverty—defined as living on less than $1.90 a day—has fallen significantly over recent decades: from 36.2 per cent of world population in 1990 to 9.2 per cent (over 689 million people) in 2017 (the most recent year of official World Bank estimates).[28] However, the rate of decline began to slow down in 2015, and in 2020 global extreme poverty began to increase again due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. By 2021, based on limited survey data, an estimated 711 million people—almost one-tenth (9.1 per cent) of the world's population—were living in extreme poverty.[29] More than 60 per cent of extremely poor people live in Africa (see figure 3.1). The two main drivers of the slowdown of extreme poverty reduction since 2015 have been armed conflict and climate change: more than 40 per cent of the world's poor live in fragile or conflict-affected countries and the poorest people suffer most from violent conflict; and a World Bank estimate suggests that climate change may push 68–132 million more people into poverty by 2030.[30] The reversal to an increase in world extreme poverty since 2020 was due to the additional impact of the Covid-19 pandemic—adding another 100 million people to those living in extreme poverty.[31] The World Bank warns that 'Without an adequate global response, the cumulative effects of the pandemic and its economic fallout, armed conflict, and climate change will exact high human and economic costs well into the future', with a risk that the SDG target of bringing the global poverty rate to less than 3 per cent by 2030 will be missed.[32]

In 2020, 768 million people were estimated to be affected by persistent hunger (i.e. undernourished people); more than half (418 million) were living in Asia and more than one-third (282 million) in Africa (see figure 3.2).[33] This included 149 million

[27] For a report on global threats covering similar areas see Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), *Ecological Threat Report 2021: Understanding Ecological Threats, Resilience and Peace* (IEP: Sydney, Oct. 2021). This report uses 5 indicators of ecological threats—food risk, water risk, rapid population growth, temperature anomalies and natural disasters—to identify countries most likely to suffer from ecological threat-related conflict.

[28] Castaneda Aguilar, R. A., 'September 2020 global poverty update from the World Bank: New annual poverty estimates using the revised 2011 PPPs', World Bank Data Blog, 7 Oct. 2020.

[29] Mahler, D. G. et al., 'Updated estimates of the impact of COVID-19 on global poverty: Turning the corner on the pandemic in 2021?', World Bank Data Blog, 24 June 2021.

[30] World Bank, *Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2020: Reversals of Fortune* (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2020); and World Bank, 'Poverty: Overview', 14 Oct. 2021.

[31] World Bank, 'Poverty: Overview' (note 30).

[32] World Bank, 'Poverty: Overview' (note 30).

[33] The estimate of 768 million people is the middle of a projected range of 720–811 million people. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) et al., *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021: Transforming Food Systems for Food Security, Improved Nutrition and Affordable Healthy Diets for All* (FAO: Rome, 2021), p. xii. See also Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 'UN report: Pandemic year marked by spike in world hunger', 12 July 2021.



Figure 3.1. Extreme poverty: Number of people affected as a share of world total, by region, 2017

Notes: Extreme poverty is defined as living on less than $1.90 per person per day. The year 2017 is the most recent for which official World Bank figures, based on household survey data, are available. For later years, the World Bank provides projections based on more limited data. Regions are as defined by the World Bank: 'Rest of the world' includes mainly North America, excluding Mexico (which is in Latin America). The figure for South Asia is highly uncertain since the region has limited survey coverage. The figure provided here for South Asia is the residual between the total and the rest of the regions.

Source: Castaneda Aguilar, R. A., 'September 2020 global poverty update from the World Bank: New annual poverty estimates using the revised 2011 PPPs', World Bank Data Blog, 7 Oct. 2020.

children under the age of 5 (22 per cent of all such children) affected by stunting (i.e. too short for their age); and 45 million children affected by wasting (i.e. too thin for their height). While the number of undernourished people decreased from 811 million (12.4 per cent of world population) in 2005 to a low of 607 million in 2014 (8.3 per cent of world population), it has subsequently been increasing. In 2020, there was a dramatic increase of around 118 million people, increasing the rate from 8.4 per cent of world population in 2019 to 9.9 per cent in 2020.[34] Much of this increase was likely to be related to the Covid-19 pandemic.[35] According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), this increase suggests that 'it will take a tremendous effort for the world to honour its pledge to end hunger in 2030', as agreed in 2015 as part of SDG targets 2.1 and 2.2.[36] The pandemic has added to the great challenge of transforming the world's food systems, which requires the support of national governments, food system actors and the international donor community (see also chapter 5).[37]

The lives and livelihoods of people are strongly affected by changes in the physical environment. Natural disasters—such as earthquakes, floods, droughts and tropical cyclones—result in loss of life, injury, loss of housing and infrastructure, and economic loss. In 2020 there were 398 natural disasters worldwide, affecting a total of 96 million people (see figure 3.3). Climate change poses a major risk for the increased prevalence of disasters.

[34] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) et al., *In Brief to The State of Food Insecurity and Nutrition in the World 2021* (FAO: Rome, 2021), p. 13.

[35] Food and Agriculture Organization (note 33).

[36] Food and Agriculture Organization (note 33).

[37] Food and Agriculture Organization et al. (note 34), p. 9; United Nations, Food Systems Summit 2021, New York, 23 Sep. 2021; and Zhou, J. et al., 'The geopolitics of food security: Barriers to the Sustainable Development Goal of zero hunger', SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2020/11, Nov. 2020.



Figure 3.2. Persistent hunger: Number of people affected as a share of world total, by region, 2020

Notes: People affected by persistent hunger are people living in households facing moderate or severe food insecurity (i.e. involuntarily skipping a meal or going without food for a day). The shares are based on the middle values of projected ranges. Regions are as defined by the United Nations: Africa includes Egypt, Asia includes the Caucasus, Cyprus and the rest of the Middle East, and Latin America includes Mexico.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) et al., *In Brief to The State of Food Insecurity and Nutrition in the World 2021* (FAO: Rome, 2021).

Armed conflict and political violence

Armed conflict and political violence are important causes of increased poverty and hunger and also result in conflict-related and civilian fatalities and injuries and the displacement of civilian populations. In 2020 there were armed conflicts in 39 countries and over 120 000 conflict-related direct fatalities (see figure 3.4).[38] Children are severely harmed by armed conflict: in 2019 almost one-fifth of all children worldwide were living in areas affected by armed conflict.[39] Sexual and gender-based violence is also widespread during armed conflict.[40] The Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022 has not only led to a large number of deaths and refugees, but it has also upset global markets for fossil fuels and cereals. Poor people are particularly affected by the consequent rising prices.

In terms of direct fatalities, interpersonal violence in peacetime results in more deaths than armed conflict. Some 464 000 people were murdered in 2017, the latest year for which reliable international data is available.[41] This corresponded to a global homicide rate of 6.1 victims per 100 000 population, with great regional variation, from 2–3 in Asia, Europe and Oceania, all well below the global average, up to 13 in Africa and a record high of 17.2 victims per 100 000 population in the Americas (see figure 3.5). The drivers of murder differ across countries, but include organized crime,

[38] Davis, I., 'Global developments in armed conflicts, peace processes and peace operations', *SIPRI Yearbook 2021* (note 1), table 2.1, p. 36.

[39] Davis (note 38), p. 39.

[40] United Nations, Security Council, 'Women still suffering in war zones, special representatives tell Security Council', Press Release SC/14493, 14 Apr. 2021.

