The member states of the European Union (EU) established the Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Compact in November 2018. The compact consists of 10 strategic guidelines and 22 political commitments to strengthen civilian CSDP missions by making them ‘more capable, more effective, and more joined up’. According to the EU member states, this is necessary to realign civilian CSDP strategically with the changed security landscape and the challenges emanating from it, as well as with the EU Global Strategy of 2016 and the new level of ambition for CSDP. The compact is not binding but member states have agreed to implement it fully by 2023.

The most concrete commitment that EU member states made in the compact is to contribute more human resources to civilian CSDP missions. The aim is to increase the share of the international mission personnel that is provided by member states (or non-EU countries) to at least 70 per cent. Priority is given to the operational positions in missions, which carry out the substantive aspects of their mandates. The compact contains no targets for individual member state contributions, although some countries have included concrete targets in their national implementation plans (NIPs).

The objective of this policy brief is to support and monitor the implementation of these commitments. It does so in three ways. First, it takes stock of the progress that has been achieved since the establishment of the compact. Second, it analyses the evolution of the demand for personnel contributions to civilian CSDP over time, which is key to understanding which capabilities member states need to develop and provide more generic and mission support capabilities in addition to more operational personnel. In doing so, they should ensure that this is not at the expense of the share of women in their national contributions. The European External Action Service should further professionalize the recruitment of mission personnel and systematically inform member states of the capability needs in each mission.
make recommendations about what EU member states and the European External Action Service (EEAS) can do to translate the political objective of increasing member state contributions to the missions into actual outcomes. The commitment in the compact to promote a better representation of women in the missions is discussed in a separate policy brief.5

WHY MEMBER STATES CONTRIBUTE TO MISSIONS

The EU has conducted 22 civilian CSDP missions since 2003, of which 10 are currently active.6 The missions are civilian in the sense that they operate under a civilian chain of command, as opposed to military CSDP missions and operations that have a separate military command structure. Civilian CSDP missions are deployed outside the EU and are often mandated to strengthen host countries’ police, rule of law and civil services. There are also examples of missions that have focused on security sector reform or that have performed monitoring tasks. The compact states that missions should also contribute to EU efforts addressing non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism, organized crime, irregular migration, hybrid threats and cybersecurity.7

EU member states maintain political–strategic control over the missions and are expected to contribute most of their personnel. This is pursuant to the Treaty on the EU, which states that CSDP missions must carry out their mandates with capabilities provided by the member states.8 One presumed advantage of this is that member states can provide specific competences such as active law enforcement personnel or civil servants. Another is that missions are more credible and effective when their composition reflects the political support of the collective EU membership.9 However, member states do not always live up to this expectation, which can have serious implications for the effectiveness of missions. Missions can also recruit contracted staff, but they usually must first consider recruiting secondees to fill any vacancies. This means that positions remain vacant longer when member states do not put forward good candidates. It is also more expensive for missions to hire contracted personnel; the costs of employing them are borne fully by missions, whereas most costs related to secondees are borne by member states. Finally, member states undermine the credibility of missions as a political tool when they cannot ensure that they are adequately staffed.

9 European External Action Service (note 7), p. 3.
TOWARDS A MORE CAPABLE EU CIVILIAN CSDP

TAKING STOCK: NO PROGRESS SO FAR

EU member states have been contributing fewer human resources to civilian CSDP in the decade since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 (see figure 1). They are currently seconding around 700 personnel to civilian CSDP missions (as of June 2019), compared to almost 2000 in 2010.10 Two-thirds are deployed in one of the three civilian CSDP missions in Europe: the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, and the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine. EU member states have recently been seconding more civilian personnel (including police) to United Nations peace operations and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) field operations than to civilian CSDP missions.

