


THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME'S CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVING THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN ETHIOPIA

FARAH HEGAZI, VONGAI MURUGANI, GRAZIA PACILLO
AND PETER LÄDERACH



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
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World Food Programme



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The SIPRI–WFP Knowledge Partnership and Disclaimer

WFP and SIPRI established a knowledge partnership in 2018 to help strengthen WFP's contribution to improving the prospects for peace in the countries where it works. The research for phase I of this partnership visited four case study states—El Salvador, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan and Mali—and produced initial findings in June 2019. The evidence from these case studies indicated that some WFP programming positively contributes to improving the prospects for peace, but also identified various issues that needed to be addressed. The preliminary report made a number of general and country-specific recommendations on how WFP's contribution to improving the prospects for peace could be improved. However, further research was required to test the robustness and general applicability of the initial findings and recommendations, and to refine and add to them with more case studies. Accordingly, phase II of the inquiry was broadened by adding new states, and deepened through a focus on five thematic areas.

Eight states were identified for research in phase II: Colombia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Lebanon, Nigeria, South Sudan and Sri Lanka. The five thematic areas are climate change, stabilization, gender, cash-based interventions and measurement. The research has inquired into and reported on these areas in all eight states, and there was also a deep dive in each country into one or two of the thematic areas. Phase II of the research will produce eight country reports, five thematic reports and a synthesis report that brings together all the evidence, findings and recommendations.

The Ethiopia case study is the third of 12 country case studies in phase II, and was conducted in partnership with CGIAR. The research focused on identifying the possible contributions made by WFP's climate adaptation and risk management programming to improving the prospects for peace. The methodology entailed a literature review of the country context and of WFP's programmes, as well as remote key informant interviews with WFP country office staff, other UN agencies, WFP implementing partners and Ethiopian government representatives, and in-person interviews and focus group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

The findings and recommendations are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the positions of SIPRI, CGIAR or WFP, or the management, executive directors or boards of these institutions. The authors alone are responsible for any errors or omissions.

* Delgado, C. et al., *The World Food Programme's Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2019).

Executive summary

Objectives

The goal of this report is to explain and assess the contribution of WFP Ethiopia's climate adaptation and risk management programmes to peace in Ethiopia. The research focused on the Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia (SIIPE) programme, and the primary objectives were to understand whether and, if so, how: (a) SIIPE contributes to reducing conflict and improving the prospects for peace in Ethiopia; (b) WFP incorporates conflict sensitivity into SIIPE; and (c) SIIPE has itself contributed to conflict between or within communities. To achieve these objectives, the research developed and tested theories of change (TOCs) that articulate how SIIPE might potentially contribute to enhancing the prospects for peace. Based on the findings in relation to these TOCs, this report makes recommendations to improve WFP Ethiopia's potential to contribute to enhancing the prospects for peace.

Overview of findings

SIIPE is a multidimensional programme that aims to enhance beneficiaries' integrated risk management capacities. First, it provides food insecure pastoralists with pasture-based index insurance coverage for their livestock. The insurance payout is triggered when satellite data shows that drought is affecting the availability of vegetation. In exchange for this insurance cover, the beneficiaries engage in asset creation activities, primarily natural resource management such as soil and water conservation, and rangeland management. The insurance payout allows beneficiaries to purchase feed and water for their livestock to minimize herd losses during a severe drought. Second, SIIPE provides support services for pastoralists, such as veterinary pharmacies, livestock vaccination programmes and access to fodder production. Third, it aims to build risk reserves by promoting a savings culture, creating savings and loans associations, and increasing financial literacy. Finally, it aims to diversify pastoralists' livelihoods and increase their income by supporting access to financial services and business development training.

Pastoralists and agropastoralists in the Somali region cope with drought in many ways, from changing mobility patterns to livestock raiding, petty trade, selling assets and engaging in wage labour. Changing mobility patterns have created inter-communal conflict as pastoralists compete over water and pasture. In some instances livestock raiding has been a source of conflict, particularly between different ethnic groups.

This report covers two TOCs that explain the relationship between WFP's SIIPE programme and the prospects for peace. The first TOC is that the insurance payout allows herders to maintain their herds or minimize their herd losses without changing mobility patterns during a drought, which decreases the likelihood of inter-communal conflict. Although conflict reduction is not an explicit objective of the SIIPE programme, WFP staff spoke of the programme's potential to reduce inter-communal conflict. More specifically, they explained that, theoretically, since the payout allows herders to buy fodder or water for their herds within their communities, they no longer need to move outside of their home district or *woreda* in search of water and pasture for their animals. As a result, inter-communal conflict over pasture and water resources would no longer take place. The experiences of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, however, do not provide a clear-cut picture. The interviewees indicated that the payouts prevented migration outside the *woreda* because they were able to

maintain their own food security, which in turn decreased inter-communal conflict, but they also indicated that migration during severe droughts continued despite the payouts. Both beneficiary and non-beneficiary interviewees indicated that cash transfers, either in the form of an insurance payout or more regularly through the Productive Safety Net Programme, allow some pastoralists to remain within their communities during a drought. This is because they use the cash to buy, among other things, fodder for their animals, thus negating the need to move outside of their *woredas* in search of pasture for their herds. As a result, some interviewees reported that inter-communal conflict had decreased.

The above results indicate that the SIIPE programme has the potential to contribute to conflict reduction and thus negative peace in the Somali region of Ethiopia. However, they also indicate that regular cash transfers have the same potential, which demonstrates that a regular source of income may offer similar results to an insurance programme.

The second TOC is that if the insurance payout allows herders to maintain the size and health of their herds, or minimizes their herd losses, without engaging in livestock raiding to rebuild their herds, then the likelihood of conflict decreases. Focus group discussions indicated that intra-ethnic livestock raiding is not currently a method of coping with drought, in contrast to the communities along the border with the Oromia region where inter-ethnic raiding is reported to be occurring and pastoralists from the Somali region cross into Kenya. Although the interviews do not provide enough evidence to either support or refute the TOC on the relationship between insurance payouts and livestock raiding as a means of coping with drought, it should not be discounted as livestock raiding may be specific to certain areas in the Somali region of Ethiopia, rather than across the entire Somali region.

Intra-communal conflict also emerges as an area of concern during periods of natural resource scarcity. Natural resource management, such as rangeland rehabilitation and building water ponds, is included as one component of the SIIPE programme, although implementation has been limited thus far. While there was not enough evidence gathered during the field research to support a TOC on intra-communal conflict, community members described how tensions and conflict can arise during droughts and periods of irregular rainfall between pastoralists living in the same *kebele*, as they compete for insufficient water resources for their herds. Although the interviewees noted that community leaders and elders facilitate conflict resolution between parties, they also explained that increasing the availability of water resources during such periods would reduce intra-communal conflict.

Additional findings emerged that were neither informed by nor relied on a TOC. First, a lack of clarity regarding the selection criteria for SIIPE proved to be a point of potential contention. In some cases, non-beneficiaries were unclear about the SIIPE selection criteria and this lack of clarity created discontent. By clearly communicating the selection criteria and expanding the coverage of the complaints and feedback mechanism (CFM), WFP could minimize such problems.

Second, regular conflict analysis to inform programming is not standard practice in the WFP Ethiopia country office; and since conflict reduction is not one of SIIPE's objectives, a conflict analysis was not conducted to inform the programme. Excluding inter- and intra-communal conflict from the context analysis that informs programme design means that the programme is designed based on an incomplete assessment of the existing dynamics within and between communities. This means that the programme fails to consider all the aspects to which it might positively contribute. Given that a proportion of WFP's climate adaptation and risk management interventions are implemented in conflict-affected regions in Ethiopia, building

capacity and expertise on conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity, and integrating these insights into programme design could increase the opportunities for enhancing the prospects for peace.

Overall, the research suggests that SIIPE has the potential to contribute to enhancing the prospects for peace in Ethiopia but there is room for improvement:

Programmatic recommendations

1. Consider prioritizing livelihood diversification activities, since they may offer a more regular source of income for households.
2. Prioritize natural resource management activities within the SIIPE programme.

Improving conflict analysis

3. Clearly communicate the targeting criteria to beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
4. Expand the coverage of the CFM to all *woredas* where SIIPE is being implemented.
5. Build the capacity and expertise in the Ethiopia country office on conflict analysis and integrating conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding into programming.
6. Conduct a conflict analysis on inter- and intra-communal conflict in the regions in which SIIPE is to be scaled-up prior to its implementation.
7. Explicitly incorporate insights from inter- and intra-communal conflict analyses into targeting, programme design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Use the conflict analysis to incorporate conflict sensitivity and/or peacebuilding as an explicit programme objective.

Abbreviations

CFM	Complaints and feedback mechanism
CSP	Country strategic plan
GDP	Gross domestic product
HDP	Humanitarian–development–peace nexus
IDP	Internally displaced person
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
SIPE	Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia
TOC	Theory of change

1. Introduction

WFP Ethiopia was selected to participate in research on the contribution of WFP to improving the prospects for peace as one of 12 country case studies of the SIPRI–WFP Knowledge Partnership. The objectives of the case studies are to understand in each context: (a) WFP’s contribution to improving the prospects for peace; (b) how WFP might enhance its contribution to improving the prospects for peace; and (c) how WFP can measure its contribution to improving the prospects for peace. The knowledge partnership explores five specific thematic areas: stabilization, climate change (see box 1.1 below), gender, cash-based transfers and measurement. Ethiopia was chosen as one of the case studies to examine these questions in the context of WFP’s climate adaptation and risk management programming. The case study focuses on the Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia (SIIPE) programme in the Somali region.

Section II provides a context analysis of Ethiopia and the Somali region, focused on conflict dynamics, the effects of climate change and their interaction with food security and conflict. Section III briefly explains the research design and objectives. Section IV presents the key findings regarding the theories of change (TOC) on how SIIPE contributes to enhancing the prospects for peace in Ethiopia, which focus on pastoralists’ changing patterns of mobility and livestock raiding. These findings are then followed by an analysis of conflict sensitivity concerns and possible areas in which WFP could contribute to improving the prospects for peace. Section V discusses cross-cutting components for improving the prospects for peace and section VI concludes with a summary of the recommendations.

Box 1.1. Key concepts and definitions

Climate change

‘Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use. Note that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its Article 1, defines climate change as: “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. The UNFCCC thus makes a distinction between climate change attributable to human activities altering the atmospheric composition and climate variability attributable to natural causes.’^a

^a Matthews, J. B. R. (ed.), ‘Annex I: Glossary’, eds Masson-Delmotte, V. et al., *An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty* (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Geneva, 2018).

