STRENGTHENING EU CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE CIVILIAN CSDP COMPACT AND BEYOND

TIMO SMIT*

I. Introduction

The Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Compact of 2018 has been the most serious attempt to date by the European Union (EU) and its member states to reinvigorate EU civilian crisis management. Civilian CSDP is a trademark instrument of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a key component of its Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises. Yet it has long been underdeveloped and insufficiently resourced, and before the compact the interest from EU member states in civilian CSDP appeared to be waning. This was perhaps best symbolized by the diminishing national contributions to civilian CSDP missions in the preceding years, which negatively affected their credibility and effectiveness. Accordingly, the first commitment EU member states made in the compact was to increase these national contributions again.

The compact has created genuine political momentum and a shared desire to strengthen civilian CSDP. Three years into the implementation phase, EU member states and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have made notable progress on several of the compact’s 10 strategic guidelines and 22 political commitments, which aim to make civilian CSDP more capable; more effective, flexible and responsive; and more joined up with other EU actors and instruments, such as Justice and Home Affairs agencies. However, there has been limited progress when it comes to increasing national contributions to missions through personnel secondments. Indeed, in several missions the share of seconded personnel has continued to decline.

EU member states have agreed to deliver the compact fully by mid 2023. This means that they have about 18 months left to translate their efforts to contribute more personnel to missions, including more women, into concrete results. Such results would benefit the operational effectiveness of missions and help sustain the political interest in strengthening civilian CSDP missions.

1 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, 14305/18, 19 Nov. 2018.
3 Council of the European Union (note 1), p. 5.

* The author would like to thank the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs for funding the research presented in this SIPRI Insights paper.
beyond the compact. Indeed, thinking about a ‘Civilian CSDP Compact 2.0’ has already started at the EU level and in some member states. The EU’s forthcoming Strategic Compass for security and defence—which will provide political and strategic guidance for CSDP for the next five to ten years, including for crisis management—will certainly inform the development of a compact 2.0. However, the parameters may also depend on the extent to which the current compact is implemented and what lessons are drawn from it.

This SIPRI Insights paper takes stock of the progress that has been achieved in the implementation of commitments by EU member states to: (a) increase national contributions to civilian CSDP (commitment 1) and raise the share of seconded personnel in missions to at least 70 per cent (commitment 3); and (b) promote a better representation of women in missions (commitment 16). It builds on previous research published by SIPRI in 2019 and 2020 and on data from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database. The objective of this paper is to contribute to the transparency and accountability of the Civilian CSDP Compact and to provide analysis and policy recommendations on its implementation.

The paper is structured as follows. First, it focuses on efforts to raise the number and share of seconded personnel (section II); second, it focuses on efforts to promote women’s representation (section III); and third, it considers national contributions towards these efforts and burden sharing among EU member states (section IV). It concludes by providing policy recommendations regarding the implementation of the relevant commitments of the compact (section V).

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6 Council of the European Union (note 1).
II. Raising secondments to civilian CSDP missions

The EU has conducted 23 civilian CSDP missions since 2003, of which 11 have been active since the Civilian CSDP Compact (see table 1). The current missions are in Europe (Georgia, Kosovo and Ukraine), the Middle East and North Africa (Iraq, Libya and Palestine), and sub-Saharan Africa (Central African Republic, Mali, Niger and Somalia). They contribute to the strategic priorities of the EU in security and defence to: (a) respond to external conflicts and crises in order to promote peace and security; (b) strengthen the capacity of partner countries to support stabilization and enhance their resilience; and (c) protect the security of the EU and its citizens from threats that may originate from outside the union. The latter include security challenges related to hybrid threats, cybersecurity, organized crime, terrorism and irregular migration. These challenges have become increasingly important focus areas of civilian CSDP missions, which have traditionally concentrated on strengthening the police and rule of law, confidence building and civilian security sector reform. Most missions are doing this in support of host governments through training, advising, mentoring and monitoring. The only civilian CSDP mission that has had an executive mandate so far is the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, which has substituted and supported Kosovan authorities in the areas of the judiciary and law enforcement.

Civilian CSDP missions are part of the predominantly intergovernmental CFSP of the EU and therefore subject to the political authority of EU member states, which decide on all matters related to them based on unanimity. According to the Treaty of the EU, the capabilities of the missions should be provided by EU member states. In theory, this means that mission personnel should be seconded and paid for by EU member states. Seconded personnel are often public servants, such as police officers, who can contribute skills and expertise to missions that may not be available outside public services. In practice, some mission personnel are contracted and paid for by the mission budget, which in turn comes from the EU budget. However, in the years leading up to the compact, civilian CSDP had become increasingly reliant on contracted personnel.

