EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium

Promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks

NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT PAPERS

No. 72 January 2021

THE IMPORTANCE OF NARRATIVE IN NUCLEAR POLICYMAKING: A STUDY OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

LAURA CONSIDINE

I. INTRODUCTION

The realm of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is one in which language matters. Non-proliferation and disarmament texts (e.g. weapons treaties) are overtly political, and disputes over specific terms and their meanings can continue over years or even decades. Other aspects of nuclear weapons language may go unexamined and become a habitual part of the discourse. These commonplace terms and themes are accepted as the linguistic terrain on which political contest occurs. The purpose of this paper is to examine these taken-for-granted terms and to study how their repeated use is part of a dominant narrative that structures political debate on nuclear weapons, specifically on the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). The paper analyses the generally uncontested language that shapes what is understood as possible and legitimate in policymaking.

The issue of recognizing and reflecting on the use of language to sustain dominant narratives in non-proliferation and disarmament, and the impact of such narratives, is a perennial one. Dominant narratives can sediment over time and become embedded in institutions and processes, but they are not fixed. Narratives can be challenged, and the political implications of language are assessed by users. Now is a particularly apt time to consider questions of language and NPT politics. The 10th NPT Review Conference (RevCon) will take place in August 2021 (postponed from early 2020), and there have been a range of initiatives in the non-proliferation and disarmament sphere, inside and outside of the NPT, including the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament initiative and the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, as well as repeated calls

SUMMARY

This paper examines the role and importance of dominant narratives on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policymaking, with a focus on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By analysing a range of policy, commentary and academic texts from 1996 to 2020, the paper identifies three core tropes of NPT discourse: the NPT as a 'cornerstone', the NPT as a 'grand bargain' and the NPT as a continuous crisis. It claims these tropes support a dominant narrative of the NPT that justifies continually lowered expectations, that is status quo-oriented and that is unfavourable to initiatives based on a vision of the future. The paper highlights the importance of the generally uncontested language that forms the background of NPT political disputes and argues this language plays an important role in shaping what is understood as possible and legitimate in non-proliferation and disarmament policymaking. It examines the European Union as an actor in NPT discourse, highlighting its role in maintaining the dominant narrative through key tropes. It recommends paying further attention to the political power of the taken-for-granted language that forms the background of NPT political contests.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr Laura Considine (Ireland) is a Lecturer in International Relations at the School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds. Her work focuses on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the role of language and narrative in international politics.

for new thinking in response to stagnation. This context provides a valuable opportunity to reflect on how dominant NPT narratives might help or hinder progress and policy innovation.

This study claims that three core tropes structure the dominant narrative on the NPT. These are: (*a*) the NPT is the 'cornerstone' of the non-proliferation regime and international security, (*b*) the NPT is formed through a 'grand bargain' and (*c*) the NPT is in a continuous crisis. These themes interact in significant ways to fulfil important political purposes in maintaining the legitimacy of the NPT. The result of the interactions of these tropes is a dominant NPT narrative that justifies continually lowered expectations, that is status quo-oriented and that is unfavourable to initiatives based on a vision of the future.

The three tropes have been identified through qualitative analysis of NPT texts, including academic articles, think tank and research institute commentary and diplomatic statements. Texts from the NPT RevCons—the meeting of states parties held every five years—plus the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings held in the three years prior to the RevCons are also analysed. The RevCons have the purpose of reviewing implementation of the NPT over the past five-year cycle and determining a path for the next five years. They are the forums through which the status of the NPT is determined and provide a key site for the construction of non-proliferation discourse. The texts examined in this paper date from 1996 to present. The originally time-bound NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995, and strengthened review mechanisms were adopted. Therefore, the post-1995 era represents the current form of the NPT.

For the purposes of this paper, 'narrative' is defined as the means through which 'human beings order disordered experience and impart meaning to themselves and their world'.[1] Narratives convert messy life into coherent stories and characters. 'Discourses' are understood as 'structures of signification'—in this case, the language used in NPT texts and spoken at NPT meetings—that 'construct social realities'.[2] Discourses generate an idea of a realm—such as that of the non-proliferation regime—that is taken as common sense and 'how it really is'. A 'trope' is a commonly recurring theme or motif that has figurative meaning, which can include metaphors or clichés.

The paper first sets out the role of narrative in international politics, explaining why narrative matters, how it has become dominant and its functions in political debate. Then, it examines previous research on nuclear weapons that has highlighted the ways in which specific narratives have shaped nuclear policymaking. A review of the NPT discourse follows, which identifies the three core tropes and examines their significance, ending with a reflection on the European Union's (EU's) role in maintaining NPT discourse. The conclusions consider the impact of the dominant NPT narrative and suggest a self-reflective practice on the taken-for-granted elements of NPT discourse and the narratives they maintain.

II. NARRATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Political realms are bounded and structured around common understandings of what can be said, who has the authority to say it and what 'goes without saying'. The language that actors within a particular field accept as legitimate is not natural, but a product of political contest. This contest requires some form of authority in which certain forms of language are constructed as natural and legitimate.[3] Dominant political actors are therefore not only those with the means to sway others to their position, but also those who have the power to structure the linguistic field—establish what the terms of the debate are—so their stated positions strike listeners or readers as being of common sense.[4]

Krebs' work provides a useful analysis of how individuals are drawn to narratives as a way to order the world and provide meaning and a sense of security.[5] While there are many possible narratives that can be constructed about any event or subject, Krebs argues certain narratives become dominant for periods of time and have particular political power. However, these narratives are not static—they are evolving constructions that influence and are influenced by changing power structures.

