


SUPPORTING SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS CONTROLS THROUGH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

The Case of sub-Saharan Africa

GIOVANNA MALETTA AND LUCILE ROBIN



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute.

GOVERNING BOARD

Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Chair (Sweden)
Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia)
Espen Barth Eide (Norway)
Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France)
Dr Radha Kumar (India)
Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra (Algeria)
Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/United Kingdom)
Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States)

DIRECTOR

Dan Smith (United Kingdom)



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Email: sipri@sipri.org
Internet: www.sipri.org

About the authors

Giovanna Maletta (Italy) is a Researcher in SIPRI's Dual-Use and Arms Trade Controls Programme. Her research areas include dual-use and arms export controls with a particular focus on European Union (EU) engagement with arms export policies. Her work also involves mapping cooperation and assistance activities in the field of arms transfer and small arms and light weapons (SALW) controls and acting as a Project Coordinator for activities related to SIPRI's participation in the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium.

Lucile Robin (France) is a Research Assistant in SIPRI's Dual-Use and Arms Trade Controls Programme. Her research is focused on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and export controls. She also helps to map out cooperation and assistance activities in the field of arms transfer and SALW controls.

SUPPORTING SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS CONTROLS THROUGH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

The Case of sub-Saharan Africa

GIOVANNA MALETTA AND LUCILE ROBIN



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

February 2021

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	iv
<i>Summary</i>	v
<i>Abbreviations</i>	vi
1. Introduction	1
2. The cross-cutting nature of SALW controls	4
SALW controls as a component of post-conflict and armed violence reduction agendas	4
SALW controls as a component of international development strategies	6
3. What is SALW control-related assistance?	8
The main assistance instruments in the field of SALW controls	8
The ODA eligibility of SALW control assistance	10
Figure 3.1. Total official development assistance disbursements towards all recipients for the ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ sector, 2002–18	12
4. The use of official development assistance to support SALW controls in sub-Saharan Africa	14
Mapping ODA-eligible SALW control-related assistance in sub-Saharan Africa	14
Key considerations	24
Box 4.1. The SIPRI and OECD databases	15
Box 4.2. SALW control-related assistance activities funded by the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation and the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund	16
Figure 4.1. ODA-eligible cooperation and assistance activities focused on SALW controls	17
Figure 4.2. ODA-eligible cooperation and assistance activities focused on SALW controls, sorted by types of activity	18
Figure 4.3. Total ODA disbursements for ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ in 2012–19 to sub-Saharan Africa (all countries ‘South of Sahara’ and ‘South of Sahara, regional’)	19
Figure 4.4. Total disbursements for all purpose codes of the ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ sector in 2012–19 to sub-Saharan Africa (all countries ‘South of Sahara’ and ‘South of Sahara, regional’)	26
5. Conclusions	28
Appendix A. Database comparison	29
Table A.1. Main differences between SIPRI’s Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database and the OECD’s CRS Aid Activities database	29
Appendix B. Database tagging	30
Focus and type tags used in the SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database	30

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs for the generous funding provided for this report and the numerous people that participated in the interviews conducted as part of this study. The authors also benefited from the work of SIPRI intern Giacomo Cassano who helped with the collection of data used for this report. The authors are also very grateful to SIPRI colleagues, the external reviewer and the editors for their comments. Any errors are the responsibility of the authors.

Giovanna Maletta and Lucile Robin

Summary

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has had a negative impact on conflict, security and development. In order to help states to address the multifaceted challenges posed by the proliferation of these weapons, some states as well as regional and international organizations have established a series of funding instruments and assistance programmes that support or provide SALW control-related assistance. In view of the recognized linkages between SALW proliferation, security and development, official development assistance (ODA) has progressively become an eligible source of funding in this field. However, there remains limited clarity on which assistance activities have been supported through development spending. A comprehensive assessment of the use of ODA to support SALW control-related assistance could help donors, policymakers and interested stakeholders to understand how assistance policies have adjusted to the recognition of the link between conventional arms control and sustainable development made in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Focusing on SALW control-related assistance provided in sub-Saharan Africa as a case study and comparing information included in separate data sets compiled by SIPRI and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, this report attempts to provide information on which relevant activities have been supported through ODA in this region. It shows that only a limited number of donors have used ODA to support SALW control-related assistance and that they have different practices in the way they report on the use of these funds. It also outlines the challenges that make mapping this assistance a particularly difficult exercise.

Abbreviations

Agenda 2030	2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
ATT OP	Arms Trade Treaty Outreach Programme
AU	African Union
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COARM	Council Working Party on Conventional Arms Export
Covid-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CVR	Community violence reduction
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DG DEVCO	Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
DOD	US Department of Defense
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
ERW	Explosive remnants of war
EU	European Union
EU-ECOWAS PSS	European Union-Economic Community of West African States regional peace, security and stability mandate
EXBS	US Export Control and Related Border Security Program
iARMS	Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IDA	International Development Association
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDICI	European Union Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P2P	Partner-to-Partner
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PF-SALW	Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons
PGA	Parliamentarians for Global Action
PSSM	Physical security and stockpile management
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons programme
SALIENT	United Nations Saving Lives Entity
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIPRI database	SIPRI's Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database
SSR	Security sector reform

TOSSD	Total Official Support for Sustainable Development
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPOA	United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
UNREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
UNSCAR	United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation
VTF	Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund
WAM	Weapons and ammunition management
WRA	US State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement

1. Introduction

In the 1990s controls on small arms and light weapons (SALW) emerged as an organizing concept for, among other things, government action, advocacy, capacity building and financial assistance.¹ Since then, states have developed a series of standards, instruments and guidance at the national, regional and international levels to regulate the international trade in SALW and prevent their illicit trafficking.² Together, they outline the key measures that states should adopt to exercise effective control over the manufacture, storage, sale, transfer and disposal of SALW.³

The growing recognition of the detrimental impact that the illicit proliferation of SALW could have on conflict, security and development was instrumental in making SALW control a prominent subject in the international agenda and in driving relevant regulatory efforts. For instance, the preamble of the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action on SALW (UNPOA) recognizes that illicit trade in SALW is a ‘multifaceted’ challenge that involves ‘security, conflict prevention and resolution, crime prevention, humanitarian, health and development dimensions’.⁴ As a result, addressing SALW trafficking and preventing their proliferation are no longer seen simply as matters of arms control; instead, they are now increasingly viewed as important components that should be embedded within conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development agendas.

Funding mechanisms and assistance programmes have been established by states and international organizations to support activities in the field of SALW control. Many of these efforts are carried out with the aim of helping states to implement specific international instruments, such as the UNPOA, the 2001 UN Firearms Protocol or the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), or strengthening states’ arms transfer and SALW control systems more generally. Other efforts have supported SALW controls as part of wider frameworks, such as conflict prevention or peacebuilding programmes.

Given the relevance of SALW controls to achieving development purposes, official development assistance (ODA) can be used, under certain conditions, as a source of funding for assistance in this field. However, the use of development spending to support security-related assistance—including to promote SALW controls—remains a particularly sensitive issue on which donors have different positions. Not all donors consider assistance in this field as the most appropriate use of ODA, while others see it as an opportunity to open up new sources to support SALW control-related work. Donors that have made use of ODA to fund assistance in this field have different viewpoints on what activities such assistance should cover and their practices in reporting on their ODA flows vary.

¹ United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations’, A/50/60 and S/1995/1, 25 Jan. 1995, para. 63.

For the purposes of this paper, the terms ‘firearms’ and ‘small arms’ are used interchangeably. The term ‘firearm’ is used in domestic settings and in national laws governing the manufacture and transfer of such weapons, as well as civilian access to them; the term ‘small arm’ is more commonly used to refer to the weapon an individual may use and carry in a military context’. For further detail on the use of these terms see e.g. Parker, S. and Wilson, M., *A Guide to the UN Small Arms Process: 2016 Update*, 3rd edn (Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies: Geneva, 2016), pp. 15–16.

² See e.g. United Nations, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, A/CONF.192/15, 20 July 2001; the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2005; Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Firearms Protocol), opened for signature 31 May 2001, entered into force 3 July 2005; and Arms Trade Treaty, opened for signature 2 Apr. 2013, entered into force 24 Dec. 2014.

³ For a comprehensive overview of international and regional instruments involving SALW controls see Parker and Wilson (note 1).

⁴ United Nations, A/CONF.192/15 (note 2), para. 15.

An accurate assessment of the use of development spending to support SALW control-related assistance could help to facilitate an informed debate among donors, assistance implementing organizations and interested stakeholders on the potential and actual use of ODA in this field, and its contribution to the fulfilment of development strategies and goals. In addition, such an assessment could provide a better understanding of the extent to which the steps made at the international level towards the recognition of a link between arms control and sustainable development have been operationalized at the assistance policy level. However, there is still no comprehensive overview of and only limited clarity on which SALW control-related assistance activities have been supported through ODA and how these aid flows have been reported by donors. The limited availability of relevant data makes answering these questions particularly challenging.

This report presents the most comprehensive attempt to date to address these issues, formulate some preliminary conclusions and outline remaining gaps in available information and existing knowledge. It will do so by examining SALW control-related assistance to countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which are among the countries most affected by SALW proliferation and among the largest recipients of security-related development spending.⁵

Many sub-Saharan African countries perform poorly in terms of development indicators, with 19 of them ranking among the 20 lowest entries in the 2020 Human Development Index.⁶ Of these 19 countries, 11 had active armed conflicts in 2019.⁷ Therefore, sub-Saharan Africa provides a suitable example of how conflict and armed violence, which are often triggered or exacerbated by the proliferation of SALW, have an evident impact on development. SALW-related challenges in the region are driven by both the demand side and the supply side. Various actors seek to acquire these weapons for different reasons and their widespread availability means that many of them can easily fall into the hands of violent extremists, terrorists and organized crime groups.⁸ In turn, this general level of insecurity also drives the demand for weapons among civilians who seek to possess them for their personal safety.⁹

Challenges on the supply side are equally diverse. Many sub-Saharan African countries are recipients of legal SALW transfers originating from within—as some states are producers of small arms—or outside of the African continent.¹⁰ However, legally transferred weapons can also quickly become a problem if diverted from their authorized end users.¹¹ Illicit SALW trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa has been

⁵ Stockholm Environment Institute, 'All donors to all recipients for Conflict, Peace & Security during 2002–2018', Aid Atlas, accessed 8 Jan. 2021.

⁶ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2020* (UNDP: New York, 2020), p. 343.

⁷ Davis, I., 'Armed conflict and peace processes in sub-Saharan Africa', *SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2020).

⁸ United Nations, Security Council, 'Small arms and light weapons', Report of the Secretary-General, S/2019/1011, 30 Dec. 2019, para. 10.

⁹ Pézard, S. and Florquin, N., *Small Arms in Burundi: Disarming the Civilian Population in Peacetime*, Special Report no. 7 (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, Aug. 2007); Wepundi, M. et al., *Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment*, Special Report no. 16 (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, June 2012); Danish Demining Group and Small Arms Survey, *Community Safety and Small Arms in Somaliland* (Danish Demining Group/Small Arms Survey: Copenhagen/Geneva, 2010); and Bevan, J., 'Crisis in Karamoja: Armed violence and the failure of disarmament in Uganda's most deprived region', Small Arms Survey, Occasional Paper no. 21, June 2008.

¹⁰ Holtom, P. and Pavesi, I., *Trade Update 2018: Sub-Saharan Africa in Focus* (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, Dec. 2018).

