SECURITY ACTIVITIES OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN AFRICA

EDITED BY
OLAWALE ISMAIL AND ELISABETH SKÖNS
Security Activities of External Actors in Africa
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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Preface

Since the late 1990s there has been a revival of external strategic attention to Africa. The increase in interest is based on several factors, which vary in degree between the actors. They include increased concern for transnational security challenges that are perceived by external actors as originating in or involving Africa, increased competition for natural resources from Africa, and the rise of emerging powers, such as Brazil, China and India, which are developing their own types of relation with and in African countries.

Civil society in Africa has an important role to play in shaping the security policies and security sectors in their countries and across the continent. Over the past two decades or so, a window of opportunity has opened up for civil society engagement in security matters. However, although such engagement is on the rise, it is still limited. An important reason for this is the relative weakness of civil society in Africa on security issues: only a small part of African civil society has the required capacity, knowledge and experience to engage in security matters. Other contributing factors include the sensitivity of such engagement in several African countries, as well as the complex nature of security policies in Africa, not least because security policies and activities in Africa are, to a great extent, influenced by African external relations—as partly reflected in the security-related policies and activities of external actors.

The present volume is an effort to map and analyse external actors’ security-related activities in Africa. The authors have drawn on their individual expertise and SIPRI’s unrivalled data sets to produce a detailed mapping of policies and activities, taking an empirical approach to understanding the role of external actors in African security. It is hoped that this volume will provide guidance and inspiration for further research on and analysis of the security-related activities of external actors in Africa, in particular by African civil society organizations but also by research and policy communities.

I thank the authors and the generous funders—the Open Society Foundations—for their dedication in bringing this book to print, and commend it as a resource for civil society actors, policymakers and academics within and outside Africa. It is a unique compendium of detailed empirical information and analysis on an important aspect of Africa’s peace and security dynamic.

Professor Tilman Brück
SIPRI Director
Stockholm, May 2014
Acknowledgements

This volume was conceived and undertaken as part of a project to support civil society organizations (CSOs) across sub-Saharan Africa in their efforts to improve their ability to analyse security sector issues, principally by learning through evidence-based policy research. While the African CSOs researched and published on the role of civil society in addressing the security challenges and shaping the security policies in their countries, SIPRI researchers took on the task of mapping the security-related activities in Africa by some of the external actors. The mapping studies of external actors presented in this volume benefitted greatly from the cross-fertilization generated by this dual approach in that the perspectives of the African CSOs helped develop the research questions of the study. We therefore gratefully acknowledge the contributions of the CSOs participating in the project: the Centre Interdisciplinaire pour le Développement et les Droits Humains (CIPAD, Interdisciplinary Centre for Development and Human Rights) in Cameroon, the West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) in Ghana, the local organization of Search for Common Ground (SFCG) in Liberia, the Coalition National de la Société Civile pour la Paix et la Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères (Conascipal, National Coalition of Civil Society for Peace and the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms) in Mali, and the Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association (ZWLA) and the Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe (WCOZ).

The project’s advisory group was instrumental in refining the project design. First of all, the intellectual input of our former colleague Wuyi Omitoogun is gratefully acknowledged, in particular for his early comments on the design of the studies. We also want to acknowledge the comments on early versions of individual chapters by advisory group members Professor Fantu Cheru, Dr Thomas Jaye, Dr Boubacar N’Diaye and Professor Amadu Sesay and by the external referees. Thanks are due also to the other members of the advisory group: Dr Renata Dwan, Dr Godwin Murunga, the late Dr Thomas Ohlson, and Muthoni Wanyeki.

We would like to acknowledge the contributions of the authors of the individual chapters and their patience with the production process of the book, which was seriously delayed due to the absorption of our time with the civil society component of the project, which became much larger than originally planned. Helen Wilandh, research assistant during part of the project, helped to verify and update data and other facts. On behalf of the authors, we also thank their many colleagues and contacts around the world who helped with their research, and the SIPRI librarians, who so actively supported us all.
Our greatest acknowledgement goes to the SIPRI editor of this volume, Joey M. Fox, who did a marvellous job in tying this book project together, for her excellent sense of language and intellectual coherence, as well as for her diplomatic skills in dealing with the consequences of the delays. Dr David Cruickshank, SIPRI’s Publications Director, supervised the editorial process and made a heroic last-minute update of the data in the appendix and the individual chapters.

This book would not have been born without the contribution of the previous SIPRI Director, Dr Bates Gill. He had an instrumental role in the conception of the project of which it is a part, including the idea to combine capacity-building and research components into a single project, and he supported the project throughout all its phases.

Finally, we want to thank the Open Society Foundations for its financial support for this project, and in particular Abdul Tejan-Cole and Akwe Amosu for their active contributions to the design of this project and for their continued support and enthusiastic encouragement, especially for the civil society capacity-building part of the project.

Dr Olawale Ismail and Dr Elisabeth Sköns
London and Stockholm, May 2014
### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>AU Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Financial year</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small arms and light weapons</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
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### China

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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China–Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>FUC</td>
<td>Follow-Up Committee</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army</td>
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### France

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>DCSD</td>
<td>Direction de la cooperation de sécurité et de défense (Directorate for Security and Defence Cooperation)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Communauté Financière Africaine</td>
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<td>EMA</td>
<td>État-major des armées (Defence Staff)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEX</td>
<td>Opérations Extérieures (External Operations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECAMP</td>
<td>Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities)</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>FPC</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Concept</td>
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<td>FSMTC</td>
<td>Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)</td>
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<td>The United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPM</td>
<td>Africa Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
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<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British military advisory and training team</td>
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<td>BPST-EA</td>
<td>British Peace Support Team–East Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPST-SA</td>
<td>British Peace Support Team for South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMATT</td>
<td>International Military Advisory and Training Team</td>
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<td>SFO</td>
<td>Serious Fraud Office</td>
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<td>SILSEP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme</td>
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<td>SJSR</td>
<td>Security and justice sector reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>The United States</td>
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<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance</td>
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<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICAP</td>
<td>Africa Peacekeeping Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>US Africa Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Africa Partnership Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSL</td>
<td>Cooperative security location</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<td>FOS</td>
<td>Forward operating site</td>
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IMET  International Military Education and Training
OEF-TS  Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara
PKO  Peacekeeping operation
PREACT  Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism
QDR  Quadrennial Defense Review
SOFA  Status of forces agreement
TSCTP  Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership
USAID  US Agency for International Development

The European Union

APF  African Peace Facility
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP  Common Security and Defence Policy
EDF  European Development Fund
EEAS  European External Action Service
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy
EIDHR  European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ESF  Economic Support Fund
ESS  European Security Strategy
EU  European Union

The United Nations

DFS  Department of Field Support
DPKO  Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPA  Department of Political Affairs
GFP  Global Focal Point
ITS  Integrated Training Service
MONUSCO  UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
MPTF  Multi-partner trust fund
MSU  Mediation Support Unit
OSAA  Office of the Special Advisor on Africa
PBC  Peacebuilding Commission
POC  Protection of civilians
R2P  Responsibility to protect
UN  United Nations
UNDP  UN Development Programme
UNOAU  UN Office to the African Union
1. Introduction

OLAWALE ISMAIL AND ELISABETH SKÖNS

Despite a half-century or more of postcolonial development in Africa, the security policies and activities of African states remain influenced by a range of external actors, including other states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and private companies. A cursory glance at Africa’s security landscape since the turn of the 21st century shows the overarching involvement of external actors in a catalogue of security-related activities across the continent, including funding, training and supporting technical cooperation and assistance; engaging in joint exercises; participating in intelligence gathering and sharing; transferring arms; deploying troops and other personnel; and establishing military presence. Examples abound. In recent years almost two-thirds of the personnel and financial resources for United Nations peace operations have been allocated to peace operations in Africa.\(^1\) China has stepped up its participation in UN peace operations, with the clear majority of its contingents serving in Africa.\(^2\) Russian contributions of personnel and training for peace operations in Africa have also increased markedly since 2000. The European Union (EU) has deployed military forces to Africa since 2003. France continues to maintain permanent military bases in Africa. The United States established Camp Lemonnier, a semi-permanent ‘expeditionary’ military base, in Djibouti in 2002 and created the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), a new unified military command for Africa, in 2008. The creation of new or revised policies and institutional mechanisms by long-established external actors, as well as the introduction of new actors, forms the basis for this revival in external security-related activities in Africa.

These developments take place simultaneously with new and increased African efforts to build regional and subregional institutional and operational capacity to address the continent’s security and political challenges. Moreover, opportunities are opening up for African civil society organizations (CSOs) to debate and help formulate security policy in their countries.


and subregions, and these CSOs are increasingly gaining the requisite knowledge, awareness and experience to influence security policies. This has added another dimension to the development of security policies and activities in Africa.

Section I of this chapter provides a brief account of the role of external actors in African security affairs during the colonial, cold war and the early post-cold war periods. Section II describes the revived external interest in Africa and some of its motivating factors. Section III presents a short literature background to contextualize the contributions of this book to the field. It also presents the book’s aim and its scope. While sub-Saharan Africa is the focus of the studies in this book, the introductory chapter provides the overall African context.

I. The historical context of external actors in African security

The involvement of external actors in Africa’s security matters is not new. Such actors have historically played key, and sometimes decisive, roles in the security dynamic of Africa. The composition of these actors and their interests and activities in Africa have evolved over time. Historically, external actors shaped security in Africa by supplying munitions, formally signing security-related agreements (such as protectorate treaties, defence pacts and political alliances), building lucrative trade networks that fuelled conflicts over the control of trading posts and taxes, and conquering African territories leading to colonial rule.

The 1884–85 Berlin Conference and the subsequent partitioning of Africa among European powers continue to have an impact on contemporary politics and the security situation in Africa. The conference defined the borders of modern African states—in many cases splitting ethnic groups into different states and forcing the cohabitation of different ethnicities in a single state—leading to intra- and interstate tensions and conflicts over territory and political control.

Under colonial rule, African territories provided soldiers and material resources for the warring parties in World Wars I and II. On independence, colonial governments bequeathed Western notions and structures of statehood and security and (often repressive) operational strategies to the new African states.3 A majority of African states remained tied to their former colonial rulers through defence and security agreements, which frequently

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included the building of military bases by former colonialists, the modelling and training of African security forces on those of colonial powers, and the establishing of the right of former colonial powers to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of African states.

**The cold war period**

During the cold war, many African countries joined with other states in the developing world to establish the Non-Aligned Movement in an effort to avoid open allegiance to either the US-led Western or Soviet-led Eastern blocs. Despite this, through continued political, security and cultural ties with former colonial powers, newly independent African states were drawn into the cold war rivalry by default. Furthermore, Africa was a focal point in the rivalry through superpower support and intervention in African conflicts, coups and counter-coups in bids to install ideologically friendly regimes. African countries were major recipients of armaments during the cold war, including small arms and light weapons (SALW), battle tanks and combat aircraft. The impact of these arms transfers persists, particularly the lingering effect of cold war-era stockpiles of SALW, most especially in the Horn of Africa. The deployment of multilateral peacekeeping troops to Africa—another dimension of external actor involvement in African security—began during the cold war. The UN’s first extensive peace operation took place in the former Belgian Congo—later renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—between 1960 and 1964. However, this was an exceptional case during the cold war. There was no other similar case in Africa until after the end of the cold war.

**Post-cold war expectations**

The end of the cold war in 1989 heralded optimism and expectations of a more peaceful world order. This positive outlook was centred on the hope for a ‘peace dividend’ that would bring about a global consensus on the virtues of democracy and good governance. This was predicated on an anticipated decrease in armed conflict and global reductions in military expenditure that were expected to release more financial resources for development projects through increases in development assistance from external actors as well as through domestic reallocation of resources.

The end of the cold war also brought with it changes in the political and geostrategic value of Africa to external actors. As observed by Ian Taylor

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and Paul Williams, while during the cold war, superpower rivalry had ‘temporarily magnified Africa’s geostrategic value’, after the end of the cold war, Africa’s strategic value plummeted.\(^6\) Additionally, there was an underlying assumption by established external actors that Africa was falling behind economically and was on the margins of the global economy. With the intensification of socio-economic processes associated with globalization in the 1990s, countries in Africa (except for South Africa) lacked the economic structures and resources to compete in the global economy: African states had failed to achieve rapid industrialization, high levels of human-capacity development, stable governance systems and resilience to global economic shocks, and they had continued to rely on the export of primary goods (i.e. raw materials, agricultural products or minerals).\(^7\) All of this suggested that Africa was of little political, strategic or economic value to external actors and that the region faced an era of more benign external intervention.\(^8\) The reality turned out to be rather different.

**Post-cold war reality**

Contrary to expectations, Africa faced a turbulent time with the outbreak of several armed conflicts during the initial post-cold war period. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa were the location of some of the most brutal armed conflicts in African history, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the DRC (then called Zaire), and not least the genocide in Rwanda. Throughout the 1990s the number of state-based armed conflicts in Africa remained high, at a level of 10–17 conflicts each year, accounting for a high and increasing share (25–43 per cent) of the world total.\(^9\)

While as expected, there was a reduction in military spending during the first post-cold war decade (1990–99)—both globally (by 30 per cent in real terms) and in the major donor countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC)—the hoped-for increase in external financial resources for development projects never materialized.\(^10\) Annual bilateral and multi-

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INTRODUCTION

lateral financial resources for development projects to sub-Saharan Africa even declined by 34 per cent in real terms between 1992 and 1999.\textsuperscript{11}

II. Revived external interests in Africa since the late 1990s

The lack of engagement of external actors in Africa following the end of the cold war was short-lived. Since the late 1990s, Africa's economic and strategic value to external actors has increased alongside its complex security–development failings. Furthermore, in addition to the revived interest among Africa's established external actors, new actors—such as Brazil, China, India and South Korea and, more recently, Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf—have established closer relations with African countries. As a result of continuing armed conflict in Africa, multilateral organizations, such as the EU, have also become more active in the region.

Conflict and instability in the region during the post-cold war period has led to an increase in the deployment of peacekeeping troops to Africa.\textsuperscript{12} Since 1999, the number of peace operations and personnel deployed in Africa—by the UN and other external actors such as the EU—has increased steadily.\textsuperscript{13} The high number of peace operations in Africa led by external organizations has often involved the active participation of African countries and personnel in those operations (especially UN missions). Moreover, there have also been African-led peace operations. African countries that regularly contribute to UN operations include Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Togo.

Additionally, during the 2000s, in contrast to the previous decade, there was a significant increase in external aid to Africa, following the UN Millennium Declaration and formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000.\textsuperscript{14} By 2011, the level of external financial resources for development projects (i.e. official development assistance, ODA) to Africa was 105 per cent higher in real terms than in 1999 and ODA to sub-Saharan Africa had increased by 134 per cent.\textsuperscript{15}

Broadly speaking, the change in Africa's position in the international geopolitical and economic system can be linked to four developments or processes: (a) increased global competition for natural resources; (b) economic

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD.Stat Extracts, ‘Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a]’, <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A>.
\item \textsuperscript{12} See individual chapters in this volume for information on involvement in peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa.
\item \textsuperscript{14} UN General Assembly Resolution 55/2, ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’, 18 Sep. 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (note 11).
\end{itemize}
growth in parts of Africa, making the area an attractive market and economic partner; (c) the ascendance of security issues as the foremost challenge to statehood—similar to development issues in the 1960s—in Africa; and (d) the radical change in policies to address international terrorism.

Natural resources

The re-emergence and intensification of competition for natural resources is clearly manifested in Africa, and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. The region’s vast deposits of the mineral resources needed for sustained industrial production; the oil and natural gas needed for energy security; and the land needed for commercial biofuel production have served to resituate Africa in global politics.16

The global competition for natural resources has been reinforced by the rapid growth of the economies (and industrial output) of countries such as Brazil, China and India.17 At the same time, some of the main oil-importing developed countries are seeking to diversify their sources of supply. The increased interest of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa is thought to partly reflect their desire to promote stability in Africa, thereby minimizing disruptions to the supply of resources.18

Economic growth

Africa, and in particular sub-Saharan Africa, has experienced strong economic growth during the 21st century. The average annual growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) in sub-Saharan Africa during the period 2000–2012 was 4.9 per cent, well above the world average of 2.7 per cent.19 Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa increased fivefold between 2000 and 2012, from $9.6 billion to $50.0 billion, and in sub-Saharan Africa there was a sixfold increase, from $6.4 billion to $38.5 billion, accounting for an increasing share of world FDI.20

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17 Taylor (note 16).


The major drivers of the increased FDI inflow to sub-Saharan Africa are the exploration and exploitation of natural resources as well as, in recent years, the region’s good economic performance.\(^{21}\) Potentially lucrative markets are another reason for investment. With a population of approximately 842 million people in 2012 (12 per cent of the world total) and an estimated GDP growth rate of 5.8 per cent in 2012 (excluding South Africa), sub-Saharan Africa is an important and expanding market for both industrial and consumer goods.\(^{22}\)

**Ascendancy of security issues**

Internally, security issues replaced economic interests as the primary driver of regional cooperation and integration in the region, and externally, security became the focus of Africa’s international relations. Since the 1990s, security issues have emerged as the most critical challenge to state legitimacy in Africa, including state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, post-conflict recovery problems, spread of SALW, organized crime (such as narcotics trafficking), transnational terrorism and maritime piracy. African states, in particular those in sub-Saharan Africa, have featured prominently at the top of the Failed States Index since the index was established in 2005. In most years, 7 of the 10 highest ranking failed states have been in sub-Saharan Africa. In the index for 2012, the top 10 included Somalia, the DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe and the Central African Republic, in that order.\(^{23}\)

The primacy of security issues in Africa has created opportunities and demands for assistance from external actors. This has resulted in a series of new security-related treaties and institutional mechanisms at the bilateral, subregional (through regional economic communities) and regional levels (through the African Union, AU). Such issues are also at the heart of multilateral peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, there were 25 such operations in Africa: 12 UN operations (including 1 joint AU–UN operation), 10 operations conducted by regional organizations (2 by the AU, 1 by the Economic Community of Central African States, 1 by the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, 5 by the EU, and 1 joint AU–

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\(^{23}\) Fund for Peace, ‘The Failed States Index 2012’, <http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2012-sort able>. This index has some conceptual and methodological limitations and is used here only in an illustrative sense.
ECOWAS operation) and 3 operations conducted by ad hoc coalitions. All but 2 of the UN operations were conducted in sub-Saharan Africa.

Change in policies to fight global terrorism

The transnational and interconnected dimensions of some security issues have interlocked Africa’s security interests and processes with those of major powers. Perhaps the most important factor was the change in the global security landscape following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on US cities, which had major implications for Africa. The USA’s subsequent ‘global war on terrorism’ altered geopolitics in ways that contributed to the redefinition of national security and national interests of major powers. Part of this redefinition saw a shift from deterrence and reaction to pre-emption, involving efforts to address the sources of terrorist activities, including the operational bases of terrorist groups abroad, through their disruption, destruction and defeat. The realization that facilities in Africa could be proxy targets for those seeking to attack Western interests (e.g. the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998) elevated the strategic relevance of Africa among some countries and intergovernmental bodies outside the region. The possibility and reality of some African states (e.g. Sudan in the 1990s and Somalia since 1991) providing safe havens from which terrorist groups could plan and initiate attacks or recruit, train and move personnel, money and weapons undetected further reinforced this approach to Africa. More importantly, the ‘global war on terrorism’ brought increased attention to the growing interconnection of security threats and challenges between the Global South and the Global North.

III. About this book

The developments described above have all contributed to a renewed external interest in sub-Saharan Africa, which is manifested in increased external activities in the region, including by national governments, multi-lateral organizations, the private sector, financial institutions and humanitarian organizations. Against this background, it has been observed that in order for future research to keep pace with the evolving competition among external actors in Africa,

First of all, we need to know more about what China, India, Russia, the United States, and other external powers are doing in Africa. Second, we need to learn more about what impact this is having on particular African countries. And third,

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25 The 2 UN operations in North Africa were the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).
we need to determine what can be done to help shape these developments and what can be done to avoid or mitigate its negative effects in the future.26

As such, it is of great importance to map and develop an understanding of the extent, nature and purpose of external actors’ interests and activities in Africa. It is within this context that this study has been undertaken, with the purpose to map out part of this landscape, namely the security-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa of seven of the major external actors in the region, and to analyse them in the context of their policies and strategies towards Africa.

**Previous studies and gaps in the literature**

The security-related component of Africa’s international relations has attracted much attention for a variety of reasons. Africa has been the centre of global peace and security challenges for much of the post-cold war period, as illustrated by the ‘new wars’ theories.27 According to Mary Kaldor, the ways in which ‘new wars’ differ from ‘old wars’ include the impact of globalization, the importance of identity politics, the means of finance, the use of private armed forces and the pattern of violence.28 Similarly, the World Bank describes violence as interconnected and fragmented, sometimes referring to it as ‘21st century violence’, which is linked to organized crime, drug and human trafficking and violent radicalization.29

The increase in, and to some extent the changing nature of, the security-related activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa is renewing the debate about extra-African influences and considerations in the study of African security and international relations. Most existing studies have focused on a specific external actor or on a particular thematic issue as it relates to security (such as peace operations, terrorism, piracy or the arms trade). Until recently, only a few studies have analysed the extra-African influences and dimensions of the security dynamic in Africa, often tangentially. In the mid-1990s, Christopher Clapham explored the survival tactics and strategies of African states in the context of globalization, including the

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29 World Bank (note 27).
simultaneous acquiescing to and manipulation of external actors’ interests, activities and influence.\textsuperscript{30}

Similarly, Jean-François Bayart has examined the intricate official–unofficial dimensions of the interactive relationships and mutually beneficial exchanges between African states (or rather heads of government) and foreign governments. In doing so, he dispelled the notion of Africa’s marginality in international relations and claimed that Africa and world politics are organically intertwined.\textsuperscript{31} The most comprehensive studies on external actors include a 2004 volume edited by Taylor and Williams and a 2010 study by Taylor.\textsuperscript{32} The former analysed the post-cold war African policies of major external actors (including Canada, China, France, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA, as well as the EU, the UN and international financial institutions). It focused on how states interact with the global political economy (driven by non-state actors and processes) to influence African affairs. The latter study continued the analysis of Africa’s place in the world based on an analysis of the combined effect of state–society relations, the society of states, the non-state world, and global economic structures and processes on Africa. These two volumes provide an excellent overview of the role of external actors in Africa and enable a comparative perspective.

Despite the growing literature on African security and international relations, there are two significant gaps. First, there is a serious lack of data and information on the activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa, and this lack is particularly pronounced in the field of security. This is related to the sensitivity and the political and politicized nature of security issues, which make it difficult for researchers to obtain information. Second, there is a lack of analysis of the available data within the context of the relevant policies of the external actors. In addition, only a few publications have attempted to analyse external actors as a collective. This makes it impossible to make comparisons between the external actors or to analyse the dynamic produced by the similarities, differences, changes and continuities in the policies and activities of external actors, and the reactions to these of other actors within and outside Africa.

\textbf{The aim, approach, scope and organization of this book}

The studies presented in this volume—and the broader project of which they form a part (see below)—were conceived to fill some of these gaps.


\textsuperscript{32} Taylor and Williams (note 6); and Taylor (note 16).
They are intended to provide detailed data, descriptions and analysis of the security-related policies and activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa. Together, they provide empirical data and analysis of which actor is doing what, where, when and why in sub-Saharan Africa. As a compendium of data and analysis of external actors’ security-related policies and activities in sub-Saharan Africa, this volume is intended to be a resource for civil society organizations, policymakers, researchers and educators, both within and outside Africa.

The studies presented in this volume are part of the SIPRI project ‘Security, democratization and good governance in Africa: the impact of external actors’ sponsored by the Open Society Foundations, which operated in partnership with CSOs across sub-Saharan Africa. The project’s research component included a series of country case studies undertaken by the African CSO partners to examine a security problem of relevance for their work, which were then published in the respective countries. One of the objectives of this project was to support the African CSOs in their efforts to conduct empirical research as a basis for their activities to raise awareness on security-related issues in their respective countries. The studies presented in this volume were part of this objective.

Aim and approach

The aim of this book is to provide data and analysis of the official security-related activities and policies related to Africa of seven major external actors—China, France, Russia, the UK, the USA, the EU and the UN. It represents an effort to collate as much comparable data as possible on the security-related activities of each of these external actors and to analyse these activities within the framework of the actor’s official policies and strategies. Provision and analysis of data on security-related activities as well as knowledge of the main sources of data and information of policy frameworks for these are important for an understanding of the policies and strategies of external actors, but such data is often hard to find and often difficult to interpret. This volume provides a resource for information and understanding of the broader picture of contemporary external activities in Africa as well as for further research and analysis of these developments, not least for civil society in African countries.

The approach of the study is pragmatic. While compiling data on activities is a core aim, in order to identify the most important security-related activities of each external actor and understand their purpose and meaning it is necessary to identify and examine the policies and strategies within which these activities are developed and conducted. The existence of

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explicit policies and strategies for Africa vary between actors. Some actors have developed a specific policy on Africa; others have a more fragmented set of policies directed towards Africa; and still others may have no official or declared policy towards Africa—in which case Africa-relevant policies must be deduced from more general policies. Furthermore, in addition to specific policies on Africa, the actors have more general policies that have implications for Africa. In particular, since many of the security-related activities are based on national security and defence policies and strategies, such activities must be understood primarily in relation to these.

Scope

Security-related activities are defined here to be activities that are used as instruments of foreign and security policies. However, to map all activities in that category would be an immense task. This study places emphasis on conventional, ‘hard’ security activities (e.g. military presence, arms transfers, military assistance and training of security forces, and military exchanges). In addition to the traditional security activities of external actors, this study also includes the activities that they undertake to strengthen the security sector of African countries, such as assisting security sector and justice reform programmes. Moreover, the authors of the individual studies have been given the liberty to include other, non-conventional (or ‘soft’) types of activity—such as diplomacy and development cooperation—that illustrate the extent and nature of the respective actor’s foreign and security policies towards Africa. Given the diversity of external actors and their respective interests and policies, the coverage of conventional and non-conventional security activities varies across the chapters.

The primary focus of this volume is sub-Saharan Africa—although this focus has sometimes been difficult to strictly implement since for some external actors it has not always been possible to cover and analyse sub-Saharan Africa separately. The focus on sub-Saharan Africa offers analytical simplicity and clarity as it reflects the broad similarities in the history and socio-economic, political, cultural and security conditions of states south of the Sahara, which differ somewhat from North African countries. Moreover, some external actors tend to include North African countries in their Middle East policies, not least due to their cultural affinity with other Arab states and membership of pan-Arab organizations (e.g. the League of Arab States). Nevertheless, the focus on sub-Saharan Africa acknowledges overlaps between the socio-political and security realities of sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, and the AU membership of countries across the continent. For example, political uprisings, rebellions and regime change in North Africa have implications for the stability of sub-Saharan Africa states through the presence of contiguous borders and the spread of SALW.
This book focuses on the policies and activities of state actors: governments and intergovernmental organizations. It thus leaves out important unofficial and non-state dimensions of Africa’s relations with the outside world. While the focus on state actors may only illuminate official aspects of external actors’ security-related engagement with sub-Saharan Africa, it nonetheless offers considerable advantages. In particular, the limitation of the coverage to state actors facilitates comparisons as well as data gathering. Potential insights can be gleaned from examining what is publicly declared as official policy alongside the actual activities undertaken by external actors. This makes it possible to highlight strategies and activities that are contrary to official policies.

Among all the external actors in Africa, those included in this volume play some of the most important roles. In the case of the five countries, this is not least because of their major power status, permanent membership to the UN Security Council, capacity for and history of unilateral military operations, and overall historical ties with sub-Saharan African countries. The EU and UN are important multilateral intergovernmental organizations in socio-political and security terms, especially as it relates to funding, assisting, deploying and providing political legitimacy for peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa. However, in addition to the seven external actors covered in this volume, a significant number of other external actors are directly or indirectly involved in various security processes and activities in sub-Saharan Africa. These include other states, such as additional European countries, Arab countries, Brazil, Canada, India, Iran, Pakistan and South Korea; international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); international financial institutions; humanitarian organizations; and private-sector actors, such as private security companies. Analysing these other external actors is a potentially crucial area of research for students and analysts of African security.

Finally, the focus on the security-related policies and activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa should not be taken to suggest that African governments, institutions and citizens are passive recipients, observers or victims of external actors’ policies and manipulations. On the contrary, Africa engages with and shapes external actors’ security-related policies and activities. The upsurge of external actors involved in security-related interests, policies and activities in sub-Saharan Africa parallels a profound expansion in intra-African institutions, initiatives and treaties, and the related building of norms, designed to tackle the continent's security challenges—‘African solutions to African problems’. At no point in the postcolonial history of Africa has there been greater emphasis on and coordination and institutional capacity building at the subregional and continental levels when responding to security threats. Similarly, since the
1990s, CSOs in sub-Saharan Africa have been gaining more capacity—through knowledge, awareness and experience—and increasing their participation in security-related policy debates and formulation. The parallel increases in intra- and extra-African security-related policies and activities underscore the primacy of security challenges in the developmental aspirations of Africa since the end of the cold war.

Organization

This book has nine chapters and a data appendix. Following this introduction, chapters 2–6 provide the mapping studies of five countries—China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA—and chapters 7 and 8 feature two intergovernmental actors—the EU and the UN. These chapters vary in focus and timeframe depending on the respective turning points in policies and activities. Chapter 9 provides the synthesis and conclusions from the individual mapping studies, making comparisons between the external actors and abstracting overall trends and patterns in their security-related policies and activities in sub-Saharan Africa. The appendix provides comprehensive data of relevance for the topic of this volume.
Since the onset of the 21st century, relations between China and Africa have become increasingly regularized and institutionalized, encompassing a broadening range of political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural and military ties. In the words of Chinese and African leaders, both sides are working to ‘further deepen the new type of China–Africa strategic partnership’.\(^1\) China’s expanded engagement in Africa has attracted much commentary and international interest. On the one hand, it has raised the expectation across Africa that China will turn its attention to long-neglected areas, such as infrastructure development, and that its strategic approach will contribute to greater stability on the continent, create promising new choices in external partnerships, strengthen African capacities to combat poverty, and develop and help integrate Africa more deeply into the global economy. On the other hand, it has also raised nettlesome policy issues, and China will increasingly face complex implementation challenges.

This chapter identifies patterns and trends in China’s security-related policies and strategies towards and activities in Africa with a view to contributing to knowledge on China in Africa’s security landscape. While acknowledging the increasing multiplicity of Chinese actors—state and non-state, military and civil, commercial and non-commercial—and their growing presence in Africa (often with varying interests), it focuses on Chinese Government policies and activities that relate to Africa.\(^2\) Given that China’s Africa policy and engagement view the continent of Africa as a whole, the focus also oscillates between sub-Saharan Africa and the continent as a whole.

Section I of this chapter provides historical background and an overview of contemporary China–Africa relations. Section II examines the policy and institutional foundations of the security aspects of contemporary China–Africa relations. Section III is a descriptive analysis of four security-related areas of China’s activities in Africa: military cooperation and capacity

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building, arms transfers, peace operations and anti-piracy operations, and conflict settlement. Section IV offers conclusions.

I. Historical background and contemporary economic interests

Background

China's modern relations with Africa date back to the early post-World War II era, following China's support for the political independence of African states and shared interest in forging a common position during the cold war as part of the Non-Aligned Movement. Relations were framed by a shared experience of colonization and status as developing countries, with both sides supporting the inviolability of state sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and the need for postcolonial states to resist Western hegemony.3

Over time, Chinese relations with Africa have changed. They have become more robust, broader, deeper and multilayered and are anchored in, or driven by, globalization currents. Contemporary Chinese engagement with Africa is commonly referred to as a ‘strategic partnership’—a generic term packaging China's expanded socio-economic, cultural, political and security engagement with African states and multilateral institutions.4 The strategic partnership has been institutionalized through the creation of joint summits—the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)—held every three years since 2000, and by China's development in 2006 of an Africa Policy (see section II below). Beyond the narrative of shared identity and solidarity, economic interests remain fundamental and best explain the dynamic of contemporary China–Africa relations.5 In the words of a senior official of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, today ‘China needs


Africa. China needs Africa for political alliances to support its aspirations to global influence, resources to fuel its development goals and markets to sustain its growing economy.

**Trade, development aid and foreign direct investment**

China’s economic relations with Africa figure prominently in the discussion about the drivers of Chinese–African security relations. This section provides some of the available data and information on China’s trade, aid and investment relations with Africa.

China–Africa trade increased at a remarkable pace over the first decade of the 21st century. Two-way trade increased from $2 billion in 1999, to $10.6 billion in 2000 and $106.8 billion in 2008 and then nearly doubled to $198.4 billion in 2012. In 2009 China surpassed the United States as Africa’s largest trading partner and has remained so since then. In 2012 Africa accounted for 5.13 per cent of total Chinese trade (up from 2.23 per cent in 2000), and China accounted for 16.13 per cent of total African trade (up from 3.82 per cent in 2000). Chinese imports from Africa include mineral fuel and lubricants (accounting for 70 per cent of the total), manufactured goods, chemicals, ores, iron and steel, aluminium, cotton, rubber, cocoa, and animal and vegetable fat and oil.

It is difficult to assess Chinese development assistance owing to peculiarities of the Chinese definition, composition and overall approach to aid as well as the lack of transparency and strong links to trade and investment activities (i.e. financing). China provides aid to Africa through grants, zero-interest loans, debt relief and concessional loans (i.e. fixed-rate and low interest). Other official finance instruments that might also be considered as aid include preferential export credits, market-rate export buyers credits, commercial loans from Chinese banks, equity loans and

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10 Freemantle and Stevens (note 9), pp. 3–6.

specialized funds (such as the fund to lend up to $1 billion to African small- and medium-sized enterprises).\textsuperscript{12}

In the absence of comparable data on Chinese development aid to Africa, researchers have produced estimates of various types of Chinese development finance to Africa. According to estimates compiled by the Center for Global Development (CGD), based on a comprehensive database on Chinese development projects in Africa, the six largest recipients of Chinese official development finance during the period 2000–11 were Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mauritania and Angola, which together received more than half of China’s official finance over this period.\textsuperscript{13} The CGD study confirmed that China’s official development finance to Africa increased over the period studied (2000–11) and concluded that, overall, Chinese activities as a financier of development were by 2011 roughly comparable to those of the USA. However, when looking at aid flows comparable to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition of official development assistance (ODA), China was still clearly behind the USA.\textsuperscript{14}

Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa is closely linked to Chinese trade and development assistance. The trend over time is difficult to estimate due to incomparable data.\textsuperscript{15} Nonetheless, the broad trend suggests an upward movement that corresponds to patterns of growth in trade and aid, and a general deepening of China–Africa economic engagement.\textsuperscript{16} The stock of China’s FDI in Africa has increased from $56 million in the mid-1990s to $4.46 billion in 2007, according to official sources, and reportedly increased to $17 billion in 2012.\textsuperscript{17} The bulk of Chinese FDI is concentrated in strategic sectors—oil, minerals and infrastructure projects conducted by Chinese state-owned companies. China’s financing of infrastructure is growing rapidly, with over 35 African countries involved in infrastructure financing and development arrangements with China.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Bräutigam (note 11), p. 223.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Strange, A. et al., China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-based Approach to Data Collection, Working Paper no. 323 (Center for Global Development: Washington, DC, Apr. 2013).
\item \textsuperscript{14} Strange et al. (note 13), pp. 34–35.
\end{itemize}
II. Security aspects of contemporary Chinese policies on Africa

China’s security-related approach towards Africa can be attributed to three main policy frameworks: its national defence policy; the triennial FOCAC summits held since 2000; and, since 2006, its official Africa Policy.

China’s defence policy

China’s international military relations and security cooperation are founded on its defence policy, which is outlined in biennial defence white papers.\(^\text{19}\)

The 2006 defence white paper discussed China’s broadening foreign military and security engagement. This included participation by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA, the Chinese Army) in international security cooperation, conducting bilateral and multilateral joint military exercises and taking an active role in maintaining global and regional peace and security.\(^\text{20}\)

The 2010 defence white paper stated that China conducts ‘military exchanges with other countries following the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ and ‘expands its participation in international security cooperation, ... enhances military exchanges and cooperation with developing countries, and takes part in [United Nations] peace-keeping operations, maritime escort, international counter-terrorism cooperation, and disaster relief operations’.\(^\text{21}\)

The 2012 defence white paper further reaffirmed its international military and security cooperation.\(^\text{22}\) This policy has significance for China–Africa security relations and is guiding Chinese participation in multilateral peace operations in Africa and military cooperation with several African countries (see section III).

The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation

FOCAC was instituted in October 2000 as a triennial assembly of the Chinese and African governments, multilateral institutions and, increasingly, business leaders dedicated to exchanging views on international affairs,

and for discussing, agreeing, coordinating and announcing new Chinese policy initiatives and targets related to Africa. According to its inaugural declaration, FOCAC ‘is a framework for collective dialogue between China and African countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit’ and for the joint pursuit of peace and development.

The influence of FOCAC on Chinese–African security and overall relations lies in its translation of broad policy framework and principles (as set out in China’s Africa Policy) into concrete, actionable activities under triennial action plans. FOCAC is the most important, strategic and visible mechanism of China–Africa relations. The location of the FOCAC summit alternates between Beijing and an African city: Beijing in 2000, 2006 and 2012, and Addis Ababa in 2003, Sharm El Sheikh in 2009 and Johannesburg in 2015. Each FOCAC is marked by a joint declaration (often to affirm common interest, principles and objectives of the cooperation, and positions on international relations). Each forum also produces Chinese pledges of socio-economic assistance which, since 2003, have formed the basis of a three-year action plan that contains specific policy initiatives and targets with implications for African and international security. FOCAC is coordinated by the Chinese Follow-Up Committee (FUC).