Telling stories about the world places order on a multitude of events and possibilities to give them coherent meanings, but it also bestows meaning on the

[1] Krebs, R. R., *Narrative and the Making of US National Security* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2015), p. 2.

[2] Milliken, J., 'The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 5, no. 2 (1999), p. 229.

[3] Edkins, J., *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003).

[4] Krebs (note 1), p. 48.

[5] Krebs (note 1), p. 10.

narrators and the narrated. Narratives give individuals an identity, a sense of self and an understanding of others. This happens on an individual level and also for groups, who define themselves through their collective stories. For example, work on nationalism has recognized how national identity is produced through sharing stories and myths.[6] Narratives thus play an important role in defining who political actors are and therefore (*a*) what is expected and acceptable action from such actors, and (*b*) what interpretation will be given to their acts.[7]

Narrative also links together the past, present and future, extracting a particular meaning from events in the past and using this meaning to shape the significance of an event or thing in the present, with implications for the future. The narrative past and imagined futures are important for shaping the possibilities of current policymaking.

Another significant effect of dominant narratives is to shape what is and what is not seen as legitimate. Legitimacy is the acknowledgement of authority or acceptability that must be granted by a specific, interested audience.[8] The granting of legitimacy is always nested within wider and preceding sets of values and beliefs.[9] New ideas are interpreted through established narratives, and those that do not fit can struggle to gain legitimacy. Policies incompatible with the dominant narratives that underpin the space of debate can therefore struggle for political traction.

III. NARRATIVE IN NUCLEAR POLICYMAKING

Previous work on narrative, identity and nuclear weapons has shown how narratives structure important nuclear debates and affect nuclear policymaking, thus providing a grounding for the analysis of the NPT narrative conducted in this paper. This section outlines three themes of this research: national and civilizational narratives, recounting nuclear pasts and futures, and the use of nuclear commonplaces and clichés.

National and civilizational narratives

Moran and Williams examined the role of narrative in the construction of national identity and how it shaped nuclear policymaking in France and Russia.[10] They showed how nuclear policy initiatives—the military alliance between France and the United Kingdom in the case of France, and New START in the case of Russia—served to reinforce core aspects of the countries' national narratives of greatness as nuclear weapon-possessing states. They demonstrated also how the national narrative is able to evolve, legitimizing new developments by incorporating them into the national story.

Postcolonial work on nuclear weapons has shown how narratives of civilization and rationality are connected to the maintenance of hierarchies in nuclear politics. Gusterson argued that ideologies of 'nuclear orientalism' (placing the 'orient' as the opposite of the rational 'west'[11]) endure in non-proliferation discourse and sustain a 'nuclear double standard'[12] in which some states can be trusted with nuclear weapons and others cannot. This double standard rests on arguments that certain types of states lack the means and the technical and political maturity to maintain stable deterrence. The civilizational narratives implicit in much non-proliferation rhetoric legitimizes a hierarchical system, presents the security needs of the nuclear weapon states (NWSs) as universal and legitimates the possession of nuclear weapons by established NWSs.

The orientalist presuppositions embedded in dominant non-proliferation narratives can also be seen in historical nuclear anxieties. For example, western media and political figures used the term 'Islamic bomb' in the 1980s as shorthand for an imputed desire for a pan-Islamic nuclear arsenal. This essentializing narrative implied an undifferentiated and inherently threatening religious bloc in which any nuclear proliferation was religiously driven.[13] Use of the

[6] Berenskoetter, F., 'Parameters of a national biography', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 20, no. 1 (2014), pp. 262–88.

[7] Biswas, S., *Nuclear Desire: Power and the Postcolonial Nuclear Order* (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2014).

[8] Beetham, D., *The Legitimation of Power* (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 1991).

[9] Considine, L., 'Contests of legitimacy and value: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the logic of prohibition', *International Affairs*, vol. 95, no. 5 (2019), pp. 1075–92.

[10] Moran, M. and Williams, H. W., 'Keeping up appearances: National narratives and nuclear policy in France and Russia', *Defence Studies*, vol. 13, no. 2 (2013), pp. 192–215.

[11] Said, E., *Orientalism* (Vintage Books: New York, 1978).

[12] Gusterson, H., 'Nuclear weapons and the other in the western imagination', *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 14, no. 1 (1999), p. 116. On how this dynamic can be seen in a particular proliferation case, see Biswas, S., 'Iran v "the international community": A postcolonial analysis of the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program', *Asian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 26, no. 3 (2018), pp. 331–51.

[13] Craig, M. M., '"Nuclear sword of the Moslem world"?: The United States, Britain, Pakistan, and the "Islamic Bomb", 1977–80', *International History Review*, vol. 38, no. 5 (2016), pp. 857–79.

term 'Islamic bomb' shows how dominant narratives interpret the motivations of different actors in ways that are shaped by dominant actors to reflect their expectations, selectively legitimating or delegitimating acts and thereby shaping policy responses.