¹¹ See e.g. De Tessières, S., *At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts: Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger* (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, Jan. 2018); Florquin, N. and Seymour, C., 'Down, but not out: The FDLR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', Small Arms Survey, Research Note no. 56, Jan. 2016; King, B., 'Excess arms in South Sudan: Security forces and surplus management', Small Arms Survey, Issue Brief no. 6, Apr. 2014; Conflict Armament Research, *Weapon Supplies into South Sudan's Civil War: Regional Re-transfers and International Intermediaries* (Conflict Armament Research: London, Nov. 2018); Conflict Armament Research, *Sudanese Stockpiles and Regional Weapon Diversion: An Analysis of Captured Equipment in the Possession of the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North in the Nuba Mountains* (Conflict Armament Research: London, May 2017); Anders, H., 'Expanding arsenals: Insurgent arms in Northern Mali', *Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,

fed largely by diversion from government stockpiles and partly by the unregulated production of crafted weapons.¹² All these weapons are easily trafficked across borders.¹³ In an effort to combat the illicit proliferation of arms, the ‘Silencing the Guns in Africa’ initiative launched in 2016 by the African Union (AU) identified practical steps such as strengthening regulations on SALW transfer controls and manufacturing, enhancing border controls, and improving stockpile management, record-keeping and destruction practices.¹⁴ Many sub-Saharan African countries receive international assistance to help to implement or strengthen these measures and some of the support they receive is funded through development spending.

Following this introductory chapter, the next chapter of the report (chapter 2) elaborates further on the cross-cutting nature of SALW controls and illustrates how this concept has been integrated into different international development frameworks, and post-conflict and armed violence reduction agendas. The inclusion of SALW controls into these different conceptual frameworks explains why related assistance work is covered by different sources of funding and embedded in different programmes, many of which have become eligible to be supported by development spending, as discussed in chapter 3. This chapter also clarifies why states may have different views on using ODA for security-related assistance and why accurately mapping the extent and scope of assistance work funded through ODA is a complex task. Chapter 4 attempts to address this challenge by drawing together relevant information relating to countries in sub-Saharan Africa collected for and included in SIPRI’s Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activities database. It also summarizes the main considerations that can be derived from this exercise. Chapter 5 provides some conclusions.

2015); Conflict Armament Research, *Nigeria’s Herder–Farmer Conflict: Domestic, Regional, and Transcontinental Weapon Sources* (Conflict Armament Research: London, Jan. 2020); and Conflict Armament Research, *Investigating Cross-Border Weapon Transfers in the Sahel* (Conflict Armament Research: London, Nov. 2016).

¹² Florquin, N., Lipott, S. and Wairagu, F., *Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa* (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, Jan. 2019); Le Brun, E. and Leff, J., ‘Signs of supply: Weapons tracing in Sudan and South Sudan’, *Small Arms Survey 2014: Women and Guns* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2014); and Diehl, A. and Jenzen-Jones, N. R., ‘Feeding the fire: Illicit small arms ammunition in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia’, *Small Arms Survey*, Issue Brief no. 8, July 2014; Nowak, M. and Gsell, A., ‘Handmade and deadly: Craft production of small arms in Nigeria’, *Small Arms Survey*, Briefing Paper, June 2018; Berghezan, G., ‘Armes artisanales au Cameroun: Urgence d’une législation cohérente pour encadrer des pratiques traditionnelles’ [Artisanal weapons in Cameroon: Urgent need for coherent legislation to regulate traditional practices], Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP), Analysis note, 4 Apr. 2016; Berghezan, G., *Armes artisanales en RDC: Enquête au Bandundu et au Maniema* [Artisanal weapons in the DRC: Investigation in Bandundu and Maniema], GRIP Report 2015/2 (GRIP: Brussels, 13 Feb. 2015); and Berghezan, G., ‘Armes artisanales en Côte d’Ivoire: Entre tradition et exigences légales’ [Artisanal weapons in Côte d’Ivoire: Between tradition and legal requirements], GRIP, Analysis note, 11 July 2014.

¹³ Anders, H., *Identifying Sources: Small-calibre Ammunition in Côte d’Ivoire*, Special Report no. 21, (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, June 2014); and Tubiana, J. and Gramizzi, C., *Lost in Trans-nation: Tubu and Other Armed Groups and Smugglers along Libya’s Southern Border* (Small Arms Survey: Geneva, Dec. 2018).

¹⁴ African Union Assembly, ‘AU master road map of practical steps to silencing the guns in Africa’, 31 Mar. 2017. Sub-Saharan African countries have also committed to a series of relevant measures at the sub-regional level such as the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other related Materials in the Southern African Development Community, opened for signature 14 Aug. 2001, entered into force 8 Nov. 2004; Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, opened for signature 21 Apr. 2004, entered into force 5 May 2006; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their ammunition and Other Related Materials, adopted 14 June 2006, entered into force 29 Sep. 2009; and the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, opened for signature 30 Apr. 2010, entered into force 8 Mar. 2017.

2. The cross-cutting nature of SALW controls

SALW control is a multifaceted concept that has evolved over the past few decades so that it now sits at the intersection of arms control, peacebuilding and development agendas. For the most part, SALW controls have developed within the disarmament and arms control field and have focused on building institutions and frameworks enabling states to exercise control over the supply of SALW. However, over the years, as a result of the increasing recognition of the multidimensional challenges posed by the proliferation of small arms, SALW controls have started to be viewed as an important component of the implementation of, among other things, post-conflict interventions and the achievement of international development goals. This chapter provides an overview of the integration of SALW controls into these multiple frameworks, which originated from the recognition of the link between SALW proliferation, security, and development. As discussed in more detail in chapter 3, the possibility to use ODA to fund security-related assistance provided the opportunity to also support SALW control-related initiatives in this way. The cross-cutting nature of SALW controls resulted in these being part of different ODA-eligible assistance activities.

SALW controls as a component of post-conflict and armed violence reduction agendas

SALW remain among the primary tools for armed conflict. Their proliferation exacerbates ongoing conflicts, and abets and sustains violent extremists, terrorists and organized crime groups.¹⁵ The control of SALW has therefore been integrated into peacebuilding agendas, particularly in programmes for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), community violence reduction (CVR), and security sector reform (SSR).

DDR programmes aim to disarm ex-combatants and help them to reintegrate into society. Set in post-conflict recovery contexts, these programmes have progressively been standardized and included in peacekeeping operations since the 1990s.¹⁶ The disarmament phase of DDR envisages the ‘collection, documentation, control and disposal’ of weapons and ammunition and can include ‘the development of responsible arms management programmes’.¹⁷ Thus, the first leg of a DDR programme inherently includes SALW control measures such as collection and destruction, or even marking and record-keeping.¹⁸ The Integrated DDR Standards produced by the UN provide specific guidance and clarification on SALW control-related activities that should be integrated into the ‘disarmament’ component of DDR processes, such as stockpile management, destruction, or weapons and ammunition management (WAM).¹⁹ With a view to further integrating arms control and peacekeeping efforts, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations

¹⁵ United Nations, S/2019/1011 (note 8), pp. 1, 3.

¹⁶ Small Arms Survey, ‘Talking about disarmament: The role of small arms in peace processes’, *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003); and United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, ‘An agenda for peace preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping’, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 Jan. 1992, A/47/277 and S/24111, 17 June 1992, para. 55.

¹⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations’, Note by the Secretary-General, A/C.5/59/31, 24 May 2005, para. 1(a).

¹⁸ United Nations, Security Council, ‘Small arms and light weapons’, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2017/1025, 6 Dec. 2017, para. 17.

¹⁹ United Nations, Inter-agency Working Group on Disarmament, ‘Module 4.10: Disarmament’ and ‘Module 4.11: Transitional weapons and ammunition management’, Demobilization and Reintegration, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, June 2020.

jointly developed additional guidance on how to operationalize effective WAM into DDR settings.²⁰ More generally, WAM has increasingly become a tool promoted by the UN Security Council to deal with weapons-related security issues not only in peace operations but also as part of other initiatives addressing conflict-affected situations.²¹

CVR programmes can complement DDR. These have the objective of preventing and reducing violence at the community level by ‘work[ing] directly with target communities to find solutions to causes of armed violence’.²² CVR programmes, by addressing the factors that lead to armed violence in the first place, can help to reduce the demand for weapons, and thus create the necessary conditions for successful DDR initiatives. For example, they provide youth at risk of recruitment by armed groups with vocational training or organize the voluntary handover of weapons.²³

SALW controls have also been increasingly integrated within SSR programmes.²⁴ The SSR concept emerged in the late 1990s and introduced a shift away from the traditional notion of security assistance focused on training and equipping security forces.²⁵ In particular, SSR aims to develop a clear institutional framework for the provision of security by strengthening the governance of relevant institutions and building capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civilian authorities.²⁶ The role of SALW controls within SSR programmes is acknowledged and clearly referenced in relevant guidance material produced by the OECD.²⁷ In this way, SALW control-related activities such as stockpile management, collection programmes, border control or the establishment of regulatory frameworks for weapons control and oversight can be relevant in the context of SSR programmes.²⁸

The mandates and activities of UN peace operations are a clear example of the integration of SALW controls into post-conflict and armed violence reduction efforts. Currently, various international peace operations in sub-Saharan African countries are mandated to conduct SALW controls in the context of DDR, CVR and SSR programmes. Examples of this include: (a) the AU–UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which cooperates with Sudan in arms collection campaigns; (b) the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), which can implement weapon confiscation and destruction activities; and (c) the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which has a mandate to conduct weapon collection and destruction, to coordinate with national authorities to ensure

²⁰ De Tessières, S., *Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context* (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Jan. 2018).

²¹ See e.g. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, *Aide-Memoire: Options for Reflecting Weapons and Ammunition Management in Decisions of the Security Council United Nations*, 2nd edn, (United Nations: New York, 2020).

²² United Nations, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peace Operations (UNDP), *Community Violence Reduction: Creating Space for Peace* (UNDP: New York, 2018), p. 1.

²³ United Nations (note 22).

²⁴ United Nations, Inter-agency Working Group on Disarmament, ‘Module 6.10: DDR and Security Sector Reform’ Demobilization and Reintegration, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, Dec. 2019, pp. 15–17. The link between SALW controls and SSR programmes is also made by e.g. Small Arms Survey (note 16), p. 153; and Greene, O., Hiscock, D. and Flew, C., ‘Integration and co-ordination of DDR and SALW control programming: Issues, experience and priorities’, Thematic Working Paper no. 3, Centre for International Cooperation and Security, University of Bradford, July 2008.

²⁵ See e.g. Short, C., ‘Security, development and conflict prevention’, Speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies, London, 13 May 1998; and Short, C., ‘Security sector reform and the elimination of poverty’, Speech at Centre for Defence Studies, 9 Mar. 1999. For an overview of the emergence of the SSR concept see Varisco, A. E., *Research in Security Sector Reform Policy: The Case of Sierra Leone*, (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2018).

²⁶ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (OECD: Paris, 2005).

²⁷ OECD, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (OECD: Paris, 2007); and OECD (note 26).