Several of the compact’s commitments therefore aim to increase the number and share of seconded personnel in the missions, either directly or indirectly. EU member states pledged to increase their national contributions to civilian CSDP (commitment 1) and collectively raise the number and share of seconded mission personnel to at least 70 per cent (commitment 3). EU member states agreed to prioritize seconded personnel in operational positions, who are doing the actual training, advising, mentoring and monitoring, among other things, of the missions. To make this possible, the compact includes commitments on: reducing bureaucratic, financial and legal barriers to secondment (commitment 2); capability

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11 Smit, ‘Towards a more capable European Union Civilian CSDP’ (note 7).
development (commitment 4); time-limited secondments of specialized teams (commitment 6); and reviewing the EEAS recruitment policy and procedures for missions, as well as the employment status of contracted personnel (commitment 10).\(^{12}\)

**Increased secondments in absolute terms**

The number of seconded personnel concurrently deployed in missions is one of the most used performance indicators in EU communication about the implementation of the Civilian CSDP Compact. EU member states agreed to review implementation of the compact regularly and support it with a comprehensive communication strategy.\(^{13}\) The EEAS issued ‘suggestions for common master messages’ to this end in July 2021.\(^{14}\) The first message about progress made was that secondments have increased 11 per cent since

\(^{12}\) Council of the European Union (note 1).

\(^{13}\) Council of the European Union (note 1), p. 11.

the compact. This is supported by data from SIPRI, if the start date for the comparison is 31 December 2018 and the end date is 30 June 2021.

According to SIPRI’s data, the number of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions increased by 10 per cent, from 710 in December 2018 to 779 in June 2021 (see figure 1). The minor deviation from the EEAS data is likely due to the fact that SIPRI does not count heads of mission as seconded personnel (because they are contracted by the European Commission) and excludes the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (KSC & SPO), based in the Hague, the Netherlands. The KSC & SPO is supported by EULEX Kosovo but is not part of the mission legally.

On the one hand, it is possible to frame this progress more positively. First, it is a 10 per cent net increase in secondments by 27 EU member states, the United Kingdom (which left the EU in 2020) and some other non-EU countries, whereas secondments by current EU member states alone went up 12 per cent between December 2018 and June 2021. Second, it is a net increase in secondments to 11 missions, some of which have scaled down. The authorized strength of EULEX Kosovo has been cut by almost 50 per cent since 2018, from 450 to 250 personnel. Secondments by current EU member states to all missions except EULEX Kosovo actually went up 20 per cent between December 2018 and June 2021. Third, this increase does not include the temporary secondments of specialized teams in the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine and the EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) in Somalia since 2021. Finally, the increase in secondments might have been even higher if it had not been for the Covid-19 pandemic, which caused a temporary drop in secondments and recruitment to missions in 2020.

On the other hand, there are caveats to measuring progress in this way. First, secondments had reached a 10-year low in December 2018, thus providing a favourable baseline for comparisons. Second, secondments fell again more recently, to 758 in August 2021. This figure is only 7 per cent more than in December 2018 and similar to the number of seconded personnel that were deployed in October 2018, just before the compact was established. The most recent decline may prove to be temporary, but it illustrates that the increase in secondments since the compact has been non-linear and remains marginal in absolute terms.

Decreased shares of seconded personnel in most missions

The increase in secondments in absolute terms since the compact has been enabled by the expansion of several missions. Indeed, the EU has raised the approved personnel strength of almost all civilian CSDP missions in recent years. As a result, the total number of approved positions in civilian CSDP missions increased 14 per cent, from 1254 in December 2018 to 1425 in August 2021. This puts into perspective the 7 per cent increase in secondments in that period. Meanwhile, the number of contracted personnel increased 27 per cent—almost four times as much—from 370 to 471.