Nuclear pasts and futures

Narratives of nuclear futures shape the boundaries of political debate, as Walker noted in a discussion of global nuclear order. Behind every policy choice is advocacy, and that advocacy 'invariably involves conjecture about the future and the appropriateness of whichever understandings, proposals and measures are offered for dealing with it'.[14] This is true for nuclear deterrence advocates and opponents. Anti-nuclear campaigners often rely on storytelling about future nuclear catastrophe for their advocacy.[15]

The dominant narrative of the history of nuclear technology also affects how nuclear challenges are understood and addressed. It is often narrated as the history of an inevitable spread. This spread has been typically described with the metaphor of 'proliferation' since the 1960s. The metaphor of proliferation suggests nuclear weapons are inherently desirable: that any state with the capacity to develop nuclear weapons will also have the required motivation.[16] The narrative of a 'wave' of proliferation always waiting to happen means past successes in disarmament are ignored and the potential for future disarmament is rejected in favour of limited arms control proposals.[17]

Nostalgia can also be a powerful narrative tool. Egeland asserted that a powerful narrative of a 'golden age' of nuclear disarmament in the era immediately after the cold war underlies the premise of a progressive, step-by-step approach to disarmament. Egeland also questioned the acceptance of this narrative, arguing nostalgia for this age 'serves to discredit overt political contestation and innovation by framing the traditional, "progressive" approach to nuclear disarmament as "proven" but temporarily off track'.[18] As such, the narrated past limits the contemporary policymaking space.

Nuclear commonplaces and clichés

Work analysing the power of narrative has shown how repeating common linguistic tropes can be used to link new ideas to established narratives about a particular policy realm.[19] By using common and taken-for-granted terms when speaking about nuclear weapons, users of these commonplaces are able to appeal to the narratives that already structure the nuclear field.

An example of such commonplaces is the series of high-profile *Wall Street Journal* op-eds, beginning in 2007, in which four high-profile political leaders in the United States called for renewed impetus on nuclear disarmament and nuclear threat reduction.[20] Senn and Elhardt argued the four politicians' use of nuclear commonplaces such as the 'existential threat to mankind', the rapid approach of a 'tipping point' bringing a 'new and more dangerous era' and the need for achievable, 'practical steps' towards disarmament were an important part of the appeal of this initiative.[21] The authors of the op-eds were able to take the well-used tropes of nuclear non-proliferation discourse and link them to a call for a renewal of nuclear disarmament.

Senn and Elhardt's work asserted the value of common linguistic tropes in creating a shorthand through which to link new ideas to established understandings within a community.[22] However, the structure of policy discourse within the confines of dominant narratives, spoken through standardized language and clichés, can also limit the possibility of change.[23] New ideas can become co-opted and weakened through translation into the established language of the dominant nuclear non-proliferation

[14] Walker, W., *A Perpetual Menace, Nuclear Weapons and International Order* (Routledge: London and New York, 2012), p. 13.

[15] Moran and Williams (note 10).

[16] Pelopidas, B., 'The oracles of proliferation: How experts maintain a biased historical reading that limits policy innovation', *Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2011), p. 302; and Pelopidas, B., 'On fatalism in nuclear proliferation studies: Questioning a tenacious historical reading', *World Political Science Review*, vol. 6, no. 1 (2010), p. 6.

[17] Mutimer, D., 'Reimagining security: The metaphors of proliferation', YCISS Occasional Paper no. 25, 1997, p. 25.

[18] Egeland, K., 'Who stole disarmament? History and nostalgia in nuclear abolition discourse', *International Affairs*, vol. 96, no. 5 (2020), p. 1403.

[19] Senn, M. and Elhardt, C., 'Bourdieu and the bomb: Power, language and the doxic battle over the value of nuclear weapons', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 20, no. 2 (2014), pp. 316–40.

[20] Schneidmiller, C., '"Four horsemen" urge new steps against nuke disaster', Nuclear Threat Institute, 6 Mar. 2013.

[21] Senn and Elhardt (note 19).

[22] Senn and Elhardt (note 19).

[23] Considine, L., 'The "standardization of catastrophe": Nuclear disarmament, the Humanitarian Initiative and the politics of the unthinkable', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 23, no. 3 (2017), pp. 681–702.

and disarmament narratives. While research has shown the value of expressing new policy initiatives in the terms of dominant narratives, it is also important to question how dominant narratives affect the potential for innovation and imagination.

IV. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY NARRATIVE

This section presents the three tropes identified as being at the heart of NPT discourse: the NPT as a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, the NPT as a grand bargain and the NPT as a continuous crisis. These three tropes combine in the dominant narrative of the NPT as the foundational but dangerously fragile grounding of international security. The section ends with an examination of whether the EU, as an NPT actor, maintains or challenges the dominant narrative.

Analysis was conducted using NVivo qualitative analysis of 55 academic and policy articles on NPT RevCons published from 1996 to 2020, accessed through Google Scholar. Based on an initial coding of these articles to identify key themes and terms, a search of LexisNexis news and commentary articles from the same period was performed. The examined texts included academic work, and think tank, research institute and news publications. This was supplemented with an analysis of available post-1995 PrepCom chair reports and factual summaries, and RevCon outcome documents to add an overview of the diplomatic discourse during the NPT RevCons and PrepComs. These texts were accessed through the United Nations website.[24] The analysis was limited to English-language texts and made up of texts published in western (and mainly US) outlets. Because of the dominance of these perspectives in non-proliferation politics, this study has merit in itself. However, further work contrasting the English-language perspectives with others would add great value to this limited perspective. This analysis does not provide a definitive review of NPT texts but identifies a set of key tropes that are reproduced across a range of academic and policy commentary and accepted as common sense by 'a critical mass of social actors'.[25] As such, the reviewed texts play an important role in narrating the NPT and its review process.

[24] UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 'NPT review conferences and preparatory committees', accessed 7 Dec. 2020.