The second FOCAC Action Plan (for 2004–2006), adopted in 2003, reaffirmed shared interests and cooperation in resolving African conflicts, including continued Chinese participation in peace operations in Africa and logistical support for African peace operations. The plan reflected continued Chinese interest in demining activities in Africa and committed China to provide financial and material assistance to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU). It also provided a collaborative framework for China and African partners to address non-traditional security issues (e.g. terrorism, small arms trafficking, drug trafficking, illegal migra-

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The third FOCAC Action Plan (for 2007–2009), agreed in 2006, highlighted shared interest in promoting nuclear disarmament, with China expressing support for Africa’s objective of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in Africa. China also pledged to support and participate in humanitarian demining operations in Africa and efforts to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and declared its readiness to provide financial and material assistance and training for African countries. The parties agreed to strengthen counterterrorism cooperation and reaffirmed their agreement to tackle non-traditional security issues and the need for greater focus by the international community on armed conflicts in Africa.\footnote{Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2007–2009), Section IV (Cooperation in International Affairs), 3rd Ministerial Conference, Beijing, 3–5 Nov. 2006, <http://www.focac.org/eng/lnfd/scbzjhy/DOC32009/t280369.htm>. See also Li et al. (note 25), pp. 17–19.}

The fourth FOCAC summit held in 2009 produced an implementation report that documented progress in achieving policy targets set on in the previous action plan.\footnote{FOCAC (note 8).}

Under the summit’s 2010–12 Action Plan, China declared its willingness to continue its support for and participation in UN-mandated peace operations and anti-piracy operations in Africa; support for the UN Peacebuilding Commission and countries in post-war reconstruction; and support for the concept and practice of ‘Africans solving African problems’ through support to the AU and subregional organizations to solve conflicts in Africa. China also pledged support to help build Africa’s capacity to carry out peace operations on the continent.\footnote{Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), FOCAC Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010–12), 4th Ministerial Conference, Sharm El Sheikh, 8–9 Nov. 2009, <http://www.focac.org/eng/lnfa/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm>. See also Li et al. (note 25), p. 19. On the UN Peacebuilding Commission see chapter 8, section II, in this volume.}

The fifth FOCAC Action Plan (for 2013–15), adopted in 2012, reaffirmed shared commitments to strengthen cooperation in policy coordination, capacity building, preventive diplomacy, peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation, with China pledging to continue supporting Africa’s efforts to combat SALW proliferation. China also pledged to launch an ‘Initiative on China–Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security’ and to provide financial and technical support to ‘the African Union for its peace-support operations, the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture [APSA], personnel exchanges and training in the field of peace and security and Africa’s conflict prevention, manage-
African governments welcomed China’s increased coordination (through its special representative) with the AU to resolve African conflicts and conduct anti-piracy efforts, with calls for increased Chinese effort. China committed itself to strengthening cooperation regarding Somalia and in its work with the AU and relevant African subregional bodies on peace and security issues.32

China’s Africa Policy

China’s Africa policy, adopted in 2006, serves as the overarching framework of Chinese engagement (including on security issues) with Africa; it incorporates FOCAC declarations and action plans and contains the principles, objectives and strategies of China’s engagement with Africa. The policy is intended to ‘present to the world the objectives of China’s policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them, and its proposals for cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a view to promoting the steady growth of China–Africa relations in the long term and bringing the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage’.33

While China’s Africa Policy contains specific principles and objectives, it is founded on a fundamental element of Chinese foreign policy and international relations: the principle of peaceful coexistence founded on political independence, non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Specific to its Africa engagement, China seeks to be guided by five key principles and policy goals: sincerity, friendship and equality; mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity; mutual support and coordination; shared learning and seeking common development; and the ‘one China’ principle (i.e. the non-recognition of Taiwan).34

China’s Africa Policy contains four areas of cooperation: political; economic; education, science, culture, health and social; and peace and security. Political cooperation with Africa is to be achieved through six channels, including high-level visits, consultations and exchanges between Chinese and African leaders and institutions to facilitate institutional dialogue; cooperation in international affairs through shared understanding and coordinated pursuit of common positions (e.g. in the UN), especially on

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32 FOCAC (note 31), Section 2.6(6).
34 China acknowledges that a majority of African countries observe the ‘one China’ principle. Only 3—Burkina Faso, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland—recognize Taiwan. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 33), p. 2.
issues relating to African peace and development. This is the framework for understanding China’s support for the AU’s perspectives and positions on African security issues in the UN Security Council. The policy for economic cooperation includes 10 areas of cooperation with Africa, among them are trade and African access to Chinese markets, Chinese investment and businesses in Africa, financial cooperation, agricultural cooperation and infrastructural development. The policy for cooperation on education, science, culture, health and social aspects covers 10 areas: human resources development and education; science and technology cooperation; cultural exchanges; medical and health cooperation; media cooperation; administrative cooperation; consular cooperation; people-to-people exchanges; environmental cooperation; and disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance.

The policy identifies four key areas of cooperation under the theme of peace and security cooperation: (a) military cooperation, where China seeks to promote high-level military exchanges, undertake military-related technological exchanges and cooperation, and provide training for African military personnel and ‘support defense and army building of African countries for their own security’; (b) conflict settlement and peace operations, where China pledges political support to efforts by the AU and African regional organizations to settle regional conflicts, as well as support to and participation in UN peace operations in Africa; (c) judicial and police cooperation, where China seeks to promote exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and African judicial and law enforcement bodies to prevent and mitigate crime, and to work with African countries to combat transnational organized crime and corruption; and (d) cooperation in non-traditional security areas through intelligence exchange and coordinated approaches to combating terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, transnational economic crimes, and so on.\(^{35}\)

III. Chinese security-related activities in Africa

As reflected in China’s Africa and defence policies and through the triennial FOCAC agreements, China has made broad commitments to undertake a variety of security-related activities in Africa. Since the 2003 FOCAC summit, China has stepped up its support for the capacity-building efforts of African countries and multilateral institutions (both the AU and sub-regional organizations) in managing security challenges, especially in the areas of peace and humanitarian operations.

This section describes and discusses some of these activities under four key themes: military cooperation and capacity building, arms transfers,
peace operations and anti-piracy operations, and conflict settlement. Some of these areas also include judicial and police cooperation and cooperation in non-traditional security areas.

Military cooperation and capacity building

China’s bilateral military cooperation with African countries, often in support of wider diplomatic engagement, has increased over the past decade. There is a dearth of reliable data on this; however, some extant literature suggests that the frequency of high-level military exchanges between China and Africa increased towards the end of the 1990s, then remained constant up till 2009 and started to increase again in 2010.\(^36\) While China has some form of military ties with virtually all of the African countries with which it has formal diplomatic relations, it has stronger military ties with Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.\(^37\) China has a formal military consultation mechanism (bi-national defence committees) for exchanging views on international and regional security issues with two of these countries: Egypt and South Africa.\(^38\)

China provides training to African military personnel and undertakes joint military exercises in peace and humanitarian operations (including demining, medical and search-and-rescue missions). The training involves either African military personnel travelling to China or Chinese instructors delivering training sessions in African countries. For instance, 15 military officers from 15 African countries participated in a 12-day course organized by the College of Defence Studies and the PLA National Defence University in May 2010; 30 Angolan military officers are trained each year in China; between 2008 and 2009 China trained the Congolese armed forces in Katanga province; between 2004 and 2008 it trained elite commando units in Guinea; and Chinese military instructors are seconded to military staff colleges in Zimbabwe and Guinea.\(^39\)

China has undertaken at least two joint military exercises with African countries—a naval exercise with South Africa in 2008 and a humanitarian exercise with Gabon in 2009. The latter exercise, code-named Operation Peace Angel, was a humanitarian medical rescue operation involving


\(^39\) Saferworld (note 36), p. 40.
70 medical service troops and a number of local paramedics, which focused on the detection of harmful gas.\textsuperscript{40} China has also launched several medical naval missions and initiated a demining assistance programme (exercise and training) in Africa. In 2010, ‘for the first time, China hosted workshops for heads of military academies from English-speaking African countries, for directors of military hospitals from French-speaking African countries, and for intermediate and senior officers from Portuguese-speaking African countries’.\textsuperscript{41} China has provided training and equipment for demining to the armed forces of Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sudan in sub-Saharan Africa and to Egypt in North Africa.\textsuperscript{42}

China provides financial assistance (grants or loans) to African countries to develop military infrastructure. Examples of this include a $1.5 million donation in 2010 to Mauritania to upgrade military engineering equipment; a $30 million loan to Ghana in 2007 for the building of a communication system for security agencies; $6 million in financial support to Angola in 2006 for the creation of a tactical and operational elite support unit in the Angolan armed forces; a $600 000 grant to Liberia in 2005 for capacity building of its armed forces and a subsequent $5.5 million donation for army barracks; and a $1 million grant to Nigeria in 2001 to upgrade its military facilities.\textsuperscript{43} In all cases, the contracts were awarded to Chinese companies, suggesting that these initiatives also serve to support the Chinese defence industry.

Chinese funding for the peace and security activities of the AU and sub-regional organizations is gradually evolving. At the January 2012 AU summit, China announced a package worth 600 million yuan ($100 million) for the AU over three years and pledged to enhance cooperation on African peace and security.\textsuperscript{44} While China has yet to provide training to the African Standby Force (ASF), it has pledged logistical support under the 2013–15 FOCAC Action Plan. China also gives grants to certain AU initiatives, including the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): in November 2011 China claimed to have provided $2.2 million in cash support to AMISOM and 5 million yuan ($780 000) to Uganda and Burundi for the purchase of logistical materials to support their participation in the mission.\textsuperscript{45} In


\textsuperscript{41} Chinese State Council (note 21), p. 37.


\textsuperscript{43} Saferworld (note 36), p. 39.


December 2011 it was announced that China would provide equipment and material worth 30 million yuan ($4.5 million) to AMISOM.\textsuperscript{46} There are also plans to create a China–AU Peace Facility intended to provide funding for AU peace operations. Other instances of financial support are $1.8 million to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2006; and $100,000 to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Peace Fund in 2008.\textsuperscript{47}

At the multilateral level, China has provided political support to the APSA to enable African institutions to take lead roles in African security issues and to facilitate a strong Africa–UN partnership on African peace and security. China’s perspectives and voting patterns on African security issues at the UN Security Council tend to reflect AU positions as envisaged under the China–AU strategic dialogue framework. In 2011 China and the AU initiated an annual security seminar series focused on cooperation on non-traditional security issues, with the inaugural session hosted by the Chinese ministries of National Defence and Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{48}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure21.png}
\caption{Chinese transfers of major conventional weapons to sub-Saharan Africa, 1954–2013}
\textit{Note}: The graph shows the 5-year moving average, plotted at the last year of each 5-year period. The SIPRI trend-indicator value measures the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons. See also the notes to table A.4 in the appendix in this volume.
\end{figure}


Table 2.1. The main recipients of Chinese major conventional weapons in sub-Saharan Africa, 2004–2008 and 2009–13

Figures are percentages shares of the total volume of Chinese arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Arms transfers

China has provided major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa since the 1960s (see figure 2.1).\(^{49}\) The number of recipients has been relatively limited, and the transfers have fluctuated over time, reflecting a few large arms transfers to two or three countries at a time (see table 2.1). The largest deliveries since the 1960s were made in the early 1970s (to Sudan and Tanzania) and in the early 1980s (to Somalia, Sudan and Tanzania).\(^{50}\) Since the early 2000s, there has been a renewed increase in transfers to a level roughly the same as in these two earlier peaks.

The volume of China’s exports of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa has been relatively small compared to that of other suppliers, in particular Russia. However, in recent years, China’s share has increased, from 5 per cent in 1989–1993 to 15 per cent in 2009–13. The Chinese share of supplies to sub-Saharan Africa apart from South Africa has increased to a higher share: from 7 per cent in 1989–93 to 18 per cent in 2009–13 (see table A.4 in the appendix).

\(^{49}\) The level and trend of Chinese arms transfers to Africa are difficult to assess due to lack of official data. China reports its transfers of major conventional weapons to the UN Register on Conventional Arms (UNROCA), but no official data is available on transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW). This section relies on data on major conventional weapons from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database for which UNROCA is one of several sources of data, while information on SALW is based on media and other secondary sources. On SALW see also Bromley, M., Duchâtel, M. and Holtom, P., China’s Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 38 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Oct. 2013).

China supplied major weapons to 16 states in sub-Saharan Africa in 2006–10, 7 more than any other arms exporter. The supply of an estimated 15 F-7MG combat aircraft to Nigeria and an estimated 12 F-7MGs to Namibia accounted for 66 per cent of all Chinese exports of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa over that period. An unknown quantity of SALW and 6 D-30 122-mm guns were transferred to Sierra Leone in 2010.

Chinese arms transfers to Africa have also broadened in recent years to include the donation of military equipment. For instance, 128 military trucks were transferred to Uganda between 2002 and 2007. Also, Sierra Leone received one patrol boat in 2006 and Nigeria a donation of $3 million worth of military equipment, including vehicles and communications equipment in 2005.

China’s military and security relations in Africa have attracted criticism from the international community in recent years. Most notably, its arms sales to some African countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and Zimbabwe, have come under scrutiny from human rights advocacy groups as well as Western governments. China has maintained that it abides by international regulations and refrains from exporting military equipment to areas on which the UN Security Council has imposed arms embargoes. China has sought to improve its arms export regulations through aligning its arms export control policies with those of international best practices over the past decade, and events in Sudan and Zimbabwe have increased official sensitivity to international public opinion. Still, China’s overarching view on arms transfers to African countries remains consistent with its foreign policy principles and the commercial logic of seeing such transfers as legitimate. This is reflected in the official

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54 Shinn (note 37), p. 168.

55 For a comprehensive overview of China’s arms transfers to Africa see Taylor, L, ‘China’s arms transfers to Africa and political violence’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 25, no. 3 (2013), pp. 457–75.


response to the Zimbabwean case, which saw the supply of weapons as ‘part of the normal arms trade between China and Zimbabwe’ and that ‘the Chinese Government always adopts a prudent and responsible attitude towards arms export and one of the important principles it adheres to is non-interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries’.  

Future trends and developments in Chinese arms transfers to Africa remain hazy, not least because of the high level of secretiveness associated with arms deals and wider national security issues in Africa. Still, emerging patterns suggest increased interest in and targeting of Africa by Chinese arms companies. This has been visible through the increased use of Africa-specific marketing techniques by Chinese arms companies at recent major arms exhibitions. For instance, at the 2010 Africa Aerospace and Defence fair in South Africa, China had the largest contingent (10) of foreign exhibitors and a national pavilion for the first time. This pattern was repeated at the Eurosatory International arms exhibition in France in 2010 and the 2011 International Defence Exhibition in the United Arab Emirates. At these exhibitions, Chinese companies distributed brochures containing pictures of African soldiers and police officers with Chinese-manufactured equipment and arms. Overall, it appears that some of the criticisms against Chinese arms transfers to Africa expose the lack of coordination between the Chinese arms industry ‘business-as-usual’ considerations (i.e. market access and sales and competitiveness) and the government’s broader political interests and policy framework.

**Peace operations and anti-piracy operations**

China has neither military bases nor combat troops in Africa; however, it has been a significant contributor to multilateral (UN-mandated) peace operations in Africa. China’s perspectives and participation in peace operations slowly evolved after it took its seat in the UN in 1971—moving from initial suspicion of peace operations to gradually acknowledging their value and embracing the need for participation and the development of the requisite capacity. China established its Peacekeeping Affairs Office in 2001, joined the UN standby arrangement system in 2002 and created a peacekeeping centre in its Ministry of National Defence in 2009.

China’s contribution of military observers, civilian police and support troops to UN missions has grown progressively since 2002, especially since the publication of its 2006 defence white paper (see figure 2.2). As of

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60 Saferworld (note 36), p. 72.

61 Chinese State Council (note 21), chapter IV.
December 2013, China had a total of 2078 personnel involved in UN missions. This continues the decade-long trend of China being the largest contributor to peace operations among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. China is also a major funder of UN peace operations: in 2010 China contributed $80 million to the regular UN budget and an additional $300 million as peacekeeping contributions; and in the list of assessed financial contributors to UN peacekeeping operations for 2013 it ranked sixth (with a contribution of 6.6 per cent)—behind the USA (28 per cent), Japan (11 per cent), France (7.2 per cent), Germany (7.1 per cent) and the United Kingdom (6.7 per cent). Africa has hosted the majority of China’s participation in multilateral peace operations since 2000, largely because the continent hosts up to 70 per cent of UN peace personnel and resources. As of December 2013 African states hosted 8 of the 16 peace operations conducted by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and 78 per cent of their

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**Figure 2.2.** Chinese personnel deployed on United Nations peace operations, by type, 2001–13

*Note:* The graph shows numbers of personnel deployed on operations conducted by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations as of 31 Dec. of each year.


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personnel. Chinese personnel have been involved in peace operations in Burundi, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Western Sahara. According to the 2012 defence white paper, as of December 2012 a total of 1842 PLA officers and men were implementing peacekeeping tasks in nine UN mission areas. Among them were 78 military observers and staff officers, 218 engineering and medical personnel for the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), 558 engineering, transport and medical personnel for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 335 engineering and medical personnel for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 338 engineering and medical personnel for the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and 315 engineering personnel for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

China has yet to deploy combat troops to UN peace operations; its contribution thus far has been restricted to providing military observers, civilian police and troops performing humanitarian support functions (i.e. post-conflict reconstruction, transport and logistics, health care, and search and rescue—see figure 2.2). In June 2013, however, China publicly expressed its interest to provide combat troops to the newly established UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), if requested by the DPKO.

A corollary of China’s involvement in peace operations is its expanding role in peacebuilding activities. China aligns its participation in peace operations to its development-led approach to peacebuilding. This has been manifested in Chinese deployment of non-combat troops (i.e. medical, transport and engineering teams) and police officers and the rebuilding of socio-economic infrastructures (e.g. schools, roads, hospitals, bridges, waterworks and agriculture). Between 2002 and 2010, Chinese peacekeepers built and repaired over 8700 kilometres of roads and 270 bridges, cleared over 8900 mines and various explosive devices, transported over 600 000 tonnes of cargo across 9.3 million km, and treated 79 000 patients, largely concentrated in Africa. At the bilateral level, China provides financial, technical and material support to African countries recovering from armed conflicts. For example, China cancelled bilateral debts owed it by Sierra Leone and signed eight financing assistance agreements between 2001 and 2007, which involved grants and interest-free loans. China provided post-war Liberia with $4.5 million worth of budgetary support ($3 million in 2004 and $1.5 million in 2006) and granted the DRC a $9 bil

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66 Chinese State Council (note 22), chapter V.
69 Chinese State Council (note 21).
lion loan in 2008, albeit in exchange for cobalt and copper mining concessions in Katanga. China’s direct financial support tends to parallel the investment activities of Chinese companies in post-conflict African countries. In Angola, the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan, Chinese companies have invested in the extractive, transportation, electricity, telecommunications and overall infrastructural development of the countries.

To be sure, China’s expanding military, political and economic ties in Africa will need to be better managed to complement its recent efforts to contribute to peace support and to support peacekeeping norms in Africa. UN officials report some frustration at their lack of access to the details of the extensive bilateral military-to-military ties between China and the various African countries where its peacekeepers are also deployed (e.g. the DRC, Liberia and Sudan). It is, therefore, unclear whether the bilateral military engagements complement China’s peacekeeping activities and the UN’s peace and security activities in Africa. Together with the Chinese Permanent Mission to the UN, UN officials are exploring ways to support security sector reform and issues related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in many of these fragile states. The Chinese delegation has reportedly not been obstructive; at the same time, it has not taken any major initiative in this area.

China also participates in international anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. The multilateral nature of this makes it consistent with China’s foreign policy principles. In December 2008 China joined other major powers involved in the anti-piracy task force—primarily the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) member countries—to safeguard the security of Chinese vessels and ships involved in transporting humanitarian-related World Food Programme supplies through the Gulf of Aden. According to China’s 2010 defence white paper,

as of December 2010, the Chinese Navy has dispatched, in 7 sorties, 18 ship deployments, 16 helicopters, and 490 Special Operation Force soldiers on escort missions. Through accompanying escort, area patrol and on-board escort, the Chinese Navy has provided protection for 3139 ships sailing under Chinese and foreign flags, rescued 29 ships from pirate attacks and recovered 9 ships released from captivity.

In support of Chinese anti-piracy efforts, the Government of the Seychelles is reported to have invited China to establish a forward-operating

70 Saferworld (note 36), pp. 85–87.
72 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations officials, Interviews with author, New York, 3 Apr. 2009.
73 Chinese State Council (note 21).
base on Mahé for its anti-piracy naval operations. China is reported to be studying the offer.\(^{74}\)

**Conflict settlement**

As China broadens and deepens its engagement with Africa, it is inevitably exposed to the internal political and security realities of Africa, which continues to confront fragmented violence and tensions within and between countries. China’s huge investment in the energy sector and demand for raw materials and natural resources increases its exposure to internal security issues in Africa. Examples of direct Chinese exposure to such scenarios abound: in 2004 rebels abducted Chinese workers in Southern Sudan; in April 2006 the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in southern Nigeria detonated a bomb in protest at a Chinese investment of $2.2 billion in oil fields in the area; in July 2006 violent protests and deaths occurred at the Chinese-owned Chambisi copper mine in Zambia; in April 2007 the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) killed Chinese oil engineers in a Sinopec (China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation) oil field in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia; and in 2008 China evacuated 212 of its citizens from Chad after armed clashes in N’djamena.\(^{75}\)

These incidents underline the blurred divide between the security and economic dynamic in African countries; China being wittingly or unwittingly and covertly or overtly drawn into or affected by security challenges; and the reality of desired and undesired security-related costs and obligations imposed on China by the region’s volatile political environment. Finally, they raise the possibilities of lack of coordination between the economic activities of the Chinese Government and the private sector, and Chinese security-related strategy, policies and activities in Africa. This raises further questions about the extent to which the Chinese Government is in full control of overseas economic activities by firms that are often partially or wholly owned by Chinese provincial and municipal governments.\(^{76}\)

Despite China’s principle of political non-interference, it appears that the realities of internal security challenges in a number of African countries are slowly influencing the interpretation and application of Chinese policy and approach to African conflict. In the Darfur conflict, for instance, Chinese President Hu Jintao outlined in 2007 the four principles underlining China’s approach to resolving the Darfur crisis and African conflicts gener-

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ally: respect for national sovereignty; peaceful settlement through dialogue and consultation on an equal basis; constructive roles to be played by the AU and UN; and safeguarding regional stability and the livelihoods of the local population. Chinese countenance of some ‘involvement’ or an ‘approach’ to managing conflicts in Africa appears to show China’s slow and cautious involvement in mediating African conflicts, especially those involving its trading partners and those with international ramifications. Rather than characterizing it as ‘interference’, some of China’s involvement has been termed as ‘influence’, such as the involvement of China in finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Darfur in 2007 and the brokering of a peace deal over disputed oil-rich border areas and oil pipeline charges between Sudan and South Sudan in August 2012. There would appear to be an economic logic to the policy changes and evolution, as China’s indifference towards insecurity (including armed conflicts) harms its economic interests by destroying bilateral relations, interrupting supplies of raw materials, generating animosity among local populations, and triggering humanitarian crises that damage China’s image as a responsible global actor.

In other instances, China has reflected and supported AU perspectives and positions on the resolution of African conflicts at the UN Security Council. Such positions often involve insistence on dialogue, negotiated settlement, and Africa-led or UN-mandated mediation and interventions. This is reflected in Chinese support for African positions on the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia and Zimbabwe; and its pro-AU position on the International Criminal Court (ICC), specifically, the rejection of the indictment and arrest warrant issued against President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan over the conflict in Darfur. Overall, Chinese policy on African conflict continues to be rooted in its core principles of preference for diplomacy (i.e. persuasion, cooperation, coordination and negotiation) over coercion, sanctions and unilateral action. In practice, however, China has exercised pragmatism, taking a case-by-case approach whereby contextual issues—such as the scale and scope of economic interests, humanitarian crises and strategic calculus (e.g. global public opinion, interests of major powers and regional politics)—influence policy choices.

77 Saferworld (note 36), p. 31; and ‘Hu puts forward principle on Darfur issue’, Xinhua, 5 Feb. 2007.
IV. Conclusions

As China’s diplomatic and business interests deepen in Africa, crafting appropriate policies to balance them is likely to become even more complicated. The goodwill earned by Chinese peacekeeping contingents repairing roads, improving other infrastructure and offering medical assistance, along with China’s broader policy in Africa, may be undermined by other activities of the Chinese Government or of the increasing number of Chinese state-owned companies, entrepreneurs and émigrés in the region. As with most major governments operating abroad, there are many challenges inherent in sharing information or coordinating policies on Africa across various Chinese governmental agencies and with the Chinese private sector.

China’s broadening and deepening of relations with Africa, including the security-related component, has attracted critical perspectives in Western policy and media outlets. There are also emerging critical perspectives and assertiveness by African countries in relation to negative aspects of Chinese economic activities in Africa. Such critical viewpoints are often about one or more of the motivations, activities and impacts of China’s security-related engagement with Africa. There are two broad strands: those that take a negative view (i.e. anti-China perspectives) and emerging literature that seeks a more balanced assessment of China’s security-related policies, activities and impact in Africa. There is a general consensus, as admitted by China, that economic interests connected with the supply of raw materials and new markets for Chinese industrial outputs are important motivations for China–Africa engagement. At the heart of the contention are China’s arms sales to some African regimes and its policy of non-interference, especially in relation to certain politically volatile states that are large exporters of raw materials.

The anti-Chinese perspective implies that the security-related policies and activities are variants or derivatives of the broader ‘predatory’ logic of China’s economic engagement with Africa—that security ties are intended to protect natural resource supply chains and Chinese investments in Africa’s extractive industry, with negative impacts on Africa’s security landscape. The advocates of a balanced overview of China–Africa relations, including security aspects, highlight that much of the literature and reporting on China–Africa relations is biased or misleading on account of their use of Western concepts and methodologies, inappropriate or incomplete data, and failure to relate it to China’s domestic dynamics, other external

80 E.g. the Government of South Sudan is reported to have expelled a Chinese oil company (Petrodar) executive for oil theft; the DRC expelled 2 Chinese commodity dealers from the Kivu region; and Gabon rejected a Chinese resource deal for being unfavourable to it. See ‘More than minerals’, The Economist, 23 Mar. 2013.
actors and China’s global context.\(^{81}\) There is a growing understanding that China’s role in African peace and security is neither wholly positive nor negative, and includes both strengths (such as peacekeeping, peacebuilding and cooperation with regional bodies) and challenges (such as the dilemma of end-uses of arms and non-interference in relation to internal political volatility in African countries).\(^{82}\)

Framed by China’s defence policy, as expressed in its biennial defence white papers, the sources of China’s security-related policy and activities in Africa include the FOCAC process and its 2006 Africa Policy. China’s security-related activities in Africa are implemented at the bilateral and multilateral levels in four key areas: military cooperation and capacity building, arms transfers, peace operations and anti-piracy operations, and conflict settlement. Chinese policy instruments and dynamics differ across the four areas, and there is as yet little evidence of proper coordination and alignment of policy and activities across these areas. However, the denominating factor appears to be a mixture of promoting African security—in order to secure natural resource supplies, trading, profit opportunities, investment and market access for Chinese firms (including defence firms)—while being sensitive to its principle of political non-interference. In practice, China’s approach is guided by shrewd pragmatism. Thus far, China’s security-related policy and activities in Africa appear to be shifting, if slowly, from initial indifference to persuasion and engagement in resolving peace and security challenges, as indicated by China’s role in conflicts in Sudan and between the DRC and Rwanda. Overall, China’s broad engagement with Africa, including security-related aspects, follows a consistent, yet slowly evolving, process that is sensitive to China’s foreign policy principles, African peculiarities, global realities and the responsibilities associated with China’s emerging international profile.

Chinese–African security engagement cannot be understood in isolation, but rather within the context of overall China–Africa relations, especially economic ties. Chinese economic interests—supplies of raw materials and opportunities for trade and investment—drive socio-political and security relations with Africa, notwithstanding Chinese principles of peaceful coexistence and political non-interference, and the rhetoric of common identity, shared history and a record of friendship with Africa. Chinese aid to Africa does not appear to be disbursed with any strategic intent. However, China’s core trading partners and recipients of FDI in Africa are largely rich in natural resources, and these natural resources (especially oil)


\(^{82}\) Saferworld (note 36), pp. i–ix.
dominate China’s imports from Africa. Still, the opportunities for trade and market access and profits for Chinese firms remain important and explain the multiplicity of Chinese actors and their interests in Africa. Chinese engagement with Africa is a puzzle; it combines negatives with positives, opportunism with principles, and exploitation with assistance.

Select bibliography

3. France

VINCENT BOULANIN

From decolonization through to the mid-1990s France developed and maintained uniquely close relationships with its former colonies in Africa. However, these relationships began to change following the end of the cold war and the emergence of a new generation of politicians in both Africa and France. France's current policy on Africa and its security-related activities in Africa need to be seen against this historical background. This chapter maps and puts in perspective France's recent involvement in Africa's security affairs.

Section I provides a brief survey of Franco-African relations from the independence of France's African colonies in the early 1960s and throughout the cold war. Section II presents and discusses France's policy on Africa in recent years, focusing on how its various components have evolved. Section III describes Franco-African defence and security-related agreements and some of the security-related activities for which they provide the legal framework: French military presence in Africa; French defence and security cooperation in Africa; and arms transfers from France to Africa. Section IV presents conclusions.


When the division of Africa between the colonial powers was established in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, France and the United Kingdom obtained the lion's share, with French presence concentrated in West and Central Africa. Although most countries became independent in 1960, the imperial vestiges survived decolonization and were directly transformed into a unique legal framework called ‘cooperation’. Reluctant to cut ties with former African colonies, French President Charles de Gaulle proposed

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1 In line with the rest of this volume, this chapter focuses on sub-Saharan Africa. It therefore does not cover French policy and activities in North Africa, which differ in many respects from those in sub-Saharan Africa.

2 The former French colonies in Africa are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo (in West Africa); Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo and Gabon (in Central Africa); the Comoros, Djibouti and Madagascar (in East Africa and the Indian Ocean); and Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (in North Africa).

that the newly emancipated countries sign agreements that maintained France’s influence over their economic, political or military affairs. This situation became known as *l’indépendance dans l’interdépendance* (independence within interdependence).4

**The pillars of France’s policy on Africa**

France’s post-colonial policy on Africa remained more or less unchanged until the end of the cold war. It was oriented primarily towards maintaining a sphere of influence in francophone countries—*le pré carré* (France’s African ‘backyard’), as President François Mitterrand famously called it. This policy created a post-colonial order in francophone Africa that in many ways replicated the French model—through the nature of francophone political systems, institutions and traditions inherited from France, through a uniquely close relationship between France and its former colonies, through close economic, political and military cooperation, and not least through a continued French military presence in several of these states.5

This policy had four pillars: political, monetary, development cooperation and military.6

*The political pillar*

The political pillar was managed primarily through high-level interpersonal relations. France’s policy on Africa was considered a *domaine réservé* (i.e. a policy area reserved for the president and the prime minister) that was managed through the African Cell in the Presidential Office at the Elysée Palace.7

Jacques Foccart was the Cell’s first head. Known as the ‘secret mastermind’ of France’s policy on Africa, he had direct and regular contact with African leaders and established extensive personal networks—called the *réseaux Foccart* (Foccart networks)—that were used as both an official and unofficial instrument of diplomacy.8 Foccart’s motto was ‘In Africa, one

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works with men not institutions’. His successors adopted the same approach, and official and unofficial high-profile interpersonal relations remained the main feature of Franco-African relations.

African leaders also learned how to use this informal system to influence French decisions. In return for their allegiance, France did not question their political longevity (e.g. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, France’s closest interlocutor in Africa, remained president of Côte d’Ivoire from 1960 to 1993) or the human rights situations in their countries.

The monetary pillar

The monetary pillar was, and continues to be, based on the CFA franc. The initials CFA currently stand for Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial Community), but they first stood for Colonies Françaises d’Afrique (French colonies of Africa) and then Communauté Française d’Afrique (French Community of Africa), reflecting the evolution of France’s relationship with the region. The West African CFA franc is used by eight of France’s former colonies in West Africa (i.e. all but Guinea) and the Central African CFA franc (which is equal in value to, and effectively interchangeable with, the West African franc) is used by the five former French colonies in Central Africa and Equatorial Guinea.

The CFA franc has been set at a fixed exchange rate with French currency (first the franc and then the euro) since it was established in 1945. This arrangement, guaranteed by the French Treasury, has served to protect and boost trade both within the CFA franc zone itself and between French companies and countries in the zone.

The development pillar

In development cooperation, France set up an extensive scheme of economic aid and assigned coopérants (cooperation assistants)—that is, technical assistants, teachers, doctors and administrative personnel—to support African institutions in key economic, military, cultural and administrative affairs. The expertise of these coopérants was fundamental in the establishment of the state apparatus of the former colonies after independence. Most of the state institutions in these countries are to a large extent replicates—in their organization or mandate—of their counterparts in France. Until the 1990s, former French African colonies remained incontestably the main recipient of French development aid.


10 E.g. Omar Bongo (President of Gabon, 1967–2009), Léopold Sédar Senghor (President of Senegal, 1960–80) as well as Houphouët-Boigny each had special access to the Elysée Palace. Gouttebrune (note 6), p. 1038.
The military pillar

The military pillar was based on a series of defence agreements and military cooperation agreements concluded with the former colonies soon after their independence (see section III below). The defence agreements provided the legal basis for French military presence and military interventions in African countries and for France to become, de facto, Africa’s gendarme during the cold war and also in many ways the proxy gendarme of the West.11

Through the military cooperation agreements France offered to train, support and provide military equipment for the build-up of national armed forces in the newly independent African states. Such cooperation resulted in a security sector that was modelled on the French system and served, it has been argued, ‘to build up units that could work closely with French units and effectively serve as branches of the French army overseas’.12 Overall, these agreements normalized French engagement in African defence and security affairs.

French justifications for its policy on Africa

France has used both humanitarian and geopolitical arguments to justify its policy towards its former African colonies.13 The spreading of its language and values was for France a vehicle for French grandeur and prestige.14 Behind the cooperation policy, many clientelistic relationships also existed, with France indirectly buying votes or informal support at the United Nations in order to become more audible on an international scene dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States.15

Economic motivations for foreign aid were downplayed in French official discourse, such as in the influential Jeanneney Report, commissioned by the French Government and published in 1963.16 This report, characterized as the most important statement of French aid policy at the time, dismissed

arguments that French foreign aid was justified for economic reasons and argued that French support for the franc zone was no longer in French national economic interest. While some companies certainly earned profits in Africa, from the French national economic perspective it made more sense to focus financial aid on countries such as Greece or Mexico that were experiencing more rapid growth. This view has since been challenged and it has been shown that French business cooperation with former African colonies was highly profitable for both the French public and private sectors.

The exploitation of natural resources was of vital importance for French foreign aid to Africa. Through its relationships with its former colonies, France accessed oil (primarily in Gabon) and uranium (mainly in Niger but also in Gabon)—two of the most economically and strategically crucial types of natural resource in the cold war era. The contemporary leading positions of the French energy firms Total (petroleum) and Areva (civil nuclear energy) would not have been possible without France’s early exploitation of natural resources in its former colonies.

II. French policy on Africa since the 1990s

In the mid-1990s France’s policy on Africa slowly began to change, mostly in response to post-cold war developments in international relations. France found its policy on Africa costly, and it was subject to criticism and opposition in Africa and at home. After the end of the cold war France could no longer justify its support of African governments with poor records in economic and social development as well as in human rights. It became necessary to initiate some changes in Franco-African relationships with the aim of maintaining French influence.

In 1994 France decided to devalue the CFA franc. This change in monetary policy towards its former colonies significantly reduced the cost to France of the exchange rate arrangement and, as such, was seen as a necessary measure to make France’s policy on Africa more affordable. Although the official aim of the devaluation was to increase the competitiveness of countries in the CFA franc zone on the global market, these countries interpreted the devaluation as a betrayal. It struck hard those coun-

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17 Hayter (note 13), p. 11.
20 Chafer (note 7), pp. 172–74.
tries with a strong dependence on export of agricultural goods (e.g. cacao or cotton) and it sharply reduced the purchasing power of these countries, since they imported mostly finished goods.23

France’s withdrawal from its traditional role in Africa can be seen most clearly in the development pillar. Three distinct changes reflect the decrease in the official privileging of France’s African pré carré. First, in 1990, during the French–African Summit held in La Baule, France, President Mitterrand proposed attaching additional conditions to France’s support by making a clear link between development aid and democratization.24 Furthermore, the Abidjan Doctrine, announced in 1993 by the Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, made the provision of French development aid contingent on the recipient signing agreements with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.25 Second, in 1998 France reformed its cooperation policy and established the zone de solidarité prioritaire (ZSP, priority solidarity zone), a policy whereby countries would qualify for development aid based on their level of poverty, not on their historical connection with France.26 Third, France began to delegate the provision and management of its contribution to development to the European Union (EU). The role of the EU in French development cooperation policy has grown, and French development aid is now increasingly channelled through the European Development Fund (EDF), a bureaucratic and technocratic institution that is less driven by pure political motivation. France also increasingly relies on the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The military pillar of France’s policy on Africa took a significant turn following Opération Turquoise, the French intervention in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Officially, the intervention was justified by the need to create a safe zone for refugees; in practice, it permitted many of those

responsible for the genocide to flee to Zaire. The nature of France’s involvement in Rwanda was criticized both internationally and domestically, and France lost much of its credibility as Africa’s gendarme. It began to reduce its military presence in Africa agreed through bilateral arrangements, shifting instead to multilateral missions, and it began to place a stronger emphasis on the training and support of African armed forces.

In 1996 President Jacques Chirac declared that ‘the era of unilateral interventions’ was over. Since then, France has been more cautious and has tried to multilateralize its military interventions, or at least to get the support of the international community—be it the African Union (AU), the EU or the UN. In order to reduce their political and economic costs, France has sought to persuade other countries to participate in its interventions.

For example, in 1997 France launched the RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix, Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities) programme (see section IV below). The purpose of RECAMP was to assist African countries to assume greater military responsibility for regional and national security. However, this demonstrable trend towards multilateralization and Africanization (such as the increasing reliance on African troops for military interventions) did not necessarily mean that France wished to diminish its influence in Africa. Rather, the purpose of these policy changes was to improve the conditions for maintaining its military influence by reducing the political and economic cost.

In 2008, in a white paper on defence and national security, France openly expressed it intention to revise the existing Franco-African defence agreements and military cooperation framework, notably, in order to include its growing concern for its internal security matters (e.g. illegal immigration, terrorism, criminality) in its national security agenda (see sections III and IV).

Finally, the political pillar of France’s policy on Africa, and in particular its interpersonal dimension, was seriously affected during the 1990s. The expression la Françafrique—which had been formulated in 1973 to describe the close ties between France and Africa—was reformulated in 1994 by critics as la France-à-fric (France, the moneymaker) to denounce the immoral dimension of the interpersonal relationships that French presidents and their networks had maintained with corrupt and undemocratic

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30 Châtaignier (note 26), pp. 251–52.
31 Charbonneau (note 25), p. 117.
regimes during the cold war. In addition, by the 1990s France’s main economic and strategic interests in Africa had moved outside the traditional pré carré. Thus, interpersonal contacts and intangible support to corrupt and undemocratic regimes no longer served the interests of France’s big companies in the same way that they had before. For example, as the oil reserves of Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo and Gabon began to run dry, Total (France’s largest petroleum company) started to focus on Angola and Nigeria.