²⁸ Sedra, M. and Burt, G., *Integrating SSR and SALW Programming*, Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) SSR Paper no. 16 (Ubiquity Press: London, 2016), p. 12; and OECD (note 27), pp. 106–107.

the safe and effective management, storage and security of stockpiles of SALW, and to provide related technical assistance to local authorities.²⁹ The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is also often an integrated component of such missions and can provide them with direct support and technical assistance in SALW control-related activities, such as, for example, destruction and WAM-related training.³⁰

Therefore, it is clear that SALW control-related activities can play a ‘key role’ in post-conflict and armed violence reduction frameworks, as recently acknowledged in the UN Secretary General’s 2019 report on SALW to the UN Security Council.³¹ These programmes have also been recognized as creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace and, thus, longer-term development, of which SALW controls represent an important component.³²

SALW controls as a component of international development strategies

In the 1990s the concept of ‘human security’ emerged as a new paradigm calling for a wider interpretation of the concept of security that relates not only to security of the ‘nation-state’ (e.g. security intended as the absence of war or the protection of a country’s territory) but also to security of the individual (e.g. security intended as ‘safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression’).³³ At the same time—as encapsulated by the UN’s first-ever report on the topic—the concept of human development underwent a shift so that it no longer referred solely to economic growth, but was also focused on providing people with the opportunity ‘to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living’.³⁴

Based on this perspective, secure environments and peaceful societies were seen as creating the proper conditions for human, social and economic development. The growing understanding of the negative consequences of insecurity on development was accompanied by the recognition of the role played by the proliferation of weapons, and especially SALW, in fuelling insecurity, conflict and armed violence and, thus, impeding development.³⁵ The most directly observable and quantifiable of these consequences are deaths and injuries, which in turn can have an impact on demography, labour capacity and healthcare systems. Other indirect effects include criminal violence, collapse of education services, displacement of people and reductions in government resources.³⁶

Civil society organizations played a vital role in putting the SALW control issue on the international agenda as well as in creating an understanding of the problem from

²⁹ UNAMID: UN Security Council Resolution 2429, 13 July 2018, para. 40; UNISFA: UN Security Council Resolution 2469, 14 May 2019, para. 15; and MINUSCA: UN Security Council Resolution 2499, 15 Nov. 2019, paras 45–46.

³⁰ United Nations Mine Action Service, ‘5 pillars of mine action’, [n.d.]; and United Nations Mine Action Service, ‘Where we work’, [n.d.]. See also e.g. United Nations Mine Action Service, ‘Darfur’, updated Oct. 2020; United Nations Mine Action Service, ‘Abyei’, updated Nov. 2020; United Nations Mine Action Service, ‘Central African Republic’, updated Oct. 2020; and SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘UNMAS weapons and ammunition management training in Ethiopia’, Ethiopia, 20–24 Aug. 2017.

³¹ United Nations, S/2019/1011 (note 8), para. 31.

³² United Nations, Inter-agency Working Group on Disarmament, ‘Module 6.10: DDR and Security Sector Reform’ (note 24), p. 2.

³³ United Nations Development Programme, *Report on Human Development 1994* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1994), p. 3.

³⁴ United Nations Development Programme, *Report on Human Development 1990* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1990), p. 10.

³⁵ Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, Geneva, 7 June 2006; and United Nations, General Assembly, ‘In larger freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 Mar. 2005, para. 120.

³⁶ Muggah, R. and Batchelor, P., ‘*Development Held Hostage: Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development*’ (United Nations Development Programme: New York, Apr. 2002). See also Small Arms Survey, ‘Obstructing development: The effects of small arms on human development’ (note 16).

a development and humanitarian perspective.³⁷ However the ensuing SALW control-related processes ended up focusing on the ‘instrument of violence rather than on the violence itself’.³⁸ In addition, although these processes acknowledged the impact of the illicit trade and trafficking in SALW on development, they mostly approached the issue from an arms control and disarmament perspective (as in the case of the UNPOA) or through the lenses of crime and law enforcement (as in the case of the Firearms Protocol).³⁹ The inclusion of development considerations in the ATT was contested during the negotiations of the treaty and ultimately rejected.⁴⁰ It was after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Agenda 2030) in 2015 that the proliferation of illicit weapons was eventually approached through a development lens and officially recognized at the international and policy levels.⁴¹ Specifically, under Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, UN member states committed to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies’ by, among other things, ‘significantly’ reducing illicit arms flows.⁴² This strengthened the importance of arms control as a ‘crucial factor’ to achieve security and development, and officially established a link between the Agenda 2030 and international instruments on conventional arms control, including SALW control.⁴³ In 2018 the UN Agenda for Disarmament further highlighted the nexus between arms control, security and development, and pointed to the SDGs as an opportunity to pursue a new ‘whole-of-system approach’ to address the multifaceted problems posed by illicit SALW.⁴⁴

The increasing recognition of the challenges posed by the illicit proliferation of SALW has been accompanied by the establishment of multiple programmes and mechanisms at the national, regional and international levels that aim to support states in improving their controls on these weapons by funding relevant cooperation and assistance activities. In view of the recognized linkages between SALW proliferation, security and development, ODA has progressively become an eligible source of funding in this field. The following chapter provides an overview of what has been generally conceived as SALW control-related assistance, the main instruments that have been established to support it (as well as their overarching goals), and to what extent SALW control-related assistance has been considered eligible to be categorized as ODA.

³⁷ Laurance, E. and Stohl, R., ‘Making global public policy: The case of small arms and light weapons’, *Small Arms Survey, Occasional Paper no. 7*, Dec. 2002; and Parker and Wilson (note 1), p. 45. On the role of civil society in the creation of the ATT see Whall, H. and Pytlak, A., ‘The role of civil society in the international negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty’, *Global Policy*, vol. 5, no. 4 (Nov. 2014).

³⁸ Parker and Wilson (note 1), p. 45.

³⁹ United Nations, A/CONF.192/15 (note 2), Preamble; Firearms Protocol (note 2), Preamble; and Parker and Wilson (note 1), pp. 45, 61.

⁴⁰ Kytömäki, E., ‘How joining the Arms Trade Treaty can help advance development goals’, Research Paper, Chatham House, Dec. 2014, pp. 13–14.

⁴¹ The negative link between SALW proliferation and development had already been recognized to some extent by the development community, but not operationalized at the policy level. See e.g. UN General Assembly Resolution 60/68, 8 Dec. 2005; United Nations, A/59/2005 (note 35), para. 120; and UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1, 25 Sep. 2015.

⁴² UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 (note 41), p. 25.

⁴³ Parker and Wilson (note 1), pp. 62–63.

⁴⁴ United Nations Office for Disarmament, *Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament* (United Nations: New York, May 2018), p. 41.

3. What is SALW control-related assistance?

The main assistance instruments in the field of SALW controls

There is a wide range of programmes and funding mechanisms in place aimed at providing assistance relating to SALW controls. Some of these have the specific objective of helping beneficiary states to build capacity to implement international instruments in the fields of SALW controls or conventional arms transfers. Others seek to help states to strengthen their arms transfer and SALW control systems more broadly. In addition, some state donors contribute to assistance efforts through programmes established at the national level or by providing financial support to UN agencies and other international or regional organizations implementing assistance projects in this field. SALW control-related assistance activities are also conducted in the context of programmes established for different purposes, as in the case of mine action initiatives.⁴⁵

The following subsections provide an overview—by no means comprehensive—of the different tools that are available to states either to provide or to seek assistance in the field of SALW controls. Most of these tools support activities by addressing the issue from an arms control and supply-side perspective. Currently, relatively few programmes focus on the demand side of SALW reduction and control. As explained in more detail later in this report, the link between security and development has opened up the possibility of supporting security-related assistance, including many of the activities described below, through development spending.

Assistance programmes supporting the implementation of arms transfer and SALW control-related instruments

Some assistance instruments have been established with the aim of supporting the implementation of international instruments in the field of SALW controls or conventional arms transfers, such as the ATT, the Firearms Protocol or the UNPOA. For instance, this is the case for the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), a multi-donor fund managed by the UN that can finance projects supporting the universalization and effective implementation of ‘relevant international instruments on arms regulation’.⁴⁶ In addition, the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) of the ATT is an important source of SALW control-related assistance.⁴⁷ The European Union (EU) supports the implementation of the ATT through the EU Partner-to-Partner (P2P) ATT Outreach Programme (ATT OP) and assistance provided within this framework has also addressed elements of relevance for SALW controls, such as physical security and stockpile management (PSSM).⁴⁸ The EU, moreover, supports the implementation of the Firearms Protocol through its countering firearms trafficking project and has supported actions specifically aimed at promoting the implementation of the UNPOA.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Wille, C., *Improving Protection, Reducing Civilian Vulnerabilities: Interaction between Mine/Explosive Remnants of War Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons Responses* (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD: Geneva, June 2017).

⁴⁶ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) 2020 Call for Proposals, [n.d.], p. 1.

⁴⁷ See in particular Article 16 of the treaty.

⁴⁸ Germany and Expertise France currently co-fund the EU P2P ATT Outreach Programme. European Union, ‘Arms/ATT’, [n.d.]; and SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘EU P2P ATT Outreach Programme second ad-hoc seminar in Zambia’, Lusaka, Zambia, 22–23 Mar. 2017.

⁴⁹ European Commission, ‘Countering firearms trafficking project: Infosheet’, accessed 29 Dec. 2020; Council Decision 2011/428/CFSP of 18 July 2011 in support of United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs activities to implement the United Nations Programme of Actions to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L188, 19 July 2011; and Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/633/CFSP of 3 Apr. 2017 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and

Assistance programmes supporting states with the implementation of arms transfer and SALW controls

A number of programmes aim to help states to strengthen their arms transfer and SALW control systems without directly linking their support to the implementation of specific instruments. Some of these are funded by the EU. For example, the above-mentioned EU P2P programme also includes the Council Working Party on Conventional Arms Export (COARM) Outreach Project established in 2008, which is more generally aimed at providing assistance in the field of conventional arms export control.⁵⁰ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund mechanism can support projects assisting NATO partners with SALW control-related activities such as destruction and PSSM.⁵¹ The Forum for Security Co-operation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also provides assistance with, among other things, ‘collection and destruction’ of SALW, stockpile management, and the improvement of SALW control-related legislation.⁵²

Other SALW control-related assistance

State donors also contribute to SALW control-related assistance through, for example, core or ad hoc contributions to UN agencies—such as the UNODA regional offices and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—and to other international governmental or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) implementing activities in this field.⁵³ In 2000–14 the UN Development Programme (UNDP) contributed to SALW control-related assistance through its ‘Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund’.⁵⁴

Some state donors, such as the United States, contribute to SALW control-related assistance efforts through programmes established at the national level. For instance, the US State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) coordinates specific efforts on mine action, PSSM and conventional weapon destruction.⁵⁵ In addition, the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program, also run by the State Department, was established to help countries to strengthen their strategic trade controls.⁵⁶

Although funding lines remain distinct, at the operational level, SALW control-related activities such as stockpile management and destruction have also been increasingly carried out as part of assistance programmes more broadly focused on humanitarian demining. These programmes are often an entry point for activities addressing SALW controls.⁵⁷

Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L90, 4 Apr. 2017.

⁵⁰ Germany co-funds the EU P2P COARM Outreach Project. European Union, ‘Arms/COARM’, [n.d.]. For other examples of EU-funded assistance in this field see United Nations, ‘Working paper submitted by the European Union: Cooperation and assistance of the European Union in support of the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects’, A/CONF.192/2018/RC/WP.8, 20 June 2018.

⁵¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ‘Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and mine action (MA)’, accessed 4 Nov. 2020. For further detail on relevant projects see NATO, ‘SALW & MA Information Sharing Platform’, [n.d.].

⁵² Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘Fighting illicit small arms and ammunition’, accessed 29 Dec. 2020.