[25] Hagström, L. and Gustafsson, K., 'Narrative power: How storytelling shapes East Asian international politics', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 32, no. 4 (2019), p. 391.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty as a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime

The policy, commentary and academic texts consistently refer to the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.[26] This is common in NPT texts and is frequently reaffirmed at NPT meetings.[27] The NPT is not just the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime in these texts, but also of 'collective security'[28] and the 'rules-based international order'.[29] Other variants include the NPT as the 'foundation'[30] or 'linchpin',[31] or as 'essential' for collective security.[32] The cornerstone trope and its variants place the NPT at the indispensable core of global peace and security.

[26] Examples of official NPT documents consulted include: Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session, Annex II, 'Chairman's factual summary', NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/21, 19 Apr. 2002; Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session, Annex II, 'Chairman's factual summary', NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/50, 13 May 2003; Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 'Chairman's summary', NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.27, 10 May 2004; Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 'Chairman's working paper', NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.78, 11 May 2007; Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 'Towards 2020: Reflections of the Chair of the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee', NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/14, 15 May 2017; Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 'Chair's factual summary (working paper)', NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.41, 16 May 2018; and Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 'Reflections of the Chair of the 2019 session of the Preparatory Committee', NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/14, 13 May 2019.

[27] Meyer, P., 'Saving the NPT', *Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 16, no. 3 (2009), p. 463.

[28] Cor van der Kwast, H., 'The NPT: Looking back and looking ahead', *Arms Control Today*, July/Aug. 2015.

[29] Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 'Chair's factual summary (working paper)' (note 26).

[30] Srinivasan Rathbun, N., 'The role of legitimacy in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime', *Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006), pp. 227–52; and Dhanapala, J., 'Fulfil and strengthen the bargain', *Arms Control Today*, June 2008.

[31] Carranza, M. E., 'Can the NPT survive? The theory and practice of US nuclear non-proliferation policy after September 11', *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 27, no. 3 (2006), p. 489.

[32] Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 'Towards 2020: Reflections of the Chair of the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee' (note 26).

The cornerstone trope has discursive power. A cornerstone is something that holds a structure up. It is the basis on which the whole construction rests and is thus necessary for the structural integrity of everything that follows. The repetition of the trope is the constant assertion that, should the NPT fail, everything that followed will fail too; the whole structure will collapse. According to the discourse, the at-risk structure includes the 'nuclear non-proliferation regime' as a whole, and also global peace and collective security and even current world order.

It is worth looking back at the development of this trope, which began during the mid-1980s. There are few mentions of the NPT as a cornerstone of the non-proliferations regime before the mid-1980s in either news reports or academic articles.[33] In March 1980 US President Jimmy Carter stated the NPT 'has become the cornerstone of U.S. non-proliferation policy'.[34] In 1983 US President Ronald Reagan described the NPT as 'a cornerstone of the international effort to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries'.[35] During the 1985 RevCon, the US head of delegation and President Reagan made reference to the NPT as 'a critical cornerstone' in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons.[36] After this high-profile use, from 1985 until 1995 the number of such references in the news and academic sources increased. The use of the phrase was subsequently cemented during the 1995 NPT extension talks. Given the original, time-bound nature of the NPT, it is perhaps unsurprising that the use of the NPT as a cornerstone is something that has increased over time.[37] It could also be argued that as treaties age and become more embedded into international order, their status as foundational is increasingly acknowledged. However, these changes in discourse are not inevitable, and it is notable how quickly this trope went from being almost totally absent to being an unavoidable part of NPT language.

The cornerstone description of the NPT is in contrast to the descriptions of other non-proliferation measures and treaties—for example the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)—that are not described as cornerstones but as 'stepping stones'.[38] A stepping stone is something that is used but then moved on from, while a cornerstone is something that, no matter what else is built on or around it, is indispensable to all further action. A stepping stone can be left behind through progress. In contrast, a cornerstone is permanent. Repetition of the cornerstone trope therefore does significant although invisible political work in reinforcing the status quo. While accepting NPT centrality as a cornerstone does not necessarily mean no progress can be made in the wider non-proliferation and disarmament regime, the interaction of the cornerstone trope with the two further tropes set out below creates a dominant narrative that renders such progress difficult.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty as a grand bargain

A second common trope of NPT discourse is that of the NPT as a grand bargain. This trope is used in several ways in the texts analysed.[39] Some accounts of the bargain in the NPT are of a fundamental trade-off between the ideals of disarmament and non-proliferation.[40] Others discuss the bargain in more specific terms of relinquishing nuclear weapons in return for access to nuclear technology, or as a trilateral grand bargain encompassing disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses.[41] The discourse describes the agreement to indefinitely extend the

[33] There were no uses of the NPT as a cornerstone trope in a Google Scholar search of academic texts pre-1985 and four mentions in a LexisNexis database search of news articles during the same period. This search is not exhaustive and is limited by English-language use, but nonetheless illustrative of broadly changing trends.

[34] Federation of American Scientists, 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] chronology', 2020.

[35] Reagan, R., 'Statement on the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', American Presidency Project, 1 July 1983.

[36] UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, 'Message of President Ronald Reagan of the United States of America to the Third Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferations of Nuclear Weapons', Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.III/64/II, 1985.

[37] For example, there were 93 mentions of the NPT as a cornerstone in the LexisNexis news database from 1985 to 1994, 593 from 1995 to 2004 and 1642 from 2005 to 2014. While this also reflects a larger number of articles on the NPT in general, this does not account for the large post-1985 increase. These numbers also do not include texts using variants such as 'foundation' or 'linchpin'.

[38] One exception that describes the NPT as a 'stepping-stone' is the work of Carranza (note 31).

