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The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

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The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy

Edited by
Alyson J. K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius

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Preface

This book is the brainchild of three different research communities based in Stockholm: the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), the Swedish National Defence College (SNDC) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The SIIA is an independent public service institution charged with the task of providing information on international relations and conducting advanced research on international security issues. The SNDC is an academic institution responsible for training senior officials and high-level civilians in the Swedish total defence system. In support of this educational mission, the SNDC also conducts research and studies in relevant fields. It has been the hosting institution in Sweden for the work of the Nordic Security Policy Research Programme established by the Nordic Council in 2001 as a framework for cooperative security policy and defence-related research. SIPRI is an independent research institution created by the Swedish state in 1966 (and still largely Swedish-funded) for the purpose of studying and documenting themes of international peace and security, with special emphasis on military spending and armaments, arms control and non-proliferation, conflict issues and the study of security institutions.

Our three institutions have identified many common interests and fields of cooperation, and one of the most obvious of these is the defence and security policy situation of Sweden itself and its neighbours. While we can pursue this together in several different ways, we felt that the time was ripe in the autumn of 2004 to take a major joint initiative in this field in the form of a research conference on the specific topic of ‘The Nordic countries and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)’. The focus on the ESDP dictated itself because of the very rapid movement going on in that field of European Union policy (and in EU security policy in general)—as well as in the linked fields of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s evolution and USA–Europe relations—at a time when individual Nordic countries were also facing tough challenges in their national processes of defence modernization and security policy development. The decision to limit the focus to the five Nordic countries, rather than inviting experts from, for example, the three Baltic states, was taken because of a perception that the challenges presented by ESDP for the latter are now sufficiently different in kind and context to make it unlikely that common analyses, or prescriptions for the way ahead, could be found for both these sets of nations. However, two of the Nordic contributors to this book have offered interesting comments on the Nordic–Baltic comparison, including the questions of how the Baltic states might view the questions that were asked about the Nordic countries for the purpose of our project, and might evaluate the Nordic responses.
The conference on the Nordic countries and ESDP that was held in Stockholm on 28–29 October 2004 was hosted by the SIIA and co-funded by SIPRI and the SNDC (the latter making use of financial support from the Nordic Security Policy Programme). It benefited also from in-kind support from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and contributions from the Finnish and Norwegian embassies in Stockholm. The participants included representatives of practically every foreign policy, defence research and peace research institute working on Nordic soil, together with several interested nations and think tanks outside the Nordic area. This book is built upon the papers delivered at the conference, by speakers in three main thematic sessions and in a closing panel, with some supplementary material designed (notably) to fill gaps in geographical coverage. It is constructed on the principle that each main topic should, wherever feasible, be addressed by experts from two different countries. Over the book as a whole, an approximate balance has been maintained between inputs from each of the four larger Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and non-Nordic experts (from Germany, the United Kingdom and the USA) who have devoted themselves to the study of this region. Each of the book’s four thematic parts is introduced by remarks from a representative of one of the three co-responsible institutes, the introduction to part I being the most substantial in view of the smaller number of chapters in that part.

We hope that this volume will be of interest and value to many audiences both inside and outside the Nordic region: students and researchers, official policy makers, parliamentarians and other political activists, the private business sector, and the general public. We would like to express our joint thanks to all those who attended and helped to organize the initial conference; to all contributors to the book; to Lise Tønnesland and Pál Dunay for research support within SIPRI; and last but not least to SIPRI editors David Cruickshank, Connie Wall and Jetta Gilligan Borg, without whom this work could never have been completed.

Alyson J. K. Bailes  Gunilla Herolf  Bengt Sundelius
SIPRI  SIIA  SNDC

Stockholm, January 2006
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>(Treaty on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence- and security-building measure</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capability Action Plan</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>EU Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>ICRU</td>
<td>Icelandic Crisis Response Unit</td>
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<td>IEPG</td>
<td>Independent European Programme Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>JSF</td>
<td>Joint Strike Fighter</td>
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<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NORDAC</td>
<td>Nordic armaments cooperation</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRM</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Swedish Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small arms and light weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNHP</td>
<td>Standard Nordic Helicopter Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEAG</td>
<td>Western European Armaments Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
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Introduction

The European defence challenge for the Nordic region

Alyson J. K. Bailes

I. The role of this introduction

The European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP), launched by the European Union (EU) in its historic decisions at Helsinki in December 1999, remains the subject of widely varying judgements, views and aspirations throughout Europe and, indeed, among many of Europe’s partners. Its initial ambition was modest: to provide an alternative means of carrying out a specific range of military crisis management tasks under the EU’s own command. Nonetheless, it has evoked fears, ranging from the risk that it could undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to that of an inevitable slide towards an integrated ‘European army’. Conversely, and although the EU member states have tried to goad each other into better defence performance with the help of ESDP targets, the continued shrinkage of most EU defence budgets exposes the seemingly unbridgeable gap between European ambition and performance. The question of the ESDP’s finalité—where the policy is actually supposed to be leading, ranging along interlinked spectrums from occasional military cooperation to complete guaranteed defence and from pure intergovernmentalism to collective European control of military assets—produces the most widely varying answers, and feelings, of all.

The ESDP is thus a challenge for all European states; but the story of how the five Nordic countries, singly and collectively, have participated in and adapted to it since its birth (and gestation period) is the particular subject of the chapters in parts I–IV of this volume. This introduction aims both to provide the starting point for appreciating the subsequent material and to anticipate an issue to which some of the closing contributions return. For the first purpose, it provides (in section II) a minimum of historical background on the Nordic countries’ defence and security roles since 1945 and (in section III) on their involvement in and attitudes to the creation of the ESDP in 1999–2000. The second substantive question it addresses (in section IV) is whether it is possible to see any common strands in the experiences of the five Nordic countries, and hence any


common or parallel features in the challenges they face and could face in future as the EU’s security and defence policies continue to evolve. The analysis in these sections is supplemented by tables I.1–I.4, which contain facts about the Nordic countries, their institutional relationships and their armed forces and defence industries.

Features of parallelism and convergence among the Nordic countries can, of course, be both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’. They include a shared concept of ‘the North’ or ‘Norden’ and shared values and interests that provide a valuable input to the process of European policy generation and execution. They also include possible shared ‘hang-ups’, relative weaknesses and problems of adjustment. The emphasis in much of the rest of this introduction is on probing the latter, but it is no part of the author’s wish to do less than justice to the former. The interesting question is whether the Nordic countries’ way of proceeding in real-life institutional settings—of which the ESDP is now among the most important—has been calculated to best effect for projecting and realizing such common values; exploiting common assets and skills; and thus ensuring that the

---

3 The term ‘Norden’—literally, ‘the North’ in Danish, Norwegian and Swedish (the equivalent Finnish and Icelandic terms being ‘Pohjoismaat’ and ‘Norðurland’, respectively)—is used as shorthand for the 5 countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (i.e., the members of the Nordic Council).
right Nordic ingredients are baked into the eventual European confection. The last section (section V) of this introduction ventures some remarks on whether the five Nordic countries are more or less likely to concert their efforts to such ends in the near future—a topic to be taken up again by some of the authors in part IV of this volume.

II. A historical sketch of the Nordic region, 1945–2000

The motto of the European Union is ‘unity in diversity’. For the five nations of Europe’s northern region—some of which have, of course, decided not to join the EU—there is no way to sum up so neatly the complex interplay between national particularity and regional identity. Since the late Middle Ages, no single power of the region has been able to enforce a strategic unity on the Nordic region and, although the option has been actively discussed, the local states have never come together voluntarily in anything resembling a collective defence community. Differences of geo-strategic outlook and historical experience among the Nordic nation states themselves have been one obstacle, if not necessarily the most critical, to any solution that would call for complete mutual trust and co-dependence.

Since World War II, the Nordic system has been made up of five independent states—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden—along with additional territories which come under the sovereignty of one or other of these states but enjoy a special status. Three Nordic countries—Denmark, Iceland and Norway—chose to become founder members of NATO, while Finland and Sweden spent the period of the cold war as neutral and non-allied states, providing exclusively for their own defence. Finland was also obliged to sign the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union.

On the face of it, these choices by the region’s democratic states created the plainest cleavage yet in their strategic alignment and defence concepts: but the

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4 The Norwegian people voted against joining the EU in 2 national referendums, in 1972 and 1994. Iceland has never applied for EU membership. Denmark, Finland and Sweden are members of the EU.
5 E.g., in the period immediately after World War II and before Denmark and Norway joined NATO in 1949, Sweden pondered a ‘Nordic defence union’.
6 Geopolitical distinctions can be made between the ‘west Nordic’ countries with a primarily Atlantic outlook and the ‘east Nordic’ countries on the shores of the Baltic Sea; between the countries with provinces lying north of the Arctic Circle and the mainland of Denmark; between Finland, as a geographical extension of the Russian–Siberian land mass, and the other countries, which have very short or no common frontiers with Russia.
7 Memories from World War II—Denmark’s and Norway’s experiences of occupation, Sweden’s neutrality, and Finland’s 2 phases of war against Russia—provide examples that are still influential in forming attitudes today.
8 These territories are the Faroe Islands and Greenland, under Danish sovereignty; Åland, under Finnish sovereignty; and Svalbard and Jan Mayen, under Norwegian sovereignty.
9 The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance formally expired in 1992 and was then replaced by a ‘friendship agreement’ which no longer referred to joint defence activity or to consultations on possible threats to security.
reality was much more complex than the formal divisions would suggest. The positions adopted by the five states were widely interpreted as being designed (consciously or unconsciously) to maintain an overall ‘Nordic balance’, in which Sweden’s remaining outside NATO helped to avoid Soviet actions that could have seriously compromised Finland’s independence. Moreover, contacts developed between Sweden and NATO through various back channels, and the armed forces of the four larger Nordic countries frequently met up in regions outside Europe where they made sterling contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Denmark and Norway played their own part in fine-tuning the regional ‘balance’ by stipulating that their NATO membership should not lead to any stationing of foreign forces or nuclear weapons on their territories in peacetime. Meanwhile, the actual national defence practices of Finland, Norway and Sweden did not diverge as much as might have been expected: all three countries continued to follow practices of universal conscription, with a significant role for reservists, and a basically territorial concept of deployment.

These elements of de facto parallelism in Nordic defence cultures were far more evident, and more openly admitted, in their national social, economic, cultural and educational arrangements. These common features later inspired the creation in 1952 of a five-nation parliamentary body, the Nordic Council, with the aim of promoting ‘Nordic cooperation’ at popular and regional as well as governmental levels. This non-legalistic, resource-efficient mode of cooperation flourished throughout the post-war period and did much to maintain—or even strengthen—the sense of a natural community among all Nordic citizens regardless of their strategic affiliations. The Nordic Council chose to avoid any discussion of defence and other external policies; given the delicacy

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13 Finland did not join the Nordic Council until 1956. The rules for the Nordic Council’s work are laid down in the 1962 Treaty of Cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Helsinki Treaty), the text of which is available at URL <http://www.norden.org/avtal/helsingfors/uk/3-2-2-hfors.asp>. The region’s economic and trade cooperation was conducted through the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), established in 1960 by the West European non-EU member states Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Finland became an associate member of EFTA in 1961 and a full member in 1986. Iceland became a member in 1970. See the website of the EFTA Secretariat at URL <http://secretariat.efta.int/>.
14 One of its strongest manifestations was the Nordic Passport Union, formalized in 1958 agreements between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (and joined by Iceland in 1965), which allowed citizens of each of the countries freedom of travel and residence in the others. Upphävande av passkontrollen vid de internordiska gränserna [Waiver of passport control at the intra-Nordic borders], 12 July 1958, URL <http://www.norden.org/avtal/pass/uk/>.
of Finland’s position, it did not have much choice. Without this restraint, Finland would not have been able to join the Nordic Council when it did, 4 years after the Council’s establishment. The first occasion when a Nordic Council member broke the taboo in open debate came only in 1974. Stålvant, C.-E., ‘The Council of Baltic Sea States’, ed. A. Cottey, Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe: Building Security, Prosperity and Solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1999), pp. 46–68, see especially fn. 12.

This method of ‘working around’ divisive or disturbing elements in order to seek common ground with neighbours in other fields has been seen by some Nordic analysts as part of a broader phenomenon of ‘de-securitization’ in cold war and post-cold war northern Europe. It applied not just between the Nordic countries themselves but also to relations with the Soviet Union, with which trade and some limited cross-border intercourse remained possible even in the cold war, and which was drawn into more explicit sub-regional cooperation frameworks with the Nordic countries after 1990. The strategic facts of life did not go away, but it was possible for governments, the publics and the media to avoid harping on them in their discourse, all the more so because it was not the Nordic countries’ own defence efforts that—in the last resort—were keeping the threat from the Soviet side at bay. Nordic countries were, moreover, free from the kind of internal challenges—such as terrorism and regional conflict—that obliged some other European countries to substantially ‘securitize’ their domestic policies, even when far removed from the East–West line of confrontation. The results in terms of keeping the whole Nordic region safe and calm, at acceptable levels of defence resource application, throughout the cold war and the instabilities of the first post-cold war decade are a matter of record. An outside observer might, however, question whether the concomitant ten-

15 Without this restraint, Finland would not have been able to join the Nordic Council when it did, 4 years after the Council’s establishment. The first occasion when a Nordic Council member broke the taboo in open debate came only in 1974. Stålvant, C.-E., ‘The Council of Baltic Sea States’, ed. A. Cottey, Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe: Building Security, Prosperity and Solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1999), pp. 46–68, see especially fn. 12.


17 The concept was first developed by Ole Wæver. E.g., Wæver, O., ‘Securitization and desecuritization’, ed. R. D. Lipschutz, On Security (Columbia University Press: New York, 1995), pp. 46–86. It should be stressed that for the Nordic countries themselves ‘desecuritization’ has no pejorative overtones. Refusal to be driven by what other actors might see as ‘realist’ and ‘objective’ security logic, or to make a choice of security ‘camps’ accordingly, has been presented by many Nordic thinkers as a normatively superior approach as well as having apparently brought the right results for the Nordic region in cold war times. Ørvik, N., ‘Defence against help: a strategy for small states?’, Survival, vol. 15, no. 5 (Sep./Oct. 1973), pp. 228–31.

18 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the Nordic countries had security fears connected as much with the new Russian regime’s weakness as its strength—e.g., the risk that hardship in north-western Russia world trigger mass migration to the West or that the security of nuclear assets would be compromised—the ‘de-securitization’ tradition helped Nordic policy makers frame a solution in terms of networks and programmes including Russia. The inter-governmental sub-regional groupings known as the Council of the Baltic Sea States (established in 1992) and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (established in 1993) proclaimed no specific security objectives but were designed indirectly to safeguard stability by promoting inter alia cooperative border management, the improvement of Russian neighbours’ living conditions, and joint Russia–West approaches to the handling of non-military challenges like pollution and maritime safety. ed. Cottey (note 15).

19 This was the function of NATO’s deterrent posture, and in particular the balance between US and Soviet naval and nuclear capacities in the far north.
### Table I.1. Basic facts about the Nordic countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Iceland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independence (if 20th century)</td>
<td>. .</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>. .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory (km²)</td>
<td>43 098ᵃ</td>
<td>338 145</td>
<td>102 819</td>
<td>306 253ᵇ</td>
<td>449 964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total gross domestic product, 2002 (US$ b.)</td>
<td>212.4</td>
<td>160.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>221.6</td>
<td>300.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Union and other European institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of European Union</td>
<td>Since 1973</td>
<td>Since 1995</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Since 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of European Monetary Union</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>. .</td>
<td>. .</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to Schengen Agreement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of European Economic Area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Formal opt-outs from <em>inter alia</em> EMU and the ESDP; the Faroe Islands and Greenland are outside the EU</td>
<td>Åland is outside EU’s tax union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Council of Europe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Council of the Baltic Sea States</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Barents Euro-Arctic Council</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

. . = not applicable; EMU = European Monetary Union; ESDP = European Security and Defence Policy.

ᵃ In addition, the Faroe Islands have an area of 1399 km² and Greenland has an area of 2 166 086 km².

ᵇ In addition, Svalbard has an area of 61 229 km² and Jan Mayen has an area of 377 km².

dency to separate strategic reality from discourse, and defence practice from the objectively prevailing defence need, has had something to do with the problems that Nordic policy establishments have experienced in trying to adapt to (or even acknowledge) the profoundly different defence demands of the 21st century.

**Policy choices 1990–2000: the appeal of ‘integration lite’**

In the honeymoon period after the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Soviet Union, it seemed as if all partial alliance groupings in Europe would dissolve and the strategic divisions of the Nordic region might also crumble again. In fact, NATO proved able not just to survive but to productively reinvent itself, both as an organ of military crisis management in the Balkans and elsewhere and as a promoter of wider ‘cooperative security’ practices in the new Europe through its North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), established in 1991.

Both NATO and the EU were soon besieged by the newly independent countries of Central Europe seeking membership, including the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since the Baltic states’ entry to NATO was opposed particularly fiercely by Russia, some observers (notably in the USA) speculated briefly on whether the Nordic countries might draw them instead into a regional defence grouping that would be clearly ‘Western’ in affiliation but distinct from NATO. It was soon clear, however, that the Nordic countries were as unwilling—and unqualified, given the asymmetry between their purely military capability and Russia’s—to provide defence guarantees for their small new neighbours as the Baltic states themselves were to accept this second choice.20 The conundrum was, inescapably, one for NATO to solve: and NATO bought time for the solution by offering a more active cooperation framework to the applicant states in the shape of the Partnership for Peace (PFP), established in 1994, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),21 which replaced the NACC in 1997. Membership of the PFP and the EAPC was opened up to other states in the European region, including Russia itself, to avoid any too early identification of those states which would eventually complete the steps to NATO membership.

The EU chose to handle the enlargement challenge somewhat differently, by granting formal applicant status (embodied in individual ‘Europe Agreements’) to countries on a case-by-case basis. The only permanent forum where the Central European countries could address military security issues in a specific-


ally European setting together with the integrated Western states was the Western European Union (WEU), which in the mid-1990s accepted 10 Central European countries (including the Baltics states) as ‘associate partners’, and allowed non-NATO EU members and non-EU NATO members to join in its work as ‘observers’ and ‘associate members’, respectively.22

In the Nordic region, too, the early 1990s were a time for countries to rethink their institutional choices and strategic affiliations. New room for manoeuvre was offered most obviously to Finland and Sweden, given the demise of the original rationale for a ‘Nordic balance’ and the questions that began to be raised—also in other parts of Europe—about the logic of ‘neutral’ status itself (‘neutral from what?’). Indeed, both these countries took independent decisions in the 1990s to change the official description of their defence policy from ‘neutral’ to ‘militarily non-aligned’ or ‘militarily non-allied’.23 Sweden applied for membership of the EU in 1991 and Finland in 1992, and both duly acceded in 1995. Finland’s motives clearly included an interest in the EU’s ability to provide a kind of ‘political’ or ‘existential’ security, including the high probability that other EU members would want to help Finland in the event of a direct Russian threat. For Sweden this argument was less explicit and somewhat less relevant, although Swedish Government did see potential in the EU to enhance the value of its own positive contributions to international security. In contrast to their Baltic neighbours, however, Finland and Sweden chose not to make parallel applications for membership of NATO. Instead, they joined the PFP, profiling themselves within it as givers rather than takers of aid and guidance, and seeking the added value (and credit) they could gain for their defence aid programmes for the Baltic states by wider coordination with partners.24 In practice, Finland and Sweden (like Austria) both made extensive use of the Partnership and Review Process within the PFP to get information and advice from NATO on adapting their own forces for maximum interoperability in NATO-led peace operations. They leveraged their observer status in the

22 The WEU associate partners are Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia (all from 1994) and Slovenia (from 1996). The observers are Austria (from 1995), Denmark (1992; the only NATO observer), Finland (1995), Ireland (1992) and Sweden (1995). The associate members are the Czech Republic (from 1999), Hungary (1999), Iceland (1992), Norway (1992), Poland (1999) and Turkey (1992).


WEU to seek certain improvements in the defence planning services on offer from NATO and the strengthening of their status when contributing voluntarily to NATO activities. In the event, they made substantial force contributions both to NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Kosovo Force (KFOR).

This Finnish–Swedish policy of maximizing access and participation without formal membership of NATO—and without the formal revolution in national policy that this would have demanded—was eventually to gain its mirror image on the part of the Nordic non-EU NATO members, Iceland and Norway. At first, with Norway’s application to join the EU in 1992, it seemed that it would provide a counter-model by opting for full double integration: but the Norwegian national referendum of 1994 produced a ‘no’ vote, and Norwegian leaders have since then made the best of a ‘not-quite-membership’ strategy. The main framework was provided by the European Economic Area (EEA), a structure for cooperation between the EU and the European Free Trade Area originally designed in 1992 but in which Iceland and Norway, with Liechtenstein, became the lone non-EU members after 1995. The EEA gave them the equivalent of full EU membership in everything pertaining to the Single Market and the associated ‘freedoms’, but did not require them to apply the EU’s structural policies internally or to adhere to its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) externally. Provision was made for ‘political dialogue’ in the EEA on foreign and security matters, and in practice Iceland and Norway often aligned themselves with CFSP statements and initiatives. Another landmark of what might be called the ‘integration lite’ strategy was the EU’s agreement that Iceland and Norway could join its Schengen programme for common frontier and immigration controls, thus allowing them to maintain the freedoms of the Nordic Passport Union even after Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into the EU.

NATO provided certain collective defence planning support to WEU under the provisions of NATO’s Berlin ministerial declaration of July 1996. NATO, ‘Final communiqué’, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996, URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/basics.htm>. The detailed NATO–WEU agreements negotiated in 1998–2000 ensured, at the insistence of Austria, Finland and Sweden, that the WEU observers would have equal access to all the related benefits and an equal part in WEU decision-making and command structures as and when the WEU carried out operations of its own using borrowed NATO assets. Finland and Sweden pursued their demands for better treatment in the command structures for NATO-led deployments and for the right to second their officers permanently to NATO headquarters, mainly in the context of NATO’s own debates with PFP partners on the ‘politico-military framework’ for their participation in NATO operations.

In 2003 Finland and Sweden provided 80 and 23 personnel, respectively, to SFOR and 800 and 723 personnel, respectively, to KFOR.

Agreement on the European Economic Area, EFTA Secretariat, Geneva, May 1992, URL <http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/LegalCorner/>. The EEA is managed by the secretariat of EFTA, of which Switzerland is also a member, having decided by referendum not to take part in the EEA. The current EEA agreement entered into force on 1 Jan. 2004.

Iceland and Norway were allowed to stay within (formally, to re-join) the Schengen Agreement after it was brought fully inside the EU’s single treaty structure from 1 May 1999, with the entry into force of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic facts about the military sectors of the Nordic countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces personnel, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve forces personnel, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription, number of conscripts and period of conscription, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of military personnel deployed in international peacekeeping missions, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure, 2004 (US$ m.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure as share of GDP, 2004 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated sales of military equipment, 2004 (US$ m.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of employees in defence industry, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of major conventional weapons, 2004 (SIPRI trend-indicator values, US$ m.)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> These figures are SIPRI relative trend-indicator values expressed in US$ m. at constant 1990 prices; see URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/arms trad/at_data.html>.

Denmark also offered an illustration of ‘integration lite’, but of a *sui generis* kind. When a national referendum went against acceptance of the EU’s 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, the Danish authorities negotiated with their partners specific national ‘opt-outs’ (confirmed at the Edinburgh European Council of 12 December 1992) from four of the more controversial dimensions of European integration: the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), European defence cooperation outside NATO, Union citizenship, and EU cooperation on justice and home affairs. The Danish people accepted the resulting compromise in a further referendum. The opt-out from what is now the ESDP has never been lifted, and it produces today a paradoxical situation in which Denmark is the least formally engaged in ESDP of all the Nordic countries despite being the only ‘doubly integrated’ one (in both NATO and the EU) and having defence doctrines and practices that are closer than those of other Nordic countries to what might be called the European ‘mainstream’. It is no secret that the Danish defence elite have found the consequences of this opt-out increasingly frustrating and have felt obliged to seek ways of working round it in specific cases to avoid an unacceptable degree of marginalization. The question of whether and in what context to hold a national referendum seeking repeal of the opt-outs remains a live one in Danish politics.

III. Nordic midwives at the birth of the European Security and Defence Policy

The EU’s decision, at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, to take a direct role for the first time in military crisis management and to establish its own military institutions and defence capability goals for the purpose—the policy package now defined as the ESDP—was not without antecedents. Steps had been taken towards it in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which envisaged the EU’s stimulating WEU operations to serve its own policy goals, and the 1997

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31 As well as opting out from the EU policies that would eventually develop into the ESDP, Denmark declined to become a full member of the WEU as it could have done (as a member of both the EU and NATO) and opted for observer status.


33 A notorious example was the occasion when the Danish member of the EU Military Committee gave what turned out to be the casting vote to choose a Finnish general as the first chairman of the committee, when he should strictly speaking not have voted at all. Larsen (note 29).

34 Council of the European Union (note 1).
Treaty of Amsterdam, which envisaged the EU’s taking full political responsibility for such operations and ‘availing itself’ of the WEU as a tool.\textsuperscript{35} Finland and Sweden took an active part in the policy formation that led to these results, throwing their weight decisively behind the choice of formulae that halted the EU’s defence ambitions far short of mutually guaranteed ‘real’ defence.\textsuperscript{36} Their view prevailed thanks to a superficially unlikely alliance with the United Kingdom, which (together with Italy and some smaller states) wanted to limit the EU’s defence competence in order to avoid competing with or undermining NATO.

During 1999, when the EU members sat down to design their own directly controlled defence operational capability—and in the process to steal all the active substance out of the WEU—the same coalition was reconstituted. From the UK’s viewpoint, the Finnish–Swedish position provided a guarantee against the EU’s sliding directly into a true ‘common defence’; for Finland and Sweden, the UK’s approach protected them from being forced into a ‘second-class citizen’ status by the importation of direct guarantees—which they could not have shared—into the EU’s treaty apparatus.\textsuperscript{37} Even so, the Nordic neo-neutrals and the UK found themselves on opposite sides, and had some difficulty in arriving at consensus, on issues like the creation of the EU Military Staff and Military Committee and the appointment of former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to preside over the new machinery.\textsuperscript{38} The Nordic countries’ concern here was to avoid ‘militarization’ of the EU’s philosophy, mechanisms and image: and they pursued the same cause to greater practical effect by proposing, successfully, that the ESDP should establish capability goals and planning and deployment options for non-military as well as military crisis management tools.\textsuperscript{39}

The period of pre-negotiation, adoption and realization of the ESDP was a testing time for Finnish and Swedish diplomacy, from which they emerged,
however, with a reasonable degree of comfort and even acclaim.\footnote{Finland held the EU Presidency at the time of adoption of the key decisions on ESDP in Dec. 1999 and was held, both at home and abroad, to have discharged its responsibilities well.} The experience was the opposite for Iceland and Norway. As supporters of modern-style crisis management, to which even Iceland was prepared to contribute with civilian personnel,\footnote{See chapter 20 in this volume.} they were not a priori opposed to what the EU was trying to do: but they did see difficulties in the fact that the EU was doing it. Most obviously, the move of the command role in prospective European operations out of the WEU and into the EU also moved them from the position of WEU associate members—with (in practice) equal decision-making rights—to that of complete outsiders from the EU circle—with no claim to rights beyond what the EU’s 15 members, including Finland and Sweden, might offer them. In a logical attempt to circumvent this problem, Iceland and Norway (and Denmark) helped to promote the production of NATO’s Washington Declaration of April 1999—which welcomed the prospective EU initiative and even offered it more NATO cooperation than the WEU had enjoyed—\textit{on the assumption that} the non-EU European members of NATO would have full and equal access to the resulting operations.\footnote{NATO, ‘The Washington Declaration’, North Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, 23–24 Apr. 1999, URL \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/basics.htm}. The NATO offer became known as the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangement because it improved on what was offered to the WEU at Berlin in 1996; see note 25.}

In the event, the EU did not adopt the NATO formulation, instead offering the non-EU states only a dialogue and consultative relationship, much of which they had to share with the Central European applicant states, plus equal participation in ‘micro’-decision making on operations to which they contributed troops. The non-EU NATO members would be systematically invited to join in EU operations that made use of NATO assets, but their access to ‘autonomous’ EU operations would be decided upon by the EU itself in each case.\footnote{These modalities were set out in detail in decisions made at the June 2001 Santa Maria da Feira European Council. Council of the European Union, ‘Presidency conclusions’, Santa Maria da Feira, 19 June 2001, URL \url{http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/fei1_en.htm}. See also chapter 20 in this volume.} Iceland and Norway protested to the last about the inadequacy of these arrangements but would, in the final resort, have been ready to live with them. It was Turkey that decided to retaliate more substantially by blocking, from the NATO end, the implementation of the NATO–EU cooperation offered by NATO in April 1999. The Turkish veto was prolonged from the inception of the ESDP in early 2001 to December 2002, and during that period Iceland and Norway had, in effect, to approach the EU direct through the EU’s own dialogue mechanisms if they wished to take any part in the first, possibly mould-setting, ESDP operations. (Details of the five Nordic countries’ contributions to EU-led operations since 2001 are given in table I.3.) At least, these strains did not lead to any lasting frictions among the Nordic countries themselves: Finland and Sweden settled into a position of trying to facilitate Icelandic and Norwegian access,
Table 1.3. European security institutional relationships of the Nordic countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European defence</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Iceland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status in the Western European Union</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>Associate member</td>
<td>Associate member</td>
<td>Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteered forces for the Dec. 1999 Helsinki European Council Headline Goal for crisis management operations (as of Nov. 2004)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to EU battle groups (as of Nov. 2004)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation in ESDP missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Iceland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), Jan. 2003–</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Military Operation in the FYROM (EUFOR Concordia), Mar.–Dec. 2003</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Operation Artemis), June–Sep. 2003</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Police Mission in the FYROM (EUPOL Proxima), Dec. 2003–</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST Themis), July 2004–</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), Dec. 2004–</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa), Apr. 2005–</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST Lex), July 2005–</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC DR Congo), July 2005–</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), Sep. 2005–</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ESDP = European Security and Defence Policy; FYROM = Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

IV. Future challenges: what are the common elements?

The issues that currently confront Nordic defence and security policy makers, in terms both of deciding what to do and of explaining it to their publics, are not solely or perhaps even primarily driven by developments in collective European policies. Any comprehensive analysis would need also to track the impact of US policies, which, especially for Iceland and the two non-NATO members, constitute a challenge for bilateral relations with the USA as well as for collective Europe–USA relations; of changes in Russian behaviour and attitude; of transnational and global issues requiring to be addressed in larger-than-European frameworks; and of challenges arising at the purely national or regional level. The questions raised in this section are deliberately focused on the dynamics of the Nordic–ESDP interaction and make no claim to provide a complete—or even, perhaps, a representative—picture. They are organized around three features of the ESDP that could be problematic for Nordic participants and partners, either per se or in their practical implications: (a) the very fact that it is an EU-based policy, (b) the notion of collective European security interests, and (c) the increasingly ‘integrative’ flavour of the demands that the ESDP is making on all its adherents in practice. A fuller analysis of the existing pattern and trend of Nordic countries’ responses to these issues, with more factual background, appears in parts I and II of this volume.

The EU as a defence framework

The most fundamental challenge presented by the ESDP for the Nordic countries lies perhaps in the fact that it is a policy of the European Union. This is self-evidently a problem for Iceland and Norway as non-members and for Denmark with its opt-outs; but Finland and Sweden are also, in terms of pan-European comparisons, nations with a relatively high level of Euro-scepticism where an EU ‘label’ on any given activity risks de-legitimizing as often as popularizing it. Against this background it is noteworthy that the idea of participation in EU-led operations has hitherto drawn high levels of support in

44 The most recent and strongest illustration of this was Sweden’s decision to invite Norway as well as Finland to join it in forming one of the EU’s new battle groups for rapid deployment, an arrangement approved at an EU ministerial meeting on capabilities on 22 Nov. 2004. See chapter 6 in this volume.


46 The judgement in this sentence applies more strongly to Sweden, where a Sep. 2003 referendum on adopting the euro failed, than to Finland.
Nordic opinion polls: but the percentage of supporters drops as soon as respondents are asked to consider an operation that is not formally mandated by the United Nations, implying that the traditional Nordic commitment to peacekeeping has much to do with this finding. As and when the military and operational aspects of the ESDP come to be more closely integrated and identified with ‘full-spectrum’ EU policies towards a given crisis or given region, it will be interesting to observe how this affects Nordic popular attitudes towards them.

One fact that the EU cannot, in any event, avoid is that it is not NATO. As argued above, all the Nordic countries have relied on NATO directly or indirectly for their survival since the 1950s. Open pro-NATO sentiment has been strongest in Iceland and Norway but even in Finland and Sweden there are many in the elite who regard NATO as the ‘serious business’ in defence and as the standard by which to measure their own forces’ professionalism. No more than the UK would Denmark, Finland or Sweden have tolerated the creation of the ESDP in a form that undermined or split NATO or in any way hastened its demise. Finland and Sweden have been among the keenest advocates of respecting and fully using the formulae for EU–NATO cooperation developed in 1999—and not only, as cynics might say, because this offers a convenient ‘back door’ view into NATO proceedings for themselves. Similarly, at the political level, all the Nordic countries tend to have something of a love–hate–love relationship with the USA which leaves them much preferring to live with a continued US strategic presence in Europe than to live without it—the more so as they do not in practice have to carry the main weight either of USA–Europe disputes or of striking USA–Europe bargains.

The trouble for ‘Atlanticists’ in the Nordic countries, as in Europe generally, is that the old NATO and the old USA–Europe relationship of the cold war years simply do not exist and cannot be recreated. The US Administration of President George W. Bush has gone far towards ‘instrumentalizing’ NATO by proclaiming that ‘The mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission’ and has driven a rapid transformation of NATO from a primarily static, territorial defence machine in Europe to a quarry for ad hoc force packages to be used in external peace missions, such as the current International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The Nordic countries have accepted the new missions and the need for thinning out territorial forces (see below), but they cannot be happy with the overall thinning out and de-prioritization of the strategic cover that NATO (and the USA) can offer for

47 On public attitudes see chapter 4 in this volume.
48 In the specific circumstances of 2003–2005, the appeal of operations conducted without the USA might also play a part.
49 Denmark, with its high-profile participation in the US-led coalition in Iraq since Mar. 2003, has become somewhat of an exception.
**Table I.4.** Non-EU security institutional relationships of the Nordic countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Iceland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of NATO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of PFP and EAPC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign forces stationed in country</td>
<td>No (peacetime)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes: US forces of the Iceland Defense Force(^a)</td>
<td>No (peacetime)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other security institutions and treaties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of OSCE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to CFE treaties(^b)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export control regimes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia Group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassenaar Arrangement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zangger Committee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) In addition to c. 1350 US personnel, military from Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway are stationed at the Naval Air Station Keflavík.

\(^b\) The CFE treaties are the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the 1992 CFE-1A Agreement and the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the 1990 CFE Treaty.

their soil. In all their elites, a debate is emerging over how far they can and should look to the EU instead for ‘existential’, and perhaps increasingly explicit, assurances of security. Accepting the Union as a potential substitute or _de facto_ successor to NATO is, however, doubly or triply hard for them: (a) because they have difficulty in admitting the real gravity of changes in NATO to start with, (b) because they either are not in the EU or do not want the EU to become a guaranteed defence community, and (c) because their predilection for military protection of territorial security defines safety in a currency which the EU—however far it evolves—is most unlikely ever to be able to supply.

A third facet of Nordic policy makers’ concerns about the evolution of the EU’s security policy is their strong view that it should not become ‘militarized’ and that it should not develop policies, notably in the field of internal affairs, that oblige its member states to ‘securitize’ their political systems and societies excessively. Finland and Sweden, in particular, have campaigned for the EU to stay faithful to ideals, which the other Nordic countries share, of transparency, legality, legitimacy in the broader sense and the pursuit of ‘peaceful’ consensual solutions wherever possible. Finland and Sweden have been prominent among those insisting that EU policies on terrorism, at home and abroad, should be framed in ways that respect fundamental civil liberties and human rights; that EU policy should in general minimize the resort to force in face of the so-called ‘new threats’; and that more should be done to tackle the causes of those threats through _inter alia_ enlightened conflict prevention and sustainable development policies. For the EU to take a tougher and more coercive path would in the Nordic view be not just wrong in principle but also counter-productive, since the Union would risk throwing away the ‘clean’ image it has generally managed to preserve so far and losing its relative acceptability to partners in other continents. It would also become more likely, in practical terms, to be dominated and principally represented by the large European military powers. The Nordic countries have, consequently, been extremely wary of any hint that the multifunctional coordination of European instruments, either on the ground in specific operations or more generally in pursuit of the

51 Iceland’s case, faced with the withdrawal of the US garrison at Keflavik that has provided the nation’s only defence cover, is particularly acute; see chapter 20 in this volume. For a Norwegian reading of the same general challenge see Værnø, G., ‘NATO i endring: konsekvenser for Norge’ [NATO in a process of change: consequences for Norway], Studieutvalgets skrifterserie no. 2/2004, Alumni Association of the Norwegian Defence College, Oslo, 2004. These Nordic anxieties are shared most notably by several of the new members of NATO in Central Europe.

52 The concerns described in this paragraph are far from being unique to the Nordic region, but the pejorative use of the expressions ‘militarization’ and ‘securitization’ is not generally part of _official discourse_ (as distinct from citizens’ and parliamentary concerns) in most other member states. There is widespread opposition in, for instance, the UK to the emergence of a ‘European army’ under _centralized non-national_ control, but that is an essentially different point. See also chapters 12 and 18 in this volume and, for an independent discussion of the relevant options in EU policy, Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, ‘A human security doctrine for Europe’, Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, London School of Economics and Political Science, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London, 15 Sep. 2004, URL <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf>.
2003 European Security Strategy,\(^{53}\) might mean *subordinating* the Union’s non-military policies to a military–strategic rationale. They dislike the idea that future enlargement decisions could be influenced *inter alia* by security considerations, or that the EU should begin to exercise a kind of ‘neo-imperial’ strategic role in its neighbourhood regions. The dilemma facing the Nordic countries, and the many other European states that hold such views, is that history may already be driving the EU in these directions and that—especially if the current tendency of US policy remains unchanged—some such ‘toughening’ of the EU’s strategic identity may be the condition for its surviving as a united community at all. Nordic capitals would then have to judge very carefully where to draw the line between maintaining a moderating influence and attempting a last-ditch defence against the inevitable—with an accentuated risk of marginalization for themselves.

**Defending European interests**

In modern times, Nordic public opinion has accorded legitimacy to defence activities that were either clearly *national* in context and content or were carried out unselfishly for the benefit of the *global* community—notably in the form of peacekeeping missions. Popular support has been high, unusually so by European standards, for a strong defence, and sacrifices have not been stinted: these are not nations with any serious ‘body bags’ complex. This Nordic defence-mindedness has, however, so far been closely linked with ideals of independence and free choice—most strongly voiced in the view of many Finns that ‘we can only rely on ourselves’, but also reflected in the distaste that the Finnish and Norwegian publics have for the idea that their soldiers should fight someone else’s wars under someone else’s command. These attitudes are easily understood in the light of history, including three Nordic countries’ relatively recent attainment of formal modern statehood. They must, nonetheless, give rise to questions about how much room there is in Nordic perceptions—not just in the elite, but at the popular level—for a concept of *collective* European interests (i.e., intermediate between the nation and the world); to what extent Nordic societies would recognize such interests as a sufficient and legitimate basis for military action; and how much sense of security community and mutual responsibility they feel with Europeans of other sub-regions, other cultures and other beliefs.

To query these points may seem somewhat counter-intuitive at present because the Nordic states have been more than ready, since 1990, to volunteer for just about every operation set up in a European institutional context. Notably, Sweden provided the commander in July 2003 for the EU Military

Operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Operation Artemis, which had a preponderance of French troops and a distinctly neo-colonial context. So far, however, missions of this sort have offered a path of relatively little resistance for Nordic governments, which have previously sent their forces to many of the same places wearing UN blue helmets and which are able—in domestic political terms—to take and finance such operational decisions with little parliamentary intervention and minimal public debate. It is thus hard to know how far Nordic tolerance would stretch if an EU mission encountered significant bloodshed, where casualties caused might be even harder to swallow than casualties taken; or how strong Nordic opposition might be if and when a majority of other EU members proposed an operation with a less than perfect legal, and less than altruistic moral, base. The fact that Nordic countries were ready to contribute troops to NATO’s KFOR, which did not have a classic UN mandate, does not necessarily settle the argument. There could be a significant difference between Nordic countries’ providing operational add-ons to a NATO-led operation—from which they could opt out at any time, and which was still essentially ‘altruistic’ in the sense that EU or NATO territories were not under threat—and taking the full and equal political ownership of a mission that would devolve upon them in the case of an EU-led deployment.

The same scenarios would be testing for other EU members, too, especially those that saw reasons of principle not to support the recent non-mandated military ‘coalitions’ for the initial military action in Afghanistan in 2002 and in Iraq in 2003. A question more specific to the Nordic region is, however, how the region’s governments and publics would feel about endorsing and contributing to an ESDP operation that was designed to meet a threat exclusively confronting the southern members of the EU and arising out of their intrinsically different strategic environment: for example, a major flood of ‘boat people’ or a threat to navigation in the Aegean or Black seas. The three Nordic EU members did not demur, in March 2004, about adopting the ‘solidarity’ commitment calling for mutual aid to be furnished between EU members, in military form if necessary, in the event of a terrorist attack. Given their own relatively low level of exposure and sensitivity to terrorist violence and their strong normative view that force is not the answer to it, how ready would they be to make good their pledge in the event of attacks on other EU countries (such as France, Italy or the UK) where their public opinion would not necessarily see the native governments in the light of ‘victims’? How far will Nordic governments be prepared to go—and how far will their parliaments let them go—in developing

54 A common Nordic device is for parliament’s formal assent to be sought to a ‘ceiling’ on the total number of forces deployed on overseas missions, after which decisions on individual deployment are made in more executive fashion, on the understanding that any conscripts engaged will be volunteers. Finland and Sweden have both recently raised their ceilings: the Swedish Green Party decided to vote for the latest increase after stating its understanding that this did not mean ‘militarization’ of the EU nor the loss of Sweden’s militarily non-allied status. Böe, S., ‘Norge med i nordisk EU-styrka’ [Norway to join in EU force], Dagens Nyheter, 23 Nov. 2004, p. 11.

pan-European cooperation in preventive measures and contingency planning for emergencies? What stumbling blocks might be thrown up by the reluctance felt in some Nordic quarters, notably in Sweden, about using either their own or anyone else’s military forces to deal with challenges to internal order and civil security?  

The integrative virus

NATO’s inter-governmental character, and its tolerance of wide variation in members’ defence practices and contributions, left plenty of room for Nordic singularities. When work on the ESDP began within the EU, it was also placed well outside the traditional EU treaty structure and the grasp of the European Commission. Decision making proceeded in intergovernmental committees without majority voting; the initial Headline Goal for European capabilities was defined in 1999 in a non-legislative fashion that made national contributions essentially optional; and there was no immediate provision for collective financing. Even in the space of a few years, however, it has become clear that this domain of EU work cannot be shielded indefinitely—any more than any other—from the harmonizing, collectivizing and integrative tendencies inherent in Union governance. To the extent that the Nordic countries have been further removed than other European states from genuinely collective defence practices up to now, they are likely to face particular strains as and when the ESDP increases the pressure for: (a) harmonizing military doctrines so that collective overseas operations become their prime rationale, rather than a secondary option for the use of essentially territorial forces; (b) phasing out con-

56 Again, Denmark is somewhat of an exception in having merged its defence headquarters with its civil emergency authority and in imposing no clear dividing line between internal and external security tasks. In other Nordic countries there is a clear trend to more open and innovative debate on the limits of military involvement, and non-ESDP-related events such as the tsunami of Dec. 2004 and destructive storms of early 2005 in Skåne have been particularly influential in Sweden’s re-think. For more on these issues see chapters 15 and 16 in this volume.