The share of international mission personnel that is seconded (as opposed to contracted) decreased from 83 per cent to 65 per cent between 2010 and 2019 (see figure 2). The only ongoing missions in which the share of seconded personnel has consistently exceeded 70 per cent are EUAM Ukraine, EUMM Georgia, and the EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territory (EUPOL COPPS). The share of seconded personnel is particularly low in EUAM Iraq, the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya, the EU CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), the EU CSDP Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia). In recent years these missions have become increasingly reliant on contracted personnel.

Member states have not yet managed to reverse these trends. Between the establishment of the compact and June 2019, the number of mission personnel seconded by member states decreased from 752 to 717. The share of seconded personnel in missions decreased from 66 to 65 per cent. The deployment rate in civilian CSDP (the number of deployed personnel as a share of the number of authorized personnel) also decreased from 83 to 78 per cent in this period.

Five member states increased their national contribution after the establishment of the compact (as of June 2019). Seven member states neither increased nor decreased their contribution. The national contributions of the remaining 16 member states decreased.

THE EVOLUTION OF DEMAND FOR CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES

Civilian CSDP has evolved significantly in the past decade and the demand for civilian capabilities has evolved accordingly. This has not necessarily been conducive to higher personnel contributions by EU member states.

First, demand has evolved in terms of quantity. The total number of authorized international personnel in missions decreased from more than 3000 in 2010 to approximately 1400 in 2019 (see figure 3). This was primarily due

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10 This number does not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) and the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SCO). The KSC and the SCO have been active since 2016 and are based in the Hague, the Netherlands. Their personnel (14 seconded and 190 contracted, as of June 2019) are recruited by EULEX Kosovo and paid from its budget, but they are not legally part of the mission.
Figure 1. Personnel contributions by EU member states to civilian CSDP missions, UN peace operations\textsuperscript{a} and OSCE field operations, Dec. 2009–June 2019


\textsuperscript{a} Individual police officers only.
\textsuperscript{b} EUBAM for the Rafah Crossing point is not included because it has fewer than 10 international personnel.
\textsuperscript{c} EUCAP Somalia was EUCAP NESTOR until Dec. 2016.

Notes: The Civilian CSDP Compact was established in Nov. 2018. Personnel figures do not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office.

Figure 2. Share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions, Dec. 2009–June 2019

CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; EU = European Union; EUAM = EU Advisory Mission; EUBAM = EU Border Assistance Mission; EUCAP = EU Capacity Building Mission; EULEX = EU Rule of Law Mission; EUMM = EU Monitoring Mission; EUPOL COPPS = EU Police and Rule of Law Mission in the Palestinian Territories.

EUBAM for the Rafah Crossing point is not included because it has fewer than 10 international personnel.

EUCAP Somalia was EUCAP NESTOR until Dec. 2016.

Notes: The Civilian CSDP Compact was established in Nov. 2018.

Personnel figures do not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office.

**Figure 3.** Evolution of the demand for personnel in civilian CSDP missions, Dec. 2009–June 2019

CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; EU = European Union; EULEX = EU Rule of Law Mission; MENA = Middle East and North Africa.

\(^a\) The figures for sub-Saharan Africa include the figures for the Sahel.

**Notes:** The Civilian CSDP Compact was established in Nov. 2018.

The authorized personnel numbers are based on the mission operation plans (OPLANs).

Personnel figures do not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office.

**Source:** SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Nov. 2019.
to successive reconfigurations of EULEX Kosovo, which remains the largest civilian CSDP mission even though it is much smaller than before. Given the prevalence of crises and instability in the EU's extended neighbourhood, it is logical to expect an increase in demand in the future. At present, however, there are no concrete plans for the establishment of new civilian CSDP missions, except for a small mission in the Central African Republic.\(^1\)

Second, demand has evolved in terms of geography. The regional distribution of this demand has gradually shifted away from Europe and more towards the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and sub-Saharan Africa (see figure 3). The share of European missions in the total demand for personnel decreased from 78 to 57 per cent between 2009 and 2019. Meanwhile, the share of MENA missions increased from 6 to 15 per cent and that of sub-Saharan African missions from 2 to 28 per cent. The latter was driven primarily by the deployment and subsequent expansion of EUCAP Sahel Niger in 2012 and EUCAP Sahel Mali in 2014. The two missions in the Sahel currently account for 20 per cent of the total authorized strength of civilian CSDP missions.