[39] Of the 55 academic and policy texts reviewed, 27 used the 'bargain' framing as the core dynamic of the NPT with 74 mentions of the NPT as a bargain. Most common phrases included 'grand bargain', 'fundamental bargain' and 'basic bargain'.

[40] Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), *Weapons of Terror, Freeing the World of Nuclear Biological and Chemical Arms* (WMDC: Stockholm, 2006).

[41] Müller, H., 'Between power and justice: Current problems and perspectives of the NPT regime', *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 34, no. 2 (2010), pp. 189–201.

NPT in 1995 as another grand bargain.[42] In this newer bargain, NPT states parties agreed to extend the treaty in return for further new commitments towards disarmament and a strengthened review process.

Authors have questioned the accuracy of the grand bargain trope, arguing for a reconceptualization as several interconnecting trade-offs,[43] or as a system of restraint and reassurance.[44] Others have shown how the idea of a bargain between NWSs and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs) hides the existence of divisions within both of those groups.[45] All these critiques are useful counters to the dominant grand bargain framing. However, in understanding the power of language in the NPT, it is important not only to question the accuracy of the grand bargain trope, but also to ask what its narrative function is. If scholars choose to describe the treaty as a quid pro quo, this has implications for fundamental understanding of the dynamic of the treaty and its future. Critics of the grand bargain trope claim it damages the NPT by foregrounding disarmament in what is a non-proliferation agreement, leading to a misreading of the treaty's purpose and generating division.[46] Others identify an important political function of the bargain trope as providing the justification for NPT participation by NNWSs.[47] According to this second reading, the bargain framing is a necessary political tool that publicly validates claims to the fairness of the treaty and allows those states who have agreed to not attain nuclear weapons to justify this decision. It allows a show of equitability that permits the ongoing acceptance of inequity in the NPT.

The argument that the grand bargain trope enables a politically necessary performance of equity undermines the claim that the idea of the grand bargain provides NNWSs with leverage over NWSs. If the bargain trope provides a means of allowing the NNWSs to continue to justify relinquishing nuclear weapons (even if it was not in their interest to get them), it is not a means of providing leverage. Instead, the trope acts to continue the articulation of the treaty as equitable but with continually deferred fulfilment of that equitability. The bargain can be fulfilled only with nuclear disarmament and therefore the end of the current nuclear order that has been established and legitimated through the NPT. The grand bargain is a promise that the status quo is temporary.

There is a tension in the NPT discourse of the temporary bargain at the core of the permanent, cornerstone treaty. This means the treaty is premised on a conflicting set of core ideas: that the NPT is fundamentally permanent, but its permanence rests on a central bargain that is only acceptable if the status it allows is temporary, in that the provisions of NPT Article VI on disarmament must eventually be fulfilled. The conflict between permanence and temporariness of the status quo is at the core of the NPT discourse. This conflict is not inevitable; it might be possible to imagine the cornerstone NPT at the heart of a more flexible regime that allows further collective action and progress. However, this possibility is limited by the third narrative trope of continuous crisis.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty as a continuous crisis

The texts reviewed in this paper cover the years 1996–2020 and include a wide range of perspectives. Almost all are in agreement on one thing: the NPT is in trouble.[48] In fact, most texts go even further and declare that the NPT is not only in trouble but also in crisis.[49] While the specific contexts and reasons for the feeling of crisis change, the overall assertion across time is that of 'looming disaster',[50] 'extreme stress',[51] a 'critical juncture'[52] and an 'alarming' state.[53] As Horovitz noted, the public pronouncements of disaster 'extend across temporal, national, ideological, professional and disciplinary boundaries'.[54] Even within positive assessments of specific events, for

[42] Aboul-Enein, S., 'NPT 2010: The beginning of a new constructive cycle', *Arms Control Today*, vol. 40, no. 9 (Nov. 2010), pp. 8–15.

[43] Johnson, R., 'Rethinking the NPT's role in security: 2010 and beyond', *International Affairs*, vol. 86, no. 2 (2010), pp. 429–445.

[44] Horovitz, L., 'Beyond pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will not collapse', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 38, no. 1–2 (2015), pp. 126–158.

[45] Krause, J., 'Enlightenment and nuclear order', *International Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 3 (2007), pp. 483–99.

[46] Krause (note 45).

[47] Harries, M., 'Disarmament as politics: Lessons from the negotiation of NPT Article VI', Chatham House Research Paper, May 2015; and Müller (note 41).

[48] In the reviewed texts, 14.5% gave a positive or neutral assessment of the current state of the NPT and/or its future, with 7.2% critiquing or challenging the idea of such assessments. The remainder gave negative assessments.

[49] Sauer, T., 'The nuclear nonproliferation regime in crisis', *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, vol. 18, no. 3 (2006), pp. 333–40.

[50] Du Preez, J., 'Avoiding a perfect storm: Recharting the NPT review process', *Arms Control Today*, vol. 38, no. 8 (Oct. 2008), p. 14.

[51] Srinivasan Rathbun (note 30).

[52] Kimball, D. K., 'A good deal that must be honored', *Arms Control Today*, vol. 32, no. 3 (Apr. 2002), p. 2.

[53] Müller (note 41).

[54] Horovitz (note 44).

example after the well-received 2000 and 2010 RevCons, authors warned that crisis has only been postponed, allowing for some 'breathing space',[55] or even that immediate success has 'sowed the seeds' for future failure.[56] In the discourse, crisis is not tied to a particular time or issue, but is endemic. This leads to the reproduction of a mode of crisis—which should, by definition, be a temporary and critical moment—becoming the new normal. The NPT thus exists in a situation of constant tension with crisis as the status quo.