57 As defined in the Helsinki decisions (note 1), the goal was to have 60 000 EU personnel available for deployment within 60 days. It was left to each country to decide what it could and would offer towards the total, and whether to help in providing certain key supporting equipment and facilities.

58 It was only in 2002 that the EU reached agreement on collectively financing certain additional and joint costs of a given operation. The major costs of personnel, their pay and equipment will continue to ‘lie where they fall’ with the providing nations.

59 The Swedish Government’s 2004 defence policy defines the aim of national defence as ‘to preserve the country’s peace and independence by: helping to manage and prevent crises in the world around us, asserting our territorial integrity, defending Sweden against armed attack, protecting the civilian population and safeguarding the most important societal functions in the event of war’. Government Offices of Sweden, ‘Our future defence: the focus of Swedish defence policy 2005–2007’, Swedish Ministry of Defence, Stockholm, Oct. 2004, URL <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/574/a/32119/>, p. 10; see also chapter 7 in this volume. Here an important shift has taken place towards a primarily outward-looking mission, and the same policy statement duly prescribes a greater concentration of effort on forces deployable externally. In Norway, however, the armed forces’ objectives are still defined in the following order: ‘to prevent war and the emergence of threats to our national and collective security’; ‘to contribute to peace, stability and to further develop international rule of law’; ‘to uphold Norwegian sovereignty’; ‘to act in concert with our allies to defend Norway and NATO against assault’; and ‘to safeguard Norwegian society against any form of assault’. Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Norwegian Defence 2005’, Feb.
scription—or at least calling up personnel on such a limited and selective basis, and simultaneously cutting back the manning of territorial units so far, that the social, economic and regional impact becomes indistinguishable from that of a professional force;\(^{60}\) (c) accepting a degree of functional specialization and, hence, of mutual co-dependence with Nordic neighbours or other European partners; (d) abandoning traditions of autarky and national preference in equipment procurement policy, and accepting the need to integrate Nordic defence producers’ niche capacities into broader European defence-industrial coalitions, with the consequence that they will rarely if ever find themselves in a leading role.\(^{61}\) This set of issues is explored further in the contributions to part II of this volume.

The three Nordic EU members—and Norway, which faces somewhat similar pressures as a result of new policies and capability targets in NATO—have made a whole series of adjustments to their national defence plans in an attempt to cope with these challenges, at different paces and with greater or lesser degrees of practical success.\(^{62}\) Up to now, they have managed to do so without having to abandon any of the formal elements of national particularism in their policies. The elastic of Finland’s and Sweden’s non-allied status may have been stretched very far by their acceptance of the anti-terrorist ‘solidarity’ commitment and of similar language implying mutual military commitments in the EU’s Constitutional Treaty,\(^{63}\) but the elastic has not yet broken.


60 The pressure to phase out or cut back conscription, in the Nordic context, does not arise primarily from the (high) quality of the volunteer forces deployed in peace missions, but rather from the economic strain a small country faces in trying to properly train and arm such forces while continuing to retrain large numbers of purely territorial troops (and maintain the stocks of equipment seen as necessary for self-defence) every year. It is also not easy, if using conscripts, to meet the stringent requirements regarding the readiness of troops to deploy overseas within days now imposed by the EU and NATO.

61 Sweden has already gone very far in this direction, as 1 of 6 European countries that are party to the Letter of Intent (LOI) on defence industrial cooperation signed in July 1998: the other 5 are France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. One result was the Framework Agreement signed by the same countries in July 2000 easing licence requirements for trade in military goods and services between them. Framework Agreement between the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry, 27 July 2000, URL <http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=391>. In 2004 Sweden worked hard to get one of its nationals appointed to the European Defence Agency created by an EU decision of Nov. 2003 and designed to pursue similar goals for the EU as a whole. Given that Swedish industry also engages in some highly classified collaboration projects with the USA, it may be argued that Sweden’s problem in this sphere is not one of accepting integration but, rather, of the gap in normative logic between its defence industrial behaviour and its defence policy principles.


63 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 19 Oct. 2004 but has not been ratified. The text of the treaty is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/index_en/>.
The question is whether the dynamics of the ESDP’s further evolution may lead to a point where not only are the Nordic EU members’ values assaulted and their contributions put in question (as might happen for the more practical and contingent reasons discussed above) but the incompatibility between their declared national defence policies and their European obligations becomes patent. The most obvious way this could happen would be for the EU to start operating in earnest in the mode of ‘common defence’, with real mutual guarantees and real joint organizational and operational structures to embody them, applicable across the whole range of members’ defence work and not just to ad hoc operations. At present, there are several EU members besides the three Nordic countries that have set their faces against this, including one of Europe’s de facto military leaders—the UK. The blow delivered to European leaders’ confidence by two popular ‘No’ votes in referendums on the Constitutional Treaty will also militate, at least for a while, against the kind of new ‘grand gesture’ that a united Euro-defence would entail. Given the accelerating pace and gathering momentum of ESDP development thus far, however, it would be imprudent to rule out this contingency forever—or, indeed, others so far unimagined that would shatter the already frail construct of Nordic limited liability. Not only the EU’s own plans, but also the further evolution of NATO, the behaviour of the USA, the actions of Europe’s enemies and the very forces of nature could all contribute to driving a further European fuite en avant.

A ‘real’ EU defence would not only be a challenge of critical proportions for Finland, Sweden and (as things currently stand) Denmark. It would also make it harder than ever for Iceland and Norway to justify staying outside the Union. It would be a historic revolution in Nordic–Russian relations, in that (a) all the Nordic states for the first time in history would be part of a single defence community with the states of mainland Europe and (b) they would share guarantees with the Baltic states within it; but (c) it would be (at least in all probability) a defence entity defining itself not in opposition to, or in distinction from, but in partnership with Russia. It would eliminate for good any element of choice over whether the Nordic countries helped the south, east and south-east European states to cope with their very different defence problems—and vice versa. It would almost certainly require more money to be set aside in Nordic budgets for security purposes overall, if not necessarily for military defence as such.64 Perhaps most sensitive of all for the Nordic region, although

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64 Norwegian and Swedish defence spending as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP)—1.9% and 1.7%, respectively, in 2004—is close to the average for European NATO members of 2.0%. Denmark spent 1.5% and Finland 1.2% of GDP in 2004, closer to the non-NATO European average (excluding
little discussed precisely because of its sensitivity, an EU with guarantees would have to face the question of whether such guarantees had any credibility at all without the dedication to Europe of—and hence, some assumption of shared European responsibility for—the nuclear forces of France and the UK.

Eighteen other European states that already belong both to NATO and the EU live under precisely the set of strategic, political and doctrinal conditions outlined above, although most of them decline to recognize the budgetary imperative.\textsuperscript{65} Several others are only too eager to join them.\textsuperscript{66} The naturalness for Nordic countries themselves of the ‘integration lite’ policy, and the skill with which they have developed it on a day-to-day basis, often makes it hard to grasp just how singular a choice it represents by broader European standards. The question still calling for a more probing analysis is whether the objective security conditions in northern Europe are still singular enough today to make such a choice rational, and to render it sustainable.\textsuperscript{67}

V. Concluding remarks: divided we stand, united we change?

Shared challenges do not always translate into common policies. The general picture that emerges from this volume is of five Nordic governments whose defence operational choices, and approaches to defence policy conceptualization and reorganization, are converging across institutional dividing lines; and who share some structures for explicit military coordination (not just the new Swedish-led battle group but also NORDCAPS\textsuperscript{68}) that would have been unimaginable in pre-1990 conditions. The creation of the ESDP can confidently be identified as one of the ‘environmental’ changes that have helped to make this possible. However, in defence industrial policy, the management of internal security, and other branches of security policy such as arms control and crisis mediation the same five states are arguably no more convergent—or even less so—than any other group of neighbouring medium-size democratic nations.

Russia) of 1.2%. In comparison, Switzerland spent 1.0% and Ireland 0.6% of GDP. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Dec. 2005.

\textsuperscript{65} There are actually 19 states with double membership but Denmark has not been counted in this particular context because of its ESDP opt-out.

\textsuperscript{66} The reference is to the countries (the Western Balkan states, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Georgia, etc.) that are currently pressing for membership of both institutions.

\textsuperscript{67} This discussion has been framed in terms of the consequences of a ‘guaranteed’ ESDP because the ESDP is the subject of this volume, but much of the same analysis would—of course—apply to Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO.

\textsuperscript{68} NORDCAPS, the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support, was established in 1997 with the aim of strengthening existing cooperation in the Nordic Cooperation Group for Military UN Matters (NORDSAMFN) in military peace support operations and expanding it to cover operations mandated or lead by others than the UN. More information is available at URL <http://www.nordcaps.org/>.

See also Knutsen, B. O., ‘The Nordic dimensions in the evolving European security architecture and the role of Norway’, Western European Union Institute of Security Studies Occasional Papers no. 22, Paris, Nov. 2000, URL <http://www.iss-eu.org/public/content/occas.html>. Finland, Norway, Sweden and the UK signed a memorandum at Ålesund, Norway, on 23 Apr. 2002 on a structure for a model joint Nordic brigade, which was to exercise for the first time in Finland in 2003. Denmark declined to be involved in this step and is also absent from the latest battle group agreement.
within the European system.\textsuperscript{69} The consequence is a new paradox: the Nordic countries have drawn closer in the military sphere where their formal differences of alignment are greatest, but not on those ‘softer’ policy topics where shared Nordic values might have been expected to come into play.\textsuperscript{70} Such contradictions are probably only explainable by the abiding legacy of the national tradition within Nordic policies discussed in this introduction, added to more than 50 years of ‘de-securitization’ of both external and internal policy discourse.

The suspicion remains that most Nordic governments have yet to address frankly, either with each other or with their own parliaments and publics, the full scale of the challenges confronting them and the exigencies of policy adaptation. Before any decisive change could become feasible, each nation would need to look again at the choice between autonomy and integration, particularism and European solidarity, and look for some way of getting through this ‘pain barrier’ that keeps its national unity and self-belief reasonably intact.\textsuperscript{71} Perhaps only on the far side of these barriers, and only on condition that each nation jumps in the same direction, could anything like a true Nordic security community for the 21st century emerge: not this time as a group apart, but in the embrace of a European family that both lets the Nordic countries act more strongly together when they want to and gives them their best ever choice of alternatives when they do not.

\textsuperscript{69} See chapters 9, 13, 15, 16 and 17 in this volume.

\textsuperscript{70} This is somewhat overstated since the Nordic countries have made reasonable progress on some non-military security topics in sub-regional forums where they work with Russia and other states of the Baltic region (note 18 above). For more on the application of Nordic values see chapters 12 and 18 in this volume.

\textsuperscript{71} This is not to say that mutual influences are absent. It is widely held that neither Finland nor Sweden could move to join NATO without a powerful ‘drag’ effect on the other, and likewise for Iceland and Norway vis-à-vis the EU. If either Finland or Sweden had declared certain recent EU developments (e.g., the new ‘solidarity’ clauses or participation in battle groups) to be incompatible with non-allied status, the other would at the least have been gravely embarrassed.
Part I
Institutional and national politics
Editor’s remarks

Gunilla Herolf

Part I of this book sheds some light on the different institutional and national policies of four Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (Iceland is considered in part IV). It focuses on their relations with the European Union and with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in terms of institutional affiliation; and on their policies towards world events and the development of these two institutions, primarily the EU. The authors of the chapters in this part explain the policies of the four larger Nordic countries in terms of certain characteristics inherent in these countries, but also as a result of external events that affect them and all European states. Two chapters explore the domestic political scene as a source for explanations of particular ‘Nordic’ policies, as well as for those of individual Nordic countries.

Since the 1990s, the EU has gone through an amazing process of change. This has perhaps been most evident in the field of security, an area that many would have thought the least likely to be at the forefront of development. The increasing build-up of military capabilities and the start-up of joint agencies and operations, new global ambitions, agreements on how to meet threats within a wider spectrum of civil–military management and, not least, the European Security Strategy of 2003 are only some of the achievements of the EU. At the same time, one of the most serious conundrums regarding transatlantic cooperation has been solved through the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements of December 2003.

The discussions in the European Convention in 2002–2003 and in the Intergovernmental Conference of 2003–2004 that led to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe also demonstrated a growth of reciprocal commitment within the EU. The new ‘solidarity clause’ in the Constitutional Treaty, relating primarily to terrorist attacks, and the clause on mutual support in the event that a member state is attacked were among the signs of this.

At the same time, there have been indications and developments that call into question the future smooth development of security-related commitments under the leadership of European institutions. One source of concern is the collapse of the ratification process for the Constitutional Treaty during 2005. Obviously, large sections of the European population find themselves uneasy with the direction or speed of European development. The rift between the grassroots and the elite needs to be healed if the European project is to pick up speed again. Regardless of whether various clauses of the Constitutional Treaty may be salvaged through agreements among governments in a ‘cherry-picking’ process, the European project is in danger without solid popular support.

Another problematic sign is the fact that European institutions as such have lost influence in comparison with individual states. This is not surprising: as institutions grow larger, it becomes increasingly inconvenient to pursue key discussions when all member states are present. Limiting important deliberations to a smaller group of large member states is not a new phenomenon but has become more common, not least within NATO. Unilateralism by the USA is heavily criticized by other NATO members, but it represents only the end of an expanding spectrum of flexibility in the geometry of cooperation among member states.
Where do the Nordic countries come into this process of evolving European patterns and policies? Seemingly, very little has changed. Long after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Finland and Sweden are still not members of NATO; Norway is outside the EU; and Denmark retains its opt-outs from certain EU policies, including common defence activity. Thus, in one or more ways, all these nations stand outside core cooperation in Europe. Other unsatisfied expectations concern the Nordic countries themselves. The Nordic region is not only easy to delimit but is also characterized by similarity and a sense of closeness among them. Yet the natural expectation that their policies will be pursued jointly or in coordination, within or outside institutions, has never been fulfilled.

This part of the book goes beyond these easily established patterns to examine what, if any, development has taken place and what might distinguish the Nordic countries from each other in their attitudes and their policies. The present remarks, which briefly summarize the chapters of this part, also speculate on what might be the future for Nordic policy.

Nordic reactions: institutional relations and new policies

Klaus Carsten Pedersen, in his chapter on Denmark and the European Security and Defence Policy, addresses the particularly intriguing issue of Danish policies vis-à-vis the EU, in order to explain what caused and has maintained the Danish security opt-out.

The four Danish opt-outs are said to have originated as emergency tools to permit Denmark to accept the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which was in doubt as a consequence of the Social Democratic Party’s policy during the 1980s. Today, Carsten Pedersen claims, neither the Danish Government nor the general public support retention of the security opt-out. In spite of this, it is hard to relieve Denmark of these restrictions: in the referendum that is required before the opt-outs can be abandoned, the security opt-out may have to be bundled together with other, less unpopular, opt-outs and the majority for abandoning them might therefore not be secured.

The result, as Carsten Pedersen sees it, of the continued existence of the opt-outs may have been a policy of compensation in which Denmark has become more assertive in security and defence matters and prone to include ‘hard’ power methods. However, since this takes place only within NATO, there is still a barrier to real Danish influence in the EU. The Danish policy of close alignment with US policy, which may be a means to compensate for this lack of influence, is seen as unlikely to have given Denmark any influence on policies.

Carsten Pedersen sees an increased degree of Nordic cooperation as a possibility for the future. In order for Nordic cooperation to pick up a real momentum, however, nothing less than full membership of both NATO and the EU by all the countries, with no opt-outs, is necessary. For the first time, he claims, this is a real possibility, with no external factors working against it.

Teija Tiilikainen writes in her chapter of the widened range of Nordic cooperation as one important consequence of the post-cold war era. Her crucial point, however, is the effect that the development of the EU has had in not only dividing the five Nordic countries into EU insiders and outsiders, but also dividing the three insiders—Denmark, Finland and Sweden—on the basis of their general EU policy. The particular issue that she cites is the division of labour envisaged between the EU and NATO, on
which the various countries hold views that both reflect and affect their mainly European or mainly Atlanticist orientation.

Tiilikainen mentions a number of factors that influence the Nordic countries’ initial choices of institutional affiliation and policies. These include historical identities; a state-centric political culture emanating from a Lutheran background; and policies characteristic of small nations. While still to a degree depending on such root causes (some of which are similar across the Nordic region), the development of the past few years has affected the Nordic countries in different ways, with Denmark and Finland representing the two extremes and Norway, paradoxically, seeming to be less critical of the EU’s security policy than Denmark. These two contrasts are illustrated by the attitude to integration displayed by the Danish opt-outs from EU integration on the one hand and, on the other, the Finnish attitude that it is necessary to be represented in all forums, which led Finland to see the introduction of the euro as a primarily political issue.

The factors that originally led Nordic countries to stay outside or join organizations are still there. For Norway, for example—as argued by Tiilikainen—the arguments against the EU have been related more to economic than to security factors; this explains how security considerations have been able to steer Norway’s active approach to the ESDP. Tiilikainen also makes a distinction between Sweden, whose experiences of neutrality and non-alignment have been positive, and Finland, with the opposite experience during the 20th century. Finland’s reasons for joining the EU were thus primarily security-related, whereas Sweden’s were heavily motivated by economic factors. A more sceptical attitude to integration in general also means that Swedish policy is not as overtly European in expression as is Finnish policy. This was seen, Tiilikainen notes, also in the discussions in the European Convention and in the Intergovernmental Conference, notably in the relative ease with which Finland was able to adjust to the changes implicit in the new provisions. She foresees, however, that the Finnish emphasis on territorial defence may be a hurdle to further integration in this field while for Sweden it is the value placed on national solutions that would be the major problem.

An important distinction made by Tiilikainen is between institutional issues and military capabilities, the latter giving individual countries the possibility to engage in various activities that help compensate for their lack of institutional membership. The fact of adherence or non-adherence to organizations still means a lot, however. The deactivation of the Western European Union deprived Norway of an important link between the EU and NATO. Also, as seen by Tiilikainen, the Danish attitude towards integration made NATO Denmark’s preferred organization and the weakening of NATO as a European security actor in relation to the EU has therefore especially affected Denmark.

Generally, NATO has been an important organization for all the Nordic countries. Even the non-members Finland and Sweden, in their initial reactions to the 1998 Franco-British St Malo Declaration, which sowed the seeds of the ESDP, emphasized the need to maintain NATO’s role and status by avoiding duplication by the EU of the military means already provided by NATO. Tiilikainen, however, emphasizes the development towards Europeanization that has since taken place for these two countries—and more so for Finland than for Sweden, she argues.

In the chapter commenting on Tiilikainen’s analysis, the present author has taken as starting points the strength of the impact of external factors and external events on
Europe, and its importance in particular for the Nordic countries. Given the small size of these countries, their policies have largely constituted reactions to events and to the policies of larger states. Partly because of this, the present author sees the individual differences among them as being smaller than Tiilikainen does. Geography—their location in a strategically important area—is one of the explanations for Denmark’s and Norway’s institutional choices but has been a vital factor behind the Atlanticism of Finland and Sweden as well.

A number of other factors, apart from those related to countries’ general European leanings, may be cited to explain the increased Europeanization that has taken place in Nordic policies. One is the vast range of suitable means available to the EU but not to NATO for securing stability in Europe—against Europe’s own sources of instability as well as global threats, such as those related to the events of 11 September 2001. US unilateralism and the tendency to let ‘the mission determine the coalition’ (see the introduction to this volume) has been seen as a wake-up call for all European countries but is especially damaging for small countries that are unlikely to form part of such favoured groups.

Other sources of the policies pursued by the different countries also show a pattern of greater complexity. The useful distinction that Tiilikainen makes between institutions and capabilities (including activities), when applied to the Nordic countries, gives a differentiated picture of the countries and their attitudes. Using this distinction, Finnish policies are seen to be in some ways less inhibited in EU matters, whereas in other respects Finland has reservations that are not shared by Sweden.

Domestic processes

Domestic factors are commonly seen to be important for the formation of Nordic foreign and security policies, and Lee Miles analyses this particular relationship. A number of features characterize all the three countries he looks at—the Nordic EU members Denmark, Finland and Sweden—and contribute to shaping their policies. One of these is the high degree of internationalization of their external agendas, with the United Nations holding a legitimizing role. Another is the importance that the concept of ‘Norden’ (i.e., ‘the North’) retains for them and their view of the effects on this region of the strategic changes that have taken place. A further common point is their belief that territorial defence considerations should be complemented by those of ‘soft’ security. A fourth is their resistance to a trend of development towards a federal Europe. Finally, the three countries are all characterized by a division between elites and the grassroots, with the latter being stronger believers in the countries’ respective traditional policies of non-alignment or Atlanticism.

Miles finds that the ‘fusion’ theory of Wolfgang Wessels is helpful in explaining how the national political elites of, on the one hand, the NATO member Denmark and, on the other hand, the non-aligned Finland and Sweden view and value the merits of participation in the ESDP.

National policy makers, according to Miles, see integration in three different but complementary forms. The first, performance fusion, reflects the view that integration is motivated by the incremental effectiveness it gives the nation state in achieving its goals. The model of performance fusion can be applied to Finland and Sweden, according to Miles, given that during the 1990s the two adopted a less doctrinal and more performance-related way of evaluating their institutional affiliation. It applies to Den-
mark as well since its domestic perspective also has a performance-related element, albeit more difficult to put into practice because of the Danish opt-outs.

The second model is political fusion, according to which domestic actors view integration as a third way between intergovernmentalism, with its lack of efficiency caused by the need for unanimity, and full federalism. In contrast to federalism, integration is seen to have an open *finalité politique* and is not so much constitution-oriented. The idea of political fusion applies to Finland and Sweden to the extent that these two countries see the need for multinational frameworks in crisis management. Both, however, remain cautious about a development that might lead to common defence structures or to intensified cooperation among the larger EU states without transparency or permission for all to join. In the same way, writes Miles, a new supranational EU is what most Danish political actors want when they seek to abolish the opt-outs. However, the Atlanticism of the Danish public serves as an impediment to such a change of policy.

The third and last form of integration is compound fusion, according to which the Union is seen as a state-like system, working alongside states rather than replacing them and with no strict division between the two. This third vision fits the views of the two non-aligned countries, in that they believe crisis management is best handled by institutions which have a none-too-clear division of competences between them and with room to introduce new elements such as ‘societal defence’. The Nordic tradition tends towards engagement in these processes, when possible, whereas previous reliance on the (essentially intergovernmental) Atlantic framework has waned somewhat as a consequence of US unilateralism. For the Danish elite as well as the Danish public—both interested in a strong role for civilian crisis management—compound fusion is also an attractive solution. However, the Danish opt-outs again create a problem and Danish efforts have therefore primarily been undertaken in NATO.

Miles concludes that Nordic domestic actors have a shared preference for seeking an effective framework for European security and crisis management, based on selective supranationalism. This suggests a compound status for the ESDP, which is in fact very much what exists today—a mixture of national and EU personnel, EU and non-EU roles, and EU–NATO processes.

Cynthia Kite, in her commentary on Miles’ chapter, adds to his analysis a number of other domestic factors such as who has the power to decide EU policies; the party systems; the party configurations of the government coalitions and their parliamentary alliances; as well as the degree of Europeanization of the various party organizations. She also brings up several important similarities and differences between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. She describes opposition to EU membership as having been traditionally on the left of the political spectrum, with the strongest support for membership among the elite. In Finland, Norway and Sweden a clear geographical centre–periphery split on this issue has also been apparent.

Among the three EU members, Denmark is more positive than Finland and Sweden to the EU—a fact which Kite sees as partly explained by the economic benefits that Denmark reaps from membership. Another reason she offers is that the Danish Parliament’s European Affairs Committee has more wide-ranging opportunities to determine EU policy than its counterparts in Finland and Sweden, since it has the right to give ministers binding instructions. Furthermore, there are more demanding rules in Denmark for submitting EU-related issues to referendums than there are in Finland and Sweden. It is interesting that these devices, which were introduced partly to placate
Euro-sceptics at the time of accession, have made Danish membership more politically ‘comfortable’ in the decades since. The instinctively more directive style of Swedish and, especially, Finnish leaders may, by contrast, open them to ambushes from public opinion—as in 2003 with the failed Swedish referendum on adopting the euro—and to the strands of anti-EU and anti-government sentiment becoming intertwined.

As noted above, in the Nordic countries there are no differences between elite and grassroots when it comes to such elements as support for joint humanitarian actions and crisis management tasks. The problem is rather the issue of collective defence. Perhaps the Finnish Government, which has thus far been able to act with less attention to domestic scepticism, will be able to take this important step more easily as and when required than will any of the others. The Swedish Government, on the other hand, would be heavily dependent on a firm cross-party majority for a change. The problem for Sweden, as Kite sees it, is that the apparently comfortable compromise of being able to opt in or out as it wishes on security-related issues may not be optimal either, because it would make it impossible for Sweden to claim a place at the core of the EU.

In conclusion

Different perceptions of the Nordic countries’ place in the evolution of ESDP are possible. One impression may be that there is little sign of change: Norway is still outside the EU, Denmark retains its opt-outs, and Finland and Sweden are still non-aligned. In contrast, the chapters in this part—while recognizing that popular attitudes remain divided—see much that has changed in these countries’ ways of relating to the changes in Europe. One possible reason for the different readings is that, in general, Nordic countries attribute less importance to institutional membership as such. This can also be seen in the fact that the formal status of non-alignment has become less and less associated with security; the answer to the question of why the Finnish and Swedish populations remain so attached to it must be sought in other factors, such as identity.

Another possible reason is the Nordic view that organizations can and should complement each other—an approach arising not least from the fact that they have all traditionally been Atlanticists, whether in NATO or not. Unable or unwilling to change their institutional affiliations, they have treated the organizations to which they do not belong as good partners for cooperation. A third explanation is that the Nordic countries have been allowed to take part in new defence and security activities, both within organizations to which they belong and in cooperation with others, without any major differences in working procedures depending upon the formal institutional memberships.

Active participation in this style has come to be seen by the Nordic elites not only as a necessary but also as a legitimate way to demonstrate their loyalty to the European Union. Loyal participation in preventing and combating crises in Europe is seen as a way both to defend Nordic interests and to contribute to the security of others. Furthermore, civilian crisis management, a strong Nordic cause, has now also been accepted by those member states that initially focused only on the military dimension.

This type of loyalty to the EU in no way conflicts with the Nordic countries’ traditional allegiance to the UN. The two complement each other, with the UN as the naturally superior organization, against whose wishes nothing should be done. For the Nordic countries the EU cannot replace the UN as a legitimizing organization, and much less can individual members of the EU.
The Europeanization process that is reflected in all the chapters of this part is thus taking place, as the Nordic countries see it, in a framework which the EU will not dominate. This does not exclude the growth of an increasing sense of European closeness, based on rational calculations—such as those embodied in Miles’ concept of performance fusion—which will also lead in the direction of increased integration over time. To take just one instance, Sweden’s declaration in 2004 that it was hard to imagine that it would be neutral in case of an attack against an EU country is a big step for a non-aligned country. Finland’s policy formulations have been similarly far-reaching on many occasions; and the same goes for a number of Danish politicians who are eager to abandon the opt-outs.

These genuinely important developments may, however, still be far less far-reaching than others in Europe would and will expect. As Alyson Bailes writes in her introduction to this volume, the ESDP might at any time take a fuite en avant, led by countries that are more used to federalist ideology (or to the practice of collective defence) and would see such a development as natural. The question is under what conditions the Nordic policies might change to accommodate to this.

Some factors are already problematic for the Nordic approaches. For example, the procedure of compensating for lack of institutional involvement by engagement in activity works better for a large country like the United Kingdom, whose military resources are very large. A small country might contribute proportionately more in terms of its own overall security capacities without anyone noticing, whereby the message and the intended balancing effect are lost.

Another factor that might make Nordic countries prone to change their policies is the fact that institutional membership for small countries might be seen as a necessity for influence. All the Nordic countries, being internationally minded, are eager to have an impact in the world. To the extent that this is denied to institutional ‘outsiders’, they will be increasingly motivated to join in ‘core’ and ‘mainstream’ processes. However, the propensity to join for this reason is lessened by the awareness of the fact that, in today’s world, influence is related more to size than to membership.

Furthermore, it is possible to imagine an external event of a kind that would make it advantageous for the non-aligned to join NATO, for Denmark to abandon its opt-outs or for Norway to join the EU. Much of Europe’s progress in general has been spurred by unexpected happenings. Nordic positions at present might seem to be fairly well cemented: but just as the Nordic countries have continuously adjusted to events and developments thus far—if not in institutional affiliations, then very often in policy terms—they will most likely do so again, should unexpected events demonstrate the need for it.

As seen from the Nordic countries, the EU and Europe are—in Miles’ terminology—the results of compound fusion, involving institutions and countries working alongside each other. The Nordic countries do not see the EU as a monolith of countries united in a common approach to all issues. Austria and Ireland also remain non-aligned; the UK is outside the Eurozone and this is not likely to change for some time; and France and Germany are among the countries that do not fulfil the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact. The heterogeneity is vast also among those considered to be in the core of the EU, and all countries have their blemishes.

As an overall conclusion, it can be posited that any move by the Nordic countries towards more integrationist policies will stem from two particular developments: a rational decision-making process based on concern about lack of influence; and a
slowly growing, subjective attraction to more demanding obligations based on a strengthened feeling for Europe as a unity. Regardless of the precise reasons, any such steps would need to be taken with great caution, as befitting small states that have much to lose if the EU is dominated by a group of larger ones. The Nordic countries will certainly continue to watch closely whether other countries are abiding by the rules and reacting strongly against breaches of them.

It is also possible that individual Nordic countries will take steps in one direction or another without the others following. This was the rule rather than the exception in the past. Nordic cooperation, while always reflecting an aspiration among decision makers and the populations at large, has never been these states’ first priority. Nordic countries will also continue to differ in the extent to which they will need to rely on popular consent. Even so, in today’s circumstances there can be no more pressing task for all member states of the EU than to consolidate their popular support. A strong Europe needs not only leadership but also, and above all, the wide support of its citizens—and the Nordic region can be no exception.
1. Denmark and the European Security and Defence Policy

Klaus Carsten Pedersen

I. Introduction

The conspicuous peculiarity about Denmark in relation to the European Security and Defence Policy is the fact that it is not a partner in the project. This fact is particularly peculiar because very few Danes would even try to argue that the Danish opt-out from European Union defence activities—one of four national opt-outs from the EU’s 1992 Treaty of Maastricht—serves any identifiable national interest. On the contrary, its detrimental effects are becoming increasingly obvious. So why did Denmark opt out in the first place? Moreover, both government and opposition parties now clearly want Denmark to ‘opt back in’ and to position itself as a dependable core country in this department of European integration, and opinion polls have for several years indicated that this view is shared by a sizeable majority of respondents.¹ So what is holding Denmark back? This chapter suggests some answers to both the questions posed above.

The Danish defence opt-out (see section II below) is particularly puzzling and problematic in the context of the development of Danish foreign policy after the cold war. As pointed out by Gorm Rye Olsen and Jess Pilegaard,² on the one hand Danish policy has become even more multilateralized than it was before 1990 and is now shaped and conducted in close cooperation with other countries and international organizations. On the other hand, Denmark has become increasingly ready to consider the use of military means and has been reforming its military forces to make them useful tools in the government’s foreign and security policy ‘toolbox’ (a term much favoured by Danish Defence Minister Søren Gade). The background to and emergence of this new policy trend are outlined in sections III and IV. This trend is widely seen as a dramatic departure from the surprisingly long-lived, defeatist ‘small-country’ psychology that characterized earlier Danish policies—locally and unlovingly referred to as the ‘1864 syndrome’ (see section III).

Section V offers comments on the Atlantic dimension: the special cases of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, and Denmark’s special relationship with the USA. In conclusion, section VI takes a brief look at the possibilities for Nordic

¹ See chapter 5 in this volume.
cooperation outside and inside the framework of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

II. The history of the opt-out

Denmark joined the European Community (EC) in 1973—along with Ireland and the United Kingdom—after a constitutionally required national referendum in October 1972 had produced a ‘Yes’ vote by a two-to-one margin. When in 1992 the EC proposed to take the significant step (through the Treaty of Maastricht) of converting itself into the European Union, Denmark again needed a referendum. The outcome in June 1992 was a wafer-thin victory for the ‘No’ side, against the advice of the centre-right government and of the opposition Social Democratic Party. Subsequent analysis showed, remarkably, that, while all other parties had delivered a majority of their voters in support of the party platform, less than 40 per cent of Social Democrat voters had backed the party position. This was odd enough in the light of the party tradition to call for some special explanation. It is tempting to postulate, if difficult to prove, that the meandering foreign and security policy course followed by the party’s tacticians over the previous decade (the infamous ‘footnote’ years) had left many Social Democrat voters thoroughly confused.

Nonetheless, the result was ‘No’, to the consternation even of many nay-sayers who got more than they had bargained for, including a potential constitutional crisis for the EU project as a whole. It was clear that the voters had to be asked in a second referendum whether they had really meant it. A package of four opt-outs from the Treaty of Maastricht was grudgingly agreed, grandly dubbed ‘The National Compromise’, but in reality constituting the kind of deal that leaves all parties unhappy. The other EU member states accepted the Danish opt-outs on the premise that they would hurt only Denmark and not hamper the progress of the rest of the Union in any way. In May 1993 the Danes voted ‘Yes’ to the Treaty of Maastricht minus the opt-outs.

One of the opt-outs, of course, was on European defence cooperation. At the time this was of so little immediate consequence that the anti-alliance Socialist People’s Party felt that their agreement to the ‘compromise’ had been bought with false coin. It meant that Denmark could not become a full member of the Western European Union (WEU), a European defence organization that was being revived after many years in de facto hibernation but which still had little or no operational role. The argument offered by many Danish spokesmen that


4 As well as the defence opt-out, the opt-outs are from aspects of Economic and Monetary Union, Union citizenship, and Justice and Home Affairs. For the official Danish version of the opt-outs and their consequences see Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Danish opt-outs’, 21 May 2004, URL <http://www.um.dk/en/menu/EU/TheDanishOptouts/>.

5 Only countries belonging at the same time to NATO and the EU could become full members of the WEU. Denmark was the only such country not to take up this option, selecting instead the weaker status of an ‘observer’ (which was otherwise held by states that belonged to the EU but not to NATO).
European defence cooperation might hurt NATO, and that it was therefore better for Denmark not to join, looked decidedly odd when all the other NATO members that also belonged to the EU had taken up full WEU membership without a qualm. In any event, the argument lost all foundation in 1994 when NATO decided to nominate the WEU as its European pillar. The Danish centre-left government that had taken over in 1993 might have grasped this early opportunity to go back to the people and argue that circumstances had now changed so much that the defence opt-out made no sense and should be dropped. The government dared not risk it, and the opportunity went.

The government’s fear of a negative referendum outcome, had the issue been re-opened in 1994, was perhaps not unfounded with the 1992 referendum in mind. It was borne out when, in 2000, Denmark voted against adopting the euro, thumbing their noses at the 77 per cent of their elected parliamentarians who had advocated a ‘Yes’ and who had been supported by the leaders of labour, industry, agriculture, finance and the press. Since 2001, government has again been in the hands of a centre-right coalition, but the defence opt-out is still in force. The Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has not yet announced a decision about when to ask the voters to scrap the opt-outs, nor indeed on whether to hold four separate referendums or just one covering all the opt-outs. The defence opt-out has come to look so ridiculously pointless and is becoming so unpopular that a motion to scrap it would probably sail comfortably through the unavoidable referendum. That it has not already happened may be due to a tactical consideration that by bundling the four opt-outs together there might be a chance of abolishing the other, less unpopular ones together with the defence opt-out.

It is of course correct to say that the defence opt-out is an important element of Danish policy, but it is at least equally important to bear in mind that the opt-out is not a true expression of Danish thinking, intentions and ambitions today and that it may not have been even in the first place. In 1992 it was included in the opt-out package in order to permit the leadership of the Socialist People’s Party to advocate a ‘Yes’ in the 1993 referendum. It cannot be known which, if any, of the four opt-outs were really important to the voters. Some analysts suggested at the time that, for many who voted ‘No’ in the 1992 referendum, any excuse to get a second vote and say ‘Yes’ would have been acceptable.

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6 ‘We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union.’ NATO, ‘Declaration of the heads of state and government’, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Brussels, 10–11 Jan. 1994, URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111a.htm>, paragraph 5.
III. The evolution of Danish security policy

The ‘1864 syndrome’

After losing its eastern provinces of Blekinge, Halland and Skåne to Sweden in the 17th century, its navy to the UK in 1807 and its union with Norway in 1814, Denmark managed to quell an uprising by the German majority in the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in 1848–50, only to be attacked and defeated by Prussia and Austria in the brief but bloody war of 1864. This defeat, leading to the loss not only of the overwhelmingly German Holstein but also and traumatically of the mainly Danish Schleswig, was to influence Danish thinking about security and defence for more than a century. After defeating Denmark, Prussia beat Austria and France in quick succession and in 1871 established the German Empire; a severely diminished Denmark found itself isolated on the doorstep of a new superpower.

The Danes rolled up their sleeves and compensated for the loss of territory and population by a remarkably fast and wide-ranging development of the country’s economy and foreign trade. Defence was another matter and remained hotly debated, many Danes asking whether it was any use at all, given the circumstances. The defence sceptics did not win this first round of policy argument, but neither did those who advocated a strong navy and small, mobile land forces as the most relevant configuration of the defence of a primarily island country. Instead, Denmark opted for the most immobile sort of defence and for two decades sank half of its military budget into the fortification of Copenhagen. The work was completed just before World War I, creating a very modern, very strong and strategically quite useless edifice: in effect, a Maginot line on an island. Denmark managed to maintain a heavily armed neutrality during that war, obliging Germany by mining the approaches to the Baltic Sea and closing them to the British Royal Navy. After the war, the defence sceptics won the second round of the debate, and Denmark gradually disarmed itself in the belief that, with no outside help to be expected, no amount of Danish military effort would stop a German invasion.

When Hitler’s forces invaded in April 1940, the ill-equipped Danish forces offered only sporadic resistance before they were ordered to surrender. The Danish Government embarked on a policy of cooperation with the German occupiers that lasted for more than three years. However, thanks to the increasingly active resistance movement and its close cooperation with the UK, Denmark managed to have itself counted on the side of the Allies by the time of the German surrender in May 1945. The euphoria of liberation was not shared by the people of the island of Bornholm, which was occupied by Soviet forces for 11 months before they decided that Bornholm was so liberated that they might

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7 North Schleswig was overwhelmingly Danish while there was a fairly equal distribution of Danes and Germans in South Schleswig around 1850. Schultz Hansen, H., Danskheden i Sydslesvig 1840–1914 som folkelig og national bevegelse [Danishness in South Schleswig 1840–1914 as popular and national movement] (Studieafdelingen ved Dansk Centralbibliotek for Sydslesvig: Flensborg, 1990), pp. 59, 91.
safely leave it. The shadow of a new threat had touched Denmark from the East.8

The post-World War II search for security

After World War II, Denmark explored with the other Nordic countries the feasibility of a Nordic defence union. A suspicious Soviet Union, however, opposed the idea and vetoed Finnish participation, while Denmark, Iceland and Norway were invited to join NATO as founding members in 1949.9

For the first time in its long history Denmark was firmly anchored in a defence alliance with the world’s strongest military power. However, as a front-line state with a strategic position at the entrance to the Baltic Sea, Denmark still felt quite uneasy, small and exposed. The ‘1864 syndrome’ was to linger on as a factor in Danish thinking about security and defence policy for the duration of the cold war. The resulting attitudes tended to be reactive and defensive and, in the never-ending debate about the right combination of deterrence and reassurance in Western policy, the Danish focus tended to be on reassurance. In exercises and war games, wars were fought defensively on Danish soil and (mostly) in Danish waters and airspace, and Danish crisis management was not seen as a matter of securing advantage but invariably as a matter of minimizing damage. Denmark’s willingness to spend on defence was limited, and its military expenditure as a share of gross domestic product never exceeded 2.5 per cent, a relatively low figure by NATO standards but one that did not, however, reflect the input of up to 60 000 unpaid home guard volunteers nor the fairly elaborate civil defence system.10

At the same time, Danish defence gradually became more efficient, with better training and better armaments. Following Germany’s entry into NATO in 1955 and the establishment of NATO’s Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) Command, a Danish and a German division formed a corps that had English as the language of command and was tasked with defending the line between Lübeck and Hamburg and holding the Jutland peninsula.11 Although the term was not

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9 The discussions on a possible foreign and defence policy union between Denmark, Norway and Sweden were conducted in a joint committee during the winter of 1948–49 but fell apart in face of the problems of assuring adequate defence capability as well as the imminent formation of NATO. Norway was the first to pull out and effectively scuppered the scheme.
11 The BALTAP Command was originally based at Karup in Denmark and formed part of NATO’s Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH). Multiple revisions of the NATO command structure led to BALTAP’s first being transferred under the supervision of the Central Command at Heidelberg in 1994 and then being replaced in 2000 by Joint Command North East (JCNorthEast) at Karup and Joint Com-
used at the time, this was in fact the first ever ‘Eurocorps’, and it was not for show but for real.\textsuperscript{12} Despite much criticism of Denmark’s relatively modest spending on defence, the quality of its forces was regarded as high and they did the job they were supposed to do on the basis of multi-year (policy and budget) defence agreements reached among the major parties in parliament, both left and right of centre.\textsuperscript{13} Public support for Denmark’s NATO membership, meanwhile, was high and increasing.

The ‘footnote’ period

A peculiar interlude in Danish foreign and security policy became a notorious part of NATO’s recent history and deserves a comment here.\textsuperscript{14} In August 1982, with the Danish economy on the edge of an ‘abyss’,\textsuperscript{15} the Social Democrat government lost the support of the Social-Liberal Party and thereby its parliamentary majority. It handed over to a coalition of centre-right parties and started thinking about how to conduct itself in opposition. After a few months it became clear that an ‘alternative’ majority might be established in one field: foreign and security policy. All that was needed was for the Social Democrats to make a U-turn on the alliance policies for which they had taken or shared responsibility since 1949. They could then count on enthusiastic support by the Socialist People’s Party to their left and unenthusiastic support by the traditionally anti-defence Social-Liberal Party to their right, which in most other fields supported the new government.

During the following five years this cross-party majority succeeded in getting more than 20 motions passed in the Danish Parliament, most of which were sympathetic to Soviet positions and critical of NATO policies. Given the relatively strong formal rights of the Danish Parliament in the external policy field, government ministers, civil servants and military officers had to convey these

\textsuperscript{12} The first multinational unit to be called ‘Eurocorps’, symbolizing a new organic type of European defence cooperation not entirely dependent on NATO, was formed by France and Germany in 1992 and subsequently joined by Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain. See the Eurocorps website at URL <http://www.eurocorps.org/>. During the 1990s other European countries taking part in closely integrated units without US or Canadian participation began declaring them as ‘Euro-forces’ available for possible use by both NATO and the WEU (or today, also in the ESDP context).


\textsuperscript{14} For more on Denmark’s dissenting ‘footnotes’ to sundry collective NATO decisions, notably on nuclear-related matters, see chapter 14 in this volume.

motions to their colleagues at NATO meetings and on a few occasions were forced to express dissent in the form of footnotes to otherwise agreed NATO policy papers. When the government finally called an election in May 1988 over one of these motions and won, the Social-Liberal Party joined the ruling coalition. The ‘alternative’ majority was dead, but the Social Democrats remained on the sidelines until they finally made another U-turn in January 1990 and rejoined the mainstream, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war.

What had been especially galling to the government and to the Danish Foreign Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, during the ‘footnote’ period was the fact that, when the cold war intensified and the two sides confronted each other face to face, Denmark had not stood by its allies and helped win the contest. The actors of the ‘alternative’ majority, on the other hand, argue that they contributed greatly to ending the cold war peacefully by showing the Soviet Union the gentle face of the West. This view seems to have the backing of the authors of the recent Danish Institute of International Studies report on Denmark and the cold war,16 but not of the present author.17

It can plausibly be argued that the ‘alternative’ majority of the 1980s was the last significant expression of the ‘1864 syndrome’. It can also be argued that it was nothing of the sort, but simply an example of tactical use of foreign and security policy in a domestic political power play.