[41] UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Global Study on Homicide 2019* (UNODC: Vienna, 2019). See also UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 'Homicide kills far more people than armed conflict, says new UNODC study', Press release, 4 July 2019.



Figure 3.3. Natural disasters: Number of people affected as a share of world total, by region, 2020

Notes: Natural disasters include biological, climatological (e.g. drought and wildfires), geophysical (e.g. earthquakes and volcanic activity), hydrological (e.g. floods and landslides) and meteorological (e.g. storms and extreme temperatures) disasters. See Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), 'EM-DAT guidelines'. Regions are as defined by the United Nations: Africa includes Egypt, and Asia includes the Caucasus, Cyprus and the rest of the Middle East.

Source: Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), <https://public.emdat.be/data>.

gender stereotypes, inequality, unemployment, political instability, firearms and drugs.[42]

Armed conflict, political violence, criminal violence and human rights violations force people to flee from their homes and take refuge elsewhere. At the end of 2020, there were 26.4 million refugees worldwide—that is, people who had fled their country and cannot return 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion'.[43] In addition, 82.4 million people were forcibly displaced at the end of 2020, internationally and internally, due to other reasons, such as natural disasters, wars and criminal environments.[44]

Environmental change

Fifty years ago, the UN Conference on the Human Environment brought attention to the dangers facing the environment and created the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) to help address the ongoing deterioration.[45] Today, environmental change is becoming an increasingly urgent risk. The UNDP's *Human Development Report 2020* warns that 'We are at an unprecedented moment in the history of humankind and in the history of our planet', with scientists proposing that 'we are now entering a new geologic epoch—the Anthropocene—in which humans are a dominant force shaping the future of the planet'.[46] This is about a new and dangerous era when 'the social and

[42] UN Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Study on Homicide 2019* (note 41).

[43] UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), 'What is a refugee?', [n.d.].

[44] UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2020* (UNHCR: Geneva, 2021).

[45] United Nations, Conference on the Human Environment, Report, Stockholm, 5–16 June 1972, A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 1973.

[46] UN Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2020: The Next Frontier—Human Development and the Anthropocene* (UNDP: New York, 2020), pp. 3, 4.



Figure 3.4. Armed conflict and political violence: Reported fatalities as a share of world total, by region, 2020

Notes: Data include reported fatalities from armed conflicts with more than 25 battle-related fatalities, events of explosions and remote violence, protest, riots and strategic developments, and violence against civilians. For definitions of the various forms of political violence see Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 'ACLED definitions of political violence and protests', [n.d.]. Reported fatalities can vary widely from actual fatalities as well as between sources and are thus rough numbers. See Kishi, R. et al., *ACLED 2020: The Year in Review* (ACLED: Mar. 2021), p. 6. Regions are as defined by SIPRI: Europe includes the Caucasus.

Sources: Davis, I., 'Global developments in armed conflicts, peace processes and peace operations', *SIPRI Yearbook 2021: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2021), based on Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 'Dashboard', accessed 10 Apr. 2021.

economic activities of humankind are undermining and fundamentally altering the planetary life-support systems on which we all depend'.[47]

Climate change is increasing temperatures and disrupting rainfall patterns, thus increasing the risk of natural disasters, as well as affecting access to water, food and shelter. According to the 2018 UN–World Bank High Level Panel on Water, up to 700 million people are at risk of being displaced as a result of water scarcity by 2030 and half of the world's population will be at risk due to 'water stress' by 2050.[48] Low-income countries suffer most from the consequences of climate change and people living in extreme poverty most of all.[49]

The biodiversity of the planet—the number, variety and variability of living organisms—has decreased at an alarming rate since pre-industrial times, with strongly negative effects on several aspects of human life, such as food security, vulnerability to natural disasters, energy security, and access to clean water and raw materials.[50] Notably, changes in ecosystems are harming the world's poorest people the most since they have the least capacity and resources to adjust to these changes. The direct causes behind the loss of biodiversity include change in land use, such as the conversion of forest to agriculture; marine system change, such as through overfishing; and

[47] Lövbrand, E., Mobjörk, M. and Söder, R., 'One earth, multiple worlds: Securing collective survival on a human-dominated planet', eds Lövbrand and Mobjörk (note 3), p. 3. See also Mobjörk, M. and Lövbrand, E., 'Security, insecurity and the Anthropocene', SIPRI, 17 Sep. 2021.

[48] High Level Panel on Water, *Making Every Drop Count: An Agenda for Water Action*, Outcome document (United Nations/World Bank: New York, 14 Mar. 2018), p. 11. See also United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, 'The Drought Initiative', [n.d.].

[49] Jafino, B. A. et al., *Revised Estimates of the Impact of Climate Change on Extreme Poverty by 2030*, Policy Research Working Paper no. 9417 (World Bank: Washington, DC, Sep. 2020).

[50] Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, *Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Biodiversity Synthesis* (World Resources Institute: Washington, DC, 2005). For a summary see Green Facts, 'Biodiversity & human well-being', 15 May 2006. See also Attenborough, D., *A Life on Our Planet* (Ebury Press: London, 2020).



Figure 3.5. Homicide rates, by region, 2017

Notes: Homicide rates are expressed as victims per 100 000 population. Regions are as defined by the United Nations: Africa includes Egypt, and Asia includes the Caucasus, Cyprus and the rest of the Middle East.

Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Global Study on Homicide 2019* (UNODC: Vienna, 2019).

overexploitation and invasive species. Climate change and pollution are projected to increasingly affect all aspects of biodiversity. While efforts to arrest this development have had some effects, the decline continues. For example, biodiversity in species has declined by 44 per cent since 1970. Virtually all ecosystems have been dramatically transformed through human actions. According to a 2020 review of biodiversity loss, there was a 68 per cent average decrease in population sizes of mammals, birds, amphibians and fish between 1970 and 2016; the value of 'nature capital'—the planet's stock of renewable and non-renewable natural resources—had declined by nearly 40 per cent since the early 1990s; and the Earth's biocapacity is currently being overused (i.e. exceeding the rate of the regeneration) by at least 56 per cent.[51] It concludes that the 'evidence shows that biodiversity conservation is more than an ethical commitment for humanity: it is a non-negotiable and strategic investment to preserve our health, wealth and security'.[52]

In summary, the magnitude and severity of the types of insecurity outlined here demonstrate the relevance of thinking about security in broader terms than purely as risks and threats related to external military aggression. These insecurities are encapsulated in the concept human security, which is discussed in the next chapter.

[51] Almond, R. E. A., Grooten, M. and Petersen, T. (eds), *Living Planet Report 2020: Bending the Curve of Biodiversity Loss* (WWF: Gland, 2020), p. 6.

[52] Almond et al. (note 51), p. 7.

4. The standard of human security

In view of the state of insecurities outlined in chapter 3, military expenditure levels should be reassessed. The standard to use for this reassessment is the status of the security of people from critical and pervasive risks and threats to the vital core of their lives, livelihoods and dignity—that is, human security.[53] This implies questioning the balance between spending on the military and spending to address risks and threats to human security.[54] This chapter briefly discusses how the idea of security for people has crystallized into concepts of human security and how this relates to military security, the security that can be attained through spending on the military.

Origins of the idea of human security

A concept of human security was first presented in the UNDP's *Human Development Report 1994*, where it was argued that an enduring peace required both freedom from fear and freedom from want: 'For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime—these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world.'[55] The report also made a concrete proposal about which threats should be considered in a concept of human security. They included threats to economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.