However, it is difficult to judge on what basis these pronouncements of crisis are being made. While specific challenges to the NPT are asserted, there are no agreed indicators of the contemporary health of the NPT that result in such dire diagnoses. There is a general lack of clarity on how NPT failure and success should be measured. The documents analysed generally acknowledge the historical success and value of the NPT in limiting the number of nuclear-armed states.[57] It is thus difficult to gain a clear idea of what post-extension success and failure requires—for individual RevCons and for the NPT in general. While some literature links the success of a RevCon to an outcome document, noting a cyclical pattern of successful and unsuccessful RevCon outcomes based on this measure, others challenge this account.[58] Similarly, while some authors link success of the NPT RevCons to the health of the wider non-proliferation regime,[59] others warn against a tendency to focus on the success/failure dynamics of individual RevCons as a direct proxy for the strength of the NPT and non-proliferation regime.[60] Agreements in principle on future action provide one measure of success, but even after RevCons in which such agreements have been made (1995, 2000 and 2010), negative prognostications still dominate.

Failure is similarly difficult to pin down, apart from using lack of an agreed outcome document as an indicator. Certain actions are labelled as urgent measures to avoid failure, but the urgency continues over decades. The entry into force of the CTBT provides an example of a goal in which urgency is repeated over many years and in different forms. According to RevCon conference chairs in 2002 and 2003, 'early entry into force' of the CTBT was a matter of urgency. By 2007 this became 'entry into force' as a matter of urgency, and in 2014 it was entry into force 'as soon as possible'.[61]

However, the defining feature of a successful RevCon is a recognition of the importance of and a recommitment to the NPT. NPT discourse is grounded in the repeated assertion that the aim of the NPT is to strengthen the NPT. Maintaining the NPT thus becomes an end in itself.

This is not to argue there is no value in the maintenance of the NPT or to dispute its significance. However, determining the success of the NPT process by measuring the level of recognition of its value and purpose leads to a circular and static logic in the articulations of success and failure: the success of an NPT RevCon is the reaffirmation of the importance of the success of the RevCon. The discourse of continuous crisis and subsequent constant need to reinforce the basic grounds of the treaty lead to lowered expectations and a static and conservative understanding of success. Lowered expectations are visible in a common call to tread lightly, to 'walk, don't run',[62] in order to avoid damaging conflict within the treaty. The prevailing sense of crisis is sometimes interpreted as positive; if consensus is the aim, then a sense of peril can lead to greater flexibility on states' positions.[63] But, as Ruzicka pointed out, this has a warping effect on what success and failure can be; when expectations become

[55] Müller, H., 'The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Some breathing space gained, but no breakthrough', *International Spectator*, vol. 45, no. 3 (2010), pp. 5–18.

[56] Rauf, T., 'An unequivocal success? Implications of the NPT Review Conference', *Arms Control Today*, July/Aug. 2000.

[57] Although academic literature has questioned this, it is nonetheless widely accepted in NPT policymaking discourse; see Potter, W. C., 'The NPT & the sources of nuclear restraint', *Daedalus*, vol. 139, no. 1 (2010), pp. 68–81.

[58] Simpson, J. and Nielsen, J., 'The 2005 NPT Review Conference', *Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2005), pp. 271–301.

[59] Potter, W. C., 'The NPT review conference: 188 states in search of consensus', *International Spectator*, vol. 40, no. 3 (2005), pp. 19–31.

[60] Choubey, D., *Restoring the NPT Essential Steps for 2010* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, DC, 2010).

[61] Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session (note 26); Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session (note 26); Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (note 26); and Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 'Chairman's working paper, Recommendations by the Chair to the 2015 NPT Review Conference', NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.46, 8 May 2014.

[62] Davies, Z. S., 'NPT 2000: Is the treaty in trouble?', *Arms Control Today*, vol. 29, no. 8 (Dec. 1999), pp. 10–14.

[63] Potter (note 59).

sufficiently lowered, 'even the smallest outcome can be presented as a success'.[64]

The trope of continuous crisis is linked with the common cornerstone description of the NPT and the grand bargain trope in a dominant NPT narrative. The narrative supported by these tropes is that of a foundational but fragile regime constantly on the verge of collapse—a permanent emergency. The state of continuous crisis maintains an idea of the central cornerstone as alarmingly fragile, needing to be strengthened and certainly not fit for adaptation or progress, thus limiting the narrative potential for ambitious proposals or those that look beyond the current fragile state. Resolving the central conflict of the NPT can be continually deferred by having a continuous sense of crisis. It is always 'not the time or place to force a confrontation' or attempt major change.[65]

The combination of these three tropes in policy and commentary on the NPT leads to two internally contradictory suppositions that are built into the NPT narrative and have an impact on policymaking: (*a*) the NPT is in a constant state of near collapse, while everyone agrees how important it is, and (*b*) there is a continual need for urgent action but within delimited expectations.

The European Union as an actor within the Non-Proliferation Treaty discourse

The EU has adopted a coordinated NPT position and aimed to become an active and significant participant in the NPT review process since the 1990s.[66] It adopted a 2003 EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and has developed institutions and common positions towards the NPT and other non-proliferation and disarmament regimes.[67] It plays an important role in the reproduction of NPT narratives.