2. Historical, political and geographic context

There is a long history of resistance to the central government in Ethiopia, primarily driven by inequality, inequity, marginalization and separatist movements. As far back as the 13th century, Ethiopia had an imperialist, feudal system in its highlands as Abyssinians exploited the indigenous population, and attempted to spread Christianity and impose the use of the Amharic language.¹ This system did not incorporate the lowlands to the same extent because of the lack of agricultural productivity, and the difficulties of controlling and taxing mobile pastoralists and a pastoralist economy.²

The control of land in the highlands and the desire to increase that control dominated the imperial project, resulting in the exploitation of farming populations.³ During the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie (1930–74), increased pressure to produce was continually placed on farmers and taxes on farming were increased. Despite government efforts to quell the discontent surrounding tax increases, opposition to Selassie's regime grew from within the army and the civil service, driven by inequity and inequality.⁴

Imperialism, feudalism and the Selassie regime came to an end in 1974, when a military coup ousted him, ushering in the Derg regime.⁵ A major factor in its ousting was the Selassie government's poor response to the drought-driven famine of 1973, which affected an estimated 2 million people.⁶ International relief agencies were barred from providing assistance and the lack of response from the Ethiopian government angered a wide swathe of Ethiopian society, from the military to the peasants and the middle class in urban areas.⁷

The Derg regime, which ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991, was initially composed of representatives from Ethiopia's various ethnic and socio-economic groups, but later prioritized one-man rule over accommodating Ethiopia's diversity.⁸ Among its most important initiatives, in order to legitimize itself, was the institution of substantial changes to land ownership in Ethiopia. Land ownership reverted to the government and peasants were awarded use rights.⁹ This effectively ended private land ownership in Ethiopia, and with it the feudal tenancy system, stripping the ruling class of its power.¹⁰ Although land reform favoured landless Ethiopians and former tenant farmers, the policy was accompanied by other initiatives such as forced resettlement, collectivization and villagization, to which people were not receptive.¹¹

In addition to these policies, the Derg regime's economic policies failed to deliver economic growth.¹² The economy was nationalized and a majority of industries were placed in the hands of the government or public-private partnerships.¹³ Nationalization discouraged private investment and overburdened the government's financial

¹ Donham, D., 'Old Abyssinia and the new Ethiopian empire: Themes in social history', eds D. Donham and W. James, *The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in History and Social Anthropology* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1986); and Markakis, J., *Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers* (Boydell & Brewer: Martlesham, UK, 2011).

² Markakis (note 1).

³ Markakis (note 1).

⁴ Zewde, B., *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991* (James Curry: Oxford, 2001).

⁵ Zewde (note 4).

⁶ Zewde (note 4); and Lanz, T. J., 'Environmental degradation and social conflict in the northern highlands of Ethiopia: The case of Tigray and Wollo provinces', *Africa Today*, vol. 43, no. 2 (1996).

⁷ Lanz (note 6).

⁸ Zewde (note 4); Lanz (note 6); and Markakis (note 1).

⁹ Zewde (note 4).

¹⁰ Zewde (note 4); and Markakis (note 1).

¹¹ Zewde (note 4); and Clapham, C., 'Controlling space in Ethiopia', eds W. James et al., *Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After* (J. Currey: Oxford, 2002).

¹² Zewde (note 4).

¹³ Markakis (note 1).

resources.¹⁴ The government prioritized the agricultural sector in its economic plans but the policies it implemented, such as the monopoly purchase of agricultural surpluses at a fixed price, reduced agricultural output. This resulted in food shortages and increased food prices.¹⁵ The control that the government took over the agriculture sector also encouraged subsistence agriculture.¹⁶

Moreover, in the early 1980s, Ethiopia experienced another severe drought-driven famine, which this time affected approximately 10 million people and led to the deaths of two million people.¹⁷ The government was late in addressing the famine, but it eventually moved people from Ethiopia's drought-prone regions to more productive areas.¹⁸ Relocation was met with great discontent both inside and outside of Ethiopia. There was a belief that the government intended to depopulate areas such as Tigray that were resistant to the regime.¹⁹ Resettlement from famine-affected areas of Tigray, Wollo and Shoa also forced farmers to switch from subsistence agriculture to commercial production, effectively making them wage labourers who earned work points to be exchanged for a proportion of the collective harvest.²⁰

The Derg regime also faced several ethno-nationalist separatist movements in addition to Tigray, such as in Oromo and Somali, driven by a desire for self-determination.²¹ The Tigray People's Liberation Front saw the Derg regime as another imperial power, as rural poverty remained high and no progress had been made towards creating a multinational state.²² By contrast, the Oromo people initially benefited from the changes made by the Derg regime, particularly on land reform.²³ However, as the Derg regime transitioned away from a multinational state towards one-man rule, the Oromo Liberation Front gained strength.²⁴ The Derg regime fell in 1991, following defeat in a civil war against the Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front.²⁵

Federalism and decentralization

Since 1991, Ethiopia has been organized as a decentralized federal state made up of ethno-national regions.²⁶ Despite its organization as a federation, the central government strongly influences regional policies through its distribution of financial resources and continued ownership of land.²⁷ Reorganization has also created regional boundaries within Ethiopia, which have resulted in regional and local conflicts over border demarcations and access to resources from federal and regional governments.²⁸ It has also localized inter-ethnic conflict. Rather than confronting the federal government, as was the case in the past, conflict along ethnic lines now occurs

¹⁴ Zewde (note 4).

¹⁵ Markakis (note 1).

¹⁶ Clapham (note 11).

¹⁷ Lanz (note 6); and Markakis (note 1).

¹⁸ Zewde (note 4).

¹⁹ Zewde (note 4); and Lanz (note 6).

²⁰ Pankhurst, A., 'Surviving resettlement in Wellegga: The Qeto experience', eds W. James et al., *Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After* (J. Currey: Oxford, 2002); and Markakis (note 1).

²¹ Zewde (note 4); and Markakis (note 1).

²² Hammond, J., 'Garrison towns and the control of space in revolutionary Tigray', eds W. James et al., *Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After* (J. Currey: Oxford, 2002).

²³ Markakis (note 1).

²⁴ Markakis (note 1).

²⁵ Zewde (note 4).

²⁶ Hagmann, T., *Talking Peace in the Ogaden: The Search for an End to Conflict in the Somali Regional State in Ethiopia* (Rift Valley Institute: Nairobi, 2014).

²⁷ Hagmann, T. and Abbink, J., 'Twenty years of revolutionary democratic Ethiopia, 1991 to 2011', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, vol. 5, no. 4 (Nov. 2011).

²⁸ Hagmann and Abbink (note 27).

between regions and over territory. Conflict within and between regions in Ethiopia has also been ethnicized as those in power seek to advance their own agendas.²⁹

As land continues to be owned by the state, customary rights, which were essential to mobile pastoralists, are no longer legitimate. This erosion of customary rights has created competition between pastoral groups over access to land and the natural resources that go with it, notably water and pasture. Soil erosion and population growth have exacerbated this competition.³⁰ In a country where a majority of the population engages in farming or pastoralism, land and its associated resources are essential.

Federalism has also created some advantages, as minority groups have become more active in the civil service and in parliament, which has allowed them to express their grievances and demands.³¹ The Government of Ethiopia engages in efforts to mediate between regional and local conflicts. If the conflict is violent, police or military troops are called on to control the violence. Community elders then mediate disputes and arrange compensation for the affected group. Occasionally, the perpetrators of violence are prosecuted using the formal legal system. Although informal dispute resolution mechanisms are used to resolve conflict, they are unable to address the root causes such as border delineations and the distribution of government resources.³²

Somali regional context

Located in eastern Ethiopia, the Somali region has a long history of conflict, as it resisted incorporation into the Ethiopian Empire and later the Ethiopian nation state.³³ This resistance to integration began in the late 1800s and continued until the Ogaden, located in the eastern Somali region, was incorporated into Ethiopia in 1948 as part of a negotiated agreement between the United Kingdom, which was administering it, and Emperor Haile Selassie.³⁴ Despite incorporation, resistance to Ethiopian rule continued, culminating in the Ogaden War of 1977 between the Derg regime and the Somali people.³⁵ The Ethiopian government emerged victorious in 1978 and reinstated military control over the Somali region.³⁶

Ethiopia may have won the war but conflict continued, and the Government of Ethiopia implemented counterinsurgency operations against guerrilla groups and aerial bombardment campaigns in the Somali region, among other strategies. In the early 1980s, the Somali region was designated a military zone by the government, which provided some stability. However, this approach—which continued until 1991—excluded Somalis from local governance.³⁷

Under the federalist framework established in the early 1990s, the Somali region became self-administered, and both power and finances were devolved. However, the federal government has continued to exert its influence over policy through, for example, federal ministry officials, leveraging its relationships with clan leaders who possess popular legitimacy and threatening the use of force, particularly after the Somali

²⁹ Abbink, J., 'Ethnicity and conflict generation in Ethiopia: Some problems and prospects of ethno-regional federalism', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, vol. 24, no. 3 (Sep. 2006).

³⁰ Abbink (note 29).

³¹ Abbink (note 29).

³² Abbink (note 29).

³³ Hagmann, T. and Korf, B., 'Agamben in the Ogaden: Violence and sovereignty in the Ethiopian-Somali frontier', *Political Geography*, vol. 31, no. 4 (May 2012).

³⁴ Hagmann and Korf (note 33).

³⁵ Hagmann, T., 'Beyond clannishness and colonialism: Understanding political disorder in Ethiopia's Somali region, 1991-2004', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 43, no. 4 (Dec. 2005); and Markakis (note 1).

³⁶ Hagmann and Korf (note 33).

³⁷ Hagmann, T. and Khalif, M. H., 'State and politics in Ethiopia's Somali region since 1991', *Bildhaan*, vol. 6 (2008).

region called for secession in 1994.³⁸ In response, the federal government strongly increased its military presence in the region and engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns against the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).³⁹ Efforts against the ONLF increased in strength after the ONLF attacked an oil exploration site in 2007.⁴⁰ In addition to a strong security response, the federal government instituted a blockade against the Somali region in an effort to reduce support for the ONLF.⁴¹ This blockade resulted in a humanitarian crisis, as aid agencies reported that humanitarian access had decreased.⁴² The federal government, however, denied that it had restricted the access of aid agencies.⁴³

In the period 2007–2018, security remained the primary concern in the Somali region.⁴⁴ Abdi Mohammed Omar, the Somali regional president in 2010–18, established a paramilitary police force of ethnic Somalis to take responsibility for the region's security, including through counterinsurgency operations and policing.⁴⁵ The ONLF was integrated into local politics when it signed a peace agreement in 2018.⁴⁶

While security remained the main priority, the federal government invested in expanding infrastructure in the region. Road networks have been extended and the region now has an international airport and a university.⁴⁷ However, the socio-economic benefits of expanding infrastructure have not yet become apparent.⁴⁸

Geographic and climate context

Located in north-east Africa, Ethiopia is a landlocked state with borders with Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. It has a varied climate ranging from alpine vegetated cool zones, to temperate zones and hot zones that consist of both tropical and dry areas.⁴⁹

Temperature

The average annual temperature in Ethiopia is 22.6°C.⁵⁰ Temperatures have, on average, increased by approximately 0.5°C since 1990 (see figure 2.1). The warming trend is greatest in the north-central, north-western and western regions.⁵¹

Climate change projections indicate that temperatures could change by between -0.5°C and 6°C by 2100.⁵² Increasing temperatures could lead to more frequent heatwaves and greater evaporation.⁵³ On a shorter timescale, the average annual temperature in Ethiopia is expected to increase by between 0.9°C and 1.1°C by 2030.

³⁸ Hagmann and Khalif (note 37).

³⁹ Hagmann, T., *Fast Politics, Slow Justice: Ethiopia's Somali Region Two Years After Abdi Iley*, Briefing paper (London School of Economics and Political Science: London, 2020).

⁴⁰ Hagmann (note 26); and Hagmann (note 39).

⁴¹ Hagmann (note 39); and Hagmann (note 26).

⁴² Rice, X., 'Humanitarian crisis hits Ethiopia', *The Guardian*, 4 Sep. 2007.

⁴³ The New Humanitarian, 'Ethiopia: Government denies looming humanitarian crisis in Somali region—Ethiopia', *ReliefWeb*, 2007.

⁴⁴ Hagmann (note 26).

⁴⁵ Hagmann (note 39); and Hagmann (note 26).

⁴⁶ Hagmann (note 39).

⁴⁷ Hagmann (note 26); and Tazebew, T. and Kefale, A., 'Governing the economy: Rule and resistance in the Ethiopia-Somaliland borderlands', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1 (2021).

⁴⁸ Hagmann (note 26).

⁴⁹ World Bank, *Climate Risk Country Profile: Ethiopia* (2021).

⁵⁰ World Bank (note 49).