⁵³ See e.g. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), *Programmes Financed from Voluntary Contributions, 2019–2020* (UNODA: New York, Oct. 2020); and UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), ‘Our funding’, accessed 4 Nov. 2020.

⁵⁴ See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Adequacy of assistance, enhanced funding and training opportunities related to implementing the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument’, Presentation at the Third Review Conference on the UNPOA, New York, 18–29 June 2018.

⁵⁵ US Department of State, ‘About us: Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement’, accessed 4 Nov. 2020.

⁵⁶ US Customs and Border Protection, ‘Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program overview’, accessed 4 Nov. 2020.

⁵⁷ Wille (note 44).

Most of the assistance instruments and funding mechanisms described so far have addressed SALW control-related assistance mostly from an arms control and security perspective. However, efforts are emerging to promote a more comprehensive approach to SALW control. For example, as part of the implementation of the UN Agenda for Disarmament, UNODA and the UNDP recently launched the ‘Saving Lives Entity’ (SALIENT) fund. SALIENT, which is part of the UN Peacebuilding Fund, aims to establish a more holistic approach to the control of SALW and the reduction of armed violence by coordinating the work of UNODA and the UNDP on the ground to support the development of long-term, sustainable and nationally based SALW control strategies to be integrated into countries’ development plans.⁵⁸

The progressive integration of the security and development agendas (discussed in chapter 2 of this report) was accompanied by the possibility of certain security-related expenditures being considered—under very specific circumstances—as ODA eligible. This also included donors’ financial support to SALW control-related assistance activities and programmes. The next subsection discusses the process that led to the expansion of the ODA eligibility criteria, how this had an impact on the use of development spending to support SALW control-related assistance and how relevant expenditures are categorized at the OECD level.

The ODA eligibility of SALW control assistance

ODA is defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as ‘government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries’. This means that any military aid or funds that promote the donor’s security cannot be counted as ‘ODA eligible’.⁵⁹ Aid is provided by the members of the OECD DAC and other donors (e.g. other countries or private foundations) to countries that are included in the list of those eligible to receive ODA as well as multilateral development organizations.⁶⁰ The DAC Secretariat collects data on aid, focusing on both ‘high level data’ (e.g. overall ODA figures per sector or per donor) and individual projects.⁶¹ The OECD publishes this data throughout the year.⁶²

The definition of the ODA eligibility criteria has evolved over time, and especially since the early 2000s, reflecting the growing debate on the interdependence of security and development. In particular, the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 2001 notably increased the relevance of and demand for security-related assistance. This, in turn, led to an expansion in the range of peacebuilding, conflict prevention, SSR and other similar activities that could be supported through development spending.⁶³ In this context, the OECD DAC clarified in 2005 that ‘technical co-operation and civilian support’ for ‘controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation’ of SALW is to be considered as ODA-eligible assistance.⁶⁴ Since then, further adjustments to the ODA eligibility of peace and security-related expenditures were carried out as part of the process of modernization of the DAC statistical system (i.e. the way ODA is measured). This process was explicitly conducted with a view to adapting the system to the new

⁵⁸ UNODA (note 53), p. 18.

⁵⁹ OECD, ‘What is ODA?’, accessed 3 Sep. 2020.

⁶⁰ A complete list of DAC members and ODA-eligible recipients is available on the OECD website.

⁶¹ OECD, ‘Frequently asked questions: 4.3 What is the difference between the DAC and CRS datasets’, accessed 30 Dec. 2020.

⁶² OECD, ‘Official Development Assistance (ODA)’, accessed 30 Dec. 2020.

⁶³ Hynes, W. and Scott, S., *The Evolution of Official Development Assistance: Achievements, Criticisms and a Way Forward*, OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, no. 12 (OECD: Paris, Dec. 2013), pp. 9–10. See also Aning, K., ‘Security, the War on Terror, and official development assistance’, *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, vol. 3, no. 1, (2010), pp. 7–26; and Saferworld, ‘The securitisation of aid? Reclaiming security to meet poor people’s needs’, *Saferworld Briefing*, Feb. 2011, p. 10.

⁶⁴ OECD, ‘Conflict prevention and peace building: What counts as ODA?’, 3 Mar. 2005.

realities of the development financing landscape. Most recently, this led to the further recognition of the ODA eligibility of certain security and defence costs, including the provision of limited military training. The process was driven by the need to ensure the proper level of financial support to the implementation of Agenda 2030, which, as noted above, provided the framework to operationalize the link between security and development through SDG 16.⁶⁵

The use of ODA to support security-related assistance has always been a highly sensitive issue. Some commentators consider it to be a worrying development insofar as it creates the risk that aid budgets could be diverted away from humanitarian assistance and promotion of economic development and welfare and instead be used to fund military actions, increase the role of the military in development initiatives or advance national security interests, among other things.⁶⁶

For instance, providing support to conflict-affected countries often means building their capacity ‘in areas’—including some related to SALW controls—‘where justifications of development spending are less apparent or that fall outside of what development budgets fund’.⁶⁷ In addition, in the case of SALW control-related assistance carried out in these circumstances, some analysts argue that there is a risk that these programmes might engage with militaries that have been involved in staging coups or are responsible for repressive acts against civilians.⁶⁸ As a result, as the issue of SALW and armed violence have always been seen as ‘politically sensitive’ issues, the linkages between small arms and development programming ‘have tended to be weak’.⁶⁹

Other commentators have argued in favour of a limited and consensus-based expansion of security-related activities that should be considered ODA eligible. This argument is rooted in the recognition that activities that may involve military forces and that aim to, for instance, stabilize post-conflict situations, reform security institutions or prevent armed violence may have an indirect and positive impact on economic development and welfare. These include measures in the ‘area of practical disarmament, and the control and the destruction of small weapons’.⁷⁰ The difficulty of using ODA to fund activities that are crucial to the maintenance of peace and security may also create the unwanted consequence of these activities being underfunded because they are considered non-ODA-eligible.⁷¹ Indeed, development spending in support of security-related assistance represented only a small fraction (1.5 per cent) of ODA in 2002–2018.⁷²

Currently, development spending in support of certain security-related activities is framed under the DAC sector of ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’, and their ODA eligibility

⁶⁵ OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Secretariat, ‘The scope and nature of 2016 HLM decisions regarding the ODA-eligibility of peace and security-related expenditures’, Mar. 2016; and Bergen, J., ‘SDG 16: A platform for a new era of international cooperation’, *Impakter*, 2 Aug. 2016.

⁶⁶ Robinson, J., ‘Redefining ODA: An opportunity for more comprehensive development’, *International Alert Blog*, 2 Oct. 2014; Saferworld (note 63); Oxfam, ‘Whose aid is it anyway? Politicizing aid in conflicts and crises’, *Oxfam Briefing Paper*, 10 Feb. 2011, pp. 2–3, 6; and Daley, S., ‘Redefining ODA: What does it mean for peace?’, *Saferworld*, 25 Feb. 2016.

⁶⁷ Maze, K., *Searching for Aid Effectiveness in Small Arms Assistance* (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: Geneva, 2010), p. 31.

⁶⁸ Isikozlu, E., ‘Getting it right? The Sahel and SALW control’, *Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Annual Report 2014* (BICC: Bonn, 2014), p. 15.

⁶⁹ Ginifer, J. and Turner, M., *Centre for International Cooperation and Security, University of Bradford, ‘SALW and development programmes: Issues and priorities’, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Background Paper, 2009, pp. 13–14.*

⁷⁰ Brzoska, M., *Analysis of and Recommendations for Covering Security Relevant Expenditures within and outside of Official Development Assistance*, Paper 53 (Bonn International Center for Conversion: Bonn, 2007), pp. 2, 19.

⁷¹ Downes, M., ‘How relevant is Official Development Assistance (ODA) to preventing conflict or building peace?’, *ISSAT Blog*, International Security Sector Advisory Team, Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), 20 May 2014.

⁷² Stockholm Environment Institute, ‘All donors to all recipients to all sectors during 2002–2018’, accessed on 8 Jan. 2021; and Stockholm Environment Institute, ‘About the data’, *Aid Atlas*, [n.d.].




Figure 3.1. Total official development assistance disbursements towards all recipients for the ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ sector, 2002–18

SALW = small arms and light weapons; PKO = peacekeeping operations.

Note: The figure was created by the authors based on data extracted from the Stockholm Environment Institute’s Aid Atlas. All financial amounts in Aid Atlas are presented in US\$ constant amounts, i.e. at ‘the current values of each transaction or activity in the actual year it was reported’.

Source: Stockholm Environment Institute, ‘All donors to all recipients for Conflict, Peace & Security during 2002–2018’, Aid Atlas, accessed 8 Jan. 2021; and Stockholm Environment Institute, ‘About the data’, Aid Atlas, [n.d.].

remains subject to particularly stringent standards.⁷³ Donors report on a voluntary basis details on their ODA in support of projects in this and other sectors to the OECD CRS Aid Activity database. In reporting their ODA flows, donors use purpose codes associated with each of these sectors to indicate which particular area a project has addressed. SALW control-related assistance is included within the ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ sector under the purpose code ‘reintegration and SALW controls’.⁷⁴ This is described by the DAC reporting directives as referring to both DDR programmes and ‘technical co-operation to control, prevent and/or reduce the proliferation’ of SALW. Activities under this purpose code are meant to support the development of relevant regulatory frameworks and institutional structures, SALW awareness campaigns, regional cooperation, and collection and destruction programmes.⁷⁵

In addition, the ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ sector includes five other purpose codes that refer to (a) assistance carried out in the framework of SSR processes (‘security system management and reform’), (b) activities related to ‘civilian peace building, conflict prevention and resolution’, (c) mine action programmes (‘removal of landmines and explosive remnants of war’), (d) DDR programmes specifically targeting ‘child soldiers’, and (e) ‘participation in international peacekeeping operations’, although this is limited to activities that are ODA eligible such as DDR

⁷³ OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), ‘ODA Casebook on Conflict, Peace and Security Activities’, DCD/DAC(2017)22/FINAL, 20 Oct. 2017, pp. 63–66.

⁷⁴ The OECD defines ‘purpose code’ as ‘list of codes, names and descriptions used to identify the sector of destination of a contribution’. OECD, ‘DAC and CRS code lists’, accessed 5 Nov. 2020.

⁷⁵ OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Working Party on Development Finance Statistics, ‘Converged statistical reporting directives for the creditor reporting system (CRS) and the annual DAC questionnaires. Chapters 1-6’, DCD/DAC/STAT(2018)9/FINAL, 28 May 2018, p. 34.

programmes and disposal of collected weapons.⁷⁶ Support to ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ represents only a small percentage of ODA disbursements towards the ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ sector: it accounted for 5.8 per cent or US\$2.7 billion of total ODA disbursements to that sector in 2002–18 (see figure 3.1).

Due to the complex nature of SALW controls discussed above, development spending supporting relevant assistance activities is captured not only by the ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ purpose code but also by the other five purpose codes that are part of the wider ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ sector. Therefore, donors’ ODA reports to the OECD CRS Aid Activities database under any of these purpose codes could potentially include support for relevant SALW control-related assistance—including in relation to some of the instruments, tools and programmes described in the previous subsections.⁷⁷ In addition, donors often provide only very limited detail on the content of their activities in their reports to the CRS database and can be inconsistent in their reporting practices. It is therefore difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the actual use of ODA to support SALW control-related assistance from these reports.