This development has affected the number and share of member state contributions to civilian CSDP because member state participation tends to be higher in missions in Europe than in other regions, especially sub-Saharan Africa. Georgia, Ukraine and the Western Balkans are politically and strategically important to most EU member states. European missions may also be more attractive to prospective secondees because of proximity, cultural affinity with the host country and perceptions of safety. The extended southern neighbourhood has not been prioritized equally by all member states, although more member states have recently been interested in the missions in the Sahel.\(^2\) However, the French-language requirements in these missions continue to be a challenge in this regard.

Third, demand has evolved in terms of functional requirements. In the compact, member states committed to prioritizing operational positions in their secondments, but the share of personnel occupying operational positions in missions decreased from 81 per cent in 2009 to 59 per cent in 2019 (see figure 3). In particular, the share of operational functions tends to be lower in smaller missions and declines when a mission is scaling down. This is logical because each mission requires similar sets of mission support and generic capabilities, which do not change proportionally when a mission is scaling up or down. The share of operational functions is also lower in missions that require extra protection and medical support capabilities due to their operational environment. The share of personnel in operational positions is 50 per cent or less in the missions in Iraq, Libya, Mali, Niger and Somalia.

This development has also contributed to the decrease in the number and share of seconded personnel because member states are more inclined to provide

\(^{11}\) Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3709th Council meeting, 11260/19, 15 July 2019, p. 8.

\(^{12}\) EU member state officials, Interviews with the author, Brussels, July 2019.
personnel for operational positions than for most of the support functions. As of June 2019, 87 per cent of the operational personnel in missions were seconded compared to 37 per cent in non-operational positions. The share of seconded personnel in duty of care and mission support functions is notably small (27 and 16 per cent, respectively).

**THE EVOLUTION OF SUPPLY OF CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES**

All 28 EU member states participate in civilian CSDP missions, although the scope of their contributions varies significantly (see figures 4 and 5). The largest personnel contributors are currently Poland, Sweden, Germany, France, Denmark, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands. Poland has been the largest contributor to civilian CSDP since 2016, mainly because it deploys an approximately 100-member formed police unit to EULEX Kosovo. Romania and the United Kingdom also used to be major contributors, but the share of their respective contributions has dropped in recent years.

There are notable imbalances in member state contributions to civilian CSDP in general and at the mission level. Some of these have become stronger in recent years.

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**Figure 4.** Personnel contributions by individual EU member states to civilian CSDP missions, UN peace operations and OSCE field operations, Dec. 2009–June 2019

CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; EU = European Union; OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

*a* Individual police officers only.

*b* Croatia joined the EU in July 2013.

Note: Personnel figures do not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office.

Towards a more capable EU civilian CSDP

First, missions have become increasingly dependent on a relatively small group of member states for the critical mass of their personnel. The eight top contributors are currently providing 69 per cent of all seconded mission staff (as of June 2019, see figure 6). This is up from 57 per cent in 2009 and up from 67 per cent when the compact was established in November 2018. The contribution share of the three Nordic member states alone—Denmark, Finland and Sweden—has increased from 14 to 23 per cent since 2009. The contribution shares of Sweden and Poland doubled between 2009 and 2019, from 6 to 12 per cent and from 8 to 16 per cent, respectively. The contribution share of France initially decreased but then doubled from 4 to 8 per cent after the establishment of EUCAP Sahel Mali in 2014. Denmark’s contribution share increased from 3 to 7 per cent between 2017 and 2019.