The political figures who embodied the interpersonal Franco-African relations have since left office, and their successors are reluctant to follow this diplomatic pattern. Current African leaders generally do not belong to the personal network of the French president. On the French side, the new political generation did not grow up with esteem for the colonial age. This became clear with the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–12). Neither he nor his successor, President François Hollande, had any particular interest in Africa. However, despite Sarkozy’s engagement in a new policy on Africa (under which he introduced more equal partnership and eliminated the interpersonal network systems), he did not challenge the system whereby France’s policy on Africa is directed from the Elysée Palace. In contrast, the dissolution of the African Cell was one of Hollande’s first Africa-related decisions, indicating that relations with African states would be managed via regular diplomatic channels as opposed to interpersonal contacts.

While France’s contemporary policy on Africa has been reformed and restructured in many ways, it has not undergone radical change. This is particularly relevant as regards French security-related activities in Africa. As the following section shows, France may have changed particular aspects of its military involvement in African affairs, but it has not renounced its influential role.

III. French security-related activities in Africa

France’s security-related activities in Africa are still based on the legal framework established during decolonization. The activities fall under three main areas: direct military presence and involvement, indirect mili-

34 Ayad, C., ‘L’Afrique ne se gouverne plus à L’Elysée’ [Africa is no longer governed from the Elysée Palace], Libération, 17 June 2009.
36 Berthemet, T., ‘La semaine Africaine de François Hollande’ [François Hollande’s African week], Le Figaro, 3 July 2012.
tary involvement through defence and security cooperation, and arms transfers.

The legal framework: Franco-African security-related agreements

The legal framework for French security-related activities in Africa is made up of three types of bilateral defence and security agreement that France signed with its former colonies soon after their independence: legally binding defence agreements, non-binding military cooperation agreements, and various defence- and security-related agreements dealing with specific details of Franco-African relations.37

The defence agreements provide a legal basis for a French military presence in the ‘partner’ (i.e. host) country.38 They regulate the status of French military bases and the right of movement of French troops and the right to use land and infrastructure for military exercises. The agreements also regulate the conditions for French military interventions.39 Until 2008, under Sarkozy’s presidency, three kinds of event could lead to the implementation of a defence agreement: ‘an internal crisis situation’, ‘a military rebellion supported from abroad’ or ‘aggression by a foreign state’.40 However, the decision to implement an agreement was at France’s discretion.41

In 2008 Sarkozy announced that defence agreements with former colonies were obsolete and should be revised, stating that French military intervention for internal security reasons was no longer conceivable, and declaring that the content of the new agreements should be made public.42 The 2008 white paper confirmed this change in policy.43 Between 2009 and 2012 France renewed defence agreements with Cameroon, the Central

37 The defence agreements and the military cooperation agreements are registered in an online database of the French Ministry of Foreign Affair called PACTE (i.e. meaning pact or treaty in French). However, the texts of the agreements are not available in full. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French base treaties and agreements, <http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/Traites/Accords_Traites.php>.
38 A full list of French defence agreements up to 2008 is available in French Government (note 32), pp. 167–68.
40 Dulait et al. (note 39).
41 This is according to an interview in 2006 with the Supreme Commander Général Henri Bentégéat. Dulait et al. (note 39), p. 9. See also Glaser and Smith (note 11), pp. 81–82.
African Republic (CAR), the Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal and Togo. Most of these are registered in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) online database PACTE, but their content is not fully available. Defence agreements with Benin, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mauritania and Niger were cancelled in the 1970s for political, ideological or economic reasons.

The military cooperation agreements, also known as ‘military technical assistance agreements’, regulate three types of French military assistance: (a) technical assistance (e.g. military personnel); (b) material support (e.g. grant aid, licences for the production for military equipment and refurbishment); and (c) education and training of African military officers. These agreements are non-binding and can be revoked by either party at any time. France has made this type of agreement mostly with former French and Belgian colonies, but also with some anglophone countries, including Kenya and South Africa. A state that has revoked its defence agreement with France has often kept its military cooperation agreement.

**France’s military presence**

French military presence in Africa takes two forms: (a) permanent military bases, that is the pre-positioned dispositifs or Forces de Présence (Standby Forces), and (b) deployment of military forces in response to a crisis or emergency—the Opérations Extérieures (OPEX, External Operations).

**Permanent military bases**

The main responsibilities of the troops stationed at permanent French military bases in African countries, as regulated by the bilateral defence agreements, can be summarized as (a) the provision of defence and security for French assets and citizens; (b) intervention to defend the territorial integrity or public order of the host country; (c) training and logistical sup-

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45 PACTE database (note 37).


47 PACTE database (note 37).

48 The term OPEX previously stood for ‘exceptional operations’ since the missions were meant to be temporary. However, since some of them turned out to be more permanent, the term ‘external operation’ has been preferred. Hébert, J.-P., ‘20 milliards d’euros pour les Opex depuis 1976’ [€20 billion for OPEX since 1976], _Le débat stratégique_, no. 96 (Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherches sur la Paix et d’Etudes Stratégiques: Paris, 2008).
port for the armed forces of the host country; and (d) support for French or multilateral operations in the country or region. The bases serve as a point of departure for OPEX. As such, they provide a suitable environment for training, education and acclimatization of French troops, and for their acquisition of knowledge of the region based on field experience and intelligence. With French troops and logistics already on the ground, the bases also facilitate a lead role for France in multilateral operations (e.g. the EU force in Chad and the CAR in 2007–2009).

Since the mid-1990s, it has been French policy to reduce reliance on direct military presence (and thus on permanent military bases) and instead provide security sector assistance to help increase the capacity of African armed forces. The end of conscription in 1996 and the professionalization of the French armed forces have also contributed to a reduction in the number of French troops stationed in Africa. Thus, there has been a continuous fall in French troop deployments at permanent military bases in Africa since the end of the cold war: from 15 000 at the end of the 1980s to approximately 8300–8800 in 1997, 5080 by July 2009 and 3150 in August 2012.

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50 Dumoulin (note 46), pp. 20–25.

51 French Government (note 32), p. 156.

52 Dumoulin (note 46), p. 23.

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**Table 3.1. Permanent French military bases in sub-Saharan Africa, 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Presence agreed (year)</th>
<th>No. of troops deployed</th>
<th>Major military equipment deployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1 900</td>
<td>7 Mirage-2000 combat aircraft, 1 C-160 transport aircraft, 2 Gazelle helicopters, 6 Puma helicopters, 2 landing craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>No detailed information; main equipment: Fennec and Puma helicopters, Transall transport aircraft, Sagaie light armoured vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1 Atlantique 2 naval patrol aircraft, 1 C-160 transport aircraft, 1 Casa, 1 landing craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 150</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 2012, France had three permanent military bases left in Africa: in Djibouti, Gabon and Senegal (see table 3.1). A fourth base in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, was closed in June 2009. After several years of discussion on whether it should be closed or not, in July 2011 the base in Senegal was turned into an operational regional cooperation centre. The number of troops was reduced, but the capacity to host and command forces for military intervention was retained.

External operations

The OPEX interventions have a long and controversial history. Since the independence of the former French colonies in Africa, France has carried out more than 20 military interventions in African countries—almost exclusively in the former French colonies (see table 3.2). Some of these interventions lasted only a few days, others years.

The French motivations for these differed from case to case. In an examination of past OPEX interventions, a 1997 report identified five motives: (a) to defend the territorial integrity of an African partner country (e.g. Chad in 1986); (b) to support an African regime facing internal rebellion (e.g. Gabon in 1964); (c) to support a military coup against an African regime (e.g. the CAR in 1979); (d) to protect and rescue French or other Western citizens and assets (e.g. Zaire in 1978) or the local population; and (e) to pursue strategic goals (e.g. the Gulf of Aden in 2008).

There was a reduction in France's deployment of OPEX globally between the 1990s and 2012, from an annual average of 12 600 troops during the period 1993–2009 to roughly 7000 troops in 2012, with about one-third in Africa. In 2012 France had five major external operations in Africa, of which four had a national mandate: Opération Epervier in Chad (950 military personnel in 2012); Opération Licorne in Côte d'Ivoire (450); Opération Boali in the CAR (240); Opération Corymbe in the Gulf of Guinea (150); and one under a UN mandate, Opération Atalante in the Gulf of Aden (400). The level and trend in French Government expenditure on

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53 French Ministry of Defence, ‘Les forces armées en Côte d’Ivoire’ [Military forces in Côte d’Ivoire], 20 July 2012, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/cote-d-ivoire/dossier/les-forces-francaises-en-cote-d-ivoire>. Some sources also include N’Djamena in Chad as a permanent base, since French troops have been deployed there since 1986, but this deployment is officially considered an OPEX intervention.


55 Omballa (note 3), p. 60.

56 See also Dumoulin (note 46), p. 78.


58 French Ministry of Defence (note 57).
Table 3.2. France’s major External Operations in sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operation name</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operation name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td></td>
<td>1992–93</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Oryx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968–72</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Limousin, Bison</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Bajoyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Verveine</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Chimère, Volcan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Lamentin</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Amaryllis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Leopard</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Turquoise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978–80</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Tachaud</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Azalée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–81</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Barracuda</td>
<td>1996–2007</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Aramis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Manta</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Congo, Rep. of</td>
<td>Pélican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986–</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Épervier</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Khor-Angar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Osde</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Malachite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Requin</td>
<td>2002–</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Licorne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–93</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Noroît</td>
<td>2002–</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Boali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Godoria</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Artemis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAR = Central African Republic, DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo.


OPEX missions are not known, since these are not included in the regular French defence expenditure but are treated as ‘additional’ or ‘exceptional’ costs.\(^59\)

Since its Rwanda intervention in 1994, France has tried to reduce the political and economic costs of its military involvement in Africa and to multilateralize its approach to military intervention by seeking the support of the international community and the AU. There are two exceptions that represent, in many ways, a continuation of France’s old-fashioned involvement in African affairs: Opération Épervier and Opération Licorne. These are both the oldest and the largest OPEX deployments in Africa. In both cases, France intervened and used force to support the official regime against rebels competing for power.\(^60\) France also sought international sup-

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\(^59\) Hébert (note 48).
\(^60\) N’Diaye (note 5), pp. 19–20.
port only after the operation had been launched. These two operations show that the trend towards multilateralization should not be seen as a substitution strategy, but rather as a complement to France’s traditional approach to Africa.

**France’s defence and security cooperation with African countries**

Two institutions share responsibility for France’s defence and security cooperation with African countries: the Direction de la cooperation de sécurité et de défense (DCSD, Directorate for Security and Defence Cooperation), which is attached to the MFA but managed by military personnel detached from the Ministry of Defence (MOD); and the MOD via its service for international relations of the État-major des armées (EMA, Defence Staff). The DCSD manages conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, while the EMA is in charge of cooperation at the operational level (e.g. of the organization of joint military exercises and of armaments matters).

**Defence and security cooperation in Africa through the DCSD**

The official objectives of French defence and security cooperation, according to the DCSD’s mandate, is to (a) promote adherence to the rule of law, human rights and individual freedoms; (b) help strengthen the defence and security sector in the partner country; (c) help optimize the use of defence and security structures; (d) promote French arms exports; (e) promote French approaches to defence and security matters; and (f) teach French language in military environments.

In addition to these official objectives, this cooperation can also be seen in the context of broader French security considerations. Since the publication of the 2008 white paper, France has addressed internal and external concerns in a more integrated fashion. Its military cooperation agenda has been enlarged to encompass, if not give priority to, police-related tasks dealing with issues such as illegal migration, piracy, drug trafficking, militant Islamic fundamentalism and financial crime.

The thematic priorities vary across Africa. According to a DCSD official, in the Sahel, ‘countering the development of Islamist threats’ is the top pri-
In this light, France supports improving internal security (e.g. by providing equipment to police and other law enforcement forces), training nomadic guards (i.e. security forces that are supposed to meet the protection needs of nomad populations and are therefore trained to work in remote and difficult areas), developing a fleet of light aircraft and improving the mobility of security forces and the quality of radio transmissions.

Although no specific figures have been communicated by the DCSD to support this, the DCSD projects in the Sahel are the most privileged in terms of budgetary allocations. In the Gulf of Guinea, the top two priorities are internal security and anti-piracy. In Central Africa—Cameroon, the CAR, the Republic of the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—security sector reform (SSR) and the establishment of training centres are at the top of the agenda. In Djibouti and Madagascar the priorities are internal security and anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

The main types of activity conducted by the DCSD include training and educating military officers, soldiers and high-level officials; providing various consultancy services to defence and internal security communities; giving minor support to African international organizations (the AU and Regional Economic Communities); and providing technical and sales sup-

### Table 3.3. Number of French military coopérants in Africa and globally, 1998–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the World</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>637</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


63 DCSD interview (note 61).
64 See e.g. French Embassy in Chad, ‘Le projet Garde National Nomade Tchadienne’ [The project national and nomadic guard of Chad], [n.d.], <http://www.ambafrance-td.org/spip.php?page=mobile_art&art=663>.
65 DCSD interview (note 61).
port for French arms exports. In anglophone countries, the DCSD's main activity is teaching French to military personnel in order to facilitate greater integration of anglophone and francophone forces in African peacekeeping operations.

Training and education is the core activity, accounting for approximately 60 per cent of the DCSD's total budget. While military coopérants play a key role in training and education, their number in sub-Saharan Africa has been reduced in recent years (see table 3.3). Sub-Saharan Africa is France's highest priority region, receiving 79 per cent of French military coopérants worldwide in 2012.

The DCSD funds more than 3000 internships for African officers in French military schools annually—roughly half of these take place in France and the other half in Africa. The schools in Africa, the Écoles Nationales à Vocation Régionales (ENVR), were created in 1997 in order to shift training of African officers from France to Africa, and so reduce the cost and adapt the content of the training to African conditions. Each of these schools, which have so far only been located in francophone Africa, has a special focus, such as peacekeeping in Bamako, Mali, and mine-clearing in Ouidag, Benin.

Support for training of peacekeeping forces and security sector reform

In 1997 France launched RECAMP, a capacity-building programme aimed at supporting the development of an African peacekeeping force under the jurisdiction of the AU and in collaboration with the UN. The programme involves training of military personnel (via seminars organized by French or French-supported African military schools), operational field training and material support (lent to peacekeeping forces). RECAMP has been described as a solution designed to ‘avoid French meddling into African affairs’. It has also been argued that RECAMP reflects a hierarchical Franco-African relationship, since France decides the agenda of RECAMP activities and, through the programme, retains ownership of the means of legitimate violence (e.g. African troops do not buy, but only borrow, French military equipment for their operations). In that perspective, RECAMP is

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67 DCSD interview (note 61); and French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 62).
70 Charbonneau (note 25), p. 113.
71 Charbonneau (note 25), p. 117.
Over time, there has been a gradual multilateralization of the training activities originally conducted under RECAMP. In 2008 the EU assumed responsibility over the major training cycle at the strategic level, under the name of EURORECAMP, while France remains responsible for operational and tactical training under its original RECAMP name. Furthermore, within the AU–EU strategic partnership, some of the EURORECAMP tools are used for the common training activities to strengthen the capacity of the African Standby Force—Amani Africa (meaning ‘peace in Africa’ in Kiswahili).

France has been late to adopt the SSR concept and provide support for it. It was not until 2008 that the French Government finally announced a French approach to what in France is called security system reform, and the initiation of French support for SSR activities in Burundi, the CAR, the

Figure 3.1. French transfers of major conventional weapons to sub-Saharan Africa, 1954–2013

Note: The graph shows the 5-year moving average, plotted at the last year of each 5-year period. The SIPRI trend-indicator value measures the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons. See also the notes to table A.4 in the appendix in this volume.


seen as a means for France to legitimize, justify and maintain its military presence in Africa.\(^{72}\)

72 Charbonneau (note 25), p. 117.


Republic of the Congo, the DRC and Guinea-Bissau. French support for SSR activities primarily covers the restructuring of armed forces, gendarmerie and police. France’s previous lack of interest in SSR largely explains why francophone African countries were late to engage in real security sector transformation—a process that anglophone countries had already begun in the 1990s.

**Arms transfers**

France is no longer a major supplier of arms to sub-Saharan Africa. This is a major change from the cold war era, when France was the sole supplier of major weapons to many francophone countries. French deliveries of major conventional weapons to sub-Saharan Africa peaked in the 1970s, dropped significantly during the 1980s and continued to decrease to a low level after the end of the cold war (see figure 3.1).

South Africa has been and remains the major recipient of French weapons. It received 45 per cent of France’s deliveries of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa in 1990–94 and 91 per cent in 2005–2009. Excluding South Africa, French deliveries of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa have been concentrated in West Africa, with some major deliveries also to Djibouti and Kenya in recent years (see table 3.4).

The number of recipients of major conventional weapons from France fell radically, from 21 countries in 1985–89 to 2–3 countries during the 2000s. However, during the most recent, shorter period (2010–13) the number of importers of French weapons increased to 11 countries (see table 3.4). The same trend is seen in France’s share of the total volume of major weapon deliveries to the region. Most of the French deliveries of major weapons to African countries during the period 2000–13 were second-hand platforms—primarily light aircraft for training or surveillance purposes, helicopters and military vehicles.

Two factors can explain the lower share of French supplies of major weapons to sub-Saharan countries since the end of the cold war. During the cold war, France regularly supplied arms to both authoritarian regimes and countries in conflict in Africa. France has since applied a more restrictive export policy towards African countries—with the notable exception of

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Chad, a country described as undemocratic, that has been found guilty of human rights abuses and that has been fighting a rebellion since 2003. Furthermore, EU or UN embargoes have been imposed on several of the African countries that previously were recipients of French weapons (i.e. the DRC, Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire). France has also shown a growing preference for leasing military equipment rather than selling and donating it as part of its military cooperation with African countries (e.g. via the RECAMP programme).

Another reason for the lower share emerges from the fact that sub-Saharan Africa is primarily a market for surplus weapons. Despite being one of the top exporters of major weapons in the world, France is a small player in the surplus arms market. There are two reasons for this: (a) the

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Table 3.4. Recipients of French transfers of major conventional weapons to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), 1985–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5-year period</th>
<th>No. of recipients</th>
<th>Main recipients&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (share of total)</th>
<th>Other recipients&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (share of total)</th>
<th>French share of total deliveries to the region (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985–89</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Nigeria (38%) Angola (12%) Gabon (12%) Kenya (12%)</td>
<td>Chad (7%)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–94</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Nigeria (26%) Mauritania (19%)</td>
<td>Niger (8%) Cameroon (6%)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–99</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>DRC (64%) Senegal (11%)</td>
<td>Madagascar (7%) Zimbabwe (7%) Botswana (5%)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Botswana (77%) Cameroon (23%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–2009</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cameroon (59%) Chad (31%) Senegal (11%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010–13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Benin (25%) Senegal (19%) Mauritania (14%) Kenya (10%)</td>
<td>Nigeria (9%) Djibouti (8%) Cameroon (8%)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo.

<sup>a</sup> ‘Main recipients’ are defined to be those states that received 10% or more of total French deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa. ‘Other recipients’ received more than 5% of deliveries but less than 10%.


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<sup>80</sup> E.g. SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/>.

long life-cycle of French military equipment, which makes them unsuitable for export once they are no longer used by the French armed forces, and (b) the fact that France’s export policy gives priority to the export of new equipment.\(^82\) Countries such as China, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine are among the largest suppliers in the surplus arms market. Unsurprisingly, these countries are the main suppliers of major conventional weapons to sub-Saharan Africa.\(^83\)

IV. Conclusions

Since the independence of its former colonies in Africa, France has been widely engaged in African security affairs, in particular in supporting African security establishments. During the cold war, France assumed a role as Africa’s gendarme on the basis of an Africa policy that included permanent military bases and frequent military interventions. This was regulated by a series of defence and military cooperation agreements that France signed with its former colonies during the decolonization period in the 1960s, replicating the French security system in francophone Africa as well as allowing it to take military action when considered necessary.

Since the mid-1990s France has tried to move away from what has often been described as a unilateral and patronizing approach to African affairs. One example of this is the review of its defence agreements and military cooperation agreements with African countries. France’s official stance is that French military cooperation with its former colonies should not be based on assistance but on cooperation between equal partners. The recent introduction of a French approach to SSR also indicates that France is changing its understanding of how security issues should be handled in a sustainable way. To reduce the political and economic costs of its military involvement in Africa, France has begun to seek support from and engage with the international community and African regional organizations when addressing security matters on the continent. This is seen in the cooperation with the EU in peacekeeping training programmes, RECAMP and EURORECAMP.

This Africanization and multilateralization of French military involvement in Africa does not mean that France is withdrawing from its aim to have an influential role in security-related issues on the continent. While France has reduced its physical military footprint—having closed several military bases—and reduced the numbers of soldiers deployed and military


\(^{83}\) Wezeman et al. (note 77).
coopérants, it still retains significant military capacities in sub-Saharan Africa. It is a major contributor of troops and logistical support for the conduct of multilateral operations on the continent and of training of military and security forces. Rather than renouncing its role as a key actor in Africa’s security, France has found alternative and more cost-effective ways to remain influential.

Select bibliography


Berthemet, T., ‘La semaine Africaine de François Hollande’ [François Hollande’s African week], Le Figaro, 3 July 2012.


Russia does not view sub-Saharan Africa as a priority for its foreign and security policy. Russian relations with sub-Saharan African states were at their lowest levels of engagement during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1992–99). Since 2000 Russia has taken steps to further develop ties with sub-Saharan African states in order to advance its geopolitical goals and economic interests. The first significant steps to re-engage with sub-Saharan Africa in the security sphere—especially with former recipients of Soviet arms and military assistance—were taken during Vladimir Putin's first two terms as president (2000–2008). Putin's successor, Dmitry Medvedev (2008–12), further increased the level of attention, and this has continued into Putin's third term. However, sub-Saharan Africa still ranks below all other regions of the world in Russia's foreign and security policy priorities. At the same time, Russian officials promote Russian contributions to peacekeeping in the region (including training for African peacekeepers), arms export possibilities, involvement in international anti-piracy operations and opportunities for Russian businesses in mineral exploration and exploitation and upgrading energy and power suppliers.

Section I of this chapter provides a historical overview of the policies of the Soviet Union and Russia in sub-Saharan Africa in the second half of the 20th century. Section II describes developments in Russia's policy since 2000, outlining some of the main motivations for Russian engagement with the region. Section III considers Russian security-related activities during the period 2000–12. It identifies the ministries and government agencies primarily involved in interactions with African states in relation to military and security issues and provides data on flows of major conventional weapons, military training, support for peace operations and participation in anti-piracy operations. Section IV offers conclusions.

I. Soviet and Russian foreign and security policy on sub-Saharan Africa, 1959–99

Sub-Saharan Africa was a relatively low strategic priority of the USSR for most of the cold war.1 There were two broad schools of thought in Soviet

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1 Although other members of the Soviet bloc—particularly Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic—played an important proxy role for the USSR regarding military and security relations with African states, these relationships are not discussed here.
policies towards the region—‘ideological’ and ‘strategic pragmatism’.\(^2\) The ideological school regarded the goal of establishing socialist states in Africa as the main driver of Soviet policy on Africa. The strategic pragmatist view treated the USSR as a realist actor that sought to maintain influence in certain countries that would enable peaceful coexistence and not result in direct conflict with the West. Both schools emphasized gaining and maintaining influence with friendly regimes in line with the Soviet Union’s regional and global ambitions and interests in competition with other powers. The ideological–strategic pragmatism distinctions can be used to generally characterize different periods in Soviet security relations with Africa because the nature of the interactions changed depending on such factors as who was in power in the Kremlin, domestic Soviet concerns, Soviet power-projection capabilities and the interests of African states themselves.\(^3\)


The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the Council of Ministers had ultimate responsibility for setting the framework for military assistance and arms exports, including deciding on suitable recipients, but state intermediaries were responsible for organizing and arranging arms exports.\(^4\) While the USSR reportedly donated small shipments of small arms and light weapons (SALW), parts and second-hand equipment to developing countries and to some armed liberation groups, it usually sold arms and military equipment at prices that ensured that costs were covered irrespective of the recipient’s politics.\(^5\) However, socialist countries were generally supplied with arms and military equipment as part of barter arrangements or on favourable credit terms (i.e. at low interest and with a long repayment period).\(^6\) It is as a result of these credit deals that countries in the developing world owed billions of dollars to the USSR when it collapsed.\(^7\)

Soviet and post-Soviet Russian military and security assistance to sub-Saharan Africa during the second half of the 20th century can be roughly divided into four periods. These periods correlate with trends in the flow of arms, military equipment and training from the Soviet bloc to sub-Saharan Africa—the most reliable available indicator of the state of relations (see figure 4.1 and section III below).\(^8\) In the first period, 1959–62, following the first round of independence, the volume of arms delivered was low. In the second period, 1963–71, the volume started to grow, but was still relatively low. In the third period, 1972–85, the volume of Soviet arms transfers increased significantly. In the final period, 1986–99, arms deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa fell dramatically (in line with total arms exports).

The first period of post-World War II interactions with sub-Saharan Africa (1959–62) coincided with the beginning of decolonization and a new global outlook in Soviet foreign policy. During this period, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev positioned the USSR as the champion of decolonization and a strong supporter of newly independent sub-Saharan African states with left-leaning leaders. Russian scholars point to the Soviet initiative in 1960 at the 15th session of the United Nations General Assembly to adopt the ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and

\(^4\) Kirshin (note 3), pp. 46–47.
\(^6\) The following sub-Saharan African states were considered to be socialist-orientated at some point during the cold war: Angola, Benin, the Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique, Somalia and Tanzania. Menon, R., Soviet Power and the Third World (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, 1986), p. 36; and Kirshin (note 3), p. 61.
\(^8\) Unless otherwise stated, data on arms transfers presented here is taken from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>. 
peoples’ as a key moment in Soviet interactions with Africa. The first instance of direct Soviet military assistance to a sub-Saharan African state occurred in 1960, when the USSR delivered military equipment to Guinea. Although this ideologically driven period of cooperation was short-lived, the deal with Guinea exhibited three characteristics that can also be found in contemporary interactions with other recipients of Soviet arms (e.g. Ghana, Mali and Sudan): (a) barter arrangements for arms transfers, (b) intra-bloc multiple donor specializations (i.e. there were divisions within the Soviet bloc in terms of who would supply whom and with what), and (c) an African recipient that looked to the USSR for military assistance but continued to look to the West in its trade and economic relations.

The second phase of interaction (1963–71) was strongly influenced by the lessons learned from the first and was characterized by strategic pragmatism rather than ideology. As a result, there was an increase in the number of recipients and the volume of transfers of arms and military assistance. During this period, the USSR exported major conventional weapons to 10 states in sub-Saharan Africa: the People’s Republic of the Congo (now known as the Republic of the Congo), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. During this period non-socialist states in sub-Saharan Africa turned to the USSR for arms, after being denied them by Western suppliers, and the USSR proved itself to be a reliable supplier. Somalia provides the clearest example of a country that had been rebuffed by Western suppliers but to which the USSR was willing to provide large quantities of arms.

The third and longest phase of Soviet interactions with sub-Saharan Africa (1971–85) coincided with the latter part of the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and those of his two successors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Soviet policy in this period displayed elements of both ideology and strategic pragmatism: while the USSR provided military equipment and assistance to liberation and anti-apartheid movements in Southern Africa, it also received basing rights and strategic access in exchange for deliveries of arms and military assistance in other parts of the continent.

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The USSR provided arms and assistance to socialist governments in Angola, Benin, the People's Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles and Tanzania both to ensure that they would not be overthrown and to marginalize Chinese influence.¹³ During this period—assisted by improvements in Soviet air and naval capabilities for delivering military equipment over long distances—the number and geographical spread of sub-Saharan African recipients of Soviet major conventional weapons increased further, to 19 states. Soviet military assistance at this time proved vital for Ethiopia's victory over Somalia in the 1977–78 Ogaden War and for the government side in the Angolan civil war. In both of these cases, the Soviet Union felt that it was unlikely that its military intervention would result in a confrontation with the United States.

During the fourth phase (1986–99) it has been suggested that sub-Saharan Africa was ‘perhaps the lowest priority on post-Communist Russia’s foreign policy agenda’.¹⁴ Although this is usually ascribed to the time in office of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, its first signs emerged after Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union in 1985. In the late Soviet period, credit and barter arrangements became less common, with Angola being the only notable recipient of such military assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. However, Russia continued to play an important role in African peace and security issues in the 1990s. For example, it voted in support of the imposition of UN Security Council arms embargoes on Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia as part of international efforts to promote peace and security in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁵ It even voted for the UN arms embargo on Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 2000 during the 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia War, despite having provided arms during 1998–99 to both sides (see section III below).

In retrospect, it is clear that African states and independence movements were not passive objects of Soviet security strategy but played a central role in shaping Soviet policies towards Africa. The USSR accommodated local aims to ensure its presence and influence, in effect becoming a hostage to the friendly African states to which it supplied military assistance. Thus, while the USSR thought that it was tying the recipients of its arms to the USSR with long-term credits and the need for maintenance and repairs for Soviet-supplied armaments, it was also tying itself to the recipient and the recipient’s policies.¹⁶ By and large, Soviet policies on Africa were driven

¹⁶ See e.g. notes from a 1977 meeting of the Politburo on the Ethiopian–Somali conflict. Transcript of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee Politburo Meeting, 4 Aug. 1977
more by opportunism than design and were dictated more by African demands and circumstances than a coherent Soviet policy on Africa. For example, this can be seen in the involvement of the USSR in Angola and in the Ethiopia–Somalia Ogaden War.

II. Russian foreign and security policy on sub-Saharan Africa since 2000

Russia does not have an explicit foreign and security policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. In the absence of such a policy, this section outlines the main motivations for Russia’s foreign and security policy on sub-Saharan Africa. In doing so, it draws on the annual Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) assessments of Russian interests in Africa and policy statements issued by the Russian president, the foreign minister and the head of the MFA’s Africa Department. Analyses by members of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for African Studies are also useful in this regard, as members of this institute are directly involved in policy formulation. It describes the few mentions of Africa in official foreign and security policy documents, gives a brief account of the decision-making structure for security-related policies on the region, and provides further detail about official visits to the region and an analysis of Russian interests in the region.

According to Vladimir Shubin, one of Russia’s most influential scholars of African affairs, Russia’s approach to Africa changed almost immediately after the departure from office of Yeltsin in December 1999.17 It can also be argued that the change coincided with the efforts of Putin to project Russia’s global role and interests during his first two terms as president. According to Shubin, Russia’s official Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) of 2000 demonstrated Russia’s desire to expand its economic interactions with African states and assist with the settlement of military conflicts—even though sub-Saharan Africa is not explicitly mentioned.18 These two goals are also prioritized in Russia’s ‘multi-pronged interaction with African States at the multilateral and bilateral levels’ in the 2008 FPC.19 Although Africa’s ranking did not change in later versions of the FPC, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, stressed in the month before President Medvedev approved the 2008 FPC that ‘the African sector is one


of the absolute priorities of Russian multivector foreign policy’. However, Russian analysts have stressed that sub-Saharan Africa is not a priority area for Russia’s foreign and security policy. This continues to be evident in the 2013 FPC. Africa is only mentioned in the final paragraph of the ‘regional priorities’ section, which states that,

Russia will enhance multifaceted interaction with African states on a bilateral and multilateral basis with a focus on improving political dialogue and promoting mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation and contribute to settling and preventing regional conflicts and crises in Africa. Developing partnership with the African Union and other regional organizations is an important element of this policy.

The only mention of Africa in Russia’s two other principal security documents—the 2009 National Security Strategy and the 2010 Military Doctrine—is as one of the regions of conflict that ‘will continue to exert a negative influence on the international situation’.

The Russian president has ultimate responsibility for the direction of Russia’s foreign and security policy on sub-Saharan Africa. The Russian Government, ministries of Defence (MOD), Emergency Situations, Foreign Affairs, the Interior (MOI), Economic Development, and Industry and Trade and related federal agencies and state corporations are responsible for the implementation of Russia’s foreign and security policy on Africa. In addition, since 2006 the Russian president has appointed special envoys for liaison with African leaders. Alexei Vasilev was special envoy for liaison with Africa leaders from 2006 until 2011, when Mikhail Margelov was appointed special envoy for cooperation with African countries.

**Russian presidential visits to sub-Saharan Africa**

Vladimir Putin became the first Russian (or Soviet) leader to visit sub-Saharan Africa when he visited South Africa in 2006. Three years later,

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President Medvedev visited Angola, Namibia and Nigeria. Both Putin and Medvedev stressed during their visits that Russia was ‘almost too late’ in engaging with Africa. Medvedev’s visit primarily focused on the interests of Russian energy companies in the region. While the Russian foreign minister noted that military-technical cooperation had been highlighted shortly before Medvedev’s visit to Angola, the only publicly announced deal for Rosoboronexport (the Russian state arms export company) related to a contract with Angola to assist in the creation and launch of its first satellite for the country’s telecommunications system.

During these visits Putin and Medvedev emphasized the positive aspects of Soviet-era links with African countries and positive perceptions of Russia among African elites that had connections with the USSR. For example, Medvedev stressed in his speech in Windhoek, Namibia, in June 2009 that not only had the Soviet Union helped African states gain independence, but that Russia did not have ‘a painful, sombre colonial history’ like many European countries and that this has helped relations with African countries. Putin and Medvedev both stressed that the main motives for Russia’s engagement with Africa differ from the Soviet motives, with economic factors replacing ideological ones. However, most of the sub-Saharan African states listed as Russia’s ‘principal partners’ were also recipients of Soviet arms exports and military assistance: Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa. Those listed under the rubric ‘with hopes for improving relations’ include Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali and Zimbabwe.

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29 A number of African heads of states and members of government received part of their education or training in the USSR or via Soviet instructors in Africa. E.g. the former and current presidents of Angola, Cape Verde, Mali, Mozambique and South Africa are alumni of Soviet educational establishments. See also chapter 2 in this volume.
Sub-Saharan Africa and Russian geopolitical and economic interests

Sub-Saharan Africa was the last region discussed in Vladimir Putin’s presidential decree of 7 May 2012 ‘On measures to implement the foreign policy of the Russian Federation’. The decree called for Russia to develop the traditional friendly relations with African countries in order to further advance the geopolitical and economic interests of the Russian Federation on the basis of multifaceted mutually beneficial cooperation and to increase contacts with the African Union and subregional groupings in addressing Africa’s development.  

Russian engagement with sub-Saharan Africa can therefore be explained on three grounds.

First, Russian officials have indicated that Russia’s involvement in African peace and security issues is related to perceptions of Russia as a global power. For example, Mikhail Margelov (Medvedev’s and Putin’s special envoy for cooperation with African countries) has stated that ‘We want [Russia’s] voice to be heard in all the international discussions on African problems. We understand our part of the responsibility for what is happening in the African continent and we are serious about it’. Some Russian officials have suggested that sub-Saharan African states appreciate alternatives to the West and the possibility of playing powers off against each other, as happened during the cold war.

Second, Russian officials believe that sub-Saharan African states share positions on global issues with Russia. Russian statements in the UN Security Council stress Russian support for efforts to settle African conflicts, and in particular support to African actors to settle African conflicts (see section III below). For example, Russia abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 1591 on Darfur in 2005 and voted against the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2008. A Russian MFA official stated that the Russian position on Zimbabwe in 2008 is a clear instance of Russia being in line with the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Com-

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34 This point featured prominently in interviews conducted by the author in Dec. 2009 with officials from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for African Studies.
munity (SADC) and individual African states. Additionally, as in the
Soviet era, Russian MFA officials have noted that good relations with sub-
Saharan African states benefit Russian national interests because the states
often vote as a bloc internationally, and these states can help Russia to
acquire support for its initiatives at the global level.

Third, Russian security interactions with sub-Saharan Africa are con-
nected with the protection and promotion of Russian economic interests, as
illustrated by President Medvedev’s 2009 trip. The delegation on this trip
included representatives of a number of major Russian companies with
strong connections to the Russian state. The Russian MFA also sees one of
its key roles as providing assistance and support to Russian companies
active in, or seeking to expand into, sub-Saharan Africa. Although Russian
officials do not expect to compete in areas where China is strong, they are
striving to improve Russian trading, investment and economic ties, espe-
cially in relation to energy and power plants, mining and some areas
involving high-tech products. During 2011 the Russian MFA provided
support for the Russian aluminium producer RUSAL in Guinea and
Nigeria; the gas company Gazprom in Namibia and Nigeria; the oil com-
panies Gazprom in Equatorial Guinea and Lukoil in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana,
Liberia and Sierra Leone; the gold mining company Severstal in Liberia; the
nickel producer Norilsk Nickel in Botswana and South Africa; and the Rus-
sian state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom in Namibia and Tanzania.

III. Russian security-related activities in Africa since 2000

Russia’s security-related activity in sub-Saharan Africa can be identified as
arms transfers, military training, contributions to UN peace operations and
contributions to anti-piracy missions. Of these four types of activity, only
the first two represent a continuation of activities carried out by the USSR
in sub-Saharan Africa. Notable developments have occurred in recent years
with regards to the latter two types of activity.

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37 Official, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs African Department, Interview with author,
38 Russian MFA official (note 37).
39 See e.g. the views expressed by Vasily Sredin, former Russian Secretary of State and Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Sredin, V., ‘Russia and Africa’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 47,
no. 5 (2001), p. 26. See also note 34.
40 Russian MFA official (note 37).
41 Russian MFA official (note 37); and Fedotov and Sidorova (note 9), pp. 67–79.
42 ‘Foreign policy and diplomatic activities of the Russian Federation in 2011’, Overview of Russia,
Arms transfers

Ultimate responsibility for Russian arms exports lies with the Russian president. The Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), which is located in the MOD, is responsible for implementing military-technical cooperation with foreign states, including concluding agreements and establishing bilateral intergovernmental commissions. The FSMTC is the leading executive federal body for the regulation, coordination and control of Russian military and technical cooperation with foreign partners. It is responsible for setting prices, considering applications and issuing licences for the export of arms and military equipment as well as authorizing and overseeing enterprises that supply spare parts, support materiel, repairs and so on. It can either be approached directly by foreign states or will be involved in considering applications made to Russian state corporations or arms-producing enterprises. The FSMTC is therefore a key node in decisions on exports of arms and military equipment.

Russian state-owned and -controlled corporations also play a key role in promoting and arranging exports of Russian arms and military equipment. As in the Soviet era, contemporary Russian decisions on the framework for arms exports and military assistance are made by the central government, but state intermediaries—not manufacturers or ministries—are responsible for organizing and arranging exports. Rostekhnologii, a Russian state corporation created in November 2007, is responsible for the advertising and marketing of Russian arms and military equipment. Another state corporation, Rosoboronexport, is responsible for conducting contract negotiations for the export of all types of Russian arms and military equipment. Since 2007 Rosoboronexport has had a monopoly on arrangements for export of Russian arms and military equipment. Of its 45 representative offices, only 2—in Angola and Ethiopia—are located in sub-Saharan Africa. Although Rosoboronexport has a monopoly on arranging for the export of finished Russian weapon systems, 21 Russian arms-producing enterprises

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45 Kirshin (note 3), pp. 46–47.