SIPRI’s Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database (SIPRI database) is a tool that can help to provide some clarity in this regard.⁷⁸ This open and freely accessible platform includes information on over 800 assistance activities that aim to build capacity in the fields of arms transfers and SALW controls in states in Africa, East Asia and South East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East. To improve understanding of how ODA is being used to support SALW control-related assistance, the next chapter looks at assistance activities implemented by countries in sub-Saharan Africa.⁷⁹ The chapter compares relevant information from the SIPRI database on SALW control-related assistance implemented in these countries with donors’ reports on their aid flows to the region to the OECD CRS database under the purpose codes of the ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ sector.⁸⁰ It provides an overview both of the types of activity that have been considered ODA eligible and of the key aspects of SALW control that they have addressed. It also highlights the different approaches that donors have adopted in reporting relevant assistance under the available purpose codes.

⁷⁶ OECD, DCD/DAC(2017)22/FINAL (note 73), pp. 67–68.

⁷⁷ Bromley, M. and Maletta, G., ‘Using official development assistance to strengthen small arms and light weapons controls: Opportunities and risks’, SIPRI WritePeace Blog, 18 June 2020; and Maletta, G. and Robin, L., ‘Mapping development assistance to small arms control: Why does it matter?’, Development Matters, OECD Blog, 2 Nov. 2020.

⁷⁸ SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, <<https://att-assistance.org/>>.

⁷⁹ For the scope of this analysis, sub-Saharan Africa includes Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Somaliland, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Eswatini, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Western Sahara, Zambia and Zimbabwe. SIPRI, ‘Regional coverage’, [n.d.].

⁸⁰ Assistance activities included in the SIPRI database as of 14 Jan. 2021. The CRS data is as of 18 Dec. 2020. OECD, ‘Creditor Reporting System (CRS)’, OECD.Stat, [n.d.].

4. The use of official development assistance to support SALW controls in sub-Saharan Africa

The SIPRI and the OECD CRS databases differ in scope, coverage and overall structure (see box 4.1 and appendix A). For instance, in the SIPRI database activities are tagged and searchable based on their ‘focus’ and ‘type’ (see appendix B). A number of the focus tags specifically cover issues related to establishing and implementing an effective system of SALW controls, on the basis of the obligations contained in the UNPOA. A key focus tag here is ‘small arms and light weapons (SALW) controls’, which covers all aspects of establishing an effective system of SALW controls. Other relevant focus tags cover particular aspects of that process. These tags include ‘inventory and stockpile management’, ‘marking’, ‘record-keeping’, ‘tracing’, ‘ammunition’, ‘destruction’ and ‘national action plan’. As the SIPRI database is predominantly focused on assistance activities aimed at improving states’ controls on SALW, it is likely that many other relevant initiatives are not covered. These could include, for example, efforts that aim to address the causes that generate the need for weapons, and thus armed violence, in the first place (e.g. DDR programmes, activities raising awareness about SALW-related risks among civilians etc.).

The CRS database is much wider in scope and coverage than the SIPRI database as it includes details on aid activities in all sectors that can be supported through development spending and not just those that are security related (and, in this case, related specifically to SALW controls). The definition of the ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ purpose code that can be used to report spending in this area is also broader than the focus tags used in the SIPRI database and encompasses activities that are not strictly related to the establishment of SALW control systems. In addition, as noted above, support for activities that are within the scope of the SIPRI database might be reported in the CRS database under other purpose codes.

Besides the differences in scope and coverage, other variations between the two data sets include differences in timeline; quality and amount of descriptive information on the assistance activities; information on budgets; and the way in which data collection is conducted (see appendix B).

Bearing in mind these differences between the two data sets, the analysis presented below draws preliminary conclusions on which assistance and cooperation activities involving sub-Saharan African countries in the SIPRI database under the focus tag ‘small arms and light weapons (SALW) controls’, have been supported through ODA. The structure of the SIPRI database and the different details it provides are a useful complement to the information that is available in the CRS database. Comparing the two data sets thus allows interested stakeholders to assess (a) the original purpose of the activities as envisaged by the donor; (b) what activities wider projects practically entailed; and (c) what specific components of SALW controls these activities have addressed.

Mapping ODA-eligible SALW control-related assistance in sub-Saharan Africa

The SIPRI database includes 809 assistance and cooperation activities implemented in different regions of the world since 2012. Of these, a total of 335 include, at the very least, one focus tag on ‘small arms and light weapons (SALW) controls’ and involved countries in sub-Saharan Africa.⁸¹ Based on a comparison of the databases in terms

⁸¹ These numbers refer to the activities included in the SIPRI database as of 14 Jan. 2021. They are based on activities sorted by using the following filters: (a) subregions: East Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, and

Box 4.1. The SIPRI and OECD databases**SIPRI's Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database**

SIPRI's database provides information about arms transfer and small arms and light weapons control-related cooperation and assistance activities implemented in different regions of the world since 2012. Each activity is given an individual page, which contains information about (a) what the activity involved; (b) any larger project of which the activity was part, its donors and budget; (c) links to any websites detailing the activity; (d) links to other closely related activities in the database; and (e) contact details of the implementers.

For further information see SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database, 'About the project', [n.d.].

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activities database

The OECD's CRS database provides information on individual aid activities and programmes reported by donors (e.g. research projects, training courses, cash transfers etc.). It also allows users to check 'where aid goes, what purposes it serves and what policies it aims to implement'.^a The CRS database contains data on aid flows both in the form of commitments (i.e. the obligation 'undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organisation') and in the form of disbursements (i.e. the 'release of funds to or the purchase of goods or services for a recipient').^b The CRS database includes information on project-specific contributions except for contributions to the regular budgets of international organizations.

^a OECD, 'Creditor Reporting System (CRS)', OECD.Stat, [n.d.]; and OECD, 'Technical guide to terms and data in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activities database', [n.d.].

^b OECD, 'DAC [Development Assistance Committee] glossary of key terms and concepts', [n.d.].

of donors and recipients, the descriptions of activities and the names of projects, at least 156 of the 335 SALW control-related assistance activities in sub-Saharan Africa in the SIPRI database can be linked to aid activities reported to the CRS database under the different purpose codes of the 'Conflict, Peace and Security' sector.⁸² Many of the remaining 179 activities were likely supported by funding that the donors have reported to the OECD as ODA spending. These include 24 activities in the SIPRI database that were funded by UNSCAR and the ATT VTF. However, for the scope of this report, the authors have decided to include only activities that it was possible to link with more certainty to aid activities in the CRS database. Although it is clear that many of the activities supported by these instruments and included in the SIPRI database are ODA eligible, it is difficult to specifically link them to the relevant donors' aid flows in the CRS database (see box 4.2).

In the SIPRI database, all of the 156 activities included a focus tag on one or more aspects of SALW controls. The focus tags with the highest levels of representation were 'inventory and stockpile management' (74), 'ammunition' (36), 'tracing' (30) and 'destruction' (23) (see figure 4.1).⁸³ In general terms, the focus tags identified for the 156 activities appear to correspond to the main challenges faced by sub-Saharan African states in relation to SALW controls and be broadly in line with the assistance needs as formulated by the recipients.⁸⁴ In addition, 'regional cooperation' was a recurring component (51 of the 156 activities also had this tag) of SALW control activities in the region, demonstrating the need for, and the efforts already being undertaken towards, tackling common challenges at the regional level.

sub-Saharan Africa; (b) focus of activity: 'Small arms and light weapons (SALW) controls'; and (c) years: 2012–20.

⁸² The aid activities reported in the CRS database and that are included in this comparison were filtered on the basis of (a) donors: official donors, total; (b) sector: all-purpose codes under 'Conflict, Peace and Security'; (c) flow: ODA; (d) flow type: gross disbursement; (e) type of aid: all types; (f) year: 2012–19; and (g) recipient: all countries 'South of Sahara', 'South of Sahara, regional' and 'Unspecified developing countries'.

⁸³ Activities can include more than one focus, and tags are not mutually exclusive.

⁸⁴ See UNPOA, 'International assistance', [n.d.].

Box 4.2. SALW control-related assistance activities funded by the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation and the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund

The United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) may also fund small arms and light weapons (SALW) control-related assistance that is eligible as official development assistance (ODA). In 2013–18 over 70 per cent of UNSCAR-funded projects qualified as ODA, and the fund ‘has been increasingly conditioned to finance ODA-eligible activities’ (although it can also support projects that are not ODA eligible).^a When applying for UNSCAR funding, applicants are required to provide information on the ODA eligibility of their proposed activities both with respect to recipients and with respect to contents. In addition, the ATT VTF Administrative Rules foresee the possibility for donors to attach specific conditions to their grants, including that of funds being used in ‘accordance with the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] DAC [Development Assistance Committee] guidelines for development cooperation’.^b

In SIPRI’s Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database there are 24 activities that have been implemented with the financial support of these instruments, that involve sub-Saharan countries and that have included a focus on SALW controls. As neither the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs—as the entity managing UNSCAR—nor the ATT VTF are listed as donors in the Creditor Reporting System database, details on the specific projects that they fund are not included in it. States donating to UNSCAR and the ATT VTF and accounting their support to these funds as ODA often use different purpose codes when reporting relevant disbursements (e.g. ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ or ‘civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution’).^c The fact that these instruments are not limited to the support of ODA-eligible projects makes it difficult to conclude with certainty which related activities in the SIPRI database were supported through development finance.

^a United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) 2020 Call for Proposals, [n.d.], p. 4.

^b Arms Trade Treaty, Voluntary Trust Fund, ‘Administrative rules’, adopted 15 Nov. 2016, amended Sep. 2018.

^c For a list of donors to the ATT VTF see Arms Trade Treaty, ‘Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF): What is the VTF?: Donors to the VTF’, [n.d.]. For a list of donors to UNSCAR see UNSCAR, ‘Information for donors’, [n.d.].

Looking at the types of activity, the majority (91) of the entries that this analysis could link to aid flows in the CRS database were fully or in part institutional capacity building activities (see figure 4.2). In addition, a total of 63 activities provided ‘technical, material or financial assistance’, which reflects the fact that many of the SALW control components with the highest levels of representation at the focus tag level are highly technical in nature.

The majority of the 156 activities were funded or co-funded by the EU (77), Germany (64) and the USA (34).⁸⁵ This is consistent with the fact that these are among the largest aid donors in the ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ sector, including the field of SALW control-related assistance (see figure 4.3).⁸⁶ The following subsections look at a selection of the 156 activities and projects supported by these and other donors through ODA.⁸⁷

Activities funded by the EU

Of the 156 activities in the SIPRI database that could be linked to aid activities reported to the CRS database, 77 were funded or co-funded by the EU. EU assistance in the field of SALW control is funded by multiple financial instruments that are available to support the external action of the EU and have different overarching goals.⁸⁸ For example, ‘non-proliferation and disarmament activities’ are explicitly addressed by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, including

⁸⁵ These figures do not add up to the total number of SIPRI database activities identified in the CRS database (156) as 1 activity was co-funded by Germany, the USA and other donors, 15 activities were co-funded by Germany and the USA, and 19 were co-funded by Germany and the EU (of which 18 activities were part of the EU P2P Programme).

⁸⁶ Stockholm Environment Institute (note 5), accessed on 30 Dec. 2020.

⁸⁷ Preference was given to activities that were implemented as part of larger (and multi-annual) projects and on which more details were available.

⁸⁸ Poitevin, C., ‘European Union initiatives to control small arms and light weapons: Towards a more coordinated approach’, EU Non-proliferation Paper no. 33, Dec. 2013.