Second, participation has varied in terms of the number of missions that member states have been contributing to. Eight member states—Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden—are currently providing personnel to at least 8 of the 10 ongoing missions (see figure 4). These member states and the UK have on average participated in at least two-thirds of the missions that were active at any point since 2009. Many other member states have never or seldomly contributed personnel.

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**Figure 5.** Personnel contributions by individual EU member states to civilian CSDP missions, Oct. 2018–June 2019

CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; EU = European Union.

*Note:* Personnel figures do not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office.

**Figure 6.** Personnel contributions by selected EU member states to civilian CSDP missions, as a share of total contributions, Dec. 2009–June 2019

CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; EU = European Union; EUCAP = EU Capacity Building Mission; EUPOL = EU Police Mission.

- The top contributors (as of June 2019) were Poland, Sweden, Germany, France, Denmark, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands (in order of size of contribution).
- The Nordic member states are Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
- East European states are defined here as Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.
- The francophone missions were EUCAP Sahel Mali (from 2014), EUCAP Sahel Niger (from 2012) and EUPOL RD Congo (until 2014).

Note: Personnel figures do not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office.

to more than three missions simultaneously.

Third, participation has varied in terms of which missions member states have been prioritizing, and these priorities tend to reflect foreign policy priorities at the national level. For example, East European member states—here defined as Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia—primarily contribute to missions in Europe (see figure 6); of the personnel they are currently seconding, 96 per cent are deployed in EUAM Ukraine, EULEX Kosovo or EUMM Georgia. Meanwhile, Belgium and France have been increasingly prioritizing francophone missions in the Sahel; of the personnel they are currently seconding, 84 per cent are in missions in Mali and Niger. For France alone, this share has risen to 90 per cent.

The other member states have been deploying much fewer personnel to Sahel missions. They are currently (as of June 2019) sending 7 per cent of their seconded personnel to these missions. As a consequence, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger are relatively dependent on Belgium and France for their seconded personnel and relatively dependent on contracted staff, most of whom are nationals of Belgium or France. The expansion of the missions in recent years has further reinforced these dependencies. The balance between seconded and contracted personnel in these missions is about fifty-fifty in 2019, and about 60 per cent of the seconded and contracted personnel are from either Belgium or France (see figure 6).

**BURDEN SHARING IN CIVILIAN CSDP: INCREASINGLY UNEVEN**

It is not surprising that some member states contribute more personnel to civilian CSDP than others. The 28 EU member states are equals when it comes to political–strategic decision making related to CSDP, but they are certainly not equal in their capacity to allocate human and financial resources to it. Burden-sharing arrangements in the EU context are, therefore, often determined using a scale of gross national income (GNI). On the one hand, this is not the best measure of participation in civilian CSDP, which is as much about sharing political ownership as equitable burden sharing. On the other hand, it is a better measure than population size, which is often used for this purpose—including by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)—to the disadvantage of member states with a below average GNI per capita.

Indeed, the share of most member states’ personnel contributions to civilian CSDP has been similar or higher than their share in the EU’s total GNI (see figure 7). The only member states for which these shares have been substantially lower are the five largest economies in the EU—France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. These countries provided 26 per cent of the seconded personnel in civilian CSDP in 2019, while they accounted for 71 per cent of the total GNI in the EU (and 63 per cent of the total population). By comparison, the three Nordic member states—Denmark, Finland and Sweden—contributed 23 per cent of the seconded personnel in missions, while they accounted for only 6 per cent of the total GNI (and 4 per cent of the total population).
Figure 7. Personnel contributions by EU member states to civilian CSDP missions as a share of total contributions, Dec. 2009–June 2019

CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; EU = European Union; GNI = gross national income.

*a Croatia joined the EU in July 2013.

Note: Personnel figures do not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor’s Office.