The UNDP report's approach has several intellectual roots. One is the link between peace and economic and social development. For instance, this link is clearly stated in the Charter of the UN, which calls for 'the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations'.[56] It was also clearly expressed by a number of important international commissions, including the Brandt Report of 1980, the Palme Report of 1982 and the Brundtland Report of 1987, which all argued that non-military risks and threats to security need to be taken much more seriously than was done during the cold war.[57]

There is also a close relationship between human security and the promotion of human rights. The first substantial provision of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 'Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person'.[58] Another root is the concept of 'positive peace': the idea that peace is more than the absence of war, as argued in the 1960s by Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung.[59] Finally, beginning in the 1980s, security studies scholarship increasingly included risks and threats in addition to those coming from outside military forces.

[53] For more on these concepts see Alkire, S., *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) Working Paper no. 2 (Oxford University: Oxford, 2003).

[54] See also Soubrier, E., *Redefining Gulf Security Begins by Including the Human Dimension*, Issue Paper no. 9 (Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington: Washington, DC, Nov. 2020).

[55] UN Development Programme (note 4), p. 3.

[56] Charter of the United Nations (note 7), Article 55.

[57] The Independent Commission for International Developmental Issues, chaired by Willy Brandt, a former German chancellor, published the report *North–South: A Programme for Survival* (Pan Books: London, 1980). Olof Palme, a former Swedish prime minister, chaired the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, which published *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament* (Pan Books: London, 1982). The World Commission on Environment and Development, chaired by former Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, published the report *Our Common Future* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1987).

[58] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted as UN General Assembly Resolution 217 (III), 10 Dec. 1948, Article 3.

[59] Galtung, J., 'Violence, peace, and peace research', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 6, no. 3 (Sep. 1969).

This included calls for the reorientation of attention and resources towards these threats and risks.[60]

With the end of the cold war, the security agenda expanded from the narrow traditional state security focus favoured during that period. Academic debates took various directions, questioning what security was about, who was providing security for whom, and what it meant if risks and threats to security were invoked.[61] Some scholars, for instance, warned of 'securitization'—that is, the use of security threats to justify deviations from ordinary processes of political decision-making and the need for emergency action, such as suspending constitutional rights.[62] Others emphasized the political nature of choosing who should be protected from what kind of danger.[63]

Broad and narrow conceptions of human security

The UNDP's broad concept of human security was further developed in the 2003 report *Human Security Now* by the Commission on Human Security.[64] Based on the UNDP's 1994 report, the commission argued that human security was about the protection of 'the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment'.[65] The 2005 report 'In larger freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all' by the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, summarized human security as 'freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity'—a threefold definition that has stuck.[66]

These expanded framings of human security bring the concept closer to another important strand of international action: human rights.[67] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and later human rights treaties spell out these fundamental rights in some detail, focusing on civil and political rights but also including economic, social and cultural aspects. However, in contrast to the comprehensiveness of the spectrum of human rights provisions, the broad human security concept limits its concerns to 'vital' risks and threats—that is, risks and threats to life, livelihoods and dignity.[68]

The broad conception of human security also continues to have strong links to development issues, which focus on the human consequences of setbacks to development through events such as disasters. Through its emphasis on prevention, protection and empowerment of individuals and communities, the broad concept of human security is close to the idea of resilience. Originally limited to describing the capability to bounce back from a crisis, from personal crisis to natural disasters, resilience has become a catchword for a wide range of activities to address adverse situations, including through prevention, management and reconstruction.[69]

[60] Buzan, B., *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, NC, 1983); and Ullman, R. H., 'Redefining security', *International Security*, vol. 8, no. 1 (summer 1983).

[61] Rothschild, E., 'What is security', *Daedalus*, vol. 124, no. 3 (summer 1995); and Baldwin, D. A., 'The concept of security', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 23, no. 1 (Jan. 1997).

[62] Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO, 1998).

[63] Booth, K., 'Security and emancipation', *Review of International Relations*, vol. 17, no. 4 (Oct. 1991); and Krause, K. and M. C. Williams (eds), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1998).

[64] Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (Commission on Human Security: New York, 2003).

[65] Commission on Human Security (note 64), p. 4.

[66] United Nations, General Assembly, 'In larger freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all', Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 Mar. 2005. For more on the related UN documents and activities see the website of the UN Human Security Unit.

[67] Sen, A., 'Development, rights and human security', Commission on Human Security (note 64), box 1.3.

[68] See e.g. Kaldor, M., 'Human security: Practical possibilities', *LSE Public Policy Review*, vol. 1, no. 2 (2020).

[69] See e.g. Gasper, D. et al., *Adding Human Security and Human Resilience to Help Advance the SDGs Agenda*, Working Paper no. 665 (International Institute for Social Studies: The Hague, Nov. 2020).

In parallel to this further development of the original idea of human security, and partly as a result of its broadness, various alternatives have been developed that emphasize particular aspects of human security.[70] A prominent one focuses on 'removing the use of, or threat of, force and violence from people's everyday lives'.[71] Analysis to assess this narrow conception of human security was, for instance, presented in the Human Security Report series, produced and published by a team of academics under the leadership of Andrew Mack between 2005 and 2013, and in the Global Burden of Armed Violence reports for the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.[72] This narrow conception of human security is analytically clearer but addresses only one, albeit important, aspect of the insecurities facing people.[73] More recent conceptions of human security tend to be particularly sensitive to environmental risks and threats.[74]

In 2020 the UNDP's Human Development Report Office announced an effort to revisit the human security concept. Building on the *Human Development Report 1994* and *Human Security Now*, a group of 'independent eminent experts' advised the office on exploring 'what "freedom from want and freedom from fear" means today'.[75] A special report, published in February 2022, explores a new generation of interacting threats that are playing out in the Anthropocene, how these affect human security and what to do about it. It concludes with calls for a bold agenda to match the magnitude of the challenges. This requires systematic, permanent and universal attention to solidarity among humankind rather than accepting fragmented approaches to security.[76]

International acceptance of human security

States have the primary responsibility to protect people from vital risks and threats. This has been politically accepted on the international level by all UN member states. An important milestone was the 2005 World Summit, when more than 170 heads of state or government met at the UN to decide on a range of issues, including development and security, and to renew the pledge to reach the Millennium Development Goals of 2000. In the unanimously agreed outcome document, the collected governments recognize that all people 'are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential'.[77]

They also pledged to further discuss and define the notion of human security in the framework of the UN General Assembly. The result of this effort was a 2012 General

[70] See e.g. Martin, M. and Owen, T. (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Human Security* (Routledge: Abingdon, 2014); Gasper, D., 'Human security', eds E. Chiappero-Martinetti, S. Osmani and M. Qizilbash, *Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2020); and Schroeder, U., 'The transformation of security concepts: Beyond the state', eds R. Geiß and N. Melzer, *Oxford Handbook of the International Law of Global Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2021).

[71] Krause, K., *Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Policy Paper no. 26 (DCAF: Geneva, 2007), p. 4.

[72] Details of the documents can be found at OCLC WorldCat Identities, 'Human Security Report Project (Simon Fraser University)'; and Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, 'Global Burden of Armed Violence', May 2015.

[73] Smith (note 3).