Figure 4.1. ODA-eligible cooperation and assistance activities focused on SALW controls

ODA = official development assistance; SALW = small arms and light weapons.

Note: The data does not add up to the total number of activities identified (156) because activities can include more than one focus, and tags are not mutually exclusive.

Source: SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database, accessed 14 Jan. 2021, <<https://att-assistance.org/>>.

‘measures target[ing] the illicit accumulation and trafficking’ of SALW and assistance ‘to implement effective controls on international arms transfers’.⁸⁹ Funding to the EU P2P Programme and support to UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) PSSM activities in the Sahel (see below) are examples of assistance funded this way.

SALW control-related activities funded through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) are integrated into wider actions addressing global and transnational threats.⁹⁰ For instance, the projects implemented by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and INTERPOL (see below) were managed by the European Commission’s Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) as part of its responsibility to implement Article 5 of the IcSP.⁹¹ Activities under this article cover issues related to, among other things, SSR and the fight against organized crime.⁹² The European Development Fund (EDF) has also been mobilized to fund SALW control-related assistance, for instance in the

⁸⁹ European Commission, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy, preserving peace and security’, [n.d.]. Common Foreign and Security Policy projects are implemented by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments of the European Commission ‘in close consultation with the European External Action Service, responsible for operational planning and policy direction’.

⁹⁰ European External Action Service, ‘Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)’, 3 May 2016; European Commission, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, ‘The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace responds rapidly to crises, builds peace and prevents conflict around the world’, accessed 30 Jan. 2021.

⁹¹ Since 1 Jan. 2021 the responsibility for the implementation of IcSP Article 5 projects has been transferred to the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments of the European Commission. In addition, effective as of 16 Jan. 2021, DG DEVCO became the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA). See European Commission, ‘Geopolitical Commission builds on International Partnerships’, 15 Jan. 2021.

⁹² European Commission, ‘Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP): Thematic Strategy Paper 2014–2020: Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014–2017 (Annex)’, [n.d.].




Figure 4.2. ODA-eligible cooperation and assistance activities focused on SALW controls, sorted by types of activity

ODA = official development assistance; SALW = small arms and light weapons.

Note: The data does not add up to the total number of activities identified (156) because activities can be of more than one type and tags are not mutually exclusive.

Source: SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database, accessed 14 Jan. 2021, <<https://att-assistance.org/>>.

framework of the EU support to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regional peace, security and stability mandate.⁹³

These are only some of the instruments that have been used by the EU to fund SALW assistance in countries in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the world. In order to address the fragmentation in EU funding tools that can be used to provide development assistance, in 2018 the European Commission submitted a proposal for the creation of the EU Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), on which the Council of the EU and the European Parliament found an agreement at the end of 2020.⁹⁴ By integrating existing development aid tools (including the IcSP and the EDF) the NDICI aims to be the EU's main development assistance financial tool as 'at least 92 per cent' of its funding is expected to meet the OECD DAC requirements.⁹⁵ It can be assumed that the NDICI will probably also support ODA-eligible SALW assistance and help to streamline the current framework.⁹⁶

A few examples of the 77 activities that were funded by the EU and that were included in the SIPRI and CRS databases are described below. Related activities were funded through the instruments discussed above, whose differences in coverage and

⁹³ The European Development Fund (EDF) is the 'main source of EU development aid for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the overseas territories'. Most of the EDF resources are managed by the European Commission. European Commission, 'European Development Fund', [n.d.].

⁹⁴ Council of the European Union, 'Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument: Coreper endorses provisional agreement with the European Parliament', Press release, 18 Dec. 2020.

⁹⁵ European Commission, 'EU Budget for the Future: The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument', Fact sheet, June 2020.

⁹⁶ European Commission staff, Communication with authors, 3 Sep. 2020; and former European External Action Service official, Communication with authors, 7 July 2020.




Figure 4.3. Total ODA disbursements for ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ in 2012–19 to sub-Saharan Africa (all countries ‘South of Sahara’ and ‘South of Sahara, regional’)

EU= European Union; IDA = International Development Association; ODA = official development assistance; SALW = small arms and light weapons; UNDP = United Nations Development Programme.

Note: The figure was created by the authors based on data extracted from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activities database.

Source: OECD, ‘Creditor Reporting System (CRS)’, OECD.Stat, accessed 18 Dec. 2020.

scope may explain why not all corresponding aid flows are coded as ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ when reported to the CRS database.

Eighteen of these activities were part of the EU P2P ATT and COARM Outreach programmes and, according to the SIPRI database, were implemented between 2016 and 2020.⁹⁷ In 2018 the EU reported among its ODA disbursements towards ‘unspecified developing countries’ ‘outreach activities’ in support of the implementation of the ATT and ‘promotion of effective arms export controls’ as ‘reintegration and SALW controls’. It also reported additional ‘EU activities in support of the implementation’ of the ATT under ‘civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution’. According to the SIPRI database, most of these activities focused on issues related to arms transfers more broadly, while only a few addressed more specific aspects of SALW controls. These were a mix of ‘institutional capacity building’, ‘sensitization and outreach’, and ‘legal or legislative assistance’ types.

Seventeen activities, which according to the SIPRI database were implemented by UNREC in 2016–18, were part of the EU-funded project on ‘PSSM in Sahel’.⁹⁸ The EU reported support to the project in the CRS database as ODA disbursements towards ‘South of Sahara’ in 2017–18 under the ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ code. Relevant activities in the SIPRI database were mostly oriented to the provision of capacity building with regard to ‘inventory and stockpile management’, ‘ammunition’ and lowering the risk of diversion.

⁹⁷ Sixteen were part of the EU P2P ATT Outreach Programme co-funded and implemented by Germany (through the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control) and Expertise France. Two were part of the EU P2P COARM Outreach Project co-funded and implemented by Germany.

⁹⁸ Council Decision 2014/912/CFSP of 15 Dec. 2014 in support of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) activities to reduce the risk of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition in the Sahel region, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L360, 17 Dec. 2014.

Six activities were part of a project aimed at countering transnational illicit arms trafficking through the implementation of the Firearms Protocol. According to the SIPRI database, these activities were all implemented by the UNODC in 2015–19; the corresponding project was reported in the CRS database by the EU as ODA disbursements towards ‘unspecified developing countries’ in 2015 and 2018. Interestingly, although the aid flows for 2015 and 2018 were for the same project, the 2015 flows were reported as ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ while the 2018 flows were reported as ‘security system management and reform’. In the SIPRI database, the activities were mostly focused on ‘ammunition’, ‘marking’ and ‘tracing’, and aimed at providing ‘legal or legislative assistance’. This is in line with the objective of the project to support the development of firearms legislation and investigative procedures on illicit arms trafficking, including in sub-Saharan African countries.⁹⁹

Eighteen activities were carried out by INTERPOL as part of EU financial support to the iARMS database.¹⁰⁰ According to the SIPRI database, these activities were implemented in 2017–19. Support for the fourth phase of this project (iARMS IV) was reported in the CRS database by the EU as ODA disbursements towards ‘unspecified developing countries’ in 2016 and 2018 and reported as ‘security system management and reform’. The project is described in the CRS database as supporting the functionality of the iARMS database, and ‘capacity building’ and ‘training’ to combat ‘firearms-related crime’. These features are in line with the information included in the SIPRI database as all 18 activities are categorized as being of the ‘institutional capacity building’ type and mostly cover issues related to ‘enforcement’, ‘tracing’ and ‘record-keeping’. Activities implemented in sub-Saharan Africa focused in particular on the Sahel region.¹⁰¹

Six activities were part of the EU support to the ECOWAS regional peace, security and stability mandate (EU–ECOWAS PSS).¹⁰² According to the SIPRI database, these activities were implemented in 2015–19. Support to the project was reported in the CRS database by the EU as ODA disbursements towards ‘South of Sahara’ in 2014–18. The reporting is not consistent over the years and this project is referred to under both the ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ and the ‘civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution’ purpose codes. In the SIPRI database, most of these activities fall under the ‘regional cooperation’ focus tag—which reflects the regional dimension of the project—and are *inter alia* of the ‘sensitization and outreach’ type.

Activities funded by Germany

Of the 156 activities in the SIPRI database that could be linked to aid activities reported to the CRS database, 64 were funded or co-funded by Germany.

Many of these activities were part of several projects that have provided support in the field of PSSM to countries in West Africa and the Sahel region. The projects aim to improve the ability of these countries to safely handle, store and dispose of weapons and ammunition, and develop their marking, tracing and record-keeping procedures. Some of these projects also have the goal of promoting and strengthening regional cooperation to tackle SALW proliferation through the involvement of organizations such as the AU and ECOWAS. In addition, Germany funded projects implemented by UNREC that provide technical assistance to specific countries’ SALW national

⁹⁹ See e.g. Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘UNODC training to support firearms trafficking investigations and prosecution in Niger’, Niger, 25–28 Mar. 2018.

¹⁰⁰ INTERPOL, ‘Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iARMS)’, accessed 31 Dec. 2020.

¹⁰¹ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘INTERPOL national iARMS training course for Ivory Coast’, Côte d’Ivoire, 30–31 Oct. 2017.

¹⁰² See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘Supply and delivery to ECOWAS member states of record keeping, handling and arms & ammunition destruction equipment’, Various locations, 28 May 2019–29 July 2019.

commissions (as in Mali and Togo) in particular aspects of SALW controls (e.g. marking).¹⁰³

Germany reported its support to all these projects in the CRS database as ODA disbursements to countries ‘South of Sahara’ and consistently used the ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ purpose code. Some of these aid activities are explicitly described by the donor as addressing armed violence reduction or enabling the creation of conditions for peace and development. Germany also co-funds the EU P2P ATT and COARM Outreach programmes. In 2014–19, among its ODA disbursements, Germany reported as assistance in the field of ‘security system management and reform’ aid activities described as ‘outreach projects’ for the implementation of the ATT, ‘ATT-support for DAC-countries’ and ‘EU COARM IV promotion of effective arms export control’.¹⁰⁴

Most of the SALW control-related assistance efforts supported by Germany are led by the Federal Foreign Office and the vast majority of these are ODA eligible since they do not involve any military components (unlike e.g. the assistance provided by the German Ministry of Defence).¹⁰⁵ Although in the past many of the activities supported by Germany have tended to focus on PSSM, in recent years Germany appears to have started to show an interest in broadening the thematic focus of its activities. By building on the growing body of knowledge on diversion and trafficking routes as well as other factors, Germany is looking to adopt a more holistic and regionally focused approach to tackling illicit trafficking by, for example, enhancing cooperation with officials working on issues such as terrorism and organized crime, awareness raising, and gender-responsive small arms control.¹⁰⁶

Examples of the 64 activities that were supported by Germany and included in the SIPRI and CRS databases are discussed below. Although the number of entries in the CRS database and their overlapping thematic and regional coverage made it particularly challenging to link them to individual activities in the SIPRI database, it was possible to identify some level of correlation. Activities that are part of the EU P2P Programme were addressed in the previous subsection (on activities co-funded by the EU) and are thus not discussed here.