Examining the European Council common positions on the NPT at each RevCon shows an actor whose statements adhere to and maintain core tropes of NPT discourse.[68] In each common position (and many other policy documents), the EU reaffirms the NPT's position as 'the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament'.[69] The core EU objective is therefore 'to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime by promoting the successful outcome' of the RevCon.[70] The common positions of 2005 and 2010 describe the NPT as 'a unique and irreplaceable multilateral instrument for maintaining and reinforcing international peace, security and stability', and the documents include multiple assertions of the need to strengthen, uphold, preserve and reaffirm commitments to the NPT.[71] This mirrors the focus on the NPT as an end in itself and the lack of clarity on success and failure in the broader NPT discourse.

The EU faces clear and growing challenges in setting out a common position. Its membership includes an NWS and NWS allies, as well as advocates of disarmament and signatories of the recent TPNW. EU member states also act on their own behalf and in other NPT coalitions at review meetings. While several commentators have looked to the European Council common positions to provide a model for consensus building that the RevCons can follow, this has also led to critiques that the EU agreed position becomes the 'lowest common denominator position of what its Member States can agree to', which leads to 'extensive use of rhetorical language rather than effectively

[64] Ruzicka, J., 'Reflections on the 2010 NPT review conference', *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, vol. 26, no. 4 (2010), p. 263.

[65] Davies (note 62).

[66] Smetana, M., 'Stuck on disarmament: the European Union and the 2015 NPT Review Conference', *International Affairs*, vol. 92, no. 1 (2016), pp. 137–52; and Kienzle, B., 'A European contribution to non-proliferation? The EU WMD strategy at ten', *International Affairs*, vol. 89, no. 5 (2013), pp. 1143–59.

[67] Cottey, A., 'The EU and nuclear non-proliferation: Soft power and the bomb?', *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, vol. 25 (2014), pp. 89–100.

[68] Council of the European Union, 'Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction', EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 15708/03, 10 Dec. 2003. Council conclusions rather than a common position were agreed in 2015, see Smetana (note 66) for discussion.

[69] Council of the European Union, '2000/297/CFSP: Council common position of 13 April 2000 relating to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', 2000/297/CFSP, Apr. 2005.

[70] Council of the European Union, '2005/329/PESC: Council common position of 25 April 2005 relating to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', 2005/329/PESC, Apr. 2005; and '2010/212/CFSP: Council common position of 29 March 2010 relating to the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', 2010/212/CFSP, Mar. 2010. In 2015 'successful' was amended to 'substantive and balanced', see Council of the European Union, 'Council conclusions on the Ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', CFSP/PESC 61, 20 Apr. 2015.

[71] Council of the European Union, 2005/329/PESC (note 70).

laying out any clear policy demands or solutions'.[72] By repeating the common tropes of the NPT discourse as a means of consensus building, the EU reproduces the dominant NPT narrative and its political implications. The EU becomes what Dee describes as a 'champion' of the NPT, discursively promoting the regime itself while providing little of substance in policymaking and leadership.[73]

V. CONCLUSIONS

A collection of distinctive assumptions and tropes form a core part of the discourse of the NPT and have been accepted as common sense by a large number of participants in the discourse. The descriptions of the NPT as a cornerstone, the use of the grand bargain trope to describe the dynamic of the treaty and the continuing repetition of the claim that the NPT is in crisis are visible throughout the texts, across academic, think tank, policy and news articles and across the years under study in this paper. They combine into a dominant narrative of the NPT as being a foundational and crucial grounding of international security while also under constant threat of collapse.

Dominant narratives have political consequences, as the previous work on narrative in nuclear policymaking (discussed in section III) has shown. The NPT narrative defines a relationship between the past, present and future of the treaty that delimits the range of policy options that are accepted as realistic in the present. The cornerstone description labels the NPT as an unparalleled, historic success that has become foundational for nuclear non-proliferation. Its claimed past success as the bulwark against an otherwise inevitable historical mass proliferation reinforces its permanence and centrality for the future of international security. However, the grand bargain trope relies on an understanding of the past that requires NPT transformation in the future. The cornerstone and grand bargain elements of the NPT narrative are important for its continuing political legitimacy, but they also result in tension over its future. By articulating the present as a continuous crisis, the third trope allows actors to defer revisiting the past or making ambitious plans for the future. This justifies a lowering of expectations.

The narrative of the foundational but fragile NPT also sets what is commonly accepted as legitimate action. This is seen in the prevalence of texts that warn against elevated expectations or initiatives that might disrupt consensus to avoid further endangering the treaty. The health of the NPT itself (however opaquely measured) is the principal referent of success, and so the goal of the NPT process is to strengthen the NPT process. As such, proposals that are seen as straying from the mainstream incremental approach, disrupting to the status quo or likely to lead to confrontation do not fit with the dominant narrative and will therefore struggle to gain legitimacy. The narrative thus provides a resource to counter new proposals as unrealistic and/or potentially harmful to the NPT.[74]

The use of repeated commonplaces and clichés is also important in the maintenance of the dominant NPT narrative. These are not unusual in politics and diplomacy, and can provide vehicles through which to build consensus and make new ideas intelligible to audiences. However, these commonplace tropes such as the NPT as a cornerstone are not neutral terms, but are powerful rhetorical tools that shape common understanding of the treaty and its possibilities. Repeating these commonplaces contributes to the maintenance of a particular narrative of the NPT, its history and future, which has implications for policymaking.