IV. The 1990s: Denmark as producer rather than consumer of security

The material in the previous section shows that several significant aspects of present-day Danish government policies may be traced back to origins in the 1980s. First, it is argued above that the Danish opt-outs from a number of EU policies were emergency tools to salvage the Treaty of Maastricht. The treaty might not have needed salvaging if the Social Democrats had stuck with their policy stance of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, instead of abandoning it and criticizing defence, NATO and European integration. Second, it may be argued that Denmark’s new assertive foreign, security and defence policy has become so assertive today partly in order to compensate for the sins of the 1980s and, more particularly, to compensate for the consequences of the defence opt-out of 1993.

The new policy was championed by Ellemann-Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs between September 1982 and January 1993, during his last years in the post. His primary focus was on the Baltic Sea region and the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In the Baltic Sea region, Denmark was the sole country that was at

17 Carsten Pedersen, K., ‘Kold krig’ [Cold war], Udenrigs, no. 3/2005 (Sep. 2005), pp. 65–78
the same time Nordic (shorthand for being neither Germany nor the USA), in NATO and in the EU. Besides these assets Denmark also brought to the table a measure of small-country empathy for the predicament of other small countries, an aspect not covered by realist schools of international relations. Ellemann-Jensen accordingly offered Baltic representatives the use of facilities in Copenhagen almost a year before their formal independence; he was among the first to recognize their independence, and the first to open diplomatic missions in all three Baltic capitals. Together with the German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, he also launched the Council of the Baltic Sea States, in which the newly independent Balts were full members from the outset. When a Social Democrat-led government took power in 1993, the new Minister of Defence, Hans Haekkerup, set up an international department in his ministry and entered into bilateral defence agreements with Poland, the three Baltic states and even Russia. The agreements with Poland and the Baltic states led to intensive military cooperation on planning, training, equipment and eventually even to cooperation in the field on peacekeeping missions. In the case of Poland it may be argued that its cooperation with Denmark facilitated its subsequent cooperation with Germany and the transformation of the Danish–German corps headquartered in Schleswig-Holstein into a Danish–German–Polish corps headquartered in Poland.

Denmark was also one of the first countries to recognize the declared independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), for much the same reasons as it had recognized Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, including a deeply rooted belief in the right of self-determination. When the United Nations called for troops to keep the non-peace in Croatia, Denmark was among the very first to respond and for extended periods had up to 1500 soldiers engaged in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina under UN and subsequently NATO auspices, proportionally more than any other country. They were also the most robustly armed UN forces on the ground and demonstrated that the main battle tank can be a very

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18 The Council of the Baltic Sea States was inaugurated at a meeting on 5–6 Mar. 1992 in Copenhagen. It is a regional forum for intergovernmental cooperation in any field of government other than military defence with 12 members: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden and the European Commission.

19 E.g., the 1994 Agreement between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Denmark on the Development of Relations in the Field of Military Cooperation and Contacts. One important purpose of this cooperation with Poland and the Baltic states was to facilitate their eventual integration into NATO. On the history of the cooperation and details of current cooperation see Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Danish–Lithuanian defence co-operation’, Embassy of Denmark, Vilnius, 14 June 2005, URL <http://www.ambvilnius.um.dk/en/menu/Defence Attaché/>.

effective ‘peacekeeping platform’.

In the late 1990s, Denmark took the initiative in the UN framework to establish the Multi-National Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG), with its planning staff based in Denmark, which first saw action in connection with a UN-supervised truce between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000. In 2001–2002 Danish special forces fought in Afghanistan as part of the US-led coalition, as did Danish F-16 ground attack aircraft, and Denmark now provides troops and C-130 Hercules transport aircraft for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Since 2003 Denmark has contributed to the operations in Iraq as part of the US-led coalition and now also in support of the NATO-led training mission. As of August 2005, there were some 500 Danish troops in Iraq.

These examples may suffice to demonstrate the point frequently made by Bertel Heurlin and others that since 1990 Denmark has become a producer of security rather than just a consumer. Sten Rynning argues that Denmark has changed its international role from that of a ‘civilian actor’ in the 1990s to that of a ‘strategic actor’ today. There is no doubt at all—indeed there is general agreement in parliamentary circles—that Denmark must try to maximize its international influence. It is not the purpose of this chapter to go into the various forms of ‘soft power’ that a country like Denmark may wield by such means as trade, aid, culture and cooperation in many fields. The novelty in the Danish context is the readiness to apply hard power as well.

The military tools in the toolbox

A third, indirect consequence of the ‘footnote’ period was the Defence Commission that was established in August 1988 as a condition for the Social-Liberal Party to join the government. The commission was aiming at a fast-moving target; it reported in January 1990 just as the whole strategic and political context had changed. It did, however, correctly conclude that the main

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21 For one of the episodes where Danish tanks under UNPROFOR command were forced to fight and did so successfully see Findlay, T., SIPRI, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp. 230–31.


tasks of Denmark’s military forces would be very different in the coming years and that great flexibility would be essential. It also concluded that Denmark should not stand first in line to cash in the ‘peace dividend’, having drawn upon some of it in advance. All in all, the commission gave Danish military planners a head start compared to most other countries in adapting to the new conditions; and the first major step was to establish the Danish International Brigade, designed and trained for deployment abroad.

Since then, another defence commission has been established and has reported, and more radical changes have been and are being implemented on the basis of cross-party defence agreements covering the years 2000–2004 and 2005–2009. The air force is being reduced by one-third. The army will be much more mobile and get the very best modern equipment. The navy no longer has submarines but is getting very capable, flexible and seaworthy surface ships designed for a number of military and civilian tasks. Territorial defence will be largely left to a reduced but better armed and trained home guard. Conscripts will receive only a four-month ‘total defence’ training course and will then provide a recruiting pool for the armed forces, which will be entirely composed of volunteers. The ambition is to be able to maintain a total of some 2000 troops (1500 army and 500 navy and air force) on duty abroad for long periods of time.

As long as the defence opt-out stands, however, this part of Denmark’s foreign policy toolbox can only be used under UN or NATO auspices or in a coalition of the willing. As soon as the EU becomes involved, Denmark must end its involvement, even if it fully sympathizes with the policy purpose. An extreme but not unlikely case would be if the UN Security Council with Denmark as a member asked the EU to undertake a peacekeeping mission. Under present circumstances, Denmark could not then contribute to the very mission it asked for.

Getting it together

Denmark’s defence opt-out so clearly prevents Danish military means from being matched to Danish policy ends that it should only be a matter of (a fairly short) time before the voters will be asked to get rid of it. Small countries with limited material resources can rely on credibility, negotiating skills and coalition power as additional sources of influence. Nikolaj Petersen points out that, in the EU setting, active and constructive participation in the integration process is in itself an important instrument of influence. However, in the words of Olsen and Pilgaard, ‘the opt-out in a policy field of such importance as defence makes Danish foreign, security and defence policy seem dis-

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26 The Defence Commission of 1997 presented its report in 1998; see Heurlin (note 23).
27 Danish Ministry of Defence (note 13); and Danish Defence Command (note 13).
28 Denmark is a member of the UN Security Council for a 2-year term ending in Dec. 2006.
connected and incomprehensible and consequently without credibility. The instruments of influence constituted by reputation, negotiating skills and diplomatic mobility cannot but be negatively affected.\textsuperscript{30}

Even with the defence opt-out still in place, Denmark may be able to pursue a proactive, internationalist foreign policy in the framework of the EU, notably in the ‘softer’ fields of EU common action. Denmark may possibly enjoy greater autonomy in the defence field as a side benefit, but its long-term influence on international developments will definitely be diminished. No matter how noble its intentions or how firm its political will, there is little that Denmark can accomplish as an independent player. Full participation in the ESDP, by contrast, would offer Denmark a unique opportunity to help shape the development of the EU as an independent provider of both hard and soft security.

V. The Atlantic dimension

Many foreign observers and even some Danes overlook the fact that the Kingdom of Denmark spans the Atlantic Ocean. Denmark still has responsibility for the security and defence of its—in almost all other respects autonomous—dependencies, the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Greenland, in particular, is no small matter: keeping one or two large frigates and three coastal patrols in Greenland waters at all times, 2000 nautical miles from their home bases, is a big task for the Danish Navy. Even so, the size and location of Greenland are such that Denmark would not be able to defend it from an enemy attack. Thus, in World War II, when Denmark was unable even to defend itself, the USA took Greenland under its wing—both because Greenland was strategically important to it as a staging post on the way to Europe and as an observation point and because it was important to deny Germany access to those benefits.

Greenland’s strategic importance has changed in nature since then but hardly diminished. The USA has two installations at Thule Air Base in northern Greenland: (a) a forward early-warning radar system that is about to be modernized and become part of the USA’s ballistic missile defence system;\textsuperscript{31} and (b) a satellite communications centre, which permits the longest continuous communication with surveillance satellites in polar orbit.

The Faroe Islands were occupied and defended by the UK during World War II and have little military significance under present circumstances. The population is a little less than 50,000 while that of Greenland is a little more.\textsuperscript{32}


Neither has any indigenous military forces, although the Faroe Islands have a fisheries patrol vessel of their own. Both territories are currently debating just how far their autonomy should develop and whether they might at some time in the future want full independence and to be able to manage their economies without the present massive grants from Denmark. It is not totally clear what consequences for these territories, if any, would follow from full Danish participation in the ESDP. Neither dependency is a member of the EU at present.33

A further aspect of the Atlantic dimension of Danish policy is, of course, the very close security and defence relationship between Denmark and the USA. Part of this rests on the Greenland factor mentioned above: Greenland is strategically important to the USA, and the USA is in Greenland on the strength of the bilateral 1951 Defense Agreement with Denmark that is linked to NATO’s Washington Treaty and runs as long as that treaty is in force.34 In 2004 Greenland became a co-signatory of an amendment to this bilateral agreement.35 Another part of the relationship is the deep debt of gratitude owed to the country that helped free Denmark from both Hitler’s Germany and the Soviet threat. A third element may lie in the very fact that Denmark—temporarily, as argued above—has isolated itself from the ESDP and is seeking to compensate for this by drawing closer to the USA and being a helpful ally in various other ways. However, what ultimate profit this ‘special relationship’ holds for Denmark remains an unanswered question. There may be some arms export orders and some military co-production, but probably not a great deal of added influence on world events.

VI. Conclusions: the Nordic dimension

The Nordic countries share most values, many central aspects of political, societal and material culture, and a great deal of history. It could even be said that most of them even share a common language. When it comes to security and defence, however, they have all gone their more or less separate ways. Until the early 19th century, while Denmark (which then included Norway and Iceland)
and Sweden (which then included Finland) were the major—although gradually declining—strategic players in northern Europe, they competed with each other and frequently fought for dominance.

After the Napoleonic wars, when the larger European powers began to set the strategic agenda also for northern Europe, ‘Scandinavianism’ became a factor in Nordic culture and politics. Put to the test in Denmark’s war with Prussia in 1864, it generated many Nordic volunteers and much sympathy, but no state-level alliance—much like what happened when Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union 75 years later. The Nordic countries could not risk serious engagement in the wars of their Nordic neighbours since their larger European neighbours had become too strong. When the large European countries fought each other in two world wars, and Europe was divided by an iron curtain during the cold war, the Nordic countries chose different solutions to the different security and defence problems they faced. The so-called Nordic balance of cold war times was not a sophisticated political construct—it was an academic label on an intrinsically undesirable situation which emerged under the pressure of external circumstances. The proof of this postulate seems to be that the balance ‘tilted’ in the very moment when the pressure on Finland from the East ceased to exist, and Finland took the first opportunity to leap as far into the core of the EU as possible.

The Nordic countries already cooperate in many fields of security and defence, and Denmark participates wherever its defence opt-out does not stand in the way. However, it would not be surprising if Nordic defence cooperation were to develop much further in the framework of the ESDP, especially when Denmark drops its opt-out and when Norway eventually joins the EU. This last need not be delayed until after the entry of Albania, as some Norwegians jokingly suggest. The road to much closer Nordic defence integration would, of course, be even smoother if Finland and Sweden were to join NATO. For the first time in Nordic history, there are no external powers pulling the countries and peoples of the region apart. The choice is now theirs entirely.

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36 See the introduction in this volume.
37 For more on the comparison of Nordic security and defence policies see chapters 4, 5, 8 and 17 in this volume.
2. The Nordic countries and the EU–NATO relationship

Teija Tiilikainen

I. Introduction

The post-cold war era has brought both new options and new challenges for the Nordic region. On the one hand, the scope of cooperation among the Nordic states has widened as the long list of issues for cooperation has been completed with security and defence policy. During the cold war this field was excluded from Nordic cooperation owing to the different security policy solutions adopted by the five Nordic states. After the cold war, cooperation on security and defence policy has increased in a pragmatic manner, which has led to a number of shared Nordic policies and structures in various international security policy contexts.

On the other hand, however, post-cold war security structures have brought a significant challenge to the Nordic region by creating new ideological and institutional divisions that cut through that very region. These divisions are, paradoxically, closely linked with European integration, an issue which during the past decade has had a divisive effect. The European Union does not merely divide the five Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden—into EU insiders and outsiders; it also divides the three insiders—Denmark, Finland and Sweden—on the basis of their general EU policy, with implications for a number of specific aspects of this policy.

This chapter deals with the relationship between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The key question is how the division of labour between the EU and NATO has been perceived in the Nordic states and how the Nordic states themselves relate to this issue, which (in broad terms) implies a division of European security policies into a ‘European’ versus an ‘Atlanticist’ orientation.

The chapter starts with a historical introduction designed to clarify the root causes of the differences in the Nordic states’ policies. The issue of the EU–NATO relationship is then approached in the present-day context and, in particular, from the perspective of the challenges raised by the EU’s Constitutional Treaty. The main focus is on the four ‘larger’ Nordic countries, while Iceland remains generally outside the scope of the chapter.¹

¹ On Iceland see also chapter 20 in this volume.
II. Four positions growing out of a common heritage

The different positions adopted by the Nordic states in relation to the EU–NATO relationship can be traced back to differences in their historical identities and general orientations towards European integration. All five Nordic countries share the same state-centric political culture emanating from a Lutheran political tradition. Seen from that cultural perspective, they all lack preparedness for participation in a supranational system of cooperation such as the EU represents. Denmark, Finland and Norway can also be viewed as being united by a ‘small-country’ tradition, which in all three countries has had the effect of giving national sovereignty a prominent position in their political values.

From an apparently similar cultural starting point, the Nordic countries have been driven to quite different positions on the development of post-cold war security systems as a result of decisions made since the end of World War II. Irrespective of the similarities in both their political cultures and historical experiences, Denmark and Finland seem to represent the two extremes of the Nordic positions towards the key structures of European security policy. It is interesting to observe how Denmark—as an EU member—has been driven into a position that, at least until recently, has been more critical of the EU’s security policy role than the position of Norway.

The Danish membership of NATO cannot be described as a love match. On the contrary, Denmark’s decision to join NATO in 1949 has been described as a pragmatic solution in a situation where none of Denmark’s more favoured options could not be realized.2 In terms of Danish political identity, NATO membership has been seen to constitute a break in Denmark’s long-standing tradition of isolated neutrality and in belief in the notion that a small country had better ‘lie down’ and conduct a policy of accommodation to the great powers.3

Even if membership of NATO was far from an uncontroversial issue in Danish politics during the cold war, it was seen to bring clear advantages compared with joining the purely European security structures.4 Denmark has, consequently, been counted among those European NATO members that were critical of the strengthening of the European Community’s security policy dimension even during the cold war era. This critical attitude survived the end

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3 Boekle et al. (note 2), p. 426, refer to this expression used by Peter Munch, the Danish minister of foreign affairs in 1929–40.
4 Henrik Larsen refers to the different form of security guarantees in the founding treaty of the Western European Union (WEU)—the 1954 Modified Brussels Treaty—and to the WEU’s policy on nuclear weapons as the main reasons for the Danish decision not to join the WEU. Larsen, H., ‘Denmark and the EU’s defence dimension: opt-out across the board?’, N. Grieger, H. Larsen and H. Ojansen, The ESDP and the Nordic Countries: Four Variations on a Theme, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP no. 16 (Ulkopoliittinen instituutti: Helsinki, 2002), p. 92.
of the cold war and led to a serious split in Danish public opinion over European integration that has persisted since 1990. Danish criticism of the European Security and Defence Policy is linked with Denmark’s critical attitude towards political integration in general. Reservations about a European political union containing supranational—or even federal—elements seem to have a solid political base in Denmark, which was occupied by Germany during World War II. From a Danish perspective, the lack of supranational elements helps to make NATO a preferable option to an ESDP that seems to reinforce the EU’s development towards a superstate. Following the negative result of Denmark’s referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, participation in the EU’s defence policy forms one of those negotiated exemptions that made possible the continuation of Danish EU membership. Thus, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration or implementation of Union decisions and actions that have defence implications.

Finland has elements in common with Denmark in its political culture and history but has arrived at a very different solution as far as its political priorities in the EU–NATO relationship are concerned. During the cold war Finland’s international position was characterized by its policy of neutrality and by its special relationship with the Soviet Union. However, Finnish neutrality was more instrumental than ideological. The immediate aim was to ease Finland’s position as a country between the two blocs and to give Finland more international room for manoeuvre. Neutrality, and the demands made both by Finland itself and from abroad in connection with maintaining this status, led to a cautious Finnish attitude towards Western political and economic cooperation.

The collapse of the cold war system—including the Soviet Union—and the Swedish decision to join the European Union provided impetus for a change in Finnish policy. The reorientation appeared to be comprehensive as Finland renounced its former general policy of neutrality, replacing it with one of firm commitment to the project of integration. This policy was based on a positive attitude towards all dimensions of the latter project, including the deepening of political integration and the Common Foreign and Security Policy as a part of it. What was left of the previous doctrine of neutrality was re-formulated as a policy of ‘military non-alignment’. However, military non-alignment neither impeded full Finnish participation in the developing EDSP nor prevented an ever-deepening cooperation with NATO in the framework of the Partnership for Peace.

Taking into account the character of Finnish neutrality as an instrument for satisfying the country’s security policy needs, the change in 1994–95 may be less extensive than it was first thought to be. It was more a question of the Finnish security policy instruments being adapted to new political conditions. Since Finland joined the EU, its membership has formed a cornerstone of its security

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policy. This has implied not only a Finnish willingness to do whatever is necessary to ensure the efficiency of the CFSP and the ESDP but also a will to maintain a strong Finnish position in all forums for decision making in the EU. This has meant that even participation in the European Monetary Union, including introduction of the euro, was perceived above all as a political issue for Finland.

Finnish pragmatism in security policy has implied a need to avoid taking strong positions on the EU–NATO relationship. At the level of political rhetoric, the Finnish position might be described as a ‘two-track policy’ in the sense that—in order to overcome the division that is implicit in the issue—Finland has emphasized both the need to strengthen the EU’s military capacity and the role of transatlantic security structures. At the level of political action, however, the picture is somewhat different. It is evident that Finland is not among those EU members that have opposed further development of the ESDP on the basis that it would violate NATO’s role in European security structures. Rather, a general Finnish priority has been to guarantee equal possibilities of participation and influence for those EU members that are not members of NATO. Considering the overall Finnish policy of firm commitment to European integration, Finland could be counted among the EU members whose policy has a European rather than an Atlanticist orientation.

In general terms, both Norway and Sweden could be placed somewhere between Denmark and Finland as far as their positions on the EU–NATO relationship is concerned. Neither Norway nor Sweden has opposed the idea of the EU having competences in security and defence policy as strongly as Denmark has done, but the constraints on their participation in the process still seem to be more significant than those felt by Finland. Norway has been a member of NATO since 1949, like Denmark, and its membership of the European Community/Union has been rejected twice in national referendums (in 1972 and 1994). Even if the feared loss of national sovereignty has formed just as important a starting point for the Norwegian anti-EU movement as it has for the Danish, in the case of Norway the argument has related more to economic policy than to political integration. In some sense, this has made the Norwegian attitude towards the EU’s security and defence policy more flexible than the Danish attitude.

The general international orientation of Norway has been described as purely ‘Atlanticist’ in the sense that, in order to achieve a firm position in NATO, Norway has felt a need to demonstrate itself to be a loyal member.6 Taking this—as well as the Norwegian people’s rejection of European Community/Union membership in two referendums—into account, it is understandable that the Norwegian reaction to the decision to launch the ESDP was not enthusiastic. Both geography and Norway’s strategic position have, however, affected the formulation of Norwegian policy to an extent that made it impossible for

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Norway simply to ignore the EU’s developing security policy dimension. The more sincere and serious the latter process has become, the more Norwegian willingness to become involved has increased.7

In some sense, Norway’s willingness to contribute to the ESDP appears to go further than its position as a non-member of the EU allows. The ESDP has—like the Schengen system and the European Economic Area (EEA)—been considered a field where Norway can try to compensate for the loss of leverage consequent to its staying outside the EU.

The Swedish position on the issue of emerging European security systems has characteristics in common with both Denmark and Norway. Sweden is one of the countries that, like Finland, remained neutral during the cold war. In comparison with Finnish neutrality, however, Sweden’s form of neutrality appears to be more ideological and deep-rooted in society; and in the period after World War II, Swedish neutrality had a much more solid base in both military and political terms. Politically, the policy had a long—and positive—history, as it was seen to have saved the country from involvement in two world wars. It was also based upon a solid military capacity and, as others struggled to emerge from the ruins of World War II, Sweden could be reckoned as one of the largest military powers in Europe. Mikael af Malmborg points out that Swedish neutrality was (in practice) dependent on the US presence in Europe—a fact which would eventually colour Swedish policy towards the ESDP.9

While Finland, with a less positive experience of neutrality, was prepared to renounce this policy relatively soon after the cold war, this was not the case for Sweden. The Swedish application for EU membership was primarily motivated by general economic needs, and Sweden did not share the Finnish aspiration to use EU membership to actuate a change in security policy.

The Swedish reaction to the developing European security and defence policy is reminiscent in some ways of the Norwegian reaction. The strong commitment of Swedish society to the principle of neutrality has put clear limits on Swedish participation in the ESDP, at least in political terms. The transatlantic link implicit in Swedish neutrality is another factor affecting the country’s attitudes. Because the ESDP has been too important a project to ignore from the perspective of political power, Sweden has participated actively in military operations.10 This has been in keeping also with the changing priorities of Sweden’s defence forces, which are going through a massive reduction of territorial defence capacity in favour of capabilities for international operations.11

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7 According to Nina Græger, Norway has tried to be involved, and to get influence, in the ESDP first through relations with the EU directly, then through NATO and finally through its relations with the Nordic states. Græger (note 6), pp. 44–55.
8 On Norway’s position in the Schengen system and the EEA see the Introduction in this volume.
10 Sweden has participated in all 3 EU-led crisis management operations: Concordia, Artemis and Althea.
11 See chapter 7 in this volume.
to its overall orientation in integration policy—and the clearly sceptical attitude towards the deepening of European integration—the Swedish position is not so overtly European as the Finnish stance (see below).

III. From the European Security and Defence Policy to the Common Security and Defence Policy

From the perspective of the EU–NATO relationship since the late 1990s, two important stages in the development of European security and defence policy can be distinguished. The first is the so-called St Malo process, which in 1998 paved the way for a solution of the institutional issues related to European defence and the incorporation of security and defence policy decision-making structures directly under the authority of the EU and its political system. As a part of this process, the functions of the Western European Union (WEU) as an independent international organization were transferred to the EU by 2000. The EU’s military capabilities were, however, capabilities offered by the member states. The system that was launched as the Helsinki Headline Goal in December 1999 aimed to make the necessary capabilities available to the EU, including the command and control, intelligence, logistics, and air and naval assets necessary to enable the deployment of 60 000 troops within 60 days and to sustain them for a year. A more specific European Capability Action Plan was launched in 2001 to assess shortfalls in the fulfilment of the Headline Goal and to propose solutions to them. An essential part of the capability arrangement was formed by cooperation with NATO, which was included in the St Malo process in the form of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements. The agreements were intended on the one hand to allow the EU to attain its planned capacity for crisis management operations sooner than would have been the case without such cooperation; but on the other hand, and from the Atlanticist viewpoint, they were also intended to decrease both the need and the desire for duplication of military instruments in the EU context.

Another important stage in the ESDP’s development was opened as part of the process of constitution making in the EU. This process, carried out through

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15 ‘Berlin Plus’ refers to a package of agreements reached in 2000–2003 between the EU and NATO dealing primarily with the EU’s access to NATO planning capabilities but also with other assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations.
the Convention on the Future of Europe that met from March 2002 to July 2003, and the Intergovernmental Conference that followed it from October 2003 to June 2004, identified the ESDP as one of those issues which seemed to require relatively large amendments to existing provisions. Many of the amendments that were eventually agreed (see below) confirmed, at least politically, the EU’s aspiration for independence as an international actor. Such changes included a clause on security guarantees and a ‘solidarity clause’ (on terrorism and natural disasters) in the Constitutional Treaty. The constitution aims to contribute also to the development of the EU’s defence capabilities by launching a process called ‘permanent structured cooperation’. This would enable smaller groups of member states to deepen mutual cooperation intended to contribute to the Union’s capabilities. As a condition of, and a first concrete step in, the process, by 2007 member states are supposed to supply combat units targeted for the Union’s missions, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups.

Another provision of the Constitutional Treaty that contributes to capability development, and which has already been executed, deals with the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EDA was established by a Joint Action in July 2004 and its activities were launched later the same year. Finally, as an indication of the new level of ambition of the ESDP, the Constitutional Treaty refers to it as the Common Security and Defence Policy.

IV. The Nordic states and the St Malo process

The St Malo process and the rapprochement between France and the United Kingdom that it implied appeared to come as a great surprise to all the four Nordic countries. The process that put an end to the WEU’s role as an intermediary between the EU and NATO was at first not celebrated in either Denmark or Norway. Danish policy can, however, be said to have been galvanized into action regarding ESDP as a result of the change in British policy. The Danish Government took a firmly Atlanticist position on the St Malo process by regarding it as the emergence of a European pillar of NATO. This was seen to imply close consultation between the two institutions and measures to ensure that the EU’s defence dimension would not weaken NATO’s command structures. The Danish opt-out from the EU’s defence policy has, however, put clear limits on Danish participation in what could be called the concrete consequence

16 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 19 Oct. 2004 but has not been ratified. The text of the treaty is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm> and selected articles are reproduced in the appendix in this volume. The solidarity clause is in Article I-43.
17 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (note 16), Article III-311.
19 Larsen (note 4), p. 112.
of the St Malo process: the EU’s military organization. Based on the official Danish interpretation of this opt-out, Denmark has participated in the formation of EU defence policy structures but has not been able to participate in decision making or in action taking place in the framework of those structures. Of the new bodies established for the EU, Denmark participates most freely in the Political and Security Committee (composed of ambassadors from EU countries and dealing also with CFSP), whereas its participation in the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff is very limited.

For Norway, the decision to integrate the WEU’s operational functions into the EU formed the most fatal element of the St Malo process. Norway thereby lost its formal link to the EU’s security and defence policy and its strong national position within the structure which, thus far, had set limits on the EU’s autonomous role. Norway’s primary goal regarding the St Malo process was to cushion its impact in the practical field of European security, and this dictated first and foremost that Norway should seek a position of influence in the new bodies created for the EU.

Finland and Sweden responded to the St Malo initiative with a common position, which interpreted the initiative very much along those lines that appeared to be most acceptable for both of them domestically. The foreign ministers of the two countries published a joint article in two national daily newspapers immediately after the St Malo meeting. The article can be seen as an effort to convince the domestic audiences about the positive value of the new process, as the key significance of the process was set in the context of the EU’s reinforced crisis management capacity. It was, however, pointed out that there was no reason to duplicate NATO’s structures and that close relations with NATO would be of key importance for the EU’s crisis management structures. These were clearly positions that were defined for a wider European audience.

A conclusion that can be drawn in retrospect is that the St Malo process materially changed the Finnish position towards European security and defence policy. Finland’s policy formulation and political debate have since then reflected the view that the EU is increasingly significant in military security and defence matters. If the Finnish Government was at first none too eager to specu-

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22 Two additional consultative compositions were established for the EU’s Political and Security Committee and Military Committee as well as at the ministerial level. They were a composition consisting of the EU members and the Central European candidates plus Iceland, Norway and Turkey; and a composition consisting of the EU members and the non-EU NATO members. See also chapter 20 in this volume.
late on the changes that the St Malo process would bring to the EU, it soon had to take a more active role as it became clear that the key structures resulting from the process were to be created during the Finnish Presidency of the EU in 1999. The historical momentum that had emerged for the deepening of European defence dictated a tempo to which a new member state like Finland—in spite of its constructive and open position towards this process—had difficulties in adapting itself. The flexibility of the Finnish position was thus concretely tested when the Cologne European Council in June 1999 invited the incoming Finnish EU Presidency to advance the creation of a military crisis management system under EU leadership. The results of the EU Helsinki Summit on 15–16 December 1999—the decisions on the size and details of the EU’s crisis management forces and on the new military organization—were more far-reaching than Finland’s national goals. They were, however, subsequently accepted by the Finnish Parliament without difficulty.

Stimulated by the experiences of its presidency, Finland supported the creation of crisis management institutions in the EU but—in order to safeguard the role of non-full members of WEU—wanted to see them as new institutions rather than as the simple reincarnation of WEU arrangements in an EU setting. So far as the EU’s capabilities in crisis management were concerned, Finland wanted to see the construction of this capability placed more firmly on the basis of cooperation with NATO than the final Helsinki decision indicated. As a result of the St Malo process, a new type of reasoning emerged in official declarations of Finnish security policy, where the EU’s military role for Finnish security started to be firmly emphasized. This was stated in the following terms in the 2001 Finnish White Paper on security and defence policy:

The European Union’s role has become increasingly important in the realization of Finland’s security interests and goals. Finland’s participation in the EU’s common foreign and security policy complements and serves to further develop of the country’s national security policy. By actively seeking to develop the European Union’s common foreign and security policy, Finland is able to strengthen its influence in international affairs and to further its own security objectives.

A strong Union based on solidarity will also benefit Finland’s security situation and help to prevent the eruption of crises that may affect Finland, as well as improve Fin-

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26 In practice, only states that were members of both the EU and NATO were eligible to become full members of the WEU. Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden (and Denmark, a NATO member) had the status of observer in the WEU, which was the third strongest status of 4 possible ones (member, associate member, observer and associate partner).
land’s ability to deal with such crises. Strengthening the effectiveness of the EU remains a firm basis for Finland’s policy on Europe. As an EU member, Finland plays a role in promoting the stable development and security of its neighbouring areas and Europe as a whole.28

At this stage, as the process had been launched successfully, Finland did not formulate any strong demands either concerning the necessity to limit the EU’s capacities for military crisis management or concerning cooperation with NATO as the necessary starting point for the EU’s capacities. The role that NATO played in European security was still emphasized, but the linkage between the two organizations appeared to have become less close and clear than it had been in Finnish formulations during its 1999 EU Presidency.

Finland and Sweden had adopted a common position towards the launch of the St Malo process and, so far as the first phases of the process are concerned, Sweden’s policy was very similar to that of Finland. Af Malmberg has described the Swedish position as follows: ‘Sweden keeps an open mind towards the new European initiatives in the field of security and crisis management, but is in no hurry to make such a capacity too independent of the resources of NATO and the USA’.29 In a declaration to parliament in 1999, the Swedish Government emphasized that the process of reinforcing the ESDP did not mean territorial defence.30 Another element in the St Malo process that made the project more acceptable for the domestic Swedish audience was Sweden’s success in simultaneously promoting the Union’s civilian crisis management capability,31 which made the entire project look much more like crisis management than anything else.

When the process advanced, the level of national sensitivity also seemed to decrease in Sweden. As noted above, the dictates of Sweden’s full participation in EU operations correspond usefully to the guidelines set for the reconstruction of the national defence system starting in 1999, which moved the focus to participation in international operations.32

V. The Nordic countries and the European Security and Defence Policy in the Constitutional Treaty

The next challenge to the EU–NATO relationship took place in the process of constitution making in the EU, when the ESDP was brought to the fore as one of those policy fields where large-scale amendments to the status quo (created

29 af Malmberg (note 8), p. 52.
31 See also chapter 11 in this volume.
by the 2000 Treaty of Nice\textsuperscript{33}) were demanded. A broad consensus emerged among the member states about the appropriateness of reviewing the instruments of the ESDP in this context. The process was successful also in as much as it was not notably affected by the Iraq crisis, which divided the EU—on security issues above all—in the midst of the constitution debate.

When the review of the ESDP was started in the European Convention’s working group on defence (Working Group VIII), it first appeared as if the political configurations that were well known from previous intergovernmental conferences would be repeated. France and Germany were, with the support of a number of other European-oriented member states, demanding more far-reaching amendments to the ESDP that would have included the incorporation of the WEU’s security guarantees into the new constitution and a kind of defence policy eurozone based on the example of the monetary union.\textsuperscript{34} A majority of the working group members were, however, not ready to go that far and sought to guide the process towards less radical reforms like the updating of the Petersberg tasks. The three Nordic governments were able to remain very much in waiting mode on ESDP issues during the Convention, as the process seemed to be advancing in a notably pragmatic direction that was not expected to demand large-scale adjustment of Nordic national positions.\textsuperscript{35}

The Convention’s final proposal for an EU constitution went further in its reforms of the ESDP than the working group had done. In addition to the more pragmatic projects like the updating of the Petersberg tasks, the establishment of a defence agency or even the solidarity clause enabling the use of the Union’s crisis management instruments in the case of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster, the proposal now included provisions on security guarantees and a new version of the defence policy eurozone called ‘permanent structured cooperation’.

Both security guarantees and the structured cooperation formula, which allowed for far-reaching cooperation in the field of the development of military capabilities, were based on the model of ‘flexible cooperation’.\textsuperscript{36} At this stage, critical Nordic reactions were aroused even if the exact direction of criticism seemed to vary in the case of each of the three Nordic EU Members.


\textsuperscript{35} The final report of the defence working group was cautious in the sense that it kept the list of recommendations short, adding to it only those proposals which had the working group’s clear support. The more controversial proposals were highlighted by specifying whether they were supported by ‘some members’ or ‘many members’ of the group. European Convention, Secretariat, ‘Final report of Working Group VIII: Defence’, CONV 461/02, Brussels, 16 Dec. 2002, URL <http://european-convention.eu.int/doc_wg.asp?lang=EN>.

\textsuperscript{36} This concept means that the cooperation could be launched by a smaller group of member states, but without the general provisions on enhanced cooperation being applied to the criteria or proceedings of such cooperation.
In Finland, opinion within the governing elites was divided over the general appropriateness of these forms of more far-reaching defence cooperation. What all could agree on was how problematic the definition of ‘defence core’ was: its terms were seen to deviate too much from the general provisions on enhanced cooperation in the draft constitution and, consequently, to risk leaving those member states that were unable to join the cooperation from the start in a worse position. Finland therefore opposed the provisions on security guarantees and structured cooperation while specifying that its opposition was above all directed towards the problematic details of procedure.

Sweden also shared the Finnish concerns regarding the details of flexible integration in the ESDP. The Swedish opposition to such ‘deepening’ of the ESDP appears, however, to have taken a more principled character than Finland’s, as shown by the statement that ‘NATO and WEU already exist for those states that wish to commit themselves to mutual defence guarantees’.

Danish policy in the Convention reflected a decision to follow the new British policy line, which involved a more constructive position towards the EU’s defence policy. The Danish Government accepted the proposals for new ESDP provisions subject to certain suggestions for modifications relating to the openness of structured cooperation and its commitment to the EU’s common values and objectives. Regarding the provision on security guarantees, the Danish Government had wanted to make an addition according to which the execution of the closer cooperation on mutual defence would take place ‘in close cooperation with NATO’.

The differences among the three Nordic EU members resurfaced, albeit partly from a new standpoint, when the debate on structured cooperation and security guarantees was continued in the Intergovernmental Conference of 2003–2004. The proposals made for amendments to the Convention’s text by the Italian Presidency in the autumn of 2003 included a more basic change in the formulation of the Union’s security guarantees. Instead of being an element subject to flexible integration, where participation would be based on the free choice of each member state, they were now turned into a general provision of the draft constitution committing every member state in an equal manner.

A common reaction came from the non-aligned member states, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden: they made a common proposal for an amendment designed to take better account of the demands of their military non-alignment. The presidency’s formulation of security guarantees had taken the following

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form: ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.’ The proposal of the non-aligned states would have abolished the supposedly automatic character of the common defence by adding a sentence according to which a member state in case of an armed attack ‘may request’ that the other member states give it aid and assistance. As a result, it was agreed to add a reference in the text of the draft constitution to the special character of the security and defence policy of certain member states, but without amending the general formulation of the provision.

Amendments to the draft constitution’s provisions on the EU’s security and defence policy were one of the key points for actors in Finland’s political life and media. The general Finnish attitude was, however, very supportive of the deepening of European defence cooperation, where no noteworthy difficulties of principle were identified. Public debate focused on the relationship between the new provision on security guarantees and the Finnish policy of non-alignment. In this debate, the new forms of the ESDP drew less criticism than the government’s attempts to protect Finnish non-alignment, which, it was claimed, risked making Finland’s overall position in the EU dysfunctional. This latter concern in part reflected the change of government in Finland in 2003, where the very pro-European, conservative National Coalition Party was left in opposition and the agrarian Centre Party led a new coalition government. The new coalition has since been criticized in several contexts for having challenged the previous Finnish policy of firm commitment to European integration.

The net result of the Finnish tactics seemed to leave a solid political ground in place for further cultivation of the policy towards EU defence issues that had been stimulated by the St Malo process and shaped under the previous government coalition led by Paavo Lipponen of the Social Democrats. In the new security and defence policy White Paper presented to the Finnish Parliament in September 2004, the government stressed Finland’s unreserved participation in the ESDP, including all the new dimensions added to it by the Constitutional

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42 Letter from Erkki Tuomioja, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Brian Cowen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, Laila Freivalds, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden to Franco Frattini, President of the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 4 Dec. 2003, CIG 62/03, URL <http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cg00/cg0000062.en03.pdf>.

43 The final formulation of Article I-41(7) is: ‘If a Member State is a victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and forum for its implementation.’ Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (note 16), Article I-41.
At this stage, the government’s interpretation of the constitution’s provision on mutual assistance was that it would strengthen solidarity in the EU and that it was politically binding on all member states. The government also confirmed its decision that Finland would contribute to the shaping of permanent structured cooperation and, specifically, would participate in the rapid response forces (including EU battle groups) being created in this framework.

The relationship between the EU and NATO no longer features in the Finnish debate as significantly as it did in the late 1990s. The Finnish Government does not raise the issue as a problem in its official statements: it is more or less taken for granted that the EU’s security and defence policy can be advanced without violating NATO’s primary role in European security policy, which is still firmly emphasized along with the EU. The question of priorities seems to have become more of a pragmatic choice for Finnish governments in a situation where public opinion has remained firmly critical of NATO membership throughout the post-cold war era but where clear support exists for strong Finnish participation and commitment in the EU context.

The Swedish debate on the recent changes in the ESDP has had a clearly different tone from that in Finland. The question of the political appropriateness of the EU’s security guarantees has been raised more emphatically in the Swedish debate, and in this context the EU–NATO relationship provided one focal point, at least initially. The protest by the four non-aligned countries against the draft constitution’s original formulation on security guarantees was a necessary action in the light of the Swedish political situation, whereas in Finland it fell under heavy criticism.

The process of adjustment to the final version of the Constitutional Treaty had some interesting features that might even be seen as bringing Sweden closer to the Finnish position of strong commitment to the ESDP. In its statement on government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign policy held in February 2004, the Swedish Government interpreted the new phase in EDS development almost entirely in the light of strengthened capacity for crisis management. However, the statement included a confirmation that Swedish non-alignment would remain, irrespective of participation in the ESDP. This was also the spirit of the defence White Paper that was presented to the Swedish

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45 Finnish Prime Minister’s Office (note 44), p. 56.

46 In a survey conducted in Sep.–Oct. 2004, 61% of Finnish respondents supported the continuation of military non-alignment. At the same time, only 14% were of the opinion that Finland should not participate in a common EU defence if one were to be built. Finnish Advisory Board for Defence Information, *Suomalaisten mielipiteät ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikasta, maanpuolustuksesta ja turvallisuudesta* [Finnish views on foreign and security policy, national defence and security], Ministry of Defence, Helsinki, 27 Jan. 2004, URL <http://www.defmin.fi/print_page.phtml?menu_id=175&lang=1&chapter_id=1785>. See also chapter 18 in this volume.

Parliament in September 2004. In this document, the government softened the significance of the Constitutional Treaty’s security guarantees by stating that the situation in the EU was already compatible with security guarantees: it was highly unlikely that any member state would ignore an armed attack against another. The government thus made it look as if no change had taken place in the relationship between Swedish non-alignment and the ESDP. In general, there seems to be less preparedness in Swedish political circles than in Finnish ones to reconsider the meaning and appropriateness of the position of non-alignment in EU conditions.

If the Swedish defence White Paper took a cautious position regarding the interpretation of the EU’s security guarantees, in another respect it signalled a ‘European’ orientation that could be seen as rather novel in the Swedish context. In the White Paper, the government emphasized the role of the USA and NATO in European security but treated a strong and unitary EU as a precondition for a functioning transatlantic relationship. This position clearly relates to the EU’s emerging crisis management capacity, to which Sweden is strongly committed for both political and military reasons. The White Paper clearly indicates that the EU is becoming the most important channel for Swedish participation in international operations—a form of military action that has become the key emphasis of Swedish military strategy. The government thus confirmed Sweden’s intention to participate in the EU’s rapid reaction forces and in the EDA.

The constructive position that Denmark took towards the deepening of the ESDP in the Convention confirmed the change of attitude that had been developing in the country since the launch of the St Malo process. Support for the reinforcement of the ESDP has been increasing in Danish political parties, and the government took a positive attitude towards the new ESDP provisions in the Intergovernmental Conference negotiations of 2003–2004. Governmental statements clearly indicate that the Danish Government no longer sees a contradiction between the growing role of EU security and defence policy and transatlantic cooperation. In this sense, both Denmark and Sweden seem to have gradually adjusted themselves to the change that has taken place in the UK’s security policy thinking. For Denmark, however, this does not mean that it is questioning its own Atlanticist position; rather, it indicates the emergence of a strengthened European dimension in parallel with it. Danish Atlanticism has clearly become more flexible, but the limits of this flexibility will not and cannot be tested as long as Danish participation in the ESDP is restricted.

Set against these changes in Danish policy, the opt-out from the EU’s defence policy has become a clear constraint for the nation—a point which has regularly been made by the government in connection with recent ESDP developments.

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49 E.g., a Danish government document states that: ‘Denmark should actively take part in the work to create the framework for the new enlarged EU. But the dynamism in the EU’s development will in the
Denmark has supported the launch of both permanent structured cooperation and the EDA, but as a result of its special position it cannot take part in the functions performed in these frameworks. The removal of the opt-out is already anticipated by the cross-party Danish defence agreement for 2005–2009. This agreement states that Danish defence should be organized in such a way as to ensure that, in the event of a removal of the opt-out, Denmark will immediately be able to contribute to future European defence initiatives.\(^{50}\)

Norway has been forced to follow the latest treaty changes in the ESDP very much as an outsider, but the policy that it adopted during the St Malo process can be seen to apply also to the reforms made in the Constitutional Treaty. Norway’s concern about being left outside the key arenas of decision making in European security and defence policy is reflected in the aspiration for close partnership with the EU in the ESDP. Norway continued its strong contribution to the EU’s crisis management capability by offering a group of 150 soldiers to the EU’s battle group scheme established in the framework of structured cooperation.\(^{51}\) Norway has also expressed its strong willingness to participate in the functions of the EDA, to which the EU has given its consent.\(^{52}\)

VI. Conclusions

Since the end of the cold war, the Nordic countries have developed different general policies regarding the EU. As relatively small countries, however, they share the common destiny of having been forced to adapt themselves to changes in their political environment rather than being able to affect that environment decisively. It could be argued that a process of adjustment is going on in all the four Nordic countries discussed in this chapter. The direction of the process is the same in all of them, implying that the EU is taking on a stronger—and more concrete—role in their security and defence policies.