Of the 64 activities in the SIPRI database that appear to have been linked to Germany’s ODA disbursements in 2012–19, 15 were implemented by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) in cooperation with various regional organizations. Of these, 5 were part of a project launched by BICC in 2018 on PSSM training in support of the ECOWAS Convention and the AU’s ‘Silencing the Guns in Africa’ initiative.¹⁰⁷ These activities were mostly aimed at providing capacity building or ‘technical, material and financial assistance’ in ‘inventory and stockpile management’, ‘marking’ and ‘ammunition’.¹⁰⁸ Four of the 15 activities implemented by BICC are indicated in the SIPRI database as being part of a project on PSSM ‘capacity development and technical advice in West Africa’ and carried out in 2016–18.¹⁰⁹ Another three were part of an AU–Germany led project on ‘Enhanced SALW Control and PSSM in the Greater Sahel’

¹⁰³ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘Civil weapon marking in Togo’, Togo, 3 Nov.–20 Dec. 2014; and SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘Training on marking and registration of SALW in Mali’, Mali, 22–29 July 2015.

¹⁰⁴ For 2017 (and only for that year) Germany reported in its ODA disbursement ‘Outreach projects for the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty’ as ‘reintegration and SALW controls’.

¹⁰⁵ German Federal Foreign Office representative, Communication with authors, 24 Sep. 2020.

¹⁰⁶ German Federal Foreign Office representative (note 105).

¹⁰⁷ For detail on the ECOWAS Convention and the AU’s initiative see note 14 in this report.

¹⁰⁸ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘Regional training on physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) in Nigeria’, Nigeria, 12–22 Nov. 2019.

¹⁰⁹ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘BICC good practice and international standards in PSSM workshop in Mali’, Mali, 19–21 Oct. 2016.

implemented in 2015.¹¹⁰ As the name of the project suggests, the activities were mostly focused on ‘inventory and stockpile management’ and were a mix of the ‘institutional capacity building’ and ‘sensitization and outreach’ types.

Fifteen activities co-funded by Germany and the USA were implemented by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) as part of the ‘Arms Management and Destruction Programme for Sahel–West Africa’ project. The overwhelming majority of these activities are categorized in the SIPRI database as providing ‘technical, material and financial assistance’ and their focus is mostly on ‘destruction’, ‘inventory and stockpile management’ and ‘ammunition’.¹¹¹

Activities funded by the USA

Of the 156 activities in the SIPRI database that might have been linked to aid activities reported to the CRS database, 34 were funded or co-funded by the USA.

Under the wider umbrella of ‘conventional weapons destruction’ the USA—through inter-agency collaboration efforts carried out by the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the US Agency for International Development—provides worldwide assistance to reduce excess stockpiles of conventional weapons (including SALW) and ammunition, as well as mine action programmes and training in PSSM.¹¹² The WRA, in particular, leads on efforts in the fields of (a) physical security (by supporting the construction or upgrade of armouries and storage for SALW and their ammunition in order to prevent diversion and leakages); (b) stockpile management (including training with regard to record-keeping, monitoring, storage and marking processes); and (c) destruction of SALW and ammunition that are no longer in use or that are obsolete and, thus, dangerous to be deployed.¹¹³ Although many of these activities are part of projects that can be linked to the USA’s reports on ODA disbursements, this assistance is not particularly driven by developmental purposes, and the activities supported by the WRA are classified as US international security assistance. This means that they are considered to be a tool primarily to advance national security and regional stability.¹¹⁴

As noted above, 15 of the 34 relevant activities identified in the SIPRI and CRS databases were co-funded by the USA and Germany. According to the SIPRI database, of the remaining 19 activities, 1 was an activity jointly funded by the USA and a number of other donors, and implemented by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency in Mauritania.¹¹⁵ The other 18 could be linked to the USA’s reports on ODA disbursements towards countries ‘South of Sahara’ (with the donor agency being the State Department or the DOD). These 18, implemented between 2012 and 2014, were reported by the donor either as ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ or as ‘removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)’. The first category (reintegration and SALW controls) included conventional weapon disposal activities (e.g. in South Sudan), mainly implemented by NGOs such as MAG and the Halo Trust. These are categorized in the SIPRI database as ‘technical, material and financial assistance’ focused

¹¹⁰ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘Training course on physical security and stockpile management in Nigeria 2015’, Nigeria, 12–13 Aug. 2015.

¹¹¹ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘Training and rehabilitation of storage facilities to improve safety and security in Mali’, Mali, 1 Oct. 2014–30 Sep. 2015.

¹¹² US Department of State, Bureau of Political–Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, *To Walk the Earth in Safety*, no. 19 (Jan.–Dec. 2019), p. 5.

¹¹³ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement representative, Communication with authors, 8 July 2020.

¹¹⁴ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement representative (note 113).

¹¹⁵ SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘NATO assistance to physical security and stockpile management, destruction, demilitarisation and disposal and defence reform in Mauritania II (Mauritania II phase 1+)’, Mauritania, 1 Feb. 2016.

on issues related to ‘destruction’ and ‘inventory and stockpile management’.¹¹⁶ The second group (removal of land mines and ERW) included assistance in ERW disposal training (e.g. in Burundi, Chad and Kenya), categorized as mostly ‘institutional capacity building’ activities on ‘ammunition’ and ‘inventory and stockpile management’.¹¹⁷

Activities supported by other donors

Sixteen of the 156 activities in the SIPRI database that might have been linked to aid activities reported to the CRS database were funded or co-funded by other donors: Sweden (6), Japan (5), Switzerland (3), Finland (1) and the United Kingdom (1).

SALW control-related assistance funded or co-funded by Sweden—through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)—included six activities implemented between 2014 and 2019 by the Parliamentary Forum on SALW (PF-SALW).¹¹⁸ These were mostly related to the promotion of interparliamentary dialogue at the global level on issues connected to SALW controls but also included some awareness raising on international instruments such as the ATT and the UNPOA.¹¹⁹ Sida contributes to the core funding of PF-SALW and Sweden reports this support in its ODA disbursements to the CRS database under the ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ purpose code towards ‘unspecified developing countries’. Finland also funded SALW control-related assistance implemented by parliamentary associations—namely Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA)—through ODA.¹²⁰ Finland’s support to the PGA is reported in the CRS database among its 2015 ODA disbursement towards ‘unspecified developing countries’ and as support to security sector reform-related activities.

Four of the five activities funded by Japan were part of a project aimed at strengthening SALW controls in Côte d’Ivoire administered through the UNDP and involving cooperation with UNREC.¹²¹ According to the SIPRI database, these activities were implemented from 2012 until 2014 and are categorized as mostly ‘institutional capacity building’ activities on ‘inventory and stockpile management’.¹²² These activities could be linked to Japan’s 2012 and 2015 ODA disbursements towards Côte d’Ivoire in support of two projects designed to enhance ‘community security’ and prevent SALW proliferation. These projects were reported using the purpose code ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ and indicating the UNDP as the channel of delivery.¹²³ The other activity funded by Japan and channelled through the UNDP was part of a project implemented in 2009–13 by the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons programme (RECSA) aimed at strengthening existing institutions of its member states in the fight against SALW proliferation in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.¹²⁴ This could be linked to what is reported in the UNDP

¹¹⁶ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘Disposal of abandoned ordnance and SALW stockpiles in South Sudan’, South Sudan, 1 Oct. 2011–30 Sep. 2012.

¹¹⁷ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘Explosive remnants of war disposal training in Chad in FY2013’, Chad, 1 Oct. 2012–30 Sep. 2013.

¹¹⁸ Two of these activities were co-funded by the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and one by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

¹¹⁹ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘ATT seminar for legislators in Benin’, Benin, 4 Mar. 2015.

¹²⁰ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) African regional parliamentary workshop on addressing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons’, Tanzania, 2–3 Apr. 2016.

¹²¹ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Programmes Financed from Voluntary Contributions, 2013–2014 (UNODA: New York, July 2014), p. 18.

¹²² See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘Validation workshop for manual of procedures on SALW stockpiling in Côte d’Ivoire’, Côte d’Ivoire, 3 Mar. 2014.

¹²³ United Nations, Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons, ‘International assistance provided by OECD states: Japan’, accessed 4 Jan. 2021.

¹²⁴ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Kenya, ‘Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons programme’, [n.d.].

projects' database and ODA disbursements towards Kenya in 2012 as 'reintegration and SALW controls'.¹²⁵

Other activities in the SIPRI database that might have been linked to aid activities supported through ODA include regional events organized by the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence Secretariat with the support of Switzerland, and assistance provided by the UK in the framework of the Somalia Security and Justice Programme.¹²⁶

Key considerations

Comparing information on SALW control-related assistance in the SIPRI and CRS databases presents some limitations, but a few key considerations can still be drawn from the analysis presented above.

Detailed information on SALW control-related assistance supported through ODA is scarce and fragmented. While general information on ODA used to support SALW controls is available on several open and publicly accessible platforms, donors do not usually provide much detail on projects funded this way.¹²⁷ In addition, when available, this information is quite fragmented (as emerges, for instance, in the way donors report on relevant aid flows in the CRS database), which makes it difficult to obtain a comprehensive picture. As this report shows, the complexity of SALW controls and their integration into arms control, development, peacebuilding and conflict prevention agendas mean that fragmentation in the way assistance—and related funding—is provided, and thus reported, is almost inevitable. On top of this, the CRS database does not capture donors' contributions to the core budgets of multilateral organizations (e.g. the AU, UNIDIR and UNODA), which, as part of their wider mandates, implement or fund SALW control-related assistance.¹²⁸ This lack of information makes any attempt to map relevant SALW control-related assistance all the more challenging. As the OECD develops new statistical tools such as the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD), more clarity on the existing level of support to tackle illicit arms flows—as mandated by SDG 16.4—could prove beneficial.¹²⁹ Stakeholders have already recognized the importance of the SIPRI database as a mapping tool in this regard, and the analysis in this report confirms that it represents a useful complement to other available information. Among other things, it allows stakeholders, experts and the interested public to examine specific components of SALW control-related projects, check on their relation to similar activities and obtain an overview of the regional and global reach of projects supporting states to build or strengthen their arms transfer and SALW control systems.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, 'RECSA small arms and light weapons project in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa', Various locations, 19 Dec. 2011–19 Dec. 2013; UNDP Kenya (note 124); and UNDP, 'Support to Regional Center on small arms II: Enhancing security in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa through practical disarmament', accessed 4 Jan. 2021.

¹²⁶ See e.g. SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, 'Workshop on preventing and reducing armed violence to promote development', Kenya, 24–28 Nov. 2014; and SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, 'CAR [Conflict Armament Research] project on improvement of accountability and management of assets by the Somali police', Somalia, 1 Oct. 2017–31 July 2020.

Reference to the Somalia Security and Justice Programme was found in the United Kingdom's Development Tracker rather than the CRS database. British Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, 'Development Tracker', accessed 14 Jan. 2021.

¹²⁷ In addition to the OECD CRS database, these include e.g. the 'EU Aid Explorer', <https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/content/homepage_en>; the UK's 'Development Tracker', <<https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/>>; USAID's 'Foreign Aid Explorer', <<https://explorer.usaid.gov/>>; and the Stockholm Environment Institute's Aid Atlas, <<https://aid-atlas.org>>.

¹²⁸ Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) representative, Communication with authors, 3 Sep. 2020.

¹²⁹ OECD, 'Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD)', accessed 10 Jan. 2020.

¹³⁰ Bejraoui, A., Gaveau, V. and Benn, J., *TOSSD: Tracking Peace and Security Expenditures in Support of the SDGs*, OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, no. 66 (OECD: Paris, Dec. 2019), p. 39.