16 Based on an analysis by the author of all calls for contributions to civilian CSDP missions published between July 2017 and June 2021 (on file with author).
As a consequence, the share of seconded personnel in missions has continued to decrease and diverge further from the 70 per cent target. The share of seconded personnel in all missions was 67 per cent when the compact was being negotiated and 66 per cent when it was agreed in 2018.\footnote{These figures and all other personnel-related figures in this paper do not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (KSC & SPO), non-permanent international personnel, such as visiting experts or specialized teams, and national staff.}
It decreased further to 65 per cent in 2019 and dropped to 62 per cent in mid 2020, due in part to the Covid-19 pandemic. It has remained at this level since then. Although the decline seems to have been halted, as yet there are no indications that a reversal of this trend is imminent.

The goal of raising the share of seconded personnel in missions to at least 70 per cent seemed moderately ambitious in 2018. The share of seconded personnel was 67 per cent at the time and had exceeded 70 per cent previously. Moreover, EU member states were committed to increasing their national contributions. However, the steady increase of contracted mission personnel since 2018 has made it increasingly unlikely that the 70 per cent target can be attained by 2023. As of August 2021, this would require that more than 100 contracted personnel across missions are replaced with seconded personnel, other things remaining equal. This is more than twice as many as when the compact started. Without the closure of missions or other major developments (or interventions), this will be seemingly impossible.

The number of seconded personnel increased in almost all missions after 2018 (see figure 2). The main exception was EULEX Kosovo, which was being downsized. It was surpassed by the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia in 2020 as the mission with the most seconded personnel. EUAM Ukraine has remained the third-largest mission in terms of secondments. Civilian CSDP missions located in Europe have always received many secondments compared to most missions deployed in other regions. This has not changed since the compact, despite a growing demand for personnel contributions coming especially from missions outside Europe.

The share of seconded personnel, meanwhile, decreased in almost all missions. Again, the main exception was EULEX Kosovo, as many contracted personnel left the mission after 2018. Most other missions have expanded their presence in host countries, in some cases also geographically by means of mobile units (such as in central Mali) or new field offices (such as in in eastern Ukraine). Even missions that are not growing need to recruit new personnel continuously due to the temporary nature of secondments. When EU member states authorize missions to expand and do more, these missions need to recruit additional personnel on top of their regular recruitment to replace outgoing staff. EU member states have not been able to fully accommodate the additional demand for personnel contributions that they have generated. This is most evident from the disproportionate increase in contracted personnel in almost all missions.

In some missions the share of seconded personnel has remained above 70 per cent, whereas in other missions it has fallen below 50 per cent. EUMM Georgia maintained the highest average share of seconded personnel in 2021 (87 per cent), followed by EUAM Ukraine (72 per cent) and the EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS, 71 per cent). Besides EULEX Kosovo, the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya is the only mission in which the average share of seconded personnel was higher in 2021 than in 2018. The share of seconded personnel continues to be the lowest in the missions in sub-Saharan Africa.

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18 See Smit, ‘Towards a more capable European Union civilian CSDP’ (note 7).
Continued high levels of secondments among operational personnel

The share of seconded personnel among operational personnel has remained relatively high in all missions since the compact (see figure 3). This is because EU member states prioritize these positions in their contributions (as per the compact) and are generally reluctant to permit contracted personnel to take them. Most operational positions therefore remain exclusive to seconded personnel. However, EU member states may approve the opening
up of operational positions (or any position, for that matter) to contracted personnel when two successive calls for contributions have not produced a successful candidate.

There are nonetheless missions that have a relatively high number of contracted personnel in operational roles. EULEX Kosovo employs the largest number of contracted personnel in such functions, including in advisory roles. This seems unnecessary given that it is a low-risk mission inside Europe, which has received personnel contributions from most EU member states. The share of the mission’s operational personnel that is seconded has remained at 80 per cent, primarily because the mission has retained its 100-strong formed police unit (FPU), provided by Poland. However, among the operational personnel that are not part of the FPU, the average share of seconded personnel was merely 57 per cent in 2021. This is markedly lower even than in EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Somalia. These missions also have a relatively high number of contracted personnel in operational positions, but unlike EULEX Kosovo they are high-risk missions that have depended on personnel contributions from a much smaller group of EU member states.