[74] See e.g. Hardt, J. N., 'Critical deconstruction of environmental security and human security concepts in the Anthropocene', eds J. Scheffran et al., *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges to Social Stability* (Springer: Berlin, 2012); and Burke, A. et al., 'Afterword', eds Lövbrand and Mobjörk (note 3).

[75] UN Development Programme (UNDP), 'Human Development Report Office to revisit the human security concept in 2021', [n.d.].

[76] UN Development Programme (UNDP), *New Threats to Human Security in the Anthropocene: Demanding Greater Solidarity*, Special report (UNDP: New York, 2022), p. 141.

[77] UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, '2005 World Summit outcome', 16 Sep. 2005, para. 143.

Assembly resolution on human security.[78] It included a common understanding of human security, emphasizing the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. With this resolution the UN General Assembly called for 'people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities' and recognized 'the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights'.[79]

Beyond the primary national obligation to improve human security, these resolutions also established an international responsibility to meet vital threats to lives, livelihoods and dignity. The 2005 summit declaration makes this clear by using the collective form 'we' when addressing the right of people to live in freedom and dignity and their entitlement to freedom from fear and want.[80] The 2012 resolution on human security confirms that 'human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people'.[81] These resolutions do not establish a legal obligation for the governments of the world; moreover, they also make clear that the protection and provision of human security is not the sole responsibility of individual states and that they should be supported from the outside in their efforts. The role of the international community is to complement government efforts and provide the necessary assistance. The UN Trust Fund for Human Security and the UN Secretariat's Human Security Unit have been established to support such efforts.[82]

Like other international pledges, including the even stronger ones on human rights, implementation does not follow automatically, despite states' commitments. The deficits outlined in chapter 3 illustrate the lack of action to effectively provide human security. At the same time, all the risks and threats that are mentioned there are addressed in activities by national and international actors, although this occurs in an issue-by-issue fashion and without explicit reference to the overarching framework of human security.

International efforts to improve human security primarily benefit from international processes in policy fields important for the human security agenda, such as protection of refugees and internally displaced persons, reduction of poverty, or disaster risk reduction. The political will that provides support in these fields is more pronounced than on human security in its entirety. This can be judged, for instance, by the size and scope of projects coordinated by the UN Human Security Unit compared to those of organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the World Food Programme (WFP).[83]

These efforts currently fall under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. While not establishing any legal commitments, the launch of Agenda 2030 by world leaders at the opening session of the UN General Assembly in 2015 demonstrated the will to improve international efforts in policy fields that are relevant for human security.[84] The 17 SDGs to be attained by 2030 address a wide range of human security risks and threats, within five broad areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet: ending poverty and hunger; protecting the planet from degradation; ensuring a prosperous and fulfilling life for all human beings; fostering peaceful, just and inclu-

[78] UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290, 'Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit outcome', 10 Sep. 2012.

[79] UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290 (note 78), para. 3.

[80] UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 (note 77), para. 143.

[81] UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290 (note 78), para. 3.

[82] On the UN Human Security Unit, which provides information on UN-supported projects that have an explicit human security focus and are funded by the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, see United Nations, 'United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security', [n.d.].

[83] United Nations (note 82).

[84] UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 (note 6), paras 35–38.

sive societies; and mobilizing a Global Partnership for Sustainable Development. All UN member states have committed themselves, in SDG 17, to mobilize means for the implementation of Agenda 2030, including through additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources.[85]

Human security, military security and state security

Human security is concerned with vital threats to individuals and communities. Such threats can be caused by both military and non-military factors. This can lead to the assumption that military security—the security that can be achieved through military means—and human security are two different issues. However, such a view ignores the fact that military security, in addition to securing states and their preferred internal organization and functioning (i.e. state order), is also about securing individuals and communities who are threatened by outside military force or terrorist attacks. In this way, human security and military security overlap. The traditional realist scholarship in the international relations discipline sees military security as only providing security for states, ignoring the facts that states are comprised of citizens and that the protection of the territory and order of legitimate states against military aggression and terrorist attacks also advances their citizens' security. Other international relations theoretical approaches, such as the idealist, globalist, feminist or constructivist strands, are not similarly state-oriented.[86]

Other elements of human security, such as secure livelihoods, can be more difficult to attain during times when military security is low, such as during armed conflicts.[87] During times of peace, in contrast, there is a greater likelihood of improvements in human security.[88] In general, there is a correlation between a lack or deterioration of human security and violent conflict;[89] in turn, violent conflict is a cause of a lack of state security.[90] In addition, the state of human security is not independent of great power politics. Geopolitical competition and conflict, of which military expenditure is an indicator, tend to exacerbate risks and threats to human security; international cooperation is a crucial means for improving it.[91]

As noted above, military and human security can be seen as part of a 'single security space', comprising the universe of efforts to protect all that is valuable from vital threats.[92] This was close to the understanding of the authors of *Human Security Now*, when they stated that 'Human security thus broadens the focus from the security of borders to the lives of people and communities inside and across those borders. The idea is for people to be secure, not just for territories within borders to be secure against external aggression.'[93]

[85] UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 (note 6), preamble and target 17.3.

[86] See e.g. Dunn Cavelty, M. and Balzacq, T. (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, 2nd edn (Routledge: London, 2017).

[87] See e.g. Tadjbakhsh, S. and Chenoy, A., *Human Security Concepts and Implications* (Routledge: London, 2007); and Commission on Human Security (note 64), pp. 20–39.

[88] See e.g. United Nations and World Bank, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2018), pp. 33–34.

[89] World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (World Bank: Washington, 2011), pp. 45–65.

[90] The UN Security Council has noted this by, e.g., adopting resolutions that address human security risks and threats as threats to international peace and security, such as UN Security Council Resolution 2177, 8 Sep. 2014, on the Ebola crisis in West Africa. See also Sergeev, A. and Lee, J., 'From state security to human security: The evolving nature of the United Nations Security Council's jurisdiction', *InterGentes. McGill Journal of International Law and Legal Pluralism*, vol. 2, no. 2 (2020).

[91] See e.g. Buzan (note 60).

[92] Smith (note 3).

[93] Commission on Human Security (note 64), p. 6.

However, at the same time, there is competition between military and human security for resources, in particular government funding. While measures to prevent and cope with some risks and threats to human security can reduce others, resources to fund them are limited, they are operationally linked to specific ministries and they serve their own priorities. Some of the financial implications of this competition are discussed in the next chapter.

5. Human security and military expenditure

The observation that there is a single security space implies a view on security spending that covers both military and non-military elements. If there is an imbalance, as the current trends of military expenditure and non-military vital risks and threats described in chapter 3 indicate, then reductions in military expenditure are an obvious source of additional funds to address non-military risks and threats.

From the point of view of rational allocation of public expenditure, financial decisions on how much to invest to reduce the various security risks and threats should be based on comparisons of the relative urgency of addressing specific needs with levels of spending for given risks and threats. Such instrumental decision-making is difficult in the case of military versus non-military risks and threats for several reasons, one being the lack of relevant data.

Better data availability would go some way towards making decisions on government spending that are based on evidence. In the end, however, these are political decisions. This refers to both decisions on how to spend money for security nationally, as well as how much to contribute to help alleviate gaps in human security worldwide.

Several political decisions have been made with respect to international commitments to improve human security, some of which include concrete financial promises. However, there is a notable shortfall between what governments have committed to in international forums and the financial transfers that they have actually made. The gap between commitments and actual funding of global human security needs demonstrates a lack of political will to implement the pledge to improve human security and provides a glaring demonstration of the need to redistribute spending within the security space away from military expenditure.