The realm of non-proliferation and disarmament politics is one in which language already matters and is a site of intense contestation. Particular phrases and terms in RevCon outcome documents, for example, are debated and disputed forcefully because of the clear political consequences of their use. NPT actors and commentators understand the power of language. However, there is another level of language that this paper has identified whose use goes unquestioned and whose power remains hidden. This is the background language of the commonplaces and taken-for-granted descriptions of the NPT that pervades academic and policy discourse. This language makes up a dominant NPT narrative that forms the terrain on which the

[72] Dee, M., 'The EU's performance in the 2015 NPT Review Conference: What went wrong', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 20, no. 4 (2015), p. 599.

[73] Dee, M., 'The European Union and its performance in the NPT negotiations: Consistency, change and challenges', eds S. Blavoukos, D. Bourantonis and C. Portela, *The EU and the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Strategies, Policies, Actions* (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2015).

[74] One example of the use of this narrative resource is the common critique of the TPNW as undermining the NPT; see Hamel-Green, M., 'The nuclear ban treaty and 2018 disarmament forums: An initial impact assessment', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, vol. 1, no. 2 (2018), pp. 436–63.

contests over the more obviously political language takes place. The findings of the paper suggest more critical attention needs to be paid to the power of commonplace and background language in maintaining dominant narratives. It is important to recognize and interrogate how the dominant NPT narrative serves to establish the terms of political debate and influence what is accepted as common sense.

The point of this paper is not to claim that the dominant NPT narrative is inherently negative or positive, but simply that this narrative exists and has political power. Understanding the role of narrative in the NPT is important for scholarship, policymaking and diplomacy, but it is challenging to develop specific and policy-relevant recommendations on the subject. It is not possible to simply avoid certain terms or to replace them with other, less-problematic words; no terms are value free and without narrative baggage. However, it is valuable and achievable that those who write and speak about the NPT, non-proliferation and disarmament—including the author of this paper—step back at times. Some space should be taken to reflect on the assumptions that underlie use of common descriptions, metaphors and jargon, and the implications of what 'goes without saying'. The practical contribution of this paper is to recommend that experts write and work with an (admittedly imperfect) practice of self-reflection on the narrative and political consequences of the background terms and phrases that are repeated without reflection.

This self-reflection is important for the EU as an NPT actor that has reproduced the dominant NPT narrative through repetition of its core tropes. With the further postponement of the RevCon to August 2021 and the extra time this provides for such reflection, now is a time to think carefully and critically on the EU's language regarding the NPT and the impact of taken-for-granted descriptions and repetitions of NPT commonplaces. The acceptance of the common description of the EU as a model for broader NPT consensus is another commonplace that should be considered carefully. The difficulties of building consensus among increasingly divided member states on the issue of disarmament specifically has resulted in recent EU statements being critiqued as lacking substance. The EU should therefore reconsider the purpose of statements of general and vague consensus across all NPT pillars. One challenge for EU policy at the forthcoming 10th RevCon and for future NPT policy is to consider to what extent accepting the commonplaces of the NPT and the EU's role within it are limiting the EU's potential as an actor. Challenging the linguistic common sense of NPT discourse is important to avoid unknowingly accepting narrative constraints on innovative and progressive non-proliferation and disarmament policy.

ABBREVIATIONS

CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
EU	European Union
NNWS	Non-nuclear weapon state
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWS	Nuclear weapon state
PrepCom	Preparatory Committee
RevCon	Review Conference
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TPNW	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

LIST OF RECENT NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT PAPERS

The case for gender balance in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper no. 71
Federica Dall'Arche
October 2020

Monitoring the response to converted firearms in Europe
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper no. 70
Benjamin Jongleux and Nicolas Florquin
October 2020

Mapping non-proliferation and disarmament education in Europe
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper no. 69
Elizabeth I-Mi Suh
September 2020

The arms control–regional security nexus in the Middle East
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper no. 68
Dr Tytti Erästö
April 2020

From critical engagement to credible commitments: A renewed EU strategy for the North Korean proliferation crisis
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper no. 67
Dr Antoine Bondaz
February 2020

The crisis of nuclear arms control and its impact on European security
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper no. 66
Łukasz Kulesa
January 2020

The question of swarms control: Challenges to ensuring human control over military swarms
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper no. 65
Maaike Verbruggen
December 2019

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the EU. The contents are the sole responsibility of the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the EU.

A EUROPEAN NETWORK

In July 2010 the Council of the European Union decided to support the creation of a network bringing together foreign policy institutions and research centers from across the EU to encourage political and security-related dialogue and the long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. The Council of the European Union entrusted the technical implementation of this Decision to the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium. In 2018, in line with the recommendations formulated by the European Parliament the names and the mandate of the network and the Consortium have been adjusted to include the word 'disarmament'.

STRUCTURE

The EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium is managed jointly by six institutes: La Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/ PRIF), the International Affairs Institute in Rome (IAI), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP). The Consortium, originally comprised of four institutes, began its work in January 2011 and forms the core of a wider network of European non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks and research centers which are closely associated with the activities of the Consortium.

MISSION

The main aim of the network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks is to encourage discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems within civil society, particularly among experts, researchers and academics in the EU and third countries. The scope of activities shall also cover issues related to conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons (SALW).

www.nonproliferation.eu

EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium

Promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks

FONDATION pour la RECHERCHE STRATÉGIQUE

FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH

www.frstrategie.org

PRIF HSFK
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung

PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE FRANKFURT

www.hsfk.de

iai Istituto Affari Internazionali

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS INSTITUTE

www.iai.it/en

IISS

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

www.iiss.org

sipri

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

www.sipri.org

VCDNP
Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

VIENNA CENTER FOR DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

www.vcdnp.org