However, national conditions for, and constraints on, this development vary from state to state. The process of adaptation appears to have been least problematic in Finland, where the high value accorded to national security has led to pragmatism in foreign policy. Finnish support to and involvement in the ESDP has not been impeded by the label of non-alignment still attached to its


\(^{51}\) The Norwegian contribution was accepted by the EU defence ministers in Nov. 2004. Estonia, Finland, Norway and Sweden will form a Nordic battle group with the support of a British headquarters.

security policy. It can, however, be argued that with the Constitutional Treaty the ESDP has reached one critical limit from the Finnish perspective. The provision on security guarantees was not largely opposed in Finnish political circles, but it is likely to lead to further debate about the validity and strength of this provision, given that territorial security still forms a key concern in Finland. The focus of this debate would be on whether Finland—with its given territorial security concerns—can rely on the emerging EU system while retaining its non-alignment or whether the EU development increases the necessity of NATO membership.

In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, popular scepticism towards European integration has constrained commitment to the ESDP. In Denmark it has worked in favour of NATO membership being seen as the most advantageous context for international security policy. In Sweden the value placed on national solutions—embodied in this case in the policy of non-alignment—has impeded a complete political commitment to the deepening European security and defence policy. In both countries, the change of British policy and the subsequent development whereby the ESDP has become one of the most dynamic and visible dimensions of EU policy are powerfully encouraging a change in national attitudes.

For Norway, scepticism towards integration has impeded its EU membership and this creates a very concrete constraint on its full participation in European defence. This scepticism is not, however, directed at elements of political integration as such and this has led to flexibility in the Norwegian position vis-à-vis the ESDP. No full picture can be drawn of either the Danish or the Norwegian policy on ESDP as long as these countries have their structural constraints, consisting for Denmark in the defence policy opt-out and for Norway in its non-membership of the EU. It is probable that if a full picture could be seen, these four Nordic countries would seem to be much closer to each other in their view and treatment of the EU–NATO relationship than many might expect.
3. The Nordic countries and the EU–NATO relationship: further comments

Gunilla Herolf

I. Introduction

The Nordic countries have undergone a number of changes over the past 15 years. Like all other countries in Europe, they have been affected by the fall of the Berlin Wall. A predicament that they share with all other smaller countries is their limited possibilities to influence developments. To a great extent, therefore, their policies have constituted reactions to events and to the policies of larger states.

All the Nordic countries retain the same institutional affiliation (in security terms) that they had during the cold war: this might surprise many, given the vast changes since 1989. In her chapter on the Nordic countries and their role in the relationship between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Teija Tiilikainen describes and analyses the way in which Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden relate to the two now dominant Euro-Atlantic organizations. This chapter offers comments on a number of analytical points made by Tiilikainen, but it also cites some additional factors and conclusions that may help to explain the past and present positions taken by these four countries. The final section speculates on where future developments in the EU and NATO might take the Nordic countries.

An important basis for the analysis in this chapter is the fact that, even after the cold war, the European and world scenes have been characterized by dramatic events and developments. This has meant that the two organizations in focus here—the EU and NATO—have undergone substantial change. It was hardly to be foreseen in 1991–92, as the Swedish and Finnish applications for membership of the European Community were submitted, that the EU would become such an important actor in the field of security. The events taking place in the former Yugoslavia turned all four countries under study into active players in European crisis management, and this in turn had an immediate influence on their own countries—a new experience for them all. European security thus became, in a totally new way, part of the Nordic countries’ own national security. The attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001 had a further, huge impact on the security agenda, affecting all countries regardless of their institutional affiliation. Finally, the USA’s policy towards Iraq—developed outside NATO and the United Nations—has had a strong influence on perceptions of cooperation in Europe.
II. The positions of the four Nordic countries

In several ways, as pointed out by Tiilikainen, the positions of the four Nordic countries covered here differ from each other. She highlights two particular reasons for this, one being their historical identity and the other their general orientation towards European integration. Others could be mentioned, geography being a prominent factor in explaining both their previous and their more recent choices. External factors are heavily involved, too, as indicated above. For Finland, in particular, the external factor of the Soviet Union was important during the cold war, since the 1948 Finnish–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance explicitly prohibited Finland from pursuing certain policies. For Finland neutrality was therefore the only option, whereas for Denmark, Norway and Sweden there was a real choice to be made. In 1948 a Swedish proposal for a Scandinavian defence union was made and discussed by these three states. Discussions ended, however, after Norway had concluded that strong military assistance, and thus a connection to the major Western powers, was needed for its defence. Norway and then Denmark chose the Atlanticist option, whereas Sweden saw continued non-alignment as its best choice.¹

Generally, this author sees more similarities among the Nordic countries than Tiilikainen does. Atlanticism, it can be argued, has been a strong and continuous characteristic of all the Nordic countries’ policies, albeit cast in different forms depending on their institutional affiliations. During the cold war a strong US military presence in the northern part of Europe was a reassuring factor, since the region was of vital strategic importance for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. For Norway, in particular, geography must be seen as a strong factor here. As Tiilikainen says, quoting Mikael af Malmborg, Swedish non-alignment has relied in practice on the US presence in Europe,² as did the security of European NATO countries. As she also mentions, Finland and Sweden in their reactions to European security and defence policy proposals have often emphasized Atlanticist viewpoints. This is not unique; all the European countries want the USA to continue to be interested in European security matters, even though their precise interpretations of how far the US involvement should stretch are not identical.

Danish policies towards the (pre-2000) Western European Union (WEU) can also be explained in terms of Atlanticism rather than of concerns about sovereignty. Denmark was the only Nordic country that was involved in European

security discussions from an early stage. Its views on the WEU were thus formed at a time when this organization had different ambitions from those it developed at a later stage. In Denmark, WEU policies were seen as expressing limited European interests, pursued at the expense of those of NATO and therefore a threat to NATO. 3 For a small Atlanticist country, not being able to wield much influence on the policies of the WEU and seeing WEU defence guarantees as nugatory as compared with those of NATO, Denmark chose the policy of staying outside specifically European defence endeavours. 4 This opt-out has recently come to be seen by many Danes as a constraint.

III. The meaning of non-alignment and relations with NATO

The non-aligned countries also demonstrate much parallelism in their policies: long after the fall of the Berlin Wall, not just Finland and Sweden but also fellow EU members Austria and Ireland have remained non-aligned. However, they have also undergone a number of changes. Austria and Finland have both changed the term used for their security status from ‘neutrality’ to ‘non-alignment’. Sweden, which already used the term ‘non-alignment’, abandoned the term ‘neutrality policy’ (as did Finland). 5 All have made policy moves that would have been inconceivable or at least more complicated during the cold war. Sweden and Finland applied for membership of the European Community in 1991 and 1992, respectively, and joined the EU in 1995 along with Austria. (Austria had applied in 1989, while Ireland had been a member since 1973.) All four non-aligned EU members entered partnership with NATO, joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) or its successor from 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and the Partnership for Peace (PFP). 6 For all four countries, participation in these bodies meant that they were in partnership with NATO, rather than waiting for future membership.

The question is therefore why Finland and Sweden have not exchanged their non-alignment for NATO membership. One reason might lie in the fact that the changes they have made are seen as satisfactory: the two countries are now doing what they want to do in terms of defence activism and see NATO as a valuable partner with which they share their values and can participate in common efforts to promote them.

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4 In effect, Denmark stayed outside the WEU institutional system until 1992 and then opted to become only an observer—a status designed for non-NATO members of the EU—rather than taking the full WEU membership it would have been entitled to as a member of both the EU and NATO. For details of WEU membership arrangements see the WEU website at URL <http://www.weu.int/>.
5 Ireland uses the term ‘military neutrality’.
6 Finland and Sweden joined the PFP in 1994, the year it was established, Austria in 1995 and Ireland only in 1999. Austria, Finland and Sweden had observer status in the NACC; Ireland did not participate in the NACC and did not join the EAPC until 1999.
A second reason surely lies in the views of the general public. Tiilikainen refers to the strong support in Sweden for the policy of non-alignment. This is true, and there is little prospect of this changing. Finnish public support for non-alignment is also high. Although it is commonly said that Finnish public opinion changes more easily when the government takes a lead, it is hard to imagine that a majority of the population would in the near future accept the idea of NATO membership.

Tiilikainen refers to two kinds of neutrality, Finnish neutrality being ‘instrumental’ and Swedish neutrality ‘ideological’. Both of these terms could be interpreted in several ways. An ‘instrumental’ approach might be equated with the pursuit of a policy that is in the Finnish interest. The conclusion would be that party political ideologies and public opinion are of little importance in deliberations among Finnish leaders on the future of continued non-alignment. Conversely, the ‘ideological’ approach would then be equated with the notion that neutrality (or rather non-alignment) is a policy to be preferred for its inherent value, tied to the normative beliefs of the population. In a sense, this notion is prevalent in Sweden today, but it should not be labelled as ‘ideological neutrality’ since this term implies an equidistance from the former Eastern and Western blocs that never characterized the Swedish population at large, the press or successive governments. Indeed, a number of breaches of neutrality by Swedish governments, always favouring the Western powers, have been revealed.

A further question is to whose views such categorizations refer. At least in Sweden, there is a division between the views of the elite and those of the broader public. In both Finland and Sweden, nostalgic and exaggerated views on the value of non-alignment and neutrality are more likely to be found among the latter group. Governments and the elite, on the other hand, have a more sober view of the value of neutrality in time of war. These groups seek to further such alternative national goals as maximizing influence with the means

7 In an opinion poll undertaken in Sweden in Sep.–Oct. 2004, 67% of respondents supported continued non-alignment, 17% supported NATO membership and 16% were undecided. Swedish National Board for Psychological Defence, "Opinion 2004" (Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar: Stockholm, 2004), URL <http://www.psycdef.se/reports/default.asp?FileID=80>, p. 79.

8 In an opinion poll undertaken in Finland in Sep.–Oct. 2004, 61% of respondents supported continued non-alignment, 34% supported joining an alliance and 5% were undecided. Unlike in Sweden, the question referred to non-alignment versus alignment, rather than explicitly mentioning NATO. Among those supporting alignment, 52% saw NATO as the preferred organization. In a follow-up question on which kind of alliance they preferred, 59% of respondents preferred NATO. Finnish Advisory Board for Defence Information, "Suomalaisten mielipiteitä ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikasta, maanpuolustuksesta ja turvallisuudesta [Finnish views on foreign and security policy, national defence and security]", Ministry of Defence, Helsinki, 27 Jan. 2004, URL <http://www.defmin.fi/print_page.phtml?menu_id=175&lang=1&chapter_id=1785>, kuvo 1, p. 9, kuvio 3, p. 11, and kuvio 9, p. 17. See also chapter 18 in this volume.

9 One such breach was the extension of runways at Swedish airbases in the east of the country. The Swedish Commission on Neutrality Policy thought that this should be viewed as facilitating emergency landings by NATO bombers returning from the East. Swedish Commission on Neutrality Policy, "Had There Been a War... Preparations for the Reception of Military Assistance 1949–1969", Report of the Commission on Neutrality Policy, Translation of Statens Offentliga Utredningar 1994:11 (Stadsrädsberedningen: Stockholm, 1994), p. 31.
they have available, within the restrictions imposed by parliamentary opposition and public views.

IV. Institutional EU integration versus military contributions

Finland and Sweden

Openness to EU integration has been more far-reaching in Finland than in Sweden. Whereas Sweden has felt freer to reject some types of cooperation, Finland has been driven by a need to be positioned at the centre of the Union. As Tiilikainen writes, security was a strong reason for Finnish membership of the EU and the expression ‘never alone again’ has often been heard from Finns. Another good example mentioned by Tiilikainen is the fact that the Finnish decision to adopt the euro was perceived as a political choice. The difference is striking here: in the Swedish discussion of this issue, many referred only to the economic factors.10

Nevertheless, there is still some hesitation in the Finnish attitude when it comes to security engagement: peace enforcement is still not doctrinally accepted, and the terms of the Finnish law requiring a UN mandate for international missions in which Finnish forces engage are stronger than in the equivalent Swedish law.11 Also, as Tiilikainen mentions, the notion of territorial defence remains strong in Finland. Sweden does not share the policy restrictions mentioned here and is also moving away from a defence policy centred on territorial defence.12

Finland’s attitude may in part be explained by the fact that it is a neighbour of Russia—geography thus coming into play again. However, this would not explain why peace enforcement has been sensitive for Finland at a time when Sweden is not only emphasizing the importance of training for such tasks but has also been actively engaged in one such operation—the EU’s Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003. The general Finnish approach to such matters that are ‘operational’ rather than institutional—

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10 Finland adopted the euro as it was established, without a referendum. In the Sep. 2003 Swedish referendum, 55.9% voted against introduction of the euro and 42% in favour. Swedish Election Authority, ‘Folkomröstning 14 september 2003 om införande av euron’ [Referendum of 14 September 2003 on introduction of the euro], 18 Sep. 2003, URL <http://www.val.se/val/emu2003/resultat/slutresultat/>.


contrary to the Swedish approach—is to be less concerned about restrictions based on principle.

Tiilikainen interprets Swedish participation in EU-led crisis management operations as being ‘power politics’. The commitment of Swedish elite forces to Operation Artemis, an operation run mainly by France, was indeed made with certain purposes in mind. The fact that the UN had asked the EU to be part of it was one important reason, but another could be seen as the defensive side of the rationale proposed by Tiilikainen: that this action was an attempt to dispel the view held by many countries that being militarily non-aligned also means fearing military engagement of a more demanding nature and seeking only to engage in civilian crisis management. This is not to say that Sweden has not sought and will not seek to gain as much influence as possible in the EU. For example, Sweden actively sought and acquired the position of a director for one of its nationals in the European Defence Agency, an important organ for Sweden.13

Comparing Finland and Sweden in these two respects thus highlights a certain parallelism: Finland seeks close integration in order to join an inner core of the EU, whereas Sweden seeks to prove its value to the organization in other ways than institutionally.

Denmark and Norway

The issues of importance for Finland and Sweden are also at the forefront for Denmark and Norway. While formally the statuses of Denmark and Norway are not similar, in practice—because of the Danish opt-outs—they both stand outside the European Security and Defence Policy, the more so since Norway has now lost the link to it that the WEU provided. As Tiilikainen explains, the situation is easier for Denmark since through the EU (not least in the context of constitutional debates) it can take standpoints that bring Denmark closer to the centre and also influence structural developments. Denmark also has a shorter path back to full cooperation within the ESDP, since it is an EU member.

For Norway, after two referendums on EU membership, the path is longer. Therefore, if Norway wants to avoid becoming marginalized (as Pernille Rieker describes it), the only path left for some time ahead is to make itself useful through its activities within the ESDP, offering ‘troops for influence’.14 Here a dilemma common to all small countries arises: regardless of the efforts made, any military inputs provided will by necessity be small compared with those of

13 Ulf Hammarström of Sweden heads the EDA’s Industry and Market Directorate.
the major countries. The danger is thus that no one will notice the implied bargain.

Most probably, the only way in which small countries are likely to be seen as adding real value, whether in the context of NATO or the EU, is if they take responsibility for regional stability. This is something for which major organizations and countries have limited capabilities and for which neighbouring countries, even small ones, have both expertise and willingness. This is precisely what the Nordic countries did vis-à-vis the Baltic region in the 1990s, with considerable success. This region is now safe, but this in itself means that the Nordic countries now no longer have a ‘natural’ security assignment where they can pursue valuable activities and earn credit.

V. European and world developments

External events have had a formidable influence on the way in which European states have interacted with each other and with organizations like the EU and NATO. Many of the developments during the 1990s served as a trigger to increase European cooperation. The wars in the former Yugoslavia led to a realization of the existence of a new world in which conflicts affected countries regardless of their institutional membership and in which all countries could have a role in handling them regardless of whether they were part of NATO or the EU.

For the Nordic countries, the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) became the concrete expression of such cooperation, providing a framework in which training could be pursued with a view to joint involvement in crisis missions. The tradition has continued in the context of the ESDP battle groups, one of which is composed of Estonian, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish forces.

Another factor that has made the differences between the two organizations less important is the growing tendency to establish work-sharing agreements in cases of crisis. One example was the crisis in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 2001. In this case, NATO, the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN worked together constructively, each contributing its particular strengths and avoiding mutual rivalry while giving an opportunity for all interested states to contribute to solving the conflict. Many other examples have followed in which civilian and military means have been combined in order to settle a conflict, taking a long-term perspective.

Furthermore, a number of events have contributed to make the security-related issues dealt with by the EU more central than those dealt with by

15 NORDCAPS was established in 1997 with the aim of strengthening existing cooperation in the Nordic Cooperation Group for Military UN Matters (NORDSAMFN) in military peace support operations and expanding it to cover operations mandated or lead by others than the UN. More information is available at URL <http://www.nordcaps.org/>. 
NATO. One of them was the 11 September 2001 attacks on the USA, which put the combating of terrorism high on the agenda. While NATO members immediately invoked the collective self-defence terms of Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, it was obvious that civilian instruments were most useful against this set of ‘new threats’. As one reflection of the international and national repercussions of the attacks, the European Security Strategy agreed by the member states in December 2003 included as its most important goals the fight against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.16 Looking at this list of threats and the means to combat them, it is obvious that the means at the EU’s own disposal—wide-ranging as they are and well suited to getting to the roots of conflict—give the organization a prominent role in fighting the conflicts of the future.

In the same way, the enlargement of the EU was clearly seen by all the Nordic countries as a highly efficient means for creating security and stability in Europe. While NATO membership was sought for its own sake, membership of the EU could deeply reshape the states seeking membership and build up their capacity for working as democratic nations, in a way that the more limited NATO membership criteria could not.

At the same time, US policies have contributed to a crisis for NATO. As the USA pursues its policies either alone or together with only a few partner countries, the situation for small countries like Denmark and Norway has deteriorated sharply. Important NATO issues are no longer discussed in plenary sessions but are instead dealt with in smaller forums. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is one example of this behaviour: it clearly shows how the most prominent member of an alliance now sees that alliance as only one of several available forums within which to work. The role of the smaller countries has, in this context, been mainly to increase the number of members that the coalition can claim to include.

A clear shift in the focus of policy and effort from NATO to the EU has taken place in all four countries. Denmark and Norway see the disadvantages of working only within the NATO fold. The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004 hardly mentions NATO.17 The Swedish defence White Paper, also published in September 2004, mentions NATO several times but declares that current developments mean that NATO is increasingly relevant to Sweden through its membership of the EU.18 The document makes many, strong references to the EU, in particular the sentence ‘It is hard to imagine that Sweden would be neutral in the event of an armed attack on another EU country’.19 Even though,

19 Swedish Government (note 12), p. 23 (author’s translation).
as Tiilikainen notes, this sentence is combined with the statement that non-alignment remains, its significance as another major step being taken away from what was once the established Swedish policy is far-reaching. In this author’s view, the shift of defence interest towards the EU in Finland and in Sweden has taken place for the same reasons as in other countries: the EU is simply the more relevant organization for the problems facing Europe today.

VI. Conclusions: the future

Obviously, countries find it easy to adjust their policies but much harder to adjust formal affiliations (and in the case of Denmark, policies that are formally entrenched). For Finland and Sweden it seems that the issue of whether or not to join NATO is slowly withering away—strong public opinion and the lack of enough political will have together taken the issue off the political agenda. At the same time, Norway will be hesitant to have another referendum on EU membership, and Denmark might lack the popular will to do something about its relationship with the ESDP. In all four countries, however, there seems to be a gap between the general opinion that things are fine as they are and the elite view that non-membership means a lack of ability to influence. As long as this gap is not bridged, it will be difficult for the elites, if they so wish, to change the views of the rest of the population.

The path of future developments in the Nordic countries, as in the past, will of course also depend on the future progress of the EU and NATO. Tiilikainen ends by saying that the Nordic countries have been good at adapting themselves; that judgement can be endorsed. The future of their institutional ties will, accordingly, depend on what they themselves are adapting to. As small states they will not shape events. The USA, as well as the major states in Europe, will largely steer further evolution, while the small countries will seek to position themselves as advantageously as possible in the new situation.

What could lead to stronger cooperation between the Nordic countries? One possible answer is a common threat or challenge in the region. It is hard, however, to imagine a scenario in which the Nordic countries would feel that they need common institutional affiliations. While the post-cold war period has seen remarkable adjustment in terms of policies, there has been remarkably little change on this basic point. Clearly, the Nordic countries attach much less importance to such matters than many other countries do. They also take a relaxed view on cooperation among themselves: they are independent countries and cooperation is important only when it promises results.

Regional cooperation is on the whole a matter fraught with difficulties for both the countries themselves and the two organizations. On the one hand, with the ideal of subsidiarity, matters should be solved at home. Baltic regional cooperation can be seen as an example of this. Common projects like NORDCAPS or ambitious attempts to use particular Nordic experiences for the good of all must also be one of the aims of European integration.
The problem is when regional groups become involved in zero-sum games, one pitted against another in the competition for common EU resources. Arguably, in many cases, if what is sought is an integrated and harmonious Europe, it is healthier that countries should not seek to form a regional group but instead find partners among all members of the organization.

If the present development continues, the most likely scenario is one in which institutional borderlines gradually wither away as the organizations grow larger and their memberships become more heterogeneous. This scenario has some advantages, promising less institutional rivalry and greater ease of cooperation. However, it would not be the best solution for the Nordic countries if it were to be combined with a trend towards ad hoc cooperation involving only the major states, the signs of which can already be seen in NATO. Big and small members together need, therefore, to master the problem of making efficiency and cohesion meet; no one would be happy with a Europe in which only a few countries were seriously involved in shaping its future.
4. Domestic influences on Nordic security and defence policy: from the perspective of fusion

Lee Miles

I. Introduction

The traditional discourse associated with the Nordic countries in the context of security questions typically emphasizes the importance of domestic factors in the shaping of their policies on the European Union’s security and defence policy and on security in general. In the first place this may simply reflect the fact that the Nordic countries are mature liberal democracies. As such, most of them display strong tendencies towards consensus policy making in the national context, and so the emphasis on seeking domestic consensus will—albeit to a limited extent—spill over into the making of foreign policy. With some simplification, there is a systemic tendency endemic in these open and transparent systems of governance to ensure that the main tenets of Nordic security policies enjoy the broad support of the elite of the mainstream political parties and often of the whole population. Second, the wider political values held by Nordic populations, such as strong attachments to internationalism, peace and security, a liberal view of human rights and moral responsibilities towards developing countries, are consistent features of the Nordic countries’ foreign policies. Of course, many might dispute whether the foreign and security policies of the Nordic countries are influenced by domestic factors and reflect the ‘will of the people’, or whether it is the foreign-policy makers who have been active in shaping the will of the population. This would, however, miss the point and is largely an esoteric exercise in analysis. What is important is to recognize that the domestic background is influential and has a complex inter-relationship with the shaping of Nordic countries’ foreign and security policies.

Furthermore, it can be argued that domestic factors will particularly influence Nordic perspectives towards the evolving European Security and Defence Policy precisely because ‘Europe’ has such resonance and attracts such controversy in Nordic domestic debates. For the domestic populations, and irrespective of whether the country is an EU member or not, discussions on Europe have a comparatively long history dating back several decades. The Nordic populations view the ESDP through the prism of broader, often volatile popular views about the merits of further integration (in Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and EU membership (in Iceland and Norway).
This chapter is not meant to provide a comprehensive case-by-case overview of the specific domestic factors influencing each Nordic country’s perspectives on the ESDP. Rather, it explores from a comparative perspective whether the importance of domestic factors in shaping Nordic attitudes to the ESDP can be explained in conceptual terms. In particular, it is assumed that Nordic policies towards the ESDP are formulated in the context of a wider national discourse on European integration per se. It is further argued that a fusion perspective (described below) can be helpful in explaining how domestic audiences view and ‘value’ the merits of participation in the ESDP. This chapter concentrates on the three Nordic EU members—Denmark, Finland and Sweden—where the national discourse is particularly well developed: domestic actors in these countries have had a substantial period in which to become familiar with the workings of EU membership and may thus be more concerned and involved with the evolution of the ESDP.

II. Strong bonds: Nordic discourse on the European Security and Defence Policy and European political integration

At face value, the external profiles of the three Nordic EU members on European security issues often seem to be rationalized in terms of the domestic debates in these countries. For convenience, the Nordic EU members can be divided into two categories, according to whether or not they are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: the ‘non-aligned Nordic EU members’—Finland and Sweden—and the ‘NATO Nordic EU member’—Denmark.

There are many similarities between the two categories and several cross-category characteristics can be identified among the domestic discourses on the European security issues. All show a strong tendency towards internationalism that highlights the importance of international law and of global international institutions, such as the United Nations, as the legitimate regulators of the conduct of nation states. The role of the UN in particular is usually regarded in Nordic countries as being essential for legitimizing peacekeeping operations and humanitarian intervention. Domestic political actors are accustomed to consenting to Nordic participation in operations conducted under the auspices or with the approval of the UN. Leading on from this, the Nordic countries have largely been favourable to notions of active participation in international crisis management. Hence, debates on the ESDP have to be placed in the context of a mainstream Nordic political discourse that favours international crisis management and a primary role for the UN in general terms.

In addition, the discourse in the Nordic countries shows that there is an awareness of regionalism. This reflects not just the countries’ status as small states that are conscious of their dependence on the actions of leading European and Atlantic powers but also the importance of regional questions such as the concepts of ‘the North’ or ‘Norden’ and, more recently, the Baltic Sea frame-
work. While it is debatable whether a ‘Nordic model’ ever existed or exists today, specific aspects that are widely associated with it still form part of the popular terminology applied by the Nordic populations to discussions of general European security questions. In addition, popular debates on the ESDP in the Nordic countries share a similar starting assessment of the strategic changes affecting northern Europe: that with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the main security issues for Europe have become less ‘hard’ and more fluid. Nordic security debates are conducted against a domestic undercurrent that favours broader ‘soft security’ interpretations of the new security threats, to encompass not just crisis management but also areas such as public health, the environment, civil nuclear power and pollution. In other words, the Nordic political elites, with the support of their domestic populations, are ‘believers in soft security’ and are accustomed to articulate arguments that do not restrict notions of European security to purely territorial or collective defence.

In addition, the two categories have often displayed similar views on the merits of European integration. All three Nordic EU members—at both the political elite and public levels—resist the idea of the EU’s developing into a federal Europe. In other words, the domestic backgrounds are dominated by a strong dose of ‘federo-scepticism’.1 It is from this perspective also that Nordic viewpoints on the ESDP should be interpreted. In particular, the evolving ESDP should not be construed as, or imply a direct integrative impetus towards, the constitutional establishment of a federal Europe. In the case of Finland and Sweden, this may lead the governments, with public support, to uphold the semblance of non-alignment as a bulwark against a federally inclined ESDP or against the Union becoming a collective defence organization like NATO. For Denmark, ‘federo-scepticism’ has created a situation in which only an official opt-out from the ESDP could solve the problem.

The two categories are also faced with similar security challenges affecting not just these Nordic countries but the whole European continent. To the east lies the challenge of maintaining good relations with Russia and, in more recent times, the EU’s pressing challenge of how to engage Russia in managing the wide-ranging ‘soft security’ questions emanating from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Finnish popular security debates, for example, often express public concerns about a potentially unstable Russia. To the west, the Nordic countries face the implications of the events of 11 September 2001, the ‘war on terrorism’, and a more assertive US foreign policy under President George W. Bush that demands more forthright responses from the European allies and partners of the USA.2 In addition, all—irrespective of whether they are NATO members


or not—are faced with responding to the changing security agenda of NATO and to the demands for the alliance to redefine its contribution to European security.

Nevertheless, the division of these three Nordic countries into two categories in order to examine the domestic background is conceptually useful.

**Finland and Sweden: non-aligned Nordic EU members**

In Finland and Sweden the central issue in domestic debates on European security matters has remained the continuation of their long-standing policies of non-alignment. On the one hand, their official definitions of non-alignment have become more flexible since 1989 and are now largely restricted to the narrow formula of ‘non-participation in military alliances’. On this basis, domestic support for participation in greater EU security cooperation becomes conditional on its not contravening non-alignment. On the other hand, the domestic background in Finland and Sweden is also characterized by a continuing—if declining—degree of public attachment to (the revised form of) non-alignment. This would make it difficult for the governments to abandon it, should they so wish. In the Swedish case at least, and as Lars Trägårdh argues, non-alignment has been an integral part of Sweden’s political culture and one of the tenets of the ‘Swedish model’ that helped to shape the country’s popular, essentially social democrat-inspired political culture. In the Finnish case, and as Toivo Miljan has written, non-alignment has been perceived by most domestic actors as having succeeded in keeping out the troops if not the influence of the Soviet Union and has thus been integral to the post-World War II survival of Finland as an independent sovereign state.

Although there may be some disagreement as to how accurate these statements are today, one thing is clear. Domestic actors in Finland and Sweden, and the populations in general, have been reluctant to give up the non-aligned status that makes these states more distinctive in the international environment and thus makes it easier for them to pursue active internationalism, as well as being ultimately effective in keeping these states out of the major conflicts affecting Europe in the 20th century. Such ‘successful’ non-alignment, when combined with a healthy dose of ‘federo-scepticism’, sets the key parameters for how foreign-policy makers in these two countries perceive existing and future ESDP options.

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3 This is despite the fact that the publics often turned a blind eye to the participation of Finland and Sweden, which is extensive enough to warrant the term ‘semi-alignment’. Miles, L., ‘Sweden and Finland’, eds I. Manners and R. G. Whitman, *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States* (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2000), pp. 181–203.


Denmark: NATO Nordic EU member

In Denmark (and the non-EU NATO members Iceland and Norway), Atlanticism accompanies ‘federal-scepticism’. The government gained domestic support for participation in NATO by arguing that Atlanticism and a close relationship with the USA were essential prerequisites for the country’s secure future and for the stability of the Nordic region. Of course, the Danish population (unlike that of Norway) has not always unreservedly accepted this, and the government was often keen to stress that Nordic Atlanticism was qualified by an attachment to the key common Nordic internationalist values mentioned above. Hence, for many years Denmark (like Norway) balanced its active participation in NATO with a ‘no foreign bases’ policy that rejected the permanent stationing of NATO forces and any nuclear presence on their territories. Nevertheless, it can be argued that in Denmark (as well as Iceland and Norway) the primacy of Atlanticism was portrayed and largely accepted by domestic actors as the core of successful security policies.

From the perspective of the Nordic members of NATO, the evolving ESDP has been viewed through the prism of Atlanticism: thus, in domestic debates, the Danes, Icelanders and Norwegians have shown concern that the ESDP should not undermine the role of NATO, whose membership they value. When this is linked with widespread ‘federal-scepticism’, national actors are concerned that the ESDP should imply neither a reduced role for NATO nor an integrative move by the EU towards a federal Europe.

In all three Nordic EU member states there is also something of an elite versus grass roots division of emphases as regards Nordic security policy. It would seem that domestic actors and, in particular, the publics are more deeply attached to the ‘theology’ of their respective existing security policies—be it non-alignment or Atlanticism. In contrast, and with some simplification, the diplomatic demands of conducting negotiations on security issues have made the political elites of the countries more pragmatic regarding their existing policy stances and more open to the supranational development of the ESDP.

III. The domestic background: structural considerations

In addition to the general Nordic domestic discourse on the ESDP, it is also important to recognize structural considerations shaping Nordic policy on the ESDP. First has been the capacity of Nordic governments for initiating fresh domestic discussions on Nordic security policy in general and the ESDP in particular. This is an important variable inter alia because the propensity for launching public debates is shaped partly by the division of the power to lead security policy. In the Finnish case, for example, formal competence for EU policy and for certain aspects of foreign policy was moved from the president to the prime minister by constitutional reforms implemented in 2000. This change was, in part, in recognition of the wide-ranging impact of the EU on domestic
policy making. Equally, the frequency and diversity of contributions from political leadership has increased in all three countries since the remit of the ESDP covers several policy areas, requiring informal and formal agreements and public commentaries from prime ministers’ offices and ministries of foreign affairs, defence and even justice.

The domestic implications of the ESDP have been recognized by Nordic political leaders. The Nordic prime ministers are progressively assuming active responsibility for coordinating national policy on the EU and, in particular, the ESDP. This is important reassuring domestic audiences as to why the EU has moved, or been perceived to have moved, from its status in the early 1990s as a ‘civilian power’ concerned largely with single market politics towards the Union of today with access to military capabilities. In the Nordic countries, the greater propensity for the prime minister to make leading statements on EU matters not only reflects a government imperative for coordination ‘from the top’, but can also be taken as a message for domestic audiences that the EU is a permanent feature of daily domestic politics.

As Cynthia Kite illustrates in chapter 5, other structural considerations include the characteristics of the countries’ party systems, the configuration of governing party coalitions and parliamentary alliances, and the degree of effort made by the parties to handle ESDP-related issues without provoking inter- and intra-party divisions. These factors are important since they affect the effectiveness of transmission channels between the governing political elite and wider domestic audiences in the Nordic countries. Several observations are worth making here. First, domestic party attitudes towards the ESDP are influenced by the parties’ orientation towards EU membership in general and are affected by the degree of EU participation and Europeanization of the respective party organizations. In general, the parties on the centre-left and left of the political spectrum are those where opposition to EU membership remains strongest (as in Denmark and Sweden), Europeanization has been slowest and the converse attachment to Nordic welfare models remains strong. The centre-left parties are usually influential players—and sometimes ‘natural’ parties of government—in the party systems of the Nordic countries and, as Kite argues, the level of intra-party division on security issues can be significant. For example, in the Swedish case, the popularity of non-alignment among members of the Social Democratic Party has been important in ensuring the government’s continuation of this policy and its consequently selective enthusiasm for the evolving ESDP. Sweden has had only minority Social Democrat governments since its accession to the EU, and this has contributed to a remarkable consistency in the evolution of Swedish policy towards the ESDP. In addition, the role of the agrarian-based Centre parties has been influential in the Finnish and Swedish party systems, where these parties have been a domestic reservoir of continuing support for non-alignment.

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6 It should, however, be noted that opposition to EU membership can be found on the right of the political spectrum as well.
The stability of the party system, which affects the durability of governing coalitions, is also a factor and in this respect the domestic experiences of EU membership have differed across the Nordic EU members. Denmark joined the EU in 1973, around the same time as a fragmenting of the Danish party system that has sometimes made the building of cross-party accords on EU matters difficult. In contrast, Finnish governmental policy making on the ESDP was facilitated by the ‘rainbow coalition’ government (1995–2003) that ensured general accord across the Finnish political spectrum for the basic tenets of Finnish EU policy during the critical early years of Finnish EU membership. As Kite highlights, none of the political parties represented in the Finnish Parliament opposes full Finnish membership of the EU and there is strong elite support for the ESDP.

The existence of durable cross-party elite consensus is a significant domestic background factor since it can influence the likelihood that key aspects of EU policy will be subject to further approval by public referendum. In Denmark, for example, where there are party divisions on the future of the opt-outs on the ESDP and other areas, participation in the ESDP will require de facto public approval through a referendum either on removing the relevant opt-out or on acceptance of the ESDP as part of any proposed EU constitution. In Sweden, where there are also party divisions on the EU, a referendum on the abandoning of non-alignment cannot be completely ruled out, although it is rather unlikely in practice. In Finland, where there is strong cross-party consensus behind existing Finnish EU policy, resort to public referendums is very rare.

IV. The fusion perspective and the European Security and Defence Policy

This chapter argues that domestic viewpoints on the evolving ESDP can be interpreted through the application of a fusion perspective. Based on the work of Wolfgang Wessels, the fusion perspective is used here to explain the formulation and implementation of national EU policy that lies at the nexus between the national and supranational levels of the EU policy cycle. A fusion perspective can provide valuable insights into how the national political elites...
value membership of the European Union and may accurately describe the ways in which governments tend to view the benefits of the ESDP.

Two caveats should be noted. First, aspects of the fusion thesis, as articulated by Wessels,\(^\text{10}\) must be applied selectively since the main focus of this study is on domestic discourses on the ESDP—a micro-perspective in terms of the whole domestic interface of national EU policy. Second, the micro-level fusion perspective largely focuses on using fusion as a ‘set of values’ that underpin the domestically derived assumptions of national policy makers when devising and implementing national EU policy. It may more accurately be described as a perspective than a thesis when addressing the domestically influenced values of policy makers developing national approaches to the EU. It also has much less to say about the effectiveness of the national strategies that they adopt. National policy makers view European integration in different yet complementary forms—defined here as ‘performance fusion’, ‘political fusion’ and ‘compound fusion’.

Performance fusion: an output-related integration mentality

The fusion perspective adopts a particular view of how and why states want to participate in European integration. Government perceptions of European integration, ever conscious of domestic viewpoints, remain largely rational and ‘state-centric’ in orientation. Domestic elite support for full membership status is based on the perceived benefits that European integration brings in terms of both domestic and international policy solutions. States favour the gradual ‘pooling’ of sovereignty with a view to joint problem solving in the EU largely because of the needs emanating from domestic politics and the imperatives set by interdependence.

Most importantly, fusion stresses that—in relation to EU matters—national elites are concerned with the relationship between the role of the nation state, as a welfare and service provider for its citizens, and the implications of interdependence.\(^\text{11}\) The elites are concerned that national policy makers find it increasingly hard to meet their citizens’ expectations—in this case in the realms of security policy—because interdependence limits the effectiveness of domestic policy instruments if they are used alone. In order to improve practical capabilities, national political elites—with the conditional support of their domestic populations—are receptive to integration while also trying to counter any negative consequences through the greater use of shared policy instruments. According to the fusion perspective, national policy makers adopt a performance-related integration mentality that links European integration processes to the evolution of the nation state and the effectiveness of policy instruments. This implies that most national actors view European integration on the basis of ‘performance-related criteria’. They are willing to accept deeper Euro-

\(^{10}\) Wessels, ‘An ever closer fusion?’ (note 8).

ean integration provided that the Union delivers political and economic results that can no longer be produced using traditional national strategies and policies. Domestic support for the Union—and for development of the ESDP—is not based primarily on commitment to a vision of an integrated Europe. Rather, it arises largely because being part of the Union (and having the ESDP) and the selective use of supranational policy making are seen to provide substantial ‘output’ benefits.

Nevertheless, EU members also have to accept that EU participation will lead to the transformation of the role of the nation state in those policy areas where the Union has competences. Popular support for the Union—according to performance fusion—is output related. Citizens accept perceived reductions in national autonomy provided that such constraints are balanced by benefits deriving from membership of the Union. If these are not delivered, they may question the advantages of European integration in general and of developing the ESDP in particular.

The Union’s future success becomes an infused part of a state’s national interest. Consequently, domestic actors have a stake in ensuring that the Union succeeds in the future, in order to enhance domestic policy outcomes, even if this meanwhile affects and complicates daily politics back home.

Turning specifically to the ESDP, and regardless of whether any given Nordic country is a non-aligned or a NATO EU member, domestic actors prefer their governments to be actively involved in European security issues with an emphasis on achieving a concrete performance output and contribution to European security operations and frameworks. At a rather simplistic level, the preferred output remains the avoidance of Nordic involvement in European wars. Whether their country is non-aligned or a NATO member, the ‘soft security’ and internationalist preferences of the Nordic populations have at their heart a desire for the Nordic region to remain a ‘zone of peace’. Thus, the ESDP is judged against general criteria that gauge its success in conflict prevention, both close to home in the Nordic region and around the Baltic Sea and on the wider borders of the Union.

There are three more specific performance-related outputs that reflect common Nordic preferences among domestic actors. First, performance fusion implies that the Nordic populations will show a special interest in foreign policy actions that enhance crisis management, since this is often regarded as the key to wider regional peace and stability. Nordic domestic actors have consistently focused on the practical mechanisms for achieving crisis management, while still showing a strong identification with the traditional foreign policy orientation—be it non-alignment or Atlanticism—of the country concerned. This should be reflected in a habitual focus by Nordic domestic actors on delivering crisis management effectively. Second, there is a widespread Nordic view that crisis management functions should not be exclusively ‘West-

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ern’ operations and, above all, prominent domestic actors often advocate the active involvement of Russia. This is partly for domestic consumption in those countries where the inclusion of Russia in operations is viewed positively. Third, there is a common Nordic view that the performance outputs of the ESDP should not be restricted to military affairs. In particular, the ‘soft security’ preferences of Nordic actors have led them to argue for extending performance goals to include civil crisis management.\textsuperscript{13}

**Political fusion: a ‘third way’ for European integration**

The micro-level fusion perspective further holds that policy makers, with domestic support, also adopt a position towards European integration per se and, in particular, on the path they would like to see the Union take in its future evolution.

Domestic actors perceive that, in order to lessen the potential erosion of statehood arising from performance fusion, there are two alternative ‘exit’ strategies for EU policies: strengthened intergovernmental cooperation and the construction of a federal state. In practice, however, domestic actors are dissatisfied with both. They dislike the limitations of intergovernmental cooperation because the effectiveness of common decisions is reduced by the lack of mechanisms to ensure universal compliance. On the other hand, national elites and publics are wary of federal solutions since they are perceived to threaten the existing constitutional and national character of West European states. As part of political fusion, domestic actors perceive integration as a ‘third way’ between intergovernmentalism and federalism. The future path of the European Union can be seen as ‘pro-integration’ and ‘supranational’—accommodating the domestic actors’ rejection of the limited effectiveness and ambitions of pure intergovernmentalism on the one hand and, on the other, their general dislike of the negative implications of constitutional federalism in terms of national sovereignty.

In the domestic context, most member states see a qualitative difference between ‘supranationalism’ and ‘federalism’, even if the implications in practice are less clear-cut. EU supranationalism is often regarded by member states as, to some extent, more performance-related, piecemeal and flexible than a federal model, and domestic actors feel that they have the ability to restrict how far supranationalism is extended in the EU—something that goes down well with national voters. In addition, supranationalism can be portrayed in domestic debates as being less ‘symbolic’ and thereby less ‘threatening’ to national sovereignty since governments often rationalize it as a means to deliver national goals. Supranationalism enjoys a broader range of domestic support as it fits with the widespread view of the Union as a largely elite-dominated system of shared management, with an agenda-setting (and supranational) technocracy at its centre. In contrast, federalism is considered to be constitution-orientated, pri-

\textsuperscript{13} See chapter 11 in this volume.
marily concerned with democratic legitimacy and consequently highly ‘symbolic’. Federalism, rightly or wrongly, is broadly interpreted by member states as requiring a final pooling of sovereignty.

This does not mean that domestic actors possess a detailed vision of how the Union should be configured—apart from the recognition that it may include (selective) supranational characteristics. Clearly, many do not; but they are certain of one thing—what they do not want to see the EU evolve into. For the vast majority of domestic actors, this means a ‘federal Europe’ that has substantial constitutional implications for the existing nation states.

In essence, people are searching for a ‘third way’ for European integration in which a more ambitious policy agenda can be embraced through supranational decision making. This third way would secure the benefits of performance fusion without resorting to a radical new constitutional arrangement for Europe that would not be popular domestically. It amounts to a process of fusion with an undecided *finalité politique*.14

Nordic domestic attitudes should display an implicit and sometimes explicit preference for a third way for the evolving ESDP. First, Nordic domestic discourse may indicate that, although crisis management is desirable, it must be compatible with general domestic preferences for European integration. Purely intergovernmental crisis management is no longer regarded as being especially effective. This is particularly so given the logic of Nordic ‘internationalist’ preferences that require any crisis management intervention to have the support of the international community through the UN. The selective use of supranational organizations is regarded as beneficial, as they are multinational and often have established, integrated command structures. Nevertheless, any supranational development of the ESDP to facilitate crisis management should not imply or be construed as leading to major domestic constitutional reform, nor should it lead to further pressure for movement towards a federal Europe. In short, the common Nordic domestic background to the ESDP sets parameters for this policy’s development that are more or less reminiscent of a ‘third way’, balancing demands for effective crisis management with the caution typical of Nordic ‘federo-scepticism’.