⁵¹ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, *Ethiopia's Climate Resilience Green Economy: National Adaptation Plan* (2019).

⁵² Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (note 51).

⁵³ Niang, I. et al., 'Africa', eds V. R. Barros et al., *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*, Part B: *Regional Aspects, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2014).




Figure 2.1. Temperature anomalies in Ethiopia relative to the 1901–2020 average

Source: World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, 'Ethiopia'.

By 2050, temperatures are expected to increase by between 1.5°C and 3°C. These increased temperatures are expected to severely affect agricultural production and the availability of water resources.⁵⁴

Precipitation

Precipitation varies greatly across the country and is seasonal. It also varies significantly from year to year.⁵⁵ In south-western Ethiopia, for example, rainfall can exceed 2000 mm, while in the south-eastern areas of the country and the Afar lowlands rainfall does not exceed 250 mm.⁵⁶ Precipitation has, on average, increased by approximately 2.6 mm since 1990 (see figure 2.2). Annual rainfall variability and drought have also increased.⁵⁷ Ethiopia experienced 11 droughts between 1997 and 2021, leading to food shortages and higher food prices, and negatively affecting the availability of pasture and water. On average, each drought affected around 5 million people.⁵⁸

Climate models disagree on how climate change will affect precipitation in Ethiopia. Some project an increase in rainfall while others predict a decrease.⁵⁹ The Ethiopian government's climate modelling anticipates an increase in annual rainfall of between 4 per cent and 12 per cent, relative to the 1975–2005 average.⁶⁰ Projections of short-term changes in precipitation (to the 2050s) indicate that rainfall could change by between -25 per cent and +30 per cent. Importantly, both the intensity and the frequency of rainfall are expected to increase. The number of days with heavy rainfall is projected to increase by 20 per cent while the intensity of rainfall is projected to increase by 10 per cent.⁶¹

⁵⁴ Ministry of Environment and Forest, *Ethiopia's Second National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC), 2015.

⁵⁵ World Bank (note 49).

⁵⁶ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (note 51).

⁵⁷ World Bank (note 49).

⁵⁸ EM-DAT, The international disasters database, <<https://www.emdat.be/>>.

⁵⁹ Niang et al. (note 53); and Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (note 51).

⁶⁰ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (note 51).

⁶¹ Ministry of Environment and Forest (note 54).




Figure 2.2. Rainfall anomalies in Ethiopia relative to the 1901–2020 average

Source: World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, ‘Ethiopia’.

Climate change in the Somali region

Average temperature in the Somali region is approximately 26°C. It has been increasing since 2000 relative to the historical average (see figure 2.3).⁶² By 2039, average annual temperature in the Somali region is projected to increase by approximately 0.6°C.⁶³

There are two rainy seasons in the Somali region. The Gu rains fall between March and June, while the Deyr rains fall between October and December.⁶⁴ The Gu rains are the primary rainy season in the region.⁶⁵ Although rainfall has, on average, been increasing in the past 10 years (see figure 2.4), the Somali region has experienced several droughts. Of the 11 droughts that struck Ethiopia between 1997 and 2021, at least nine impacted the Somali region, resulting in food shortages.⁶⁶

Projections of future rainfall patterns in the Somali region indicate that average annual rainfall will increase by approximately 35 mm by 2039.⁶⁷ However, the location of the rainfall is projected to move north-west, away from Ethiopia’s pastoral and agropastoral regions.⁶⁸

Climate-related security risks in Ethiopia

Livelihoods in Ethiopia are strongly dependent on agriculture. The sector comprises 35.5 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and employs 67 per cent of the population.⁶⁹ Farming, agropastoralism and pastoralism are the country’s primary agricultural activities.⁷⁰

⁶² World Bank, Ethiopia: current climate, climatology, <<https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/>>, accessed 13 Dec. 2021.

⁶³ World Bank, Ethiopia: climate projections, mean projections, <<https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/>>.

⁶⁴ World Food Programme, *Pasture-Drought Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia: Technical Design Study* (2016).

⁶⁵ World Food Programme (note 64).

⁶⁶ EM-DAT, The international disasters database (note 58).

⁶⁷ World Bank (note 63).

⁶⁸ World Food Programme (note 64).

⁶⁹ World Bank, Employment in agriculture (percentage of total employment), modelled ILO estimate, Data, accessed 3 Nov. 2021; and World Bank, Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (percentage of GDP), Data, accessed 3 Nov. 2021.

⁷⁰ USAID, *Typical Hunger Seasons, Month-by-Month for Ethiopia* (2009).




Figure 2.3. Temperature anomalies in the Somali region relative to the 1901–2020 average
 Source: World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, ‘Ethiopia’.

As of October 2020, WFP estimated that approximately 8.6 million people were highly food insecure.⁷¹ This figure has increased since the start of the conflict in Tigray in November 2020. The main factors affecting food insecurity in Ethiopia are climatic conditions, particularly drought; a fast growing population; land degradation; migration from rural to urban areas; locust infestations; and conflict.⁷² Since farmers and pastoralists depend on rainfall to grow their crops, and feed and water their animals, changes in the intensity, timing and frequency of rainfall can be problematic and negatively affect households’ food security.⁷³ Repeated droughts have increased food insecurity, especially in the Tigray, Afar and Somali regions—the driest regions in Ethiopia.⁷⁴

Analyses of the relationship between climate change, food security and conflict in Ethiopia demonstrate that drought and temperature extremes contribute to a reduction in crop and livestock productivity, and to increases in household-level food and nutrition insecurity, poverty and inequality, as well as reduced agricultural employment. These, in turn, correlate with a higher likelihood and intensity of conflict over and above existing additional potential drivers of conflict.⁷⁵ Food insecurity on its own is an insufficient trigger for conflict but in concert with other drivers such as existing grievances, can increase the probability of conflict emerging.⁷⁶

⁷¹ World Food Programme, *WFP Ethiopia, Country Brief May 2020*, 2020; and IPC, *Ethiopia IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, October 2020–September 2021*, 2020.

⁷² World Food Programme, *Climate Risk and Food Security in Ethiopia: Analysis of Climate Impacts on Food Security and Livelihoods* (2014); Lewis, K., ‘Understanding climate as a driver of food insecurity in Ethiopia’, *Climatic Change*, vol. 144, no. 2 (Sep. 2017); Megerssa, G. R. and Bekere, Y. B., ‘Causes, consequences and coping strategies of land degradation: Evidence from Ethiopia’, *Journal of Degraded and Mining Lands Management*, vol. 7, no. 1 (Oct. 2019); and Kassegn, A. and Endris, E., ‘Review on socio-economic impacts of ‘triple threats’ of COVID-19, desert locusts, and floods in East Africa: Evidence from Ethiopia’, *Cogent Social Sciences*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1 Jan. 2021).

⁷³ Demeke, A. B., Keil, A. and Zeller, M., ‘Using panel data to estimate the effect of rainfall shocks on smallholders’ food security and vulnerability in rural Ethiopia’, *Climatic Change*, vol. 108, nos 1–2 (Sep. 2011).

⁷⁴ Alemu, T. and Mengistu, A., ‘Impacts of climate change on food security in Ethiopia: Adaptation and mitigation options, a review’, eds P. Castro et al., *Climate Change-Resilient Agriculture and Agroforestry: Climate Change Management* (Springer International Publishing: Cham, 2019); Ministry of Environment and Forest (note 54); and Lewis (note 72).

⁷⁵ Pacillo, G. et al., *Assessing the Relationship between Climate, Food Security and Conflict in Ethiopia and in the Central American Dry Corridor (CADC): Quantitative Analysis on the Impact of Climate Variability on Conflict in Ethiopia and in the CADC Countries* (CGLAR: Nov. 2021).

⁷⁶ Delgado, C., Murugani, V. and Tschunkert, K., *Food Systems in Conflict and Peacebuilding Settings: Pathways and Interconnections* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2021).




Figure 2.4. Rainfall anomalies in the Somali region relative to the 1901–2020 average

Source: World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, ‘Ethiopia’.

Livelihoods, climate change and conflict in the Somali region

Livelihoods in the Somali region are diversified but still heavily reliant on natural resources, which makes them vulnerable to the effects of climate change.⁷⁷ Pastoralism is the dominant livelihood source; herders raise livestock and trade their products, such as dairy produce.⁷⁸ Agropastoralism is also practiced in the region, and agropastoral households raise livestock, grow crops and sell firewood or handicrafts.⁷⁹ Farming also constitutes a livelihood source in the region.⁸⁰

The projected increase in temperatures and changes in rainfall could have adverse impacts on pastoralists in the region. Droughts are a common occurrence in Ethiopia’s pastoral regions and put pastoral livelihoods at risk as livestock die off.⁸¹ Herders report that drought and disease are the primary factors leading to the death of their livestock.⁸² Rising temperatures will have negative physiological impacts on the animals themselves and could also increase the incidence of disease. Climatic changes might also change the geographic distribution and availability of water and pasture.⁸³

Approximately 1.25 million people experienced a high degree of food insecurity in the Somali region in 2020.⁸⁴ Several factors contributed to this status, including changes in temperature and rainfall patterns.⁸⁵ Unusually dry rainy seasons reduce the availability of crops, the pasture on which livestock feed and the health of livestock, which compromises the food security of pastoralists and agropastoralists.⁸⁶

Pastoralists and agropastoralists in the Somali region cope with drought in many ways, such as changing mobility patterns, livestock raiding, petty trade, selling assets

⁷⁷ Devereux, S., *Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia*, Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Research report no. 57 (IDS: Brighton, UK, 2006).

⁷⁸ Nassef, M. and Mulugeta, B., *Water Development in Ethiopia’s Pastoral Areas: A Synthesis of Existing Knowledge and Experience* (USAID, ODI, Save the Children: 2012); and Devereux (note 77).

⁷⁹ Devereux (note 77).

⁸⁰ Devereux (note 77).

⁸¹ Ayele, T., Dedecha, D. and Duba, D., ‘The impact of climate change on pastoralists livelihoods in Ethiopia: A review’, *Journal of Resources Development and Management*, vol. 63 (Mar. 2020); and World Food Programme (note 72).

⁸² Devereux (note 77).

⁸³ Tiruneh, S. and Tegene, F., ‘Impacts of climate change on livestock production and productivity and different adaptation strategies in Ethiopia’, *Journal of Applied and Advanced Research* (May 2018).

⁸⁴ IPC (note 71).

⁸⁵ World Food Programme (note 64).

⁸⁶ IPC (note 71).

and engaging in wage labour.⁸⁷ Making changes to mobility patterns, which has been identified as a pathway connecting the effects of climate change with insecurity, has created inter-communal conflict as pastoralists compete over water and pasture.⁸⁸ Livestock raiding can also be a source of conflict, particularly between different ethnic groups.⁸⁹

Traditional informal institutions are typically used to resolve intra-ethnic conflict in the Somali region.⁹⁰ Elders or a council of elders enforce customary law by mediating in disputes between clans and negotiating agreements on compensation. The Ethiopian government has recognized this mechanism as a formal means of conflict resolution and integrated it into the Somali regional government.⁹¹

Although inter-ethnic conflict can also be resolved through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms if an agreement can be negotiated by elders, it is more commonly addressed through Ethiopia's formal legal system.⁹²

⁸⁷ Belay, K., Beyene, F. and Manig, W., 'Coping with drought among pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in eastern Ethiopia', *Journal of Rural Development*, vol. 28 (Winter 2005); Devereux (note 77); and Catley, A. and Iyasu, A., *Moving Up or Moving Out: A Rapid Livelihoods and Conflict Analysis in Mieso-Mulu Woreda, Shinile Zone, Somali Region, Ethiopia* (Feinstein International Center and Mercy Corps: 2010); and Stark, J., *Climate Change and Conflict in Africa and Latin America: Findings and Preliminary Lessons from Uganda, Ethiopia, and Peru* (USAID: Washington, DC, 2013).