Table 4.1. Sub-Saharan African recipients of Soviet and Russian deliveries of major conventional weapons, 1950–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5-year period</th>
<th>No. of recipients</th>
<th>Main recipients (share of total)</th>
<th>Other recipients</th>
<th>Transfers to sub-Saharan Africa as a share of all Soviet/Russian exports (%)</th>
<th>Soviet/Russian transfers as a share of all deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa (%)</th>
<th>Change in volume of Soviet/Russian exports compared to previous decade (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950–59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Guinea (100%)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sudan (30%)</td>
<td>Somali (28%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+57 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–79</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Ethiopia (33%)</td>
<td>Somali (13%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>+1 034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–89</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Angola (53%)</td>
<td>Eritrea (11%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>+54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–99</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Angola (31%)</td>
<td>Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>−88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–2009</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sudan (43%)</td>
<td>Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>+55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010–13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Uganda (52%)</td>
<td>Cameroon, Chadur, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

.. = unknown or not available.

are permitted to engage directly in negotiations with foreign states interested in seeking to procure spare parts, servicing or upgrades to arms and military equipment in their inventories. Three more (the open joint stock companies United Aircraft Corporation–Transport Aircraft, United Shipbuilding Corporation and Oboronservis) can conduct foreign trade activities for specific projects.49

The trend in Russian arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa

The Soviet Union was a major supplier of arms and military equipment to sub-Saharan Africa until its disintegration. While the region received only 4 per cent of Soviet exports during the period 1950–92, the USSR supplied 43 per cent of sub-Saharan African imports of major conventional weapons. During the 1980s, when the USSR was the single largest arms exporter to sub-Saharan Africa, the volume of deliveries was at its highest point, both in terms of overall volume and as a share of overall Soviet exports of major conventional arms (see figure 4.1 and table 4.1). Angola was the largest sub-Saharan African recipient of Soviet major conventional arms (but accounted for only 1 per cent of total Soviet exports); Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia and Sudan were also among the significant recipients.

Despite the dramatic decline in the volume of Soviet or Russian exports of major conventional weapons to sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s, Russia remained the largest exporter to the region during the period—accounting for 24 per cent of all deliveries. Two other former Soviet republics, Belarus and Ukraine, accounted for, respectively, 7 per cent and 4 per cent of deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. Angola and Ethiopia were the most important recipients in the 1990s, but the volume of deliveries to these countries from Russia was much lower than from the USSR during the 1980s. Russia delivered major conventional weapons in the 1990s to a number of states—Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Rwanda and Sierra Leone—that had not received such weapons from the USSR.

The volume of deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa during 2000–2009 increased considerably in comparison to the period 1990–99 but was still much lower than during 1980–89. However, due to an increase in the overall volume of arms deliveries from all states to sub-Saharan Africa during 2000–2009, Russia provided less than a quarter of the total volume of deliveries. Compared to the 1990s, Russia added Ghana, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal to its list of recipients of major conventional arms in sub-Saharan Africa.

Motivations for Russian arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa

Russian analysts have identified weak economies, demand for cheaper weapons and corruption as lead factors affecting arms sales to sub-Saharan Africa. However, they have also noted that regional conflicts and challenges to states by non-state armed groups have helped to fuel demand for arms in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region—thereby creating openings for Russian arms exports.\(^{50}\) For example, Russia supplied combat aircraft to both sides of the 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia War and, following the expiry of a 12-month mandatory UN arms embargo during 2000–2001, it fulfilled new orders for more combat aircraft from both countries.\(^{51}\) More recently, in response to a request from the Malian Government to provide helicopters, armoured vehicles and SALW for use in the conflict with Tuareg separatists in the north of the country, Rosoboronexport delivered SALW in January 2013.\(^{52}\) Russia has thus demonstrated that it is willing to respond positively to requests for arms from parties in conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.

Officials of Rosoboronexport reported in 2008 that it had ‘intensified cooperation’ with ‘traditional partners’ such as Angola, Ethiopia and Uganda and ‘established steady relations’ with Botswana, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe.\(^{53}\) Rosoboronexport’s General Director, Anatoly Isaikin, stated that sub-Saharan Africa is ‘a very promising but complicated market. There is a lot of our equipment still remaining from the Soviet times. It all requires repairs and modernization. But there is a problem: most of our potential clients have very limited military budgets’.\(^{54}\) So, while Rosoboronexport continues to promote the sale of newly produced Russian arms and military equipment, it has identified the upgrading and modernization of MiG combat aircraft and Mil military transport and attack helicopters as a potentially promising export market in sub-Saharan Africa.\(^{55}\) Rosoboronexport and Russian aircraft producers


\(^{51}\) Golotyuk, Y., ‘Russia failed to observe the embargo against Ethiopia and Eritrea’, Vremya Novosti, 18 May 2000, p. 6; and Gankin, L. and Lantratov, K., [All the sisters in the barrel of a gun], Kommersant, 15 Apr. 2005 (in Russian).


\(^{54}\) Litovkin, D., [We are exchanging grenade launchers for diamonds], Izvestia, 22 Sep. 2008 (in Russian).

have established service and repair centres for Soviet- and Russian-supplied fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in Ethiopia and Sudan and hope to open more in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, there are plans to expand provisions for pilot training in the region. Rosoboronexport recognizes that it faces competition in this regard from companies in Belarus, Israel, Ukraine and several former Warsaw Pact states.

To overcome the challenge of ‘limited military budgets’ identified by Isaikin, Russia offers ‘flexible’ terms for paying for arms and military equipment, including barter deals and joint ventures in the fishing, mining and oil industries. Rosoboronexport is reportedly seeking to work more closely with Russian companies involved in the exploration, exploitation and transport of natural resources and in construction and vehicle manufacturing in sub-Saharan Africa, as part of its efforts to explore ‘alternative and flexible payment schemes’. These options are reportedly ‘more acceptable for the developing African nations’, but it remains difficult to identify deals that have been concluded in this manner. In mid-2012 it was reported that, in connection with negotiations on a Russian–Zimbabwean agreement on investment and defence cooperation, Rostekhnomogii was seeking rights to develop platinum deposits in exchange for supplying Zimbabwe with arms and military equipment.

The single most significant deal between Russia and a sub-Saharan African state in recent years was a $740 million deal between Russia and Uganda for the supply of 6 Su-30MK2 combat aircraft and related air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, 31 T-90S tanks and other military equipment. There were initial suggestions that the arms would be paid for in-kind, as the Russian energy company Lukoil was negotiating participation in the development of Ugandan oil fields. However, in March 2011 Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni announced that the government had taken out

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61 ‘Russia’s comeback to Africa’ (note 48), p. 36.
62 Kislev, E. et al., [Helicopter exchange deal], Kommersant, 27 June 2012 (in Russian).
a loan to pay for the weapons.\textsuperscript{64} The Ugandan Minister of Defence, Crispus Kiyonga, informed the Ugandan Parliament that there had not been, and would not be, ‘negotiations to swap oil fields for military supply’.\textsuperscript{65} In September 2012 the deputy director of Rosoboronexport, Alexander Mikheyev, stated that Rosoboronexport was in discussions with Uganda on exercising the option to purchase six more SU-30MK2.\textsuperscript{66}

Rosoboronexport has also used the biennial Africa Aerospace and Defence exhibition to promote the purchase of Russian arms and military equipment for African peacekeepers, as well as for combating terrorism, organized crime, trafficking and border surveillance.\textsuperscript{67} In this regard, Russian peacekeepers deployed in sub-Saharan Africa could be seen as a ‘marketing tool’ to demonstrate the reliability and performance of Russian arms and military equipment. Russia is also marketing offshore monitoring and security systems to coastal African countries to protect military facilities and offshore natural resources and to combat drug and arms trafficking and piracy.\textsuperscript{68} Additionally, Russian Tigr armoured vehicles have been supplied to Guinean armed forces guarding gold and diamond mines. Although it is unclear if the vehicles will be used to guard mines operated by the Russian company Nordgold in Guinea, Russia has urged the Guinean Government to provide security for RUSAL’s plant in Guinea, serving to illustrate some of the potential linkages between Russian arms exports and economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{69}

\textbf{Military training}

The Russian MOD is involved in the training of African military personnel in connection with arms transfers and bilateral training programmes and offers related opportunities at educational establishments in Russia. Comprehensive open-source data on the number of Russian military advisers in Africa, African officers trained in Russia or the total number of African military personnel trained by Russian military personnel is difficult to find. There are reports that Russian military personnel have been involved in training programmes associated with deliveries of major conventional


\textsuperscript{65} Naturinda, S., ‘Government asks Russia to explain jet story’, \textit{Daily Monitor (Kampala)}, 8 Apr. 2010.


\textsuperscript{68} ‘In search for new forms of cooperation’, \textit{Voennyi’ diplomat}, no. 3 (2006), pp. 92–93.

weapon systems to Ethiopia and Sudan during the past decade. However, it is unclear whether these personnel provided more than training and whether they were involved in combat operations.

According to some sources, the number of African students receiving education in Russian military colleges and MOD educational establishments increased from 200 in 2000 to 1000 in 2009. In 2009 Alexei Stepanov, director of the MOD section for training of foreign servicemen in higher educational institutions, described the training of foreign military personnel as an important part of Russia’s strategy for promoting Russian arms exports. Angola’s defence attaché in Moscow, Luís Inácio Muxito, reported that Russian military advisers and trainers resumed training of Angolan military personnel in 2000, following the suspension of Soviet military training for Angolan armed forces in 1991. Russian military colleges are also reported to be training Angolan military personnel. It has been reported that Russia trains Sudanese military and engineering officers. In March 2013 Russian and South African defence forces met in Moscow to discuss cooperation in several spheres, including the exchange of students, instructors and military courses.

**Peacekeeper training**

The Russian ministries of Defence and the Interior are involved in the training of African military and law enforcement personnel for peace operations in Africa. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, reported in 2007 that Russia trained 300 African peacekeepers annually, and in 2008 and 2009 that Russia trained 400 African peacekeepers annually. In May 2009 Lavrov stated that Russia might further increase its contribution to

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70 Unofficial reports suggested that in 2005 there were around 500 Russian military advisers in Sudan in relation to training for recently delivered weapons. Golotyuk (note 51), p. 6; and Khairulin, M., [In Sudan peacekeepers will defend Russian oilmen], *Gazeta*, 22 Dec. 2005, p. 5 (in Russian).


72 Lisanov (note 71).


peace operations in Africa by training more African peacekeepers and civilian specialists at the Russian Ministry of the Interior.78

One of the centrepieces of Russia’s contribution to training African peacekeepers is the MOI’s training centre for peacekeepers near Domodedovo, Moscow oblast. Between 2006 and 2009, 159 peacekeepers from more than 16 African states received training there.79 For example, in 2008, 23 peacekeepers from Lesotho participated in peacekeeping and law-enforcement training provided by the Russian MOI.80

Russian officials have stressed that the provision of training to African peacekeepers does not correlate strongly with Russian political and economic interests in Africa.81 The courses are open for all and form part of Russia’s efforts to develop and be part of the network of training centres for peacekeepers. Russian officials are reportedly in support of moves for standardized curricula, and Russia has already sent teams of Russian instructors from the Ministry of the Interior to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana.82

Contributions to UN peace operations

Russian contributions to UN peace operations are regulated by a 1995 law.83 The law authorizes Russia to participate in UN peace operations and states that the president, the government and the Federation Council (the upper house of the parliament) share responsibility for peace operations, but that the president has the authority to decide to send soldiers or military personnel for a particular operation, while the government decides on civilian contributions.

Russian foreign policy documents and statements point out that Russia contributes to UN peace operations by providing Russian personnel, equipment and transportation and also by providing training and equipment for African peacekeepers (see above).84 As of 2009 there was no coordinating

78 [Russia might activate its participation in peacekeeping services in Africa—Lavrov], Interfax, 27 May 2009 (in Russian).
79 Russian peace operations expert from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview with author, Moscow, 10 Dec. 2009. Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the UN, has been quoted as stating that nearly 80 servicemen and representatives of law enforcement agencies from African countries are trained at Domodedovo every year, and all these graduates later join UN peace operations throughout the world. Saikin, Y., [Peacekeepers need reforms], Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 28 Jan. 2009 (in Russian).
81 Russian peace operations expert (note 79).
82 Russian peace operations expert (note 79).
agency or ministry for peacekeeping and, alone among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—the P5), Russia had no central roster of experts for deployment on peace operations. Russian officials acknowledge that they are lagging behind the other P5 states in this regard and so monitor developments in other states in order to improve Russian capabilities to participate in peace operations. The MFA distributes requests for Russian peacekeeping personnel contributions to the ministries of Defence, the Interior and Emergency Situations. The Ministry of Finance plays an important role in decisions on financial contributions to UN peace operations. However, the final decision on whether Russia will provide personnel or funding for UN peace operations rests with the president.

Russia’s ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, stated at the beginning of 2009 that Russia is prepared to increase its contribution to UN peacekeeping via increased aid for the training of police for peace operations and increasing the number of personnel sent to the UN Secretariat and to its field missions. In May 2009 Lavrov stated that Russia might further increase its contribution to peacekeeping in Africa by increasing the number of Russian personnel deployed there. However, by 2012 the reverse had happened (see below).

Russian official assessments suggest that such contributions do not correspond with the stature of Russia. From the statements by Churkin and Lavrov, it appears that the Russian MFA is keen to increase involvement in peace operations. Mikhail Margelov has also been vocal in making the case for Russia increasing its contribution and assistance to peace operations in Africa. He has regularly visited Russian troops deployed on missions in the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and Sudan. Russian MFA officials have stressed that Russia is considering ways to further develop its contribution to peacekeeping in Africa, including providing more support to the AU and its peacekeepers in line with commitments made by Russia as a member of the Group of Eight (G8). For example,
Russia provided $2 million for the AU’s African Peace Fund in 2012 to support African peacekeeping capabilities.\textsuperscript{91}

Although Russian officials have presented Russian contributions to peace operations as altruistic acts by a great power, some Russian commentators have suggested that these contributions are linked to Russian arms sales and other economic and political interests.\textsuperscript{92} Margelov has stressed links between peace operations and post-conflict commercial opportunities, noting that,

After conflicts end, the governments of the reconciled states remember the contributions made by other countries in stopping bloodshed and violence. This has an impact on the intensity of subsequent economic relations in terms of reconstructing and developing damaged economies. For example, the oil fields of Darfur are mostly being worked by French and Chinese companies. But Russia is interested in this kind of work as well.\textsuperscript{93}

In 2012 Russia was the 62nd largest contributor of personnel to UN peace operations. Russian peacekeepers were deployed to nearly all UN peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa: to Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Liberia, South Sudan and the Abyei Area (on the border between Sudan and South Sudan).\textsuperscript{94} To most of these missions, Russia contributed only experts; troops were provided only to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and to the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), while police personnel were provided to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and UNMISS. Russia more than doubled the number of personnel from the ministries of Defence and the Interior deployed with UN peace operations in Africa between 2000 and 2009, from 136 to 300.\textsuperscript{95} However, the number dropped to 62 by December 2012.\textsuperscript{96} The largest Russian contributions to peace operations during 2000–12 in Africa were for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and in the UN Mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT), where Russia also deployed helicopter support groups.

\textsuperscript{91} Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Statement by the minister of foreign affairs of Russia Sergei Lavrov at a reception for the heads of diplomatic missions of African countries on the occasion of Africa Day], Moscow, 30 May 2013, <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/2fee282eb6df40e64325699005e6e8c/43a270363bb8b27fe44257b7b004a56f4> (in Russian).
\textsuperscript{92} Ivanov, V., [Russians will go to Africa to make peace there: the Kremlin is sending peacekeepers to Burundi], Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, no. 27 (23 July 2004), p. 2 (in Russian); and Khairulin (note 70).
\textsuperscript{93} Margelov, M., [Penetration in Africa], Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 10 Dec. 2008 (in Russian, author’s translation).
In 2007 Russia was the 40th largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, contributing $86.7 million, accounting for 1.4 per cent of global contributions. In 2010 Russia provided $158 million and in 2011 it provided $160 million for UN peacekeeping operations. Russia publicly provides aggregated information on payments for UN peacekeeping operations, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Russia provided support worth a total of $170.9 million in 2011 and $104.5 million in 2012. Russia stated that it paid its assessed contribution for UN peacekeeping operation in full for 2011–12.

Russia is the biggest single contributor of services to support UN peace operations: in a typical year, 13 per cent of services are provided by Russian companies. In 2011 this was worth $382 million. The majority of contracts have been for the provision of air transportation services—accounting for approximately three-quarters of the UN peace operations' contracts for air services.

**Contributions to anti-piracy missions**

Russia has participated in the international anti-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia since 2008. In October 2008 Russia secured the permission of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to patrol off the coast of Somalia as part of the international effort to combat piracy. The Russian frigate *Neustrashimy*, the first vessel dispatched to participate in the international efforts to counter piracy, entered Somali territorial waters in October 2008, and Russia has continued to provide vessels from its various fleets for anti-piracy missions in the region.

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97 Margelov (note 93).
98 Data provided by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a briefing, as reported in Nikitin (note 83), p. 163.
101 Saikin (note 79).
102 Data provided by Russian MFA at a briefing, as reported in Nikitin (note 83), p. 163.
103 Saikin (note 79).
104 [Russian Navy will send its assets to Horn of Africa every now and then], *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 29 Oct. 2008, p. 6 (in Russian).
Russian officials are reportedly keen for international efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia to be conducted and coordinated under UN auspices.\textsuperscript{105} Vladimir Kotlyar, who is nominated by Russia to act as an international arbitrator under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), has suggested that the long-dormant Military Staff Committee (MSC) under the UN Security Council could help coordinate the actions of the different navies involved in the anti-piracy efforts and could also assist with basing and supply issues.\textsuperscript{106} One of the reasons for this proposal is ensuring that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) does not have the main coordinating role for these efforts.

IV. Conclusions

Sub-Saharan Africa has not been a region of particular importance for the foreign and security policy of either the Soviet Union or Russia, and it is of far less interest than regions closer to home. Nevertheless, Russian security-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa—arms transfers, military training, peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations—appear to have intensified in recent years. These activities are primarily being undertaken in areas that developed strong links with the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s (the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa), but there are also signs of intensified security relations with states across sub-Saharan Africa that enjoy good relations with Russian firms involved in mineral exploration and exploitation.

In its efforts to sell arms to sub-Saharan Africa, Russia faces competition from other former Soviet states and Warsaw Pact members, as well as Israel. Russia’s offers of flexible payment options, including credit and barter, are reminiscent of Soviet-era practices yet do not appear to have resulted in orders of a magnitude comparable to those placed by Angola, Ethiopia or Somalia during the cold war. Russia’s main partners today in this sphere and for military training are those states that relied heavily on the USSR for arms and training: Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda. Russian contributions to UN peace operations in the CAR, Chad and Sudan since 2000 have been significant by Russian standards, in terms of number of personnel and equipment deployed. The announcement in 2012 of financial support for AU peace operations marks another change and could result in the expansion of training courses for African peacekeepers too.


\textsuperscript{106} Kotlyar, V., ‘Piracy in the 21st century’, \textit{International Affairs} (Moscow), vol. 55, no. 3 (June 2009), pp. 65–66.
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5. The United Kingdom

SAM PERLO-FREEMAN

Although the United Kingdom is no longer a colonial power in Africa, it retains significant ties with its former African colonies and other African countries through trade, investment, cultural exchange, diplomacy and security activities. Overall, Africa has not been a major foreign policy priority for most British governments since the demise of British colonial power on the continent. However, this picture began to change considerably in 1997 with the election of Tony Blair as British prime minister. Since then, British policy on Africa—particularly in relation to development assistance—has been given higher priority.

Section I of this chapter gives a brief outline of the historical context for British involvement in Africa. Section II considers the development-focused policy framework that has guided most of the UK’s formal Africa policy since 1997 and the place of security issues within it. It also addresses the less openly stated aspects of policy related to trade, investment and the British arms industry, which may clash with stated development goals. Section III discusses British security-related policies and activities in Africa, including diplomatic engagement with peace processes, participation in and support to military and peace operations, arms transfers, and natural resource extraction. Section IV provides conclusions.

I. Historical background

Official British involvement in Africa dates back to 1660 and the chartering of the Royal African Company, which maintained a monopoly on English trade, primarily the slave trade, with West Africa. Nearly 150 years later, the 19th century began with the British abolition of the slave trade in 1807 but ended with British participation in the Berlin Conference in 1884–85 and the European regularization of colonialism in Africa. Following rapid decolonization in the 1960s, British rule in Africa officially ended in 1980, when Zimbabwe gained independence. Under their contemporary names, British colonies or protectorates in Africa included all or part of Botswana, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia (Somaliland), South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

1 Under their contemporary names, British colonies or protectorates in Africa included all or part of Botswana, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia (Somaliland), South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

While the UK has not maintained permanent military bases in Africa since the mid-1970s, it has supported strong interests and links with former colonies, including military links. The UK has signed defence agreements with several former colonies, including Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria and South Africa. It has engaged in numerous military interventions in former colonies, including Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda in 1964, Mauritius in 1968, Gambia in 1981, and Sierra Leone in 2000 (see below).

Many of the armed forces of newly independent former colonies were British-trained. Overall, however, Africa was a low priority for British foreign policy from the time of decolonization until 1997. It was remarked that ‘Africans and students of Africa will search in vain for sustained debates or literature on contemporary British policy in Africa’.

The UK’s strongest postcolonial interests in Africa, primarily with former colonies, have usually been commercial. For example, several British multinational corporations have significant long-term interests and investments in Africa: the oil companies BP in Angola and Shell (a British–Dutch company) in Nigeria; the mining companies Anglo American and AngloGold Ashanti across the continent; the banks Barclays and Standard Chartered also continent-wide; and the arms company BAE Systems in South Africa. The UK has been one of the major international investors in Africa. Along with France and the United States, the UK has consistently been one of the three largest suppliers of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa.

II. British policy on Africa since 1997

In the decades following the end of British rule, Africa was not seen as a major strategic or economic priority for the British Government, in general, or for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) or the Ministry of Defence (MOD), in particular. The election of the Labour government of Tony Blair in 1997 led to considerably greater British engagement with Africa, largely focused on development issues. The creation in 1997 of the Department for International Development (DFID), which began to lead and oversee British policy on Africa, was emblematic of this new approach.

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While the FCO retained a significant diplomatic presence in Africa, DFID exerted a greater influence on the continent.\(^8\)

While the pro-development agenda and attention to African peace and security issues was partially motivated by the Labour Party’s desire to satisfy the humanitarian and internationalist sentiment of its electoral base, it also coincided with the increasing recognition of the nexus between security and development. Proponents of this nexus assert that security and development are inextricably linked and that extreme poverty and insecurity—in Africa and elsewhere—left unaddressed through development could lead to security problems for the West in the form of terrorism, mass migration and the disruption of trade. The importance of the security–development nexus was recognized by DFID from the time of the department’s establishment.\(^9\)

During the 1997–2010 Labour government, the UK’s formal Africa policy focused on development and was based on three key pillars: (a) promoting economic development and tackling poverty, particularly in pursuit of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); (b) promoting good governance, including support for democratization, transparency and anti-corruption policies; and (c) supporting conflict prevention and resolution.\(^10\) These themes are clearly interrelated, and one of the key features of British policy was the integration of conflict prevention and resolution into the development strategies developed by DFID.

The following subsection summarizes some of the key policies and initiatives of the 1997–2010 Labour government in relation to promoting development and good governance in Africa, as well as the policy on preventing and resolving conflict in Africa. The next subsection describes how the policy and overall approach have been adapted under the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government that came to power in 2010.

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8 Patrick Merienne of DFID’s Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit also confirmed that direct FCO and MOD programme activities in Africa are very limited. White, M., DFID Regional Conflict Advisor for West Africa, Interview with author, London, May 2010; and Merienne, P., DFID Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit, Interview with author, London, May 2010.


British policy on Africa, 1997–2010

Promotion of development

One of the most measurable changes in British policy was the increase in aid to African countries. While total British official development assistance (ODA) tripled between 1997 and 2010, aid to sub-Saharan Africa grew at a much faster rate: it almost quintupled over this period, from $631 million to $3.1 billion.¹¹

The aid disbursement prioritized states that were perceived as pursuing strong poverty-reduction strategies and good governance.¹² For those countries seen as particularly close partners, a substantial portion of ODA took the form of direct budgetary support, as opposed to specific project funding. In 2007, 17 African countries were receiving direct budgetary support.¹³

The UK—and in particular Blair and his finance minister, Gordon Brown—was at the forefront of global efforts to increase aid, cancel ‘Third World debt’ and improve the terms of trade for developing countries, especially those in Africa. These efforts bore some fruit at the 2005 Group of Eight (G8) summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, which brought about a pledge to increase worldwide ODA by $50 billion by 2010 and to write off $50 billion of multilateral debt of the poorest countries under the Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative (MDRI).¹⁴ British policy for African development was essentially embodied in the 2005 report of the Commission for Africa, chaired by Blair himself, with participation from serving African heads of state and ministers.¹⁵

The results of such efforts often fell far short of the hopes of campaigners. For example, the promise of a doubling of aid by 2010 made at Gleneagles was missed by a wide margin; in real terms, total ODA from countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee to developing countries increased by just 37 per cent between 2004 and 2010.¹⁶ Progress was made

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¹³ Porteous (note 12).

¹⁴ The G8 comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the USA; the European Commission is also represented. G8 Communiqué issued following the Gleneagles Summit, 6–8 July 2005, <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/Government_Support/recognition_by_the_g8.html>; and Jubilee Debt Campaign (JDC), ‘The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative: the good, the bad and the ugly’, JDC briefing paper, 26 June 2006, <http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/?lid=2949>.

¹⁵ Commission for Africa (note 10).

on debt relief, and there is evidence of positive effects of this, but non-governmental organizations have argued that the debt reductions do not go nearly far enough.\textsuperscript{17} On other issues, such as trade, the ambitious goals of the Commission for Africa have remained unfulfilled.

\textit{Promotion of good governance}

The UK has consistently described good governance as a key condition for development, and has, at least on paper, placed it at the heart of its development strategies. The British governance agenda in Africa was established with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Agreed by African governments in 2001, NEPAD presented good governance as integral to the donor–recipient relationship.\textsuperscript{18} DFID’s 2006 white paper also made good governance a central theme. It listed the three aspects of governance as capacity (the ability of states to act and achieve objectives), responsiveness (the degree to which states are able and willing to listen and respond to the needs and wishes of its citizens) and accountability (the ability of citizens to hold their governments’ policies to account and, ultimately, to replace them peacefully).\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Prevention and resolution of conflict in Africa}

British policy regarding the prevention and resolution of conflict in Africa was most clearly set out in a 2001 DFID consultation document.\textsuperscript{20} The document identified a combination of factors as the underlying causes of conflict in Africa, including inequality between groups, state failure, economic decline, the entrenched history of political violence, natural resource exploitation and the misuse of resources (both as a source of grievance and a means of financing conflict). Secondary factors identified included the abuse of ethnicity, lack of educational and employment opportunities and the ready availability of small arms.\textsuperscript{21} The consultation document proposed a variety of efforts to tackle these issues at the African level and by the UK and internationally and are reflected in British security-related activities in Africa, discussed below.

\textsuperscript{19} British Department for International Development, \textit{Eliminating World Poverty} (note 10).
\textsuperscript{20} British Department for International Development, \textit{The Causes of Conflict in Africa} (note 10).
British policy on Africa since 2010

British policy on Africa has to a large extent continued to focus on development under the coalition government that came to power in 2010, with David Cameron as prime minister. Cameron’s government has maintained the broad policy lines of previous governments; for example, the security and development theme remains a clear focus, and the commitment to increasing British ODA to 0.7 per cent of gross domestic product by 2014/15 has been kept. However, there have been notable changes. First, Africa policy is no longer dealt with in a DFID-chaired cabinet committee; instead, it goes to the new National Security Council, which does not view issues from the same regional perspective, and the FCO is now expected to take the lead on more Africa-related issues. Second, and linked to this, there is a more explicit acknowledgement of British national interests in Africa, including trade and energy interests, and an approach that seeks to promote development in tandem with the pursuit of these interests. Third, direct budgetary support is being used less, with only nine countries receiving direct budget support in 2010/11. Budgetary support was projected by DFID to fall from 15 per cent of total bilateral aid to 12 per cent by 2014/15.

III. British security-related activities in Africa since 1997

Since 1997 British involvement in African security has been steered by a range of priorities. In some cases it has been guided by goals of conflict prevention, management and resolution in recognition of the security–development nexus, but more traditional national security and economic interests also feature. The main modes of this involvement include diplomatic engagement in African conflicts; military and security cooperation agreements between the UK and African countries; participation in military and peace operations in Africa (especially Sierra Leone); support for the military and security sectors of African states, including training of forces and support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and SSR; support for civilian peacebuilding efforts, conflict prevention and resolution; and arms exports to Africa.

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**Diplomatic engagement in African conflicts**

The UK has frequently been involved in international diplomatic efforts relating to various African conflicts. It was one of the main brokers of the 1979 Lancaster House agreement that led to the independence of Zimbabwe, and was involved in the negotiations leading up to the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994. During the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s other major British diplomatic engagements in sub-Saharan Africa included Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In the more recent past, the UK participated—along with Kenya, Norway and the USA—as an external observer and supporter of the negotiation process leading to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan, which ended the civil war in southern Sudan. These four observer countries subsequently became guarantors of the CPA. As a guarantor, the UK has maintained engagement at various levels through the work of the Conflict Pool (see below) and at the diplomatic level. Since 2002 the British Government has maintained a Special Representative for Sudan (and, since 2011, South Sudan), who has been involved in ongoing negotiations between South Sudan and Sudan. It also provides financial support to the African Union (AU) CPA High-level Implementation Panel on Sudan and South Sudan.24

**Military and security cooperation agreements**

The UK has military or security cooperation agreements with a number of African states, although their details are not always made public. Such agreements may relate to, for example, basing rights, anti-terrorism cooperation, support for training and SSR, and so on. The agreements with Kenya and South Africa illustrate how these agreements are framed.

The British–Kenyan military cooperation agreement, which dates back to June 1964, allows the UK to use land in Kenya for infantry training exercises in tropical conditions. Six British Army infantry battalions participate in six-week training exercises in Kenya, often in preparation for combat deployments, such as in Afghanistan.25

The UK has had military relations with post-apartheid South Africa since 1994, and a British military advisory and training team (BMATT, see below) was involved in the integration of the new South African National Defence

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Force. Between 1994 and 2011, the two countries agreed more than a dozen memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and other arrangements on defence cooperation, providing for, among other things, the provision of British advisers to the South African Department of Defence, joint training exercises and training by one party on the territory of the other, as well as formalizing the role of the British Peace Support Team for South Africa (BPST-SA).26

Participation in military and peace operations in Africa

As a result of Africa’s generally low strategic priority to the UK since decolonization, direct British military involvement in Africa has been limited. Furthermore, major military deployments elsewhere have overstretched British forces, further limiting the UK’s willingness to participate in missions not involving vital British interests. Thus, the UK has sought to avoid substantial troop deployments in Africa, preferring instead to promote an African-led security agenda through measures such as training African forces for peace operations in support of the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as discussed below.

The UK’s participation in multilateral peace missions operations in Africa has been limited since 1997 (see table 5.1). The UK has also participated in European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR Somalia, Operation Atalanta), a multilateral anti-piracy operation that was launched under the auspices of the EU in 2008. The mission seeks to prevent and deter piracy in order to protect vulnerable shipping in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, including World Food Programme vessels delivering aid to Somalia. The UK provides the operational headquarters, and the operation has been commanded by British admirals.27 One British vessel also took part initially.28

The UK’s bilateral intervention in Sierra Leone was by far the most significant case of British direct military involvement in Africa since decolonization and was an exception to the British pattern of involvement in the region (see box 5.1). Sierra Leone subsequently became the primary test bed for the UK’s conflict-prevention strategies in Africa and the major target for funding under the Conflict Pool, including substantial support for SSR, training of the Sierra Leonean armed forces and police, transitional

Table 5.1. British participation in multilateral peace operations, 1999–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Maximum total strength$^a$</th>
<th>Maximum British contribution</th>
<th>Dates of British participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>17 711</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1999–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC)/UN Organization</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>20 202</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1999–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Eritrea</td>
<td>4 004</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2000–2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Missions in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>10 903</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2005–11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>16 664</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2003–2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Military Operation in the DRC (Operation Artemis)</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1 968</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the DRC</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2005–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(EUSEC RD Congo)$^b$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>UN/AU</td>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>15 922</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2007–2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)$^b$</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2007–2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)$^b$</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2007–10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Military Operation in Chad and the CAR (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>3 420</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2008–2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR Somalia, Operation Atalanta)</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>1 880</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>2008–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia)</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2010–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)$^b$</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2010–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>4 803</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2011–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>6 439</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2013–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger)$^b$</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2013–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali)</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2013–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


$^a$ These figures include troops, military observers, police and civilian staff.

$^b$ These are observer or civilian missions only.

justice, and for DDR programmes for former rebels. British intervention in Sierra Leone is widely seen as having played an important role in turning the tide in the country's civil war, and subsequently in rebuilding Sierra Leone’s security sector. The UK’s role as a former colonial power, its considerable diplomatic investment in Sierra Leone and Blair’s doctrine of ‘humanitarian intervention’ help explain the UK’s willingness to intervene militarily in a country in which it had no significant strategic interest.

**Support for African military and security sectors**

Despite the limited presence of British troops in Africa, the UK is extensively involved in the African security sector through training, SSR and other means. Since 2001 British support for the African security sector has

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**Box 5.1. The British military intervention in Sierra Leone**

The United Kingdom began support for training Sierra Leone’s armed forces in March 1998. It also helped draft the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement between the restored government and the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and pushed for the deployment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

The return to war in 1999 led to an increasingly dire situation. UNAMSIL peacekeepers, mostly from other African countries, were losing their weapons to RUF rebels, and atrocities by pro- and anti-government armed groups were occurring around the country. In May 2000 a force of 600 British troops deployed to Freetown, initially with the task of evacuating British and other foreign citizens. However, their mission quickly developed into one of establishing control over Freetown and bolstering UNAMSIL there.

In total, 2500 British troops, backed by a naval force, deployed to Sierra Leone. While they only rarely engaged in combat, their presence helped convince rebel forces that the war was unsustainable. The civil war was officially declared over in January 2002, and the conflict has not since recurred.

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Security activities of external actors in Africa

Table 5.2. Shares of Conflict Pool funding for Africa, by region and theme, 2003/2004 and 2008/2009

Figures are percentage shares of the total.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Central Africa</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Peace operations</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Political dialogue</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa-wide</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APSA = African Peace Support Architecture; DDR = disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; SSR = security sector reform.

a This is defined as ‘Actions and policies aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict encompassing a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programs and mechanisms…’.

b Other themes include media, analysis, and work related to small arms and light weapons.


been increasingly funded by the Conflict Pool (see below). While on the one hand the SSR agenda is relatively new, links between British and African militaries have been continuous from the colonial period, in particular through the training of African forces. While efforts to support the African security sector have recently been presented under the banners ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘security and development’, they have also historically been used as a way of maintaining British and Western influence in Africa, especially during the cold war.31

The Conflict Pool and other conflict-prevention and peacebuilding activities

In April 2001 the British Government created the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) as a joint initiative of the MOD, the FCO and DFID in order ‘to improve the UK Government’s contribution to conflict prevention and peace building in Africa by joining-up UK expertise across the three departments in development diplomacy and defence’.32 The ACPP was merged in 2008 with the parallel Global Conflict Prevention Pool to form the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP). In 2009/10 the Stabilisation Aid Fund for Iraq and Afghanistan was then merged into the CPP, which was renamed the Conflict Pool. The term Conflict Pool is used here to refer also

31 See e.g. Roper and Wood (note 3).
to the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and the Conflict Prevention Pool.\textsuperscript{33} The Conflict Pool acts as a coordinating mechanism to fund a range of British conflict-prevention and peace-support activities in Africa, including SSR; DDR; training for peace operations, political dialogue and grass roots peacebuilding efforts; and support for African regional organizations in peacebuilding efforts, media work, analysis and work on small arms and light weapons (SALW).\textsuperscript{34}

The share of funds spent on peacebuilding increased rapidly between 2003/2004 and 2008/2009, in particular support for election processes in West Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe (see table 5.2).\textsuperscript{35} The share of SSR, although still substantial, has declined from representing around half of the total spent in the years up to 2004, while DDR activities have diminished in absolute as well as relative terms, as several major programmes have ended.\textsuperscript{36} An interesting trend is the move towards supporting small, grass-roots peacebuilding activities. These projects may involve grants as small as £10 000 ($16 000) that can be mobilized swiftly and flexibly in response to local need.\textsuperscript{37}

Drastic budget reductions to the Conflict Pool since 2009—partly a result of the economic crisis—have forced the termination of funding for a number of activities (see table 5.3). Cuts include the funding previously provided for the widely praised Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana; funding for the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre; an accelerated reduction of security-related projects in Sierra Leone; and an almost complete withdrawal from Southern Africa, except for South Africa and Zimbabwe. Most support in 2010 was focused on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe as well as on support for the AU’s African Standby Force.\textsuperscript{38}

DFID funds a range of conflict-prevention projects in Africa outside the Conflict Pool through its bilateral country programmes, including various peacebuilding and dialogue projects (both at a grass-roots level and supporting UN missions) and work related to DDR, SSR and SALW. Total expenditure on DFID conflict-prevention activities in Africa amounted to £49.1 million ($76.5 million) in 2009/10, £44.5 million ($68.8 million) in

\textsuperscript{33} See e.g. British House of Lords, Written answers, Hansard, 22 Apr. 2013, columns WA375–78.
\textsuperscript{34} British Department for International Development (note 32).
\textsuperscript{35} British Department for International Development (DFID), Africa Conflict Prevention Programme: Annual Report 2008/09 (DFID: London, [n.d.]). The 2009/10 Annual Report for the combined CPP does not provide similarly detailed figures, and annual reports have not been published for the CP for subsequent years.
\textsuperscript{36} British Department for International Development (note 35); and Ginifer and Oliver (note 29).
\textsuperscript{37} White (note 8).
\textsuperscript{38} Merienne (note 8); and White (note 8).
SECURITY ACTIVITIES OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN AFRICA

Table 5.3. Total Conflict Pool funding for Africa, 2001/2002–2012/13


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial year</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£ m.</td>
<td>$ m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/2003</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/2004</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/2005</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>116.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/2006</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/2007</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>104.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2010/11, and £42.9 million ($68.7 million) in 2011/12. The budget for 2012/13 was rather higher, at £81.0 million ($128 million).\(^{39}\)

As of 2010, the main British conflict-prevention activities in West Africa (mostly led by the Conflict Pool or DFID, but also involving the FCO and the MOD) included work with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to build capacity in relation to mediation, political dialogue and preventative diplomacy; support for the ECOWAS Standby Force; support for the amnesty process in the Niger Delta, Nigeria; support for efforts to identify threats and mitigate effects of political violence, in particular in Nigeria; continuing engagement in Sierra Leone; support for EU and UN efforts in Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia; and work

\(^{39}\)The 2009/10 figure excludes any projects that may have been completed between 1 Apr. and 1 Aug. 2009. These projects can be found on a searchable online database of DFID projects at <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/> . The database covers projects that were operational on 1 Aug. 2009, and subsequent projects; hence, it is only comprehensive from 2010/11. The database does not seem to always make clear which projects are funded by the Conflict Pool or its predecessor pools, and which are funded by DFID. However, DFID’s share of Conflict Pool funding has fallen in recent years, so that in 2010/11 the portion of Conflict Pool spending coming from DFID (for all regions, including Africa) was £9 million ($13.9 million), and in 2011/12 was £16.2 million ($26 million). Hence, the majority of the above figures appear to be additional to the Conflict Pool. Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), Evaluation of the Inter-departmental Conflict Pool (ICAI: London, July 2012); Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), Terms of Reference for Evaluation of the Inter-departmental Conflict Pool (ICAI: London, July 2012); and National Audit Office (NAO), Review of the Conflict Pool (NAO: London, Mar. 2012).
with Ghana to ensure that lessons from the Niger Delta are learned as Ghana’s oil production begins to come on-stream in the coming years.40

In addition to Conflict Pool and DFID funding, the UK—on top of its mandatory assessed contribution to UN peacekeeping costs from the same funding stream—provides discretionary peacekeeping funding: £44.6 million ($82.1 million) in 2006/2007, £29.5 million ($59.0 million) in 2007/2008, and £18 million ($33.1 million) in 2008/2009, chiefly for operations in Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan. Since the total for 2009/10 includes both the Conflict Pool funds and discretionary peacekeeping funds, it in effect represented a 50 per cent cut compared with the previous year, from a total of £87 million ($159.9 million).41

Training

British involvement in training African armed forces has been ongoing since the colonial era and, indeed, many African armed forces are the direct successors of British-led colonial forces.42 Since decolonization, British training of African forces has been led by British military advisory and training teams, the first such being established in Ghana in 1976.43

During the 1980s and 1990s, Southern Africa was a particular focus for BMATT activities. In Zimbabwe (after independence in 1980), Namibia (after independence in 1990) and South Africa (after the end of apartheid in 1994), BMATTs led or assisted with the process of creating new national armed forces, integrating formerly hostile forces.44 The BMATT in Zimbabwe also trained Mozambique’s armed forces during its civil war.45 Other BMATTs were provided to Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius and Swaziland in that period. The BMATT presence in South Africa was succeeded in 2004 by the British Peace Support Team for South Africa, with a particular role to train South African forces for regional peace operations.46 In 2013 BPST-SA consisted of nine military officers and one civilian staff member.47

The UK’s training activities in West Africa include a BMATT in Ghana, with eight personnel (in 2006) engaged in ‘training trainers’ to improve Ghanaian forces’ ability to participate in international peacekeeping mis-

40 White (note 8).
41 British House of Commons, Written answers, Hansard, 2 Apr. 2009, columns 1303W–1306W; and Merienne (note 8).
42 E.g. Ebo (note 30).
46 Jackson (note 4); and Hughes, G., ‘South Africa Defence transformation: a project still in progress’, CSSM Keynotes, Series no. 11/07 (Cranfield Centre for Security Sector Management: Shrivenham, 2007).
47 British Army (note 25).
Up until 2009/10, the UK also provided financial support and personnel to KAIPTC in Accra. In East Africa, British military training activity centres around the 12-member British Peace Support Team-East Africa (BPST-EA) in Nairobi, operated by the British MOD under the Conflict Pool. BPST-EA forms part of the UK’s strategy to build African peacekeeping capacity through the AU's African Standby Force as well as to train troops engaged in the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The BPST-EA also operates the International Mine Action Training Centre.