Despite the commitment to prioritize seconded personnel in operational positions, the number of contracted personnel occupying such roles increased in several missions. The total number of contracted personnel in operational positions in all missions except EULEX Kosovo increased from 35 in February 2019 to 59 in August 2021. This implies that at least 24 vacancies for operational positions could not be filled with personnel provided by EU member states in this period. Indeed, an analysis of the calls for contributions published since the compact reveals that several operational posts were re-advertised multiple times and eventually opened to contracted personnel. This includes a whole unit of advisers on human resources management reform within EUAM Ukraine, at a time when this was a priority for the mission. Other examples include vacancies for (senior) advisers in EUAM Iraq, EUAM RCA in the Central African Republic (CAR), EUBAM Libya, EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUCAP Somalia and EULEX Kosovo. This is in addition to the seconded posts that were converted to contracted posts just before the compact, such as nine adviser posts in EUCAP Somalia in 2018.

These conversions of posts that could not be filled by EU member states are one of the main reasons why contracted personnel have been increasing in most missions, including in operational positions. This also explains in part why the share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions has not been increasing since the compact. Once vacancies have been filled by contracted personnel, these posts are rarely filled by seconded personnel again. As a result, it is very difficult for EU member states to raise the share of seconded personnel in missions that have accumulated a critical mass of contracted personnel, even when they nominate more candidates to them.

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19 Based on an analysis by the author of all calls for contributions published between 2017 and 30 June 2021.

III. Promoting women’s representation in civilian CSDP

In the Civilian CSDP Compact, EU member states committed to actively promoting a better representation of women at all levels in missions. They agreed to do this through their national contributions, which they had pledged to increase. The compact does not specify timelines or targets for increasing women’s representation, which remains well below gender parity in most of the missions.

Women’s representation across civilian CSDP missions has not yet improved since the compact, despite efforts to attract and retain more women personnel. The number of women deployed has increased in absolute terms in line with total deployments, with minimal effect on the overall gender balance (see figure 4). The total number of women serving in missions increased 19 per cent between December 2018 and August 2021, from 238 to 282. The number of women went up 12 per cent among seconded personnel, from 168 to 188, and 34 per cent among contracted personnel, from 70 to 94. Women continued to account for about 22 per cent of all mission personnel,

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24 per cent of seconded personnel and 20 per cent of contracted personnel. Nevertheless, there are signs of a slow upward trend in these figures since mid 2019.

Women’s representation varies between missions and there are many possible explanations for this, including factors related to size and composition, contributing countries and type of capability requirements. Since the compact, the average number of women personnel per year increased in all missions except EULEX Kosovo (see figure 5). In some missions this has led to a better gender balance. This has especially been the case in EUBAM Libya and EUPOL COPPS, where the average share of women among each mission’s personnel reached almost 40 per cent in 2021. In other missions gender imbalances have increased. The share of women among the personnel of EUCAP Sahel Mali and EULEX Kosovo reached its lowest point in 2021, at 16 per cent and 14 per cent respectively (see figure 6).

Women’s representation varies even more greatly within missions, between different job functions. Women personnel tend to disproportionately work in functional areas such as human resources management, planning and reporting, and medical support, or as human rights and gender advisers. Women tend to remain underrepresented in senior management and operational positions, and nearly absent in support functions within, for example, security and protection, information and communication technology, and logistics. Gender balancing efforts usually concentrate on the management and operational positions in missions, which have the highest visibility and operational impact. These are also positions that are often prioritized in the national contributions of EU member states, which is not the case for the various mission support functions.

**Women’s representation among operational personnel**

The majority of the 500–600 operational personnel in civilian CSDP missions can be divided into three broad categories. More than half of them can be grouped into the first category of advisers, experts and trainers. Most of the current missions rely heavily on such personnel for the implementation of their mandates, especially those with advisory or capacity-building tasks. The share of women in this category increased from 19 per cent in 2019 to 21 per cent in 2021. However, in some missions this share is markedly lower, especially in EUCAP Sahel Mali (11 per cent on average in 2021) and EUAM RCA (6 per cent on average in 2021).

Civilian monitors constitute the second category of operational personnel in civilian CSDP missions. EUMM Georgia has approximately 120 of these, who patrol the areas in Georgia along the de facto border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The mission prioritizes mixed-gender patrols and aims to deploy more women monitors. However, the share of women in these positions has remained at around 25 per cent since 2019. According to the mission’s latest gender mainstreaming assessment, this is due to a shortage of women candidates put forward by EU member states. On average, only 15 per cent of the candidates nominated for secondment to the mission in

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One possible reason for this is that EU members are also contributing 350 personnel, of which 80 women, to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