**Compound fusion: the European Union as a ‘compound polity’**

The fusion perspective assumes that domestic actors regard the European Union as a ‘compound polity’. From a fusion perspective, the EU encompasses a process in which political institutions have fused their competences and powers—on a broadening scale and with growing intensity—for preparing, making, implementing and controlling binding decisions for public policies through the use of state-like instruments. The Union is thus viewed as a kind of state-like

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politico-administrative system that works in conjunction with, rather than serving to replace, the existing nation states. This is called ‘compound fusion’, in which governments, administrations and actors increasingly pool and share public resources from several levels to attain commonly identified goals. Compound fusion also envisages the participation in this EU core network of a wide array of actors outside the central government administrations. The Union continues under compound fusion to be regarded as a fused organization of member states and supranational elements.

Selective extensions of the supranational powers of the EU are sanctioned by the member states, leading to a mix of policy instruments. The system of mixed competences in the present Union enables domestic actors to ‘value’ the compound nature of the EU polity, since it allows integration to take place without its being perceived in domestic circles as damaging other key ‘national interests’.

Any attempts to make once-and-for-all, clear-cut divisions of competence between the national and EU level (as in federal models) are deemed politically sensitive. In reality, the EU plays an important role in the processes that lead to the adoption of national decisions and standpoints, as much as vice versa. Compound fusion does not envisage any strict division between the national and the European. Resources are merged so that the accountability and responsibilities for specific policies are diffused.

The fusion perspective suggests that the Nordic domestic discourse actually envisages the ESDP as delivering a kind of compound crisis management. In particular, Nordic populations would prefer the ESDP not to focus on hard security and territorial defence mandates, since these either are incompatible with non-alignment or are an aspect of security already provided through NATO. Instead, ESDP personnel should be dedicated to wider ‘soft security’ roles such as crisis management. Hence, the Nordic populations will not oppose—although support will sometimes be reluctant—the idea of Nordic military officials working in or for EU or NATO crisis management command structures or of those structures being part of EU- or NATO-led peacekeeping operations that place Nordic soldiers at the disposal of NATO or EU commanders. In essence, then, the ESDP has become a merged compound of national and EU personnel, of EU and non-EU roles, and of EU–NATO processes mediated through, for example, the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements.

V. Empirical evaluation

This chapter does not attempt to give a wide-ranging empirical analysis. Instead, this section provides an illustrative overview of the domestic discourse

16 The ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements were made in Apr. 1999 between the EU and NATO and deal primarily with the EU’s access to NATO planning capabilities but also with other assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations.
common to the Nordic non-aligned and NATO EU members from a fusion perspective.

**Finland and Sweden: non-aligned Nordic EU members**

*Performance characteristics*

As noted above, non-alignment in Nordic countries has always been somewhat flexible and the task of interpreting its parameters has largely been in the hands of the foreign policy elite whose task is (with domestic support) to translate non-alignment into practice. Hence, there have been subtle differences even between Finnish and Swedish non-alignment. Changes made to both Finnish and Swedish security policy since the 1990s, however, have made it less doctrinal and thereby increased the weight attached to performance criteria, helping non-alignment to survive the fact that a bipolar Europe has ceased to exist. Non-alignment has also been interpreted more flexibly by domestic opinion. After the events of 11 September 2001, while governments emphasized that ESDP actions must be compatible with international law, domestic discourse has broadly accepted the need for participation in key activities and downplays the need for formal membership of organizations. The stress is on delivering results through cooperation rather than on the question of membership status.

Here, too, however, there have been differences in emphasis between the Finnish and Swedish cases. In 1995–96 Finland embarked on an open debate about the future viability of NATO membership, and the issue has returned intermittently to the fore of Finnish domestic politics ever since. In contrast, the Swedish debate has been more constrained and the issue of NATO membership remains a sensitive undercurrent in domestic politics. In general, Finnish domestic actors can be said to be more advanced in their deliberations on NATO, less convinced of the long-term viability of non-alignment and more likely to consider NATO membership as attractive.

However, neither the Finnish nor the Swedish domestic debate is primarily focused on NATO, at least in the context of crisis management roles. Rather, the governments have used performance-related arguments to highlight the advantages of the emerging ESDP, while arguing against the EU developing a ‘hard’ defence dimension. The Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson, in a key speech in February 2003 outlining governmental views on the future of the EU, highlighted a ‘practical mentality at work’. Persson stated that, ‘Should a member state fall victim to an international terrorist attack, the other member states would come to its assistance if the attacked state so requested’ and that he had ‘nothing against committing this solidarity to a treaty’. However, he was

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equally insistent that ‘it must not take the form of a common defence’. Nevertheless, the Swedish public also regard it as crucial that international approval for such activities is maintained and that military operations are sanctioned by the international community and the UN.

In Finland, the discourse contains more prominent and traditional preoccupations with hard security. On the one hand, Finnish domestic actors and the public are more comfortable with the European integration process in general than are their counterparts in Sweden. As Pernille Rieker observes, EU membership has been ‘seen as a way for Finland to confirm its long repressed Western identity, and not as a threat to national sovereignty and freedom of action’. Hence, in the Finnish case, the ESDP seems to be more readily, if not universally, accepted as a possible future substitute for non-alignment and as an integral part of the EU as an existing security policy actor. However, the Finnish domestic discourse on security matters is still shaped by traditional security considerations and by the country’s long border with Russia.

Performance characteristics have been invoked to rationalize retaining non-alignment. The Swedish and, to a lesser extent, Finnish publics largely hold the view that non-alignment has a good track record and has delivered direct benefits. For the Swedes, it is widely perceived to have enabled their country to avoid involvement in wars since 1814, while the more pragmatic Finns universally regarded non-alignment following World War II as the only viable policy—other than being subsumed into the Eastern bloc—that could balance Finnish preferences with Soviet security concerns. Thus, any new arrangements must be seen as delivering equivalent or improved benefits in terms of Finnish and Swedish peace and security. As Anders Bjurner comments, Swedish security policy ‘has to be based on popular support and the view of the majority of the people has to be respected’.

Given Finland’s and Sweden’s successful histories of involvement in NATO-led crisis management operations, as well as their influence as non-aligned EU members on the emerging agendas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the ESDP, the majority of Swedes—and to a lesser extent Finns—are still inclined to feel that their country should abandon non-alignment only if future membership of NATO would discernibly increase the country’s or the region’s security. The ‘burden of proof’ remains with those who want Finland and Sweden to join NATO. The case has so far not been sufficient to convince the publics that NATO membership would bring benefits on the necessary scale.

Nordic publics also seem receptive to arguments that military crisis management must be complemented by EU (and NATO) civil arrangements as part of

practical peacekeeping. Familiar with years of Swedish, and sometimes Finnish, involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, the publics can readily see that crisis management requires not just short-term military intervention, but also medium- to long-term civil cooperation, particularly in building indigenous police forces able to maintain legitimate civil order. Finnish and Swedish security discourse accepts, with qualified domestic support, that crisis arrangements should include a fused compound not just of military and civil dimensions but also of national and EU personnel. Domestically, the EU is now accepted as a leading provider of crisis management capabilities.

The third way for security policy

In terms of domestic discourse, as noted above, the idea that European crisis management can be carried out on a purely intergovernmental basis has long been discounted. As Nordic participation in the missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and elsewhere testifies, the publics have largely accepted the merits of multinational and supranational frameworks, provided by the EU and NATO, as being the most appropriate for European crisis management. Indeed, although the general impression is that the Finns and the Swedes favour intergovernmental solutions, domestic actors have actually been receptive to Nordic participation in supranational arrangements provided that these are seen to deliver effective crisis management capabilities.

Just as the governments in broad policy terms have sought a ‘third way’ by retaining a looser loyalty to non-alignment that avoids provoking popular sensibilities over unqualified ESDP participation or NATO membership, domestic actors in both countries have displayed preferences for a ‘third way’ as regards the development of the EU’s capabilities in security and defence. While supporting the extension of the CFSP and the Union’s ‘soft security’ capabilities for meeting wider challenges in Europe, including an effective crisis management apparatus, the publics have been cautious about the Union developing an overt ‘common defence’. As Kite indicates, a majority of both the Finnish (63 per cent) and Swedish (56 per cent) publics believe that decisions on foreign policy should be made jointly within the EU: yet larger majorities are convinced that defence decisions should remain the preserve of the national governments (87 per cent in Finland and 76 per cent in Sweden). At least in Sweden, domestic actors have been very wary of the idea that the emerging ESDP might include a common defence provision, which they would see as transforming the Union into a formal military alliance.

From a fusion perspective, this is also significant since many Swedes and, to a lesser extent, Finns view the transformation of the EU into a military collective defence organization as a key indicator of a wider intention to move towards a European ‘superstate’. From the perspective of political fusion, the

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21 See table 5.1 in chapter 5 in this volume.
formal commitment to a defence alliance is avoided in much the same way as ‘constitutional’ arrangements are treated with suspicion in other spheres of EU activity.\(^{22}\)

In Sweden, the Persson government’s policy towards the negotiations on a constitution for the EU throughout 2003 is indicative here. In the run-up to the ill-fated European Council negotiations in December 2003, and alongside general worries that the draft EU constitution should not represent a leap to a federal design, possible reforms of the CFSP and the ESDP were prominently reported in Sweden and debated in the Swedish Parliament. The Prime Minister took a cautious line, arguing that the ESDP could be improved but that it must remain open for all member states and be transparent, in order both to preserve Sweden’s non-alignment and to avert worries about the Union becoming over-involved in defence planning. For domestic consumption, the Finnish and Swedish governments voiced concerns that the ESDP should not be dominated by ‘small clubs’ and that purely EU-led defence initiatives might create tensions between non-aligned countries and those whose security is linked to NATO. They were thus mistrustful of some larger EU countries’ support for ‘structural cooperation’ provisions in the ESDP that would leave room for bilateral or multilateral defence initiatives that might take the EU further into the realms of common defence. The publics also saw such initiatives as possibly leading the EU to compete with or duplicate roles currently provided by NATO.

Looking forward, the domestic discourse in Finland and Sweden increasingly revolves around two issues. The first is whether the ESDP—through, for example, the proposed EU constitution\(^{23}\)—may conceivably lead to an all-embracing EU provision on collective defence and what this would mean for non-aligned EU members.\(^{24}\) The second lies in the performance-related desires of EU governments to enhance EU military capabilities through restructuring, and what this means for relations with NATO and for the configuration of national armed forces. Both issues need to be handled delicately by the Finnish and Swedish governments since, regardless of the fate of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty, they tend to enhance domestic perceptions of the EU as having negative impacts on national arrangements and existing policy stances. Domestic perceptions, while accepting a ‘third way’ of political fusion that accepts selective supranationalism in the case of crisis management, still maintain a wider suspicion either of a single EU collective defence policy or of comprehensive NATO membership for the whole of Europe.


\(^{23}\) The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 19 Oct. 2004 but has not been ratified. The text of the treaty is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm> and selected articles are reproduced in the appendix in this volume.

\(^{24}\) Herolf, G. and Huldt, B., ‘The European Union and the inclusion of a collective defence clause’, eds E. Reiter, R., Rummel and P. Schmidt, Europas ferne Streitmacht: Chancen und Schwierigkeiten der Europäischen Union beim Aufbau der ESVP [Europe’s distant military force; opportunities and difficulties for the European Union in establishing the ESDP], Forschungen zur Sicherheitspolitik no. 6 (Mittler: Hamburg, 2002), pp. 67–70.
Compound crisis management?

The Finnish and Swedish view of European crisis management can also be equated with compound fusion. Both countries’ publics have long accepted the merits of European crisis management, while maintaining a general preference for flexible ‘coalitions of the willing’ using differing multinational organizations after securing international legal approval from the UN. The Nordic view of European crisis management envisages the involvement of a large number of actors and a far from clear division of competence among the multinational organizations engaged in crisis management operations, even within one geographical area. Where possible, the publics of both Finland and Sweden favour wider Nordic cooperation for crisis management solutions and have, for example, welcomed their governments’ establishment of a joint EU battle group as part of their contribution to an EU rapid deployment force. In practice, the EU is seen as the partner organization that can deliver the best results at the right time, using its multifunctional resources. This would not, however, exclude cooperation with any or all of the leading organizations and partners in Europe if the results would be more effective.25 Two examples are illustrative here. First, in December 2003 NATO chose Sweden as the site for the inaugural meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Security Forum, which discusses and encourages multilateral approaches to crisis management. The meeting took place in Åre on 24–25 May 2005. Second, domestic support for Nordic troops working under EU-, NATO-, UN- and Western European Union-led command at various times has been sustained. Finland became the first non-NATO member to assume command of a component of the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo in the spring of 2003 and has, with public support, also contributed experts and financial assistance to EU peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003.

In line with the logic of ‘fusion’, Finnish and Swedish participation in European crisis management has facilitated further re-thinking of Sweden’s own security planning and defence forces, with substantial domestic repercussions. In general, the Swedish Government has been quicker than its Finnish counterpart to argue that the ESDP and crisis management will lead to national defence reforms. In terms of popular support for the ESDP, however, the perception that Europe is helping to transform the national defence apparatus cuts both ways. The Swedish and—to a lesser extent—Finnish populations have both liked and disliked the idea of forging more flexible national military structures that can be used for both national and international contingencies (and that enhance the professionalism of the armed forces). Popular caution reflects, not least, the fact that for Sweden the defence reforms made since 1999–2000 represent the start

of the biggest transformation of national defence forces in the post-cold war period and that they demand unpopular defence cuts and base closures.\textsuperscript{26}

The domestic debate in Sweden also seems to be more advanced, at least at elite level, as regards the civilian aspects of security and combating terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{27} As Bengt Sundelius argues, Sweden needs to replace the tradition of ‘total defence’ with what he calls a ‘societal defence’ that seeks to reduce the vulnerability of civil society; and there has been a growing domestic debate both on this idea and on the possible evolution of an EU internal crisis management capability. On the whole, the Nordic publics have been receptive not least because fears of terrorist attack have also grown in the Nordic countries. Hence, the Swedes place a greater emphasis on ‘comprehensive security’ or ‘functional security’,\textsuperscript{28} facilitated by the Europeanization of Swedish security policy. However, Finnish attention to internal security matters is accelerating with the government’s adoption of an internal security programme on 23 September 2004.\textsuperscript{29} Indeed, the Finnish Government’s 2004 report on Finnish security and defence policy formally states that defence planning now takes place in conjunction with internal security considerations.\textsuperscript{30}

As regards the domestic ESDP debate, the evolution of the ESDP may actually be used by the two governments to constrain the discussion about eventually joining NATO, which is already limited in Sweden but is more open in Finland. There is a popular view among the political elite that the non-aligned countries already enjoy the benefits of a ‘third way’ in the form of the existing ESDP. The ESDP has the major advantage of not having the USA as a participant, whereas NATO is typically seen by Nordic non-members as coming under direct US leadership. Although the Finns and Swedes are mostly happy to see European security efforts led by the USA, they remain anxious about recent trends in US foreign policy that have tended towards a greater reliance upon ‘aggressive unilateralism’. Thus, while the Swedish (and Finnish) view may often be ‘Atlanticist’,\textsuperscript{31} both countries suffer from bouts of anxiety. If the respective political elites wish to abandon non-alignment, then an ESDP that (so far) encapsulates a softer and more progressive ‘European way’ may be an attractive route for Nordic security policy. The ‘EU-ification’ of Swedish (and Finnish) activism in the defence and security field will thus continue.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{26} See chapter 7 in this volume.
\textsuperscript{27} Rieker (note 19).
\textsuperscript{31} Herolf and Huldt (note 24), p. 77.
Denmark: NATO Nordic EU member

Performance characteristics

Given that Denmark is the longest-serving Nordic EU member, it should be easy to find evidence to show whether domestic interests are important for Danish perspectives on European security cooperation. In practice, however, Danish domestic perspectives on the EU per se have always included a substantial performance-orientated element. As Kite shows in chapter 5, while 63 per cent of Danes voted for accession in the 1972 referendum on membership of the European Community (EC), domestic support was largely secured on the grounds that the EC was to remain an essentially economic-orientated ‘Common Market’. For most of the 1970s and 1980s, the Danes resisted any political or institutional reform that sought to extend the supranational (never mind federal) credentials of the EC institutions. However, accompanying the original economic arguments was a so-called ‘security argument’ in favour of Danish participation in European integration that did strike a chord in domestic discourse and provided a persuasive rationale for the domestic actors: that economic and political integration was a precondition for a transformation of the military rivalry between France and Germany.

Danish attitudes towards the question of EU membership have become less hostile over time. Thomas Pedersen argues that from 1990—and in spite of a few serious hiccups on the way such as that in 1992 over the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) and in 2000 over adopting the euro—33-the Danish elite has become more predisposed to accept EC/EU supranationality.34 Denmark is no longer an ‘EU-sceptic’ state since there is widespread elite acceptance of the benefits of being a full member. Yet it remains a fervent ‘federo-sceptic’, with the Danish elite and public both expressing major reservations over the direction of further European integration and outright opposition to anything that represents a movement to a ‘federal Europe’.

For the Danish public, not easily predisposed to political integration, the performance case for integration has needed to be particularly persuasive. As Lene Hansen shows,35 this was the particular problem with the debate over the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992: accepting the case that the treaty would improve performance demanded too great an act of faith on the part of the Danish population when it also included new integrative measures on European Monetary Union, the CFSP and cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs. In simple terms, and particularly in the case of the CFSP, the performance case was not sufficiently overwhelming.

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It is equally notable that, of the four opt-outs negotiated after the Danish public’s rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht in the June 1992 referendum, the one pertaining to defence policy is expressed in terms that diverge most from the original articles of the Treaty of Maastricht. Making the performance case for the CFSP and the ESDP has thus become more complicated in domestic terms since the formal opt-outs set the parameters of domestic discussion on the ESDP in many instances. Notably, and despite its NATO membership, the ESDP opt-out means that Denmark does not fully participate in EU discussions and decisions on defence matters. Domestic considerations are fundamentally important for Danish national policy on the ESDP since the government has to consider, in addition to the impact of the opt-outs on relations with the EU, the attitudes of the mainstream political parties in Denmark and their relationship with the CFSP and the ESDP. As Kite indicates, Danish public opinion shows strong support (57 per cent) for defence decisions remaining in the hands of the national government, even if it is more sympathetic to decisions on foreign policy being made jointly within the EU (60 per cent in favour). The opt-outs also assuage domestic concerns regarding the impact of European integration on Danish ‘democracy’ and ‘identity’. In sum, to allow the removal of the opt-outs, the performance case would have to be truly overwhelming.

Danish public awareness of being a ‘small country’ is heightened by Denmark’s close geographical proximity to Germany. The domestic discourse on the ESDP in Denmark also exhibits elements that underlie party discourse on the EU in general. The ESDP debate includes echoes of broader Danish concerns that acceptance of further European integration may enhance the influence of the larger EU neighbour, Germany, over Danish affairs.

Political fusion: a third way

The path of seeking a supranational Europe that will not require constitutional change leading to a federal Europe is, in many ways, what most Danish political actors want. Certainly, the existence of the opt-outs means that the Danish formal position leans slightly towards the intergovernmental tendency regarding ESDP cooperation. It makes a third-way solution for ESDP attractive as a concept for Denmark but difficult to work for in practice since full Danish participation in the ESDP has integrationist overtones.

Nevertheless, the governing liberal Venstre party has long questioned the viability of the opt-outs, and—since Denmark’s successful 2002 EU Presidency—the government of Anders Fogh Rasmussen has become more assertive in advocating their removal. Fogh Rasmussen, Prime Minister since 2001, has reiterated his belief that that Denmark ‘must be a full and unconditional part of

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36 Hansen (note 35), p. 74.
37 See table 5.1 in chapter 5 in this volume.
the EU’ and that it ‘should abolish the opt-outs’.39 There remain political difficulties in overcoming public hesitancy on the matter. These are also well illustrated by the two practical preconditions that the government set in January 2003 for removing the opt-outs: a referendum and the EU’s prior adoption of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty, which itself would need to be ratified by referendum in Denmark.40 Fogh Rasmussen has also shown his attachment to a model of Europe that resembles ‘political fusion’ by his assertions that the future Union should be ‘a community of nation states . . . in which the Member States have decided to carry out a number of task together by leaving the competence to the EU’.41

While there is some evidence of the Danish political elite promoting a stronger integrationist position, the influence of Atlanticism on public opinion is still notable. Of all the Nordic countries, Denmark has been the most assertive in showing support for the USA since September 2001. The Danish coalition government supported President Bush and Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, even if this was at the cost of alienating the Franco-German axis in continental Europe. Moreover, since April 2003 the Danish Government—in spite of public opinion polls indicating less than 50 per cent (and declining) approval ratings for such action—has maintained its active role in the reconstruction of Iraq and was, for example, one of the first countries to send civil liaison officers to the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority government of Iraq. The Danish Government has been willing to assert and even prioritize its ‘Euro-Atlantic’ credentials and transatlantic ties, even at the cost of undermining the Franco-German axis and perhaps the future development of the emerging ESDP. In addition, the ESDP is problematic precisely because it is linked domestically with further European political integration in a way that NATO is not. This helps explain why Danish domestic actors are at ease with NATO but more uncertain about where an integrationist ESDP may lead.

**Compound fusion?**

On one level, in spite of the defence opt-out, the Danes have been very active in trying to influence the ESDP—namely, through the elaboration of a European Security Strategy that identifies common threats to European security.42 In addition, both the Danish political elite and the public have been strong supporters of the EU’s developing civil crisis management functions since this can be

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41 Danish Prime Minister’s Office (note 40).

more easily reconciled with Danish perceptions of the EU as a ‘civilian power’. However, as the Danish role in the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans illustrates, Danish commitments to peacekeeping are much easier to handle under NATO auspices and Danish military reforms have been primarily NATO-driven. When the EU took over the NATO mission in the FYROM in 2003, Danish soldiers had to be withdrawn since, under the terms of its opt-out, Denmark cannot participate in EU operations involving military capabilities. This also extends to Danish representatives not participating in the work of EU military structures, such as the EU Military Committee, or in being obliged to finance operations involving military capabilities. Here, domestic constraints are placing limits on the conduct of Danish policy towards the ESDP: it is more convenient for Denmark to be formally part of a crisis management coalition led by NATO than one under the ESDP. Nevertheless, public opinion in Denmark is becoming increasingly aware that the country’s opt-out from the ESDP does have rather bizarre consequences, and this may have implications for the level of party and public support for the continuation of this particular opt-out in the future.

VI. Preliminary conclusions

Denmark, Finland and Sweden, with varying levels of domestic support, may actually be content to see the evolution of a ‘fused’ ESDP with supranational and intergovernmental features. Whether they are non-aligned or NATO members, however, they also seem content to leave the ESDP without a coherent design based on an explicit, ambitious agenda.

Domestic pressures on the respective Nordic policies towards the ESDP can be understood using a fusion perspective. Nordic domestic actors want an effective framework for performing European security and crisis management tasks (performance fusion), based on a selectively supranational, but not federally inclined, ESDP (political fusion) that requires Nordic military involvement on a flexible basis adding to the compound nature of European capabilities (compound fusion). This is close to what already exists in one form or another today in the evolving ESDP. One thing is clear: at least in the case of the Nordic countries, domestic considerations will continue to be important factors in shaping governmental perspectives on the evolving ESDP.

43 Rieker (note 19), p. 381.
44 Rieker (note 19), p. 376.
5. The domestic background: public opinion and party attitudes towards integration in the Nordic countries

Cynthia Kite

I. Introduction

In chapter 4, Lee Miles discusses some of the basic similarities of the Nordic countries as regards their foreign policy orientations. These include a commitment to an internationalism that emphasizes international law and the United Nations, a sense of being part of a region, an emphasis on soft security and scepticism about federalism as a desirable way for Europe to develop. He also discusses the usefulness of the ‘fusion’ approach to studying Nordic views on and evaluations of developments in the European Security and Defence Policy.

This chapter focuses on other domestic factors. First, it provides background on the views of the political parties and of public opinion in the Nordic countries during the respective debates on membership of the European Union. Second, it discusses current opinion on the development and direction of the EU. Finally, it addresses the possible implications of these factors for Nordic participation in security and defence cooperation.

II. The question of membership of the EU

In the 1960s and 1970s, in the wake of the United Kingdom’s decision to apply for membership of the European Community (EC), the Nordic countries began to discuss the issue of EC membership for themselves. On the one hand, in Denmark and Norway whether or not to join was largely a question of economics and political authority. The economic aspect of the question was whether the country or its citizens would stand to win or lose economically. Politically, the question related to the implications of membership for policy-making authority and national sovereignty more generally. Security and defence issues were not particularly important for the Danish and Norwegian parties or citizens in their evaluation of the benefits and drawbacks of EC membership. In Finland and Sweden, on the other hand, the question of membership was shaped by security considerations. In both countries, relations with the EC were perceived as subordinate to security policy, and the question was: what relationship with the EC was compatible with neutrality? For Finland, since membership was obviously unacceptable to the Soviet Union, it was a non-issue. In Sweden the dominant view—despite occasional objections from the centre-right
Moderate Party and the Liberal Party—was that neutrality was incompatible with membership, which was therefore out of the question. Support for neutrality was so strong that the decision not to seek EC membership was largely uncontroversial. Finland and Sweden were thus spared the domestic political confrontations that Denmark and, particularly, Norway experienced in the 1960s and 1970s.

Danish public opinion data from the early 1960s show that 45–55 per cent of respondents expressed support for joining the Common Market.\(^1\) Relatively few (around 10 per cent) were opposed outright, but over 40 per cent were unsure. From 1970 the pattern changed, with support starting to decline: between 1970 and the late summer of 1972 support was on average about 40 per cent while opposition rose from 9 per cent to about 30 per cent. The undecided group fell from 40 per cent to about 25 per cent.

The issue was most problematic for the Social Democratic Party. Although the party itself favoured membership, some members opposed it and they made their opposition clear in debates in the Danish Parliament and by voting against approving the treaty of accession in September 1972.\(^2\) The party’s voters were also split, with about half in favour of membership and half opposed. The issue was less problematic for other parties. The Socialist People’s Party and its voters were solidly opposed. The liberal Venstre party, the Social-Liberal Party and the Conservative People’s Party were in favour, as were their supporters. From 1970 to 1972, of those Danes who had a position on membership, the majority were always favourable—at times over 60 per cent were favourable. Given this, it is not surprising that voters approved membership by a large margin—by 63 per cent to 37 per cent—in the referendum of October 1972. Voter turnout was 90 per cent.

Norwegian public opinion data illustrate that support for membership has always been lower than in Denmark and opposition to membership always higher.\(^3\) In Norway, of those expressing an opinion, only 30 per cent favoured membership in mid-1971, down from just over 50 per cent in 1970. The same pattern was observable in the 1990s, when support was about 50 per cent in 1991–92 but down to 35 per cent by 1993.

As regards political parties, there are also important differences between Denmark and Norway.\(^4\) Historically, party opposition to membership in Denmark was largely a phenomenon of the left. In Norway party opposition has always come from both the left and centre and occasionally, if briefly, from the Progress Party on the right. As in Denmark, both the Socialist Left Party and

\(^1\) Kite, C., *Scandinavia Faces EU: Debates and Decisions on Membership 1961–94*, Research Report no. 1996:2 (Umeå University, Department of Political Science: Umeå, 1996), pp. 149–52. Public opinion and voting data may not add up to 100% due to rounding of figures and blank or spoiled votes.

\(^2\) The text of the Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, signed on 22 Jan. 1972, is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/treaties_accession.html>.

\(^3\) Kite (note 1), pp. 157–64.

groups in the Norwegian Labour Party opposed membership. In addition, the Centre Party and its voters have been firmly opposed to membership since the 1960s. The Christian Democratic Party and its voters were split on the issue in the 1960s and 1970s and opposed membership in the 1990s. The liberal Venstre party and its voters were also divided over EC membership—and the party split in the 1970s after the referendum. In Norway opposition is thus broader and is found throughout both the political left–right and geographical centre–periphery spectra. It is hardly surprising that Norwegians have rejected membership twice—on 25 September 1972 by a vote of 53.5 to 46.5 per cent and on 28 November 1994 by 52.2 to 47.8 per cent.

In Sweden there was little political opposition from the traditional parties to applying for EU membership once the cold war had ended in 1989. All parties except the Left and Green parties favoured membership. On the other hand, developments in public opinion resembled those in Norway. There was considerable support for membership in 1990: 63 per cent were positive and only 15 per cent negative, with 21 per cent undecided. However, by May 1993, after negotiations on the details of membership and as public campaigns in the run-up to the referendum on EU membership started, only 31 per cent were in favour and 45 per cent were opposed (24 per cent were undecided). In 1991, among those with an opinion, 70 per cent were in favour, but in 1993 only 41 per cent were (i.e., 59 per cent were opposed). Large groups of voters from several parties that favoured EU membership were opposed, including supporters of the Social Democratic, Centre and Christian Democrat parties. While the agricultural sector in Denmark has always favoured membership and that in Norway always opposed it, in Sweden those working in agriculture were split. Many were undecided about membership in May 1993, and of those with an opinion 45 per cent were opposed and 55 per cent in favour.

In its support for EU membership, Sweden falls between Denmark and Norway: it was neither as positive as Denmark, nor as negative as Norway. This is clear from the 13 November 1994 referendum vote in which 52 per cent were in favour and 47 per cent against. This trend is also reflected in public opinion data and in party politics. Compared to Denmark, in Sweden there was less support for membership from the centre of the Swedish political spectrum. At first, the Centre Party supported negotiations but refused to unequivocally support membership before knowing the terms, and Centre Party voters were not enthusiastic about membership. Similarly, while the leadership of the Christian Democrats supported membership, their voters were not equally supportive. On the other hand, Sweden did not have parties of the political centre that were unequivocally opposed, as did Norway.

In Finland public opinion throughout the period 1991–94 was more supportive of membership than opinion in Norway and Sweden. An average of about

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45 per cent supported membership during this period (34 per cent were opposed, while 22 per cent were undecided). During the same period support in Sweden was about 35 per cent (with 22 per cent undecided) and in Norway about 32 per cent (also with 22 per cent undecided). The big Finnish political parties—the Social Democratic Party, the conservative National Coalition party and the Centre Party—supported EU membership. Party opposition came from two small parties on the right—the Finnish Rural Party (renamed the True Finns in 1995) and the Christian Democrats. The Left Alliance and the Green League took no position on membership before the 16 October 1994 referendum. The Centre Party behaved somewhat like its Swedish counterpart: it was supportive but vacillating, or at least reserved and cautious. It supported negotiations but argued that a firm position on membership was possible only after the terms of accession were known. This approach can be explained by the fact that the party’s supporters—farmers and rural populations—opposed EU membership. The Centre Party voted to support membership at a party conference in June 1994 after Esko Aho, the Prime Minister, threatened to resign as party chairman. The Finnish farmers association, the Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners, like its Norwegian counterpart, went on record against membership and was active in the ‘No’ campaign. In the referendum on EU membership, 60 per cent of Centre Party sympathizers voted against membership. The referendum results were 57 per cent in favour of membership and 43 per cent opposed. Voter turnout was considerably lower in Finland (74 per cent) than in Sweden (83 per cent) and Norway (89 per cent).

In summary, as regards the question of EU membership, the parallel features in the four Nordic countries discussed here were: (a) opposition on the left, including in the social democratic parties, although the Finnish Left Alliance did not formally oppose membership; (b) greater support for membership among party leaderships than among voters; and (c) a clear geographical centre-periphery split in Finland, Norway and Sweden. An important difference among the four countries concerned the respective positions of parties and voters in the political centre, particularly rural populations and parties and organizations representing the agricultural sector.

III. Current Nordic attitudes towards the EU

This section presents recent data on party and public attitudes towards the European Union and towards EU-based security and defence cooperation in the three Nordic member states of the EU. As regards political parties, recent research shows that there is considerable variation across the Nordic countries in the share of the vote that Euro-sceptical parties receive in national parlia-

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7 Pesonen, Jenssen and Gilljam (note 6), pp. 62–63.
8 Pesonen, Jenssen and Gilljam (note 6), pp. 67–68.
mentary elections. The term ‘Euro-sceptical’ refers to parties that oppose membership and those that are mainly sceptical and critical as regards the EU but which do not demand that the country leave the EU. In the most recent elections, these parties’ proportion of the vote was highest in Denmark, at almost 40 per cent, followed by 21 per cent in Sweden and only 6 per cent in Finland. There are currently two anti-EU parties in the Danish Parliament—the right-wing Danish People’s Party and the Red–Green Alliance. All parties in the Finnish Parliament support membership. The Finnish Centre Party’s degree of pro-Europeanism varies depending upon whether or not it is in government, but it is firmly committed to EU membership. The Finnish Green League has become considerably more favourable to the EU since 1995, even calling for EU legislation on minimum standards in social, environmental and tax policy.

In Sweden, the Left and Green parties are anti-EU. While the Swedish Centre Party does not oppose membership, it does oppose Sweden’s adopting the euro.

Turning to political participation, in national elections Nordic citizens are exceptionally participatory. Voter turnout in parliamentary elections in recent years has been well over 80 per cent in both Denmark and Sweden and over 65 per cent in Finland. In contrast, Nordic citizens are considerably less interested in participating in EU elections. Voter turnout in EU parliamentary elections in June 2004 was 48 per cent in Denmark, 37 per cent in Sweden and 41 per cent in Finland.

As regards public opinion, data from a 2003 Eurobarometer poll show that, of the three Nordic EU members, Denmark is more positive about the EU than Finland and Sweden (see table 5.1). This is true as regards both overall views of the EU and, in particular, common foreign and defence policies; indeed, Danes are more favourable to the EU than the average in the EU15 (the EU members prior to the May 2004 enlargement). At the same time, they are less enthusiastic about cooperation on foreign policy and defence than the EU15 average. Swedes are generally more negative than Finns, and both are more negative than the EU15 average. This is true as regards both the overall evaluation of the EU and the attitude to foreign and defence cooperation.

Historically, Danes have always been the ‘least reluctant’ Europeans in the Nordic region, which is somewhat puzzling. For one thing, compared to opposition to the EC in the 1970s and 1980s, which was mainly a phenomenon on the left in Denmark, today there is also opposition from the right by the Danish

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11 International Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance (IDEA), International IDEA voter turnout website, URL <http://www.idea.int/vt/>.


13 As well as Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the EU15 includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
**Table 5.1.** Public opinion in Denmark, Finland and Sweden about the EU, October–November 2003

Figures are per cent of respondents.

**Support for European Union membership**

‘Generally speaking, do you think your country’s membership in the European Union is . . . ?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>EU15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A good thing</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A bad thing</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither good nor bad</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Benefit from European Union membership**

‘Taking everything into consideration, would you say your country has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>EU15</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefited</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not benefited</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Support for a common foreign policy**

‘What is your opinion on the following statement? Please tell me whether you are for it or against it. One common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union, towards other countries.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>EU15</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Decisions on foreign policy**

‘Do you think that decisions on foreign policy should be made by your national government, or made jointly within the European Union?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>EU15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National government</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jointly within the EU</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Support for a common defence policy**

‘What is your opinion on the following statement? Please tell me whether you are for it or against it. One common defence and security policy among the member states of the European Union.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>EU15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
People’s Party. Moreover, there is a significant, stable level of Euro-scepticism in Denmark, which has been clearly demonstrated in the Danish referendums on EU developments. In 1986, 44 per cent of Danish voters rejected the 1986 Single European Act. Parliamentary support was even weaker, with 56 per cent of the members of parliament voting against the act, including some members of the Social Democratic, Social-Liberal, Socialist People’s and Left Socialist parties. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht was rejected by 50.2 per cent of Danish voters, although in this case parliamentary opposition was much lower—only 15 per cent, with members of the Socialist People’s and Progress parties casting the ‘No’ votes. The agreement at the Edinburgh European Council of 12 December 1992 that Denmark accept the Treaty of Maastricht with four opt-outs was rejected by 43 per cent of Danish voters (although only by the Progress Party in parliament). Finally, 45 per cent of voters and 20 per cent of parliamentarians (from the Socialist People’s, Progress and Danish People’s parties and the Red–Green Alliance) opposed the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam in 1998.

Why do Danes seem so favourable towards the EU in public opinion polls? A possible explanation for their rather high overall support for the EU despite significant scepticism is a combination of the economic benefits of member-

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16 The Left Socialist Party is now part of the Red–Green Alliance.
18 The 4 opt-outs were from the Economic and Monetary Union, European defence cooperation outside NATO, EU citizenship and EU cooperation on justice and home affairs.
ship, which have been widely acknowledged for many years, and the fact that domestic political actors, in particular sceptics, have real opportunities to influence the behaviour of the Danish Government in Brussels. This is partially because of the power of the European Affairs Committee in the Danish Parliament, which has the formal right to give ministers a negotiating mandate that must be respected. However, it is also because under the Danish constitution all decisions that involve delegating power to supranational organizations require a referendum if the transfer is supported by less than a five-sixths majority in parliament. The strength of these domestic controls is such that Finn Laursen goes so far as to say that ‘Danish EU policy is driven by domestic politics’. Erik Damgaard argues that the importance of parliament and voters in Danish EU politics is the result of a combination of widespread Euro-scepticism and weak minority governments. Thus, overall support can be maintained because on sensitive issues the Danish Government is forced to take domestic opinion seriously and act accordingly—which inter alia explains the four Danish opt-outs. Danish voters—EU favourable and EU sceptical alike—know that they have the right to give their final ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a new EU constitution and that they will decide the future status of the opt-outs. It should be noted that, although Denmark’s early post-World War II preferences favoured intergovernmental cooperation, such as that under the European Free Trade Agreement, its geo-strategic position and economic interests have acted to push it towards acceptance of—if not necessarily enthusiasm for—regional cooperation within the EC/EU framework.

Finland and Sweden joined the EU at a time of economic difficulty, and their economic problems did not end with membership. Even if membership was not responsible for this, the arguments of the ‘Yes’ sides in the 1994 referendums on EU membership about the economic benefits of membership understandably lost credibility. In Sweden support for membership began to fall soon after the 1994 referendum. In June 1995 only 20 per cent of Swedes still thought that membership was a good idea; 48 per cent were opposed. Finnish public support for the EU did not erode so quickly but, as the Eurobarometer data show, it is lower than it was in the referendum. Compared to Denmark, in Finland and Sweden EU sceptics have less opportunity to influence government policy. The European Affairs committees in the Finnish and Swedish parliaments are not as powerful as the Danish committee: in particular, they cannot give ministers binding negotiating instructions. In addition, Finland and Sweden have no

24 Damgaard (note 22), p. 158.
constitutional obligation to hold referendums on transferring power to supranational organizations. Thus, it is unlikely that there will be referendums in these countries on a new EU constitution, even if some parties—for example, the Left and the Green parties in Sweden—call for one. The absence of EU-sceptical parties in the Finnish Parliament means that even when the parliament is involved in policy making it is unlikely to reflect the Euro-scepticism and anti-EU sentiment that exist among the membership of most parties and in the Finnish population.

IV. Implications for Nordic participation in security and defence cooperation

Given the Nordic countries’ long history of support for and participation in UN missions, it is not surprising that there is support in these countries for the EU’s development of a capacity to carry out the Petersberg Tasks and, more generally, rapid response capabilities in order to perform UN-sanctioned missions.25 The development of binding EU collective defence obligations is clearly more problematic. This is obviously true for Sweden, where neutrality—or at least non-membership of military alliances—has long been part of its national identity. Sweden’s engagement in helping to guide EU defence cooperation towards peacekeeping and humanitarian aid efforts is in keeping with Swedish foreign policy traditions and thus has support among the Swedish public. In addition, Sweden may contribute to slowing down EU moves towards collective defence obligations that would push the EU closer to becoming a military alliance of the sort that Sweden eschews. Nonetheless, the question of security guarantees and common defence will have to be faced eventually and, presumably, it will be more problematic for Sweden than for the other Nordic countries. Even in Finland, where neutrality has a shorter history and may not be part of the national identity in the same way as it is in Sweden, the widespread support for neutrality as a policy solution will pose a similar challenge.

Although Denmark has a history of collective security as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there has been considerable Danish opposition to the EU’s developing a common defence—hence the defence opt-out. Even among some who oppose a continuation of the opt-out, notably the Social-Liberal Party, there is opposition to Denmark maintaining a territorial defence and to EU defence cooperation if it involves increased military spending. More generally, the Social-Liberal Party opposes what it perceives as the militarization of the EU, including an EU that aspires to be a military superpower.26

25 The Petersberg Tasks were agreed in 1992 to strengthen the operational role of the Western European Union. They were later incorporated in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. They include humanitarian intervention and evacuation operations, peacekeeping and crisis management, including peace-making. See chapter 6 in this volume.

Finally, what might all this mean for the future? Will party politics and citizens’ opinions be important influences on Nordic government action as regards the future development of EU security and defence cooperation, or will elites do what they like regardless of domestic politics? It is easier to answer this with regard to the EU’s capabilities to carry out humanitarian and crisis intervention and management tasks. As noted above, in the Nordic countries there is no elite–citizen split on this aspect of security and defence cooperation. Such developments are in line with long-established Nordic foreign policy traditions and are widely supported by elites, parties and citizens. The more complex question relates to support for the development of binding collective defence obligations. On the surface, this is less problematic for Denmark (and Norway, if it should join the EU) because of a 50-year history of collective security as a member of NATO. On the other hand, Denmark does not prefer the EU over NATO in this regard (as Miles notes, it is Atlanticist), and there is no support in Denmark for the increased military spending that would presumably be necessary if the EU were to assume some of NATO’s collective security responsibilities. The most obvious indication of Danish opposition to too far-reaching a defence role for the EU is the Danish defence opt-out. It is widely accepted in Denmark that it is not possible to revoke this and the other opt-outs without a new referendum. Thus, there is reason to believe that domestic political conditions will have an important impact on Danish policy vis-à-vis security and defence policy cooperation.

Perhaps paradoxically, given its history of neutrality, it is possible that the Finnish Government will be able to act more autonomously in security and defence matters, while paying relatively little attention to domestic scepticism or even outright opposition. There is widespread and strong elite support for full participation in all aspects of EU cooperation and a lack of organized and powerful EU scepticism in the Finnish Parliament. In short, Finnish scepticism, although real, has few channels of influence. The Swedish Government, on the other hand, is more likely to be constrained by party and public opposition to security and defence developments that require EU members to give binding collective defence guarantees to each other. Neutrality is deeply rooted in the Swedish identity—even if the formal definition of Swedish neutrality has been watered down to refer to freedom from alliances and the possibility of remaining neutral in a violent conflict. The question can be asked whether ‘freedom from alliances’ reflects reality given Sweden’s cooperation with NATO and its membership of the EU. Nonetheless, non-membership of any military alliance has powerful symbolic value. Any security and defence cooperation that is perceived as undermining it is likely to be strongly opposed by large numbers of citizens as well as by the Centre Party, the anti-EU parties and significant parts of the Social Democratic Party. In other words, opposition will be broad, extending from the left of the political spectrum well into the centre and will probably even include a sizeable number of Christian Democrat voters. In this situation it seems likely that Sweden’s ultimate fallback position on security
and defence cooperation would be to support some sort of ‘variable geometry’, to use an old term. Such a position would ensure that Sweden could opt out of security cooperation but not stand in the way of others who want to act. The trouble is that this, the most comfortable solution in domestic political terms, would mean a break with Sweden’s efforts since 1999 to avoid ‘singularization’, to claim a place in the EU’s security ‘hard core’ and, in general, to avoid creating ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ groups in security and defence cooperation.

In short, the domestic factors discussed here suggest that, as regards security and defence cooperation, the pattern that the Nordic countries display vis-à-vis adoption of the euro might be a guide to their engagement in the ESDP. Finland participates fully and, at least as regards binding collective defence obligations in the foreseeable future, Sweden is on the sidelines. Denmark must formally remain on the outside until Danish voters have reversed their decision on the defence opt-out. Sweden can be expected to continue to be an active supporter of the Petersberg Tasks and a proponent of the further development of crisis intervention and management capabilities.
Part II
National defence and European cooperation
The Nordic countries are suspended between national defence transformations and European security ambitions. The domestic sphere in each country is characterized by organizational inertia and budgetary constraints. The common enterprise of building the European Union is caught between the competing logics of political aspirations and of industrial–technological dynamics. In this part of the volume, some features of this high-wire Nordic existence inside the larger EU circus arena of the European Security and Defence Policy are outlined by experts in the field. By and large, the contributors strike a pessimistic tone regarding the future prospects for distinct and high-profile Nordic acts in this evolving show.