The UK’s most far-reaching involvement in training African forces in recent years has been through the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) in Sierra Leone. IMATT has been supported financially through the Conflict Pool’s SSR programme in Sierra Leone. Established in 2002, IMATT was tasked with rebuilding Sierra Leone’s security apparatus from scratch. IMATT officers assumed executive and operational roles within the new defence structure, and since 2003 ownership has gradually been handed over to the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). As in South Africa and Zimbabwe, IMATT’s training role included integrating combatants from the former Sierra Leone Army, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and other militias into a new army. The total international training presence in Sierra Leone (IMATT plus a number of short-term training teams) peaked at 600 in September 2001, reducing annually as the security situation in Sierra Leone stabilized. By early 2010, IMATT’s size was down to 110 troops, with contingents from five countries, although it remains under British command. A particular focus at present is to enable Sierra Leonean forces to participate in regional peace operations. Military personnel from African countries also travel to the UK to receive training. In the period 2002–2005, for example, the UK received a total of 12,414 foreign military personnel for training, including 431 from 25 African countries. The largest numbers were from Kenya (74), Nigeria (59), South Africa (54) and Sierra Leone (34).
Thus, the emphasis of British training of African forces has shifted over the years. In the early postcolonial period it was perhaps mostly a means of maintaining British influence and promoting Western influence. More recently, the majority of training mission have tended to be oriented towards building capacity of African forces for peacekeeping, as part of the UK's support for the APSA—a reflection of the UK's desire to avoid deploying troops in Africa. Many such missions involve small numbers of British personnel and focus on ‘training the trainers’, rather than on large-scale training missions such as were conducted by earlier BMATTs. Post-conflict integration of new forces has also been a recurring theme, most recently in Sierra Leone.

Security sector reform

The UK has been a leader in developing SSR for African countries and has, according to some, shaped the international consensus on SSR in Africa.\textsuperscript{56} DFID has pursued SSR since 1999 and has increasingly emphasized the role of the security sector in development strategy. The British SSR agenda (often expanded to security and justice sector reform, SJSR) includes developing both the capacity and the professional nature of the security forces; developing the institutional framework for governing the security sector; promoting democratic civilian control of the security sector; and enshrining principles of good governance such as transparency and accountability.\textsuperscript{57}

Sub-Saharan Africa has been one of the major focuses of British SSR support. According to a 2007 mapping study, over the period 2001–2005 the UK was involved in SJSR projects in 17 African countries and committed £240 million ($480 million), of which £149 million ($298 million) came from DFID and £91 million ($182 million) from the Conflict Pool. Funded SSR activities included work with the armed forces, police and justice systems, work at operational level and at the level of oversight institutions and included training, capacity building, policy formation, institutional development and DDR. Slightly over half the funds committed related to projects on safety, security and access to justice.\textsuperscript{58}

The focus of British SSR efforts varies from country to country depending on the perceived issues of relevance and the political engagement of


\textsuperscript{58} Ball et al. (note 30).
local decision makers.\textsuperscript{59} For example, the UK’s engagement related to Uganda’s first defence review—an attempt to put Uganda’s defence policy and budgeting on a sound policy basis. Elsewhere, in Nigeria SSR has concentrated on policing and access to justice, while in the DRC it has been more comprehensive, although securing the commitment of decision makers to governance issues has been difficult.\textsuperscript{60}

By far the largest British SSR programme was the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP), which was the first UK-supported project specifically labelled as SSR when it was established in June 1999. The project took up 60 per cent (£144.9 million, $263.5 million) of the British SSR budget earmarked for Africa in the period 2001–2005.\textsuperscript{61} The lessons learned from Sierra Leone in many ways shaped the UK’s understanding of the concept as a whole.\textsuperscript{62} SILSEP was initiated in the context of ongoing conflict, initially geared to the exigencies of winning the war against the rebels. With Sierra Leone’s MOD and governance structures

\textsuperscript{59} Hendrickson, D., Leader of the Conflict, Security and Development Group at Kings College London and consultant to the British Government on SSR, Interview with the author, London, May 2010.


\textsuperscript{61} Ball et al. (note 30), p. 10. The UK’s involvement in Uganda’s defence review came first, in 1998, although it was not labelled SSR.

\textsuperscript{62} Albrecht and Jackson (note 30).
barely functioning, the entire security system had to be rebuilt from the ground up. British officers and civil servants occupied key positions in the Sierra Leone armed forces, police and MOD. Following the end of the civil war in 2002, ownership began to be handed over to local actors—although there were criticisms among some Sierra Leoneans that this process occurred too slowly. The SSR process included DDR, formation of the new official armed forces from former members of the army and non-state armed groups, training of the police, and various activities to build the institutional capacity of the Sierra Leonean security and justice sector. A total of 90 British personnel were stationed Sierra Leone in April 2007, but this number dropped to 30 by April 2010 and to 20 by April 2012, by which time all MOD civilian personnel had also left. British funding for SSR in Sierra Leone has also remained significant, standing at £7.4 million in 2011/12. Leadership of the security sector has largely passed to Sierra Leoneans, and IMATT officers no longer have executive roles within the Sierra Leonean MOD or armed forces.

**British arms transfers to Africa**

The UK is one of the world’s top arms exporters, and the British Government puts a high priority on the strength of its arms industry, including support for exports. British transfers of major conventional weapons to Africa declined from its peak in the early 1980s to almost negligible levels in the mid-1990s (see figure 5.1). Over the period 2000–12 the UK exported major conventional weapons to only six African countries: South Africa, Algeria, Tanzania, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Somalia (in ranking order). British arms transfers to Africa accounted for 2.7 per cent of total British transfers during this period, with South Africa accounting for 66 per cent of the figure for Africa, and Algeria for 31 per cent.

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63 Albrecht and Jackson (note 30).
64 See e.g. Ball (note 56); and Mitton, K., ‘Engaging disengagement: the political reintegration of Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front’, *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 8, no. 2 (2008), pp. 193–222.
65 Albrecht and Jackson (note 30).
68 The material under this subheading is largely taken from an unpublished paper by Pieter D. Wezeman, SIPRI, ‘UK arms to Africa’. Except where otherwise stated, all information on major conventional weapon sales comes from the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>.
Official British arms export figures (which include items in addition to major weapons) confirm the low level of British arms exports to Africa. During the period 2003–2007 the British Government licensed the export of military equipment worth a total of €625 million ($855 million) to sub-Saharan countries, including €326 million ($446 million) to South Africa and €146 million ($200 million) to Nigeria.\textsuperscript{71} Export licences granted for small arms sales to Africa have been very limited, suggesting that the UK is exercising a certain degree of restraint in this area, in accordance with its ethical guidelines for arms exports.\textsuperscript{72}

**Controversial cases**

Despite the ethical guidelines for arms exports, there have been a number of export decisions that have raised serious concerns and given rise to the suspicion that the UK placed the interests of the British arms industry above its developmental and governance goals for Africa.

First, in 2000 it was revealed that the UK had continued to authorize the export to Zimbabwe of spare parts for BAE Systems Hawk trainer/light combat aircraft, even though there were credible reports of the use of such aircraft in the DRC, in whose civil war Zimbabwe was involved.\textsuperscript{73} The government justified this on the grounds that it was important for BAE to be seen as a trustworthy supplier. The UK subsequently imposed a complete arms embargo on Zimbabwe in May 2000, revoking existing licences.\textsuperscript{74}

Second, in 2002 the UK authorized, in the face of protests from DFID, the sale of a £28 million ($42 million) military air traffic control (ATC) system to Tanzania, despite a World Bank recommendation that the system was unsuitable for Tanzania’s requirements for a civilian ATC system. The sale was the subject of accusations of bribery of Tanzanian officials to secure the deal.\textsuperscript{75} BAE admitted in 2010 to charges of false accounting in

\textsuperscript{71} EU Council, various years, ‘Annual report according to operative provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’. These reports are available at SIPRI, ‘EU annual report’, <http://www.sipri.org/research/arming/arms/transfers/transparency/EU_reports>. The UK does not publish data on the value of actual deliveries of military equipment.

\textsuperscript{72} Based on licences for export of SALW to Africa between 2004 and 2008 reported by the UK to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, <http://www.un-register.org/>.


relation to the deal (although not formally admitting to bribery) and agreed to pay a £30 million fine as part of a plea bargain.\footnote{Leigh, R. and Evans, D., ‘Serious Fraud Office backs £30m BAE plea bargain despite opposition’, \textit{The Guardian}, 1 Apr. 2010.}

Finally, the largest, and perhaps most controversial, British arms sale to Africa under Blair’s Labour government was the 1999 deal to sell Hawk Trainer aircraft and JAS Gripen advanced fighter aircraft (the latter a Swedish aircraft in which BAE has a 30 per cent stake) to South Africa. The deal formed part of a 30 billion rand ($5 billion) package of sales by companies from several European countries, which also included submarines, frigates and helicopters.\footnote{See e.g. Dunne, J. P. and Lamb, G., ‘Defence industrial participation; the South African experience’, eds J. Brauer and J. P. Dunne, \textit{Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and Case Studies in Arms Trade Offsets} (Routledge: London, 2004), pp. 284–98.} Blair was actively involved in selling the deal during two visits to South Africa in 1999. The deal was widely criticized for being far in excess of the country’s security needs and diverting resources from much-needed social expenditure.\footnote{E.g. People’s Budget Campaign, ‘People’s Budget 2006/07’, Feb. 2005, <http://www.sacc-ct.org.za/campaigns.html>.} It was the subject of major corruption allegations, including the Defence Minister, Joe Modise, and Deputy President Jacob Zuma (now president)—although only two lower-level officials were convicted.\footnote{For a detailed account of the deal and the allegations of corruption and official cover-up see Feinstein, A., \textit{After the Party: A Personal and Political Journey Inside the ANC} (Jonathon Ball: Johannesburg, 2007).} The British Serious Fraud Office (SFO) also investigated commission payments made by BAE Systems in connection with the aircraft. BAE has admitted to paying £112 million in commissions but deny that it involve bribery.\footnote{McGreal, C., ‘Arms deal investigators probe BAE payment to South African’, \textit{The Guardian}, 6 Jan. 2007.} However, the SFO investigation allegedly uncovered payments to a number of politically well-connected companies and individuals linked to those involved in the procurement process, including to Modise.\footnote{Feinstein (note 79).} The investigation into BAE was terminated as part of the plea bargain deal described above.

**Natural resource extraction**

Within the extractive sector in Africa the UK’s development, governance and conflict-prevention goals can potentially come into conflict with British economic and corporate interests. Many African countries are highly dependent on natural resource exports. The potential of such dependence to contribute to conflict, human rights abuses, corruption and environmental damage—while failing to promote development for the majority of
the population—is well documented. Many British or British-linked companies are major players in the global energy and extractive industries and are active in many African countries. The most controversial case in recent years has been Shell’s oil extraction in the Niger Delta, which is alleged to have caused massive environmental damage. While in recent years Shell has made an effort to improve its image and invest in numerous community development projects, a recent study found these produced little benefit. Shell has also been accused of over-reliance on, and collaboration with, the repressive instruments of state security to combat opposition to their activities.

The British Government has acknowledged the potential conflict and has responded by supporting and promoting two major international initiatives: the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which is designed to encourage transparency in company payments and government revenues related to extractive industry contracts; and the Kimberley Diamond Process, aimed at eliminating ‘blood diamonds’ as a means of financing conflict.

Both initiatives suffer from the fact that they are entirely voluntary, an approach that has been criticized by non-governmental organizations as wholly inadequate to tackle the deeply entrenched problems in extractive industries operating in developing countries with limited state capacity. The UK has shown no willingness to consider more binding or statutory approaches.

IV. Conclusions

British security-related engagement in Africa has increased greatly since 1997, in particular during the Labour government of 1997–2010. The United Kingdom’s Africa policy has been placed in a development framework, largely led by the Department for International Development. Similarly, British security activities in Africa have been placed within a security and 

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development framework and—except in Sierra Leone for a few months in 2000—pursued at arms length: that is, by providing training for African forces and support for security sector reform and peacebuilding efforts while committing few British troops to peace operations. Training has been focused on improving the capacity of African forces to engage in peace operations themselves, which fits well with the development of the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture, Africa’s Regional Economic Communities and the UK’s desire to avoid deploying troops.

Beyond Sierra Leone—which has been described as the most successful of the UK’s SSR activities—internal and external reviews of the SSR programmes and of the Conflict Pool have given a cautiously positive verdict, finding many examples of valuable work but with much room for improvement (e.g. in relation to strategic coherence of programmes) and with some outright failures. The interdepartmental approach of the Conflict Pool is seen as innovative and, according to DFID, has been investigated as a model by other countries.

Thus, the British Government policy of promoting African development and security is reflected to a significant degree in activities on the ground, albeit imperfectly and on a relatively small scale. This focus on Africa was perhaps the most palpable expression of the ‘ethical dimension’ to foreign policy proclaimed by the Labour government on its election in 1997. With the Labour Party’s progressive base deeply disappointed by decisions such as arms sales to the Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia and the war in Iraq, the party could present the Africa policy—including its military dimension such as the intervention in Sierra Leone—as a genuinely altruistic element of British foreign policy, untarnished by the pursuit of national interest.

However, another more narrowly self-interested side to the UK’s security relationship with Africa can be discerned. While aid, debt relief and efforts to prevent and resolve conflict were certainly present, they took place in a fundamentally neo-liberal policy framework that promotes the interests of private investors, and which critics argue fails to address the real needs of African people. In the security field, the role of self-interest can be most clearly seen in the British Government’s efforts to promote arms sales to Africa, often despite serious concerns over corruption or human rights; and in the failure to tackle the damaging activities of major British corporations

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87 See e.g. Department for International Development (note 12); Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Evaluation of the Inter-departmental Conflict Pool (note 39); and National Audit Office (note 39).

88 British Department for International Development (note 12).


involved in extractive industry, supporting instead an entirely voluntary approach to the environmental, security and governance problems they create. With Africa largely peripheral to British strategic interests, peace and development goals could be given a prominent position; but such goals have often found their limit when they come into conflict with the interests of British corporations operating in Africa.

Select bibliography


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During the cold war, relations between the United States and African states were dominated by US realpolitik considerations and often involved US support to authoritarian regimes in Africa. Immediately following the end of the cold war, it appeared that the USA had lost its strategic interest in Africa, and most of the 1990s was characterized by US strategic disengagement from the continent. Simultaneously, and in contrast to the cold war, support for democratization and good governance became a more prominent part of the USA’s policy on Africa. However, this post-cold war period of reorientation in US policies on Africa was short. During the administration of US President George W. Bush (2001–2009), there was a profound redirection of US national security strategy and security policy on Africa, involving increased US efforts to engage with Africa in security-related issues. Since the early 2000s, there has been not only a substantial increase in US security-related activities in Africa but also a change in the organization of such activities.

This chapter maps US security-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa. Section I offers a brief historical account of US–African relations in order to set contemporary US policy on and security-related activities in Africa in perspective. Section II presents the USA’s policies and its national security strategy as they relate to Africa since the early 2000s. Section III describes the USA’s main security-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa, including US military presence, arms transfers and security assistance. Section IV addresses some of the concerns related to US security involvement in Africa. Section V provides brief conclusions.

I. Historical background

Three historical developments have shaped US–African relations: the transatlantic slave trade during the 17th–19th centuries, the colonization of Africa and the cold war. Although the USA does not have a history as a colonial power in Africa—a...
affected by colonization. The USA recognized Europe’s colonial interests in Africa, as agreed at the 1884–85 Berlin Conference—and basically confirmed at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919—and benefited from the related rights of access to resources and markets in Africa. This recognition also constrained the USA’s own bilateral relations with African states during the colonial period and until World War II, when the USA articulated its own strategic interests in Africa, most immediately to deny the Axis states (Germany, Japan, Italy) access to North and West Africa.

During the cold war, when African countries were drawn into the East–West rivalry for political, economic and ideological supremacy, the US approach to Africa was dominated by ideological, geopolitical and security concerns related to the containment of Communism. This was reflected in the large volumes of US arms transferred to African states, the pattern of US economic and military assistance to the continent, and the subordination of US foreign assistance to national security considerations, with foreign aid often justified based on the strategic importance to the USA of the recipient.

After the end of the cold war, the official US view was that Africa was no longer a region of significant strategic interest. A 1995 Department of Defense (DOD) report on US security strategy for sub-Saharan Africa concluded that ‘We do desire access to facilities and material . . . especially . . . in the event of contingencies and evacuations. But ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interests in Africa’.

During the administration of President George H. W. Bush (1989–93), US policy towards Africa focused on humanitarian and disaster response operations. The following president, Bill Clinton (1993–2001), entered office with an ambitious Africa policy, calling for a ‘new strategy of American engagement to encourage the spread and consolidation of democracy [and] opposing political oppression across Africa’. According to this strategy of ‘democracy enlargement’, the USA would take a firm foreign policy stance

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against authoritarian African leaders, involving a more active role for the US Department of State (DOS), in contrast with the cold war when the DOD and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had taken the lead.8

The fate of US soldiers deployed to Somalia in 1992–94 played a major role in the change in US foreign and security policy towards Africa. Soldiers deployed as part of Operation Restore Hope, a US-led humanitarian aid mission mandated by the United Nations Security Council, became involved in regular war fighting, resulting in 18 of them being killed and 73 wounded in a firefight in October 1993.9 This experience led to the eventual withdrawal of all US troops from Somalia and shifted US troop deployment policies in two ways: first was the adoption of an informal doctrine based on a resistance to deploying US troops to Africa, often referred to as ‘no US boots on African soil’; and second was a more general retreat from US participation in UN peace operations, as codified in a 1994 US Presidential decision directive.10 Since 1993, direct involvement of troops in UN peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa has virtually ceased, the main exception being the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Instead, US support for peacekeeping in Africa has taken the form of various types of peacekeeping training programme for African armed forces.

In sum, during the 1990s, US security and foreign policy on Africa was based on the assessment that Africa was no longer of major strategic interest to the USA and was characterized by a general US disengagement from Africa, although there are significant qualifications to this description.11 However, towards the end of the 1990s, there were signs that US disengagement from Africa would be only temporary, as shown by the US response to the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

II. US policy on Africa in the 21st century

Following the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 2001 and the USA’s launch of the ‘global war on terrorism’, terrorism was upgraded to the number one threat to US security. The USA assessed Africa to be a significant potential source of terrorist threats, which led to Africa’s rise as a region of strategic importance to the USA.12 Within this context, US security-related policies and strategies towards Africa underwent a pro-

11 See e.g. Hentz (note 5); and Akinrade, S. and Sesay, A. (eds), Africa in the Post-Cold War International System (Pinter: London, 1998).
found transformation during the administration of US President George W. Bush. The key instruments of policy formulation for this redirection included the US national security strategy, periodic defence reviews, and a number of other strategy and policy statements by the administration.

In this context, while access to African oil is not a prominent feature in US official policy and strategy documents, critics argue that it is an important factor behind the increased US strategic interest in Africa, which since the 1990s has emerged as a major producer of crude oil.\(^\text{13}\) Two important reports from the early 2000s laid the basis for US policy on oil imports from Africa. In 2000, a US National Intelligence Council report forecast that West African energy production could account for up to 25 per cent of North American oil imports by 2015, up from 15 per cent.\(^\text{14}\) In May 2001, a high-level task force led by Vice President Dick Cheney recommended that the USA should seek to shift its oil imports from the Middle East to other regions, including West Africa, and called for US action to promote increased oil production in Africa.\(^\text{15}\) Later that year, Walter H. Kansteiner, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, declared that African oil had ‘become a national strategic interest’.\(^\text{16}\)

The strategic view of Africa is seen in the 2002 US National Security Strategy, which identified ‘disease, war and desperate poverty’ in Africa as threats to the US strategic priority of ‘combating global terror’. It concluded that the USA must ‘help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists’.\(^\text{17}\) The reassessment of Africa as a source of threats also had an impact on USA’s Africa policy. This was reflected in the work of the Africa Policy Advisory Panel, which was authorized by the US Congress in 2003 to generate recommendations on how to strengthen the USA’s Africa policy. Commonly referred to as the Africa Panel, it was a group of experts chaired by Kansteiner. In its 2004 report, the panel concluded that Africa had assumed a new strategic place in US foreign policy, reflecting how ‘9/11 altered the US strategic conception of global security’.\(^\text{18}\)

tified five factors that had forced this US reappraisal of Africa: ‘HIV/AIDS; terror; oil; armed conflicts; and global trade’.

The Africa Panel also identified three main goals for US policy on Africa: establishing peace and security (including countering terrorism), limiting the spread of HIV/AIDS and promoting economic development through trade. President Bush’s policy on Africa was closely aligned with the analysis and recommendations of the Africa Panel, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), announced in 2003—a commitment to spend $15 billion over the next five years to combat HIV/AIDS, primarily in Africa and the Caribbean. However, the most profound trademark of US policies and strategies towards Africa during this administration was the strong focus on counterterrorism.

The first explicit indication of the USA’s policy on Africa under the administration of US President Barack Obama appeared in a speech to the Ghanaian Parliament in July 2009, in which Obama emphasized the global character of Africa’s security challenges, while reiterating US policy to support Africans to help themselves. The continued strategic importance of Africa to the USA was confirmed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and in the 2010 National Security Strategy. However, it took until June 2012 for the Obama administration to present a comprehensive formulation of its policy on Africa: the U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa states that ‘Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community, and to the United States in particular’. It places a stronger emphasis on governance issues and economic growth and uses a different terminology—for example, ‘violent extremism’ replaced ‘terrorism’, a semantic change reflecting a different understanding than the previous administration of the phenomenon. Overall, however, there has been no fundamental change in the security-related aspects of US strategies and policies towards Africa since Obama’s election in 2009.

US security-related policy objectives and instruments in Africa

According to the 2010 QDR, US security instruments in Africa include assistance to ‘fragile, post-conflict states’ (e.g. Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC, and Sudan) and ‘failed states’ (e.g. Somalia) in order to address transnational problems (e.g. extremism, piracy, illegal fish-
The U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa lists five main actions under its objective to advance peace and security: (a) to counter al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups; (b) to advance regional security cooperation and security sector reform (SSR); (c) to prevent transnational criminal threats; (d) to prevent conflict and, where necessary, mitigate mass atrocities and hold perpetrators accountable; and (e) to support [multilateral and local] initiatives to promote peace and security.\(^2\)

The main policy instruments to achieve US security objectives are various types of security cooperation, such as bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales and financing, officer exchange programmes, educational opportunities at professional military schools and assistance to foreign security forces in building competence and capacity. An increasingly important type of security cooperation is ‘security force assistance’ missions, that is ‘“hands on” efforts, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries’ forces’.\(^2\)

Based on experience for ‘denying terrorists and insurgents safe heavens’ in Afghanistan and Iraq, US forces are operating in tandem with host-state forces in host-state units, which have the advantage of knowing the terrain, language and local culture, preferably under ‘host-nation leadership’ and employing only a modest number of US forces.\(^2\)

This model is applied in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, where US forces provide training, equipment and advice to their host-state counterparts on ‘how to better seek out and dismantle terrorist and insurgent networks while providing security to populations that have been intimidated by violent elements’.\(^2\)

Countering terrorism and violent extremism has remained an important strategy under the Obama administration, with important implications for Africa. The US National Strategy for Counterterrorism, presented in June 2011, reiterates that the USA is ‘at war’. However, rather than referring to the broad and unspecified ‘global war on terrorism’, the new strategy emphasizes that the USA is ‘not at war with the tactic of terrorism or the religion of Islam’ but with a specific organization: al-Qaeda.\(^2\)

The strategy also stresses that US counterterrorism efforts ‘require a multi-departmental and multinational effort that goes beyond traditional intelligence, military and law enforcement functions’ and is complemented by broader capabilities, such as diplomacy, development, strategic communications and the

\(^{24}\) White House (note 22), pp. 4–5.
\(^{27}\) US Department of Defense (note 21), p. 28.
power of the private sector.29 Similarly of relevance for Africa is the 2005 US National Strategy for Maritime Security, which describes how the US Government will promote an international maritime security effort ‘to enhance the security of and protect U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain’.30 It has four main objectives: (a) to prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts; (b) to protect maritime-related population centres and critical infrastructures; (c) to minimize dangers and expedite recovery from attacks; and (d) to safeguard the ocean and its resources.31 The strategy underscores the need for a coordinated international approach to increase awareness of activities in the maritime domain, to enhance domestic and international maritime security frameworks, to improve information fusion and analysis and to improve the response posture to any occurring incident.32 To this end, the strategy document refers in particular to US initiatives to help improve border and coastal security in Africa.33 In 2008 an action plan was presented to apply the strategy to combating piracy off the coast of Somalia.34

**United States Africa Command**

The establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008 continues to be the main, and probably most controversial, US security policy initiative towards Africa taken since the end of the cold war. AFRICOM is a Unified Combatant Command for Africa within the US military command structure, with all the roles and responsibilities of a DOD geographic combatant command, including the ability to lead or facilitate military operations. Its area of responsibility covers all African countries except Egypt.35

Based on concerns that the command would be a first step towards a larger US military presence in the continent, the establishment of AFRICOM was met with great scepticism in Africa. Originally, the USA intended to locate AFRICOM’s headquarters in Africa. However, only one African country—Liberia—offered to host it, and so it is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, alongside the European Command (EUCOM). Most of AFRICOM’s 2000 assigned personnel—military, civilian and private con-

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31 White House (note 30), pp. 1–11.
32 White House (note 30), p. 25.
33 White House (note 30), p. 12.
35 Prior to the creation of AFRICOM, responsibility for African countries was divided among 3 US DOD commands: European Command (EUCOM) for North, West, Central and Southern Africa, Central Command (CENTCOM) for the Horn of Africa, and Pacific Command (PACOM) for the states in the Indian Ocean.
tractors—are also based in Stuttgart and at bases in Florida, USA, and the United Kingdom.\(^{36}\) AFRICOM is one of the two largest of the USA's six geographic commands in terms of operations and maintenance funding, and with a $282 million budget in financial year (FY) 2012, the largest.\(^{37}\)

According to its mission statement, AFRICOM protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.\(^{38}\)

AFRICOM is responsible for the management and coordination of most US security-related activities in Africa, in particular those focusing on counter-terrorism and support for and training of African security forces.\(^{39}\)

AFRICOM has been presented as a rather non-traditional command with its emphasis on war prevention rather than on war fighting.\(^{40}\) Over time, AFRICOM has developed into a more traditional combatant command, partly by participation in the external dimension of the Arab Spring, and in particular through its focus on counterterrorism activities. Since October 2012, AFRICOM has its own in-extremis force, a rapid-reaction force with its home base in Colorado, USA, and with an element forward-stationed in Europe and with troops to be forward-deployed in Africa.\(^{41}\)

Critics of US policy and strategy towards Africa focus primarily on the motives for US policy choices, arguing that US foreign policy objectives in Africa—as developed in particular during the Bush administration—are based on narrow US self-interest, such as protection from terrorist activities and access to oil and other natural resources. This, it is argued, has a number of negative implications, for African countries and citizens as well as for US–African relations. In particular, there is a concern among critics about the militarization of USA's Africa policy with its strong focus on security and on military policy tools. As evidence of militarization, critics

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point to the US focus on support for military training programmes in Africa and the increases in US arms sales, in particular to countries considered strategic for the ‘global war on terrorism’.  

The main concern regarding militarization relates to the establishment of AFRICOM and its impact on US–African security relations. Of particular concern is the fact that AFRICOM, in addition to its responsibility as a military command, is also tasked with coordinating US Government civilian activities in Africa, including in the economic and development assistance domains. This arrangement, it is argued, involves an increased reliance on the US military and a subordinated role for the DOS and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), despite their greater experience and skill in promoting peace, security and development. While the Obama administration has made efforts to find a balance between defence, diplomacy and development in its foreign policy, it is questionable whether this has been successful for its Africa policy.

III. US security-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa

The USA’s security-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa reflect in part its shift, or return, to a strategic view of Africa in the early 2000s. While direct US participation in military operations is minimal and permanent US military presence is limited, increased US military and security engagement is clearly manifest in the wide-ranging US security-related tasks and activities on the continent, most of which are led by and conducted by AFRICOM. This section documents US military presence in sub-Saharan Africa as well as US arms transfers, foreign assistance and security programmes undertaken to strengthen African military and security capabilities for counterterrorism, peacekeeping, stabilization, SSR and maritime security related to sub-Saharan Africa.

Military presence

The USA has no officially permanent military base in Africa. Instead, the US basing posture in Africa is described as involving ‘a limited rotational military presence to help build partner security capacity’. For the support of defence activities ‘in theatre’, given the ‘light U.S. footprint’ in Africa,

The United States will work with allies and partners to enhance a defense posture that supports contingency response by improving our relationships and access

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agreements with African allies and partners, improving preexisting African-owned infrastructure, and exploring innovative opportunities for logistical collaboration with African militaries.\textsuperscript{45}

Thus, US military presence in Africa is built in accordance with the ‘expeditionary basing posture’ adopted by the USA after the end of the cold war. This posture includes so-called foreign forward operating sites (FOSs) and cooperative security locations (CSLs)—two types of temporary military presence often referred to as ‘lily pads’—which are supported by a legal framework based on negotiated status of forces agreements (SOFAs) and transit rights agreements with African states that codify the legal rights of US armed forces and access to local facilities.\textsuperscript{46} The emphasis of this posture is on ‘a flexible ability to respond to contingencies, emerging threats, and global security needs in distant theaters’ and on the adaptability of the posture ‘to address challenges such as insurgency and terrorism . . . and the maintenance of secure access to the global commons’.\textsuperscript{47} Lack of transparency regarding this system makes it difficult to fully and accurately map the scope of US military presence in sub-Saharan Africa.

Nevertheless, the USA does have a military base in Africa: Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which is described as an ‘enduring’ FOS—that is, a semi-permanent ‘expeditionary’ military base.\textsuperscript{48} Camp Lemonnier is a US Navy-led base that is used by several US military commands.\textsuperscript{49} It is the primary base of operations for AFRICOM in the Horn of Africa, and it is the home of AFRICOM’s Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). It also serves as the hub for US forces operating in the Horn of Africa and provides support for US military operations in the Gulf of Aden area and in Yemen.\textsuperscript{50} Since 2012 this base has been increasingly used for US unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and fighter aircraft in US military counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{45} US Department of Defense (note 21), p. 68.
\textsuperscript{47} US Department of Defense (note 21), p. 64.

The US Government has leased the site of Camp Lemonnier (a former French military base) from the Djibouti Government since 2001, primarily for the purpose of managing counterterrorism missions. The lease also allows for the use of the nearby international airport and port facilities. The five-year lease extension agreed in 2007 included a major expansion of the site from 88 acres (36 hectares) to nearly 500 acres (202 hectares) and the building of permanent housing units.\(^{52}\) A number of new construction projects were initiated during 2012.\(^{53}\) As of June 2013 the base ‘supported’ a total of approximately 4000 personnel (US, joint and allied forces, military and civilian personnel and US DOD contractors) and approximately 1000 host-country and third-country national workers.\(^{54}\)

In addition to Camp Lemonnier, the US armed forces have access to a number of lily pads across Africa. According to a 2011 report by the US Congressional Research Service, the USA had access to CSLs in 10 countries in sub-Saharan Africa—Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia.\(^{55}\) However, it is difficult to obtain specific information about these locations, or about the US SOFAs with African governments that provide the specific access arrangements.\(^{56}\)

While there are no permanent US military bases in Africa, there is a significant US military presence on the continent, including the unquantifiable rotational presence of US forces participating in various exercises (e.g. counterterrorism efforts, communications interoperability exercises and theatre security operation activities). For example, US troops are present in Africa in a bilateral role, primarily for the training and education of African military and security forces, but also to conduct counterterrorism and rescue operations. By and large, the principle of ‘no US boots on African soil’ still applies to the participation of US troops in UN peace oper-


\(^{55}\) Ploch (note 50), p. 9.

\(^{56}\) Most of the available information on lily pads is provided by journalists. E.g. one article reported that US UAVs were flown from Arba Minch airport in Ethiopia and from Seychelles; that there were 100–200 US troops at a base in Manda Bay, Kenya; and that US special operations forces are stationed at a string of forward operating posts in Africa, including in the Central African Republic, the DRC and South Sudan. Turse, N., ‘The increasing US shadow wars in Africa’, Mother Jones, 12 July 2012. While the US DOS publishes an official list of treaties and other international agreements, it is impossible to identify those that provide access and transit rights. US Department of State (DOS), Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2012 (DOS: Washington, DC, Jan. 2012).
Following the US withdrawal from Somalia in 1994, US military and civilian personnel have participated in only 10 peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa, and most of this participation has consisted of merely police staff or military observers, usually with one or two troops per mission. Instead, the USA provides support for African peace operations. As succinctly summarized by security studies scholar Paul Williams, when US troops returned to the Horn of Africa and thus to sub-Saharan Africa, ‘it was primarily to conduct counter-terrorism operations, initially after the 1998 embassy bombings and then in the aftermath of 9/11. US policy thus looked at Somali and regional politics through the narrow and distorting prism of counterterrorism’. This prism is to a great extent also used for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.


Arms transfers

US arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa have declined significantly since the cold war. According to SIPRI data, deliveries of major conventional weapons reached a peak in the late 1970s and fell to a trough in the early 1990s (see figure 6.1). In the period 1991–95, the level of US deliveries of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa was only 5 per cent of the level of 1976–80. However, since the mid-2000s, US arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa have increased significantly again. During the period 2006–10, the volume of US deliveries of major weapons was 3.5 times higher than in 2001–2005. While during the 5-year periods 1996–2000 to 2006–10, the USA ranked eighth or ninth among the suppliers of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), in the most recent 5-year period, 2009–13, it ranked sixth. However, at 3.0 per cent of the total in the latter period, US arms transfers were far below the three main suppliers: Ukraine, Russia and China.

Official data on US transfers of all types of military equipment (i.e. beyond major weapons) to sub-Saharan Africa show similar trends although less marked and with different peaks and troughs. The value of deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa under the US Government’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme peaked in FY 1982 at $122 million. Thereafter, FMS deliveries were on a decreasing trend until a low point of $7.9 million in FY 2002. Since then, there has been an almost fivefold increase (in current US dollars) to $37.6 million in FY 2011. FMS agreements for future deliveries have also increased significantly, from $6.3 million in FY 2000 to $72.7 million in FY 2011.