Input and output measures of government spending

To assess the balance between spending on the various elements within the single security space, in particular military and human security, it would be useful to have comparable data. This data should cover both financial input—what is spent—and material output—what is achieved by that spending in relation to the goal of that spending. This would allow an evidence-based comparison of spending to needs, and lead to the allocation of resources on a common basis within the security space. Unfortunately, there are conceptual difficulties as well as data-availability problems which make such comparisons difficult.

The quantification of the level of military security is highly problematic, not least because it is, to a large extent, dependent on the military expenditure of others. Another problem in quantifying military security based on the level of military spending is that some of that spending is wasteful, for instance because of corruption (see chapter 6). In contrast, the consequences of non-military risks and threats for the (in-)security of people listed in chapter 3 can be clearly quantified.

With respect to measuring levels of spending, the situation is largely reversed. Much data on military expenditure is available, although there continues to be much room for improvement in government reporting of military expenditure data.[94] The situation is considerably worse for data on spending on human security. Two difficulties with putting a price tag on spending for human security stand out.

A first one concerns the role of states and thus, by extension, government spending. While states and their expenditure are important for human security, there is also

[94] See Béraud-Sudreau, L. and Lopes da Silva, D. 'Transparency in government reporting on military expenditure in South East Asia', *SIPRI Yearbook 2021* (note 1); and Wezeman and Wezeman (note 19).

an important role for non-state actors in the provision of human security, not least for those who are at risk. In consequence, the composition of government and non-government spending on human security is different from country to country. Military expenditure, meanwhile, is overwhelmingly made by governments.

A second difficulty is to identify the government activities that aim to improve human security. Often, budget items by relevant government institutions, such as ministries of health, cover spending for both human security and other activities. This limits the scope for measuring spending on human security by separating out these two parts of governments spending.

Despite these difficulties, there have been attempts to aggregate available data into comprehensive security budgets.[95] But the available data only allows for the inclusion of some aspects of security beyond military security. More work is needed to identify relevant activities and spending categories in order to construct more complete security budgets. To be able to implement a human security approach to budgeting on security, it is necessary to begin developing methodologies for assessing human security and for measuring human security spending.

A possible starting point for developing lists of relevant activities and spending categories could be assessment of the actions and means required to reduce the likelihood of current and future sufferings due to vital threats to people's lives, livelihoods and dignity. These include the assessments of needs made by humanitarian organizations for people in immediate need of support.[96] Such activities would have to be supplemented by other activities for the prevention of crises that threaten the vital core of people's life, liberty and dignity as well as activities empowering them to deal with such crises. An example where such efforts are under way is the policy field of disaster risk reduction: under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, UN member states have agreed to develop national and local disaster risk-reduction strategies, which include enumerations of concrete actions that are deemed necessary for disaster prevention, management and recovery.[97]

Even when data on relevant activities becomes available, it will be necessary to introduce a threshold for what are considered 'vital' risks and threats to human security. Judging from related similar issues, such as the defining of poverty, it is likely that governments would also be willing to consider a common definition of vital human security risks if it were offered by an authoritative international institution such as the UN.

International financial commitments

International donors are already helping states that lack sufficient resources to improve human security in several ways. One is through development assistance, which although not always efficient and well targeted, aims to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and communities to vital risks and threats. To put it differently, it aims to increase their resilience through prevention, protection and empowerment—three constitutive principles of human security.[98] Another important financial-support

[95] See e.g. Pemberton, M. and Korb, L., *Report of the Task Force on a Unified Security Budget for the United States* (Institute for Policy Studies: Washington, DC, Aug. 2010); and the discussion of unified security budgets in Lockspeiser, J., *Report: Women, Peace and Security Financing Workshop*, New York, 7–8 July 2016 (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom: New York, 2016).

[96] See e.g. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 'Needs assessment and analysis', [n.d.].

[97] UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030* (United Nations: Geneva, 2015).

[98] See e.g. Gasper et al. (note 69).

mechanism is international humanitarian assistance. This has more than tripled since the early 2000s, reflecting the growing risks and threats to human security.[99]

Despite considerable efforts, however, the international donor community is falling behind relevant commitments. Only a few countries have ever spent more than 0.7 per cent of their national income on official development assistance (ODA), a goal agreed to by the international donor community more than 50 years ago.[100] In 2020, ODA by member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) amounted to $161.2 billion, representing 0.32 per cent of their combined GNI.[101] Another example of a commitment not being met is that of international humanitarian assistance. Based on available data, a total of $37.7 billion was asked for in international calls for assistance during 2021. However, only 46 per cent of this figure was funded after appeals coordinated among many international agencies.[102]

International peacekeeping is also related to human security as it serves the goal of protecting people from risks and threats of armed conflict. The approved budget for UN peacekeeping operations for the financial year 1 July 2021–30 June 2022 is $6.38 billion.[103] In addition, regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), as well as individual states provide additional peacekeeping forces, for which no comprehensive data is available. However, there is a general shortfall in funding for peacekeeping missions.[104]

Shortfalls also mark international commitments in other fields with direct relevance to human security. This is the case for funding for the SDGs of the internationally agreed Agenda 2030, which is substantially more demanding than the efforts to substantially improve human security. In 2018 it was estimated by the UN and international experts that $3.3–4.5 trillion per year needed to be mobilized to realistically achieve the SDGs.[105] Developing countries were said to face an average annual funding gap of $2.5 trillion in these investments. Another study estimated that there was a shortfall of $222 billion per year in the funding for eliminating poverty by 2030 in 46 countries that were not capable of funding this themselves, in addition to the $86 billion per year that these countries would be able to finance themselves if they raised income to the maximum possible and redistributed government spending to the priority areas for eliminating poverty.[106] Another example is that of climate change, which will require large investments in transformation of energy production, mobility, agriculture and industry. In 2009 rich countries pledged to channel $100 billion per year by 2020 to less wealthy countries to help them mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change. Even this goal was not met.[107] These examples demonstrate the urgent need for additional funding.

There is a growing need for resources to reduce threats and risks to human security, particularly in those countries where the levels of human security are the lowest and

[99] Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX), 'GHA international humanitarian assistance', Development Initiatives, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

[100] UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), 'International development strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade', 24 Oct. 1970, para. 43.

[101] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 'COVID-19 spending helped to lift foreign aid to an all-time high in 2020', Detailed note, 13 Apr. 2021.

[102] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Global Humanitarian Overview 2022* (OCHA: New York, Dec. 2021), p. 64.

[103] United Nations, Department of Peace Operations, 'How we are funded', [n.d.].

[104] United Nations, *Our Common Agenda* (note 26), p. 60. See also Mir, W., 'Financing UN peacekeeping: Avoiding another crisis', Issue brief, International Peace Institute, Apr. 2019.

[105] UN Sustainable Development Group, *Unlocking SDG Financing: Findings from Early Adopters* (UN Development Cooperation Office and Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation: New York, 2018).

[106] Manuel, M., Samman, E. and Evans, M., 'Financing the end of extreme poverty: 2019 update', Briefing note, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Sep. 2019.