Jesper Christensen notes the growing impression of the policy footprint of the ‘EUequalizer’ on member states in the defence and security field. Other policy sectors have long experienced such external pressures on the substance of and procedures for national policy. Agricultural policy, competition rules and foreign trade are clearly subordinated to EU directives and mandates. Increasingly, the ‘third pillar’ of Justice and Home Affairs generates similar effects at the national level. National defence policy is now also embedded in the common ambition to build the ESDP. Here, each government faces serious problems as the policy pledges worked out in EU forums come up against other long-standing operational tasks and the limited capabilities of the armed forces. Gerrard Quille points to a very real gap between the agreed EU policy documents on the one hand and national planning efforts and resource priorities on the other.

The EU suffers from an implementation deficit in the area of security and defence policy. Such a deficit has been empirically noted in many other sectors, so it comes as no surprise that this area, too, should experience problems with the concrete follow-up at national level to decisions made centrally by the EU. It is more of a surprise, however, that the generally high-performance Nordic EU members do less well in this sector. When even the Nordic countries, usually so assiduous in implementation, are unable to live up to pledges made by their political leaders, the seriousness of purpose behind Europe’s ambitious reform plans can be questioned.

Nonetheless, the commitments made by national leaders can be viewed as steps in the pursuit of a compelling strategy to force national transformation upon reluctant and often obstructionist defence establishments. Again, the experiences of other policy sectors may be instructive in this regard. The European Commission’s drive towards the Single Market target of 1992, and later towards realization of the Economic and Monetary Union, helped national leaders in their efforts to reform domestic, economic and financial structures. Making commitments to international operations under EU auspices may, over time, provide the best hope of eliminating the costly remnants of cold war defence structures and oversized forces. In the Nordic countries, the military–provincial axis—the economic and social importance of force stationing and of associated industries for a number of, especially peripheral, internal regions—has been even more entrenched in national politics than the military–industrial complex.

Quille points to the potentially important role of the new European Defence Agency (EDA). In the future, a sectoral dynamic with a spill-forward effect may emerge in this
field. Stakeholders have been institutionalized in permanent bodies with clear mandates to move the joint defence effort forward. Bureaucracies for security and defence have been created. Judging from the track records of other sectors, this innovation will lead to a steady stream of proposals to strengthen further the joint tasks of the Union.

Regardless of the shifting political seasons, the professional work will grind on. Some initiatives will take a seemingly long time before they are enacted, while others may suddenly fit with the flow of political fortunes. Today the euro has been adopted by 12 countries, but how many recall the original 1970 Werner Plan outlining the benefits of a European monetary community? Who would have thought in the 1980s that national governments would surrender their monetary sovereignty to a supranational authority? Who in 2006 can imagine that national governments may in the future delegate arms procurement decisions to an independent, impartial EU body? The EDA will pursue the classical top-down integrative method of upgrading the common interest. Soon enough, the weight of this ‘EUqualizer’ will penetrate the national defence establishments and force major transformations.

Alongside these top-down dynamics, experiences on the ground are already significantly shaping the direction of future priorities. By taking part in various international military operations, in the Balkans and in Africa, European defence establishments have been made to confront immediate and concrete needs, to construct ad hoc solutions and to document formative experiences. To the extent that the Nordic armed services take part in such operations, their sense of direction, purpose and priorities will depart from their traditional territorial missions. Lars Wedin points out in this context that it is regrettable that with almost 10,000 Swedish officers on active duty, only 750 men and women presently serve in military missions abroad. In part this can be explained by budgetary limits, but it also reflects the cold war mission of territorial defence, which although operationally obsolete is organizationally still hegemonic.

Björn Hagelin reviews the standing of the Nordic defence industry and its prospects for survival in the future. During the cold war period, Swedish industry was a major player in the Euro-Atlantic defence sector. It also maintained strong links with the other Nordic countries, as a reliable supplier and as an important market. During the 1990s these Nordic ties became less strong, as all nations reached for more varied sources of defence equipment and for wider markets. At the same time, the Nordic defence ministers upgraded and formalized the links among their countries in this sector: but this Nordic Armament Co-operation initiative (NORDAC) has been a mixed success, according to Hagelin.

Strong pressures are felt by the arms industry to consolidate its very high pre-production costs as well as achieving longer production series to reduce the unit cost to buyers. The EU’s leaders want to foster a competitive European arms industry that can hold its own against strong US competition. The answer may lie in more intra-European mergers and enhanced cooperation across national borders: yet this drive towards an intercontinental competitive edge could also reduce intra-continental competition and in effect create local monopolies. Such outcomes would not be to the advantage of cost-conscious taxpayers or to the liking of their elected representatives. Michael Brzoska argues that there could be a continued value in keeping a distinct Nordic defence industry that can contribute to the overall market openness of the European arms procurement process.

While a shrinking Nordic defence industry may be on the defensive, the so-called security industry is on the offensive. Recognizing new market opportunities in the
USA as a result of the growth of the homeland security field, many companies have established new links with US partners. US investments in research and development, high-technology product development and traditional protection services offer new opportunities outside the EU. Responding to this North American dynamic, the Union has launched its Preparatory Action in the field of Security Research with the aim of promoting hi-tech innovation and economic growth in Europe. Parts of the Nordic defence industry are being reoriented towards this emerging homeland security field. In addition, many established security service companies, such as Securitas-Pinkerton and Falck, are developing their roles assertively in Europe and in North America. It is possible that a new Nordic security–industrial complex is taking shape in response to the political priorities and policy trends after the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the USA and of 11 March 2004 in Madrid.

By and large, Nordic governments are committed to and engaged in the EU’s ambitions for a higher international profile, including a readiness to intervene abroad. The question remains, however, to what extent EU-mandated military interventions are motivated by the same values that have traditionally supported Nordic engagements in the service of international peace and security. To critics, some EU operations resemble the colonial-style interventions of the previous Belgian, British, Dutch and French empires. The motivations behind the newly created EU battle groups resemble the classic mission of the US Marines, whose highly trained and well-equipped units have for a century been on stand-by to intervene on short notice in the Caribbean or in Central America to protect US interests and citizens.

The Nordic countries do not have similar recent colonial legacies or histories of armed intervention in overseas locations. In fact, three of these small democracies gained sovereignty only in the 20th century. Building national military capacities to be able to take part in semi-colonial interventions may thus not be seen in all political quarters as a priority national security task. As noted by Christensen, the traditional Nordic strategy has been a ‘counter-power’ approach. Civil instruments have been stressed ahead of military force; so-called soft power techniques have been favoured; and security enhancement through confidence building and informal networking across political boundaries has been advocated. In part this orientation has been motivated by value preferences and in part by sheer necessity. Very limited hard resources are available for external power projection by these small countries.

In many ways, the Nordic approach to international peace and security is close to the original European Community method of building, over time, reliable expectations of peaceful resolution of conflicts through networking in a non-zero sum political context. The current vogue for building military capacity for international operations at a distance deviates, in fact, from this EU legacy as well as from the Nordic traditional security enhancement approach. So far, the neocolonial features of the ESDP have not been widely debated within Nordic societies. However, critics do object to the perceived military dominance within these so-called international crisis management operations. Finland and Sweden have since the autumn of 1999 consistently pushed for giving a greater weight to the civil aspects of these deployments. At the Gothenburg European Council of June 2001, a common strategy for conflict prevention was adopted, following a Swedish initiative.

Setting the Nordic countries against the European Union represents a false dichotomy. In the Nordic political landscape it has never been an either–or proposition, but always a question of pursuing both civil and military approaches in some sort of
balance with each other. Political attention has shifted between the two approaches over time, but both have always been politically relevant. In Denmark an analogy is often made with an individual person who does not replace his or her family through marriage, but retains the kinship of family while adding the legally binding bond of marriage. Of course, the contract of law takes precedent over kinship: but the former can be discontinued, albeit at some cost and pain. In contrast, the mark of a family bond cannot be erased, even if one wanted to do so.

Nordic ‘family affairs’ within a wider Euro-Atlantic community of contractual obligations have been relatively salient over the past 50 years. After the collapse of the negotiations for a Scandinavian Defence Union in 1949, informal trans-governmental cooperation was launched among the armed services on the lines of plans set out in great detail in the then secret appendices to the never concluded defence treaty. As compensation for the symbolic setback in the defence field, the Nordic Council was established in 1952 by the Nordic parliaments. This Danish initiative served a purpose similar to the Messina Conference, which followed the failure of the European Defence Community initiative in 1954 and led to the 1957 Treaty of Rome.

Sector-based coordination among Nordic civil servants was spearheaded, and generated concrete policy results, during the 1950s and 1960s. The free movement of people was initially given precedence over the trans-border flow of goods. The 1961 agreement between Finland and the European Free Trade Area resulted in the removal of customs barriers between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden on 31 December 1967, ahead of the Common Market schedule of the European Community (EC). As a result of the Danish (and planned Norwegian) membership of the EC in 1973, the Nordic Council of Ministers was established to push forward Nordic solutions to the remaining cross-border problems. The Nordic Investment Bank became a considerable financial force in regional development. Considerable government funding was provided for common programmes in culture, higher education and research to nurture the common identity, several joint institutions were erected to manage the common budgets and programmes, and a small Nordic bureaucracy was established.

During the 1990s Nordic leaders devoted considerable energies to engaging and assisting the vulnerable democracies in the Baltic Sea region. In particular, security-enhancing projects were given high priority and US involvement was sought. After the Baltic states’ joined NATO and the EU in 2004, a Nordic debate on the future direction of regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea region gained new impetus. Nordic service industries, not least the finance sector, already consider this sphere as a home market and push for the removal of new barriers to the free flow of money, communication and people. As during previous periods of geo- and eco-political transformation in the North, the pivotal question is how to combine contractual engagements in the wider Euro-Atlantic community with the concrete and practically focused trans-border cooperation needs of the immediate ‘family’.

When looking to the future prospects for achieving policy coherence among the Nordic countries within the wider development of the ESDP, the underlying dynamics behind such coherence should be considered. Only to a limited extent is this common orientation in the security and defence area a result of deliberate intergovernmental cooperation. Rather, its primary foundation is the inherent harmony of values, attitudes and outlooks towards questions of war and peace among the professional elites in these nations. Coherence is more the result of parallel national actions, based on independent expert judgements, than of explicit intergovernmental negotiations. However, these
distinctly formulated national stands are informed by a constant flow of ideas and of
telling examples among professional and political elites.

Trans-governmental coordination as a process of mutual learning through network-
ing is the basis for the policy coherence that often, but not always, results. Diffusion of
policy initiatives and best practices across national settings generates coherence in
doctrines and practices. Any ambition of integrating the Nordic region is not a driving
political force. Instead, consensus formation around policy outcomes is processed
through the adoption of shared problem frames and common views on the realm of the
desirable and the possible within the sector.

A closer look at the internal dynamics of the EU also reveals that the processes of
transnational policy diffusion may be just as consequential for coherence of doctrines
and practices as the open and deliberate drive for political integration. Over time, pre-
valent practices become institutionalized and protected by stakeholders. They are then
codified through directives, agreements or even intergovernmental treaties. In this way,
the European Union has widened its mandate to cover many new policy sectors that
were not included in the original formula of the 1950s for a common market and the
protection of agriculture.

Irrespective of the fate of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty, in which the ESDP has a
prominent place, the forward-moving dynamics in this sector are not going to stall. All
the Nordic governments will need to develop their positions with regard to these evol-
ving practices, the new institutions, and the required capabilities and operational tasks.
The diffusion of ideas between Nordic capitals will inform this policy-shaping work.
Similarly, opinions will be exchanged with the elites of other nations. Some novelties
may be articulated through think tanks and in the working chambers of Brussels.

Clearly, an important new chapter is now under way as the Union takes on the core
functions of the European social contract: securing the survival of democratic society
and the safety of its citizens. As noted by Magnus Ekengren in part III of this volume,
the notions of the internal and the external breakdown in this drive to transform the EU
from a security community free of internal political violence into a secure community
capable of safeguarding its members from threats at home and abroad. The Nordic
countries may well be instrumental in this policy-shaping enterprise and could help
move the Union beyond the present confines of the European Security and Defence
Policy.
6. The impact of EU capability targets and operational demands on defence concepts and planning

Gerrard Quille

I. Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy by examining two principal drivers and their impact on individual nations’ defence choices: collective European capability targets and operational demands. Operational demands were first made at the 1999 Helsinki European Council under the Helsinki Headline Goal. Capability targets were set primarily at the 2001 Laeken European Council, where the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was launched. While operational demands preceded the capability targets, the ESDP has since become most heavily focused on the ‘bottom-up’ capability targets. The operational demands remained, at best, a generic political commitment until actual demand for two military crisis management operations arose in 2003: in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The capability-development process has benefited from conceptual developments following from the Helsinki Headline Goal, including new force concepts like the Rapid Reaction Force and the new battle groups. More general capability requirements, such as those defined in the Helsinki Headline Goal for the European Union as a whole to have up to 60 000 troops deployable within 60 days and sustainable for up to one year, have acted largely as a starting point and framework for discussions on how to rectify capability shortfalls. This chapter shows that the original operational demands were part of that conceptual framework to support the capability-development process, but also that such targets soon took on a dynamic of their own as a result of real operations that in turn inspired new operational concepts (battle groups, standby forces and bridging forces) and planning requirements (the EU Civil–Military Planning Cell due to become operational in December 2005).


While the Headline Goal has been a political catalyst, it is the capability targets and operational demands that have provided the focus for discussions on the institutional evolution of the ESDP at the levels of decision making, planning and force conception. Nevertheless, the future development of the ESDP remains intrinsically tied to the choices of the key member states—France, Germany and the United Kingdom—particularly in the areas of further multinational defence cooperation and reform of the European defence industry. These two structural drivers lie at the heart of the member states’ desire for more collective defence capabilities at the EU level. The success in applying other EU levers (i.e., Community policy and resources) to effect such structural changes will be a key determinant for the success of European collaboration in getting more ‘bang for their euro’ and in providing military responses for a demanding range of complex international challenges, such as those detailed in the European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted at the December 2003 Brussels European Council.4

Section II of this chapter provides a brief introduction to the ESDP and the dominant current trends. Section III reviews the important structural limits (the budgetary framework) and drivers pushing the transformation of European defence through the EU. The chapter then focuses on mapping these dynamics by looking first (in section IV) at the capability targets and then (in section V) at the operational demands. The chapter concludes by drawing together again, in section VI, the key interrelationships between capability targets and operational demands and defence concepts and planning.

II. The European security context

The debate on European defence capabilities in the context of the EU took a dramatic turn in December 1998 when, at a bilateral summit in St Malo, France and the United Kingdom agreed that the EU ‘needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. . . . To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’.5 The Balkans tragedies had underlined Europe’s weakness and inspired France and the UK to kick-start European defence discussions in


an EU framework. The bottom line—now a broadly accepted truism—was that no European state could act alone in meeting the new global security challenges and their collective responsibilities and that no major European power was facing a standing military threat. It was recognized that the new threats required more than a military response and that in some cases the latter was totally inappropriate; but the weakness of European states in terms of capacity for modern-day crisis management operations was widely seen as an area in need of urgent attention. In Europe this common analysis has since been anchored on a common threat assessment and was captured in the ESS.6

The main challenge, as defined in the ESS and also by NATO in its Strategic Concept adopted at the 1999 Washington summit,7 is no longer to maintain cohesion against a threatening Russia, but for NATO and the EU to help their members in a process of transformation and legacy management of cold war defence systems to meet today’s collective security challenges.8 This transformation is taking place against the backdrop of a security environment in flux after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and of consequent high demands on European armed forces for deployments such as those in Afghanistan, Africa, the Balkans and Iraq.9 These conflicts are putting heavy operational demands on NATO and the EU as institutions, promoting institutional change in the shape of new defence concepts, processes and, in the case of the EU, a pragmatic effort to implement the so-called defence deal agreed on in the framework of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty.10 Thus, NATO and the EU, as well as being security providers in themselves, are the principal security frameworks for supporting the transformation of European states to meet common security objectives.

While the EU member states can refer to a long tradition of support for common security concepts (not least from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the Western European Union’s 1995 Common Security Concept and not least the relevant provisions of the EU’s 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam), it is no less important to note the more self-interested motives that

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8 Cold war-legacy management has been conceptually developed in Bailes, A. J. K., Melnyk, O. and Anthony, I., Relics of Cold War: Europe’s Challenge, Ukraine’s Experience, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 6 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Nov. 2003), URL <http://www.sipri.org/>, where it is practically applied to the management of redundant cold war stockpiles in the former Soviet Union. The concept is also usefully applied to understand defence transformation debates in Western Europe and the role of the EU and NATO in legacy management of European defence.

9 For a survey of the recent demands on Europe’s armed forces see Giegerich, B. and Wallace, W., ‘Not such a soft power: the external deployment of European forces’, Survival, vol. 46, no. 2 (summer 2004), pp. 163–82.

help explain European support for collective or multilateral security frameworks.\textsuperscript{11}

In an interdependent world with increased opportunities for market economies but corresponding risks for open societies, no single state, let alone a European one, can achieve global governance and global security. The threats prioritized in the ESS—international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, threats to regional security, failed states and organized crime—cannot be met alone. This is now a statement of the obvious for most Europeans; since the 1990s their governments have to varying degrees tried to respond by placing an emphasis on the transformation and management of legacy defence establishments, force structures and equipment, and have made moves towards capabilities tailored for force projection and humanitarian intervention (for both conflict prevention and crisis management).\textsuperscript{12}

III. The European defence context

Transformation is more than just a political reorientation—through institutions or policy statements—to meet new threats in a changing security environment. It also entails reaching to all levels of the defence establishment—policy, operational capacities including armed forces, and procurement including defence industrial policies—to create appropriate defence instruments to support security policy priorities.\textsuperscript{13} Perhaps the most significant motives for Europe to work collectively on defence matters are the tasks of restructuring European defence (including the defence industrial base) and the state of defence spending.\textsuperscript{14}

European defence spending began to stabilize around the mid-1990s, after a period of decline in the immediate aftermath of the cold war (see figure 6.1, which compares EU and US military expenditure from 1989 to 2003). Most commentators believe that this level of defence spending is likely to remain broadly stable for the foreseeable future. Owing to the EU’s overall rules of financial discipline, accepted (more or less) under the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact, as well as relatively low rates of economic growth, the members of the pact are under strong pressure not to expand public spending. Nor would an increase in spending necessarily provide more military capability, unless


\textsuperscript{13} For more on understanding the levels of defence and communities of actors see Baylis, J., \textit{British Defence Policy: Striking the Right Balance} (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1989).

\textsuperscript{14} For a comprehensive survey of the contemporary structural obstacles see Quille and Mawdsley (note 4).
accompanied by reform of inefficient procurement processes, ministerial bureaucracies and relevant industrial sectors.

Even where defence budgets are maintained at present or slightly increased levels, it has been pointed out that the cost of defence equipment is subject to a higher rate of inflation than that in other sectors of the economy.\(^\text{15}\) This is due to the fact that defence equipment is not subjected to the open economy’s normal competitiveness, while cost overruns and equipment over-specification also contribute to the spiralling of defence equipment costs. Therefore, a budget that is constant, or that increases only at the rate of inflation for the civilian economy, will still not be enough to keep up with the higher defence-related rate of inflation. Defence budgets are also under constant strain from large multi-year defence procurement programmes.

Some analysts argue that, if defence budgets are not going to increase, their structure should be looked at in order to acquire resources for the capability-development aspect of defence transformation.\(^\text{16}\) It is argued that by restructuring the armed forces, especially in those countries with large standing or conscript armies, more money can be invested in the research and development and procurement areas of the defence budget, leading to greater equipment-based capability. This is a simple argument with some merit, but in the short term significant costs are associated with retiring serving (senior) members of the armed forces, with training for specialized professional forces, and indeed with closing barracks and other facilities that are made redundant by reductions in force size.\(^\text{17}\)

After considerable effort in the 1990s by EU member states, at the national level, to transform their defence establishments from cold war-oriented postures with an emphasis on mass land-based armies, major platforms (fleets, fighter aircraft and bombers, and tanks) and successor-based procurement (more fleets, more fighter aircraft and bombers, and more tanks), there is now a growing consensus among national planners and governments that these projects can no longer be achieved by individual states. New concepts are drawing defence planners away from the cold war emphasis on large military platforms towards an emphasis on communications as a key linking enabler in ‘network-enabled warfare’ and through concepts such as ‘effects-based warfare’.\(^\text{18}\)

The privileged relationships that developed between defence establishments and national defence industries during the cold war, which were believed to be essential to ensure security of supply, have now become part of what is understood as a structural obstacle to transforming national defence postures. This


\(^{17}\) See chapter 7 in this volume, where these phenomena are described in the particular case of Sweden.

The problem is covered elsewhere in this volume, but its essence is that governments appear reluctant to withdraw support for an industry that cannot compete without the government’s business and that this leads at the European level to the over-production of equipment—sometimes of inappropriate equipment for today’s defence needs, for example, the Eurofighter—for national and European markets. In some cases it has led to irresponsible exporting of weapons and equipment to unstable regions and repressive regimes.\footnote{Miller, D., \textit{Export or Die: Britain’s Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq} (Cassell: London, 1996).}

This combination of structural problems has driven EU member states, the European Commission, the EU Presidency and the defence industry—after many years of hesitation—to push collectively for a breakthrough on armaments policy at the EU level. The argument is that, if defence spending is not to increase, one obvious way of bridging capability gaps is through increased cooperation in armaments. Joint procurement of the necessary equipment would offer savings through economies of scale and reduced duplication. However, this might not be such an easy option, given that the armaments market in the EU is not particularly efficient, European defence industrial consolidation is still patchy and defence procurement remains oriented towards national needs. Two dominant features are evident on the defence industrial scene: a growing monopolization in the aerospace and defence electronics sectors; and a lack of

\begin{center}
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\end{center}

\textit{Figure 6.1.} Total military expenditure of EU member states and military expenditure of the USA, 1989–2003

Figures are in constant (2003) US dollars. The EU15 are the 15 post-1995 members of the European Union.

\textit{Source:} SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
consolidation of mostly subsidized and protected national capacities in the other sectors.20

The 25 EU members undoubtedly have a defence budget problem, starting with the strong imbalance between expenditure on personnel and equipment that affects almost all of them, and including the mere pittance—one-quarter of the US total—that they spend on research and development. The main problem thus lies with the quality of European defence spending—how EU member states allocate their limited resources. The overall level of investment (especially on equipment and research and development) is largely insufficient if measured against the shortfalls that the member states have agreed to address together under the ECAP and NATO’s 2002 Prague Capability Commitments. Uneven spending across the EU countries, even among the main spenders, further creates a potential ‘burden sharing’ problem inside the Union. The EU members neither use comparable budgetary invoicing nor have compatible procurement cycles, which further complicates policy coordination and convergence.21

Alongside the intergovernmental ambition to work more closely on defence matters, the EU can support defence transformation in other ways—specifically its Community pillar (the EU’s first pillar), where the issue of creating a single market in defence is being explored and a European Security Research Programme will be established to help boost ‘science- and technology-based security innovation’.22 Considering the deep roots of defence policy in national defence industrial partnerships and policy, this approach might have an equally or even more critical impact on the shape and process of European defence reform. Tackling structural change in defence policy has always required an approach that deals with not just the political and strategic aspects but also the other critical levels of operational restructuring and defence industrial policy.23 Against this background, the next section turns to the EU ‘demand side’ of the capability–hardware debate, to look at how capability targets are affecting the political and operational levels of defence policy and to map out some of the key issues arising as the debate moves on to the implementation of the new Headline Goal 2010.24

20 Quille and Mawdsley (note 4).
21 Garden, Clarke and Quille (note 16).
23 Baylis (note 13).
IV. How is the European Security and Defence Policy being used for capability targets?

At the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, the EU member states defined the Helsinki Headline Goal as follows: ‘cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000–60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks’. Initial developments focused on establishing the institutional framework to support the Helsinki Headline Goal, and the Nice European Council of December 2000 approved decision-making structures for the ESDP in the shape of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

The Helsinki Headline Goal prompted a new debate, alongside a much older one in NATO, on European defence capabilities, which has been a mainstay both of subsequent European summit meetings and of expert debate. In order to move towards the Helsinki Headline Goal’s targets, in November 2000 an EU Capability Commitments Conference (now an annual event) was held, at which member states were easily able to volunteer enough manpower and assets to satisfy the EU’s initial operational demands for that year. Indeed, there was a surplus of commitments in some areas, such as soldiers (over 100,000), combat aircraft (over 400) and ships (100), but an absence of commitment in other areas, such as strategic airlift and tactical transport (including helicopters). Member states made their commitments in such a complicated manner (referring to combinations of forces and timeframes for availability) that a force planner would not be able to state with any confidence which of the troops were available at any one time without substantial re-discussion and confirmation with the member states. This auditing function was beyond the mandate of the EUMS, which simply held that the Helsinki Headline Catalogue could only be updated with voluntary information from the

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25 Council of the European Union (note 1).
28 Two catalogues were produced by the EUMS: the Helsinki Headline Catalogue, which reviewed all European military capabilities, and the Helsinki Force Catalogue, which compiled all the member states’ commitments at the Nov. 2000 Capability Commitments Conference. At the second Capability Commitments Conference, held on 19 Nov. 2001, the Helsinki Progress Catalogue was produced, in which the shortfalls were documented and monitored for improvement. This cataloguing process is supported by the EUMS and directed to the EUMC and overseen by the member states’ representatives in the Helsinki Task Force.
29 Garden, Clarke and Quille (note 16).
By making the EUMS responsible for compiling and analysing the member states’ commitments but not providing it with the authority to determine the exact status and availability of the assets committed, planners had been appointed who were not allowed to plan. Should the Political and Security Committee discuss a crisis and seek military advice on the possibilities for an intervention, the EU military authorities would have to seek that advice from member states’ capitals or from NATO (following the agreement of April 2003, known as the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, that gave the EU access to NATO’s planning capability).

Subsequent analysis of the ‘generic list of capabilities’ contained in the ‘Elaboration of the Headline Goal’ and of the EUMS Catalogues reinforced the consensus that Europe has capability shortfalls. Five key shortfalls affected force deployability: in strategic and tactical lift; sustainability and logistics (including air-to-air refuelling); effective engagement (including precision weapons); survivability of force and infrastructure (including rescue helicopters); and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The aim was to acquire these capabilities by ‘voluntary’ commitments made under the European Capability Action Plan. Under the ECAP the member states agreed to ‘mobilise voluntarily all efforts, investments, developments and coordination measures, both nationally and multinational, in order to improve existing resources and progressively develop the capabilities needed for the Union’s crisis-management actions’.

The core principles to be followed were: (a) improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of European defence efforts, using existing or envisaged cooperation between countries or groups of countries; (b) a ‘bottom-up’ approach, creating additional capabilities on a national and voluntary basis; and (c) coordination between EU member states as well as EU–NATO harmonization. Nations or groups of nations could commit themselves to the improvement of specific capabilities.

While the member states had originally identified 42 shortfalls at the 2001 Capability Commitments Conference, 19 ECAP Panels were set up to rectify 24 ‘significant’ shortfalls. After analysis of these shortfall areas the panels were to report on 1 March 2003. By late 2002, however, it became clear that the progress of the ECAP Panels was losing momentum and that there would be no

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32 Meeting of European Union Defence Ministers (note 27).
33 Garden, Clarke and Quille (note 16).
34 Council of the European Union (note 2).
35 Council of the European Union (note 2).
36 The ECAP Panels consist of and are chaired by so-called experts from the member states. The work of the panels is coordinated by the member state representatives in the Helsinki Task Force, which draws on the support of the EUMS. Final direction is from the Political and Security Committee.
announcements of new capabilities or projects to acquire the capabilities by the deadline. The EU members and their Helsinki Task Force representatives to the EUMC were also very busy during this period negotiating an agreement with NATO on the Berlin Plus arrangements, in order to ensure access to NATO assets for the EU’s first planned military operation, to be launched on 1 March 2003 in the FYROM.\textsuperscript{37} Member states thus decided to extend the ECAP process to a second phase with more focused work undertaken by ECAP Project Groups, which replaced the ECAP Panels. From April 2003 the ECAP Project Groups focused on 15 project areas: (a) Headquarters, (b) Combat Search and Rescue, (c) Attack Helicopters, (d) Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence, (e) Medical, (f) Strategic Sea Lift, (g) Strategic Airlift, (h) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, (i) Nuclear Biological and Chemical Forces Protection, (j) Space-based Assets, (k) Special Operations Forces, (l) Air-to-Air Refuelling, (m) Interoperability of Humanitarian and Evacuation Operations, (n) Support Helicopters, and (o) Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance.\textsuperscript{38}

The ECAP process maintained the emphasis in the Helsinki Headline Goal on ‘voluntary’ commitments. Although capabilities were not immediately forthcoming, the process was seen as a success. Indeed, NATO’s Prague Capability Commitments process, adopted in December 2003 to replace the earlier Defence Capabilities Initiative, was said to have drawn on the ECAP’s success in getting EU states to voluntarily commit to an operationally focused set of capability goals.

Nevertheless, generating defence capabilities is a longer-term process with considerable obstacles to overcome, including those outlined above on spending and defence industrial relations. Both NATO’s Prague Capability Commitments process and the EU’s ECAP process began to suffer the same fate as the original Defence Capabilities Initiative—a lack of political will from their members. Unfortunately, although the two organizations were focusing on almost identical capability shortfalls, member states did not permit them to hold joint meetings on the subject, even after agreeing security arrangements for inter-institutional exchanges. A number of ECAP Project Groups adopted informal ‘back-to-back’ meetings whereby national experts could attend an EU capability meeting on one day and a NATO meeting on practically the same subject the following day. While this relationship is improving, it represents another obstacle to achieving capability targets.

The ‘bottom-up’ focus of the first Helsinki Headline Goal, and its intensification under the ECAP process, had achieved early successes in getting member states to focus on capability gaps and voluntarily commit themselves to seeking ways to make up the shortfalls. Turning that political will into an investment of resources would take much longer. Considering the experience of NATO under its Defence Capabilities Initiative, this was not such a surprise.

\textsuperscript{37} Cameron and Quille (note 3).

and even less so considering the challenge posed by defence spending and procurement practices in Europe. The awareness among member states and some analysts of the need for a renewed injection of political will was to lead in due course to the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA), designed for a ‘top-down’ injection into the EU capability-building process.

The European Defence Agency

The European Defence Agency was established by a Joint Action of the EU in July 2004, following the so-called Barnier Proposal in the European Convention. The Council decided that during 2004 an ‘agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments’ would be established. It would have four key roles: (a) ‘developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management’; (b) ‘promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation’; (c) ‘strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base’; and (d) ‘creating a competitive European defence equipment market as well as promoting, in liaison with the Community’s research activities where appropriate, research aimed at leadership in strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities’.

In 2004, ministers agreed that the agency should be tasked with: (a) identifying future defence capability requirements, in both quantitative and qualitative terms (forces, equipment, interoperability and training); (b) continuing to work with NATO through the Capability Development Mechanism; (c) encouraging member states to meet their capability commitments in the ECAP process; (d) promoting the harmonization of military requirements; and (e) pursuing collaborative activities to make up shortfalls, and defining financial priorities for capability development and acquisition.

The agency slowly became operational under its director, Nick Whitney. A useful report was produced during the start-up process by the EDA’s Establishment Team, outlining in detail the future shape and key functions of the agency, and stating clearly that ‘The Agency raison d’être is to support the Member States in their collective effort to strengthen the ESDP’. The functions of the EDA are seen as: (a) to improve coherence and remedy fragmentation in the European defence capability-generation process, and (b) to provide longer-term

41 It will take time to get the EDA up and running at full speed, and this will be in the context of ongoing developments under the Headline Goal 2010, ECAP Project Groups and the Commission’s work on security research (Preparatory Action). Nevertheless, in 2005 it had reached its initial core-staff quota of 80 personnel in its 4 directorates (including experts seconded from national administrations) and it has a budget of €25 million for 2005 (including €10 million for non-recurring set-up costs).
strategic direction as the basis for making decisions about future ESDP capability requirements.

In general, the EDA should provide a measure of ‘top-down’ political support for defence transformation for the EU member states and, importantly, their defence ministers (who will meet in the agency framework). The intention is to move from identifying EU-level capability targets to strengthening the links with national defence establishments and ensuring that the resources and commitments to make up the targets are built into national planning systems.

The European Commission will be one of the key stakeholders in the agency and as such it is ‘fully associated’ with the work of the agency. The preparatory report of the Establishment Team stated that ‘The Commission’s work on Research and Technology, market regulation and defense industrial policy issues require, and offer beneficial potential for, a fruitful partnership between Agency and Commission’. This is a major understatement, because the Commission is fast developing its role in this area and will have a major impact on the investment strategies of the European defence and security research industry and their patterns of procurement through its work in promoting key European capacities in research and high technology, many of them relevant also to developing weapons and defence-related capabilities for Europe’s military. The agency can assist ‘joined up’ capability generation by linking up with these Commission efforts.

Key questions remain about the EDA, not least concerning the ease with which it can either become the focus for capability discussions and take over the ECAP process from the EUMC or be wedded with the latter in some other coherent fashion. The Commission’s role will provide a different challenge as it moves from its present association with the EDA to a more developed dialogue on setting future research priorities that help produce technologies for the future armed forces of Europe.

In the early stages of the ESDP, the relationship of the capability-building process to operational demands, set out notably in the Helsinki Headline Goal, was often criticized as weak in institutional and substantial terms, with each aspect associated with different champions. The latest structural creations, including the EDA, are designed to help manage more effectively the short- and longer-term process of acquiring the necessary capabilities to meet operational demands and security priorities. That said, the structural limits of defence budgets and national defence industrial policies remain as a serious barrier to achieving cooperative and collective solutions at the EU level and will remain as a constant problem during the early years of the EDA and the Helsinki Headline Goal 2010.

43 ‘Fully associated’ means in particular that the Commission can exchange information, assessments and advice, as appropriate, on matters where its own activities and strategies have a bearing on the agency’s missions.

44 Agency Establishment Team (note 42), p. 54.
V. What are the operational demands and planning requirements?

There are four main points of reference for understanding the operational demands evolving from the ESDP that have affected defence planning and concepts: (a) the original Helsinki Headline Goal (including the Rapid Reaction Force) and the Petersberg Tasks; (b) the operational realities of early ESDP missions; (c) the Headline Goal 2010 and the battle groups; and (d) EU–UN cooperation on military crisis management.

The Petersberg Tasks

The Petersberg Tasks—as defined in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam—provide both an immediate point of departure and an obstacle to understanding military roles in EU crisis management. The treaty defines the tasks as including ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making’. These broad formulations were unhelpful as incorporated in the Helsinki Headline Goal and equally unhelpful when developed in such working documents as the ‘Food for thought paper’ on the ‘Elaboration of the Headline Goal’ and in subsequent steps to agree a strategic context, key planning assumptions, illustrative scenarios and eventually potential force packages. The Helsinki Headline Goal, the Petersberg Tasks and the Elaboration of the Headline Goal have all been described as carrying limited value for planning purposes and for rooting work on the Helsinki Headline Goal in the reality of national defence planning. For instance, the illustrative scenarios based on the Helsinki Headline Goal envisaged three main operations: conflict prevention, assistance to civilians and separation of warring parties by force. The elaboration of, for example, ‘separation of warring parties’ remained ambiguous and the details of force requirements were limited to generic lists of capabilities (early-warning surveillance, control of air movement and sea control), with no precise details of requirements for types of units or capabilities or the size of the force envisaged (the text referred to a minimum of two brigades and possibly more than one division). Not surprisingly, differences soon emerged among EU states in their interpretation, especially of the upper end of the scale of operation.

As shown in table 6.1, countries such as France took an ambitious interpretation of the scale of force—seeing Operation Desert Storm as a possible Petersberg Task; others, such as the UK, referred specifically to the concept of crisis

46 Meeting of European Union Defence Ministers (note 27).
47 Garden, Clarke and Quille (note 16).
48 Garden, Clarke and Quille (note 16).
Table 6.1. Indicative upper limits of the Petersberg Tasks, by analogy and description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Analogy</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>IFOR/SFOR/KFOR, 1995–2001</td>
<td>‘Peacekeeping’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Desert Storm, 1991</td>
<td>‘Restoring order’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Allied Force, 1999</td>
<td>‘Crisis management’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Allied Force, 1999</td>
<td>‘Crisis management’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


management, citing Operation Allied Force. For other countries, such as Italy and Sweden, it was the existence of a legal mandate, specifically a United Nations mandate, that mattered more than the scale and demands of the operation. The constructive ambiguity that was a strength of the Petersberg Tasks as originally defined by the Western European Union (where they were understood in the context of the Balkans crises of the 1990s as peace-support or robust peacekeeping operations at the higher end of operational demand) had become unhelpful in the context of the ESDP and under the new Helsinki Headline Goal process.

This ambiguity is less problematic at the lower level of the operational scale, although an increased emphasis on policing roles within the ESDP may stretch some states’ understanding of what constitutes a lower-level action—perhaps explaining why the European Gendarmerie Force, established in September 2004 by France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, was launched as a multilateral initiative outside the EU framework. At the high end of the scale, while the ambiguity of the Petersberg Tasks and the targets set by the member states in the Helsinki Headline Goal may help to mask political differences, it is a problem for planning purposes, in particular for those working in the EUMC and the EUMS. The latter came to hope that the issue would be more effectively addressed by the Headline Goal 2010 (see below).

The operational reality: ‘ESDP goes live’

Reality on the ground provided the first indication of the type of concrete operations that the EU might conduct under the ESDP, and it also helped to speed up agreement between the EU and NATO on access to NATO assets. On 31 March 2003 the EU launched the EU Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUFOR Concordia). European Union forces took over from NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony with the aim of contributing further to a stable, secure environment in the FYROM and ensuring the implemen-
tation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, which settled the conflict between Macedonian Slavs and Albanians. The EU force patrolled the ethnic Albanian-populated regions of FYROM that border on Albania, Serbia and the province of Kosovo.

The operation, requested by the FYROM and endorsed in UN Security Council Resolution 1371, was conducted by personnel from 13 EU member states (all member states other than Denmark and Ireland) and 14 non-member states. The total forces were a modest 400 lightly armed military personnel, and the budget for the first six months of the operation was €6.2 million. The EU drew on NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus arrangements, thus providing the first test case for the strategic EU–NATO partnership for crisis management embodied in the agreement of December 2002.

The EU’s second military operation, Operation Artemis, highlighted a second operational concept available to the Union, that of the ‘framework nation’. The aim of Operation Artemis was to prevent a large-scale humanitarian and civil crisis in Ituri, a region in the north-east of the DRC. The EU responded to an appeal by the UN Secretary-General and launched a military operation on 12 June 2003, under a mandate set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1484. Operation Artemis sought to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the capital of Ituri, with a force of about 1800 soldiers, mostly French. Artemis was the EU’s first military operation outside Europe as well as the first not to rely on NATO assistance.

Operation Artemis showed that the ‘framework nation’ concept—initially elaborated within the Western European Union—can be useful for achieving some semblance of ‘rapidity’ in an EU multinational operation. Certain member states have the necessary structures to lead rapid response operations, and in a Union of 25 members it will not always be possible to include every member in every operation, as was attempted with EUFOR Concordia.

A third EU military operation, EUFOR Althea, took over from NATO’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) on 2 December 2004. While the model being employed draws on the Berlin Plus arrangements, the scale of the operation is much larger (about 7000 troops). The model is also interesting because the operation is being closely associated with the 2004 Comprehensive Policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and is being tabled by the EU as an innovative approach to improving civil–military coordination in the field (specifically, with the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has run a police operation since January 2003).

52 Quille and Missiroli (note 3).
The reality of operational demands has somewhat bypassed previous rhetorical questions, such as what the ESDP was for and where it might be used. While they illustrate the EU’s strategic ambitions, both in its neighbourhood and in sub-Saharan Africa, there is no ground for complacency about a multiplication of these actions because the capability-building process underpinning the operations remains a much longer-term effort. Ongoing conflicts in such places as Darfur, Sudan, and the reactions of different European states to recent operational demands in Afghanistan and Iraq have provided reminders of the political and material limits to collective European action.

The Headline Goal 2010 and the battle groups

The Headline Goal 2010

The limitations of the Petersberg Tasks as a guiding concept were finally recognized in the European Security Strategy, and in November 2003 the EU member states endorsed a plan to ‘define’ the presently opaque operational demands for the EU by June 2004, in a planning framework extending to 2010. The hopes that might have been attached to this new start were, however, soon to be disappointed. Rather than ‘defining’ the Petersberg Tasks, the Headline Goal 2010 loosely expanded them.

The Headline Goal 2010 was adopted at the June 2004 Brussels European Council, and its essence may be captured in the following statement.

Building on the Helsinki Headline and capability goals and recognising that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed, Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. This includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As indicated by the European Security Strategy this might also include joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement.

In order to achieve this new Headline Goal and add further details, a programme with some specific milestones was identified. The objectives were: (a) to establish during the second half of 2004 a civil–military cell within the EUMS and to establish the capacity to rapidly set up an operation centre should the need arise for certain operations; (b) to establish the European Defence


54 Garden, Clarke and Quille (note 16).

Agency during 2004, to work *inter alia* on correcting the ECAP capability shortfalls; *(c)* to implement by 2005 EU joint coordination in strategic lift (air, land and sea) as a step towards achieving full capacity and efficiency in strategic lift by 2010; *(d)* to transform (in particular for airlift) the European Airlift Co-ordination Cell into the European Airlift Centre by 2004 and to develop (between some member states) a European airlift command by 2010; *(e)* to complete by 2007 the establishment of EU battle groups, including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and disembarkation assets; *(f)* to acquire the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008; *(g)* to improve communications at all levels of EU operations by developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage for all communications equipment and assets (both terrestrial and space) by 2010; and *(h)* to develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria for national forces committed to the Headline Goal in the field of deployability and in the field of multinational training.

The Headline Goal 2010 attempts to link the capability-development process with a new framework reflecting recent operational and institutional innovations. However, it does not define the Petersberg Tasks more precisely, nor does it clarify such ambiguities as whether there is an agreed limit to the high end of EU military intervention, or what precise targets in terms of capacity for concurrent operations and sustainability the EU should use in its planning. Further ambiguity is added by references to ‘joint disarmament operations’, which could include anything from providing personal security for UN inspectors to a full-scale invasion such as that in Iraq. The same vagueness affects references to issues that are critically important for defence planning, such as: ‘Interoperability but also deployability and sustainability will be at the core of Member States efforts and will be the driving factors of this goal 2010.’

It is still early days in the process of elaborating the new Headline Goal, and serious effort is being invested in trying to respond to some of these remaining ambiguities. The fluid institutional setting may slow this process down since efforts to establish a civil–military planning cell and the EDA will overlap with the timetable to agree illustrative scenarios. Simultaneously, new lessons are being learned during ongoing operations such as EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, launched in December 2004.

**Battle groups**

The Headline Goal 2010 contains milestones and key concepts, such as battle groups, that are meant to provide new drivers for defence transformation in the member states as well as providing actual defence tools. The original Helsinki Catalogue process will remain in place for analytical purposes and, innovatively, as the basis for categorizing capabilities to fulfil tasks within certain

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scenarios. This represents a breakthrough in limiting the targets of the new Headline Goal 2010 to planning and concepts. For instance, the battle group is seen as a key ‘mobilizing’ tool. A battle group will consist of highly trained, battalion-size formations (1500 soldiers each)—including all combat and service support as well as deployability and sustainability assets. These should be available within 15 days’ notice and be sustainable for at least 30 days (extendable to 120 days by rotation). They should be flexible enough to promptly undertake operations in distant crisis areas, under—but not exclusively—a UN mandate and to conduct combat missions in an extremely hostile environment (mountains, desert, jungle, and so on). As such, they should prepare the ground for larger, more traditional peacekeeping forces, ideally provided by the UN or member states.