Civilian CSDP is competing for the civilian capabilities of its member states with domestic demands, other organizations such as the UN and the OSCE, and EU agencies such as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The domestic demand for law enforcement and border guard personnel has increased in most member states, in particular those that have been greatly affected by domestic terrorism and the migration crisis. The demand from other organizations increased especially after the establishment of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine in 2014. EU member states have been seconding around 450 personnel to the SMM in recent years, which is more than they are currently providing to EULEX Kosovo and EUMM Georgia combined. Many member states are currently seconding more personnel to UN and OSCE missions than to civilian CSDP (see figure 4).

Meanwhile, Frontex has emerged as the most serious competitor for the civilian capabilities of EU member states. It is setting up a standing corps of 10 000 operational staff between 2019 and 2027 consisting partly of personnel seconded by member states on a mandatory basis. Frontex is currently recruiting the first 700 border guards for the standing corps, which is similar to the total number of personnel seconded by EU member states in all civilian CSDP missions.

In addition to civilian CSDP missions, military CSDP missions and operations are also drawing on member state resources. These demands are not competing in the sense that the former pertain to civilian capabilities and the latter to military capabilities. However, the net financial costs of deploying military personnel and equipment far exceed those of deploying civilian personnel. Assessments of burden sharing in crisis management in the context of CSDP should, therefore, take into account the national contributions to both its civilian and military components. For example, Denmark has been punching above its weight in civilian CSDP but maintains its opt-out from participation in military CSDP, whereas Spain has been providing relatively few resources to civilian CSDP but is among the largest contributors to military CSDP.

The number of personnel that member states are seconding is indicative of their political willingness to contribute to civilian CSDP, although it does not necessarily tell the full story. Seconding to a civilian CSDP mission is a competitive process in which member states nominate candidates for a vacant position, from which the relevant mission then makes a selection. The rate by which nominated candidates are selected can vary significantly from country to country. This means that the size of member state contributions does not necessarily correspond their willingness to contribute to civilian CSDP, but depends on both the quantity and the quality of the candidates they are putting forward (and how well they were prepared for the recruitment process).

Many non-French-speaking member states, for example, are...
acutely aware of the security challenges emanating from the Sahel and claim that they wish to contribute more to missions in the region. However, they often point to the challenges of finding qualified French-speaking candidates to nominate and the low selection rate of those they put forward. Although few deny the utility of staffing these missions with personnel that speak French (one of the official working languages of the EU), many question whether the benefits of upholding strict language requirements for all positions outweigh the costs.  

There is also another development that has affected the share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions negatively, which has nothing to do with EU member states. This is the often overlooked fact that it has become much less common for non-EU countries (third countries) to contribute to missions. Third countries currently account for 1 per cent of the seconded personnel in civilian CSDP compared to 10 per cent back in 2010. This might change following Brexit, as the UK has made it clear that it wishes to continue participating in civilian CSDP after its exit from the EU. This would require that the UK signs a so-called Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU. In the absence of an FPA or a transition agreement, there is no legal basis for the UK’s continued participation in civilian CSDP following its departure from the EU.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES GOING FORWARD

The Civilian CSDP Compact provides the EU and its member states with a window of opportunity to reinvigorate civilian CSDP and unlock the potential that has been attributed to it, namely a credible and effective tool that can contribute to the prevention and management of crises and conflicts. It has created a sense of momentum that member states and the EEAS have used to think strategically about where and how civilian CSDP can add value, and to push through measures and reforms to this end. Although the compact and its commitments are non-binding, there is a comprehensive annual review process that can simultaneously support member states and the EEAS in the implementation process and hold them accountable for it.

Preserving momentum

In order to maintain this momentum, it is important that member states and the EEAS achieve results during the compact’s implementation that increase the operational effectiveness of missions. In terms of the commitments to increase the number and share of seconded personnel, the results in the first year of the compact seem discouraging. However, it is too early to draw conclusions from this. The process of nominating, selecting and deploying personnel alone can take several months. This means that if member states have already been putting forward more candidates, the effects might not yet be visible. Processes such as

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15 EU member state officials, Interviews with the author, Brussels, July 2019.
16 British official, Interview with the author, Brussels, July 2019.
increasing budgets and modifying legislation take even longer.