[107] Timperley, J., 'The broken $100-billion promise of climate finance—and how to fix it', *Nature*, 20 Oct. 2021.

which can least afford to invest in the protection of people. Mobilization of additional international sources of finance is needed, as also recognized in SDG 17.[108] Compared to the level of current global military expenditure, shortfalls in existing funding commitments directly related to human security appear limited. Financial needs are likely to grow, not least because of the Covid-19 crisis, making military spending a weighty source of additional finance. In 2021 the UN secretary-general therefore opted for an urgent call for increasing international cooperation, including in support of Agenda 2030.[109] In order to help build the political will to consider military expenditure reductions in response to this call, the next chapter turns to three priority fields of activity in which military spending reductions could help address this gap.

[108] For a status report see United Nations, *The Sustainable Development Goal Report 2021* (United Nations: New York, 2021), pp. 60–61. For an overview of how military spending contributions can contribute towards achieving the SDGs see Tian, N., Lopes da Silva, D. and Kuimova, A., 'Military spending and the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development', *Rethinking Unconstrained Military Spending* (note 21).

[109] United Nations, *Our Common Agenda* (note 26).

6. Priority fields of activity for military expenditure reductions

The starting point of this paper is the urgent need to close funding shortfalls for efforts to avert vital risks to human lives. Reducing military expenditure and redirecting the funds to human security priorities can go some way towards achieving this. As the history of military expenditure reduction initiatives (as briefly outlined in chapter 2) makes clear, a major objection to earlier initiatives was the fear that they would lead to reductions in state security. This chapter shows that rebalancing military expenditure to better meet non-military risks and threats does not need to reduce, and can even improve, security in the traditional sense.

This paper proposes three priority fields of activity in which financial resources can be reallocated from the military without harming a state's security: (*a*) arms control and disarmament negotiations and agreements; (*b*) sector-wide security sector reform for conflict prevention; and (*c*) financial responsibility in military expenditure and arms procurement. None of these fields of activity is new. They address areas where military spending makes no contribution to military security: both in the context of inimical relations between states, where the security provided by the military spending of one side is cancelled out by the military spending of the other side; and in the national context, where, for example, spending to prevent armed conflict can be inefficient or, because of corruption, wasteful. Thus, in addition to suggesting the scope for rebalancing levels of military spending, the priority fields of activity proposed here also address how the money is spent, focusing on inefficient parts of military expenditure.

All these fields of activity could help to improve human security by explicitly making military expenditure reductions a target. These three proposals could kick-start the process of identifying additional opportunities to redirect military expenditure to address security concerns beyond those which fall within the purview of armed forces. While this paper argues for governments to broaden the scope of security beyond military security and place more emphasis on non-traditional risks and threats, this requires political will that has so far been lacking. Suggestions for military expenditure reduction as a step-by-step process might help build such political will.

Arms control and disarmament negotiations and agreements

Reducing the likelihood of armed conflict and limiting the destructiveness of military capabilities are the core objectives of disarmament and the regulation of armaments. As shown above, the link to reductions in military spending was already recognized in the Charter of the UN (see chapter 2). Levels of armaments in one country are often justified by the levels of armaments of potential foes. Research into the driving factors of military expenditure confirms the importance of the security dilemma: what one side sees as an improvement in security is seen as a threat in another, leading to arms races in extreme cases.[110]

Obviously, much money could be saved if countries were to refrain from reciprocal spending on the military—with common disarmament according to agreed rules as the optimal outcome. Accordingly, the Charter of the UN tasked the General Assembly with developing 'principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments'

[110] See e.g. Dunne, J. P. and Smith, R. P., 'The econometrics of arms races', eds T. Sandler and K. Hartley, *Handbook of Defense Economics*, vol. 2, *Defense in a Globalized World* (Elsevier: Amsterdam, 2007).

and tasked the Security Council with planning 'for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments'.[111]

When international disarmament negotiations did not lead to practical results, the narrower concept of arms control, with or without disarmament, gained popularity in the 1960s. While the experts who developed the concept of arms control focused on stabilization of the nuclear arms race, they also saw cost savings as an important aspect. For instance, in 1961 arms control was considered to cover all forms of cooperation between potential military enemies with three goals: (*a*) 'reducing the likelihood of war', (*b*) reducing 'its scope and violence, if it occurs', and (*c*) reducing 'the political and economic costs of being prepared for it'.[112] Cost savings were a consideration in some arms control agreements, such as the 1972 Soviet–US Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.[113] Nevertheless, agreed military expenditure reductions had no role in arms control negotiations during the cold war. Moreover, there was no link with the efforts at reducing military expenditure (see chapter 2).

Financial considerations became more important again after the end of the cold war, albeit indirectly. One example is the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine (APM) Convention.[114] One of its objectives is economic: to remove an obstacle to reconstruction and development after the end of a conflict.[115] Other examples include the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 2008 Cluster Munitions Convention.[116] The period of post-cold war arms control and disarmament has had its setbacks, particularly with respect to the reluctance of major powers to participate. However, it indicates that linking the three goals *a*–*c* in international arms control negotiations and agreements is both feasible and productive.[117]

A renewed emphasis on the financial dimension of arms control and disarmament is overdue. The importance of addressing current and future needs to improve human security makes a strong case for opening negotiations on agreements that free military expenditure. Because the prime logic of military spending is to provide military security, it makes sense to link reductions in military spending with improvements in military security through arms control and disarmament. At the same time, considering reductions in military spending as one element in negotiations on arms control and disarmament adds to their potential to increase security—both military security in a direct way and other aspects of security through the opportunity for financial reallocation.

In his 2021 report *Our Common Agenda*, the UN secretary-general called for a New Agenda for Peace that should take a more comprehensive, holistic view of global security. It would be essential to include military expenditure reductions in this agenda.[118] Institutionally, this implies widening the scope of stakeholders invited to contribute new ideas for arms control and disarmament initiatives to include others within the 'single security space' who have an interest in how government budgets are allocated.

[111] Charter of the United Nations (note 7), articles 11, 26.

[112] Schelling, T. C. and Halperin, M. H., *Strategy and Arms Control* (Twentieth Century Fund: New York, 1961), p. 2.

[113] Soviet–US Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), signed 26 May 1972, entered into force 3 Oct. 1972, not in force from 13 June 2002, *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 944 (1974), pp. 13–17.

[114] Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM Convention), opened for signature 3 Dec. 1997, entered into force 1 Mar. 1999.

[115] See e.g. Thakur, R. and Maley, W., 'The Ottawa Convention on landmines: A landmark humanitarian treaty in arms control?', *Global Governance*, vol. 5, no. 3 (July–Sep. 1999), p. 279.

[116] Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC), opened for signature 13 Jan. 1993, entered into force 29 Apr. 1997; and Convention on Cluster Munitions, opened for signature 3 Dec. 2008, entered into force 1 Aug. 2010.

[117] See e.g. Cooper, N. and Mutimer, D. (eds), *Reconceptualising Arms Control: Controlling the Means of Violence* (Routledge: London, 2012).

[118] United Nations, *Our Common Agenda* (note 26), para. 89.

Making the diversion of the world's human and economic resources for military security a core concern does not diminish the importance of current arms control and disarmament efforts that have other objectives. Current international relations are marked by growing distrust among states, erosion of international agreements and increased military efforts. Increases in militarization, in turn, lead to the further deterioration of relations among states. Arms control and disarmament are of overwhelming importance in stopping and reversing such trends. Linking arms control to the reallocation of finances to help improve human security offers opportunities to establish broad political coalitions in support of arms control initiatives. For instance, jointly negotiating limitations on military expenditure and limits on certain types of major weapon system or on the numbers and deployment of military personnel could overcome the dilemma of what comes first—disarmament or military expenditure reduction—which has plagued earlier initiatives for military expenditure reductions.