The battle group is not a completely flawless concept: in particular, it leaves open the question of follow-on forces. The battle group is sustainable for 120 days, while the UN force-generation process (the most likely source of follow-on forces) takes six months, creating an obvious gap. However, the Headline Goal handles this by linking its specific references to the battle group concept (also more moderately described as ‘minimum force packages’) with a more comprehensive concept of intervention whereby the EU has the ability ‘to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases’. This provides a critical point of departure for further work to aid force planning for EU crisis management, but the text of the Headline Goal 2010 leaves the details incomplete. Another major addition is the statement that ‘Procedures to assess and certify these high readiness joint packages will need to be developed’. Such procedures will potentially add a qualitative and quantitative breakthrough in allowing forces assigned to the EU not only to be committed and counted in catalogues but also to be verified and vetted in order to substantially improve defence planning processes.

The next crucial step in understanding whether the battle group concept will help to frame discussions on European defence capabilities targets (like the earlier Rapid Response Force), or will actually lead to committed and verifiable force packages, is the formation by the member states of the force packages that they committed at the November 2004 Capability Commitments Conference. This process is ongoing: at a battle group coordination meeting on 11 May 2005 the member states reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring that the first two years of full operational capability (i.e., from 2007) would be achieved, but they did concede that a shortfall existed for one of the two slots in the second half of

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57 An official of the British Ministry of Defence, in an interview with the author, described a battle group as the smallest self-sufficient military operational formation that can be deployed and sustained in a theatre of operations. The concept draws on standard NATO doctrine: e.g., the NATO Response Force ‘land component’ is a land brigade configured tactically with 5 battle groups.

58 Council of the European Union (note 24).

59 Council of the European Union (note 24).
Further work is focusing on the qualitative aspects of the commitments, such as on defining standards and criteria for the battle group.

EU–UN cooperation on military crisis management

Some of the missing links between the EU battle group’s intervention period (up to 120 days) and the UN’s force-generation process are touched upon in Ireland’s June 2004 ESDP Presidency Report. The document provides an ambitious framework to take forward substantial cooperation in EU–UN military crisis management operations. After the experience of Operation Artemis, further analysis is being conducted on two specific models to meet the objective of ‘an EU operation in answer to a request from the UN’ either with a stand-alone force or as a component of a larger UN mission (a modular approach). The first model, known as the ‘bridging model’, reflects an Artemis-type operation whereby the EU intervenes rapidly for a short period in order to give the UN time to mount a new operation or reorganize an existing one. The key to success here is close coordination with the UN for a quick replacement and smooth transition. The second model, known as the ‘standby model’, has been described by the UN Secretariat as an ‘over the horizon reserve’ or an ‘extraction force’ provided by the EU in support of a UN operation. European experience also exists for such a model with the Danish-based multinational standby high-readiness brigades (SHIRBRIGs). The Presidency Report states that this type of model would require ‘complicated coordination’ with the UN, ‘could carry considerable associated risk’ and will be analysed further during development of the battle group concept.

Member states will also be able to continue long-standing bilateral or multinational commitments to the UN and may use the EU as a clearing house to which they can submit information on the capabilities that they have committed to the UN and, if they wish, coordinate national contributions. The June 2004 ESDP Presidency Report states that these three issues (the clearing house, the bridging model and the standby model) will be developed further in the context of ongoing efforts to implement the Joint Declaration on EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis Management.

While EU support for UN crisis management operations is consistent with the ESS and with Franco-British visions, the standby model in particular raises interesting new issues. References in the June 2004 ESDP Presidency Report

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62 Since Sep. 2003, when the Joint Declaration on EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis Management was signed, there has been a process whereby dialogue through the consultative ‘steering committee’ mechanism has been encouraging officials to get to know one another.
imply a need for a very rapidly deployable and robust standing force, but
whether this can be developed for ‘immediate reaction’ without the need for
forces to be pre-assigned to the EU (in order to comply with the EU’s decision-
making process) remains to be seen. Such an approach would be more demand-
ing than the Artemis model, and the voluntary, trust-based commitments of the
Rapid Reaction Force would not meet this requirement.

VI. Conclusions: the way forward

The Headline Goal 2010 calls for the realization of an EU Civil–Military Planning
Cell, and the more demanding aspects of the EU–UN military crisis management framework would also require a central EU planning and operations facility. In the meantime, the further development of the Civil–Military Planning Cell could usefully take up the less controversial role of fostering good working relations with the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations and overseeing analysis of lessons learned from EUFOR Althea.

These changes come at an interesting moment in the evolution of the EU’s security and defence policy architecture. In addition to the new Civil–Military Planning Cell, the Headline Goal 2010 and benchmarks, the European Defence Agency and the launch of the largest ESDP mission to date in EUFOR Althea provide a good moment to reflect upon the outstanding needs of the European Union in planning terms. The battle group concept will need to be developed by the EUMS through realistic scenario-based work to promote readiness, sustainability, concurrency and follow-on forces, as well as cooperation with and transition to civilian operations, and this in turn should facilitate realistic categorization of capabilities for tasks. The EUMC, supported by the EUMS, will also be responsible for putting together lessons learned from the first six months of EUFOR Althea. That operation is starting to generate important civil–military concepts in the framework of the Comprehensive Policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and of liaison work with the EU’s Office of the Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as production of a new integrated police unit within the military operation. Such developments will combine with the new targets and planning capability to create a particular emphasis on the integration of civil and military planning. The Civil–Military Planning Cell will be coming on-stream in parallel with these developments and would do well to structure its work around these real operational needs.

Regarding civil–military relations in general, it will be interesting to see how the expansion of EU structures to handle defence capability targets and operational demands alters the balance between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management. Both have traditionally been equally emphasized in the ESDP, but few would disagree that the civilian dimensions of the Headline Goal and institutional planning capacities have been neglected and so it will be interesting to see how the civil–military role of the Planning Cell is approached. The emphasis on the civil–military nature of EUFOR Althea and the integration
of the Integrated Police Unit in the military mission offer opportunities to explore these concepts further and to incorporate them into the analytical and planning capacity of the new cell.

The Dutch Presidency of July–December 2004 took the debate further, in particular on future steps for the EU planning process which has prepared the way for the development of the Civil–Military Cell during 2005. With the creation and development of the new Civil–Military Planning Cell during 2005 (and its operational centre, planned for 2006) a key missing link in support of the EU’s political authorities will be provided. This will be further strengthened by the British Presidency’s work in July–December 2005 on developing the conceptual framework for civilian crisis management and in particular on how to take forward comprehensive planning concepts. Nevertheless, planning is just one element: an expanded mandate at the EU level that is not linked to the realities of national planning and decision making will not support the original goal, which is to help member states’ defence establishments transform themselves in support of collective security policy objectives. There is a growing consensus that, with the new mechanisms provided by the EDA in place, the greatest challenge is now the gap between the policy and the planning of EU member states themselves.

It is argued above that capability targets and operational demands have been used as the two main drivers within ESDP, affecting defence concepts and planning. The capability-generation process has benefited from the operational demands, which have also provided the conceptual framework for discussing capability shortfalls.

The Petersberg Tasks and the Rapid Reaction Force were also useful for achieving political consensus on developments of the ESDP but soon became limited for planning purposes or as a guide to the future evolution of the ESDP. However, the realities of emerging crises in the FYROM and the DRC in 2003 shed light on where the ESDP might concretely be applied, allowed a trial of the ‘framework nation’ concept, and drove forward the development of new ESDP concepts such as the battle groups, bridging forces and standby forces. It remains to be seen how the EU member states will meet their commitments to have battle groups that are fully operational by 2007, after which it can be judged what capability the concept will provide in the short term. Nevertheless, it can be observed that such ‘forces’ (including the earlier Rapid Reaction Force) have also acted as an important driver in the capability-generation process, by providing at least some guide as to what level of intervention Europe would like to be able to provide for collective crisis management objectives.

These new concepts, in turn, are underpinning and framing the new capability-development process, such as with the battle groups. However, the new capability-development process is itself becoming more institutionalized,
with the EDA and with the embryonic links it entails to the Commission’s work on security research and defence industrial market policy. These will be critical in meeting underlying structural challenges posed by national defence policy and planning and defence industrial relations in Europe.

The success of the member states in developing capability targets and meeting operational demands, as well as in developing innovative concepts and planning arrangements, has so far been dependent on sustained political will. When that political will waned, as during the Iraq crisis, criticism of the ESDP welled up again and the capability-development process stalled. The tremendous positive will that has been shown since then to produce an agreed European Security Strategy, and to come to an agreement on defence clauses in the Constitutional Treaty, should be acknowledged as important steps in getting Europe back on track: to focus on collective security ambitions and on the role which military crisis management might have in supporting such policies.
7. The impact of EU capability targets and operational demands on defence concepts and planning: the case of Sweden

Lars Wedin*

I. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the impact on Swedish defence planning of the European Union’s capability targets and operational demands. There are several reasons for choosing the specific case of Sweden rather than trying to cover all the Nordic countries. One reason is that, when it comes to ‘hard’ security policy, the Nordic countries differ more than is generally believed: Denmark’s opting out of the European Security and Defence Policy is an example of this. Although neither Sweden nor Finland is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Finnish security policy is generally seen as being based on real-politik, while Sweden has tried to take a principled approach to the issue of collective defence. In this context, it should be remembered that Sweden is the only country in the EU that did not experience war in the 20th century.

Against this background, it is of interest that the Swedish Government recently formulated a new defence policy, in which the ESDP seems to be given highest priority.1 This is a clear break with the past.

Another reason for focusing on Sweden is that the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) are in the midst of significant process of transformation. This has been presented as a bold move to transform the remnants of a passive, anti-invasion defence force dependent on mobilization of reserves into an active and mobile force ready for expeditionary warfare and peace-support operations under the auspices of the EU, NATO or the United Nations. However, the transformation seems to be severely underfunded, which could have potentially disastrous consequences.

The issue of the new defence policy is all the more interesting as the Swedish population is one of the most Euro-sceptical in the EU; the negative outcome of the September 2003 referendum on adopting the euro, the success of anti-EU


* This chapter reflects the views of the author, not necessarily those of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Armed Forces or the Swedish National Defence College.
parties in the 2004 European elections and the debate about the Constitutional Treaty are examples of this fact. In addition, the ruling Social Democratic Party is deeply divided regarding the EU and depends on the support in parliament of two parties—the Left Party and the Green Party—with explicitly negative policy on the EU.

In this domestic context of December 2004, this chapter analyses the new Swedish defence policy against the requirements spelled out in official EU documents, such as the European Security Strategy, and explained in chapter 6. This section continues with a description of the historical and political background to Sweden’s defence policy. The effect on that policy of cuts in the defence budget are outlined in section II. Strategic and political implications are discussed in section III and the effect on capabilities in section IV. Conclusions are drawn in section V.

Background

During the cold war, Sweden followed a ‘policy of military non-alignment’, by which was meant ‘non-participation in military alliances in peacetime in order to remain neutral in the event of war in its neighbourhood’. This policy was underpinned by armed forces designed to be strong enough to deter a potential assailant from attacking. In fact, at their peak, the SAF could—after mobilization—theoretically muster some 800 000 men and women. The relatively huge defence industrial sector formed a cornerstone of this policy. The idea was that the SAF would have weapon systems with a ‘Swedish profile’, adapted for use by soldiers with little training but also designed not to be interoperable with those of other countries, thereby underpinning the credibility of the ‘policy of military non-alignment’. Sweden did take part in UN peacekeeping operations: this may have been important from a political point of view but was seen as a sideshow by the Swedish military.

Sweden’s relationship with NATO has often been characterized as Berührungsangst (literally, a fear of contact). During the 1990s Sweden became increasingly active in NATO’s Partnership for Peace, which has given much healthy input to the SAF. However, it remains politically unacceptable to suggest the possibility of Sweden joining the alliance.

Sweden has been an active player in the development of the ESDP in order to further at least two national interests. On the one hand, Sweden was genuinely interested in increasing the EU’s crisis management capabilities. On the other hand, Sweden wanted to be able to stop all movement towards enlargement of the Petersberg Tasks or towards a common defence. However, the Swedish

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2 See also chapter 5 in this volume.
4 The term ‘military non-alignment’ is used in this chapter as it is generally understood. The Swedish term translates directly as ‘freedom from military alliances’.
5 See also chapter 9 in this volume.
Government has—albeit somewhat grudgingly—accepted the provisions of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty regarding defence. The statement in the constitution that the obligation to assist a member state that is under attack “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States” is deemed to be an adequate safeguard of Sweden’s position regarding collective defence.

The SAF have been undergoing a transformation, at least since 1999, with the aim of developing an international crisis management capability. However, there have not been any radical changes: the officer corps is relatively old (median age about 35 years), participation in crisis management operations is still voluntary even for officers, and a general obligation for national military service forms the basis for all training, including that for officers. The procurement budget is still taken up by orders made just after the end of the cold war, for equipment that is often of dubious relevance in today’s environment.

In June 2004 the permanent, cross-party Swedish Defence Commission presented its proposals on ‘defence for a new time’. Based on this, in September the government presented its White Paper on defence to parliament for approval. It should be noted that the budget for 2005 was decided on as part of a general agreement on Sweden’s finances between the government and its two supporting parties, both of which are pacifistic and oppose the EU. This agreement means that the annual defence budget will be reduced in steps by 3 billion kronor (approximately €333 million) by the end of 2007 from its present level of about 40 billion kronor (€4.44 billion), that is, by 7.5 per cent.

II. The defence budget

Like most countries in Europe, Sweden has cashed in the so-called peace dividend following the ending of the cold war. The result has been a number of successive reductions of its armed forces. In comparison with other current EU member states, however, the Swedish Armed Forces have not done so badly: between 1985 and 2002 Sweden increased its relative standing in terms of defence spending, both per capita and as a percentage of gross domestic product. The impending reduction in spending of 7.5 per cent will reduce its relative standing, but not significantly.

There are two basic considerations regarding the budget. As most officers known to the author would admit, the problem is not the level of financial input

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6 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 19 Oct. 2004 but has not been ratified. The text of the treaty is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm> and select articles are reproduced in the appendix in this volume.

7 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (note 6), Article I-41.7.


9 Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5 (note 1).

but the extremely poor output. Sweden presently has some 750 personnel in international crisis management missions, of whom only 70 were committed for the EU’s EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;\textsuperscript{11} the reason for this very limited commitment is said to be financial. Taking into account the fact that the SAF have some 10 000 officers and each year train about 15 000 conscripts, this is hardly impressive.\textsuperscript{12}

Second, through its acceptance of the European Security Strategy, Sweden has committed itself to a policy which states that ‘to transform [the EU’s] militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary’.\textsuperscript{13} The new defence policy takes account of this objective insofar as reductions in the present organization may be used—‘partly’—for the enhancement of Swedish contributions to international crisis management.\textsuperscript{14} Given the present state of the SAF, it should be possible to obtain much more output. The real issue is whether this will happen.

III. Policy and strategy

From a European political point of view, the new Swedish defence policy is, on the whole, a very positive step forward. By and large, it is well in line with the European Security Strategy and the Constitutional Treaty. The overall objective is to strengthen the Swedish contribution to international cooperation and crisis management in order to further peace and security for Sweden, the EU and the world at large.

Most remarkable is the treatment of the issue of solidarity. It is now clearly stated that threats to peace and security need to be met in cooperation with other countries. The policy states that it is hard to imagine that Sweden would stay neutral in the event of an armed attack against another EU member.\textsuperscript{15} Conversely, other EU members are expected to help Sweden if it is attacked. The old paradigm that ‘Sweden only defends Sweden and only Sweden defends Sweden’ is dead. It is rather surprising, however, to see that ‘military non-alignment’ is said to constitute the best basis for this policy.\textsuperscript{16}

In fact, the issue of Sweden’s neutrality is not completely dead. It is stated that the Swedish policy of non-membership of military alliances ‘has served us well’ and that it offers ‘the opportunity for neutrality during conflicts in our

\textsuperscript{12} In Dec. 2004 there were 11 622 officers. This is expected to fall to 9800 by Jan. 2008. There were 14 466 conscripts in 2004. From 2006 the average number of conscripts will be about 8500 per year. Swedish Armed Forces, ‘The facts’, Stockholm, 2005, URL <http://www.mil.se/article.php?id=1672>, pp. 39, 44–45.
\textsuperscript{13} Council of the European Union (note 3), p. 12.
\textsuperscript{14} Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5 (note 1), p. 23.
\textsuperscript{15} Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5 (note 1), p. 23.
\textsuperscript{16} Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5 (note 1), p. 23.
immediate region’. Furthermore, freedom of action is a political imperative: ‘Sweden shall in each and every case be able to take decisions on its own analyses’. Even if solidarity is important, Sweden will neither accept nor offer security guarantees. It should be remembered that the Swedish agenda in the EU is to make the union as intergovernmental as possible; this applies in particular to the ESDP.

Against this background, it is possible to see the emphasis on taking part in crisis management operations as a kind of investment in solidarity. In any event, the new defence policy is completely in line with the emphasis placed by the European Security Strategy on the need to handle the risks of crisis and instability by means of cooperation, primarily through the EU: ‘the EU is central to Swedish security’. Furthermore, such cooperation will also be advantageous for the development of the SAF.

International cooperation, which really started in the mid-1990s, has been of enormous benefit to the SAF. Through the Partnership for Peace, regulations, doctrines, procedures and equipment have been adapted to international—that is, NATO—standards. Through participation in international staffs such as the EU Military Staff, Swedish officers learn modern strategic and operational planning skills. This transformation was certainly necessary for being able to participate in ever more complex peace support operations, but it has also given the armed forces a new sense of professionalism. The requirements stemming from the decision to become a framework nation for the Nordic battle group will certainly add to this development.

In contrast to the European Security Strategy, the Swedish defence policy is surprisingly silent on two significant threats: international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Both issues are mentioned in the defence policy, and the Solidarity Clause in the Constitutional Treaty is seen as an expression of the solidarity between EU member states on these matters. However, virtually nothing is said about the implications of these threats for the SAF. Regarding terrorism, there are two explanations. Terrorism directed against EU member states is not seen as being part of the ESDP, which, in Sweden’s view, is about crisis management operations outside the territory of the EU. Second, Sweden traditionally has great difficulties handling civil–military coordination. A recently published study, however, has proposed that the SAF may support the police in certain circumstances. If accepted, this would constitute a break with the past.

19 Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5 (note 1), p. 27.
20 Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5 (note 1), p. 27; and Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (note 6), Article I-43.
21 See chapters 15 and 16 in this volume.
Even if the main threats originate in distant regions, Sweden must be able to defend itself. The future of the SAF is hence said to be dependent on two sets of missions: the territorial defence of Sweden and development of related competences; and support for international peace and stability. Insiders see one reason for the continuing insistence on defence of the country’s territorial integrity as being the political imperative of retaining conscription.23

Here, however, the new defence policy makes a kind of logical somersault. As the political situation in Sweden’s own region is very positive, it is possible to reduce the SAF significantly.24 At the same time, the defence policy clearly states that Sweden should increase its contributions to international crisis management operations.25 The big question is whether this is possible.

IV. Capabilities

The main issue from the perspective of the EU is whether Sweden will try to cover any of the identified shortfalls in the Helsinki Headline Goal and fulfil the Headline Goal 2010.26 Given the central role of the ESDP stated in the new Swedish defence policy, some commitment to the goals would be expected.

There are two kinds of clear commitment in the defence policy, one positive and one negative. On the positive side, Sweden has a clear objective to increase its contributions to EU military missions. It will lead a Nordic battle group with participation from Estonia, Finland and Norway, and Sweden aims to be able to mount two concurrent operations at battalion level in addition to three smaller missions.27 In comparison with the situation today, this amounts to a huge increase in the number of deployed personnel. Battle groups will also require a hitherto unheard of degree of readiness. Furthermore, the policy document makes rather general statements on the importance of flexibility, mobility and so on.

On the negative side are the reductions in operational capability. Here the policy is explicit. It states, for instance, that the number of surface warships will be reduced to seven, a ridiculously small number.28 The policy goes on to express concern that the number is so low that it might be difficult for Sweden to take part in crisis management operations.

The policy is virtually silent on the procurement needed to fulfil the nation’s political ambitions and the EU’s Headline Goals. Information from sources in

24 Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5 (note 1), p. 32.
27 Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5 (note 1), p. 44.
28 Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5 (note 1), p. 64.
SAF Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence, however, seems to make it clear that the commitments stemming from the Headline Goal have not been driving policy.

The policy is also more or less silent on future procurement. The Supreme Commander of the SAF has been directed to make proposals on this matter before the next financial year. At present, a relatively high proportion of Sweden’s defence budget is allocated to procurement. However, much of this expenditure is for orders placed in the 1990s. At present, there is virtually no money for new initiatives, adapted to present requirements; rather, it has been rumoured that there will be important cuts.

Nevertheless, there are also some positive signs. For instance, Sweden now accepts the idea of capabilities pooling, which is a major break with former policy. An interest is expressed in air-to-air refuelling capability and the requirement for strategic transport is at least alluded to. The analysis of and enthusiasm for network-based defence have been toned down to a more realistic level.

On personnel, the new defence policy is mixed. It gives, at last, a green light for a kind of long-term military service for conscripts volunteering to take part in operations abroad. It will also be possible to employ a limited number of rank-and-file soldiers on contract terms—a necessity for the battle group concept.

The number of conscripts called up is to be reduced, but conscription will continue to be the normal basis for recruitment. It is not even clear if the SAF will be able to find sufficient volunteers among conscripts for international operations; the training of those who do not so volunteer will constitute a waste of money and effort. Indeed, some also argue that the organization will be so reduced that it will not be able to train enough recruits.

The present level of Swedish participation in international crisis management operations is, as pointed out above, very low in proportion to the country’s total defence forces and spending. The fact that Sweden’s contributions are also small relative to other Nordic countries’ is identified as a problem in the defence policy. It is surprising that EUFOR Althea, the biggest military operation undertaken so far by the EU, was not given priority, especially since it was planned for over a long period of time. Given that, the Swedish contribution of 70 personnel is derisory. The reason seems to be budgetary; Swedish participation in the UN Mission in Liberia has used up all the available money. This implies that Sweden has neither the ability nor the willingness to shift


funds to match priorities; and it may indicate that the ESDP is not so important when it really matters.

Regrettably, the low number of soldiers provided for EUFOR Althea fits into a pattern in which Sweden prefers to contribute small units to many operations, rather than making an impact by contributing larger units to a few operations. This approach puts many Swedish flags on the map but gives Sweden very little influence. From a military perspective it is well known that the deployment of battalion-sized units should be the norm. Participation with platoon-level units does not give Swedish officers the opportunity to hold command posts and certainly will not give them any opportunity to hold important international posts as the latter are in practice allocated in relation to the size of contributions. The defence policy states that Swedish officers should have the opportunity to command at battalion level and above during exercises,32 but in the present financial situation this will be hard to implement.

This issue raises another one. It is astonishing that the greater part of Sweden’s contributions to international combat operations appears to be ground forces. Given the organization of the SAF and its dependence on conscripts, such forces may not be its main comparative advantage. Sweden could do more with its high-technology units in the navy and air force, leaving the army to concentrate on traditional international peacekeeping, where it has a good reputation. Establishing a battle group is an ambitious objective and might have important repercussions for Sweden’s overall operating capability. As underlined in a recent report on European defence,33 Europe needs expeditionary rapid-reaction forces as well as substantial, sustainable peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, a battle group will need combat support as well as support by air and maritime forces.

Regarding officers, the present situation is somewhat chaotic. The new defence policy states that, in future, taking part in international operations will be a natural part of an officer’s career. Furthermore, the organization should have more warriors and fewer bureaucrats, thereby implying a reduction of the currently high median age of officers. On the other hand, the government, outside the context of the defence policy, wants to increase the already comparatively high retirement age from 60 to 61. More importantly, the sharp decline of the budget will have drastic consequences. As well as the closure of bases and disbanding of regiments, about 10 per cent of officers (there are no professional non-commissioned officers in Sweden) will be fired and recruitment will be stopped for several years. The government is silent on how this can be done, just saying that the ‘parties’ should handle it in the normal way—through an agreement, according to Swedish civil law, between the Supreme Commander and the officers’ union. This will mean that it is primarily the young officers who will be obliged to leave. There are indications that the youngest officer in

32 Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5 (note 1), p. 149.
the navy will be around 33 years old. Operational capabilities in both the long and the short runs will obviously be severely affected.

V. Conclusions

Sweden’s 2004 defence policy constitutes an important political step forward. Sweden fully embraces the ESDP and makes it and the related operations its priority. There are, however, still areas where old thinking prevails, such as ‘non-participation in military alliances’, neutrality and reluctance to engage in cooperation against terrorism.

While the rhetoric is laudable, the facts are less encouraging. It seems extremely dubious that the Swedish Armed Forces will succeed in carrying through a massive transformation and enhancement of operational capabilities within a budget that is very tight and which will require drastic cuts in both personnel and equipment. Aside from the battle group, it is open to question whether Sweden will be able on this showing to take its share of responsibility for the development of the military capabilities of the European Union. It is also doubtful whether the planned battle group will materialize, among other reasons because of a possible lack of trained personnel.

Postscript

There has been a lot of turbulence in the Swedish Armed Forces in 2005. On the one hand, the Swedish Government seems committed to the realization of the Nordic EU battle group. On the other hand, a number of officers have been fired; others have left voluntarily. The result is that a surplus of 1000 officers now has been turned into a deficit of 500. The financial situation is still precarious in spite of the large-scale rationalizations and base closures. General Håkan Syrén, the Supreme Commander of the SAF, has stated that any further reductions will have serious consequences. The risk that such reductions will take place is not negligible, in particular since the minority Social Democrat government seems to have given the Left and Green parties veto rights over issues regarding the defence budget. It is difficult to understand how the good intentions in the White Paper will be realized. Mao’s words about ‘paper tigers’ seem highly applicable to the Swedish defence policy: ‘in appearance it is very powerful but in reality it is nothing to be afraid of’.

34 Försvarets forum, no. 4, 2005, p. 1.
8. ‘Not only, but also Nordic’: the European Security and Defence Policy and its implications for alternative frameworks of Nordic cooperation

Jesper L. Christensen*

I. Introduction

The European Security and Defence Policy and the European Union are now moving at an unprecedented pace along lines that are more militarily activist—as well as integrationist. At the same time, security and defence policies in all the Nordic countries that maintain armed forces—Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden—are undergoing thorough reassessments in the face of 21st century realities. Change is coming to individual Nordic countries and to ‘Norden’ (that is, the Nordic region) as a whole, and what could or should be the outcome of the European influence on this process is an interesting and important question.

The interplay between the EU’s security and defence policy and Nordic defence policies is a subject as complicated as its description is long. Of primary interest for the purposes of this chapter are the implications of the ESDP for the defence and security political future of Norden as a whole: how will the EU and the ESDP affect the Nordic region? To answer this question, the focus here is on the implications of the ESDP for alternative frameworks of defence cooperation, such as those that Nordic countries might engage in outside the EU structures.

Since the subject of ‘Norden’ as a region, with its identity and security community, is covered elsewhere in this volume, the present chapter focuses solely on the question of frameworks for defence cooperation and uses a specialized theoretical approach. The purpose of this exercise is to show that the ESDP

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raises new questions about the relevance of any alternative Nordic framework for defence cooperation, and that if the Nordic countries want a positive answer to these questions they must offer some variety of added value through a forward-looking ‘dynamism’.

Presuming that alternative frameworks of defence cooperation imply cooperation not directly handled through the EU or the ESDP, the investigation borrows a notion from the realm of conceptual studies. It uses the techniques of the academic discipline of international politics to identify the supporting ‘pillars’ of Nordic security and in the process suggests and explores new conceptual approaches to the changed world and its changing future. The chapter thus aims to place itself above the many detailed political analyses of the subject and to seek a possible generic approach to the question of constructing alternative frameworks of cooperation within the present international topography.

The investigation in section II is in three parts. First, the security dynamics of Norden are described. The three analytical handles represented by the ‘pillars’ of history, politics and resources are then used to establish the foundation for the description of possible alternative frameworks. Three ideal frameworks for defence cooperation, called the ‘niche’, ‘clip-on’ and ‘lifeguard’ functions, are then introduced. Finally, in section III, these three frameworks are tested against the growing challenge of relevance posed by the continued evolution of the ESDP and against the present strategic reality as reflected in the changing tasks defined by the armed forces of the United Kingdom. This will lead to the conclusion in section IV that dynamism will be pivotal for any future Nordic network. Overall, the somewhat abstract approach taken is grounded in a wish not to force the subject into previously established categories, but to let it reveal itself in a benign theoretical environment where the possibilities for alternative Nordic frameworks can unfold freely.

II. Understanding Norden: security traditions, characteristics and the three ‘pillars’

Balance and counter-power

To examine the security- and defence-related implications of the ESDP for the concept of ‘Norden’, it is necessary first to review the region’s special relationship to security in both objective and subjective terms. The dominant Nordic security dynamic during the ‘strategic holiday’ between the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 and the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 2001 can be restated with words borrowed from Andreas Løvold. In a review

4 For the notion of the ‘strategic holiday’ see Lindley-French, J., ‘European defence: the capabilities development process post-September 11—what kind of operational needs for which purposes?’, Speech to the WEU Colloquy on Equipping Our Forces for Europe’s Security and Defence—Priorities and Short-
essay covering a number of books on the situation in Norway and the other Nordic countries he uses the terms ‘balance’ and ‘counter-power’ to describe the EU’s potential role as a civil power, as opposed to the more one-sided power of what he describes as ‘the American empire’. He states that: “‘size’ no longer refers to just weapon stockpiles or military control over territories, but to other forms of political capital’, thus pointing to precisely the kind of alternative ‘balancing’ actions and ‘counter-power’ strategy—not necessarily using military means—that lie at the root of security and defence policy in Norden.

In these terms, the Nordic security dynamic can be depicted as the interplay among the region’s countries caused by the wish for balance and the practice of counter-power. This interplay gives these countries a collective Nordic appearance even though their actual cohesion may be questionable. Figure 8.1 shows the Nordic security dynamic as consisting both of the pluralistic, multifaceted internal processes in the respective countries and of an external strategy of ‘not putting all your eggs in one basket’ while making the most of what is available.

**Balance**

While the Nordic countries have a long history as balancing powers in international politics, whether in peace-brokering activities or through their efforts not to provoke larger players, the factors most often cited when describing them are their relatively small populations and their limited material resources. The consequence is that their will is often frustrated by a lack of means. This also leads to a permanent dilemma of prioritization, which accounts for a sizeable portion of the internal political debates and characterizes many of their defence and security political actions.

To some extent these things are true also of Norden collectively. Even as a group, the Nordic countries cannot carry the same security burdens as, for instance, the UK.6 On all levels the available muscle has to be applied where it comings, Madrid, 5 Mar. 2002, URL <http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/colloques/cr/2002/lindley.html>.


6 The total military expenditure of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden was less than one-third of that of the UK in 2004. Stålenheim, P., Omitoogun, W. and Perdomo, C., ‘Tables of military expenditure’,
counts the most, be it in the realm of security policy or in the prioritization of military deployments. The resulting balancing acts of the respective Nordic countries can result in what look like parallel collective choices, even if not intentional. Whichever way the matter is viewed, it appears that the need to balance can be used in describing a part of the Nordic security dynamic, even today.

The close relationship between internal and external actions in pursuing this process is linked with a predominantly cross-party and pluralistic approach to external policy making which itself forms part of the special Nordic nature under scrutiny here. As an example, parts of the text of the military inquiry of the Norwegian chief of defence were put on the Internet some time before the report itself was completed, thus giving all concerned parties the opportunity to comment on their areas of interest.7 Another example is the agreement in 2004 on a new Danish defence policy platform, in which great pains were taken to include as many Danish political parties as possible.8

Counter-power

Historically, the Nordic countries have worked not just to balance poles of power but also to moderate the way in which power is expressed. This was done by moderating the use of force first among the states of the region themselves and then against others.9 Establishing whether this ‘counter-power’ aim is still significant requires that two separate but parallel paths be explored: the search for counter-power and its application.

Seeking counter-power does not necessarily mean opposing existing powers or creating a special counter-position. Some Nordic countries still remain officially non-aligned or neutral, but all are now firmly situated within ‘the West’.10 Instead, the aim is to create a field of power or ‘clout’ that helps maintain the individual relevance of the small Nordic countries and assists their balancing act in their interaction with the greater powers, be they national or institutional.11 This need not take the form of countering the new US ‘empire’, as

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7 Norwegian Chief of Defence, Forsvarschefens militærfaglige udredning [Military inquiry of the chief of defence] (Forsvarsdepartmentet: Oslo, 2002), URL <http://www.mil.no/fst/mfu/start/delut/>. This report was the precursor to Storting Proposition 42 of 12 Mar. 2004, which led to a decision that Norwegian defence be further modernized in 2005–2008.
11 Græger, Larsen and Ojanen (note 1).
has been suggested, but it does entail keeping the sense of a national self in the face of the pressure of the globalizing world, of which the USA is also a part. This aim is shared by individual Nordic countries and by the region in general, and one of the forms it takes internationally is the provision of counter-arguments to the logic of force, often grounded in the powerful example of the ‘Nordic peace’.

While all the Nordic countries act as though this common Nordic understanding of peace still exists, some now seem to be taking up solo careers. Denmark has been to war in Iraq, and Finland and Sweden are working with the EU battle group project, something that Denmark will not do but which Norway is very interested in doing. All these actions can still be understood as part of a national search for counter-power in the interest of a balanced policy, but they also point towards the dismantlement of the Nordic region as a framework for a cooperative security effort. They hint that something may have infiltrated the ‘commonness’ of Norden and taken over its function: European integration would seem to be that something, and it naturally affects the way in which counter-power is being applied. The consequences of Norden’s ‘common uniqueness’ are being handled differently by the individual countries.

The Nordic region and the individual Nordic countries have tried to use their own history of peace to educate the world, using their model as a kind of soft resource to reach hard targets. One theme of this model as understood in the region could be termed the ‘symmetricalizing’ of the asymmetric. Nordic countries are all the more committed to the strategy of addressing the issues behind the ‘new’ asymmetrical threats, which the major national players at present seem more intent on countering with military means.

Because history supports it, political will dictates it and lack of resources in any event necessitates it, the conviction in the Nordic countries is that the goals of security and many of the goals of defence policy are best handled through various international organizations. That is how counter-power is thought to be best applied in areas beyond the Nordic region. Working in institutions may bring the Nordic countries into contact with different and perhaps more belli-

12 See, e.g., Neumann, I. B., ‘USA er en trussel mot oss’ [The USA is a threat to us], Ny Tid, 23 Aug. 2003.
17 Græger, Larsen and Ojanen (note 10).
18 Græger, Larsen and Ojanen (note 10).
cose mindsets, but they also gain access to a platform for promoting their own agendas, including the search for counter-power. Two paths are thus being travelled at the same time. On the one hand there is the reluctance to relinquish the Nordic style, which calls for a more ‘civil’ counter-power. The other trend is to pursue this ‘not only, but also civil’ counter-power approach through institutions of ‘the common good’, which inherently have a corrosive effect on small-group norms in the sense that their values transcend and penetrate all sorts of borders. What is happening is that states ‘voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to lose factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts between themselves’.19

From defence dynamic to Nordic ‘pillars’

The balance–counter-power dynamic shown in figure 8.1 thus offers one generic way to define the Nordic attitude for the purpose at hand. It is the result of a need to tightly manage both cultural and historical predispositions and scarce resources in order to act in the general international as well as security and defence political domains. Both forms of ‘counter-power’ discussed display a close link with the aim of ‘balancing’, and both these elements of the security dynamic in turn seem to be built on what can be pictured as three pillars: history, politics and resources. Norden has previously handled the three pillars well, maintaining a strong international profile. However, the extension of traditional methods now seems to be leading individual Nordic countries to work more for their individual interests and to expand their room for manoeuvre. The paradox is that their attempts to do this often carry the risk of being absorbed into another, larger community with ‘European’ values akin to the historical Nordic ones. The Nordic nations thus face a friendlier version of Nietzsche’s warning that ‘he that fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster’.20 The next step is to ascertain what implications the Nordic countries’ enhanced interaction with this friendly monster carries for alternative frameworks of defence cooperation.

Three pillars of Norden

In the introduction of The NEBI Yearbook 2003, which covers integration in northern Europe and the Baltic region, it is stated that: ‘The background is as simple as it is self evident: the realization that deep integration requires a minimum of commonality in respect of legal, institutional and political con-

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This is a comment on the integration associated with the EU enlargement process but can also be used in the investigation of other frameworks of cooperation. Instead of understanding integration via minimal criteria of legal, institutional and political conditions, the categories can be switched and other avenues investigated. Thus, in the case of Norden, even if it may be true that ‘the continued level of Nordic value cohesion cannot be attributed to conscious efforts to align Nordic positions’, the categories of history, politics and resources can be used to identify and explore the possible alternative frameworks for cooperation.

History

Any alternative mechanisms for cooperation will have to be established within a defence political geography that applies to the whole Nordic area, regardless of individual alliance statuses. They must knit together the institutional roles of the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations, and acknowledge domination by the USA and Russia. A special question that follows is: how much common Nordic identity remains after the fall of the USSR and the Berlin Wall? Did the avenues of cooperation close down between 9 November 1989 and 11 September 2001? In other words: can Norden remain clearly demarcated in the absence of the USSR? Whatever the answers to these questions may be, it is useful to pursue the issues concerning the shadow of Russia because they illustrate the transition to new and perhaps more complex, as well as integrative, times.

In the globalized world, Norden’s geography plays a changed role. This may be exemplified by what Russia represents now, as opposed to what the USSR represented. Before, strength characterized the nature of the opponent; now, the dominant characteristics are Russia’s weakness and the consequences of that weakness. The danger is still one of invasion, but not a conventional military one. Issues such as cross-border crime and terrorism, which are not new but are now moving to centre stage, are presenting new threats (or challenges) for old borders. This situation translates into a continued awareness of the need for...
for national defence—especially for Finland—albeit of a transformed nature. Whereas some Nordic countries, as in Denmark, seem to be following more activist lines, stretching all the way to Iraq, others demarcate their security and defence policy closer to home by developing a new outlook within the previous geographical frame of northern Europe. Both schools are acting out their version of the Nordic defence dynamic, while redefining Norden by way of their own interaction with their surroundings. The Finnish and Swedish initiative that led to the Petersberg Tasks being taken on by the EU can also be seen as a new way of living out the logic of Nordic history. However, as the limited number of countries behind that initiative indicates, it had nothing to do with a common Nordic identity. These complexities indicate how what may have seemed a tightly knit Nordic region under the pressures of bipolarity has reacted since 1989: new renderings of Norden are being made or, as the case may be, old ones are being set free.

These currents are reflected inter alia in the release of a large number of new defence documents by Nordic governments. For some the focus is still primarily centred on the national arena, such that ‘security and defence policy is aimed at safeguarding the country’s independence and society’s fundamental democratic values’. For others, the wording of the documents reflects a transitory state where the international and national aspects of security are dealt with side-by-side: ‘The focus must be on carrying out international actions and preserving our territorial integrity.’ This hints at diverging Nordic paths. An alternative reading is that, to different degrees, the region’s states have been reluctant to accept the changing parameters of international politics and are still stuck subjectively in the state-centred cold war models of old. In objective terms, their new challenges are not so different from those felt by states in many other places, and that may be the very essence of what is new—historically speaking.

Critically, it may be asked whether a special Nordic coherence really exists or whether the actions attributed to coherence are merely the actions of any country with a wish for civil rather than military solutions—a wish that the EU was founded on. It appears that, for Norden, a collective expression does not

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27 Huldt (note 9), p. 310; and Holbæk, Henneberg and Sønderskov (note 15), pp. 49 ff.
28 Finnish Ministry of Defence (note 26).
29 Græger, Larsen and Ojanen (note 1), p. 22. The Petersberg Tasks were agreed in 1992 to strengthen the operational role of the Western European Union. They were later incorporated in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. They include humanitarian intervention and evacuation operations, peacekeeping and crisis management, including peace making. See chapter 6 in this volume.
32 Bailes, A. J. K., Preface, Hopkinson (note 13).
necessarily equate to individual conviction, especially in defence matters. One example might be the large amount of stabilization aid given to the Baltic states in the 1990s. It may be possible to talk about a collective Nordic impression being made on the future of these countries, but it is doubtful whether the Nordic effort can be understood as collective. The Danish position on the Baltic states was expressed through donations en bloc, while the Swedish support was more tangible, in the shape of equipment for rifle battalions in each of the three countries. Overall, the Baltic countries have been strengthened by Norden, but only via a coincidence of the individual contributions.

Whatever the answer to the above questions, the shift between what was and what is makes the question of history, as well as those of resources and politics, a relevant factor in considering alternative methods of Nordic cooperation. A comparison with how Norden has functioned previously may shed some light on, or even influence, the way Norden could be today. From the above it could be concluded that the avenues of cooperation have not been closed down, but for the time being they appear to be empty of travellers, so that ‘what might once have been Nordic is hardly distinguishable from what may today be European’.

**Politics**

Turning to the political framework, the next step is to find out what influence the lattice of UN membership and the varying memberships of NATO and the EU actually has on the alternative Nordic forms of defence cooperation. All the Nordic countries are members of the UN and three—Denmark, Sweden and Finland—are members of the EU. Norway is not a member of the EU and Denmark is not involved in its military aspects. On the other hand, Denmark and Norway are members of NATO, while Finland and Sweden are not. This institutional lattice has many other complexities, and the task here is to understand the possibilities and pitfalls for alternative Nordic frameworks within it.

The Nordic countries still maintain a significant profile as global peace activists through the UN. However, the EU is steadily becoming a more integrated and thus forceful player in this forum, and it is increasingly seen as the main force acting in concert with allies such as the USA in areas of common interest.

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35 See, e.g., Knutsen (note 9).

36 Laatikainen (note 22), p. 435.

37 The Danish defence opt-out is not covered here because the question at hand concerns the implications for alternative frameworks, not involvement in the ESDP as such.

38 See tables I.3 and I.4 in the introduction in this volume.

such as peace, liberty and democracy. Consultations in the Nordic Council have made it possible for all the Nordic countries to continue coordinating their policies, but as an integrated subroutine of the EU rather than as a distinct group. In the defence policy area, the advancement of the EU as a conduit for common European goals and interests was indirectly furthered when NATO troops stepped in on the UN’s behalf in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Europe’s backyard, triggering the dynamics that led to the creation of Europe’s own military intervention capabilities in 1999. Against a background where both the USA’s demand for ‘coalitions of the willing’ and its growing military technical superiority present tough challenges for European states, one of the clear aims of the ESDP was to make the EU capable of acting when the USA does not. The ‘Berlin Plus’ concept for EU–NATO collaboration that was finally activated in 2003 points, however, to a wish for EU coexistence with NATO rather than competition.

After 11 September 2001 the non-allied EU countries could not have agreed to a putative offer by the EU to support the USA with all their available means, as the NATO members did within the alliance. This brings the EU–NATO question into the Nordic investigation. Given the Nordic countries’ different memberships, Nordic frameworks designed to bridge the divide might seem problematic. However, not even the region’s non-allied states wish to see any conflict between NATO and ESDP projects, and all the Nordic countries would much prefer the development of the latter not to become a wedge between Europe and its allies. The emergence from 2000 of proposals for an EU rapid-reaction force and of the NATO Reaction Force in 2002 may have raised some specific questions about compatibility; however, since the issue is defence


41 Laatikainen (note 22), p. 428.

42 Holbæk, Henneberg and Sønderskov (note 15).


44 ‘Berlin Plus’ refers to a package of agreements reached in 2002–2003 between the EU and NATO. It gives the EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities and to a certain extent opens the common assets and command structure of the alliance for the EU’s use. See also the introduction in this volume.


cooperation and not defence or regional identity, it seems perfectly possible (for Nordic or any other European countries) to support both these defence structures and indeed to benefit from their synergistic function. Questions about a more existential opposition between the European (or Nordic) defence grouping and NATO remain for the future, making the debate at this stage an essentially academic one about where the ESDP is heading.