The FPU in EULEX Kosovo can be considered the third category, due to its size. This unit has the lowest level of women’s representation of all categories of operational mission personnel. The number of women among the approximately 100 members increased from 1 in 2019 to 3 in 2021, thus remaining very low. Members of the FPU are not individually recruited by the mission like ordinary personnel, but are selected by the Polish National Police and deployed in unit formation. The FPU is the only remaining
executive function of the mission and continues to act as the second security responder in Kosovo, after the local police force. It is capable of riot control and special weapons and tactics (SWAT) operations. These types of police or gendarmerie units tend to be overwhelmingly male and barriers to women’s representation are similar to those in the military domain. This also applies to EUCAP Sahel Mali’s mobile unit for central Mali, which deployed in 2020 under the banner of the European Gendarmerie Force. This all-male unit consisted of 20 military police, including advisers, trainers and a robust armed protection team. It is no coincidence therefore that women’s representation has been particularly low in these two missions.

**Women’s representation among heads of mission and senior management**

The European Commission launched the third Gender Action Plan (GAP III) for EU external action in November 2020. One of its pillars is that the EU must lead by example and ensure gender-responsive and gender-balanced leadership at top political and management levels, including in CSDP missions. According to GAP III, the EEAS is actively pursuing this by encouraging EU member states to nominate women candidates as heads of mission. Heads of civilian CSDP missions are technically contracted by the European Commission, but the commission’s gender parity target for management positions does not apply to them.

The representation of women among heads of mission in civilian CSDP has been notoriously low, but has improved somewhat recently. EU member states had appointed 62 heads of mission before they established the compact, of which 6 were women. Since then, EU member states have appointed 11 more heads of mission—one for each mission, including the new EUAM RCA—of which 3 were women. There was a period in 2019 and 2020 in which none of the missions was led by a woman. The optics of this were poor in light of the compact and the 20th anniversary of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2020. However, if EU member states can maintain gender parity in their appointments, gender balance among heads of mission is within reach. This is also the case for the positions of deputy head of mission and chief of staff (which are sometimes double-hatted), in which the share of women increased to 42 per cent in 2021.

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**Efforts to promote women’s representation**

Even though the compact lacks ambition when it comes to gender balancing, the commitment to promote women’s representation in missions has received much attention. EU member states have established an informal thematic working group specifically on this commitment. The European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management (COE) has initiated a mentoring programme for women in CSDP missions to support their professional development and increase their presence in management positions.\(^30\) The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) has been reviewing standard job descriptions, training members of selection panels and surveying mission members on work environment issues, among other things. The CPCC has also drafted a gender strategy and action plan, and plans to finalize these documents in 2021. The draft includes text on affirmative action measures to increase the selection of women candidates, similar to the instructions under the recent special temporary measures of the UN Secretariat for achieving gender parity.\(^31\) However, such measures will have to be approved by member states.

EU member states have also been discussing the possibility of revising the current policy on non-family missions so that personnel can be accompanied by their families in low-risk and medium-risk missions. The EEAS has prepared an options paper to this end at the request of some member states.\(^32\) One of the premises of the paper is that family-friendly missions could attract a wider and more diverse pool of candidates. The paper links this to the compact and the commitment to increase national contributions to missions. Although it does not explicitly reference women’s representation or gender, non-family missions are often brought up as a barrier to recruiting and retaining women personnel in peace operations.\(^33\) The introduction of family duty stations would have financial and legal implications, as well as consequences for the duty of care responsibilities of these missions. The options paper therefore emphasizes that this would require a feasibility study.\(^34\) However, it is clear that any revision of the policy on non-family missions would not apply to missions in high-risk environments such as CAR, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Niger and Somalia, where the share of seconded personnel and the representation of women tend to be the lowest.


\(^{34}\) European External Action Service (note 32).
IV. Comparing national contributions to civilian CSDP

In the Civilian CSDP Compact, EU member states committed to jointly increasing the number of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions. Technically, EU member states did not promise to individually increase secondments. References to burden sharing are absent from the compact, but the issue has recently resurfaced in the context of military CSDP missions and operations, in discussions about Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Strategic Compass. In November 2020, the Council of the EU agreed that more transparency is needed among member states about their implementation of PESCO commitments, including their pledge to provide ‘substantial support’ to CSDP missions and operations.\(^{35}\) The council also agreed to discuss further the possibility of developing ‘measurable objectives’ and ‘progress indicators’, based on a ‘fair share’ principle.\(^{36}\) The EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Josep Borrell, has said that he strongly supports this as a means of incentivizing member states to contribute more to CSDP missions and to stimulate burden sharing.\(^{37}\) Even if EU member states did agree to this, it remains unclear how ‘fair share’ might be defined and whether objectives for burden sharing would encompass contributions to civilian CSDP missions.