⁸⁸ Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87); Beyene, F., 'Natural resource conflict analysis among pastoralists in southern Ethiopia', *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, vol. 12, no. 1 (Apr. 2017); and Mobjörk, M., Krampe, F. and Tarif, K., *Pathways of Climate Insecurity: Guidance for Policymakers* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2020).

⁸⁹ Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87).

⁹⁰ Markakis (note 1).

⁹¹ Mussa, M., Teka, H. and Aliye, A., 'Indigenous conflict management and resolution mechanisms on rangelands in pastoral areas, Ethiopia', *Journal of African Studies and Development*, vol. 9, no. 9 (Dec. 2017); and Hagmann, T., 'Bringing the Sultan back in: Elders as peacemakers in Ethiopia's Somali region', eds L. Buur and H. M. Kyed, *State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Palgrave Macmillan US: New York, 2007).

⁹² Tenaw, Z. T., 'Indigenous institutions as an alternative conflict resolution mechanism in eastern Ethiopia: The case of the Ittu Oromo and Issa Somali clans', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 16, no. 2 (2016); and Gelan, D. T., Getahun, T. and Beyene, F., 'Participatory conflict analysis: The case of pastoralist groups in south-eastern Ethiopia', *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, vol. 7, no. 5 (2017).

3. Ethiopia case study approach

Objectives and background

This report explains and assesses the potential contribution of WFP's climate adaptation and risk management programmes to enhancing the prospects for peace in Ethiopia, with a focus on the Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia programme. SIIPE was selected as the programme of interest because it is being implemented in a drought-prone region where inter-communal conflict occurs over access to pasture and water resources. The primary objectives are to understand whether and, if so, how: (a) SIIPE contributes to reducing conflict and improving the prospects for peace in Ethiopia; (b) WFP incorporates conflict-sensitivity into SIIPE; and (c) SIIPE has itself contributed to conflict within or between communities.

WFP's SIIPE programme, which was first implemented as a pilot in the Somali region in 2018, is multifaceted and comprises various elements that aim to build beneficiaries' integrated risk management capacities. First, it provides food insecure pastoralists with pasture-based index insurance coverage for their livestock. The insurance payout is triggered when drought affects the availability of vegetation, as measured by satellite data. In exchange for insurance coverage, beneficiaries engage in asset creation activities, primarily natural resource management such as soil and water conservation, and rangeland management. The insurance payout allows beneficiaries to purchase feed and water for their livestock to minimize herd losses during a severe drought.⁹³ Second, SIIPE provides support services for pastoralists, such as veterinary pharmacies, livestock vaccination campaigns and access to fodder. Third, it aims to build risk reserves by promoting a savings culture, creating savings and loans associations, and increasing financial literacy. Finally, it aims to diversify pastoralists' livelihoods and increase their income by supporting access to financial services, accompanied by business development training. As of 2021, SIIPE had insured approximately 28 000 households. The average insurance payout per household between 2018 and 2021 was \$47.90.⁹⁴ Fifty-two per cent of the households covered are women-headed and approximately 4700 households are using the programme's financial services.⁹⁵

To articulate the pathways through which SIIPE can contribute to enhancing the prospects for peace, the analysis developed theories of change that explain how SIIPE can reduce conflict and contribute to peace. These TOCs are specific to the chosen programme and the local context in which WFP is implementing that programme. As a result, this research is not generalizable to other *woredas* and *kebeles* (wards) in Ethiopia where WFP is implementing, or considering the implementation of, SIIPE or similar programmes. It should not be used to inform scaling-up programming within or outside of the Somali region without first understanding the local context in which programmes are being implemented. It can, however, be used as a source of ideas for conducting due diligence while designing a similar programme within or outside of Ethiopia.

Although the results of the research may not be generalizable to other contexts, TOCs provide a method of thinking about the steps and assumptions required to make them plausible. This method can be applied to other contexts within or outside

⁹³ World Food Programme (note 64).

⁹⁴ WFP staff member, correspondence with the authors, 23 July 2021; and WFP headquarters staff member 4, correspondence with the authors, 14 Jan. 2022.

⁹⁵ WFP staff member, correspondence with the authors, 23 July 2021.

of Ethiopia to evaluate both the potential of WFP programming to contribute to improving the prospects peace and the conflict sensitivity of programming.

Methodology

The research involved several phases and methods of data collection. The first phase of the research consisted of a quantitative analysis of the relationship between climate change, food security and conflict, and was conducted to provide an overview of the situation in Ethiopia. This analysis also partially informed the selection of study sites for the field research. Remote research also consisted of a desk review of WFP's programme documents and academic research in order to develop the TOCs. In addition, we conducted 30 virtual semi-structured interviews, of which 23 were with WFP's staff in the Ethiopia country office, five were with WFP partners and two were with Ethiopian government representatives. We also administered a survey to WFP country office staff, to which 53 individuals responded.

The second phase of research was a field visit. Due to the travel restrictions imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic, a local research firm was contracted to conduct interviews and focus group discussions with SIIPE beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and local community leaders in the *woredas* of Dolo Ado, Kebridehar and West Imey in the Somali region of Ethiopia. These *woredas* were selected based on: (a) the results of a spatial analysis that overlaid the occurrence of conflict, food insecurity and climatic conditions conducted by CGIAR (available as a separate report);⁹⁶ and (b) consultations with the WFP Ethiopia country office on their experience of conflict in the areas where SIIPE has been implemented. The primary criteria for selecting *kebeles* within each *woreda* were the presence of inter-communal conflict (based on the experience of the WFP Ethiopia country office staff), SIIPE implementation since 2018 or 2019 and accessibility. Local researchers from the Somali region, all of whom had experience of conducting interviews and focus groups on food security and international development in the Somali region and Ethiopia more broadly, conducted semi-structured interviews with 75 individuals and led two focus group discussions. The interviews were conducted with 33 SIIPE beneficiaries, 12 non-beneficiaries who are enrolled in the Ethiopian government's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and 30 community leaders. The focus group discussions were conducted in West Imey and Kebridehar with SIIPE beneficiaries. One group was of seven women and five men; the other group was of five women and five men.

Limitations

The main limitation of this research is that the data was collected by local researchers. Working with local researchers is advantageous since they speak the local language and have a strong understanding of context. However, two implications relevant to the analysis arise: first, because the authors did not collect qualitative data from the field themselves, nuances will have undoubtedly been missed that may have been obvious had the authors been interacting with the beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and local community leaders. Second, working through local researchers means that relevant follow-up questions might not have been asked.

Research from phase I of the knowledge partnership indicates that WFP's climate risk management programming could be an area in which WFP contributes to increasing the prospects for peace.⁹⁷ For this reason, climate change was selected as

⁹⁶ Pacillo et al. (note 75).

⁹⁷ Delgado, C. et al., *The World Food Programme's Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace* (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2019).

one of the five thematic areas on which to focus the research during phase II. Preliminary research on the relationship between climate change and conflict in Ethiopia derived mixed findings, although it did point the researchers towards areas on which to focus, such as changing mobility patterns and livestock raiding. However, in-country qualitative research focused on the Somali region found limited evidence, as many of the TOCs were either not strongly supported by the data or could not be confirmed. Surveying beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries could provide additional insights on the TOCs, since the survey would cover a larger number of people and perhaps provide some certainty.

Despite these challenges, the research has generated conclusions about which activities to prioritize, how to address potential discontent regarding targeting, and capacity building on conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity within WFP, all of which are geared to increasing WFP's contribution to improving the prospects for peace.

4. Findings: WFP’s contribution to improving the prospects for peace in Ethiopia

WFP began its operations in Ethiopia in 1968.⁹⁸ In 2020, it assisted almost 4.3 million people.⁹⁹ WFP’s climate change adaptation and risk management programmes in Ethiopia, which comprise SIIPE, the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative and the Joint Programme on Rural Women’s Economic Empowerment, provided assistance to 402 105 people, which was roughly 9 per cent of the total number of people served in 2020.¹⁰⁰

The Country Strategic Plan (CSP) for 2020–2025 (see box 4.1) is aligned with the Government of Ethiopia’s Ten-Year Perspective Plan (2020–2030), the Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda, the Climate-resilient Green Economy Strategy and the Productive Safety Net Programme. It is also aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Ethiopia. The CSP focuses on meeting the urgent and short-term needs of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and food insecure people. Its second primary objective is to grow and strengthen resilience and livelihood diversification activities, as WFP operationalizes the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus. Strategic outcome 2 addresses climate change adaptation and risk management activities.

This section presents the research findings on two theories of change that explore the relationship between WFP’s SIIPE programme and the prospects for peace. The recommendations presented after each TOC are intended to be actionable and to inform development of the next CSP. The research is intended to assess contributions to both positive and negative peace.¹⁰¹ Negative peace is primarily characterized by the absence of violence.¹⁰² Actions and initiatives that decrease violence between and within communities and/or clans contribute to negative peace. Positive peace, on the other hand, involves aspects beyond a lack of violence, such as the ability to resolve conflict without resorting to violence, equity and a lack of structural violence.¹⁰³

Theory of change: Changing mobility patterns

If the insurance payout allows pastoralists and agropastoralists to maintain their herds, or minimize their herd losses, without changing mobility patterns during a drought, then the likelihood of inter-communal conflict decreases.

Context

Herders and agropastoralists in the Somali region have long been coping with the effects of extreme weather on their livelihoods. Mobility is one of the strategies in which households engage in order to cope.¹⁰⁴ Prior to the delineation of regional boundaries, herders moved relatively freely in search of water and pasture for their herds, and arrangements for the use of such common pool resources were cooperative,

⁹⁸ World Food Programme, *WFP Ethiopia Country Brief* (2017).

⁹⁹ World Food Programme, *WFP Ethiopia 2020 Annual Country Report Overview* (2021).

¹⁰⁰ World Food Programme (note 99).

¹⁰¹ Delgado et al. (note 97).

¹⁰² Galtung, J., ‘Positive and negative peace’, *Peace and Conflict Studies: A Reader* (Routledge: New York, 2012).

¹⁰³ Galtung (note 102); and Diehl, P. F., ‘Exploring peace: Looking beyond war and negative peace’, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 60, no. 1 (Mar. 2016).

¹⁰⁴ Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87).

flexible and based on seasonal availability.¹⁰⁵ Ethnic border demarcations, however, have had implications for property rights and negated these common pool resource arrangements.¹⁰⁶ The establishment of ethnic federalism and the creation of associated administrative boundaries have increased inter-ethnic and intra-clan competition over territory because it has politicized access to pasture and water points, as groups vie for control over land and its associated resources such as water and pasture.¹⁰⁷

As a result of competition over territory and the erosion of common pool resource arrangements, pastoralists and agropastoralists no longer move their herds over long distances in search of water and pasture in the course of a normal rainy season. Instead, they move their animals over short distances and remain within their territorial boundaries.¹⁰⁸ When droughts occur, however, they must move over longer distances in search of those same resources, which can bring them into conflict with other communities if prior access has not been negotiated.¹⁰⁹ As one interviewee summarized: 'there is peace in the rain'.¹¹⁰

Although pastoral livelihoods in the Somali region are diversified, they are reliant on natural resources. Raising livestock is the primary livelihood activity, while the next most prominent ones are selling livestock or by-products of livestock rearing such as dairy products and animal hides. Other activities, such as collecting firewood to make and sell charcoal, and small businesses such as tea stands, supplement a household's income.¹¹¹ Recognizing the need for livelihood diversification and small business development, WFP has included these as elements of the SIIPE programme.