While US arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa have been much lower in the 21st century than during the cold war and account for a small share of overall arms transfers to the region, they are significant for some individual African countries, because the bulk of US arms transfers are concentrated on a relatively small number of recipients. During the period FYs 2006–11, the USA made FMS deliveries to 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with a total value of $122.4 million, of which 96 per cent went to the 15 largest

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62 US Department of Defense (note 61).
security activities of external actors in Africa

Table 6.1. Deliveries and agreements under the US Foreign Military Sales programme to sub-Saharan Africa, financial years 2006–11

Figures are in $m., at current prices. Totals may not add up to totals due to rounding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value ($ m.)</td>
<td>Recipient Value ($ m.)</td>
<td>Recipient Value ($ m.)</td>
<td>Recipient Value ($ m.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other states</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Other states</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>122.4</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>164.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo.


recipients (see table 6.1).\(^63\) FMS agreements for future deliveries are similarly concentrated.

The pattern of recipients reflects US priorities and policies in Africa (see table 6.1). Six of the recent recipients supply oil to the USA: Chad, the DRC, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. The recipients also include Djibouti (the host of Camp Lemonnier) and Sao Tome and Principe (the home of another AFRICOM support facility) as well as nine countries included in US counterterrorism partnership arrangements: Chad, the Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda.\(^64\)

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\(^64\) These partnerships are the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). See US Department of State, ‘Diplomacy in action’, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm>.
Foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa

The USA provides foreign assistance (economic, security and military) to almost all countries in sub-Saharan Africa (47 countries in FYs 2008–13) as well as to the African Union and to subregional organizations and initiatives.65 Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 23 per cent of total budget request for US bilateral foreign assistance in FY 2013.66 The overwhelming share of US foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa is for economic assistance (87 per cent in FY 2013), primarily for the global health and child survival programmes (see table 6.2), followed by security assistance (10.6 per cent) and military assistance (2.5 per cent).67

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67 US Department of State (note 66).
According to historical data from the USAID, US foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa declined during the early 1990s, reflecting the post-cold war disengagement from Africa (see figure 6.2). During the late 1990s, assistance began to increase again, primarily due to increases in food aid and the initiation in 1996 of DOS support for ‘migration and refugee assistance’ in response to famines and armed conflicts in Africa. Since the early 2000s, the growth in US foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa has been rapid, from $2031 million in FY 2000 to $9338 million in FY 2011. A post-cold war peak was reached in FY 2010 (at $10 079 million), with a continuous although modest decrease until FY 2013.

In accordance with the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, all US foreign assistance is authorized by the DOS. Thus, although military assistance pro-

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69 This is data for ‘obligations’ as reported in USAID’s online database. Obligations are binding agreements that will result in outlays. US Agency for International Development (USAID), ‘U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants’, <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/>. This is a companion website to the annual report to the US Congress, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations—commonly known as the Greenbook. Unfortunately, the data in the Greenbook differs significantly from the data provided by the DOS in the Congressional Budget Justification documents.
70 The decrease in FYs 2011–13 is according to more recent data from the DOS. This data is for appropriations for bilateral assistance. US Department of State (note 66), p. 2.
grammes are implemented by the DOD, they are, in principle, carried out under DOS authority, oversight and guidance. The rationale for this principle is to align military assistance with general US foreign policy goals. However, in the wake of September 2001, the DOD was given its own authority for a number of special security assistance programmes. The following sections cover the regular US military and security assistance under DOS authority, and the special security assistance programmes under the DOD, respectively.

**Military and security assistance under authority of the US Department of State**

US military assistance to sub-Saharan Africa has been increasing rapidly in recent years. While during the 1990s and up until FY 2004 annual military assistance never exceeded $50 million, in FY 2005 it jumped to $280 million and in FY 2006 to $520 million. By FY 2009, at $894 million, it was 26 times higher than in FY 2004 ($34 million), at current prices. According to DOS data, military assistance has increased faster than total foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, thereby increasing its share of total assistance from less than 4 per cent in the 1990s and up to FY 2004 to more than 8 per cent in FY 2009.\(^71\)

US military assistance to sub-Saharan Africa is chiefly for support of peace operations, which is used to train African personnel for peacekeeping activities. US military assistance to sub-Saharan Africa consists primarily of three budget accounts: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET). According to DOS data, the PKO account represented 82 per cent of US appropriations for military assistance to sub-Saharan Africa in FY 2013 (see table 6.2).\(^72\) The FMF account provides grants to foreign governments to finance the purchase of US weapons, related services and military training through the FMS programme. FMF grants decreased between 2002 and 2008 but more than doubled between 2008 and 2010. IMET grants are provided to fund training of foreign military personnel, including at institutions in the USA. IMET grants to sub-Saharan Africa increased during 2001–2004, dropped in 2005, then increased again until 2011, after which it has dropped again.

In addition to military assistance, since the early 2000s the USA has provided a significant amount of security assistance to Africa.\(^73\) The security assistance is funded primarily under the ‘Peace and Security’ programme in

\(^71\) US Department of State (note 66). The DOS data—and thus also the shares of the total—differ significantly from the data provided in the Greenbook, compiled by the USAID.  
\(^72\) USAID Greenbook data, which is for obligations rather than appropriations, show much higher figures and shares for PKO: $718 million in FY 2008 and $864 million in FY 2009, accounting for 97% of total military assistance in both years. US Agency for International Development (note 69).  
\(^73\) In the USAID Greenbook, security assistance is included in the category ‘economic assistance’.
the Foreign Assistance budget. The major areas within that programme are ‘stabilization operations and security sector reform’, ‘conflict mitigation and reconciliation’ and ‘counter-terrorism’. The main form of security assistance is through the Economic Support Fund (ESF), which accounted for 83 per cent of DOS security assistance to sub-Saharan Africa in FY 2013 (see table 6.2). The ESF increased from $64 million in FY 2000 to $562 million in FY 2013. ESF assistance is used for a wide range of programmes, including economic reform, air-traffic safety, education in human rights and democracy, and counterterrorism activities such as border control and freezing terrorist assets. Funding for international narcotics control and law enforcement support to sub-Saharan Africa has increased strongly in recent years, and in FY 2013 it accounted for 11 per cent of US security assistance appropriations to sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, non-proliferation, antiterrorism, demining and related programmes account for roughly 6 per cent of DOS security assistance to sub-Saharan Africa.

Special security assistance under the authority of the US Department of Defense

Special security assistance under DOD authority is a relatively new source of foreign assistance funds introduced by the Bush administration in the mid-2000s to provide a faster and more flexible form of security assistance to foreign military and maritime security forces for special purposes. One of these is the so-called Section 1206, enacted in 2005, which provides the US Secretary of Defense with the authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specified purposes—counterterrorism and stability operations—and train and equip foreign maritime security forces for counterterrorism operations. The fund is essentially a DOD-authorized counterpart to the DOS FMF.

Section 1206 is the first major authorization of the DOD to explicitly train and equip military forces of foreign countries. In general, all previous DOD training and equipping activity was done under DOS authority and as part of DOS programmes—in line with the Foreign Assistance Act. This new DOD authority is controversial, not least because it may undermine the Secretary of State’s statutory responsibility to guarantee the coherence of US foreign policy.

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77 Serafino (note 76), p. 1.
While the authority granted under Section 1206 was originally meant for activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, over time its use has been broadened to include many other countries, including those in Africa. For the period FYs 2006–2009, bilateral and multilateral programmes in North and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 19 per cent of all Section 1206 funding; in FY 2011 alone such programmes accounted for 46 per cent (see table 6.3).78

Other types of DOD special security assistance are Section 1208 (Support of Military Operations to Combat Terrorism) that authorizes DOD support to ‘foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals’ assisting or facilitating US military operations conducted by special operations forces to combat terrorism; and the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), which funds participation at US military educational institutions, regional centres and mobile courses taught locally, acting essentially as a DOD counterpart to IMET.79

Critics of the DOD-authorized special security assistance programmes argue that these are another indication of the militarization of US foreign assistance and that they weaken congressional oversight, including human rights protections.80 In contrast to US practice since the 1960s, such assistance authorized by the DOD rather than the DOS raises the concern that the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the fundamental direction of US foreign policy is undermined.

Security programmes

Four main security assistance programmes are funded by DOS military and security assistance: support for African peacekeeping; support for SSR; support for countering terrorism and violent extremism; and improving maritime security.81 AFRICOM plays a major role in the implementation of these activities. Additionally, a considerable amount of DOS military and security support to Africa is outsourced to private military and security companies.

Support for African peacekeeping

The USA has supported African peacekeeping capabilities first through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) beginning in 1997 and from 2004

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78 This data refers to all of Africa since it was not possible to separate out data for sub-Saharan Africa only. Total Section 1206 funding for the period FYs 2006–11 was $1574.6 million; for FY 2001 it was $247.5 million. Serafino (note 76), p. 26.
79 Serafino (note 76), p. 2.
Table 6.3. Section 1206 security assistance for counterterrorism and stability operations for North and sub-Saharan Africa, financial years 2006–11
Figures are for approved notifications, in US$ m., at current prices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Main programmes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Border, coastal and maritime security; helicopter upgrade for counterterrorism</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda, Burundi</td>
<td>Counterterrorism support for deployment to Somalia</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Suppressing trans-border terrorist activity; ISR for border security; helicopter upgrade and vehicles for counterterrorism</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Fixed-wing aircraft; modernization; FOL for counterterrorism</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>MDA, response, interdiction and coastal security; counterterrorism capabilities</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Counterterrorism communications, night vision</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania</td>
<td>Regional security initiative</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Maritime security</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Togo</td>
<td>Maritime equipment</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Seychelles</td>
<td>Maritime security</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea maritime capability</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad, Nigeria</td>
<td>Information-sharing</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Light infantry equipment for counterterrorism</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo (Republic of), Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>MDA and territorial water threat response capability</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Countering the Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal</td>
<td>TSCTP civil–military operations training</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Military counterterrorism capacity, light infantry vehicles and other equipment</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Airlift capacity training</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal</td>
<td>Intelligence capability</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>301.3</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FOL = Forward Operating Location; MDA = Maritime Domain Awareness; ISR = Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; TSCTP = Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.

through its successor, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme.

During the period 1997–2012, the USA provided training and non-lethal equipment to more than 215,000 African peacekeepers in 238 contingent units through the ACRI and ACOTA programmes. During its 5-year duration (1997–2001), ACRI conducted training of about 9000 soldiers in eight African countries, including Benin, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal and Uganda.

ACOTA is a DOS programme run in collaboration with the DOD and AFRICOM. Since 2005 ACOTA has been part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral programme established by the USA in 2004 to train troops for peace operations, primarily in African countries. ACOTA’s mission is to enhance the capacities of African partner states ‘to participate in worldwide multinational peace operations’. As of 2013 ACOTA had 25 partner countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia.

Support for security sector reform

According to US policy, the guiding principles for US SSR programmes are ‘support host state ownership; incorporate principles of good governance and respect for human rights; balance operational support with institutional reform; link security and justice; foster transparency; do no harm’. Since the mid-2000s, significant US SSR programmes have been conducted in the DRC, Liberia, Somalia and South Sudan.

87 US Agency for International Development (USAID), US Department of Defense (DOD) and US Department of State (DOS), Security Sector Reform (USAID, DOD and DOS: Washington, DC, Feb. 2009), pp. 3–4. This document is often referred to as the US Government Interagency Working Paper on SSR.
88 Bittrick (note 81).
Support for countering terrorism and violent extremism

The USA operates two major counterterrorism programmes in Africa: (a) the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), established in 2009, supported by the military component CJTF-HOA, established in 2002; and (b) the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), established in 2005, supported by the military component Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), established in October 2001.  

PREACT member countries include Burundi, the Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The combined joint operational area of CJTF-HOA, which is based at Camp Lemonnier, covers 10 countries: Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda. In addition, 11 other countries comprise an area of interest for the task force: the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the DRC, Egypt, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Sudan, South Sudan and Yemen.

CJTF-HOA’s original mission was ‘to focus on “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region”, and to provide a forward presence in the region’. In 2008, when authority over CJTF-HOA was transferred to AFRICOM, its mission was broadened to ‘cooperative conflict prevention’, part of which was to ‘train the region’s security forces in counter-terrorism and other areas of military professionalization, serve as advisors to peace operations, and oversee and support humanitarian assistance efforts’. In addition, it became engaged in assistance and support to maritime security forces in the region.

TSCTP is an extension of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which was launched in 2001. According to AFRICOM, TSCTP is a ‘US State Department-led initiative specifically developed to address potential expansion of operations by terrorist and extremist organizations across West and North Africa’. According to the DOS, the core goals of TSCTP are to enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of the countries in the Pan-Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and
Senegal) and to facilitate cooperation between those countries and US partners in the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). OEF-TS, which has operated under AFRICOM since 2008, had partnerships with the armed forces of 10 countries in 2012: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. Objectives of OEF-TS include the training and the equipping of rapid-reaction forces in partner countries to help reduce illicit flows of arms, goods and people, and to prevent terrorists from establishing ‘sanctuaries’. It also provides training and equipment to build an information-sharing capability with and between trans-Saharan countries.

**Maritime security and the African Partnership Station**

The US Government is engaged in a number of activities to improve maritime and port security in Africa. These include an extensive programme to build maritime capacity of the coastal states in Africa through training, cooperation and the provision of equipment (e.g. patrol craft and radar).

The Africa Partnership Station (APS) is a US Navy-led programme launched in 2007, currently under AFRICOM. Its aim is to strengthen partnerships in Africa in order to increase regional and maritime safety and security. Originally, APS included only countries around the Gulf of Guinea in West and Central Africa, but since 2009 it has also included countries in East Africa. The APS is primarily a capacity-building programme, consisting of a series of training activities aboard a ship, which according to AFRICOM ‘functions as a mobile university, moving from port to port, fostering long-term relationships between the US and international partners’ without leaving ‘a permanent footprint in Africa’. More broadly, the APS is part of US efforts to form global maritime partnerships to secure the oceans of the world. US funding for the APS is roughly $20 million annually, divided equally between deployments in West and Central Africa and East Africa.

**Outsourcing in US security support programmes: AFRICAP**

Since the early 1990s, US military and security assistance has to a large extent been outsourced to private military and security companies on con-
tract to the DOD and the DOS. For Africa, this is particularly the case for peacekeeping support and SSR programmes.

Through the Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP) contracting system, the DOS outsources tasks to enhance the capacity of African countries to conduct peace operations, crisis management and counter-terrorism. Activities outsourced through AFRICAP include military training, strategic advisory services, equipment procurement, logistical support services and construction services. Companies can win five-year umbrella contracts, whereby they are entitled to bid for specific contracts and award contracts to other companies as sub-contractors.

Awarded in 2003, the first round of AFRICAP outsourcing consisted of two umbrella contracts, with a ceiling of $500 million each, going to DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE). The second round of contracts, awarded in 2009, went to four contractors with a ceiling of $375 million for each: AECOM, DynCorp, PAE and Protection Strategies Incorporated (PSI).

The extensive use of private firms in US security support programmes in Africa has been subject to some review and criticism, in particular regarding the lack of accountability, since most private military and security companies are accountable to the US Government rather than to the African host governments.

IV. Conclusions

Since the early 2000s the USA has reiterated the strategic value of sub-Saharan Africa. This is based on three major factors: (a) the perceived threat of international terrorism; (b) the increased competition for oil and other energy resources from Africa; and (c) concern about transnational security challenges associated with the lack of peace and security in Africa.

During the administration of President George W. Bush, an extensive US policy on Africa was developed to pursue US strategic goals related to these three factors. It includes a large component of foreign economic

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assistance, focusing on health, education, and development as well as measures to promote economic growth, trade and investment. At the same time, US national security strategy during the Bush administration had strong implications for Africa. This included the initiation of counter-terrorism programmes in East Africa and the Sahel in late 2001; the initiation of maritime security programmes in East and West Africa during the 2000s; the establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2002 and the implementation of a basing system to access African military facilities (FOSs and CSLs) founded on bilateral agreements with African countries. In particular, the increased US strategic view of Africa is reflected in the establishment in 2008 of AFRICOM, a separate unified military command for Africa, with a mission to protect and defend US national security interests by strengthening the defence capabilities of African states and regional organizations.

In line with this policy and strategy, the USA has developed extensive security-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa. The main US approach to strengthening peace and security in Africa is to support the capabilities and capacities of African military and security forces. These capacity-building activities are focused on training and equipping African military and security forces for their participation in peacekeeping, counterterrorism and maritime security missions as well as on supporting the reform of African security sectors. The military components of these activities are implemented through AFRICOM and involve the significant participation of US military personnel. This capacity-building approach is reflected in US arms exports to Africa, which is concentrated to the countries participating in US programmes and has been increasing since the mid-2000s.

While most US military and security assistance to Africa falls under the authority of the US Department of State, it is implemented by the US Department of Defense, and in particular by AFRICOM. Critics point to the fact that looking at Africa through the narrow lens of counterterrorism and other US national security interests has involved a militarization of US policies and strategies towards Africa, which risks adverse effects for both African security and US–African relations.

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Several member states of the European Union (EU) have a long history of military and other security-related activities in Africa. However, the EU in its own right is a relatively new actor in security and defence policy in general, and in security-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Indeed, it was only with the adoption of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999—when the EU began to organize and implement joint security-related activities by member states—that the EU truly became a security actor.

This chapter maps the main security-related activities that are coordinated, managed or funded by the relevant various branches of the EU—principally the Council of the European Union and the European Commission—that have a direct impact on security and governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Section I sketches the historical background for the EU’s security-related involvement in Africa. Section II summarizes the EU policies that are relevant to its security-related activities in Africa. Section III gives an overview of specific EU security-related activities in Africa, and section IV offers brief conclusions.

I. Historical background

Following its formation in 1957, initial attempts by the European Economic Community (the precursor to the EU) to develop its role on the world stage were largely directed towards Africa. This led to a series of privileged partnership agreements such as the 1964 and 1971 Yaoundé conventions, the 1975–89 Lomé conventions and the 2000 Cotonou Agreement. However, the EU’s level of activity related to peace and security was limited until the late 1990s. Following the end of the cold war, the European Economic Community, and later the EU, became increasingly focused on the

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1 Although this chapter focuses on the EU as an international actor in its own right, rather than the activities of individual member states, there is a certain amount of unavoidable overlap between the activities of the EU and its member states. In particular, multilateral peace operations—although organized and mandated at the EU level—are staffed by individuals seconded by individual member states whose costs are covered at the national level.

2 African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States, ‘Treaties and agreements’, <http://www.acp.int/node/5>. While the 2 Yaoundé conventions cover only African ex-colonies, the 4 Lomé conventions and the Cotonou Agreement cover states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

number of civil wars and interstate conflicts and the widespread instability in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. As early as 1993 the EU was starting to scrutinize the security challenges facing African states. In addition, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda led to wide-ranging debates in the EU on how to prevent the recurrence of such a tragedy. In 1997 the Council of the European Union—consisting of member states’ heads of government—adopted a common position identifying conflict prevention in Africa as an EU priority.

Since 2000 a combination of internal and external factors has increased the importance of Africa in the EU’s list of priorities and served to increase the EU’s engagement in peace and security issues there. These factors can be summarized under four headings: (a) EU integration in security and defence, (b) recognition of the security–development nexus, (c) the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and (d) shifting geopolitical considerations vis-à-vis ‘new’ external actors in Africa—particularly China.

**EU integration in security and defence policies**

One of the problems with analysing EU policy, particularly foreign and security policy, is the lack of a single body that is responsible for formulating and implementing it. From 1993 to 2009, under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, EU responsibilities were divided among three ‘pillars’. With the entry into force of the 1997 Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the pillar system was abandoned. However, the extent to which the EU will manage to overcome the legacy of the pillar system and achieve truly coherent policies towards Africa on security-related issues remains an open question. Before and after the Lisbon Treaty, activities that have the potential to have a direct impact on security in sub-Saharan Africa have been carried out by both the Council (the principal decision-making body of the EU, composed of one minister from each member state) and the European Commission.

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5 Olsen (note 4), p. 245.


(the executive body of the EU). With regard to several important areas of relevance to this chapter, the Council and the Commission have frequently found themselves in direct competition, publishing their own policy documents and supporting their own activities with few attempts at effective coordination.10

Since the early 1990s EU member states have gradually integrated their security and defence policies. As part of this process, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was created in 1993 and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999, later renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy.11 While the CFSP gave the EU the ability to organize and agree positions and activities in the field of foreign and security policy, the CSDP provides an institutional framework for the launching of peace operations and the development of international crisis-management capabilities.12 The CSDP, an intergovernmental framework, has been increasingly used to launch military and police missions in Africa. Indeed, some commentators have noted that Africa offers the ideal ‘incubator’ for projecting and testing these tools of intergovernmental coherence in making and implementing foreign and security policy.13 In support of this view, these commentators point to the physical proximity of Africa to Europe and the EU, the close historical and cultural ties between the two continents, and the general consensus in the EU on how to approach the region.14

The Lisbon Treaty created the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to act as the main coordinator and representative of the CFSP within the EU. The position is supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is composed of officials from the Council Secretariat and the Commission as well as staff seconded from member states’ diplomatic services.15 The EEAS is likely to have a significant impact on how the EU engages with a range of issues relating to peace and security in Africa, particularly in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR).

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10 See the discussions on security sector reform in sections II and III below.
11 The Lisbon Treaty renamed the ESDP as the CSDP. The term CSDP, rather than ESDP, is used throughout this chapter.
14 Kotopoulou (note 13).
The security–development nexus

Since the early 2000s the EU has increasingly adopted and advanced concepts and policy frameworks associated with the nexus between security and development, encapsulated in the 2005 statement by Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General, that ‘we will not enjoy development without security, or security without development. But I also stress that we will not enjoy either without universal respect for human rights’. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been most active in developing policies that reflect this line of thinking. However, the different branches of the EU have enthusiastically adopted the ideas and concepts generated by the OECD.

One key implication of this has been an expansion in the range of activities that can be supported using the EU’s development-related policy tools and funding instruments: the EU has been able to use its development-related policy tools and funding instruments to fund security and defence-related activities in Africa. The clearest example of this has been the use of the European Development Fund (EDF) to support peace operations led by the African Union (AU). The EDF has also paved the way for the EU to take a more active role supporting DDR and SSR in sub-Saharan Africa (see section II below). However, despite the shift in thinking, there are still restraints on how the EU can use its funds. For example, EU support for AU-led peace operations cannot be used for the acquisition of lethal weapon systems or regular troop salaries. Funding is restricted to items such as daily allowances, medical supplies and transport costs.

The emergence of the African Peace and Security Architecture

The establishment of the AU in 2001 represented a turning point in African security. The AU, unlike its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), does not maintain a position of absolute respect for national sover-
The AU’s Constitutive Act states that it reserves the right to intervene in member states in certain ‘grave circumstances’, specifically ‘war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. After it replaced the OAU in 2002, the AU established the African Peace and Security Architecture in an attempt to develop and strengthen African peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding mechanisms at the continental, subregional and national levels. The APSA created clearer channels for dialogue about peace and security issues within Africa.

The founding of the AU and subsequent emergence of the APSA has provided the EU with a platform for more systemic engagement with African states. The EU sees itself as a natural partner and supporter of the AU, including in the AU’s efforts to develop a more active role for itself in the fields of peace and security. As one Commission official put it, ‘the AU is the only organization looking like the EU in the world [and we] want to strengthen it’. The EU is the largest financial partner of the AU, both in general and with regard to its security-related work.

Shifting geopolitical considerations in the light of ‘new’ actors in Africa

The increasing involvement in Africa in recent years of new actors—such as Brazil, China, India and other countries of the Global South—has presented Africa with a range of new policy and commercial options. This change in the African environment, based on Africa’s increased economic growth and abundance of natural resources, presents the EU with increased competition in a number of areas, including access to resources, markets, political alliances and development cooperation. Africa’s importance as a source of energy and raw materials has increased. As one commentator has noted, this makes ‘fruitful cooperation between the EU and Africa even more urgent’.

Commentators have argued that Europe’s increased engagement with Africa—including in security-related issues—represents an attempt to

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23 European Commission official, Interview with author, Brussels, 16 Nov. 2009.
26 Kotsopoulos (note 13).
respond to the growing role of emerging economic powers and the challenge that it poses to Europe’s primacy in the field of development cooperation in Africa. This is particularly true for China’s increasing engagement in Africa, both diplomatically and commercially, with strong increases in foreign direct investment, trade and development funding. It thus represents a competitor to the EU in its efforts to strengthen trade relations with Africa as well as providing an alternative model for future economic and political developments among African states. At the same time, China has been strongly criticized within European circles for being ‘less scrupulous’ than the EU and its member states in dealing with repressive or corrupt regimes in Africa and for using its aid policies to benefit Chinese companies and interests.

II. EU policies on security-related activities in Africa

EU policymaking in fields relevant to the provision of security in sub-Saharan Africa draws heavily on standards agreed elsewhere (e.g. in the UN, the OECD and nationally). For example, the EU’s concept note on DDR states that, ‘a great deal of work has already been undertaken to strengthen policies and methods for implementing DDR, especially in the UN, which should be taken into account in developing an EU approach’. Nonetheless, due to its global reach and the wide range of resources at its disposal, the EU has rapidly emerged as a key player in the support and implementation of activities with a direct impact on security in sub-Saharan Africa. This section describes a selection of the key policy documents that express EU thinking with regard to peace and security in sub-Saharan Africa, both at the broader, conceptual level, and in more specific areas of programme activity, including the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the 2005 EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform, the 2006 Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform, the 2006 EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, and the 2007 Joint Africa–EU Strategy.

The European Security Strategy

The 2003 European Security Strategy was designed to provide a coherent vision for the EU’s activities in the fields of peace and security. The document outlines five key threats that the EU faces: terrorism, the proliferation

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28 See chapter 2 in this volume.
29 Kotsopoulos (note 13).
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. With regard to sub-Saharan Africa, it makes two key points. First, it acknowledges the security–development nexus, noting that ‘Security is a precondition for development’.  

Second, it emphasizes the need for good governance and the effective rule of law, noting that ‘the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states’. The ESS also stresses the need for the EU to act pre-emptively—using the full range of tools at its disposal—to prevent conflict around the world, including in sub-Saharan Africa. This is couched in terms of the need to prevent the emergence of threats that might directly jeopardize the EU but also the need to maintain stability in a region that is emerging as an increasingly important supplier of energy to the EU, the world’s largest importer of oil and gas.  

While the ESS has been praised for its forward-thinking vision of the EU’s security needs in the modern world, the extent to which it can truly be said to form a coherent strategy for the EU remains in doubt. The different branches of the EU do not treat the ESS as a fully developed ‘grand strategy’ that provides a coherent framework for its external policies. At the national level, ‘security strategies specify the security interests of a state and the means through which it aims to uphold these interests’. The ESS has not done that. Although the importance of the ESS as a key concept for the CSDP is recognized, ‘its practical impact has been limited’. At most, ‘the ESS is widely seen as a statement of principles, rather than as a concrete guide to action’. Meanwhile, at the different levels of the EU, officials have continued with the process of strategy-making ‘by stealth’ rather than design. That is, rather than a single overarching strategy, multiple strategies ‘have developed in a parallel and fragmented process, leading to the emergence of fault lines in the EU’s security policies’. Some of these are discussed below.

The EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform and the Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform  

Support for police and justice reforms as part of SSR has long formed an integral part of European Commission assistance strategies and EU crisis-
management missions in the CSDP framework in Africa as well as during the pre-accession process with future EU member states. The publication of the ‘EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform’ by the Council in 2005 and ‘A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform’ by the Commission in 2006 brought the EU’s diverse range of SSR-related activities into public focus.\(^{38}\)

These two papers draw on a variety of sources, including debates in other policy areas. In 2005 the OECD DAC defined the objective of support for SSR—security system reform in DAC guidelines—as seeking to ‘increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law’.\(^{39}\) The EU’s official position on SSR was formulated later that year and followed on from the DAC’s work. In the EU context, SSR itself is understood as a system which includes the ‘core security actors’ (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services etc.), ‘security management and oversight bodies’ (e.g. government ministries, parliaments and civil society organizations), the ‘justice and law enforcement institutions’ (e.g. courts and prosecutors) and non-statutory security forces, with whom donors rarely engage (e.g. liberation armies and private security companies etc.).\(^{40}\) According to the Council’s concept, SSR is primarily understood as a development-oriented activity aimed at creating an ‘accountable, effective and efficient security system, operating under civilian control consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance, transparency and the rule of law, and acting according to international standards and respecting human rights’.\(^{41}\)

Support for SSR has been given a low priority within the EU and mainstreaming it into the EU’s complex architecture continues. Nevertheless, the EU is widely seen to be a leader in the field of SSR activities.\(^{42}\) In particular, the EU has a wide range of policy instruments at its disposal that cut across all areas of government relevant to SSR, including the military, police and judiciary.\(^ {43}\) However, the lack of a common EU strategy for SSR support highlights both ‘the fragmentation of competences’ inside the

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\(^{40}\) Council of the European Union (note 38), p. 7–8.

\(^{41}\) Council of the European Union (note 38), p. 4.


\(^{43}\) Weiler (note 42).
EU and the ‘residual cultural gap between a development-oriented and a security-oriented community’.  

**The EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration**

According to the 2006 EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, ‘DDR refers to a set of interventions in a process of demilitarizing official and unofficial armed groups by disarming and disbanding non-state groups and, possibly, downsizing armed forces’. DDR has been identified as a key area for EU engagement in post-conflict peace-building in a number of official documents, including the ESS and the Joint Africa–EU Strategy. In addition, the 2009 European Report on Development also recognized DDR as belonging to one of the three broad lines of EU policy towards fragile states in sub-Saharan African, along with SSR.

**The Joint Africa–EU Strategy**

The Joint Africa–EU Strategy was adopted at the December 2007 Africa–EU Summit. The aim of the joint strategy is ‘to develop a political vision and practical approaches for the future partnership between the EU and Africa, based on mutual respect, common interests and the principle of ownership’. The strategy represents the most ambitious and wide-ranging context for contemporary EU engagement and activities in Africa. It is accompanied by an action plan, which was last updated in 2010, establishing eight strategic Africa–EU partnerships.

The first of these partnerships, the Africa–EU Partnership on Peace and Security, is intended to serve as a unified framework for coordinated Africa–EU initiatives in this field. The overall aim of the partnership is to ‘Reach common positions and implement common approaches on chal-
Challenges to peace and security in Africa, Europe and globally. Additional aims include enhanced ‘dialogue on challenges to peace and security’, ‘full operationalization’ of the APSA and the creation of ‘predictable funding’ for African-led peace support operations. Pre-existing funding mechanisms and policy tools continue to operate in parallel with the partnership, including the SSR and DDR concept documents described above.

Other areas of activity under the joint strategy also have the potential for direct and indirect implications for security in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, objectives highlighted under the second partnership, the Africa–EU Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights, include commitments to ‘reach a common understanding of governance’ and to ‘consolidate a common human rights agenda’. Objectives highlighted under the third partnership, the Africa–EU Partnership on Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure, include the aim to ‘Improve and sustain infrastructure and services’.

Commentators have argued that implementation of the 2007 action plan was hampered by a number of problems, including differences in capacities and expectations between AU and EU diplomats. In particular, both sides have acknowledged that there have been difficulties due to unfulfilled expectations among African states that the joint strategy would be a source of additional funding. A European Commission document from July 2009 noted that ‘only modest progress has been made towards establishing common positions in international fora and key negotiations, and both parties are struggling with the concept of “treating Africa as one”’. Implementation of the 2010 action plan (for the period 2011–13) appears to have been hampered by many of the same issues.

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52 Africa–EU Partnership (note 51).
53 Africa–EU Partnership (note 22).
55 European Commission and Directorate General Development (note 54).
56 Bello (note 27), p. 2.
III. The EU’s security-related activities in Africa

This section focuses on the four main areas of EU activity that have the greatest direct impact on security in sub-Saharan Africa: (a) military CSDP missions; (b) support for DDR activities; (c) support for SSR activities; and (d) support for AU-led peace operations. There are clear overlaps between these four categories. In particular, SSR is a relatively recent concept that in certain cases has been applied retroactively to describe specific activities—such as capacity building with the police force—that were not classed as SSR at the time they were carried out.

Military CSDP missions in sub-Saharan Africa

The EU has been directly involved in peace and security activities in sub-Saharan Africa since 2003 via a series of military CSDP missions in a number of states, including the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Between 2003 and the end of 2013, 13 of the 28 CSDP missions launched by the EU were in sub-Saharan Africa, including the anti-piracy EU Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR Somalia, Operation Atalanta). Of these 13 missions, 6 have been military missions and 7 have been civilian or part-civilian led missions, focusing on tasks such as capacity building and SSR (see table 7.1).

The first EU military CSDP mission, Operation Artemis, was launched in June 2003 in the DRC. The mission, established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1484, aimed to contribute to the stabilization and improvement of the humanitarian and security situation in Bunia, in eastern DRC, until it was possible to deploy a UN force. The operation lasted until September 2003, when responsibility for the area was handed over to the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC). Operation Artemis was both the EU’s first fully autonomous crisis-management operation outside Europe and the first CSDP mission of any type—civilian or military—in Africa.

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Personnel (years)</th>
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<td><strong>Military missions</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Civilian missions with a security sector reform (SSR) component</strong></td>
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CAR = Central Africa Republic, DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo, EU = European Union.

Due to its ability to deploy quickly, the EU can provide short-term bridging forces or reinforcements. However, there is little evidence that the EU is likely to engage in the type of long-term mission in sub-Saharan Africa in which the AU and UN are currently engaged. Indeed, there are indications that the EU’s military CSDP missions will be mainly used to complement the UN’s peacekeeping activities. As of December 2013, the EU had only three military CSDP missions in sub-Saharan Africa—the EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia), Operation Atalanta and EUTM Mali (see figure 7.1). While this may serve to undermine the EU’s ambition to play a more active role on the world stage, it also reflects the EU’s desire to see African regional organizations become more active in responding to threats to peace and security in Africa.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities in sub-Saharan Africa

The EU has supported DDR activities, including in sub-Saharan Africa, since the early 1990s. The bulk of this work has been funded by the EDF. Substantive support has also come from the EU’s funds for humanitarian

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64 Johansson et al. (note 63).
assistance, especially in relation to children's DDR and through the EU's Rapid- Reaction Mechanism.65

Collecting comprehensive data on the EU's support for DDR processes is extremely difficult. DDR activity is funded from a variety of budget lines and is often not explicitly identified in budgetary documents. For this reason, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive overview of the EU's DDR work in sub-Saharan Africa.

According to an official EU report from 2006, the EU had by then supported DDR processes in 16 countries in Africa since the early 1990s, 9 of which were specified: Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone and Somalia.66

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65 European Commission and Council of the European Union (note 17).
Security sector reform activities in sub-Saharan Africa

The EU’s SSR efforts can be broadly split between (a) the provision of advice, monitoring and training through short- to medium-term CSDP missions, and (b) more substantial longer-term programmes within the framework of European Commission assistance to partner countries.67

Security sector reform support through CSDP missions

Most visibly, nearly all of the EU’s CSDP missions have a mandate to assist in defence, justice or police reform. In particular, seven of the EU’s civilian- or partially civilian-led CSDP missions in sub-Saharan Africa have had some element of SSR-related activities within their mandates. The total funds spent supporting these missions has risen steadily in recent years, from €5.9 million ($7.3 million) in 2005 to €24.4 million ($31.4 million) in 2012 (see table 7.2). Meanwhile, the total number of missions has risen slightly, from two or three between 2005 and 2011 to five in 2012 and 2013 (see figure 7.2).

During 2012 the EU launched three civilian-led CSDP missions in sub-Saharan Africa, all of which would involve some SSR-related components.

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These include a maritime capacity-building mission for states in the Horn of Africa, an airport security capacity-building mission in South Sudan and a law-enforcement capacity-building mission in Niger.\textsuperscript{68} No new civilian-led missions were launched in 2013.

The EU’s approach to SSR—as outlined in the EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform and the Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform—has only provided the underlying concept of one CSDP mission: the EU Mission in Support of SSR in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau), which was launched in 2008. The mission consisted of about 20 experts and aimed to assist with the operationalization of Guinea-Bissau’s national SSR strategy. This small, short-term mission was seen as a test case for implementing the EU’s comprehensive approach to SSR.\textsuperscript{69} However, the EU viewed the army-led assassination of the country’s president in March 2009 and an attempted military coup in Guinea-Bissau in April 2010 as casting serious doubts over the commitment of the country’s military high command to the SSR process.\textsuperscript{70} As a result, the EU closed the mission in September 2010 and cancelled plans for a follow-on mission that would also have focused on SSR issues.\textsuperscript{71} At the time of cancellation, the EU stated that ‘political instability and the lack of respect for the rule of law … make it impossible for the EU to deploy a follow-up mission’.\textsuperscript{72}

\textit{Security sector reform support within the European Commission assistance framework}

The European Commission has also pursued large security-assistance programmes. Commission funding for SSR-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa is provided from three main sources.

The largest source is the EDF, which totalled €22 billion ($30 billion) for the period 2008–13, including an estimated €20 billion ($27 billion) for sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{73} The second source of funding is the Instrument for Stability (IFS), which consists of both short- and long-term components. The IFS focuses on a range of issues, including ‘support to mediation, con-

\textsuperscript{68} European External Action Service (note 59).
\textsuperscript{73} Kotsopoulos (note 13).
fidence building, interim administrations, strengthening Rule of Law, transitional Justice or the role of natural resources in conflict’. During 2007 and 2008 the IFS allocated €64 million ($91 million) for activities in Africa. The third funding instrument is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Relatively small, the EIDHR has a ‘limited bearing on SSR issues in the field of rule of law reforms and human rights training’.

Similar to DDR work, collecting accurate data on Commission-funded SSR activities in sub-Saharan Africa is widely considered to be a near-impossible exercise. This is due to the confusing array of thematic and geographical budget lines that the Commission has at its disposal, the difficulty in determining whether a particular action is part of the EU’s SSR agenda and the principle of decentralized implementation of Commission assistance.

**Support for African-led peace support operations**

Funding for AU-led peace operations in Africa is one of the largest and most visible contributions the EU has made to the security of sub-Saharan Africa. Internally, the EU is keen to move away from simply underwriting the budgets of CSDP missions and towards building the capacity of African peacekeepers themselves. Since 2004, €100 million ($135 million) has been allocated for ‘strengthening the capacity and effective functioning of the various components of the APSA and at reinforcing the political dialogue by improving cooperation on the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa’. However, the demand from African states for funding peace operations is far higher than that for capacity building. Further complicating issues are African states’ limits on spending funds on capacity building and the ‘political sensitivities’ that can get in the way of programming. For example, only 16 per cent of the funds allocated for capacity building under the 9th and 10th EDFs (for 2000–2007 and 2008–13) was actually used within the APSA.