**Measuring national contributions**

Measuring national contributions to civilian CSDP missions to assess burden sharing is politically sensitive and not straightforward. The most used indicator (also used in this paper) is the number of personnel that EU member states are seconding to missions at a particular time. Although this is a useful indicator it has clear limitations.

First, national contributions to civilian CSDP are not limited to seconded personnel in missions. This indicator does not include temporary mission personnel, such as visiting experts or members of specialized teams. Neither does it cover secondments to the CPCC in Brussels, which functions as the operational headquarters of the missions, or to the COE in Berlin, which supports member states and the EEAS in their implementation of the compact.

Second, the number of personnel that EU member states are seconding to missions at any given time does not necessarily reflect their willingness to contribute to civilian CSDP. Member states cannot simply deploy personnel to missions whenever they please, as secondment is voluntary and subject to a competitive selection process. The selection rates of nominated candidates and the retention rates of selected candidates may vary among member states for reasons beyond their control. Therefore, there may be gaps between the intended and actual levels of national contributions, as measured by the number of secondees.

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36 Council of the European Union (note 35), annex, p. 9; and Dutch House of Representatives, Defence Council, ‘brief van de minister van Defensie’ [Brief from the Minister of Defence], 15 Apr. 2021, p. 7.
37 Borrell, J., EU High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP), ‘What’s next for European defence?’, HR/VP Blog, 7 May 2021.
Third, quantitative indicators can measure personnel contributions but not capability, which has been defined as ‘the ability to implement a given task’. Measuring contributions in terms of the number of seconded personnel does not capture their relative quality and scarcity. Whereas some personnel contributions may be more or less expendable, others can fill critical gaps in a mission and are capability multipliers. Moreover, aside from budgetary considerations, the added value of seconded personnel is greater in some positions than in others. Contracted personnel may even be preferable in certain mission support functions, where they can provide greater continuity than seconded personnel. Neither are all seconded personnel active government employees borrowed from member states; a substantial proportion are in fact freelancers, who are effectively subcontracted by member states on behalf of missions.

Conceptualizing fair share contributions

These limitations in terms of measuring national contributions can be overcome with additional indicators and better data. The quality of the available human resources statistics on civilian CSDP missions has already improved since the compact. This data may improve further now that the CPCC is operating a new human resources database, the Civilian Missions Application (CIMA). CIMA contains data as of June 2020 and has been integrated with the electronic recruitment system for the missions. This should enable the CPCC to analyse more complete and more granular data, for example, linking data on nominations, selections and retention—broken down by member state and seconding authority—to specific posts within missions. Another useful indicator would be member states’ annual expenditure on civilian crisis management. However, data on such expenditure remains hard to compile, especially as many member states do not have a dedicated budget line to cover the costs of their contributions to civilian CSDP.

Defining what constitutes fair or equitable burden sharing among EU member states is complicated in itself. Decisions on matters related to civilian CSDP require unanimity, which means that all 27 member states are equal in this regard. Yet member states are not equal in their means and abilities to contribute to CSDP. EU member states therefore contribute to the financing of the common costs of military missions and operations based on their gross national income (GNI). CPCC staffing reports on civilian missions include a table in which member states’ contributions are compared against the relative size of their population (which favours member states with a high GNI per capita). Meanwhile, national contributions to the new standing corps of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) are based on a distribution key negotiated by member states.

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Figure 7. National contributions of personnel to civilian CSDP missions, average per year, 2018–21
CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; EU = European Union.
Notes: Countries are ranked by the average size of their contribution in 2021. Annual averages are based on bimonthly data and rounded to the closest integer. The averages for 2021 are based on data up until 31 Aug. 2021.

ways have their advantages and disadvantages, but they illustrate that differences between EU member states must be considered when comparing contributions to CSDP.