Analysis

The SIIPE insurance payouts are intended to provide short-term assistance to help pastoralists and agropastoralists protect their assets during a drought rather than compensate them for the loss of assets.¹¹² Beneficiaries can, for example, use the payout to buy access to water, fodder or veterinary services for their herds.¹¹³ This means beneficiaries should be able to maintain their herds and avoid animal deaths during a severe drought without having to resort to coping strategies such as migration to ensure their food security.¹¹⁴ In other words, SIIPE aims to allow beneficiaries to absorb the effects of drought so that it does not negatively affect their herds and, in turn, their food security.

Although conflict reduction is not an explicit objective of SIIPE, WFP staff spoke of the programme's potential to decrease inter-communal conflict. More specifically, they explained that, theoretically, since the payout allows herders to buy fodder or

¹⁰⁵ Hagmann, T. and Mulugeta, A., 'Pastoral conflicts and state-building in the Ethiopian lowlands', *Afrika Spectrum*, vol. 43, no. 1 (2008).

¹⁰⁶ Hagmann and Mulugeta (note 105); and Gelan, Getahun and Beyene (note 92).

¹⁰⁷ Hagmann and Mulugeta (note 105); Beyene (note 88); and Hagmann (note 39).

¹⁰⁸ Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87); and Hagmann and Mulugeta (note 105).

¹⁰⁹ Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87); Beyene (note 88); Focus group discussion, West Imey, 17 Sep. 2021; Focus group discussion, Kebridehar, 24 Sep. 2021; SIIPE interview 4, 18 Sep. 2021; SIIPE interview 10, 17 Sep. 2021; SIIPE interview 9, 24 Sep. 2021; SIIPE interview 11, 17 Sep. 2021; Community leader interview 7, 20 Sep. 2021; Community member interview 13, 17 Sep. 2021; Non-beneficiary interview 5, 19 Sep. 2021; Non-beneficiary interview 9, 27 Sep. 2021; Community leader interview 9, 24 Sep. 2021; Community member interview 11, 21 Sep. 2021; Community member interview 13, 17 Sep. 2021; Community member interview 14, 20 Sep. 2021; and Community member interview 15, 17 Sep. 2021.

¹¹⁰ Non-beneficiary interview 5, 19 Sep. 2021.

¹¹¹ Devereux (note 77).

¹¹² WFP staff member 9, interview with the authors, 12 Mar. 2021; and World Food Programme, *Innovative Approaches to Building Resilience for Refugees and Host Populations in Ethiopia (2018–2022): From Humanitarian Assistance to Self-Reliance* (WFP: Rome, 2019).

¹¹³ WFP staff member 9, interview with the authors, 12 Mar. 2021; and World Food Programme (note 64).

¹¹⁴ WFP staff member 16, interview with the authors, 25 Mar. 2021; and WFP staff member 9, interview with the authors, 12 Mar. 2021.

Box 4.1. Strategic outcomes of WFP's Ethiopia country strategic plan, 2020–2025

WFP's country strategic plan for Ethiopia primarily focuses on providing short-term, immediate assistance for refugees, internally displaced persons, and other food-insecure and undernourished people. It also includes resilience building and livelihood diversification activities operationalizing the HDP nexus. There are five strategic outcomes in the CSP:

Strategic outcome 1: Shock-affected populations in targeted areas and refugees in camps are able to meet their basic food and nutrition needs.

Strategic outcome 2: Vulnerable and food-insecure populations in targeted areas have increased resilience to shocks.

Strategic outcome 3: Nutritionally vulnerable populations in targeted areas have improved consumption of high-quality, nutrient-dense foods that prevent all forms of malnutrition.

Strategic outcome 4: Federal and government institutions, the private sector and local non-governmental organizations benefit from capacity strengthening in the areas of early warning and emergency preparedness systems, safety nets programme design and implementation and supply chain management.

Strategic outcome 5: Government, humanitarian and development partners in Ethiopia have access to and benefit from effective and cost-efficient logistics services, including air transport, common coordination platforms and improved commodity supply chains.

Source: World Food Programme, *Ethiopia Country Strategic Plan, 2020–2025* (World Food Programme: Rome, 2020).

water for their herds within their communities, they should no longer need to move outside their home *woredas* in search of water and pasture for their animals.¹¹⁵ As a result, and as one WFP staff member explicitly stated, inter-communal conflict over pasture and water resources will no longer take place.¹¹⁶ These observations by WFP staff are consistent with research that indicates that the pastoralists and agropastoralists do not move their herds over long distances if the resources they need to maintain them are available locally.¹¹⁷

The experiences of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, however, do not provide a clear-cut picture. Interviews with 13 individuals indicated that the payouts prevented movement outside their *woredas* because they were able to maintain their food security, which in turn reduced inter-communal conflict.¹¹⁸ In contrast, 24 SIIPE beneficiaries indicated the opposite—that they had continued to move outside their *woredas* during severe drought in search of pasture and water for their herds.¹¹⁹

It is unclear, however, why some beneficiaries would migrate seasonally while others do not. One explanation might relate to how programme participants spent the insurance payout. Two SIIPE beneficiaries indicated that the insurance payout of 5000 Ethiopia birr (equivalent to \$100) was enough to cover supplementary feed and veterinary fees for their animals during a drought.¹²⁰ Nonetheless, they indicated that they had spent the payout on school supplies for their children or on food to smooth their own consumption throughout the drought.¹²¹ Although the collected data do not address this, and beneficiaries may have used other financial resources to pay for fodder, it could be that those who spent the payout on items other than food and water for their animals engaged in migration outside their home districts to find pasture and water for their herds, thereby bringing them into conflict with other pastoral communities. Alternatively, beneficiaries may continue to migrate outside their *woredas* despite having received a payment if water resources for their animals are

¹¹⁵ WFP staff member 16, interview with the authors, 25 Mar. 2021; and WFP staff member 7, interview with the authors, 11 Mar. 2021.

¹¹⁶ WFP staff member 16, interview with the authors, 25 Mar. 2021.

¹¹⁷ Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87).

¹¹⁸ SIIPE interview 3, 21 Sep. 2021; SIIPE interview 5, 21 Sep. 2021; SIIPE interview 6, 20 Sep. 2021; and non-beneficiary interview 3, 18 Sep. 2021.

¹¹⁹ Focus group discussion, West Imey, 17 Sep. 2021; Focus group discussion, Kebridehar, 24 Sep. 2021; and SIIPE interview 11, 17 Sep. 2021.

¹²⁰ SIIPE interview 8, 20 Sep. 2021; and SIIPE interview 11, 17 Sep. 2021.

¹²¹ SIIPE interview 8, 20 Sep. 2021; and SIIPE interview 11, 17 Sep. 2021.

insufficient. This might particularly be the case if the natural resource management component of SIIPE (addressed below) has not yet been implemented in the *woreda* in which the beneficiaries live.

By way of comparison, the interviews with non-beneficiaries who received cash transfers from the PSNP indicated that cash transfers might have a similar effect on decreasing mobility as the insurance payouts. Nine non-beneficiaries noted that prior to implementation of the PSNP, pastoralists migrated in search of pasture and water for their herds.¹²² However, since financial support became available through the PSNP, pastoralists no longer migrate because they use the payment to buy fodder for their animals.¹²³ In addition, two non-beneficiaries indicated that because herders received cash transfers from the PSNP, they no longer moved with their herds after losing most of their livestock to drought, which in turn had reduced inter-communal conflict.¹²⁴ It should be noted, however, that non-beneficiaries indicated that some pastoralists who had received cash transfers from the PSNP continued to migrate with their herds during droughts.¹²⁵

Both beneficiary and non-beneficiary interviewees indicated that cash transfers, either in the form of an insurance payout or more regularly through the PSNP, allowed some pastoralists to remain within their communities during a drought. They used the cash to buy fodder for their animals, among other things, thereby negating the need to move outside their *woredas* in search of pasture for their herds. As a result, the interviewees reported that inter-communal conflict had decreased.

SIIPE therefore has the potential to contribute to conflict reduction and negative peace in the Somali region of Ethiopia. However, regular cash transfers have the same potential, indicating that a consistent source of income could offer similar results as an insurance programme. Prioritizing livelihood diversification activities, which are already a component of SIIPE, could provide a more steady source of income. As a result, beneficiaries might be more likely to use the insurance payout to meet their livestock's needs, reducing their movement with their herds outside their *woredas* and the potential for inter-communal conflict.

Conflict sensitivity concerns

Consistent with the findings from phase I of the SIPRI–WFP Knowledge Partnership on the conflict potential of targeting, prioritizing livelihood diversification activities for the households most in need carries similar risks.¹²⁶ It has the potential to create discontent or tension between beneficiary households if households that have not been prioritized are not informed of, or do not understand why, this is the case. Thus, prioritization should be accompanied by clear communication on why some households have been prioritized over others. Clear communication regarding the selection of beneficiaries is addressed below.

In addition, it is essential to understand how the potential outcome of reverting to non-drought mobility patterns will affect the availability of pasture and water within pastoralists' *woredas*. This is because reduced mobility may lead to increased competition over existing natural resources. It is therefore important to account for natural resource management, which is addressed below.

¹²² Non-beneficiary interview 6, 20 Sep. 2021; and non-beneficiary interview 8, 27 Sep. 2021.

¹²³ Non-beneficiary interview 6, 20 Sep. 2021; and non-beneficiary interview 8, 27 Sep. 2021.

¹²⁴ Non-beneficiary interview 7, 20 Sep. 2021.

¹²⁵ Non-beneficiary interview 1, 24 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 2, 17 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 3, 18 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 5, 19 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 7, 20 Sep. 2021; and non-beneficiary interview 8, 27 Sep. 2021.

¹²⁶ Delgado et al. (note 97).

Recommendation

1. WFP should consider prioritizing livelihood diversification activities for the households most in need since they offer a more regular source of income. Selection criteria should be communicated clearly to reduce the likelihood of tensions between prioritized and non-prioritized households. Livelihood diversification activities will probably need to be paired with natural resource management activities to avoid increasing pressure on existing resources.

Theory of change: Livestock raiding

If the insurance payout allows pastoralists and agropastoralists to maintain the size and health of their herds, or minimize their herd losses, without engaging in livestock raiding to rebuild their herds, then the likelihood of conflict decreases.

Context

Studies on the relationship between climate change and conflict in Ethiopia primarily focus on livestock raiding, and have inconsistent findings. The incidence of violence related to livestock raiding has been found to increase during atypically wet and atypically dry years, and when vegetation increases.¹²⁷ These variations may relate to differences between pastoral groups, as, for example, the Borana pastoral group engages in more livestock raiding during wet years, while pastoral groups in the Somali region engage in more livestock raiding during dry years.¹²⁸ The scarcity of pasture, partly driven by drought, is another source of conflict, as pastoral groups compete over dwindling resources.¹²⁹

In the Somali region, livestock are raided from within the same clan or from other clans or ethnic groups, among other things, to cope with the effects of drought.¹³⁰ Raiding from within the same clan or ethnic group can redistribute resources within the clan and typically does not lead to inter-communal conflict, as the raided group will reciprocate in the future and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms settle disputes.¹³¹

Raiding between ethnic groups creates conflict between communities.¹³² Inter-ethnic raiding along the Oromia–Somali border, for example, is used to intimidate and to gain access to pasture, especially in areas where there are contestations over grazing land. Inter-ethnic raiding also perpetuates violence because it involves retaliation as pastoralists engage in raiding and counter-raiding.¹³³

Livestock raiding is also carried out for commercial reasons. Once acquired, the animals are immediately sold either in local markets or across the border in Djibouti.¹³⁴

¹²⁷ Raleigh, C. and Kniveton, D., 'Come rain or shine: An analysis of conflict and climate variability in East Africa', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 49, no. 1 (Jan. 2012); Ember, C. R. et al., 'Rain and raids revisited: Disaggregating ethnic group livestock raiding in the Ethiopian-Kenyan border region', *Civil Wars*, vol. 16, no. 3 (July 2014); and Meier, P., Bond, D. and Bond, J., 'Environmental influences on pastoral conflict in the Horn of Africa', *Political Geography*, vol. 26, no. 6 (Aug. 2007).