The EU supports African-led multilateral peace operations by providing budgetary support and training for African peacekeeping troops. In response to the AU’s request at the Maputo Summit in July 2003 for the

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76 Schroeder (note 69).
78 Moeller, J., Principal Administrator African Union and Peace Facility, Interview with the author, 17 Nov. 2009.
79 Bello (note 27), p. 4.
establishment of an EU facility for supporting African-led peace operations, the African Peace Facility (APF) was opened in May 2004 based on €250 million in funding from the EDF.\footnote{Council of the European Union, Decision no 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa, \textit{Official Journal of the European Union}, L345, 31 Dec. 2003.} Prior to the APF’s creation, there had been some limited EU contributions to African-led peace operations, but these were small scale and based on ad hoc decisions.\footnote{Moeller (note 78).} Notably, the EU made explicit reference to the security–development nexus when justifying the use of EDF funds to establish the APF.\footnote{Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 12–13 Dec. 2003, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/78364.pdf>, p. 20.}

The APF funds a broad range of activities, including conflict-management operations performed by African troops and efforts ‘to cover conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation as well as to accelerate decision-making and coordination processes’.\footnote{European Commission (note 77).} Funding peace operations represents the core activity of the APF. Funds are primarily used to finance allowances for military or police observers and troops, rations, insurance, medical support, fuel and technical assistance.\footnote{Strzaska and Moller (note 19).} In practical terms, this excludes funding for weapons, ammunition, military equipment and basic military salaries.\footnote{Strzaska and Moller (note 19).}

More than €1 billion ($1.4 billion) has been allocated by the EU to the APF since its establishment in 2004.\footnote{European Commission, \textit{Annual Report 2011: The African Peace Facility} (European Commission: Brussels, 2012), p. 26.} This includes €440 million ($546 million) allocated under the 9th EDF (covering the period 2004–2007) and €600 million ($879 million) under the 10th EDF (for 2008–13).\footnote{European Commission (note 86), pp. 13, 25–26.} Of this, €600 million was initially earmarked for covering the costs of African-led peace operations. The biggest recipients of APF funds have been the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which had received €305 million ($417 million) by the time it closed in 2007, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which had received €258 million ($358 million) by the end of 2011 (including additional contributions from member states), and the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX), which had received €88 million ($122 million) by the end of 2011.\footnote{European Commission, ‘AMIS’, 5 Dec. 2012, <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/ACP/regional-cooperation/peace/peace-support-operations/amis_en.htm>.

\footnote{European Commission (note 86), pp. 19, 21.} AMIS was the first major AU peace operation and APF support was essential to its delivery.\footnote{European Commission (note 78).}
IV. Conclusions

The European Union has emerged as a significant actor in security-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa due to a number of factors, including its recognition of the security–development nexus, EU integration of security and defence policies, the emergence of the African Peace and Security Architecture, and shifting geopolitical considerations of new actors in Africa. In recent years, the EU has significantly expanded its range of security-related activities to include peace operations, SSR and DDR activities, budgetary support for AU-led peace operations, and longer-term capacity building to support the AU. Nonetheless, numerous commentators have lamented the lack of coordination in EU activities, arguing that this has severely diluted the impact of the EU’s work. Perhaps the most pertinent example is the lack of a unified strategy to guide the EU’s SSR activities. There continues to be widespread hope that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the EEAS will allow for the EU to develop and implement more coherent policies in these areas, particularly SSR. However, until the EEAS has begun to fully demonstrate its utility on the ground, it is hard to determine whether there is cause for such optimism. For the time being, it appears that the EU still suffers from overlapping structures in its security-related activities in sub-Saharan Africa.

In terms of the effectiveness of its work in Africa, the EU is also constrained by the conflict between its interest in supporting capacity-building efforts and African states’ desire to receive direct budgetary support. Future developments will also be influenced by cuts to aid and military budgets among EU member states. As these cuts take effect there is likely to be growing pressure for the EU to take on some of the responsibilities in the fields of security and development that member states can no longer afford. This may lead to pressure for the EU to take a more active role in security and military issues. A 2008 report recommended that the EU ‘could provide either funds or equipment directly to forces engaged in AU-sanctioned peace and security operations’.

Effectively executing this role will depend on EU member states reaching agreement on how far they are willing for the EU to go in this field, something that has been hard to achieve in the past.

Select bibliography


The United Nations is a long-standing actor in Africa, and its contributions to security there date back to the founding of the organization itself in 1945. With the rise in the number of intrastate conflicts in Africa in the mid- to late 1990s, the UN became, and remains, the primary multilateral actor in peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding activities in Africa. While the UN has a broad engagement in Africa, the UN bodies with the most security-relevant policies and activities are the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and the Secretariat through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).

The chapter focuses on UN policies and activities to support peace and security in Africa that have been developed, decided and conducted since the end of the cold war. Section I provides a survey of key UN decisions of relevance for peace and security in Africa during this period, as reflected in Security Council resolutions, reports of the Secretary-General and other UN policy documents. Section II maps the main UN security-related activities in Africa, including conflict prevention, peace operations, peacebuilding and capacity building. Section III offers conclusions.

I. UN norm-setting and policy on peace and security in Africa

This section traces and surveys select key UN policies that address peace and security in Africa. While many of these policies were ultimately institutionalized by the UN, several—such as the responsibility to protect (R2P) and protection of civilians (POC)—were initiated outside the UN system and only eventually adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly. However, in framing the issues, the various UN policy documents also set the norm for how to address the problems.

The role of the United Nations in norm-setting

The UN, as the multilateral organization with the widest membership, is often seen as the standard-bearer of international norms. It is the forum in which those norms are established and the body through which they are
diffused. In the post-cold war era, the UN has become more active in setting international standards and diffusing norms, which in some cases member states are obliged to uphold. This is reflected in the number of resolutions passed by the Security Council. Between 1946 and 1990 the Security Council passed an average of 15 resolutions per year; since 1991 the annual average has increased more than fourfold, to nearly 64 resolutions. There has also been a qualitative difference in how the norms are socialized (i.e. the process by which norms become readily accepted). In the 1990s UN Security Council resolutions targeted both national governments and the UN system with calls to action. In the 2000s and 2010s the main focus has been on improving the efficacy of the UN system.

Establishing an international norm within the UN system is a reiterative process. It often takes many discussions and negotiations within the Security Council and the General Assembly, multiple resolutions over a period of several years and numerous reports by the Secretary-General for a norm to be internalized at the UN, diffused more widely so that it trickles down to the national level and, ultimately, is acted on.

UN norm-development and implementation activities in the field of peace and security have had particular implications for Africa in the post-cold war period: a majority of the new norms are either reactions to events in Africa or Africa has served as a testing ground for new norms. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established by the UN in 1994, set the precedents of defining systematic rape, sexual violence and forced pregnancy as acts of genocide when committed with an intent to destroy or change the ethnic composition of a population, and defining (widespread) rape as a crime against humanity. These precedents were then accepted in the 1998 Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). Similarly, the General Assembly’s 2000 resolution condemning the illicit trade in diamonds, which had contributed to the financing of conflicts in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone, has led to a widely accepted norm that has been informally extended to the general banning of illicit trade in any conflict commodity.¹

In certain exceptional cases, a landmark resolution can be readily accepted as norm-setting, and can thus be quickly mainstreamed into all UN programming.² An example of this is Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 on women, peace and security. This resolution addressed the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women; recognized the undervalued and underutilized contributions women make to peace-

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building; and highlighted the importance of women’s full participation as active agents in peace and security. It has been actively implemented in Africa.

**Redefining security policies**

The concept of security went through a transformative shift in the post-cold war era, moving from traditional (i.e. state-focused) security to human (i.e. people-oriented) security. In the UN context, the concept of human security was first introduced by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994.³ It appeared in a UN policy document for the first time four years later—in a report by the Secretary-General on ‘The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa’.⁴ This report arguably laid the groundwork for many of the UN’s subsequent policy initiatives on peace and security in Africa. It highlighted and made specific proposals for three areas in which the UN could act.

First, it proposed that the UN play a bigger role in compiling, tracking and publicizing data on sources of arms flows to Africa.

Second, it identified post-conflict peacebuilding as an area in which the UN could play a critical role in supporting African countries’ transition from conflict to peace as well as in preventing a relapse into conflict. In particular, the report noted the UN’s peacekeeping role in Africa and highlighted how a peace operation may, in some instances, be the most appropriate framework for assisting a country emerging from conflict to make the transition to sustainable peace. The report suggested that the UN contribute to strengthening the capacity of African regional and subregional organizations to undertake peace operations.

Third, it identified human rights and the importance of adherence to international humanitarian law and human rights norms in conflict situations as priority issues for the UN Secretary-General, and the report proposed that, in order to ensure greater predictability of financing, funding for any special human rights missions deployed by the UN be shifted from ‘voluntary contributions’ by UN member states to ‘assessed contributions’ as part of their membership obligations.⁵

The evolution to the prevailing human security paradigm in the UN system as a whole was in large part a response to the changing nature of conflicts in Africa. The majority of armed conflicts in Africa in the post-cold war period have been protracted intrastate conflicts, which are linked

⁵ United Nations (note 4), para. 51.
to regional and international criminal networks and have used the targeting of civilian populations as a central war-fighting strategy. The shift to the human security approach has had an impact on the way in which the UN addresses conflicts in Africa and more broadly: the legitimacy and the credibility of the UN Security Council have become dependent on its perceived ability to act as a guarantor of civilian protection.\(^6\) As a consequence, the UN is more likely to deploy peace operations in conflicts where the warring parties target the civilian population. Conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians are also more likely to get peace operations with robust mandates in which the use of force is authorized.\(^7\) Thus, Africa hosts the majority of UN peace operations and received 70 per cent of UN peacekeeping resources in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan and Western Sahara.\(^8\)

### The protection of civilians

The protection of civilians is now a well-established norm, including the notion that international actors, such as the UN, should act on it. However, there remain concerns by several countries that some approaches employed to enhance POC can be in direct conflict with principles of sovereignty.\(^9\) The scars of genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the crimes against humanity during the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war in the DRC during the civil war since 1996 have pushed the UN to do more.

One response of the UN was to change the nature of its peacekeeping approach: mandates became increasingly robust and more ambitious; and operations became more complex, involving a whole host of actors in addition to the military. Operations also became costlier and lengthier. Over the years the type of response advocated has shifted towards a more proactive protection of the civilian population in conflict. The UN Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention in Libya in 2011 was the first to explicitly cite protection of civilians.\(^10\) The shift was most pointedly illustrated in March 2013 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of an intervention brigade as part of the UN Organization

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Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to conduct ‘targeted offensive operations’ to protect civilians.\textsuperscript{11} Another equally contentious development in 2013 relating to proactive civilian protection was the Security Council’s authorization of the use of unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance in UN peace operations (piloted by MONUSCO).\textsuperscript{12} The UN Secretariat has argued that better protection of civilians requires, among other things, better situational awareness in areas where the security levels are fluid, and so requires modern tools that, arguably, allow peacekeepers to act appropriately and in a timely manner.\textsuperscript{13}

In the mid-1990s, the UN began to highlight the need to protect civilians, particularly women and children during conflict. Initially, the issue was framed as a humanitarian imperative and centred on the vulnerabilities of refugees and internally displaced persons, while at the same time acknowledging that large movements of people have a destabilizing effect on neighbouring countries. The focus was first on children, as seen in a 1996 report that proposed a comprehensive set of actions to improve the protection and care of children affected by armed conflict.\textsuperscript{14} Following the report, the General Assembly appointed a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. In 1999 the Security Council passed the first of a series of six resolutions on the issue, highlighting the issue of children and armed conflict as a global priority.\textsuperscript{15} From these resolutions, three key recommendations evolved: protecting children (especially girls) from sexual abuse during armed conflict; recognizing the linkages between small arms proliferation and the continuation of armed conflict; and including children in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes.

The first dedicated resolution on POC was passed in 1999, after several open debates in the Security Council.\textsuperscript{16} It also led to the deployment of a

\textsuperscript{11} UN Security Council Resolution 2098, 28 Mar. 2013.


\textsuperscript{14} United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Promotion and protection of the rights of children’, Note by the Secretary-General, A/51/306, 26 Aug. 1996.


UN peace operation with a specific protection mandate that same year: the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Even in the early days of the civilian protection debate, there was recognition that each state had the primary responsibility to protect its civilians. However, there was also a simultaneous recognition that in times of conflict—when governments are either unable or unwilling to protect civilians—there was a need to involve a wide range of domestic and international actors (e.g. humanitarian organizations, political actors etc.). Since then, POC mandates have been routinely included in UN peace operations. Translating this norm into practice, however, has not always been straightforward. A 2004 review of the UN’s actions to protect civilians concluded that there were several shortfalls.\textsuperscript{17} Specifically, there was no common understanding of what a POC mandate is and how to implement one. It also pointed to the lack of a clear doctrine or policy framework for UN actors and troop- and police-contributing countries to follow. In 2010 the DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) produced a joint operational concept note on the protection of civilians in UN peace operations that led to all missions having to create strategies and actions plans for addressing POC issues.\textsuperscript{18} Potential improvements to the UN’s POC practices are of particular salience to many Africa civilians, given that Africa hosts at least two-thirds of the UN peace operations.

The POC norm is reinforced at the regional level. The 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) contains implicit and explicit reference to civilian protection: Article 3(h) seeks to promote and protect human and people’s rights and Article 4(h) explicitly states ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity’.\textsuperscript{19} Among the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the charters, protocols and treaties of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) also contain clauses promoting (or permitting) protection of civilians in the context of armed conflict or grave violations of human rights within their jurisdiction.

Linking rule of law to peace and security

The cornerstone of the human security concept is the growing acceptance that a country’s rule-of-law system has a direct impact on that country’s peace and security, and when that peace and security is compromised, international peace and security is also threatened. Equally, insecurity has a negative impact on a country’s sustainable development: Africa has provided pointed illustrations of the negative impact of poor governance and conflict on economic development (e.g. in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC and Zimbabwe); the positive turnaround when governance improves and conflict is resolved (e.g. in Angola and Mozambique); and the fragility of progress when the roots of the conflict are not adequately addressed (e.g. in Mali).

The integration of human rights discourse and rule-of-law issues into thinking on peace and security was marked by two policy processes at the UN.

The first was the 2000 Millennium Declaration, which paved the way for an approach to security and development issues based on individual rights and for an emerged consensus that security, development and human rights reinforce each other. The declaration’s eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for 2015 listed a range of collective actions aimed at eradicating extreme poverty while concomitantly promoting basic human rights, gender equality, education and environmental sustainability. The MDGs paid special attention to Africa as it was the region furthest from meeting any of the goals. For instance, the UN 2013 MDG report noted that, despite impressive gains in eradicating extreme poverty at the global level, the number of people living in extreme poverty in Africa rose steadily from 290 million in 1990 to 414 million in 2010 and it was also the only region for which there was an increase.20

A decade after the declaration and with mixed progress in attaining the eight MDGs, government leaders gathered for a summit to renew efforts to meet the goals and to ensure sustainability of efforts beyond 2015. Subsequently, the Secretary-General appointed a high-level panel to produce a development agenda beyond 2015. In May 2013 the panel issued a report emphasizing peace and security as one of the ‘five transformative shifts’ that would further strengthen the development of countries. This key recommendation had been missing from the MDGs.21 The report also underscored the centrality of establishing a functioning formal state authority (and the mechanisms that make such an authority accountable

and responsible). The report’s calls for ensuring good governance validated the UN’s decade-long prioritization of rule of law and issues related to the security–development nexus (in which security and good governance are intrinsically linked to development), but they also drew attention to the weaknesses of the policy imperatives.

The second policy process was the UN’s promotion of rule of law and governance issues to the forefront of the policy agenda. Following decolonization, the UN played a major role in the subsequent state-building processes in many countries. One of the earliest, and arguably the largest, state-building enterprise during the cold war period was the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The mission, which operated from 1960 to 1964, was mandated to maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo (now the DRC). It was also one of the earliest UN efforts at what is now termed security sector reform (SSR).

In more recent years, three documents have further underscored the fact that weak or absent rule of law can pose a threat to international peace and security: the seminal 2004 report by the Secretary-General on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, the 2005 World Summit Outcome, and a 2006 report by the Secretary-General on UN support for the rule of law. The reports notably emphasized the UN’s role in reinforcing norms and providing assistance in ensuring accountability, rebuilding the public’s confidence in justice and security institutions, and promoting gender issues.

In 2008 the UN Secretary-General produced a report on the role of the UN in SSR. It underlined that ‘effective and accountable security institutions are essential for sustainable peace and development’ and that the security–development nexus should be the cornerstone of the UN’s approach to security. The report articulated that the UN’s role in SSR is to provide support to national governments’ efforts to establish or re-establish an effective and accountable security sector. It outlined the entry points for the UN to operationally engage in SSR activities in countries, and it delimited areas in which UN engagement would be inappropriate (e.g. provision of armaments and other military equipment and the reform of

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intelligence services). Importantly, a key recommendation of the report was that for any UN SSR support to be legitimate, sustainable and effective, it must be based on national ownership. In addition, the report advocated a strong normative role for the UN and the development of policies and guidance on SSR. It provided a working definition of SSR, which goes beyond the traditional military elements and involves a wider range of national institutions. In 2011 the Security Council held its second open debate on SSR and essentially reaffirmed the UN principles and approach to SSR as laid out in the 2008 report. However, there is some criticism that the UN approach, thus far, continues to be overwhelmingly state-centric and does not focus adequately on citizens, and that it also needs to capture the role of informal security providers.

The bulk of UN SSR efforts in Africa are in post-conflict countries, with a UN peace operation serving as the main SSR instrument. The increase in the number of UN actors supporting rule of law and SSR, often with interrelated roles and responsibilities, has led to overlapping and, at times, duplicative and incoherent approaches and programmatic activities. Recognizing the ongoing challenges of coordination, joined-up programming has been called for at the highest levels of the UN and prompted a new response: the Global Focal Point (GFP) on police, justice and corrections. The GFP, established in 2012, is a coordinating mechanism that brings together, among others, the DPKO and the UNDP—the two principal UN actors for rule of law and SSR support in post-conflict countries through the UN peacekeeping and special political missions. The GFP mechanism also applies to countries that do not host a UN mission but where UN assistance may be required in cases of crisis. The initiative aims to realize joint country-level assessments, planning, programming, and financial and human resource mobilization in the police, justice and corrections sectors, which occupy an overlapping area of the rule of law and SSR. However, according to one assessment of the UN’s role in promoting the rule of law, a UN peace operation is often not a suitable instrument to address local rule of law problems in a host country.

The UN rule of law policy agenda has had normative, policy and institutional implications for Africa. In the particular area of SSR, the UN has

27 For a thorough analysis of this new mechanism see Price, M., Steeves, K. and van de Goor, L., Soldering the Link: The UN Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections (Clingendael Institute: The Hague, Aug. 2012).
provided technical support to, for example, the AU and ECOWAS, which have crafted SSR policies and created units to coordinate SSR. The 2013 AU Policy Framework on SSR acknowledged the role of the UN in setting out basic principles for international approaches to SSR and solicited UN assistance in implementing the AU’s SSR policy, undertaking joint SSR needs assessments, technical support (capacity building) to the AU in SSR, and support in monitoring and evaluating AU SSR activities.\textsuperscript{29} The UN currently offers ongoing technical support and capacity-building services in SSR to the AU through the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa. In addition, observers have noted that, although Africa remains at the heart of the UN’s SSR efforts, a growing number of African countries are emerging providers of SSR assistance.\textsuperscript{30}

In more recent years, transnational organized crime, which has been described as a central threat to the rule of law and the root cause of conflict, has emerged as a growing threat to fragile and post-conflict countries.\textsuperscript{31} As the linkages between the transnational organized crime and conflict are stressed on policy agendas, calls for UN peace operations to better address this emerging threat have intensified.\textsuperscript{32} However, there remains an absence of strategy or policy guidance within the UN. Africa also features prominently in this work, given the connections between insecurity and transnational organized crime in countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia, among others. This has generated policy impulses in Africa, such as ECOWAS’s 2008 Political Declaration and Action Plan against Drug Abuse, Illicit Trafficking and Organized Crime, and the 2013 West Africa Commission on the Impact of Drugs on Governance, Security and Development.\textsuperscript{33}

II. The UN’s role in peace and security in Africa

With human security as the guiding principle and the emerging consensus on the security–development nexus, more and more UN institutions are increasingly tasked with addressing interlinked security–development

issues in Africa. For instance, the UNDP traditionally focused on ‘pure’ poverty alleviation activities, such as access to health and education. However, beginning in the mid-1990s it slowly began to address rule of law and SSR, and in the past decade security-related issues such as DDR, SSR and the rule of law have become core activities for the UNDP. In addition, several mechanisms ranging from an ad hoc working group of the Security Council to the standing Peacebuilding Fund have been established.

One of the key Security Council resolutions to strengthen the UN’s effectiveness in Africa was Resolution 1318 of 2000 on the Council’s role in maintaining peace and security.\textsuperscript{34} The resolution emphasized that the UN would give special attention to the promotion of peace and sustainable development in Africa and to the specific characteristics of conflicts in Africa. To enhance the effectiveness of the UN’s capacity, reforms to the way UN peace operations were carried out were recommended. These included establishing more specific mandates that were achievable, with better-trained and better-equipped personnel, improved planning and command and control capacity, and more sustainable financing. Other notable policy and normative aspects of Resolution 1318 include (a) prevention of small arms flows to conflicts; (b) an emphasis on the importance of including DDR programmes in peace operation mandates; (c) implementation of strong measures against illegal exploitation of conflict resources; (d) advocacy for international criminal justice for atrocities crimes; and (e) strengthened cooperation with the Organization for African Unity (OAU, the AU’s predecessor) and subregional organizations.

Five years later, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1625 on conflict prevention, a catch-all resolution that in many respects echoed Resolution 1318. Resolution 1625 identified a long list of activities targeted at different parts of the UN system—the Security Council, the Secretariat and the member states—to prevent conflict in Africa.\textsuperscript{35} It called for the development of policy initiatives to encourage good governance and human rights in order to prevent the weakening or collapse of state institutions. The resolution declared that the UN would strengthen national governments’ conflict-prevention strategies through assisting with conflict risk assessment and developing national dispute-management capacities. Resolution 1625 also supported other international efforts to support Africa’s efforts to improve security and development (e.g. the 2005 Gleneagles Declaration by the Group of Eight, G8).\textsuperscript{36}

In 2003 the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA) was established within the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) to bridge the gap between the UN’s political and economic activities for

\textsuperscript{34} UN Security Council Resolution 1318, 7 Sep. 2000.
\textsuperscript{36} See chapter 5 in this volume.
and in Africa. The OSAA’s task is to coordinate all UN activities and to ensure that UN policies and strategies for Africa are coherent, to increase international support for Africa’s development and security, and to be the focal point for the AU’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Its primary function is advocacy. Specifically, its role is to highlight emerging issues arising from Africa. Thus, it is not an operational department. The OSAA holds regular conferences and information-sharing meetings. For example, in 2009–10 its main activity was the review of the implementation of the 1998 report on the causes of conflict in Africa. However, given that there are already similar structures, the added value of this office is questionable.

The UN’s security-related activities in Africa can be categorized under four broad themes: conflict prevention and mediation; peacekeeping; peacebuilding; and institutional capacity building. The range of UN agencies and activities with direct and indirect, actual and potential impact on security in Africa is diverse. These four themes highlight the UN’s most visible activities and align with some of the UN’s key mandate areas and institutional priorities over the past decade.

**Preventing and mediating conflicts in Africa**

Established in 1992, the Department of Political Affairs is the designated UN department for peacemaking and preventive diplomacy. The principles and values that the UN is perceived to stand for put the UN in the unique position of playing the role of an ‘honest broker’ in conflict mediation. Through its support for political settlement of conflicts (via negotiated peace agreements), the UN has played a critical role in addressing conflicts in Africa. Prior to the 1990s such activity focused on resolving conflicts linked to decolonization and minority rule, but also on attaining cessation of hostilities. In the post-cold war period, the intrastate and complex nature of conflicts in Africa (often combining political and economic grievances) have necessitated that mediation efforts focus on achieving comprehensive settlements that include power- and wealth-sharing mechanisms and that address constitutional, justice, security and human rights issues.

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37 One of the DPA’s core functions is to monitor and analyse political developments in Africa. The department has 2 divisions for Africa: Africa I (responsible for East and Southern Africa) and Africa II (responsible for West, Central and North Africa). Each division looks at cross-cutting issues, e.g. SSR and small arms and light weapons, and drug and human trafficking that particularly affect the subregions. The divisions are also responsible for managing the UN’s special political missions in their respective subregions (see below). The DPA is also the lead focal point for the UN’s 10-year capacity-building programme for the AU (see below). The DPA received a boost in stature and funding after the Security Council passed Resolution 1625 in 2005.

The recent reinvigoration of the UN’s role in preventive diplomacy and mediating conflicts is due in part to the priorities of the present UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, and in part to the emphasis placed on mediation and negotiated settlements of conflicts by the AU and subregional organizations. Moreover, political settlements that are adequately inclusive (resulting from mediation efforts) remain the most effective strategy for preventing and ending conflicts as highlighted by the power-sharing agreements in Kenya and Zimbabwe (both in 2008), and the comprehensive peace agreements in Sierra Leone (in 1999) and Liberia (in 2003).

Working with the AU, subregional organizations and other international stakeholders, the UN plays one or more of the following roles in preventing and mediating conflict in Africa: (a) initiating, convening and funding peace talks; (b) serving as a moral guarantor and co-signatory to peace agreements; (c) acting as the implementer of peace agreements; and (d) providing international political legitimacy to peace agreements through participation, endorsement or UN Security Council authorization of peace agreements. The involvement of the UN in mediating conflicts in Africa also means that such efforts are more likely to adhere to UN legal and normative frameworks, such as not including amnesty for atrocity crimes, promoting a gender-sensitive approach to peace agreements, and ensuring that the protection of civilians is respected.

The DPA established the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) in 2006 to strengthen the good-offices capacity of the UN Secretary-General. The MSU provides operational support to current peace processes led by the Secretary-General’s special envoys, representatives and advisers. Since 2008 the MSU has engaged deeply in mitigating conflicts and assisting sustained political dialogue in the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya and Madagascar. The unit works with regional and subregional organizations to strengthen their mediation capacities; is a repository of expertise and information on conflict mediation; and maintains a standby roster of rapidly deployable mediation advisers.

**UN peace operations in Africa**

As of 31 December 2013, 8 of the 16 peace operations conducted by the DPKO were located in Africa. The UN is the largest deployer of personnel

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41 The 8 missions, in order of their start date, are the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in Sudan, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) on the
to peace operations in Africa—those 8 operations accounted for 78 per cent of DPKO personnel deployed worldwide. The overwhelming majority of the multidimensional UN peace operations—those that require military, police and civilian experts—are located in Africa. MONUSCO, with over 20 000 military, police and civilian personnel, is the largest UN peace operation in the world.

Between 1989 and 2013 the UN conducted a total of 33 peace operations in Africa (conducted by the DPKO or the DPA). The number of operations increased steadily after 2001 (see figure 8.1), as did the size, as evidenced by the steady increase in the number of personnel. The budgets for the peace operations in Africa correspond with the rise in the number of operations (see figure 8.2).

A comparison of the mandates of UN peace operations in the 1990s with those launched in the 2000s indicates a change in priorities for the UN. Those launched in the 1990s tended to have political mandates—the UN was responding to conflict. The operations launched in the 2000s tended to have ‘moral’ mandates with the view to a sustainable peace. Almost all new peace operations launched since 1993 have had SSR or rule-of-law

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Figure 8.1. Number of United Nations peace operations deployed in Africa, 1989–2013


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SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (note 8). See also table A.2 in the appendix in this volume.


Ayebare, A., former Permanent Representative of Uganda to the UN, Interview with author, New York, Jan. 2010.
mandates (see figure 8.3). The state-building mandates of the missions are reflected in the increasing use of civilian personnel in UN peace operations in Africa. While the bulk of UN peacekeepers continue to be military personnel, 15,846 civilian personnel were deployed in 2013, compared to 770 in 2000.\(^{45}\)

As nearly half of the UN’s uniformed personnel are Africans, the DFS’s Integrated Training Service (ITS) has in recent years sought to systematize its engagement with the many national training centres in Africa. It launched an extensive outreach and awareness-raising campaign with the African troop- and police-contributing countries regarding pre-deployment training. The ITS sets standards and benchmarks for training centres to comply, ensuring that training is harmonized and standardized.

As of December 2013 there were four special political missions with primarily peacebuilding mandates led by the DPA (in addition to the eight DPKO-run operations).\(^{46}\) The establishment of some of these missions (e.g. in Sierra Leone) followed after the closure of DPKO-led peace operations, to support the consolidation of the countries’ peacebuilding efforts and ensure sustained international political and financial commitment. Presently, there is a lack of clarity as to the difference between special political and peacebuilding missions. In 2010 the DPA undertook an overall assessment of these missions to review DPA’s role in enhancing their ability to implement the mandates.

\(^{45}\) See table A.2 in the appendix in this volume. See also Soder (note 43).

\(^{46}\) These 4 missions were the UN Integrated Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), the UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).
The Peacebuilding Commission

The UN established the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 and launched the standing Peacebuilding Fund in 2006 to support it (see the discussion of funding below). The PBC was intended to fill the institutional gap between peacekeeping and development activities and further strengthen the UN’s capacity for peacebuilding in the widest sense. On a practical level, it was an attempt to simplify the UN’s convoluted programming procedure. The lack of coordination and complementarity between actors had prevented otherwise sound peacebuilding strategies from being converted into concrete, sustained achievements.

The three main purposes of the Peacebuilding Commission were stated to be: (a) to serve as a central node to bring together different international actors, marshal resources, and propose integrated strategies and overall

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47 The Peacebuilding Fund also provides funds to countries other than those on the PBC agenda.
priorities for post-conflict peacebuilding in general terms and in specific
country situations, thus enhancing inter-institutional coordination; (b) to
focus attention on the institution-building efforts necessary for the func-
tioning of a state; and (c) to develop expertise and best practices, with a
view above all to ensuring predictable and sustained financing as well as
sustained international attention to peacebuilding activities. The core of
the PBC’s work was envisaged to be its country-specific activities, notably
in the period when countries move from transitional recovery towards
development and to actively anchor the UN’s peacebuilding activities in
nationally owned, demand-driven solutions.

There is concern that the advisory nature of the PBC’s powers have ren-
dered it toothless. A 2010 review was fairly negative about the Com-
mission’s lack of success. It noted that if the planned objectives had been
met, there probably would have been a ‘wider demand from countries to
come on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda’, and a better indication of
how the Commission had made an impact on the ground. The report
further argued that, if the Commission had adequately fulfilled its first
objective, ‘peacebuilding in this context would have a higher place among
United Nations priorities’ and stronger relationships would have been
forged among the PBC and the Security Council, the General Assembly and
[the UN Economic and Social Council].

All six countries on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda are in Africa:
Burundi, the CAR, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The
PBC’s engagement in these countries aims to sustain international attention
to and resources for critical peacebuilding priorities and strengthen
coordination between multilateral and bilateral actors. Although these
countries have received the attention of the PBC since its inception, by the
end of 2013 they showed (at best) measured signs of an improvement in
their recovery and have expressed disappointment about the lack of added
value of the PBC to the overall impact of the UN’s engagement in these
countries.

The UN–AU partnership

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter clearly recognizes the important role of
regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security.
However, the UN has not considered its relationship with regional organ-

50 United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, Review of the United Nations peace-
Security Council and the UN Peacebuilding Commission, Special Research Report No. 2013/1 (Security
izations in a systematic fashion. Instead, it has addressed the issue piece-meal, and in the case of Africa it has resulted in an ambiguous strategic relationship between the UN’s Security Council and the AU’s Peace and Security Council.

At the UN’s 2005 World Summit, leaders called for ‘forging predictable partnerships and arrangements between the United Nations and regional organizations, and noting in particular . . . the importance of a strong African Union’. However, this declaration was not new: the Security Council had already passed resolutions calling for the strengthening of partnership between the UN and the AU or OAU, as well as providing technical and financial support to the OAU and subregional organizations. In particular, in 1998, following the Secretary-General’s report on conflict development in Africa, the Security Council mandated that the UN should assist the OAU with operationalizing its own early-warning system and encouraged governments to contribute to the UN Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa.

The UN’s most recent effort to strengthen the UN’s capacity-building work is the integration of three different UN offices in Africa under one umbrella, the UNOAU, headed by a UN Assistant Secretary-General. Effectively, not only do all the different UN departments and agencies working in Africa now share the same physical location, they also come under the direct ‘command’ of the Assistant Secretary-General. The UNOAU is the latest in a series of efforts related to the consolidation process labelled ‘One UN’ to present a coherent UN strategy.

At the operational level, the partnership between the UN and the AU has taken a more nuanced approach that identifies the complementarities and ways for both organizations to support the other. The support provided by the UN Support Office to AMISOM is perhaps the most prominent example.

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53 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 (note 23). This was also the year in which the G8 Gleneagles Summit, the United Kingdom-led Commission for Africa and the European Union all drew up policy documents to concretize their political commitment to support Africa’s security and development needs. For a summary of these initiatives see Wiharta (note 48), pp. 139–57; and chapters 5 and 7 in this volume.


55 The UNOAU absorbed the responsibilities of the UN Liaison Office, the AU Peacekeeping Support Team and the UN Planning Team for AMISOM. It was established in July 2010, with its first head, Zachary Muburi-Muita, appointed in Oct. 2010. ‘UN integrates its three offices in Africa to UNOAU’, New Business Ethiopia, 23 Feb. 2011.

56 Delivering as One was proposed by the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence. See United Nations Development Group, ‘Delivering as One: making the UN system more coherent, effective and efficient’, <http://www.undg.org/?P=7>. 
The Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union

The signing in November 2006 of the Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union, which provides the structure for UN assistance to the AU, re-energized the UN’s capacity-building efforts with the AU. The overall objective of the framework is to ‘enhance the capacity of the AU Commission and African subregional organizations to act as effective UN partners in addressing the challenges to human security in Africa’.

The focus during 2009–11 was on peace and security. The focal point for the implementation of the overall programme is the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Given the initial focus of the programme, a separate Peace and Security Cluster was created, led by the DPA. The cluster was further subdivided into three sub-clusters: (a) Peace and Security Architecture of the AU; (b) post-conflict reconstruction and development; and (c) human rights, justice and reconciliation. The respective UN entities responsible for the sub-clusters are the DPKO, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

Some observers have noted that the Ten-year Capacity-Building Programme does not adequately match the AU’s or Africa’s security needs or priorities. Instead, it is a reflection of UN priorities and focuses disproportionately on peacekeeping. More importantly, the document was drawn up with little strategic review of the current security challenges facing Africa. For instance, the UN should, arguably, pay more attention to elections as they have increasingly been flashpoints for conflicts in Africa.

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58 ‘Enhancing UN–AU cooperation’ (note 57), para. 3. Following the agreement, in Sep. 2007 the General Assembly called for the implementation of the programme. UN General Assembly Resolution 61/296, 17 Sep. 2007.
59 This work was done through the UN Liaison Office to the AU in Addis Ababa, which was replaced by the UNOAU in 2010. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security, S/2008/186, 7 Apr. 2008.
60 Ayebare (note 44).
UN-coordinated funding for security-related activities in Africa

Multi-partner trust funds (MPTFs) are an instrument used by the UN and other multilateral organizations to pool their voluntary contributions for donor assistance for a specific recipient country or on a specific thematic issue such as human security or sexual violence in conflict. One of the earliest trust funds was the UN Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa, which was launched in 1995. In 2003 the AU, while drawing up its policy strategy for the African Standby Force, proposed that the UN Trust Fund be used to finance training for AU planning officers. However, trust funds were not routinely used until the mid-2000s. Since then, the UN has created several funds for various purposes in different countries. There are a number of MPTFs that have been created for several countries in Africa, but these mostly relate to humanitarian purposes.

The Peacebuilding Fund, an MPTF that is particularly relevant to Africa, is funded by voluntary contributions from member states and was designed to accelerate the release of funds for the launch of peacebuilding activities. Its establishment in 2006 reflected the realization that the implementation of peacebuilding programmes had often suffered from a lack of resources. As of 2013, the fund had 51 donor states, one of the broadest donor bases among the UN MPTFs, and totalled $455.6 million. Of this, $378.7 million had been allocated to 17 countries in Africa—Burundi, the CAR, the Comoros, Chad, the Comoros, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda (including $271 billion to the 6 countries on Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda). One of the biggest advantages of the Peacebuilding Fund is its ability to finance SSR activities—about one-seventh of its funding up to 2011 was allocated to support such SSR activities as human rights training and provision of equipment and better accommodation for military personnel. In fact, about two-fifths of the PBF’s resources go towards activities such as SSR, rule of law, DDR and dialogue, which fall under the

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64 A full list of the various MPTFs is available at <http://mptf.undp.org/portfolio/fund>.
65 The top 10 donors to the fund up to 2013 were Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, Japan, Germany, Spain, Finland and Ireland. United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, ‘Contributions’, <http://www.unpbf.org/donors/contributions/>.
‘Support for the implementation of peace agreements’ category of priority areas.

In addition to standing financial contributions, the UN has also provided financial and in-kind contributions to the AU for peace operations on an ad hoc basis.\textsuperscript{68}

III. Conclusions

The role of the United Nations in peace and security in Africa has evolved significantly over a relatively short period of time. The evolution was shaped by the way the UN framed peace and security issues and this is reflected by four shifts.

The first shift was in the reframing of security as human security and the development of new norms that had direct and indirect implications for peace and security in Africa. The redefinition of security resulted in new norms on civilian protection, against rape and gender-based violence, and on genocide. The redefinition of security and emergent norms has influenced the structure, composition and mandates of UN activities in Africa, and its engagement with African institutions (e.g. the AU and the RECs). The new norms have become core elements in security-related academic and policy debates, operational planning and activities in Africa.

The second shift was from a compartmentalized approach to security to an integrated approach that incorporates human rights and rule of law, development and justice issues. This is reflected in policies and activities on the MDGs, SSR, transitional justice and transnational organized crime.

The third shift was in the framing of peace operations, in particular their size and mandates. The trend is away from traditional (interpositional and buffer forces) peacekeeping to multidimensional peace operations with broader mandates (covering issues of state-building, SSR, civilian protection and peacebuilding).\textsuperscript{69} Since 1993 the mandates of almost all UN peace operations in Africa have included state-building, SSR and peacebuilding elements.

Framed as ‘conflict prevention and mediation’ and ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, the fourth shift was a move away from reacting to conflict towards preventing conflict relapse and new conflicts. There is a clear recognition and emphasis on sustainable, long-term peacebuilding.

The UN is also slowly evolving new institutions and operational mechanisms to implement the new framing, norms and approaches to security-related issues in Africa. Internally, new units and coordinating mechanisms have been created to implement and strengthen the effectiveness of UN operations.

\textsuperscript{68}See e.g. Soder (note 43).