National contributions since the compact
National contributions to civilian CSDP missions are not divided evenly among EU member states. Neither did all member states contribute evenly to the net increase in secondments in the years following the compact. Indeed,
In 2021, as in previous years, the top contributors of personnel to civilian CSDP missions are Poland, Germany, Sweden, France, Finland, Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands (see figure 7). Each of these eight member states provides between 5 per cent and 16 per cent of all seconded personnel across the 11 missions. Except for Poland and France, they are all contributing personnel to at least 9 of the missions.
The eight top contributors accounted for 73 per cent of all seconded personnel in missions in 2021, up from 67 per cent in 2018. In several missions, especially those in the Middle East and North Africa and the Sahel, this share is even higher. Coincidentally, these eight member states also account for 73 per cent of the GNI of the EU (based on GNI in 2019, excluding the UK). Indeed, most member states have been contributing as much or more to civilian CSDP than to the EU’s GNI in the past years. The only member states that have not are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

Fourteen EU member states contributed more personnel in 2021 (on average) than in 2018. This included all eight top contributors, except Sweden. The national contributions of Germany (+17), France (+14) and Finland (+15) increased the most in absolute terms. Germany and Finland increased their secondments to several missions, while all of France’s additional secondments went to EUCAP Sahel Mali and the new EUAM RCA. EU member states that have nationals currently serving as heads of mission have often increased their secondments to these missions in particular: Finland in Ukraine, France in Mali, Germany in Iraq and Niger, Ireland in Somalia, Italy in Libya and Portugal in CAR.

Twelve EU member states contributed as many or fewer personnel in 2021 than in 2018. Most of these decreases were relatively minor and likely caused by the downgrading of EULEX Kosovo, to which many of these countries have been sending most of their secondees. Sweden has provided fewer personnel in 2021 than in 2018, but it is still the third-largest contributor, after Poland and Germany, accounting for 10 per cent of all seconded personnel in missions.

The national contribution that has decreased the most since the compact is that of the UK, which left the EU and therefore ended its participation in civilian CSDP in 2020. The British contingent in missions consisted of 21 personnel in 2018 (on average) and almost 100 personnel in 2013. There is a commitment in the compact to promote personnel contributions by third states, but there are no indications that the UK intends to resume participation in civilian CSDP missions any time soon. Personnel contributions by non-EU members in general decreased from 32 in 2018 to 5 in 2021. Canada, Norway and Switzerland are the only remaining third state contributors.

**Women in national contributions**

Most top contributors to civilian CSDP missions are also providing a relatively high number of women personnel (see figure 8). Sweden, Finland, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have the highest number of women in their national contributions. Together, they are providing 65 per cent of all women seconded personnel in 2021 (on average), up from 57 per cent in 2019 (the first year for which this data is available). These five member states have all been contributing more women personnel to missions in the years since the compact, especially Finland (+9) and the Netherlands (+7). The average number of women in the national contributions of each of the other 22 member states did not change much in the same period.

The five member states that are seconding the most women personnel in absolute terms are also scoring well in terms of the gender balance of their national contributions. As such, these member states have a large positive effect on the representation of women in civilian CSDP missions.
overall, especially among the seconded personnel. The share of women seconded personnel across all missions has remained relatively stable since the compact—at around 24 per cent—although there are signs of a gradual increase since August 2019. The share of women has been substantially higher (and increasing) among the personnel seconded by Sweden, Finland, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. The median share of women in their national contributions increased from 35 per cent in 2019 to 38 per cent in 2021. Finland, which has explicitly committed to achieving gender parity in its contributions, seconded more women than men to civilian CSDP missions in 2021 (53 per cent on average). In the national contributions of the other 22 member states, the median share of women fell from 17 per cent to 16 per cent. Some smaller member states in this group have maintained relatively high shares of women among their secondees, such as Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania. Meanwhile, women have been particularly underrepresented in the national contributions of some of the largest member states, such as France, Poland and Spain.

**The need for more and better data**

The available data clearly demonstrates that some EU member states have been more effective than others in promoting a better representation of women in missions through their national contributions. However, it remains difficult to assess whether the member states that contribute many women personnel are actually contributing to a better gender balance across different parts of the missions. This requires data that can show which posts in missions each member state (or better still, each seconding authority) is filling with its secondments. Such data is not yet sufficiently available. Most of the EU member states that are contributing many women personnel have in common that they can second freelancers and contribute non-operational personnel for mission support and administrative functions.\(^{42}\) This implies that they have access to larger candidate pools and more options to pursue vacancies for which it is easier to attract women candidates. Combined with political incentives or targets, these member states might end up seconding more women to those parts of missions in which women are already well represented. Such efforts risk exacerbating gender segregation within missions instead of reducing it.\(^{43}\) This highlights the importance of more fine-grained data on both the nomination and selection of candidates in order to understand the effects of gender-balancing efforts and prevent unintended consequences.