¹²⁸ Ember et al. (note 127).

¹²⁹ Hundie, B., 'Conflicts between Afar pastoralists and their neighbors: Triggers and motivations', *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, vol. 4, no. 1 (2010).

¹³⁰ Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87); Devereux (note 77); Catley and Iyasu (note 87); and Markakis (note 1).

¹³¹ Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87).

¹³² Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87).

¹³³ Beyene (note 88).

¹³⁴ Beyene, F., 'Property rights conflict, customary institutions and the state: The case of agro-pastoralists in Mieso district, eastern Ethiopia', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 47, no. 2 (June 2009); and Catley and Iyasu (note 87).

Because there is no mechanism for conflict resolution or compensation between ethnic groups, clans from the Somali region have a greater incentive to raid livestock from pastoralists in the Oromia and Afar regions.¹³⁵ If they engage in intra-ethnic raiding, they are obliged to pay compensation to the raided group for any deaths or injuries incurred during the raid, consistent with the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that mediate disputes between and within clans in the Somali region.¹³⁶

Analysis

The focus group discussions with 20 SIIPE beneficiaries indicated that livestock raiding is not currently a method of coping with drought. Participants explained that it had been practiced as a strategy for coping with drought in the past.¹³⁷ However, as one interviewee noted—in line with increasing poverty rates among pastoralists in the Somali region¹³⁸—the ‘effects of climate change like lack of rainfall entirely disordered our livelihood and our indigenous coping strategies . . . today everyone is poor and poor people cannot raid livestock from one another’.¹³⁹ Beneficiaries in the focus group added that since they are from the same clan, they do not engage in livestock raiding.¹⁴⁰

These findings are not consistent with the broader research on inter- and intra-clan livestock raiding in the Somali region, which sees it as a coping mechanism that is redistributive as less wealthy pastoralists raid livestock from the more wealthy.¹⁴¹ In this case, however, redistributive raiding is not reported to be occurring as the interviewees’ economic circumstances are similar.

Inter-ethnic raiding, on the other hand, was reported to be occurring in communities along the Oromia–Somali border. For example, when pastoralists from the Somali region migrated into the neighbouring Oromia region or into Kenya in search of pasture for their herds, three interviewees indicated that livestock were looted in the process.¹⁴² This is consistent with broader findings on inter-ethnic raiding in the Somali region, especially along the Oromia–Somali border, where there are conflicts over territory and grazing land due to the changes in property rights that accompanied ethnic border demarcations.¹⁴³

Although the interviews do not provide enough evidence to support or refute the TOC on the relationship between insurance payouts and livestock raiding as a means of coping with drought, this TOC should not be discounted as the findings might be specific to certain areas within the Somali region of Ethiopia, rather than the entire Somali region, where, for example, there are wider wealth disparities between pastoralists.

Natural resource management

Along with inter-communal conflict, intra-communal conflict emerged as an area of concern during drought and periods of natural resource scarcity. Natural resource management is one component of the SIIPE programme. Activities include, for

¹³⁵ Catley and Iyasu (note 87).

¹³⁶ Catley and Iyasu (note 87); Mussa, Teka and Aliye (note 91); and Hagmann (note 91).

¹³⁷ Focus group discussion, West Imey, 17 Sep. 2021; and focus group discussion, Kebridehar, 24 Sep. 2021.

¹³⁸ Kassahun, A., Snyman, H. A. and Smit, G. N., ‘Impact of rangeland degradation on the pastoral production systems, livelihoods and perceptions of the Somali pastoralists in eastern Ethiopia’, *Journal of Arid Environments*, vol. 72 (2008).

¹³⁹ Focus group discussion, West Imey, 17 Sep. 2021.

¹⁴⁰ Focus group discussion, West Imey, 17 Sep. 2021.

¹⁴¹ Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87); Nassef and Mulugeta (note 78); and Catley and Iyasu (note 87).

¹⁴² Non-beneficiary interview 7, 20 Sep. 2021; and non-beneficiary interview 5, 19 Sep. 2021.

¹⁴³ Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87); Hagmann and Mulugeta (note 105); and Beyene (note 88).

example, rangeland rehabilitation and constructing water ponds to increase access to both pasture and water resources. These are prioritized in line with the Ethiopian government's Productive Safety Net Programme.¹⁴⁴ Natural resource management activities under the SIIPE programme have only been implemented in one of the three *woredas* studied, where a water pond was constructed and a rangeland rehabilitation project was implemented.¹⁴⁵ Five natural resource management activities have been implemented across the 11 *woredas* in which SIIPE is being implemented.¹⁴⁶

Not enough evidence was gathered during the field research to support a TOC on intra-communal conflict and, to our knowledge, only limited research has been conducted on the relationship between natural resource scarcity and intra-communal conflict in the Somali region of Ethiopia. Nonetheless, community members described how tensions and conflict can arise between pastoralists living in the same *kebele* during droughts and periods of irregular rainfall, as they compete for insufficient water resources for their herds.¹⁴⁷ Food insecurity is a significant concern for pastoralists and agropastoralists in the Somali region, especially since their livelihoods depend on seasonal rainfall.¹⁴⁸ A lack of rain reduces the availability of pasture and water resources, which in turn increases food insecurity as people rely on their livestock as a source of meat and dairy products to consume and sell. Under these circumstances, community members compete for pasture and water resources for their herds in order to maintain their livelihoods and food security, which increases social tensions and conflict within and between communities.¹⁴⁹ One focus group participant explained, 'there is no doubt that food insecurity is our major problem and it has negatively affected the social cohesion of the *kebele*...due to food insecurity there is tension over scarce resources and this has triggered conflict among the pastoral community of the *woreda*'.¹⁵⁰ These accounts are consistent with research that indicates that intra-communal conflict takes place over scarce resources in the Somali region, and is exacerbated by a human population that is increasing by 2.6 per cent annually and a growing livestock population.¹⁵¹

Although 21 interviewees noted that community leaders and elders facilitated conflict resolution between the parties, they also explained that increasing the availability of water resources during drought and periods of natural resource scarcity would reduce intra-communal conflict.¹⁵² There is therefore a clear demand for natural resource management activities, especially those that increase the supply of water

¹⁴⁴ WFP staff member 9, interview with the authors, 12 Mar. 2021; and Mercy Corps staff member, interview with the authors, 26 Aug. 2021.

¹⁴⁵ WFP staff member, correspondence with the authors, 21 July, 2021.

¹⁴⁶ WFP staff member, correspondence with the authors, 21 July, 2021.

¹⁴⁷ SIIPE interview 11, 17 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 1, 21 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 2, 18 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 3, 21 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 4, 20 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 5, 20 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 6, 18 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 7, 20 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 8, 24 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 9, 24 Sep. 2021; community member interview 14, 20 Sep. 2021; community member interview 10, 18 Sep. 2021; community member interview 11, 21 Sep. 2021; community member interview 12, 19 Sep. 2021; community member interview 13, 17 Sep. 2021; and community member interview 15, 17 Sep. 2021.

¹⁴⁸ Focus group discussion, West Imey, 17 Sep. 2021; focus group discussion, Kebridehar, 24 Sep. 2021; and SIIPE interview 10, 17 Sep. 2021.

¹⁴⁹ Community leader interview 5, 20 Sep. 2021; and Beyene (note 88).

¹⁵⁰ Focus group discussion, West Imey, 17 Sep. 2021.

¹⁵¹ Beyene (note 88); and World Bank, *Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Assessment: Ethiopia (Somali Regional State Government)*, Final Report (2020).

¹⁵² Community leader interview 1, 21 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 2, 18 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 3, 21 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 4, 20 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 5, 20 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 6, 18 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 7, 20 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 8, 24 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 9, 24 Sep. 2021; community member interview 14, 20 Sep. 2021; community member interview 10, 18 Sep. 2021; community member interview 11, 21 Sep. 2021; community member interview 12, 19 Sep. 2021; community member interview 13, 17 Sep. 2021; and community member interview 15, 17 Sep. 2021.

during droughts. As more water becomes available for pastoralists' herds, the likelihood of intra-communal conflict decreases, thereby contributing to negative peace.

Conflict sensitivity concerns

Prioritizing water provision as part of SIIPE's natural resource management activities could meet the obvious demand for water in pastoral communities. However, increasing the supply of water could itself be a source of conflict as it might attract pastoralists from other communities experiencing water shortages. Without an agreed and enforceable use arrangement with other communities or negotiated permissions, inter-communal conflict could arise.¹⁵³

In addition, the carrying capacities of both water and grazing resources need to be taken into account, since a greater availability of resources could encourage community members to increase herd size, potentially leading to resource depletion and, in turn, intra-communal conflict. This is an especially important consideration as government interventions to increase water availability for pastoralists in the Somali region in the 1970s undermined traditional water and grazing management and led to rangeland degradation.¹⁵⁴

Recommendation

2. Prioritize natural resource management activities within the SIIPE programme, while taking account of the carrying capacity of water and grazing resources.

Increasing WFP's contribution to improving the prospects for peace

This section discusses additional findings that are neither informed by nor rely on theories of change. First, and consistent with the findings of phase I of the SIPRI-WFP Knowledge Partnership on targeting, SIIPE targeting emerged as a source of tension within communities.¹⁵⁵ Second, conflict analyses are not commonly carried out to inform programming. Addressing both these issues has the potential to increase WFP's contribution to improving the prospects for peace.

Targeting

A variety of targeting methods can be used to select beneficiaries for inclusion and assistance, from blanket targeting to geographic targeting and community-based targeting.¹⁵⁶ In targeting for SIIPE, WFP uses geographic targeting to identify the insurable areas that need the most assistance.¹⁵⁷ Within these areas, communities are then selected to participate in the programme based on their level of vulnerability and need, and their participation in the Productive Safety Net Programme. Targeting individual households within communities, however, is a consultative process that involves the government, community leaders and community members themselves. Selected households should have at least five tropical livestock units and participate in

¹⁵³ Belay, Beyene and Manig (note 87).

¹⁵⁴ Hagmann and Mulugeta (note 105).

¹⁵⁵ Delgado et al. (note 97).

¹⁵⁶ World Food Programme, *Targeting and Prioritization: Operational Guidance Note* (WFP: Rome, 2021).