Negotiations with military spending reduction as an objective will require new levels of government transparency in military expenditure data. Negotiating parties will want confidence in monitoring and even verifying what they agree on. Improving official reporting on military expenditure is thus an important step towards the goal of linking military spending and arms control.

Sector-wide security sector reform for conflict prevention

Armed conflict and political violence are two major causes of insecurity. It is therefore only logical that the significant reduction of all forms of violence and related deaths is one of the SDG targets (SDG target 16.1).[119] Some of the approaches to addressing these conflict-engendered insecurities are expensive, and both national and international efforts to address them have always fallen short. However, a more effective and less expensive approach is prevention, which is a key principle of human security. Research has demonstrated that conflict-prevention measures work in many countries that have successfully managed high-risk conflicts and avoided any descent into violence.[120] Many regional organizations have established conflict-prevention mechanisms to ensure that the root causes of conflicts are addressed at an early stage through a combination of analysis, early warning, rapid response and partnerships.[121] In adopting preventive measures, including preventive diplomacy, some of the fundamental causes of insecurity must be identified and addressed. In many conflict- and post-conflict states, abuse perpetrated by security forces has been a major contributory factor in causing, exacerbating, escalating and prolonging armed conflicts and deepening their traumatic effects.

Security sector reform as a process of enhancing effective and accountable security for the state and its people has been a major policy instrument for addressing this fundamental cause of armed conflict and political violence.[122] Its attraction lies in the holistic approach to security, where human security, rather than state or regime security, is the main object of security. The UN, for instance, expresses its interests in SSR as being 'to support States and societies in developing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions so as to contribute to international peace and security, sustainable development and the enjoyment of human rights by all'.[123] It

[119] UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 (note 6).

[120] United Nations and World Bank (note 88).

[121] United Nations, 'Preventive diplomacy: Delivering results', Report of the Secretary-General, S/2011/552, 26 Aug. 2011.

[122] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *The United Nations SSR Perspective* (United Nations: New York, May 2012).

[123] United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, 'Securing peace and development: The role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform', Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659–S/2008/39, 23 Jan.

further holds that such security institutions are critical to preventing countries from relapsing into conflict.[124] Governments and other international organizations have expressed their support for SSR.

Reforms—such as professionalizing the forces through training and providing effective governance of security institutions through democratic control and oversight—are seen as critical components of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction.[125] To achieve this objective, a sector-wide approach to SSR that seeks to enhance the governance and overall performance of the security sector as a whole is important.[126] This UN approach contrasts sharply with the more common approach of the international donor community, which focuses mainly on component-specific SSR. In particular, an overwhelming share of support for SSR has been for defence reforms, especially 'train and equip' efforts, where the military is provided with some equipment and training.[127] The reason usually advanced for privileging the defence sector is that the armed forces are at the heart of providing effective security for the state and represent the arm of the security sector most prone to abuse, which eventually results in armed conflict.

However, this practice has limited the scope of SSR as originally envisaged and developed.[128] The idea of dealing with all aspects of security as an interlinked system for efficient service delivery and provision of security to citizens has thus been circumscribed by focusing mainly on the defence sector.[129] While the focus on the defence sector addresses short-term threats and stability, the long-term goal of sustaining peace and preventing conflict is less guaranteed without also reforming the other security forces dealing with internal security and the state institutions entrusted with oversight of the security forces. Severe deficits in the governance of the security sector, including in accountability, transparency and responsiveness, can result in the breakdown of law and order, leading to impunity.[130]

Yet, in most countries implementing SSR, the causes of insecurity after a conflict are internal rather than external, and so require security forces other than the military. In addition, the governance aspect of reform is neglected. Parliaments and other oversight bodies are often left out of the reform process, thereby leaving the defence sector as the most potent part of the security sector, with little or no effective control mechanism. These critical aspects of the reform are left untouched while resources are focused on the so-called hard aspect of reform, with all its implications for financial responsibility and accountability in the resource-allocation process.

A redistribution of resources to other deserving arms of the security sector is thus needed to ensure organic growth of the sector to sustain peace and prevent the risks and other forms of insecurity that the defence sector cannot address alone. This would allow preventive action to be put in place to avoid a relapse into violence and ensure that critical financial resources are redistributed in a way that enhances the capacities of other arms of the security sector to prevent or mitigate the impact of major crises and disasters. Prevention is cost effective. One study estimates that a global total of

2008, para. 45(a).

[124] UN Security Council Resolution 2151, 28 Apr. 2014; and UN Security Council Resolution 2282, 27 Apr. 2016.

[125] Brzoska, M., 'Extending ODA or creating a new reporting instrument for security-related expenditures for development?', *Development Policy Review*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Mar. 2008); and Fitz-Gerald, A. M., *SSR and Peacebuilding: Thematic Review of Security Sector Reform (SSR) to Peacebuilding and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund* (United Nations, Peacebuilding Support Office: New York, 2012).

[126] Hänggi, H., 'Conceptualizing UN support to security sector reform', eds A. Ebo and H. Hänggi, *The United Nations and Security Sector Reform: Policy and Practice* (DCAF and Lit Verlag: Zürich, 2020).

[127] Eckhard, S., *The Challenges and Lessons Learned in Supporting Security Sector Reform* (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Bonn, June 2016).

[128] Fitz-Gerald (note 125).

[129] Eckhard (note 127).

[130] United Nations and World Bank (note 88), p. 161.

$5–70 billion per year could be saved if a preventive approach were to be adopted over a considerable period.[131]

To achieve the overall objective of SSR—to sustain peace and prevent relapse into conflict—a sector-wide approach should be adopted, which may entail further coordination of efforts by external partners supporting SSR. In addition to preventing conflict, effective implementation of SSR could lead to a reduction in military spending in the long run after the security governance architecture has been institutionalized.

Financial responsibility in military expenditure and arms procurement

Financial responsibility implies that government operates efficiently and effectively in raising revenue and in spending taxpayers' money. It entails honesty and discipline in financial planning as well as transparency and accountability in the use of resources.[132] In most countries, the parliaments that decide on spending and the executive authorities that spend what is appropriated have several financial responsibilities. These are primarily towards their citizens, but there are also global responsibilities arising from commitments made as members of international organizations, for example on issues such as transparency and corruption.[133]

Practically all states argue that their military expenditure is in line with what is necessary for their military security. In other words, they claim to be efficiently using resources in the military sector. However, there are several problems with current levels of military expenditure. One is that a significant proportion of it is in response to military spending by others. As argued above, the military expenditure of pairs or groups of countries in rivalry, in competition or even war cancel each other out. Rather than reducing risks and threats, their spending may even increase them if rivals enter into dangerous arms races. A second problem relates to decision-making over military spending, which is often not transparent and is thus prone to corruption and other forms of inefficiency.[134] A third is off-budget expenditure, which is expenditure that is not included in the state budget but is funded from sources outside the budget, such as revenues from natural resources or from military businesses.[135] Fourth, decisions on military spending are often driven by concerns other than the provision of military security. Procurement decisions, for instance, are often shaped by economic considerations, such as providing employment in particular regions, as well as by lobbying by arms producers and sellers.[136]

Finally, corruption is a major challenge to financial responsibility. Military expenditure, particularly arms procurement and the arms trade, is vulnerable to corruption because of the secrecy surrounding many such activities. In assessments of corruption, procurement is regularly among the sectors at the top of the list, alongside off-budget expenditure, in many developing countries.[137] The problem goes deeper, however, than

[131] United Nations and World Bank (note 88), p. 3.