Donors classify their ODA support to SALW controls differently. Donors differ in their use of the purpose codes of the ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ sector to report ODA in support of SALW control-related assistance. The comparison of the SIPRI and CRS databases in this report shows how the choice of these codes is dependent on what aspect of the project the donor is focusing on, how the project is generally framed and, not least, what the donor’s priorities are. The EU-funded projects implemented by the UNODC and INTERPOL described above are particularly good examples of this. The IcSP component financing these projects aims to strengthen ‘the capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities involved in the fight against ... all forms of illicit trafficking’, which may explain why ‘security system management and reform’ was indicated as the purpose code of reference.¹³¹ Another example is provided by mine action assistance programmes that include SALW control-related components (e.g. destruction and stockpile management), as in the case of USA-funded activities implemented by the Halo Trust.¹³² Support for SALW control-related assistance may draw from different domestic budgets or be managed by different offices within one ministry (e.g. arms control or humanitarian affairs offices), which may also explain why a certain code is preferred over another. In addition, there are sometimes inconsistencies (e.g. between years or different projects) in the way donors classify their ODA support for SALW control-related assistance. While these different practices make it challenging to track associated assistance flows, they also highlight the relevance of SALW control-related assistance for other activities linked with the broader development agenda.

Types of SALW control-related assistance supported through ODA. A significant number of activities in the SIPRI database implemented in sub-Saharan Africa that could be linked to donors’ reports on ODA flows appear to be focused on tackling the challenge of SALW proliferation—especially in West Africa and the Sahel region. This is mainly through the provision of training and technical assistance to enhance the recipient country’s ability to properly store SALW and their ammunition or safely destroy excessive and destabilizing stockpiles. Assistance funded by Germany and the USA focused particularly on these activities.

Some activities addressed the problem of illicit SALW trafficking by providing countries with assistance to establish tools to criminalize, investigate and prosecute such trafficking—as in the case of the EU-funded projects implemented by INTERPOL and the UNODC—or to improve states’ arms transfer and SALW controls—as in the case of the EU P2P Programme. In general, SALW control-related activities were largely focused on promoting regional instruments (e.g. the ECOWAS Convention) and regional cooperation, although some also supported the implementation, and raised awareness, of international instruments such as the ATT, the Firearms Protocol and the UNPOA.

Hardly any of the activities in the SIPRI database that could be linked to ODA flows reported in the CRS database were part of initiatives addressing the causes that generate the need for weapons (and thus the causes of armed violence), in the first place (e.g. CVR programmes, activities raising awareness about SALW-related risks among civilians etc.). However, as mentioned earlier in this report, this may be a result of the fact that the SIPRI database is mostly focused on assistance activities that aim to improve states’ controls on conventional weapons, including SALW.

¹³¹ European Commission (note 92), p. 43.

¹³² Representatives of Halo Trust, Communication with authors, 21 Sep. 2020.




Figure 4.4. Total disbursements for all purpose codes of the ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ sector in 2012–19 to sub-Saharan Africa (all countries ‘South of Sahara’ and ‘South of Sahara, regional’)

SALW = small arms and light weapons; PKO = peacekeeping operations.

Note: The figure was created by the authors based on data extracted from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activities database.

Source: OECD, ‘Creditor Reporting System (CRS)’, OECD.Stat, accessed 18 Dec. 2020.

Efforts are being made to address the security and development challenges posed by SALW proliferation through more holistic approaches. The establishment of the SALIENT fund is a step in this direction. Donors like Germany also now seem willing to shift away from efforts narrowly focused on PSSM in sub-Saharan Africa to more comprehensive approaches tackling illicit trafficking more broadly and based on lessons learned from experiences in other regions.

Donors supporting SALW control-related assistance through ODA. As mentioned earlier in this report, based on information included in the CRS database, in 2012–19 Germany, the EU and the USA were the three major providers of development assistance coded as ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ towards countries in sub-Saharan Africa.¹³³ This is reflected in the fact that the vast majority of activities in the SIPRI database—focused on SALW controls, implemented in sub-Saharan Africa and that could be linked to aid flows—are, indeed, funded by these donors. However, for the reasons previously discussed in this report referring to the difficulty of mapping SALW control-related assistance supported through development spending, it is likely that there are relevant contributions that were not captured by this analysis. Nonetheless, spending under ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ represented only a very small percentage of global ODA (US\$162 million; roughly 3 per cent) in the sector of ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ towards sub-Saharan Africa in 2012–19 (see figure 4.4). This could suggest that the link made between security and development—and specifically between arms proliferation and development—has not yet been fully operationalized at the development assistance level and that there

¹³³ Data refers to total disbursements to sub-Saharan Africa (intended as all countries ‘South of Sahara’ and ‘South of Sahara, regional’). See figure 4.3 in this report.

might still be some hesitance to use development spending to fund security-related assistance. It could, therefore, indicate that although states have generally agreed on the importance of addressing SALW proliferation, certain donors may still question whether their development spending is the most appropriate tool to support SALW control-related assistance in the first place.¹³⁴

In addition—although most acknowledge the importance of addressing the destabilizing presence of small arms—donors when allocating their ODA, in situations in which resources are scarce and development needs are many, usually prioritize actions that they see as more clearly targeting poverty reduction and supporting the development of social and economic infrastructure. It seems likely, moreover, that donors will now devote a large proportion of these resources to mitigating the consequences of the health crisis created by the Covid-19 pandemic.¹³⁵ Therefore, some donors may prefer to promote multilateral assistance efforts in the field of SALW controls through their contributions to the budget of multilateral organizations such as the EU or to international peace missions that support or implement relevant activities.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Representative of donor country, Communication with authors, 5 Nov. 2020.

¹³⁵ Representative of donor country, Communication with authors, 2 Sep. 2020; and Sida representative, Communication with authors, 3 Sep. 2020.

¹³⁶ Representative of donor country, Communication with authors, 2 Sep. 2020.

5. Conclusions

As a result of the recognition of the negative impact that the widespread availability of SALW can have on security and, thus, development, addressing the proliferation of these weapons is now seen not only as a matter of arms control but also as an important component of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development agendas. The increasing awareness of the cross-cutting challenges posed by the proliferation of SALW led to the establishment of assistance programmes and funding mechanisms at national, regional and international levels aimed at supporting states to improve their controls on these weapons. In view of the recognized linkages between SALW proliferation, security, and development, ODA has progressively become an eligible source of funding in this field.

This report represents the most comprehensive attempt to date to provide information on which SALW control-related assistance activities have been supported through ODA and how these aid flows have been categorized by donors. The analysis is based on a comparison of information on SALW control-related assistance activities implemented in countries in sub-Saharan Africa and reported in the SIPRI and CRS databases.

An accurate overview of the use of development spending to support SALW control-related assistance is important to understand how and to what extent donors have operationalized the link between conventional arms control and sustainable development within their assistance policies and funding decisions. It could also provide more clarity on how donors have followed up on the opportunity—provided by the SDGs—to pursue a more comprehensive approach to addressing the multifaceted problems posed by SALW. The absence and fragmentation of relevant data makes fully answering these questions particularly challenging. Nonetheless, this exercise has shown that only a limited group of donors has reported the use of development spending to support SALW control-related assistance. Based on the information in the CRS database, the share of ODA used for ‘reintegration and SALW controls’ remains very small. There are also variations in the way donors report and categorize relevant assistance, and the activities that they fund differ in terms of their type, focus and overarching goals. Most importantly, although a few key donors remain focused on tackling issues related to SALW control-related issues, development finance overall may not be sufficient to address all the many challenges posed by the proliferation of SALW. In addition, the long-term impact of the current Covid-19 pandemic on governments’ aid budgets is likely to further reduce the resources available to fund assistance work in this field.

Appendix A. Database comparison

Table A.1. Main differences between SIPRI's Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database and the OECD's CRS Aid Activities database

Main differences	SIPRI database	OECD CRS database
<i>Scope and coverage</i>	Arms transfer and SALW control-related cooperation and assistance activities implemented in Africa, East Asia and South East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East	Aid activities in all sectors that can be supported through ODA towards all eligible recipients
<i>Timeline</i>	Includes information on assistance based on the exact dates and years in which specific activities took place	Activities can be sorted on the basis of whether the donors have committed or disbursed funding for their implementation in the particular year on which they are reporting
<i>Descriptive information on assistance activities</i>	Includes a description of individual activities and the wider projects of which these are part	Donors can include long or short descriptions of the aid activities, but information is inconsistent in terms of both quantity and quality
<i>Information on budgets</i>	Includes information on the budget allocated for assistance activities when available, but it does not specify the nature of the funding and is not limited to ODA-eligible assistance	Allows tracking of ODA flows from DAC members
<i>Data collection</i>	Is carried out by SIPRI researchers and inputs are submitted by donors and implementing organizations	Based on information submitted voluntarily by donors on a yearly basis

ATT = Arms Trade Treaty; CRS = Creditor Reporting System; DAC = Development Assistance Committee; ODA = official development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: Authors' compilation.

Appendix B. Database tagging

Focus and type tags used in the SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database

The 'focus' tags used in the SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database include issues that concern establishing and implementing an effective system of arms transfer controls and which relate to the main obligations contained in the ATT. These are as follows:

1. 'Transfer controls': Establishing or improving an arms transfer control system;
2. 'Control list': Establishing or improving the list of controlled goods;
3. 'Risk assessments': Establishing or improving systems for assessing any risks associated with a transfer;
4. 'Import controls': Establishing or improving controls on imports;
5. 'Transit and trans-shipment controls': Establishing or improving controls on transit and trans-shipment;
6. 'Brokering controls': Establishing or improving controls on brokering;
7. 'Border controls': Establishing or improving border and/or customs controls; and
8. 'Reporting on arms transfers': Establishing or improving systems for collecting and reporting information on arms transfers or the control system itself.

The 'focus' tags also include issues that concern establishing and implementing an effective system of SALW controls and which relate to the main obligations contained in the UNPOA. These are as follows:

1. 'Small arms and light weapons (SALW) controls': Establishing or improving a system of SALW controls;
2. 'Inventory and stockpile management': Establishing or improving systems for managing SALW stockpiles;
3. 'Marking': Establishing or improving systems for marking SALW;
4. 'Record-keeping': Establishing or improving systems for maintaining records on the production, storage or disposal of SALW;
5. 'Tracing': Establishing or improving systems for tracing the origin of illicit SALW;
6. 'Ammunition': Establishing or improving controls on the production, storage or disposal of SALW ammunition;
7. 'Destruction': Establishing or improving systems for safely disposing of unsafe or surplus of SALW; and
8. 'National action plan': Establishing or improving national action plans as required under the UNPOA on SALW.

The activities in the SIPRI database are also tagged and searchable according to their type. The four ‘type’ tags are:

1. ‘Sensitization and outreach’: Building awareness among governments, parliamentarians or NGOs about issues related to arms transfer or SALW controls.
2. ‘Legal or legislative assistance’: Reviewing, amending or drafting legislation or regulations related to arms transfer or SALW controls;
3. ‘Institutional capacity building’: Strengthening administrative capacities among the national authorities responsible for arms transfer or SALW controls; and
4. ‘Technical, material or financial assistance’: Providing (a) technical experts for training activities or longer-term secondment; (b) equipment and software for record-keeping, marking, detection and other relevant uses; or (c) institutional funding or direct budgetary support in areas relevant to arms transfer or SALW controls.

For more information see SIPRI Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, ‘About the project’, [n.d.], <<https://att-assistance.org/about-us>>.



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Email: sipri@sipri.org
Internet: www.sipri.org