Although there is currently no data available that breaks down national contributions by type of seconding authority or uniformed service, it is evident that the member states which are sending gendarmeries to missions tend to have few women among their secondees. Going forward, data from CIMA might clarify to what extent certain missions and certain contributors are relying on active (or former) military police, and to what extent women are underrepresented in this personnel category.\(^ {44}\) Such insights will be particularly useful in case member states are considering raising their

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\(^{42}\) Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (note 39).


\(^ {44}\) European External Action Service (note 40).
level of ambition in promoting women’s representation in missions beyond the compact and potentially setting targets to this end. This is relevant not least because missions in CAR, Mali and Niger are advising and training local gendarmerie forces as part of their mandates, which means that these will likely remain important capability requirements for civilian CSDP in the coming years.

V. Policy recommendations

The civilian CSDP Compact has been the most serious attempt to date to strengthen civilian CSDP. Three years into the implementation of the compact, EU member states and the EEAS have made notable progress on several of its commitments. However, progress on the commitments to increase the number and share of seconded personnel in missions, and to promote a better representation of women in them, has been mixed at best. Whereas secondments to missions have increased in absolute terms since the compact, enabled by the expansion of several missions, the share of seconded personnel has fallen to 62 per cent overall and has reached even lower levels in some of the missions. Women’s representation has not increased overall, although it has visibly improved in some missions and among heads of mission. Several EU member states have increased their personnel contributions since the compact, but not enough to prevent a steady increase of contracted personnel in missions, including in operational positions. As a consequence, it has become increasingly unlikely that the aim to raise the share of seconded personnel to 70 per cent can be achieved by mid 2023, when the compact is due to be delivered.

Recommendations regarding the implementation of the Civilian CSDP Compact

1. EU member states should nominate more candidates for posts in civilian CSDP missions. They should prioritize operational positions, especially in missions with low shares of seconded personnel, and especially in posts previously held by contracted personnel.
2. EU member states should especially nominate more women candidates, prioritizing posts with management responsibilities and operational positions.
3. EU member states should encourage, when possible, tour-of-duty extensions for their seconded personnel, especially for women personnel.
4. EU member states and the EEAS should meanwhile anticipate the failure to achieve 70 per cent seconded personnel by mid 2023. The EEAS should prepare an analysis and a communication strategy explaining why the target may be missed; and it should explore alternative indicators on recruitment, retention, vacancies and budget allocations, to see whether these might be used to show progress towards the more effective staffing of missions.
5. EU member states that do not yet have dedicated budget lines for participation in civilian CSDP missions should establish them. In the meantime, they should calculate their expenditure on civilian CSDP since the compact and report these to the EEAS, in order to: (a) better assess national contributions and enable comparisons; (b) identify inefficiencies in expenditure; (c) monitor impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on national budgets; and (d) establish baselines to compare with expenditure beyond 2023.

6. The EEAS should invest in additional analytical and technical capacity within the mission personnel division of the CPCC, so that it can produce more frequent and more in-depth analysis of human resources statistics and fully exploit the potential of the new human resources database, CIMA. Among other things, this will be critical for monitoring the effects of the forthcoming CPCC gender strategy and action plan on the recruitment and retention of women personnel in missions.

7. The EEAS should conduct or commission a comprehensive study on the reasons why actual and potential mission members (both men and women) decide for or against joining, staying or returning to civilian CSDP missions. The study should be structured in such a way that it can be replicated by different seconding authorities and applied to different contexts. It could in turn inform a feasibility study on the potential costs and benefits of revising the EEAS policy on non-family missions.

8. The EEAS should finalize the reviews of the recruitment policy and procedures for civilian CSDP missions, as well as the employment status of international contracted staff, as per the compact and the 2019 Joint Action Plan with the European Commission.\footnote{Council of the European Union, Joint Staff Working Document, Joint Action Plan Implementing the Civilian CSDP Compact, 8962/19, 30 Apr. 2019.}
STRENGTHENING EU CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE CIVILIAN CSDP COMPACT AND BEYOND

Timo Smit

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Timo Smit (Netherlands/Sweden) is a Researcher with the SIPRI Peace Operations and Conflict Management Programme.