There has been progress on other elements of the compact, based on which member states should be expected to contribute more to civilian CSDP in the second year. This includes the finalization of the joint action plan of the European Commission and the EEAS and of most member states’ NIPs, a review and revision of the CPCC’s recruitment and selection procedures, and the approval of the concept for specialized teams.¹⁷ The latter allows for the short-term deployment of national or multinational team formations, in addition to the standard individual deployment for a minimum duration of one year.

**Preserving unity between member states**

One of the compact’s greatest strengths is that it is supported by all member states. The development of the compact was initially a non-inclusive process in the sense that it was spearheaded by a group of like-minded member states, which made the negotiations of the commitments difficult and at times unconstructive. However, all EU member states signed up for the end product and have since expressed their support for it. Civilian CSDP is a highly political instrument and one of its main comparative advantages over EU agencies is the close engagement and ownership of the member states. Member states seem to realize that in order to preserve this advantage, it is a prerequisite that they increase their contributions to it.¹⁸

One of the main challenges in delivering the compact will be to preserve this unity among member states while making progress on the implementation of its commitments. Member states and the EEAS will need to manage the risk that burden sharing in civilian CSDP, in general, and in certain missions, specifically, may become more uneven as a result of the varying abilities of member states to scale up and diversify their contributions. The member states that pushed the hardest for the compact and have the highest ambitions for civilian CSDP are generally also among the countries providing the bulk of the capabilities. Many of them already have well-functioning national structures and legislation in place for the secondment of personnel to civilian CSDP missions. Germany, Finland and Sweden even have dedicated government agencies that can subcontract civilian experts and second them to peace operations, including civilian CSDP missions. Ironically, some of the member states that were the most adamant about an inclusive Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on the military side of the CSDP might inadvertently contribute to a de facto ‘two-speed Europe’ on the civilian side of the CSDP.

**The secondment system**

Besides advantages, there are also disadvantages to the fact that the majority of personnel in civilian CSDP are seconded by member states. One obvious challenge is that the personnel in missions

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¹⁸ EU and EU member state officials, Interviews with the author, Brussels, May 2019.
have similar working conditions, yet their compensation packages can vary significantly depending on the member state or national authority which seconded them. As a consequence, for nationals of lower-income member states it might be more attractive financially to be contracted by a mission than to be seconded to it, and after a secondment it can be more attractive to use that mission experience to secure a contracted position in that or another mission instead of returning to civil service in the home country. For this reason, seconding authorities in lower-income member states may be hesitant to nominate their best staff members for temporary deployments in civilian CSDP missions.

The differences in renumeration could become more of an issue as civilian CSDP missions focus increasingly on activities higher up the value chain, such as the provision of strategic advice. Furthermore, member states have committed in the compact to developing and providing missions with specialized capabilities for activities in areas such as preventing violent extremism, irregular migration, hybrid threats and cybersecurity. There is, therefore, a risk that these specialized and high-end operational positions in civilian CSDP missions will become particularly dominated by the higher-income member states, which are in a better position to afford to pay competitive salaries and lend expensive capabilities. The compact refers to the possibility of providing financial incentives to support the development of capabilities by member states. Some member states would be interested in extending such incentives to the provision of capabilities. The European Commission and the EEAS should provide clarity in terms of what is possible in this regard and manage expectations in terms of what is not.