¹⁵⁷ World Food Programme (note 156); WFP staff members 11 and 12, interview with the authors, 19 Mar. 2021; WFP staff member 16, interview with the authors, 25 Mar. 2021; WFP staff members 13 and 14, interview with the authors, 19 Mar. 2021; and WFP staff member 9, correspondence with the authors, 28 Nov. 2021.

the Productive Safety Net Programme.¹⁵⁸ Households are then chosen based on need and the programme's targeting criteria.¹⁵⁹

Geographic targeting carries a high probability of exclusion errors.¹⁶⁰ When explaining this targeting process, WFP staff members indicated that, in cases of such errors, complaints can be made to WFP through its CFM.¹⁶¹ They also indicated that limits on resources can restrict the number of people who are selected as beneficiaries even if they meet the targeting criteria, which can create resentment among those excluded and confusion about why those who appear more vulnerable have been excluded.¹⁶²

The points made by WFP staff about targeting were reflected in the interviews conducted with community leaders and non-beneficiaries. On the one hand, respondents indicated that WFP programming was not a source of tension in communities.¹⁶³ Eleven non-SIPE beneficiaries noted that there is no tension between SIPE beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries because the selection criteria are fair, non-beneficiaries understand the selection criteria and SIPE beneficiaries will share the benefits they receive with non-beneficiaries, which increases social cohesion within the community.¹⁶⁴ As they see it, those who do not receive support from SIPE understand why they were not selected, citing reasons such as that SIPE aims to target the poorest families, or that SIPE targets those who are sensitive to drought and whose livestock have died due to drought, or targets families with a small number of livestock and a large number of household members.¹⁶⁵

On the other hand, one community leader reported that SIPE targeting has created some tensions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, although it has not 'developed into an all-out conflict in the community yet'.¹⁶⁶ In this account, the selection criteria for the programme were unclear to non-beneficiaries, and their knowledge limited to the idea that selection was random and based on a lottery.¹⁶⁷ Six other community leaders also reported that while there had been no conflict between SIPE beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, the selection criteria for SIPE were unclear and the lack of clarity had created some discontent.¹⁶⁸

Accountability to affected populations is a core commitment of WFP. One element of this core commitment involves providing information to beneficiaries that is well understood.¹⁶⁹ Previous research and the varying viewpoints presented above emphasize the need to extend this principle to non-beneficiaries through better

¹⁵⁸ WFP staff members 11 and 12, interview with the authors, 19 Mar. 2021; WFP staff member 16, interview with the authors, 25 Mar. 2021; WFP staff members 13 and 14, interview with the authors, 19 Mar. 2021; and WFP staff member 9, correspondence with the authors, 28 Nov. 2021. Note: Tropical livestock units convert the number of livestock to a common unit. One tropical livestock unit is equivalent to 250 kilograms of a live animal. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, Tropical livestock units (TLU), FAO, 2011.

¹⁵⁹ WFP staff members 11 and 12, interview with the authors, 19 Mar. 2021.

¹⁶⁰ World Food Programme (note 156).

¹⁶¹ WFP staff members 11 and 12, interview with the authors, 19 Mar. 2021; and WFP staff member 7, interview with the authors, 11 Mar. 2021.

¹⁶² WFP staff members 11 and 12, interview with the authors, 19 Mar. 2021; WFP staff survey, July 2021; and WFP Regional Bureau for East Africa, staff member 1, correspondence with the authors, 25 Nov. 2021.

¹⁶³ Community leader interview 7, 20 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 8, 24 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 9, 24 Sep. 2021; community member interview 11, 21 Sep. 2021; community leader interview 15, 21 Sep. 2021; and community member interview 13, 17 Sep. 2021.

¹⁶⁴ Non-beneficiary interview 2, 17 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 3, 18 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 4, 21 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 5, 19 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 6, 20 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 7, 20 Sep. 2021; and non-beneficiary interview 8, 27 Sep. 2021.

¹⁶⁵ Non-beneficiary interview 2, 17 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 3, 18 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 4, 21 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 5, 19 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 6, 20 Sep. 2021; non-beneficiary interview 7, 20 Sep. 2021; and non-beneficiary interview 8, 27 Sep. 2021.

¹⁶⁶ Community leader interview 6, 18 Sep. 2021.

¹⁶⁷ Community leader interview 6, 18 Sep. 2021.

¹⁶⁸ Community leader interview 6, 18 Sep. 2021; and community member interview 14, 20 Sep. 2021.

¹⁶⁹ World Food Programme (note 112).

communication between WFP and non-beneficiaries regarding targeting criteria and reasons for selection, as these may become a source of tension.¹⁷⁰ Ensuring that the information is clearly understood by those who are not selected might decrease tensions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries within communities. It is also aligned with WFP's core value of accountability. An internal audit of beneficiary targeting by WFP, which included an evaluation of the Ethiopia country office, noted that 'it is essential to periodically monitor the impacts of prioritization on excluded groups to evaluate their vulnerability profile and quickly respond when their situation has deteriorated'.¹⁷¹ Although the intention of this recommendation was to use the information to advocate for more funding in order to expand programming, it should also be extended to monitoring whether or how the targeting criteria and exclusion from prioritization have the potential to create tensions between community members.¹⁷²

As noted above, as part of its accountability to affected populations, in 2015 WFP began implementing a CFM in its field operations. This mechanism provides an avenue for community members—beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries—to express concerns, provide feedback, or register complaints about the agency's programming, which WFP can then address. In Ethiopia, WFP implemented the CFM for projects under Activity 5, which includes SIIPE, in 2020.¹⁷³ However, it has not been implemented in all the areas in which SIIPE is active, and is currently limited to approximately 55 per cent of SIIPE *woredas*.¹⁷⁴

Improving conflict analysis

Conflict analysis to inform programming is not standard practice in WFP's Ethiopia country office and conflict expertise is 'not yet well established at the field office level'.¹⁷⁵ However, integrated context analysis—one of the tools WFP uses to assess vulnerability and need—overlays security data from WFP's Security Unit with variables such as access to water to identify the location of water conflict hotspots and inter-communal clashes, especially in the Somali region.¹⁷⁶ While this integrated context analysis provides a sense of the dynamics that might be occurring, it does not analyse the causal factors associated with conflict.¹⁷⁷

More specifically, since conflict reduction is not one of SIIPE's objectives, a conflict analysis was not carried out.¹⁷⁸ In addition, as a WFP resilience building programme, SIIPE would not normally be implemented in a conflict context.¹⁷⁹ The technical design study for implementing SIIPE in the Somali region examined the migration patterns of pastoralists and noted that they only migrate outside their *woredas* during severe droughts. The study did not comment on the inter-communal or intra-communal conflicts within the Somali region that arise from changes to mobility patterns during severe droughts, or those that arise from competition for water resources within communities. Instead—and consistent with the programme's objective of pro-

¹⁷⁰ Delgado (note 97).

¹⁷¹ Office of the Inspector General, *Internal Audit of Beneficiary Targeting in WFP* (World Food Programme: Rome, 2020), p. 15.

¹⁷² Office of the Inspector General (note 171).

¹⁷³ World Food Programme, *Ethiopia Annual Country Report 2020: Country Strategic Plan 2020–2025*.

¹⁷⁴ WFP staff member 9, correspondence with the authors, 28 Nov. 2021; and WFP staff member 29, correspondence with the authors, 31 Jan. 2022.

¹⁷⁵ WFP staff survey, July 2021.

¹⁷⁶ WFP staff member 2, interview with the authors, 5 Mar. 2021.

¹⁷⁷ WFP headquarters staff member 1, correspondence with the authors, 18 Nov. 2021.

¹⁷⁸ WFP staff member 7, interview with the authors, 11 Mar. 2021; and WFP headquarters staff member 3, correspondence with the authors, 24 Nov. 2021.

¹⁷⁹ WFP headquarters staff member 3, correspondence with the authors, 24 Nov. 2021.

viding pastoralists with index insurance—the focus remained on whether insuring pastoralists within their *woredas* would be possible given their migratory patterns.¹⁸⁰

In contrast, in the interviews with WFP country office staff in Ethiopia, participants recognized that migration outside of *woreda* boundaries is associated with inter-communal conflict over pasture and water resources;¹⁸¹ and that this was not explicitly accounted for in the programme's design.¹⁸² In the initial stage of SIPE, when it was implemented as a pilot project in 2018, conflict analysis was not part of the background research conducted prior to project implementation.¹⁸³ However, when SIPE became part of broader resilience programming in 2019—and prompted by a series of analyses of the Gambella region that did contain conflict analysis—WFP understood that 'it was clear that we need to conduct or be aware of conflict-related aspects as we implement the resilience building project' in the Somali region.¹⁸⁴ To date, however, this awareness has not informed SIPE programming in the Somali region.

If inter-communal and intra-communal conflict are excluded from the context analysis, then programme design is based on an incomplete assessment of the existing dynamics within and between communities, and is thus not sensitive to conflict. This is particularly true when drought coping mechanisms, such as changing mobility patterns, can be a source of conflict. Such exclusions mean that the programme fails to consider all the aspects to which it can positively contribute. Among the outcomes that might be considered—especially in the context of operationalizing the HDP nexus—are changes in patterns of inter- and intra-communal conflict or indicators of social cohesion.

There are precedents for using conflict analysis to inform programming in UN agencies. UNICEF, for example, uses conflict analyses to inform the planning and implementation of its programmes. It emphasizes 'the social dimensions of conflict, the particular role of children and young people in conflict, protection issues, and equitable access to social services' and uses the results to inform programming.¹⁸⁵ WFP's country office in Turkey has developed a social cohesion index that assesses the relationship between the local Turkish community and Syrian refugees to understand how WFP's programmes can improve social cohesion.¹⁸⁶ The index contains indicators pertaining to interpersonal relationships, perceptions of the economic implications of hosting refugees and perceptions of safety, security and stability. Similarly, the UN Development Programme has collected data on local conflict and social cohesion in Lebanon, and has been developing a social cohesion index for the Arab region to better understand potential entry points for peacebuilding projects.¹⁸⁷ The data collected includes information on inter-group trust and threat perceptions.¹⁸⁸ In the case of Ethiopia, however, the focus of the conflict analysis and the indicators of social cohesion must be appropriate to the drivers and types of conflict. WFP is

¹⁸⁰ World Food Programme (note 64).

¹⁸¹ WFP staff member 7, interview with the authors, 11 Mar. 2021; WFP staff member 8, interview with the authors, 11 Mar. 2021; WFP staff members 13 and 14, interview with the authors, 19 Mar. 2021; WFP staff member 15, interview with the authors, 22 Mar. 2021; WFP staff member 16, interview with the authors, 25 Mar. 2021; WFP staff member 22, interview with the authors, 13 Apr. 2021; WFP staff member 23, interview with the authors, 22 Apr. 2021; WFP staff member 26, interview with the authors, 10 June 2021; and WFP staff member 27 (former), interview with the authors, 16 June 2021.

¹⁸² WFP staff member 26, interview with the authors, 10 June 2021.

¹⁸³ WFP staff member 27 (former), interview with the authors, 16 June 2021.

¹⁸⁴ WFP staff member 27 (former), interview with the authors, 16 June 2021.

¹⁸⁵ UNICEF, 'Guide to conflict analysis', Nov. 2016, p. 5.

¹⁸⁶ World Food Programme, Turkey Country Office, *Social Cohesion in Turkey: Refugees and the Host Community*, Online survey findings rounds 1–5 (July 2020).

¹⁸⁷ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 'Overview of communal relations in Lebanon', UNDP and Ark International Dashboard; and Harb, C., 'Developing a Social Cohesion Index for the Arab world', UNDP, Dec. 2017.

¹⁸⁸ Harb (note 187).

uniquely positioned to collect this type of data, as it regularly administers surveys to beneficiaries, although data collection should also cover non-beneficiaries.

While conflict is a sensitive topic to discuss and address in Ethiopia, taking a broader perspective on how to tackle some aspects of it, such as inter- and intra-communal conflict over natural resources, could provide a starting point for operationalizing the 'P' in the HDP nexus. It has the potential to contribute to both negative peace, or reducing conflict, and positive peace by improving livelihood security—and human security more broadly—as soundly managed natural resources provide the basis for pastoral livelihoods in Ethiopia.

Given that a proportion of WFP's climate adaptation and risk management interventions are implemented in conflict-affected regions in Ethiopia, guidelines will be needed on how to routinely integrate conflict sensitivity into programme design and implementation.¹⁸⁹ It will be especially important to institutionalize this as WFP works to operationalize the HDP nexus.