[132] International Monetary Fund (IMF), Fiscal Affairs Department, *Manual on Fiscal Transparency* (IMF: Washington, DC, 2001)—see chapter 2 for definitions of financial responsibility used by various countries.

[133] See e.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *OECD Budget Transparency Toolkit: Practical Steps for Supporting Openness, Integrity and Accountability in Public Financial Management* (OECD: Paris, Sep. 2017).

[134] Omitoogun, W. and Hutchful, E., SIPRI, *Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: Processes and Mechanisms of Control* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006). See also Perlo-Freeman, S., 'Transparency and accountability in military spending', SIPRI, 3 Aug. 2016; and Transparency International (TI), *The Transparency of National Defence Budgets* (TI: London, Oct. 2011).

[135] Hendrickson, D. and Ball, N., *Off-budget Military Expenditure and Revenue: Issues and Policy Perspectives for Donors* (Conflict, Security and Development Group, International Policy Institute, King's College: London, 2002).

[136] See Utley, M., 'Defence procurement', eds D. J. Galbreath and J. R. Deni, *Routledge Handbook on Defence Studies* (Routledge: London, 2018).

[137] See data collected by Transparency International, 'Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index'; and World Peace Foundation, 'Global arms trade and corruption'. See e.g. in the case of Sudan, Suleiman, B., 'Sudan's exchange rate: How to sustain progress and preempt risks', Briefing, The Sentry, Mar. 2021.

immediate financial effects. Corruption at the level of government corrodes standards of financial behaviour in the population, including with respect to taxes, which in turn reduces government income. Corruption is also a major factor in hollowing out states, which leaves them without internal resources to mobilize when needed.[138]

Major international bodies such as the Group of Twenty (G20) have guiding principles to ensure integrity in the procurement process through encouragement of an open and competitive process.[139] Despite this, however, it does not appear as if governments are doing enough to stem the tide of corruption in the defence sector. A 2015 Transparency International study on corruption in the defence sector found that 70 per cent of governments fail to protect against corruption.[140] Courts of auditors and other institutions tasked with fighting corruption are often prevented from investigating military issues when they are declared to be national secrets. The study found that two-thirds of parliaments fail to be watchdogs of defence corruption.

There are several international commitments to fight corruption.[141] The 2003 UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is a major anti-corruption convention with a global coverage.[142] It is both preventive and punitive, with nearly all the countries of the world party to it, but its effects have been minimal.[143] Substantially reducing corruption and bribery is also one of the objectives of the SDGs (target 16.5).[144] Other international bodies, such as the G20, the EU and the AU, also have various types of anti-corruption framework to stem the tide of corruption, with varying degrees of success. A successful elimination of corruption (or at least a substantial reduction), especially in the defence procurement process and regarding off-budget expenditure, would go a long way in reducing military expenditure and releasing resources for other uses—in particular, human security.

[138] See e.g. Chayes, S., *Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security* (W.W. Norton: New York, 2014).

[139] Group of 20 (G20), 'G20 principles for promoting integrity in public procurement', 2015.

[140] Transparency International, 'Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015'.

[141] Duri, J., 'Overview of international commitments on corruption and illicit finance', U4 Helpdesk Answer 2021:3, Transparency International, 12 Feb. 2021.

[142] United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), adopted by the UN General Assembly 31 Oct. 2003, opened for signature 9 Dec. 2003, entered into force 14 Dec. 2005.

[143] Transparency International and UNCAC Coalition, *Using the UN Convention against Corruption to Advance Anti-corruption Efforts: A Guide* (Transparency International: Berlin, 2013).

[144] UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 (note 6).

7. Conclusions

Threats and risks to human security cannot be met by reallocating funds from military spending alone. Nevertheless, savings from military expenditure reductions could make an important contribution to the rising need to meet challenges such as extreme poverty and climate change.

Suggestions to agree on joint reductions of military expenditure have been made before. The novelty of this paper is to directly link the objective of reducing military expenditure to broader security assessments. The proposed standard of security is that of human security, for two reasons.

The first is the interrelationship between military security and human security. Earlier initiatives to reduce military expenditure failed because of concerns about reductions in traditional state security. While these concerns must be taken seriously, they are based on a traditional understanding of security that focuses exclusively on the protection of territory and the state order. Such an understanding is proving overly narrow at a time of growing risks and threats to people and their environment. The standard of human security implies a reconsideration of spending on the military in view of the demands of non-military risks and threats.

Second, by adopting the United Nations resolutions on human security as well as on non-military threats to life and livelihoods, human security has been accepted in principle as an objective by the international community. The obligation to improve human security falls primarily on individual states, but the international community has made collective commitments to support states in their efforts to promote human security needs. However, it has not lived up to these commitments in the past. Worse still, with the rising need to address vital risks and threats, there is a danger of even greater shortfalls to come. This must be considered in national decision-making on military expenditure in all countries.

This paper does not include detailed suggestions on where to spend resources saved through military expenditure reductions. This is deliberate, as deficits in human security are large and widespread, and optimal options for the improvements of human security depend on circumstances. Furthermore, the available data on which to base concrete proposals remains weak. Data on spending on human security is sparse and is not easy to develop. But because of the importance of data in directing policy and activities to improve human security, increased efforts to improve the data are necessary in order to support the rebalancing of budgets within the single security space. The data on human security therefore needs to be improved. Improvement is also necessary with respect to official data on military expenditure. The UN's military expenditure reporting instrument needs to be upgraded. Additional instruments, for instance with respect to the verification of national data, will be important for increasing the trust in internationally negotiated military expenditure reductions.

Three proposed priority fields of activity to pave the way for military expenditure reductions and reallocation of financial means to human security needs are (*a*) arms control and disarmament negotiations and agreements; (*b*) sector-wide security sector reform for conflict prevention; and (*c*) financial responsibility in military expenditure and arms procurement. On the one hand, they are designed to preserve the security of states and state order. On the other hand, they may become more attractive, at least among some political forces, through their links with improvements in human security. The New Agenda for Peace, suggested by the UN secretary-general in his 2021 report *Our Common Agenda*, would be a good forum to begin discussions on linking arms-limitation and conflict-prevention measures to military expenditure

reductions.[145] Similarly, efforts to promote SDG 16 on conflict and governance, particularly SDG targets 16.1 (reducing of all forms of violence) and 16.5 (reducing corruption and bribery) could be a link to military expenditure reductions. Finally, savings on military expenditure should become an explicit goal of SSR initiatives.

The priority fields of activity proposed in this paper to start rebalancing security spending are not meant to be exclusive, but rather to stimulate further debate. They are also unlikely to quickly make major contributions to meeting the growing need to provide human security worldwide. But continuing on the current course of further increases and record-high global military expenditure is not an option. The proposals aim to break the trend by showing that reductions in military expenditure can help improve all dimensions of security, hopefully initiating discussions on opportunities for further, wide-reaching reductions of global military expenditure in the future.

[145] See United Nations, *Our Common Agenda* (note 26), p. 4.

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