**Promoting a better representation of women**

Another significant commitment in the Compact is to actively promote a better representation of women in all levels of the missions. It will be challenging for member states to contribute to this commitment while at the same time increasing their national contributions. The representation of women tends to decrease when the demand for personnel contributions increases, and it tends to be lower among operational personnel. The representation of women also tends to be lower in the national contributions of most member states that are not among the top contributors to civilian CSDP. In other words, if member states contributions and the share of operational personnel would increase again, and if the gap between the top contributors and other member states would narrow, there is a risk that this might actually result in a lower representation of women in the missions. This issue is addressed in a separate SIPRI policy brief.\(^\text{19}\)

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is positive that all member states committed in the compact to increasing the number and share of the personnel they are jointly contributing to civilian CSDP. The successful implementation of these

\(^{19}\) Smit (note 5).
commitments is a precondition for a more capable civilian CSDP by 2023. To this end, member states and the EEAS should consider the following:

1. **Member states should contribute more personnel to civilian CSDP.**

   This applies especially to member states that have been providing relatively few personnel and less to the top contributors, which are likely to continue providing the critical mass of international mission staff for the foreseeable future. Based on their NIPs, member states should aim to increase the number of candidates they nominate as well as their selection rate, by ensuring their candidates are carefully preselected and prepared for the recruitment process.

2. **Member states should diversify their contributions.**

   Member states should not only contribute more to missions in which they are already participating, but also seek to second personnel to missions in which they are not yet present. This applies especially to member states that participate in few missions and missions in which few member states participate. It is important that the share of seconded personnel improves in all missions, particularly those in which it is relatively low. From a cost-saving perspective this might not be so important if the balance improves in civilian CSDP overall, as each mission is financed from the same CFSP budget. However, from a political ownership and credibility perspective, it helps if all member states take responsibility for resourcing the missions they are collectively mandating.

3. **Member states should prioritize operational personnel but also contribute more generic and mission support capabilities.**

   On the one hand, it makes sense that the compact prioritizes seconded staff in the operational positions of missions. These are the staff that execute mission mandates and contribute directly to their political objectives. The more candidates the missions can choose from for these positions, the better the situation is. On the other hand, the proportion of operational positions has been declining and the share that is filled by seconded personnel is already high. If member states put forward additional candidates for operational positions, there is a risk that this would not improve selection rates (more competition means more unsuccessful candidates) or the overall balance between seconded and contracted personnel. Meanwhile, it is critical for the functioning and responsiveness of missions that they have quick and reliable access to generic and mission support capabilities. The proportion of these positions has been increasing and relatively few are filled by seconded personnel. The need for member states to provide mission support capabilities to missions is included in commitment 4(c) in the compact.  

4. **Member states should increase the share of women in their contributions.**

   The efforts to increase and diversify national contributions should not be at the expense of promoting a better representation of women in the missions, which is also

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a commitment in the compact. To this end, all member states must include in their NIP how they plan to contribute to this commitment and set targets for the representation of women in their national contributions. This should be preceded by an analysis at the national level of the gender balance in the nominations and secondments to civilian CSDP at present and in previous years.

5. The EEAS should further professionalize the recruitment of mission personnel.

The CPCC has been conducting a review of the recruitment and selection procedures for civilian CSDP missions in 2019. Based on the outcome of the review, the CPCC should take steps to professionalize the procedures where needed and possible. This should include measures to reduce the duration of the selection process and improve the feedback loop between the CPCC and member states. The missions and the CPCC should always provide member states with detailed, consistent and timely feedback on the reasons for non-selection of their candidates.

6. The EEAS should systematically inform member states of capability needs in the short and medium term.

The CPCC does not yet have a centralized human resources database in which it can access and share, in real time, detailed data on the staffing of civilian CSDP missions, although it is working on a technical solution. Until then, the CPCC should use the statistics that it collects manually to monitor and analyse the current and projected capability needs of each mission, and report these to member states on a regular basis to give them the opportunity to improve their planning around nominations.


## ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUAM Iraq</td>
<td>EU Advisory Mission in Iraq</td>
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<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td>EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya</td>
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<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point</td>
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<td>EUCAP NESTOR</td>
<td>EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territories/Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL DR Congo</td>
<td>EU Police Mission for the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Framework Participation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>European Border and Coast Guard Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross national income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>Kosovo Specialist Chambers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>National implementation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Special Prosecutor’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMM Ukraine</td>
<td>Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine</td>
</tr>
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