Without making peacebuilding the primary objective of WFP, capacity and expertise on conflict analysis should focus on understanding how to incorporate conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding as objectives for existing and planned WFP programming, and on reducing the conflict risks that programme implementation can create.¹⁹⁰ These analyses should be separate from WFP's Security Unit, which focuses on understanding how security risks can affect staff safety, assets and the delivery of assistance.¹⁹¹ Incorporating conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity could be done in partnership with other UN agencies, such as UNICEF which has supported mediation of water conflicts in Ethiopia's pastoral regions.¹⁹² It is also likely to receive support from donor governments, since they have expressed an interest in reducing inter-communal conflict.¹⁹³

Recommendations

3. Clearly communicate targeting criteria to beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to reduce discontent, tensions and the potential for conflict between the two groups. Initial efforts to communicate targeting criteria should be followed up on a regular basis to ensure continuing understanding of the criteria.
4. Expand coverage of the CFM to all *woredas* where SIIPE is being implemented so that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries can provide feedback on and express their concerns regarding the SIIPE targeting criteria. WFP can then respond, thereby decreasing the likelihood of discontent and tensions between community members.
5. Build capacity and expertise in the Ethiopia country office on conflict analysis and integrating conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding into programming.

¹⁸⁹ WFP staff survey, July 2021.

¹⁹⁰ World Food Programme, *WFP's Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings: Informal Consultation* (World Food Programme: Rome, 2013).

¹⁹¹ WFP staff member 23, interview with the authors, 22 Apr. 2021; and World Food Programme, *Security Report* (World Food Programme: Rome, 2018).

¹⁹² UNICEF, *Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding in UNICEF*, UNICEF, [n.d.].

¹⁹³ Representative of Government of Sweden, interview with the authors, 31 Aug. 2021.

6. Conduct a conflict analysis on inter- and intra-communal conflict for the regions in which SIIPE will be scaled-up before its implementation in those regions.
7. Explicitly incorporate the insights from inter- and intra-communal conflict analyses into targeting, programme design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Use the conflict analysis to make conflict sensitivity and/or peacebuilding an explicit programme objective, along with indicators to measure conflict reduction and peacebuilding outcomes.

5. Cross-cutting components for improving the prospects for peace

In addition to climate change, the SIPRI–WFP Knowledge Partnership covers four areas of research: gender, cash-based transfers, stabilization and measurement. Although the focus of this report is on climate change, some of the findings presented below are relevant to the other areas of research.

Gender

Men and women experience conflict and extreme weather events, and the resulting destruction and displacement, differently. Ethiopia has a patriarchal culture, which means that men often have better access to resources and power than women.¹⁹⁴ While there have been some improvements in the status of women, these are offset by prevailing gender norms.¹⁹⁵

There is a tendency for the conflict literature to describe women as victims but UN Security Council Resolution 1325 recognizes that women have a role to play in peacebuilding. It proposes the inclusion of women in peacebuilding through their participation in: governance, peace and security; preventing conflict and violence; protecting women's and girls' rights in conflict, and advocating for appropriate and just relief for survivors of conflict.¹⁹⁶ Some of these pillars intersect with the objectives of WFP's *Gender Policy, 2015–2020*: food assistance adapted to needs, equal participation, decision making by women and girls, and gender and protection.¹⁹⁷ While this intersection shows the potential for WFP programming to contribute to peace in Ethiopia, and is consistent with WFP's *Gender Policy, 2022–2026*, the objectives lack an explicit peacebuilding agenda, which could limit their potential to contribute or obscure their contribution to peace.

The CSP acknowledges that gender—through its influence on access to resources and opportunities—affects well-being, including livelihood options and food and nutrition insecurity in Ethiopia.¹⁹⁸ To address this, the CSP notes that WFP will mainstream gender into its programming. WFP conducts gender analyses and collects gender disaggregated data for its programming, but concerns were expressed that these exercises did not always provide enough evidence to design specific programming for women and men.¹⁹⁹

Regardless of this critique, the country office observed that men were more likely to participate in public works, while women were more likely to be involved in livelihood and nutrition programmes, since they target pregnant and lactating women, and their children. To ensure that women-headed households can participate equally in public works programmes, and to increase the number of women participating in such programmes, WFP has intentionally targeted women and created an enabling environment for women to work on public works activities.²⁰⁰ For instance, they have allowed women to arrive late or leave early as dictated by their caregiving schedules.

¹⁹⁴ Mersha, A. A. and van Laerhoven, F., 'Gender and climate policy: A discursive institutional analysis of Ethiopia's climate resilient strategy', *Regional Environmental Change*, vol. 19 (2019).

¹⁹⁵ Bekana, D. M., 'Policies of gender equality in Ethiopia: The transformative perspective', *International Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 43, no. 4 (2020).

¹⁹⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, 31 Oct. 2000.

¹⁹⁷ World Food Programme, *WFP Gender Policy, 2015–2020*, 2015.

¹⁹⁸ World Food Programme, *Ethiopia Country Strategic Plan, 2020–2025* (World Food Programme: Rome, 2020).

¹⁹⁹ WFP staff members 3 and 4, interview with the authors, 5 Mar. 2021.

²⁰⁰ WFP staff member 15, interview with the authors, 22 Mar. 2021; and WFP headquarters staff member 2, correspondence with the authors, 22 Nov. 2021.

They have also included pregnant women, who would not be expected by the community to work, as programme beneficiaries. In other programmes, such as SIIPE, women beneficiaries were targeted for the livelihood component of the programme and trained to create off-farm livelihood activities, for instance through savings groups and investing in selected activities, such as the milk value chain. Finally, the school feeding programme has provided meals to school children and given their parents a platform to meet and discuss issues that affect their children. Among the issues on gender and protection that have been discussed in the past are sexual and gender-based violence in the community, domestic violence and early marriage.²⁰¹ While these social issues were beyond the programme's objectives, their effect on child well-being allowed the community to discuss what were normally restricted subjects.

Cash-based transfers

Whether WFP provides cash transfers or in-kind assistance in Ethiopia depends on which modality the market can support and the preferences of the beneficiaries. In addition, transfer values are location-dependent and must be appropriate to the area's market conditions.²⁰²

Cash transfers can have positive effects in Ethiopia. Cash transfers have improved local economies and businesses, and provide beneficiaries with the freedom to use the cash as they see fit. In addition, one WFP staff member noted that cash transfers help beneficiaries to meet their basic needs, which reduces the likelihood of criminal activity such as looting and theft.²⁰³ These findings are consistent with those on the effect of cash-based transfers on peace in Lebanon—that cash transfers decrease 'desperation-motivated' crimes such as theft.²⁰⁴ The value of the transfer, however, needs to be enough to meet those basic needs. An important point is that it is not necessarily the modality that matters for a peaceful outcome, but meeting basic needs. This can also be achieved by providing in-kind assistance, especially if there is no market where beneficiaries can spend the cash.²⁰⁵

Cash transfers have the potential to generate tensions between recipients if the value of the transfer is not equal for all recipients. For example, tensions arose between two groups of IDPs in southern Ethiopia because they were receiving different amounts of cash. One group was receiving a larger transfer from WFP compared to a smaller amount being received by another group from a non-governmental organization. The situation was resolved by establishing a sub-national cash working group to harmonize the amount of cash being distributed.²⁰⁶ More broadly, the value of cash transfers as part of relief response is harmonized between the PSNP and WFP to avoid the potential for such tensions to arise.²⁰⁷

Stabilization

Food insecurity increases grievances and can have negative implications for peace and stability.²⁰⁸ Several interviewees stated that WFP's assistance in Ethiopia is a stabilizing force. Using reasoning similar to that on the effect of cash transfers, WFP staff

²⁰¹ WFP staff member 17, interview with the authors, 25 Mar. 2021.

²⁰² WFP staff members 5 and 6, interview with the authors, 8 Mar. 2021.

²⁰³ WFP staff member 21, interview with the authors, 8 Apr. 2021.

²⁰⁴ Tschunkert, K., *The World Food Programme's Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace in Lebanon* (SIPRI: Stockholm, Sep. 2021).

²⁰⁵ WFP staff member 21, interview with the authors, 8 Apr. 2021.

²⁰⁶ WFP staff member 21, interview with the authors, 8 Apr. 2021.

²⁰⁷ WFP staff member 8, correspondence with the authors, 8 Jan. 2022.

²⁰⁸ Delgado, Murugani and Tschunkert (note 76).

explained that food assistance helps beneficiaries meet their basic needs, making them less likely to engage in criminal activity.²⁰⁹ One illustrative example came from the Oromia region, where IDPs are reported to have used violence against a government representative because their basic food needs were not being met.²¹⁰ Another example was noted in Benishungul-Gumuz, where WFP's programming for refugees is not always fully funded and it sometimes has to decrease the rations distributed by 30–40 per cent. When the size of the ration decreases, it is no longer sufficient to meet beneficiaries' basic needs, so refugees engage in activities that are not welcomed by the host community, such as collecting more firewood to sell.²¹¹ This leads to confrontation and tensions between refugees and their host community.²¹² It is important to note, however, that it may not necessarily be the case that refugees are depleting local resources. Instead, as in Afar, host communities may perceive that refugees are depleting resources because the environment in which the host communities live is already suffering from scarcity.²¹³

Although the examples presented above do not directly address the relationship between WFP assistance and stabilization, they illustrate that a lack of assistance or a decrease in existing assistance can generate tensions or violence.

Measurement

WFP traditionally measures nutrition, gender inclusivity and the number of beneficiaries. However, because the primary goals of programming are to improve food security, nutrition and livelihoods, it does not measure how achieving these goals contributes to peace. Following the realization that its programming contributes to peace, WFP has begun to consider these relationships in their programme design, implementation and monitoring. Country office staff had anecdotal evidence that activities such as SIPE reduce pastoral migration in search of pasture and water in drought years, which leads to a decrease in inter-group conflict.²¹⁴ While this shows that there is a possible link between programming and conflict reduction, the evidence was limited to the contexts under discussion. To build stronger evidence, the country office is beginning to generate information on conflict occurrence and causes as part of a process of developing indicators to measure conflict. However, the country office has acknowledged that this is complex work that is still being pioneered.²¹⁵

²⁰⁹ WFP staff member 8, interview with the authors, 11 Mar. 2021; and WFP staff member 18, interview with the authors, 26 Mar. 2021.

²¹⁰ WFP staff member 18, interview with the authors, 26 Mar. 2021.

²¹¹ WFP staff members 5 and 6, interview with the authors, 8 Mar. 2021.

²¹² WFP staff members 5 and 6, interview with the authors, 8 Mar. 2021; and Martin, A., 'Environmental conflict between refugee and host communities', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 42, no. 3 (2005).

²¹³ Smith, L. et al., 'Local integration and shared resource management in protracted refugee camps: Findings from a study in the Horn of Africa', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1 (2021).

²¹⁴ WFP staff member 16, interview with the authors, 25 Mar. 2021.

²¹⁵ WFP staff member 2, interview with the authors, 5 Mar. 2021.

6. Conclusions

The findings of this research suggest that SIIPE can reduce conflict between communities, and thus potentially contribute to enhancing the prospects for peace in Ethiopia. However, some broader concerns around conflict analysis and targeting are consistent with the findings from phase I. Based on the research results and recommendations discussed above, a number of recommendations are summarized below.

Programmatic recommendations

1. Consider prioritizing livelihood diversification activities, which may offer a more regular source of income for households.
2. Prioritize natural resource management activities within the SIIPE programme.

Improving conflict analysis

3. Clearly communicate all targeting criteria to beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
4. Expand coverage of the CFM to all *woredas* where SIIPE is being implemented.
5. Build capacity and expertise in the Ethiopia country office on conflict analysis and integrating conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding into programming.
6. Conduct a conflict analysis on inter- and intra-communal conflict in the regions in which SIIPE will be scaled-up prior to its implementation in those regions.
7. Explicitly incorporate the insights from inter- and intra-communal conflict analyses into targeting, programme design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Use the conflict analysis to incorporate conflict sensitivity and/or peacebuilding as an explicit programme objective.

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