\textsuperscript{69}In 2013 the Security Council endorsed the importance of the multidimensional approach through UN Security Council Resolution 2086, 21 Jan. 2013.
security-related activities in Africa. Externally, the UN has strengthened its partnerships with the AU and the subregional organizations in peace and security. Concrete examples of this are the UN Office to the African Union, the UN Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the AU, and new funding arrangements.

Despite the increase in UN security-related activities in Africa, gaps remain between the ideals and aspirations as set out in policy statements and norms on the one hand and the reality of implementation on the other. This indicates two things. First, it takes time for UN policies to take root and be properly implemented. Second, security-related issues in Africa—and the UN policies and approaches to address them—continue to dynamically evolve.

Select bibliography


9. Conclusions

OLAWALE ISMAIL AND ELISABETH SKÖNS

This chapter provides a summary and synthesis of the security activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa and identifies overlapping issues and patterns in their official security-related policies and activities. At the same time, it acknowledges differences among external actors in their policy focus and interests and the generally fluid nature of external actors’ security-related roles in Africa, which are often dictated by political exigencies.

Section I of this chapter synthesizes the security-related policies and strategies of external actors in Africa as described in this book. Section II provides an overview of the security-related activities undertaken by external actors to pursue policy goals. Section III provides conclusions on the broader context of external actors in African security. It focuses on the group dynamics of the external actors and offers brief reflections on the future research agenda related to the security-related activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa.

I. New policies, strategies and institutions

Over the past decade nearly all the external actors covered in this volume developed new policy initiatives and created new institutions to advance security, geopolitical and economic interests in Africa. In some cases, an actor’s official security-related policies, or at least part of them, are contained in an overall policy on Africa, but in most cases they have been derived from a number of policy and strategy documents and statements, including those on defence policy and national security strategy. The raft of new and revised policies by external actors underscores the rising profile of sub-Saharan Africa in global security and in the geopolitical and economic calculus of external actors, as manifested in external engagement in areas, such as peace operations, conflict prevention, counterterrorism, anti-piracy and energy security.

The security-related policies towards Africa of the external actors covered in this volume represent a mix of continuity and change. In order to reflect shifting security-related priorities, France and the United Kingdom—the two former colonial powers in this study—reshaped their policy and institutional processes related to Africa in the periods following the end of the cold war and the terrorist attacks on the United States of...
11 September 2001. France reformed its Africa policy and institutional setting from the late 1990s, especially the security component, by reshaping and reducing its military presence in Africa and interlocking its security activities with those of the European Union (EU), in addition to those of the United Nations. The UK has developed a number of policy initiatives within its ‘ethical foreign policy’ that was established in 1997, such as the security sector reform (SSR) strategy, which was elaborated in 2001. It also created the Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997 and the Commission for Africa in 2004 to advance key priorities such as conflict prevention, good governance, development and trade. In the post-September 2001 era, the British Government expanded its list of Africa-related policy issues to include radicalization, immigration, piracy and organized crime.

Similarly, China and the USA have introduced new policies and institutional set-ups with implications for security in Africa since the end of the cold war. China has developed a number of new policies and institutional mechanisms of relevance to its security-related engagement with Africa. This includes the triennial Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), instituted in 2000 as a framework for collective dialogue with African countries on key areas, including peace and development; its Africa Policy, introduced in 2006; as well as changes in its defence policy, as reflected in its biennial defence white papers since 2006. The USA identified sub-Saharan Africa in the post-September 2001 period as a key region in its global security calculus. The 2002 US National Security Strategy, which defined ‘combating global terror’ as the USA’s strategic priority, stated that the USA ‘must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states . . . to deny havens for terrorists’.\(^1\) In 2004 a panel led by the US Department of State concluded that Africa had assumed a new strategic place in US foreign policy, reflecting how ‘9/11 altered the US strategic conception of global security’.\(^2\) The US Government’s new thinking on Africa crystallized in 2008 with its creation of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), a unified combatant command mandated to lead and coordinate US security, humanitarian and economic interests in Africa. Since the mid-2000s the USA has developed a number of new security-related policies and strategies with direct or indirect relevance for sub-Saharan Africa, including its 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, its 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism and its 2012 Strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa.

Russia has not developed any new—and in fact does not have any—official policy or strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa. Neither does it consider

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sub-Saharan Africa as a priority for its foreign and security policy. However, Russia is paying increasing attention to the region and has, since 2000, taken steps to develop ties with sub-Saharan African states in order to advance its geopolitical goals and economic interests.

The EU and the UN have also developed new policies and institutional mechanisms towards, or with implications for, sub-Saharan Africa. In 2003 the EU identified sub-Saharan Africa as a region of utmost priority in its European Security Strategy (ESS), and in 2007 it adopted the Joint Africa–EU Strategy aiming to partner with and to provide assistance on peace and security issues to sub-Saharan Africa. The UN has developed a number of policies of relevance for peace and security in Africa, as documented in UN Security Council resolutions and reports by the UN Secretary-General. Some of these are directly related to Africa. However, most of them are of a more general character, establishing norms and norm implementation strategies in the field of peace and security, which nevertheless have direct relevance for Africa. To support its lead-actor role in peace and security in Africa, the UN has also initiated new institutional arrangements, such as the creation in 2003 of the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA), regional offices for Africa, and the 2006 Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union (AU), with the overall objective to enhance the capacity of the AU Commission and subregional organizations to act as effective UN partners in addressing the challenges to human security in Africa.

There are a number of cross-cutting themes that can be identified in the strategies that external actors use in pursuit of security-related policy goals in sub-Saharan Africa, including the increasing use of multilateral approaches, support for the ‘Africanization’ of African security, and the increasing privatization of externally provided security-related support.

**Multilateralism versus bilateralism**

A clear change in the security-related strategies of external actors towards Africa is the increasing recourse to multilateralism, that is, the use of inter-governmental institutions or assemblies of states and governments to communicate, negotiate and implement policies and programmes. In the context of external actors in Africa, it operates in two interrelated ways: the use of multilateral organizations or assemblies outside of Africa to push agendas within Africa, and the engagement of external actors with sub-Saharan Africa through African multilateral organizations—centrally, the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)—to plan, negotiate or implement security-related policies and programmes. Examples of the former include turning to the EU and to the UN to initiate policies and programmes or participate in security-related activities in Africa. France has
embraced multilateral strategies in its security-related policies and activities in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily by transferring its peacekeeping training to EU activities (e.g. the EU missions in Chad, Guinea-Bissau and Niger). Similarly, the UK has shifted its SSR activities to the EU. China and Russia have increased their participation in UN peace operations in Africa through the UN. The China–Africa FOCAC represents the largest gathering of African leaders outside of the AU. The 2007 Joint Africa–EU Strategy illustrates multilateralism on both the external actor and African sides.

The increase in multilateralism is part of a global trend. On the external actor side it reflects the growth in multilateral approaches to peace and security issues in sub-Saharan Africa—for example, both the EU and the UN have created partnership arrangements as pillars of their evolving security-related policies and activities in Africa. On the African side, it is the result of the growing profile of African regional and subregional bodies (the AU and RECs).

The increasing use of multilateralism by external actors does not seem to be a substitute for or indicate a diminishment of the use and importance of bilateral strategies. The relationship between the bilateral and the multilateral strategies of external actors is dynamic and complex. On the one hand, the approaches are mutually reinforcing, with most external-actor countries using multilateralism to drive or consolidate gains already achieved through bilateralism (e.g. to give political and diplomatic legitimacy to bilateral agendas) and vice versa. On the other hand, the use of both bilateral and multilateral strategies could be paradoxical—where policy and strategies at the bilateral level are different from those pursued through multilateral channels.

Support for Africanization of African security

A second visible change in strategy among external actors in Africa is that their security-related approach to Africa is based on the principle of ‘Africanization’—supporting African institutions, countries and personnel to take the lead in African security-related activities. This is shown in the clear emphases in their strategies on capacity building (training, supply of weapons and other military and security-related equipment, and financial and logistical support), partnerships and joint military exercises and other security-related activities between external actors and sub-Saharan Africa countries in virtually all new policies by external actors. Africanization appears to formalize an implicit ‘division of labour’ on African security issues, in which African countries provide the personnel and take responsibility for the physical and political risks (casualties, political controversies etc.), while external actors contribute to the financial costs and lend diplomatic support at the UN. For example, the USA’s Trans-Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counter-Terrorism (PREACT) were designed to develop and support the capacity of African security forces to address terrorism. Similar commitments are contained in the joint China–Africa FOCAC action plans. The EU provides support for African-led peace operations through the African Peace Facility and the UN provides financial and in-kind contributions for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Africanization resulted from two parallel yet mutually reinforcing processes. One of these was the demand for (and inevitability of) African countries and institutions taking the lead in responding to peace and security challenges in sub-Saharan Africa. The first clear manifestations of this were the interventions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 1990s, a development that transformed the organization from a solely economic-integration body into a security actor. The timing of these interventions coincided with the temporary lack of interest in African security matters by most external actors. Since then, the AU and the RECs have developed new policies and institutional mechanisms for addressing peace and security challenges within their jurisdiction. Main examples of this are the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the decision to establish an African Standby Force (ASF).

The second factor behind the shift towards Africanization in external actor security-related approaches is the increasing financial, diplomatic and political cost of external actors’ direct involvement in African security. Excessive financial costs were a major determinant of France’s decision to reduce its direct involvement in francophone Africa. The increased costs are also associated with some of the external actors’ military engagement elsewhere (e.g. in Afghanistan and Iraq), increasing hostility in external actors’ domestic constituencies to casualties in foreign military activities (e.g. a legacy of the US intervention in Somalia in 1993), with financial and budgetary limitations faced by some external actors. The trend towards Africanization underscores the logic of exploring less costly and more efficient ways of addressing security threats in Africa (including terrorism and armed conflicts that threaten regime stability or disrupt the supply of natural resource or lead to large scale humanitarian emergencies).

**Privatization**

There is an increasing use by external actors of private security and military companies to undertake security-related tasks and roles in Africa. For example, the UK and the EU Delegation contracted Pricewaterhouse-Coopers to undertake SSR tasks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); and the USA used two private contractors—DynCorp and Pacific
Architects and Engineering (PAE)—in its SSR programme in Liberia, for such tasks as recruiting and training soldiers and providing advanced training to military officers. This is an extension of the global practices used by external actors in other regions of the world, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq.

For Africa, this constitutes a profound change in the security-related roles of external actors over the past decade. It raises important governance questions regarding oversight mechanisms for private security and military companies. In particular, it is argued that the fact that the contractors report only to their employers, not to the government that they are supporting, has negative implications for the accountability and transparency of the services they provide.

II. Activities

This volume's mapping of security-related activities by external actors in sub-Saharan Africa reveals a broad spectrum of activities. The selection of which activities to cover is based primarily on each actor's policy goals, most often policy goals in relation to Africa specifically, but also general policy goals, such as for national security. This section summarizes and analyses common sets of security-related activities undertaken by external actors to pursue policy goals in Africa. Yet, even attempting to uncover common themes of activity across the studies is a complex task given the range of agency and types of activity. The coverage of activities by external actors in this volume varies in scope and depth, as conditioned by the policy context, historical realities, the nature and mandate of external actors, and the political and security dynamic internationally and in sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, four thematic categories of security-related activity can be discerned: military presence and interventions, peace operations, security sector support and arms transfers.

Military presence and interventions

There is a long history of military presence and interventions by external actors in Africa spanning, in particular, the colonial and cold war periods.


Prior to the 1990s, France, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the USA had deployed troops to Africa either to intervene in specific situations or to maintain military bases. Since then, the pattern has changed with reductions in the level of military presence and deployment by external actors. Still, external actors continue to maintain some level of direct military involvement in and around Africa in two ways: permanent military presence at military bases and temporary deployments of troops for specific purposes.

The number of permanent military bases in sub-Saharan Africa has decreased significantly since the end of the cold war. As of 2012, only France maintained permanent military bases in sub-Saharan Africa—in Djibouti, Gabon and Senegal—while the USA had a semi-permanent base in Djibouti. France has pursued a policy since the mid-1990s of reducing the number of permanent bases in Africa and the number of troops deployed at the remaining bases. It instead relies on security sector assistance, primarily to increase the capacity of African security forces. The USA has moved in the opposite direction, establishing its first military base in sub-Saharan Africa in 2008, in support of its ‘global war on terrorism’ policy. In addition, the USA has access to a number of facilities, such as airbases and ports, so-called forward operating sites and cooperative security locations, as regulated in bilateral status of forces agreements. By 2011 the US military had access to 10 cooperative security locations in sub-Saharan Africa, about which there is little open information, however.\(^5\)

The second form of direct military involvement—temporary deployment of troops or military interventions—has also decreased since the end of the cold war. However, several of the actors examined in this volume are still deploying troops to sub-Saharan Africa. France still deploys military troops on an ad hoc temporary basis (the so-called OPEX, \textit{operations extérieures}), although some of these deployments have become rather permanent. By the end of 2012, France had five major OPEX operations in sub-Saharan Africa.

There are also ad hoc deployments of troops (based on national authorization) in operations to support multilateral (e.g. UN) peace operations and anti-piracy patrols in and around Africa. France, the UK and the USA have undertaken such independent military deployments to support UN peace operations during the 2000s. Examples of this include the French deployment to Côte d’Ivoire (in 2011), the British deployment to Sierra Leone (in 2000–2002); and the US deployments to Liberia (in 2003) and the DRC (in 2011).

Finally, all actors covered in this volume have some role in the anti-piracy operations off the coasts of sub-Saharan Africa. France and the UK contribute to the EU anti-piracy Operation Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. China and Russia contribute forces on a national basis, and the USA is engaged in extensive cooperative maritime security operations in both the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea. Finally, the UN through UN Security Council Resolution 1816 of 2008 provided the legal basis authorizing foreign naval forces to enter Somali territorial waters in pursuit of piracy.\(^6\)

**Peace operations**

Peace operations by external actors in sub-Saharan Africa started in the 1960s with the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo (now the DRC), launched in 1960. They are perhaps the most visible and largest form of security-related activity undertaken by external actors in Africa. The number of UN peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa increased in the early years of the post-cold war period, peaked in 1994 at seven operations, after which they fell to three operations in 1997.\(^7\) Since then, there has been a steady increase and over the past decade there have been 7–10 UN peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa.\(^8\)

Since 1999 there has also been an increase in peace operations conducted by other actors, such as the AU and its predecessor, African subregional organizations, the EU and various ad hoc coalitions. The total number of peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa has increased from 9 in 2000 to 23 in 2013.\(^9\)

At the same time, there has been an increase in the deployment of personnel, military and civilians in UN peace operations in Africa. Between 2000 and 2013, the number of military personnel increased sevenfold (from 13,395 to 95,955) and the number of civilian personnel increased more than 20-fold (from 770 to 15,846), almost all in sub-Saharan Africa.\(^10\)

Africa accounts for a large share of all peace operations worldwide and is host to some of the world’s largest peace operations.\(^11\) Of the 57 peace operations worldwide in 2013, 23 were in Africa (i.e. two-fifths), and they

\(^6\) UN Security Council Resolution 1816, 2 June 2008.
\(^8\) See table A.2 in the appendix in this volume.
\(^9\) See table A.2 in the appendix in this volume.
\(^11\) Examples include the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).
accounted for 47 per cent of all personnel deployed on peace operations.\(^{12}\) In UN peace operations, Africa accounts for an even higher share of personnel deployed: 81 per cent in 2013.

The involvement of external actors in peace operations can be assessed according to three parameters: deployments of peace operations, contributions of personnel to peace operations, and financial and other support for peace operations. The EU and UN have launched several peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa. UN missions include those to the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. The UN has also undertaken a hybrid mission with the AU in Darfur, Sudan. The EU has deployed peace operations, sometimes to support UN missions, such as in the CAR, the DRC, Chad and Guinea-Bissau.

Second, as regards contributions of personnel to peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa, China and Russia are the largest contributors to UN peace operations among the five countries covered in this volume. China has provided troops and military observers to UN peace operations in the DRC, Liberia and Sudan. Russia has provided troops to UN peace operations in the CAR, Chad and Sudan and military observers in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. The participation of the UK and the USA in multilateral peace operations in Africa is limited to symbolic participation by fewer than 10 personnel.

Third, in terms of political, financial and logistical support for peace operations in sub-Saharan Africa, all five countries, as well as the EU are major contributors. They are involved in authorizing peace operations in Africa, especially in their role as permanent members of the UN Security Council. In most cases, they have supported peace operations in response to potential or actual human rights abuses and armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, although disagreement often occurs over the scope and wording of mandates. On funding, all five countries are financial contributors to peace operations in Africa through the EU, the UN or bilateral financial support for the AU peace operations in Somalia and Sudan.

Finally, the five countries provide varying degrees and types of logistical support to UN- and African-led peace operations in Africa. The logistics support by France, the UK and the USA is often at the bilateral level to troop- and police-contributing countries, involving primarily troop transportation services. Training of African armed forces for peace operations can also be seen as a type of logistical support. The next subsection describes such activities.

\(^{12}\) SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (note 7).
Security sector support

All the external actors covered in this volume undertake a range of security sector support activities for African countries and multilateral organizations in line with Africanization strategies. This is often framed as capacity building and involves institutional support to the peace and security agenda of African multilateral organizations as well as bilateral support to the security sector of individual countries, such as for security sector reform and peacebuilding. The range, depth, focus and approaches differ between and among the external actors.

The EU and UN under a series of partnership initiatives support institutional capacity building for African multilateral organizations, mostly within the APSA framework. This support includes efforts to develop African capacity to effectively absorb and use external security assistance, and to plan, deploy and coordinate military and civilian aspects of peace operations. Much of these activities are covered by the 2006 Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU. EU capacity-building support to the AU for the full operationalization of the APSA is a key element of the peace and security partnership contained in the 2007 Joint Africa–EU Strategy. One of the most important contributions by the EU is its support for AU-led peace operations.

The more extensive security sector support activities take place at the bilateral level involving one or more external countries as initiators and several African countries as recipients. These activities often take the form of training, education, joint exercises and provision of equipment to improve the capacity of African armed forces, internal security forces and other personnel for peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations.

The more structured capacity building activities are linked to long-term policy frameworks. France, the UK and the USA have the most extensive military- and security-related capacity-building programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. Through the RECAMP programme, France provides structured military training and participation in peacekeeping to increase the capacity of African countries to undertake peace support and counterterrorism operations. The programme also includes the provision of prepositioned military equipment at French bases in Africa for African units engaged in peace operations. The UK-led International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) in Sierra Leone has provided training, support and advice for the restructuring of the Sierra Leonean armed forces since 2002. The USA's Africa policy is focused on training and assistance to African peace operations and counterterrorism operations as well as support for security sector reform in post-conflict countries. Examples of US assistance to peace operations include the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme and the Global Peace Oper-
lations Initiative (GPOI). Examples of counterterrorism operations include the TSCTP and the PREACT. While these programmes are led by the US Department of State, the US Department of Defense provides military support through its AFRICOM units.\(^\text{13}\) The DOD also runs capacity-building programmes in maritime security throughout the coastal nations in Africa. Under the Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP), the Department of State outsources tasks to enhance the capacity of African armed forces and other personnel to conduct peace operations, crisis management and counterterrorism. Tasks outsourced to private companies include military training, strategic advisory services, equipment procurement, logistical support services and construction services.

Capacity-building activities can also be part of arms transfer packages. For instance, Russia’s military and security training activities in Africa are often linked to the maintenance of imported Russian weapon systems, such as in the cases of Angola, Ethiopia and Sudan.

**Arms transfers**

Considering the absence of any major indigenous arms production capabilities in sub-Saharan Africa (with the main exception of South Africa), these countries depend on imports for their acquisitions of both major weapons and small arms and light weapons (SALW). However, the sensitivity attached to arms transfers means that reliable and consistent data is often difficult to find, especially for SALW.

Transfers of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa decreased initially after the end of the cold war but have increased again since the late 1990s. According to SIPRI data, major weapon deliveries decreased by two-thirds between the last five-year period during the cold war, 1986–90, and the low point, 1994–98. However, the increase since then has brought them to a level in 2009–13 that is only one-third lower than in 1986–90. A significant part of the increase in recent years is due to deliveries following the large arms import deals by South Africa in the early 1990s. For the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, the fall in arms transfers has been greater since the end of the cold war, by roughly half. However, the trend in recent years has been upward.\(^\text{14}\)

In a global perspective, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for a relatively small share of total arms transfers—3.6 per cent in 2009–13 including transfers to South Africa and 3.1 per cent when these are excluded. This low share reflects the relatively low military budgets of most African countries.\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^\text{13}\) The units are Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) and Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).


\(^\text{15}\) See table A.3 in the appendix in this volume.
Thus, in general, sub-Saharan Africa is not a major arms market for any of the external actors covered here.

Of the five countries covered here, Russia and China have been the main suppliers of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa since the mid-1990s. During the period 2009–13, they accounted for 26 and 15 per cent, respectively, of transfers to sub-Saharan Africa—and 30 and 18 per cent, respectively, to sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa. France, the UK and the USA have reduced their major weapon transfers to the region. In 2009–13, the share of the USA was 4 per cent (3 per cent excluding South Africa), that of France was 2 per cent (also 2 per cent excluding South Africa) and that of the UK was very small. Several other countries had larger shares of the sub-Saharan African market for major weapons during this period, in particular Ukraine (21 per cent), Sweden (12 per cent, primarily due to a large arms deal with South Africa) and Belarus (4 per cent).

Although transfers of major weapons have become less important for external actor policies in Africa, compared to during the cold war, many transfers are still linked in some ways to their policy goals, whether in the economic, political or security domain. This is to some extent reflected in the lists of the main recipients of weapons from the respective suppliers. During 2009–13 the main recipients of Chinese major weapons in sub-Saharan Africa were Tanzania, Nigeria, Namibia, Ghana and Ethiopia. France’s main recipients were South Africa, the francophone countries Benin, Senegal and Mauritania, followed by Kenya. Russian arms transfers are perhaps an exception, motivated more by short-term revenues than by specific policy goals, although the study in this volume also suggests a linkage between Russian arms exports and its economic interests in the region. The main recipients of major weapons from Russia during this period were Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Ghana. British exports of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa have declined to virtually nil since the end of the cold war, with the one main exception of large deliveries to South Africa in a controversial and lucrative arms deal reached in 1999. Finally, the main recipients of US major weapons in sub-Saharan Africa during 2009–13 were South Africa and Nigeria (the two major powers in the region), followed by the DRC (a main recipient of US security sector support), Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (one of the main oil-producing countries in the region).

The volume of major weapons delivered to the region does not reflect the full picture. In addition, the flows of small arms and lights weapons to the region are substantial, and such equipment plays a major role in the violent conflicts in the region, both for governments and for armed groups. However, there is no source of reliable and consistent data on such flows.

16 See table A.4 in the appendix in this volume.
Most of the available data on SALW flows derives from reports from some of the suppliers. Based on the limited data available, a SIPRI study identified 22 countries that supplied SALW to sub-Saharan Africa during 2006–10, including all five external actor countries covered here.\textsuperscript{17}

III. The broader context of external actors in African security

Having identified the cross-cutting themes in the official policies, strategies and activities of external actors, this concluding section offers reflections on the broader context. By considering external actors as a collective, what can be discovered or learned from their security-related policies and activities in sub-Saharan Africa? What does their group dynamic reveal? The chapter ends with some observations on the research process leading to this volume and on the need for further research, asking the question: how viable is this as an area of future research?

**Peer influence and synchronization**

At first glance there seems to be some evidence of peer influence and synchronization among external actors in their security-related policies and activities in Africa. There are three types of evidence to this effect: the simultaneity of policy reviews and changes; the similarity of policies and activities; and the geographic pattern of relations and activities. The chronology of policy reviews and changes shows that during a period of roughly 10 years (from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s), all the external actors covered in this volume undertook a series of policy reviews and changes in relation to security-related goals and activities in sub-Saharan Africa (China in 2000–2006, France in 1994–2008, Russia in 1999, the UK in 1997, the USA in 2001–2003, the in EU 2007 and the UN in the 2000s).

Second, despite variations in policy goals, some of the strategies and activities of external actors are remarkably similar  (e.g. increased use of multilateralism, reduced military presence, reduced reliance on arms transfers, and strong focus on capacity building and Africanization).

Third, the geographical pattern of security-related engagement in Africa among external actors suggests an informal ‘sphere of influence’ logic among external actors, in that particular external actors seem to take the lead in peace and security issues in particular sub-Saharan Africa countries. While this is fluid, part of this pattern tends to reflect history and cultural connections, and the strength of military, political and economic interests.

at any point in time. Thus, France often takes the lead in peace and security issues in francophone countries (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Mali), and the UK in anglophone countries (e.g. Sierra Leone). With the entry, or increased presence of other external actors, this pattern is changing. China has emerged as the lead external actor in Guinea, Sudan and Zimbabwe. The USA has emerged as the lead external actor in countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Liberia. Furthermore, increasingly there is more than one lead external actor, such as in Nigeria (the UK and the USA), Senegal (France and the USA) and Ghana (the UK and the USA).

However, what may seem to be peer influence and synchronization may well primarily reflect a convergence of interests, often dictated by self-interest and shaped by pragmatism.

**The convergence of security issues**

A significant element of external actors’ group dynamic in relation to security-related policies and activities in sub-Saharan Africa is the emergence of shared security issues among the external actors and African countries. Issues such as piracy, terrorism, illicit trade in narcotics, organized crime and illegal migration affect the security of both external actors and African countries. Over the past decade, Africa has emerged as an important frontier, in varying degrees, in external actors’ defence against these security concerns. The national security concerns of external actors are either exported to Africa or have become security issues for Africa as well. For example, the USA actively works with African partners (countries and institutions) to prevent the spread of terrorism in Africa. France and the UK, working through the EU, are involved in anti-piracy naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden and in supporting counterterrorism efforts in varying degrees in the Sahel region. However, the extent to which some of these issues are indigenous to Africa or are genuine security problems there is open to debate.

**The policies and politics of self-interest and pragmatism**

Beyond the official security-related policies, strategies and activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa, there is evidence of an enduring logic of self-interest and pragmatism among the external country actors. Pragmatism is the tendency of external country actors to pursue relatively politically ‘safe’ (less controversial) or ‘correct’ policies and activities that enjoy the support of key African states, political elites and institutions, and perhaps other global policy actors, and that are ostensibly in compliance with international law and norms. Self-interest is the proclivity of external actors’ policies and activities to be driven by issues central to their national
interests, rather than any ‘altruistic’ or ‘humanitarian’ consideration. External actors may sidestep moral and political considerations where and when they come in conflict with key strategic interests (e.g. uninterrupted supply of natural resources, and national security needs).

The geographical pattern of relations with African countries tends to reflect not only a general sphere of influence logic, but also a logic of self-interest—often grounded in historical and cultural ties, geostrategic importance (including national security), or economic interests (e.g. access to markets, investments and natural resources). These considerations feature prominently in the overt and covert policies and activities of external actor countries, as underscored by their stronger relations with certain countries in sub-Saharan Africa, notably Angola, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda.

For instance, the USA’s policy on Africa is officially aimed at strengthening democratic institutions and governance, resolving conflict and promoting peace, enhancing sustained economic growth, strengthening public health and the fight against HIV/AIDS. However, critics argue that the natural resource dimension (primarily energy) and the prioritization of counterterrorism loom large in US involvement in Africa and African security, and that the USA’s close relations with Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda are better explained by realpolitik considerations.

France’s roles in the political upheavals in Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania and Niger have been controversial, or paradoxical at best, as it is seen as supporting oppressive regimes and flawed electoral processes in some cases, and as seeking to protest against similar actions in others. This underlines the pre-eminence of France’s economic, security and diplomatic interests over other considerations.

China and Russia also exemplify this trend in marked ways, China through its unambiguous resource-oriented diplomacy and Russia through its focus on arms exports. China’s policy on Africa and engagement with countries such as Angola, the DRC, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe are based on Chinese interest in securing access to energy and mineral resources.

**The securitization of resource needs and supplies**

The upsurge in global demands for natural resources, especially oil and gas and mineral materials has increased the geopolitical and economic importance of African states that are endowed with such resources. The external actor countries and their headquartered multinationals or state-owned corporations are the lead investors and operators in Africa’s extractive industries. The need for uninterrupted supply of these resources requires the protection of financial investment in Africa’s extractive industry, and the
CONCLUSIONS

political stability of African countries that are endowed with resources. This generates a complex web of military and economic relations between external actor countries and relevant sub-Saharan African countries. The overall extraction, processing and movement of these resources within the relevant sub-Saharan African countries are increasingly becoming ‘securitized’—that is, declared to be issues of national security and given special (sometimes extra-legal) security arrangements by host governments and multinational corporations (and their home governments).

Some indicators of the securitization of the extractive industry in Africa include the deployment of soldiers to guard facilities for extracting, processing and transporting natural resources; the provision of additional financial resources to train and equip security forces (including the buying of weapons); the hiring of private security companies to protect facilities and expatriate personnel; and the use of local armed groups (i.e. militias) to prevent disruptions to natural resource supply chains.

The global context of Africa security-related policies and activities

There is cross-cutting evidence that the global context—defined by the globalization of economic and political-security processes (and the opportunities and constraints it brings)—informs the security-related policies and activities of external actors in sub-Saharan Africa. Notwithstanding the rise in sub-Saharan Africa’s economic and security importance over the past decade, the Africa policies and activities of external actors are neither exceptional nor unusual but follow the external actors’ global strategies.

The changes, continuities and paradoxes observed in the policies and activities of external actors in Africa are embedded in a larger global dynamic. For example, the French efforts to multilateralize its approach to military interventions in sub-Saharan Africa is a function of post-cold war military rationalization and cost reduction, while the US military presence partly reflects a change from ‘garrison’ to ‘expeditionary’ force-projection approaches. China’s security-related engagement linked to its interest in natural resources and Russia’s efforts to access the arms market in sub-Saharan Africa are part of these countries’ overall strategies. British policy on security and development in sub-Saharan Africa is an element of an overall policy framework that can be said to promote the interest of private investors.

Reflections and an agenda for future research

The objective of the research project leading to this volume was clear: to collect, provide, describe and analyse data on the security-related activities of seven major external actors in sub-Saharan Africa, with a view to pro-
viding a basic handbook for civil society, policymakers and academics interested in these issues. While this may appear as a rather modest objective, it has been a challenging task. The research process involved struggling with complex conceptual questions about the remit of external actors and what is security and security-related. Methodologically, the authors grappled with issues of how to study external actors and security-related issues; the coverage of formal and informal aspects; stated policies and unstated manifestations of policies and strategies; hard and soft security issues; and direct security issues versus non-security issues that have an impact on security. Reflecting on the research process identified four key observations with implications for future research on the subject matter with a view to building a holistic understanding of how external actors shape Africa’s security landscape.

First, there is the conceptual conundrum of defining ‘security’ or ‘security-related’. For the studies in this volume this was a central question, since it was the basis for the selection of activities, strategies and policies to cover. This study opted for a hard-security, state-centred approach. The main reasons for this narrow approach were that such activities have a significant impact in the countries where they are applied, while at the same time data on such activities is sensitive and, therefore, available only to a limited extent to a broader group of interested people. Second, SIPRI has long experience of collecting and assessing such data. Third, such an approach also had advantages in terms of standardization of the studies to enable an analysis of the collective dynamic of this type of activity. This study contributes some hard-to-find data and analysis of value for civil society organizations, policymakers and other analysts of external security-related activities in Africa. However, in order to have a more comprehensive picture of the impact of external actors on peace and security in Africa, the scope of activities covered would have to be considerably broadened.

Second, there is the choice of which actors to include for examination. This involves two issues: which type of actor and which specific actors of the chosen type. While this study includes only governments and intergovernmental bodies, it is clear that in order to capture the reality of external activities in Africa, it is necessary to include other types of actor. In particular, the divide between external national governments and the private sector in their policies and activities in sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly blurred. Non-governmental international organizations and external national organizations play an increasingly important role in Africa, some of them in security-related areas, and many with at least implications for African peace and security.

This volume defines ‘external actor’ narrowly and covers a limited number of such actors, which potentially limits the wider application of its findings to other external actors in Africa. Future research is clearly needed
on more types of actor—state and multilateral, and private sector external actors—and of more specific actors of each type, and the interconnections between their security-related policies and activities in Africa. This is important given the increasing number of external actors operating in and shaping the security dynamic in Africa.

Third, the research process grappled with the variation among external actors in terms of their typology of policy processes and definition of ‘Africa’ and ‘security’, and the implications this variation has for the comparability across actors and for analysing them as a collective. Some of the actors have a defined ‘Africa Policy’ and others do not; some define ‘Africa’ in a continental sense while some have a sub-Saharan focus. Moreover, there are important differences in studying state and multilateral external actors, and the interconnections between them. More conceptual thinking and future research is needed to better understand and manage these variations.

Fourth and most important is the problem of data. Consistent with the narrow scope for the research, this volume focuses on official data on basically hard security gathered from open and, as far as possible, primary sources. All authors faced major challenges in terms of the availability and quality of data. This type of data is often difficult to locate and even more so to access. The available data is often scanty, poorly defined, lacking in detail, fragmented, poorly organized and sometimes inconsistent. There is strong evidence of low transparency in the actual implementation of the security-related relations between external actors and sub-Saharan Africa. This may seem surprising considering that most of the external actors covered here are among the leading ‘advanced economies’ and multilateral organizations, which are strong advocates of transparency and openness in government. This underscores the secrecy and sensitivities often associated with security-related issues and international relations in general. It also raises methodological questions about alternative ways of studying external actors in Africa. Most of all, it shows the importance of more and further research into these issues.
# Appendix. Security-related data on Africa

**Table A.1.** Armed conflict and other organized violence in Africa, 1990–2012

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**Notes:** Armed conflict, or state-based conflict, is defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is a government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Incompatibility over government refers to incompatible positions regarding the state's type of political system or the composition of the government. Incompatibility over territory refers to incompatible positions regarding the status of a territory and may involve demands for secession or autonomy (intransistate conflict) or aims to change the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict). An armed conflict which results in more than 1000 battle-related deaths in a year is classified as a war in that year. Other armed conflicts are classified as minor armed conflicts.
Non-state conflict is defined as the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.

One-sided violence is defined as the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded.

Interstate conflicts are fought between two or more governments of states. Intrastate conflicts are fought between a government of a state and one or more rebel groups. Internationalized intrastate conflicts are intrastate conflicts in which one or both sides receive troop support from an external state.

Table A.2. Multilateral peace operations in Africa, 2000–13

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AU = African Union; CEEAC = Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale; CEMAC = Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; EU = European Union; OAU = Organization of African Unity; UN = United Nations.

\[a\] UN figures include peace operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Department of Political Affairs and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

\[b\] AU figures exclude UNAMID.

\[c\] The figures for sub-Saharan Africa excludes the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), with 27–30 troops and 300–500 other personnel per year during 2000–12 and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), with 15 civilian personnel in 2011 and 139 civilian personnel in 2012.

\[d\] Figures for UN personnel in 2011 do not include the personnel of the UN Mission of Sudan (UNMIS), which closed in July 2011, since most of this personnel was transferred to the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

\[e\] No data is available for the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) in 2013.

\[f\] No data is available for CEMAC in 2002.

\[g\] No data is available for ECOWAS in 2000.

Notes: ‘Multilateral peace operation’ includes operations that are conducted under the authority of the UN and operations conducted by regional organizations or by ad hoc coalitions of states that were sanctioned by the UN or authorized by a UN Security Council resolution, with the stated intention to (a) serve as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, (b) support a peace process, or (c) assist conflict prevention or peacebuilding efforts.

SIPRI employs the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations description of peacekeeping as a mechanism to assist conflict-ridden countries to create conditions for sustainable peace. Peacekeeping tasks may include monitoring and observing ceasefire agreements; serving as confidence-building measures; protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assisting with the demobilization and reintegration processes; strengthening institutional capacities in the areas of the judiciary and the rule of law (including penal institutions), policing, and human rights; electoral support; and economic and social development. Good offices, fact-finding or electoral assistance missions are excluded, as are peace operations comprising non-resident individuals or teams or negotiators, or operations not sanctioned by the UN.

Figures are in US $b., at constant (2012) prices and exchange rates.

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Notes: The guideline definition of military expenditure used by SIPRI includes expenditure on the following actors and activities: (a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities. It includes all current and capital expenditure on (a) military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; (b) operations and maintenance; (c) procurement; (d) military research and development; and (e) military aid (in the military expenditure of the donor country). It does not include civil defence and current expenditure for past military activities, such as for veteran’s benefits, demobilization, conversion and weapon destruction.

Figures in constant US dollars are displayed on a calendar year basis. Conversion from financial year data to calendar year data is made on the assumption of an even rate of expenditure throughout the financial year. Local currency data is converted to US dollars at constant prices and exchange rates using the national consumer price index (CPI) for the respective country and the annual average market exchange rate.

The totals for the world and regions are estimates because data is not always available for all countries in all years. In cases where data for a country is missing at the beginning or the end of the series, these estimates are based on the assumption that the rate of change for that country is the same as the average for the region to which it belongs. In cases where data is missing in the middle of the series, the estimates are made on the assumption of an even trend between the end values. When no estimates can be made, countries are excluded from all totals. The series for the world total is a time-consistent series that differs slightly from the shorter, 10-year series provided in SIPRI Yearbook 2014, due to the exclusion of data for Iraq.

Table A.4. Main suppliers of major conventional weapons to sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–2013

Figures are shares (%) of all supplies to sub-Saharan Africa, including and excluding South Africa, based on SIPRI trend-indicator values (TIV). Countries are listed according to rank order for 2009–13.

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\(d\) Figures for Russia include figures for the Soviet Union up to 1991. Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine became independent suppliers from 1992.

Notes: SIPRI’s definition of an arms transfer includes sales of weapons, including manufacturing licences, as well as aid, gifts and most loans or leases to the armed forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence agencies of another country, a non-state armed group, or an international organization, when the transferred item has a military purpose.
‘Major conventional weapons’ are defined as (a) most aircraft (including unmanned), (b) most armoured vehicles, (c) artillery over 100 millimetres in calibre, (d) sensors (radars, sonars and many passive electronic sensors), (e) air defence missile systems and larger air defence guns, (f) guided missiles, torpedoes, bombs and shells, (g) most ships, (h) engines for combat-capable aircraft and other larger aircraft, for combat ships and larger support ships and for armoured vehicles, (i) most guns or missile-armed turrets for armoured vehicles and ships, (j) reconnaissance satellites, and (k) air refuelling systems.

The volume of transfers of major conventional weapons is measured by the SIPRI trend-indicator value (TIV), which is a unique measurement unit developed by SIPRI. The TIV is based on the known unit production cost of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer. Weapons for which a production cost is not known, are given a TIV based on a comparison with core weapons using size and performance characteristics (weight, speed, range and payload); type of electronics, loading or unloading arrangements engine, tracks or wheels, armament and materials; and the year in which the weapons was produced.

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