Based on the assumption that, ‘In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means’, the European Security Strategy of 2003 deals with the dynamic security challenges arising from a globalizing world in the aftermath of 9 November 1989 and 11 September 2001. The strategy aims to reconcile different visions of European security and defence policy, ranging from the territorial horizons of some, through the growing international engagement of most, to the outlook of the more militarily activist states. It also lists most of the security concerns felt by all Nordic countries, among others, in the field of civil or total defence and defines the ‘not only, but also civil’ approach best calculated to achieve a balanced policy for meeting these concerns. Finally, the strategy proposes to pursue these aims in a multilateral framework, including partnership with NATO, whereby all the elements sought in the Nordic defence dynamic seem to be covered. Added to the strategy, the EU’s proposed constitution contains many alternative ways of applying the same balanced counter-power approach. So, although the adoption of the Constitutional Treat has been put on hold, it still functions as an indication of a manifest balanced counter-power approach within the European project.

It would thus appear that the ESDP presents plenty of possibilities for cooperation, but what happens outside the formal policy is perhaps more interesting. The proposed constitution does not explicitly cover third parties, but in the case of Norden even the non-EU member state Norway does not really

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52 Council of the European Union (note 50), p. 12. The increasing concern in the Nordic countries in the area of civil defence is shown by the establishment in 2002 of the Swedish Emergency Management Agency and in 2003 of the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning; see chapter 16 in this volume.
54 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (note 40); see in particular Articles III-310–12 on the ESDP and Article I-43 on defence against terrorism.
55 Missiroli (note 51).
represent a different pole, as shown by its strong interest in the EU battle group initiative. As Bjørn Knutsen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment wrote in 2000, ‘Norwegian views now fit into the new policies emanating from the EU integration process’, and thus all the Nordic countries, including those formally outside the EU, are now steadily being absorbed by what can be called the ‘EUQualifier’. The EU and its ESDP, assisted by the Nordic defence dynamic, is in the process of a non-hostile takeover of Nordic issues, making it questionable whether it is relevant or, indeed, possible to remain Nordic without first being European.

At present there appears to be room enough for the UN, NATO and the ESDP within the international political topography. Constitution or no constitution, the EU is engaged in fulfilling a unique role of ‘civil’ or ‘soft’ power that was previously ascribed to the Nordic countries to a large extent, but for which they are now too small. Being part of this process enables the Nordic countries to benefit from the similarity between the goals and methods of their own defence dynamic and those of the ESDP. In this light there appear to be many possibilities for exploring alternative frameworks of defence cooperation, because many of the minimum requirements of Nordic security have already been met. At the same time, however, the realistic alternatives may be limited because ‘the Nordics are no longer an autonomous international actor on the world stage independent of the other states in the EU’. Europeanization may in fact be happening at double pace in Norden because the Nordic defence dynamic is opening the countries to the ‘EUQualifier’ at the same time as it is driving the national security and defence policies towards more integrated measures.

**Resources**

The Nordic countries do not possess any natural, economic, military or other conventional resources on a scale big enough to have any influence on the level of engagement where NATO, the EU and countries such as the USA and Russia operate. Instead, a kind of resource may be noted here that the Nordic countries do possess and may be able to aggregate as a kind of force multiplier for any future initiatives.

Where other European nations may experience strategic alignment problems in areas outside NATO, one comparative advantage where the Nordic countries can bring to the field is their long experience of working together, or at least on parallel lines. This cooperation has been global as well as regional and has used a wide catalogue of tools to solve complicated problems. The collective experience of the Nordic countries, if harnessed somehow, could in theory become a very valuable resource giving any alternative Nordic framework a running start, even in the face of the ‘EUQualifier’. That, however, depends on how any future

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56 Knutsen (note 9), p. 34.
57 Laatikainen (note 22), p. 434.
possible framework of Nordic cooperation allocates the scarce conventional Nordic resources available.

**Generating the ideal frameworks**

When the three pillars of the Nordic system are considered together, scaffolding appears, as shown in figure 8.2, from which alternative frameworks for cooperation can be seen. Connecting the three pillars produces three ideal frameworks, which together represent the space for potential action. However, the presence of the ‘EUqualizer’ poses a challenge to the relevance (or ‘added value’) of any of these frameworks, whether in pure form or in combination: a framework that is ‘nice to have’ for the Nordic countries need not be ‘necessary to have’ in the light of the EDSP. In other words, can any one framework or combination of frameworks attempt to bind together Nordic history, politics and resources in a way that will remain relevant in the face of the ‘EUqualizer’?

**Framework 1** could be the developing of a more specific and collective ‘niche’ function for the Nordic forces, focusing on airlift capacity, information operations, policing actions, and so on. The focus might also be on other, more combat-related tasks, the main point being the prioritization of certain specific capabilities.

**Framework 2** would be a ‘clip-on’ function based on the established branches of the Nordic military—the air forces, navies and armies—and including as many as possible of their various usual functions. This would preserve something like the present-day national defence structures and a fuller catalogue of
capabilities. Any Nordic force deployed as a result would, however, be of such a limited size that it would need to be co-opted as a part of the operations of bigger units in order to function.

Framework 3 could be described as a ‘lifeguard’ function to ensure the survival of the Nordic ‘idea’, or ‘profile’, embodying the region’s historical sense of community in a cooperative framework. In terms of overall security policy this might result in a Nordic caucus in international politics, which in terms of defence policy would require the re-styling of structures in accordance with the chosen policy theme. Expanded intra-Nordic collaboration in training and education might be an example of this.

III. Testing alternative frameworks against real-world conditions

At this point the test of relevance must be applied, bringing the conceptual back into contact with the real world. The EU will undoubtedly gain much new experience from the EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which commenced in December 2004, and as the ESDP thus presumably gains momentum it will be increasingly hard to see the relevance of any alternative frameworks. Since the general perception is that the future tasks and challenges of the EU will be similar to those defined in the UK’s national defence doctrine, lessons from the latter may offer guidelines for any alternative Nordic frameworks for maintaining a distinct profile in the future.

A July 2004 report by the British Ministry of Defence contains suggestions for preparing the UK’s defence for the 21st century. These suggestions provide a shortcut to defining the requirements that any Nordic cooperation will have to meet. In short, the report assumes that:

the most complex large scale operations will only be conducted as part of a US-led coalition. Our primary goal is to maximise our ability to influence at all levels the planning, execution and management of the operation and its aftermath in support of our wider security policy objectives. Our force structure at large scale should therefore


focus on those capabilities which add real weight to the campaign and hence the UK’s ability to influence its outcome.\textsuperscript{61}

The rest of the report spells out the consequent goals of British forces being able to \textit{connect, integrate} and \textit{synchronize} in order to \textit{launch} and \textit{support} operations and, in that context, to \textit{sense, engage, destroy} and \textit{assess}. Any military contingent or structure must be agile enough to adapt to multiple, diverse levels of engagement both with potential allies and with potential enemies. The focus is on obtaining hard power through organizational ability in both types of interaction.

The question is whether the Nordic countries wish to aim for similar capabilities in a self-sufficient manner or to contribute with certain elements to the collective efforts of others. Both avenues could generate alternative frameworks for cooperation, but with quite different contents and consequences.

The overall lesson is that there may be alternative defence frameworks for Norden, but that their relevance is questionable—and rapidly becoming even more so. From the analysis thus far it seems that, confronted with the ‘EUqualizer’, ‘the lack of a self-evident institutional context is the main obstacle for potential Nordic cooperation with respect to the ESDP’.\textsuperscript{62} In order to establish such a context, any of the above frameworks or some combination of them would need to first address the challenge of relevance.

A cooperation framework containing elements from all three of the above frameworks may be the most congenial for the Nordic countries themselves, but it may not prove very integration-friendly nor represent a responsible use of resources. A pure ‘clip-on’ or ‘niche’ framework could probably appeal to larger partners, but only on the grounds of its practical value, rather than of any specifically Nordic quality. If, on the other hand, the Nordic countries adopt a framework overly geared to preserving their existing traditions and force structures, it is questionable whether the relevance criterion can be fulfilled. Even if the ‘Nordic lifeguard’ framework is ‘nice to have’ for Norden, its closed nature makes it unlikely that it will be able to find a place in the globalized world.

Examination of the three pillars of Nordic defence identity shows that, while the EU may have helped to illuminate and even further develop what is Nordic in all of the pillars, it has done so by a process of steady encroachment. To say that Norden only comes into being at the time of its death is perhaps an overstatement; but as the EU takes over more and more Nordic hallmarks in the handling of security, it would be a fitting description to say that Norden may be choking on the fruits of victory.\textsuperscript{63} The incorporation into a collective EU culture

\textsuperscript{61} British Ministry of Defence (note 60), p. 3.

\textsuperscript{62} Græger, Larsen and Ojanen (note 10), p. 234.

\textsuperscript{63} See also Laatikainen (note 22), p. 437.
of, for example, the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession\(^{64}\) and the Petersberg Tasks as a programme for crisis management can only be seen as a good thing, but in doing so the ‘EUqualizer’ is steadily narrowing the space for alternative frameworks by taking over both their role and their content.\(^{65}\)

For any alternative framework to remain relevant, it must be dynamic enough to cater for the coming, perhaps even unforeseen, needs of the EU (or, indeed, of NATO). Coupling the knowledge gained from the history, politics and resources pillars with the experience of the UK, it appears that dynamism is the key to any attempt to institutionalize Norden in an alternative framework of defence cooperation. Norden needs dynamism in order to succeed in simultaneously mirroring the historical Norden, working within the given political situation, deriving guiding principles for administering resources, and acquiring and positioning capabilities. Unless they are more dynamic than the structures surrounding them, alternative frameworks will in time become irrelevant or be taken over and swallowed up.

**IV. Conclusions**

The prima facie influence that the European Security and Defence Policy has on the concept of ‘the Nordic’ is to force it into spaces not yet covered by this and other EU policies. Even with the EU constitution on hold for now, the ‘EUqualizer’ will slowly but certainly continue to erode the ground available for a specifically Nordic expression of defence or security identity. This will happen not just because of Norden’s inhibiting lack of resources, but because most elements of the Nordic defence dynamic are already contained in the forces driving the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and its ESDP.

Because the defence and security political area is in such rapid transition, and important developments in the ESDP, such as the commencement of EUFOR Althea, are still fairly recent, it is not really possible to determine what works and what does not in the short and middle terms. In the long term, any attempts at constructing alternative frameworks will have to work within the institutionalized testing ground demarcated by the interaction of the ESDP both with larger frameworks such as the UN and NATO, and with the specifically Nordic or Nordic–Baltic space. In practice, the scope for such attempts will become narrower, and their appeal for the Nordic countries themselves may also be in doubt. At present, as shown in this chapter, the desire to remain Nordic (especially in terms of balance and counter-power) is already driving the countries along separate paths at a good pace because what could be called Nordic qualities and contexts are now found in many places beyond the Nordic region. Should this divided region want to coalesce at some point, to retain a sense of a distinctly Nordic nature in a way that does not deny this positive

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\(^{65}\) Rasmussen (note 45), p. 48.
European development, a proactive, forward-looking dynamism seems to be the key condition for overcoming the problem of relevance and allowing the three pillars of Nordic identity to hold their own against the ‘EUqualizer’ (the friendly monster of integration). Only then, in European security and defence policy as such and also in the broader interactions of the EU, NATO and the UN, could the specifically Nordic (or, indeed, Nordic–Baltic) framework prove to be rejuvenating, bringing Norden to the forefront of the present strategic reality.
I. Introduction

This chapter addresses two questions:

1. What has been the situation with regard to Nordic—Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish—defence equipment cooperation during the past 10 years?
2. Can sub-regional Nordic cooperation in this sphere survive and, if so, can it contribute to Europe-wide cooperation in the framework of the European Union?

The chapter examines the Nordic development, production and procurement of defence equipment. Transfers of such equipment and defence industrial relations, including offset policies, are reviewed in section II. Of special interest is the role of the USA, as both a competitor to and a partner with European countries; this is illustrated by Nordic participation in the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) combat aircraft project (see section III). In section IV broader aspects of Nordic and EU defence equipment cooperation are discussed.

II. Nordic defence equipment cooperation

Arms deliveries

As shown by SIPRI data on arms transfers, in the 11-year period 1993–2003 there was a relatively low volume of direct deliveries of major weapons from one Nordic country to another, including manufacture under licence. Of all possible transfer relations between the four countries, SIPRI data suggest that the most significant transfers of major weapons have taken place from Sweden to Norway (20 per cent of all Swedish deliveries), from Finland to Sweden (29 per cent of Finland’s deliveries) and from Finland to Norway (15 per cent deliveries).

1 Its lack of an indigenous defence industry means that Iceland is not included.
2 Nordic defence operational issues—e.g., cooperation between armed forces in areas such as training and tactics or in actual operations—are not discussed in this chapter; see chapters 6–8 in this volume.
3 For the SIPRI definition of major weapons and SIPRI methodology for arms transfers see URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/atmethods.html>.
of Finland’s deliveries). Swedish deliveries to Norway during this period included CV-9030 (TA-2000) combat vehicles, 9LV-200 Mk-2 and Ceros-200 fire control radars, Giraffe surveillance radars, ATHUR artillery locating (‘hunting’) radars and Rbs-70 portable air defence missile systems. In the same period Finland delivered XA-180, XA-185 and XA-200 personnel carriers to Norway and Sweden.

From the importer’s perspective, Sweden has been a relatively important supplier for Norway (Sweden supplied 24 per cent of Norway’s imports of major arms during this period). Denmark delivered no major weapons to another Nordic country, although over 80 per cent of the sales by Terma Industries, Denmark’s largest aerospace producer, were to foreign recipients. However, Norway and Sweden have delivered limited volumes of major weapons to Denmark.

The data thus suggest that the Norway–Sweden relationship may be defined as the ‘core axis’ of Nordic major arms transfers. Other bilateral intra-Nordic major arms transfers accounted for less than 10 per cent of bilateral deliveries for the countries concerned. Sweden’s relatively strong position as a supplier corresponds to the size of its defence industry and is reflected in official national export statistics. According to SIPRI data, of Sweden’s major arms deliveries in the period 1993–2003, 3 per cent went to Denmark, 5 per cent to Finland and 20 per cent to Norway. According to official Swedish data—which cover more than just major weapons—these countries’ respective shares were 4, 3 and 14 per cent. Similar Norwegian data for the eight-year period 1996–2003 show a clear dominance of exports to Sweden at about 20 per cent, which accounted for most of Norway’s exports to the Nordic region.

Sweden’s position is a result of its historically broad and advanced defence industrial base, high defence technological ambition and competitive successes. The Nordic region has traditionally been among the most important for Swedish defence exports. During the cold war, official policy sanctioned the idea that Sweden should cooperate mainly with the other European neutral countries and the Nordic countries: similarities among the histories and foreign policies of the latter were regarded as more important than differences in their formal defence alignments.

Today the situation is different. Finland and Sweden are members of the EU and have formal relations with European political and military institutions as well as partnership relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Sweden’s defence industrial base has been reduced and restructured, and

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Sweden’s security and defence policy is cast increasingly in international rather than national terms. Of Sweden’s three official cold war ‘policy pillars’—independence, neutrality in wartime and military non-alignment—only military non-alignment remains. Independence has become interdependence, and neutrality is no longer the only, or even the most likely, option should there be a war in Europe. It may therefore come as no surprise that the importance of the Norway–Sweden axis in Nordic defence supply stagnated during the 1990s. Apart from a peak in 2000 owing to major arms exports to Finland, the share of Norway’s defence sales that went to other Nordic countries fell from around 30 per cent in 1999 to below 10 per cent in 2003, the result of reduced deliveries to Sweden. The same is true for the Nordic region’s share of Sweden’s major arms exports, which decreased continuously from 30 per cent in 1999 to below 10 per cent in 2003.6

This reduction in the intra-Nordic market for major arms took place despite political support for increased Nordic cooperation in the production of equipment. An updated NORDAC (Nordic armaments cooperation) Agreement was reached in November 2000 and entered into force in February 2001.7 Its purpose was to reduce national expenditure on defence purchases and associated support activities by sharing costs and to support a Nordic defence industrial base. A variety of activities were envisaged, starting from joint development and manufacture of new equipment and the common or coordinated procurement of equipment—from a Nordic country or elsewhere—and going on to post-delivery cooperation such as sharing operational experiences or cooperation in maintenance and support of common equipment.8 Examples include the joint development of the Viking submarine by Denmark, Norway and Sweden and the coordinated procurement of the NH90 helicopter by Finland, Norway and Sweden.

NORDAC: an experiment in Nordic arms cooperation

There may be many commonalities between the Nordic countries, but it does not follow that individual military ambitions and requirements are identical. The countries’ different security political choices in 1949 had consequences for developments in their defence procurement and defence industries. Finland was prohibited from developing or even acquiring certain types of equipment under post-war treaties and had special security relations with the Soviet Union. Denmark and Norway chose to rely on the USA for much of their defence equip-

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6 It has also been noted that the Nordic market for ammunition and similar systems has stagnated. Nammo, ‘Improved performance continuous in Nammo AS’, Press release, 5 May 2004, URL <http://www.nammo.com/thenews/default.asp?id=84>.

7 The Agreement between the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of Sweden Concerning Support for Industrial Cooperation in the Defence Materiel Area (NORDAC Agreement) was signed on 9 Nov. 2000. For more information see the NORDAC Internet site, URL <http://www.nordac.org/>.

ment, while Sweden established a broad and advanced domestic defence industrial base.9

The practical realization of a four-nation Nordic market has therefore been problematic. The Standard Nordic Helicopter Programme (SNHP) failed in its all-Nordic ambition when in September 2001 Denmark, because of its particular requirement for a standard troop-transport, support and rescue helicopter, selected the AgustaWestland EH101 helicopter, while the SNHP Committee selected the NH90 helicopter for service in the other three Nordic countries. Offsetting—that is, compensating for—the expenditure was important for all four countries (see below) and may have influenced Denmark’s choice since AgustaWestland had previously supplied the country.10

The Viking submarine project has been an even bigger Nordic failure—Finland was never a member; Norway became an observer in 2003, having been a member; and in 2004 Denmark decided not to acquire more submarines. Nonetheless, the joint venture in which companies from Denmark, Norway and Sweden participate will try to find other partners so that the Viking can enter into production.11 To further illustrate the underlying difficulties, the NORDAC methodology for cooperation has been revised several times since 1995, and the 1998 multilateral guidelines were revised in November 2000 to permit bilateral cooperation.

The conclusion by NORDAC’s members in 2004 that it has been a success12 may be true if success is measured broadly and is based on relatively few large—and many small—completed undertakings. The conclusion may be different if these successes are measured against the time, cost and other resources lost on unsuccessful undertakings. This does not imply that there have not been important benefits: savings have been achieved and NORDAC members point out that technology, test results and other information have been exchanged even when agreements concerning common procurement or maintenance were not realized.13 Even so, it is also acknowledged that benefits have not been divided equally among the participants. This might be an effect of the different defence structures in the Nordic countries, but it may also reflect a historical circumstance embedded in Nordic cooperation since the 1940s, namely, the strong position of Sweden. NORDAC could, indeed, be regarded as a modern and more modest version in the equipment sphere of the failed Nordic defence union proposed by Sweden in the late 1940s. Although

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11 The Viking Submarine Corporation is a joint venture of Kockums (Sweden), Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace (Norway) and Odense Staalskibsvaerft (Denmark).

12 NORDAC (note 8), p. 18.

13 NORDAC (note 8).
the exploitation of Sweden’s strong defence industrial position is a necessary condition for a sub-regional Nordic arms market with any real substance, it brings with it a Nordic imbalance in Sweden’s favour. Many of the major weapons procured or considered by NORDAC have been of Swedish origin. However, the successful undertakings have generally not involved all four countries, and there are several examples of the inability of the NORDAC members to establish consensus on the procurement of Swedish equipment.

Defence industrial relations

There exists no complete information about intra-Nordic defence industrial relations (i.e., transactions between companies rather than governments) comparable to the data available on interstate arms transfers. It is therefore not possible to make a detailed comparison of the Nordic countries’ experiences in this regard, either with each other or with other countries. However, based on Sweden’s strong position, what is said here about Sweden’s defence industrial relations may also reflect important aspects of more general Nordic defence industrial relations.

According to official Swedish information, the total number of new permissions granted by Sweden for defence industrial co-development or co-production with Nordic countries in the 11-year period 1993–2003 was highest with Finland (10 permissions) followed by Norway (7 permissions) and Denmark (1 permission).14 These 18 Nordic permissions accounted for nearly 16 per cent of the total number of new bilateral permissions granted by Sweden during this period (table 9.1, row 4), only slightly lower than the Nordic region’s share (21 per cent) of Sweden’s total defence equipment exports during the same period.

These figures suggest that there is a different Nordic ‘core axis’ in the field of defence industrial relations, namely, that between Finland and Sweden. This may partly be explained by the similar requirements of and parallel indigenous industrial capabilities in Finland and Sweden, but also by different company structures and government attitudes to cooperation and foreign ownership in the Nordic countries.

In contrast to Sweden in particular, but also to Finland, in Norway the government retains a large share in the ownership of major arms companies such as Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace and Nammo. With the exception of Nammo, major Norwegian arms companies, such as Kongsberg and Raufoss, have only limited shareholdings by companies registered elsewhere in the region. Saab (Sweden) and Patria (Finland) each own 27.5 per cent of Nammo, with the Norwegian Government holding the remaining 45 per cent, while the Swedish companies Ericsson and Volvo Aero have Norwegian subsidiaries.

The Finnish Government has supported foreign ownership of defence companies operating in Finland and the creation of transnational structures. It is a

14 Swedish Government (note 5).
majority owner of Patria; the remaining 26.8 per cent of the shares were acquired in 2001 by EADS, a European transnational aerospace company. In January 2004 EURENCO (the European Energetics Corporation) was formed by merging subsidiaries of Patria, the Swedish company Saab and the French company SME. The French company holds 60.2 per cent of the new company and the Nordic companies hold 19.9 per cent each.15

Aside from ammunition, the other major field of Nordic defence industrial cooperation is army vehicles. Patria Hägglunds is a joint venture established in 1999 by Patria and Sweden-based Alvis Hägglunds. The company exploits the combined capacities of the two partners in order to distribute the BvS10 and CV9030 vehicles and to carry out the further development and marketing of the AMOS mortar system—the main product of Patria Hägglunds—on the world market.16

Official figures for Finland’s defence exports reflect the major impact in a short period of time of these defence industrial relations with Sweden. The


share of Finland’s defence exports that went elsewhere in the Nordic region increased from less than 10 per cent in 1997–99 to about 70 per cent in 2000–2002; all of the increase in 2001–2002 was accounted for by exports to Sweden.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Offsetting Nordic imbalances?\textsuperscript{18}}

The idea behind defence equipment offset is to obtain a return, over time, on the money invested in expensive imported weapon systems. The formal offset policies of the Nordic countries evolved during the 1990s, and they had all publicized such policies by 1999. These individual policies converge in their attempts to make more use of, and increase the national benefit from, offsetting, notably as a tool for promoting defence industrial collaboration and the acquisition of technology.\textsuperscript{19} They also reflect a trend of change from civilian to military offsets.

It is generally acknowledged that offsets disrupt competition as well as increase the supplier’s costs and risks. Under the NORDAC Agreement the parties must refrain from demanding industrial offset for the procurement of products from another Nordic country, unless required to do so by other rules and regulations.\textsuperscript{20} It is too early to judge the extent to which this rule has been implemented and how successful it has been. Although the NORDAC Agreement requires that information about the Nordic defence trade should be compiled in annual offset accounts and an evaluation report on the offset balance be drawn up every fifth year, the first report is not due until 2008.

However, claiming an ambition to refrain from obtaining potential industrial and technological benefits is easier than taking the political and practical measures to do so. The imbalances noted by NORDAC may be assumed to work mainly to Denmark’s disadvantage. In June 2002 there were Danish military offset obligations with over 30 foreign suppliers to be completed before 2010. The value of such obligations was expected to increase as a result of additional

\textsuperscript{17} No data were available for 2003.


\textsuperscript{19} In parallel with increasing clarity, offset arrangements have come to include not only military transfers and other forms of benefits to the buyer but also military transfers from the offset beneficiary. ‘Market intelligence’, \textit{Jane’s Defence Industry}, vol. 18, no. 11 (Nov. 2001), p. 13; and \textit{Countertrade & Offsets}, 22 Oct. 2001, pp. 5–6. These arrangements are not the same as an export offset policy. No Nordic country has formulated such a policy, although the Association of Swedish Defence Industries (ASDI) attempted to do so in 2002. The ASDI included in its draft defence industrial collaboration policy a requirement that Swedish defence companies should also apply their own collaboration policy to export recipients. This requirement did not remain in the final policy. ASDI, \textit{Policy för Offset och Industrisamverkan för försvarsindustrin i Sverige} [Policy for offsets and industrial collaboration for the defence industry in Sweden], Stockholm, 29 Jan. 2003, URL <http://www.defind.se/offset.htm>.

\textsuperscript{20} NORDAC Agreement (note 7), section 4. This requirement is similar to that formulated by the European Defence Industries Group (EDIG) in a 2001 policy paper. The EDIG arguments reflect the basic criticism of offsets as a market-distorting mechanism. EDIG, ‘EDIG policy paper on offsets’, Policy paper no. EPP/00/18, Brussels, 26 June 2001.
acquisitions, and there was an obvious risk that the military obligations contracted with Danish industry would become impossible to fulfil.21 The idea of a defence-related venture fund with foreign supplier capital that could be used as a catalyst to expand Denmark’s production of defence equipment was put forward by the Danish National Agency for Enterprise and Housing as a response to these concerns in August 2002.

A special task force was established in December 2002 to study the proposed fund. On the basis of the task force’s report,22 a decision was taken in May 2003 not to go ahead with the fund as proposed. A revised offset policy was presented in 2004 to take effect from 1 June.23 The major features of the offset policy are that only defence-related offsets will be accepted and a bank guarantee is to be provided by the larger foreign suppliers within one year of the contract. This requirement seems to serve part of the purpose of the failed venture fund. If a bank guarantee is paid out, the money goes to the Danish Government for spending on administering international cooperation and on initiatives to foster research and development (R&D) activities for future military requirements. Companies that fail to provide the required bank guarantee will be blacklisted and excluded from further Danish contracts.

Another obstacle to offsetting imbalances in Nordic defence transfers may be that protectionism still exists in parallel with attempts to increase Nordic cooperation. Countries and agencies remain unwilling to harmonize or to give up traditional elements of their technological base and their leading roles, just as individual companies are unwilling to lose a competitive edge. The common ambition of Sweden’s 1999 offset policy, the official offset guidelines published in 2002 and the policy declared in 2003 by the Association of Swedish Defence Industries is to support defence industrial activities in Sweden.24 Other Nordic governments, agencies and companies may not be willing to subscribe to a policy intended to sustain Sweden’s defence industrial position in general and its superiority among the Nordic countries in particular. They may instead seek long-term cooperative relations outside the Nordic framework, and foreign interests may further complicate opportunities for sub-regional Nordic cooperation by their influence on company strategies.

Although most observers seem to agree that defence equipment offsets will remain a necessary evil for suppliers, one factor undermining the use of offsets is the implementation of best practice based on competition in the production

21 See Hagelin (note 18).
and procurement of major defence projects. One such model is the US JSF project. It is also an example of out-of-region cooperation by the Nordic countries.

III. Non-Nordic arms cooperation

Arms transfers and defence industrial cooperation

The finding that Nordic defence cooperation is limited and unbalanced is strengthened when compared with the level and pattern of non-Nordic defence cooperation. Non-Nordic suppliers of major weapons to individual Nordic countries have always been more important than Nordic suppliers. Based on SIPRI data, in the period 1993–2003 the USA was the main supplier to Denmark (43 per cent of all Danish major arms imports), Finland (74 per cent) and Norway (46 per cent). Sweden was an exception in that Germany was its major supplier, accounting for 72 per cent of Sweden’s imports. However, this was mainly the result of Sweden’s purchase and manufacture under licence of German battle tanks. Without these orders, Sweden’s major foreign supplier would also have been the USA.

When looking at the Nordic countries as arms suppliers, however, differences rather than similarities stand out. According to SIPRI data, of the four Nordic countries, Sweden is the largest supplier of major weapons, followed by Norway, with roughly half of Sweden’s volume. Both are among the world’s 15 largest suppliers in the five-year period 1999–2003. Denmark and Finland exported far less than Norway in that period.25

The reduced intra-Nordic arms market has been paralleled by a growth in markets outside the region. For Sweden this is illustrated by the increasing number of recipient nations and the importance of non-Nordic recipients.26 For all four of these Nordic countries, three or fewer recipients account for a majority of deliveries (see table 9.2). Some deliveries have been of second-hand equipment, for example, as defence or ‘security’ aid to new EU members. The very high share of the deliveries from Denmark accounted for by the USA was the result of deliveries of second-hand ships and four second-hand Draken combat aircraft that Denmark had previously imported from Sweden. Deliveries of new Nordic equipment to European countries include Danish licences for the manufacture of patrol ships by Greece; Finnish export of armoured personnel carriers to the Netherlands and Poland in addition to Nordic countries; Norwegian export of Penguin ship-to-ship missiles to Greece, Spain and Turkey and Swedish-designed radars from Ericsson’s Norwegian subsidiary; and, in


26 According to official Swedish data, while the average annual number of nations importing ‘war equipment’ from Sweden between 1993 and 1999 was 47, that average was 54 in the 4 years 2000–2003. Swedish Government (note 5).
addition to the Nordic deliveries mentioned above, Swedish export of anti-aircraft, anti-ship and anti-tank missile systems to Austria, Germany and Poland, as well as vehicles to France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the UK, plus radar systems to France, Germany, Greece, Poland and the UK.

Sweden is the only Nordic country with an advanced combat aircraft industry. Orders from the Czech Republic and Hungary for the JAS-39 Gripen aircraft, a joint venture between Saab and BAE Systems, are not reflected in table 9.2 since deliveries have only just begun.27 Aircraft deliveries from other Nordic countries include second-hand US helicopters from Norway and indigenous light trainer aircraft from Finland.

Sweden’s experiences of international defence industrial cooperation may, again, serve to illustrate more general developments. Sweden is the only Nordic signatory of the 2000 Framework Agreement on the restructuring of the European defence industry.28 The other signatories are the main European arms producers: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. Sweden’s policy in support

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**Table 9.2. Major weapon deliveries from the Nordic countries in the period 1993–2003**

The percentage of total major arms exports accounted for by each category are calculated from the SIPRI trend-indicator value and rounded. Recipients accounting for more than 10% of the value of total arms supplied are shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Armoured vehicles</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Missiles</th>
<th>Radars</th>
<th>Ships (% of exports)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main recipients (% of exports):
- Denmark: USA (88)
- Finland: Sweden (29), Netherlands (18), Norway (15), Mexico (11)
- Norway: Australia (31), USA (28), Greece (11), Poland (11)
- Sweden: Singapore (23), Norway (20), Australia (13)

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.

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of international defence industrial cooperation is evidenced by 38 bilateral permissions with the UK, Germany and France (UK 15, Germany 12 and France 11) and 20 bilateral permissions with the USA in the 11-year period 1993–2003. These four countries accounted for 50 per cent of all new Swedish bilateral permissions for defence cooperation over this period, compared with 18 Swedish permissions (or 15 per cent) for defence cooperation with Nordic countries (see table 9.1 above).

Sweden has also moved from bilateral to multilateral defence industrial cooperation, including R&D. While such cooperation has been common for Denmark and Norway as a result of their NATO membership, it was formally accepted as a Swedish policy as recently as 1992. The first officially registered Swedish permission for multilateral cooperation was with France and Germany in 2002, involving the manufacture of front fuselages for the NH90 helicopter. It was followed by a permission in 2003 to establish the Finnish–French–Swedish company EURENCO. NORDAC has studied several non-Nordic major weapon systems as potential subjects for common or joint procurement and maintenance or support arrangements, such as the German Leopard 2A4 battle tank, the US C-130 transport aircraft and the US AGM-114 Hellfire anti-tank missile. US equipment stands out among the foreign major systems that were considered. As a consequence, non-Nordic alternatives for joint maintenance and support were ultimately preferred for some of these weapons and it seems to have been easier to reach full Nordic agreement in these cases; for instance, on using the existing ‘user club’ for the AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile and on joining the NATO TOW anti-tank missile partnership group rather than attempting purely Nordic support of these missiles.

Looking at foreign company shareholdings, the USA as a full or part owner is not as visible in Nordic companies as it is in other European arms producers. Sweden again stands out as the Nordic country where the internationalization of the defence industrial base has been most rapid and extensive. The five largest Swedish defence companies are partly or wholly foreign owned (see table 9.3). In 2004 BAE Systems acquired Alvis, meaning that BAE Systems became not only a shareholder in Saab but also the owner of Hägglunds. Bofors Defence was wholly owned by the US company United Defense, which itself was acquired by BAE Systems in 2005.

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The apparently low US interest in acquiring defence companies in the Nordic countries is counterbalanced by the USA’s role as the main arms supplier to countries in the region. A major US combat aircraft project for the future is the JSF. It has been suggested that the US Department of Defense aims to crush all combat aircraft competition in Europe with that project and that it is a ‘Trojan horse’ in ‘fortress Europe’.33

Nordic participation in the Joint Strike Fighter project

Transatlantic cooperation in the development of major defence equipment to be acquired by the US Armed Forces is rare.35 The JSF combat aircraft project is an exception in that it attempts to meet, from a common platform, the needs of three US military services as well as foreign customers. It has been described as the ‘Pentagon’s first cutting-edge procurement programme to be co-developed and co-produced by the United States in cooperation with foreign governments and industries’.36 In October 2001, when the JSF was known as the F-35, the US Government chose the Lockheed Martin version of the aircraft, and the programme moved from the competitive development phase to the engineering and manufacturing development phase.

The foreign industrial participation in this project is not guaranteed to be in proportion to investment (there is no *juste retour*). Instead, all participating foreign companies receive contracts on a commercial and competitive basis. This is expected to result in the most efficient production and lowest price. Although the benefits of participating are acknowledged by governments, they have been

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Foreign shareholder (country), proportion owned</th>
<th>Equipment field of Swedish company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alvis Hägglunds AB</td>
<td>BAE Systems (UK), 100%</td>
<td>Land vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bofors Defence AB</td>
<td>BAE Systems (UK), 100%</td>
<td>Artillery and ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kockums AB</td>
<td>ThyssenKrupp (Germany), 100%</td>
<td>Surface ships and submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saab AB</td>
<td>BAE Systems (UK), 20% plus a mix of Swedish and foreign owners</td>
<td>Aircraft and a variety of other aerospace and advanced systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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36 Kapstein (note 34).
reluctant to allocate large funds from hard-pressed defence budgets to a project with no guaranteed national industrial involvement and for which they may not have a military requirement when the aircraft becomes available. Only the British Government has agreed to pay the price for full partnership in both the competitive development phase and the engineering and manufacturing development phases, while the other nine non-US participants have accepted less than full participation in order to balance costs and expected gains. For Denmark and Norway the JSF is one option for the replacement of their F-16 combat aircraft, and each paid $10 million to become associate partners in 1997. For participation in the engineering and manufacturing development phases each paid $125 million.

However, both Denmark and Norway have echoed other participants’ complaints that they have not received a good return from their investments in terms of technology and industrial contracts. While they are free to buy other aircraft—such as the British–Swedish Gripen aircraft mentioned as a possible alternative for Norway—Norway is also keeping its options open by participating in the multinational Eurofighter Typhoon project. Thus, rather than being a ‘Trojan horse’ in a non-existent European ‘fortress’, the JSF may stumble at the Nordic gate. However, should Denmark or Norway decide to acquire the JSF, it will be acting in line with a tradition of acquiring US combat aircraft. Should either select the Gripen aircraft, this would be the first time that a Nordic country flies the latest version of a Swedish-designed combat aircraft. It would also be likely to be the last time, since indigenous design and development of the most advanced defence platforms is not a feasible future option for Sweden.

IV. Conclusions

There is not really an intra-Nordic arms market in the sense of regular and balanced transfers of relatively large volumes of major weapons between the

37 These 9 participants are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore and Turkey.
39 ‘Danish subcontractors may have to leave US JSF project’, *Nordic Business Report*, 7 Jan. 2004. See also Sköns, Bauer and Surry (note 30), pp. 409–18.
Nordic countries. Nordic cooperation seldom involves all four countries with an indigenous defence industry and quite often only two of them: the relationship between Norway and Sweden may be defined as the core axis for arms export, while the defence industrial relationship between Finland and Sweden in the areas of military vehicles and ammunition is the most significant in the region. These two relationships also partially reflect more general imbalances in Nordic arms cooperation. The major imbalance is Sweden’s strong position as a ‘hub’ in Nordic cooperation, derived from its relatively broad and advanced defence industrial base and R&D. However, under future Swedish policies the scope of its R&D ambitions will be reduced to niche competences to be maintained mainly through international cooperation and civil–military synergies. One result will be more arms imports than were previously acceptable under Sweden’s national procurement policy. Cooperation with the other Framework Agreement partners and with the USA, along with politically and militarily supported arms exports and customer support, has also become more important for sustaining limited defence industrial competences.

A second imbalance is the smallness of Denmark. Its limited defence industrial base is reflected in its insignificant role in intra-Nordic defence trade and cooperation, its relatively low volume of arms exports and its concern with fulfilling offset requirements. Denmark’s decision not to acquire more submarines put an end to the Viking submarine project as a Nordic procurement endeavour.

There is a trend, most clearly reflected in the case of Sweden, away from national autarky—varying levels of which had been achieved—towards international interdependence in the form of broader R&D and manufacturing cooperation and towards more extensive and varied imports and exports. This conclusion is also supported by the stagnation in the core intra-Nordic arms market. These findings, plus the difficulties experienced in NORDAC, call into question the term ‘Nordic arms market’ on the basis of both its structure and its volume. NORDAC’s ambition is not to establish Nordic defence technological leadership by way of a common procurement organization or policy. Instead, it tries to make the most of national Nordic plans and decisions. The possibilities for sharing operational and technical experiences and test results, as well as establishing joint or common maintenance and support arrangements for identical equipment in the national inventories, seem to offer a more practical route to intra-Nordic cooperation than reaching agreement on common or joint procurement of major weapons.

This chapter addresses two questions. While answers exist for the first question—what is the situation with regard to Nordic defence equipment cooperation?—and for part of the second—can sub-regional Nordic defence equipment cooperation survive?—the remainder of the latter question is harder to answer—if Nordic defence equipment cooperation can survive, can it be important in the EU context? The answer depends on information about not only sub-regional Nordic cooperation but also developments within the EU and
EU ambitions and objectives. In general, sub-regional defence cooperation will have a greater chance of survival in an EU ‘muddling through’ scenario, where the greatest cost-effectiveness is not the ambition, than in a scenario where the major, if not all, EU defence producers work in joint or coordinated projects aiming for cost-effectiveness by reducing excess capacity. The EU is at least trying to move in the latter direction, and every Nordic country, including Norway, seems prepared to support that ambition. In that case, intra-Nordic defence cooperation can survive only if it involves equipment or capabilities that contribute to the overall EU ambition. If not, sub-regional interests in keeping structures, companies and projects alive may hinder the development of effective EU-wide defence R&D, manufacture and procurement.

However, the risk that intra-Nordic cooperation will cause major problems in either of these two scenarios seems small. The explanations lie in both intra-Nordic and EU developments. It remains to be seen whether the EU will be able to establish efficient, cost-effective defence R&D, manufacturing and procurement. The benefits of such a maximalist ambition will be balanced by those of having a degree of competition and overcapacity. Many of the systems that are currently produced in and exported by the Nordic countries, individually or in cooperation, are being or may be acquired by other European armed forces for use in EU or NATO rapid, transportable and interoperable forces and battle groups. Cooperation between the EU and NATO permits all the Nordic countries to participate: in November 2004 Finland, Norway and Sweden declared their intent to establish an EU battle group, and Norway is the lead nation for NATO’s high-level group in a NATO–EU Strategic Sea Lift cooperation programme. However, how much of this industrial capacity will survive and be relevant 15 years from now, and whether close EU–NATO cooperation will continue, remains to be seen.

The establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) may limit the room for sub-regional cooperation on defence equipment in favour of coordinated solutions among more EU members. There is no lack of organizations in Europe with overlapping tasks and ambitions. A body like the EDA—under the name of the European Armaments Agency—was first envisaged in 1976 when the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) was established within the

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42 The author wishes to thank Michael Brzoska, Bonn International Center for Conversion, for valuable comments about future scenarios.
43 The largest order in Hägglunds’ history was an order from the Netherlands in late 2004 for combat vehicles. ‘Rekordorder till Hägglunds’ [Record order for Hägglunds], Svenska Dagbladet, 11 Dec. 2004, Näringsliv p. 4, URL <http://www.svd.se/dynamisk/naringsliv/did_8718681.asp>.
45 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Strategic Sealift—co-operation between EU and NATO is strengthened’, Press release, Oslo, 16 Sep. 2004, URL <http://odin.dep.no/fd/engelsk/aktuelt/news/010081-210002/>. This uncertainty is also related to decisions by company shareholders. E.g., all activities at Alvis Moelv, a Norwegian subsidiary of the Swedish company Hägglunds, owned by the British company Alvis, ceased in 2004.
NATO. The IEPG’s functions were transferred to the Western European Union (WEU) in December 1992. Among the basic principles for that move was that there should be a single European armaments cooperation forum. Since May 1993 the WEU armaments cooperation forum has been known as the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). Its policy aims are basically the same as those of the EDA and those formulated in the 2000 Framework Agreement: more efficient use of resources through *inter alia* increased harmonization of requirements; the opening up of national defence markets to cross-border competition; the strengthening of the European defence technological and defence industrial base; and cooperation in R&D.\(^{47}\)

While Denmark and Norway, as NATO members, were full members of the IEPG from the start in 1976, Finland and Sweden became full members of the WEAG only in November 2000. Representatives from all the Nordic countries take part in the work to strengthen the European position in defence research and technology and to promote cost-effective cooperative equipment programmes. In early 2005 it was formally agreed that the EDA would gradually take over the activities of the WEAG.\(^{48}\) It seems reasonable to expect that the Framework Agreement will also be incorporated into the EDA and that the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement (OCCAR, the joint armaments cooperation organization),\(^{49}\) and possibly EU members’ involvement in the NATO Research and Technology Agency, will establish some kind of link with the EDA’s work. In other words, increasing ‘EUropeanization’ of defence R&D, manufacture and procurement should be expected.\(^{50}\) Nordic countries may be able to influence some of these developments: in 2004 Finland and Sweden secured important but temporary positions for their nationals as EDA assistant director for armaments and EDA director for industry and markets, respectively.\(^{51}\) Sub-regional activities, however, must fit broader EU goals and capabilities that are likely to be defined mainly by more important member states and producers.

In this process, NORDAC may have to adapt, change its ambitions or perhaps even dissolve. The unequal distribution of NORDAC’s benefits is said to be the price that the Nordic countries must pay in order to reap the benefits from

\(^{47}\) On the IEPG and the WEAG see URL <http://www.weu.int/weag/>. Cooperation between government research establishments through joint programmes has been aided by memoranda of understanding, the first (THALES: Technology Arrangements for Laboratories for Defence European) signed on 18 Nov. 1996 and the most recent (EUROPA: European Understanding on Research Organisation, Programmes and Activities) on 15 May 2001.

\(^{48}\) *EU/Defence: EDA formally endorses transfer of WEAG/WEAO activities to EDA*, *Atlantic News*, 26 Apr. 2005, p. 3.

\(^{49}\) The OCCAR was established by France, Germany, Italy and the UK on 12 Nov. 1996. For more information see URL <http://www.occar-ea.org/>.


\(^{51}\) It was reported that Sweden achieved its position through unfair competition with the Finnish candidate. Lundberg, S., *Finsk vrede over EU:s direkttörsval* [Finnish anger over EU’s director choice], *Dagens Nyheter*, 21 Oct. 2004, p. 15.
Nordic armament cooperation. However, it is questionable whether Nordic countries and their armed forces will accept such imbalances if EU solutions offer greater benefits. It is therefore understandable that Finland is studying the conditions for European equipment maintenance and support cooperation.\footnote{Finnish Prime Minister’s Office, \textit{Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004}, Government Report no. 6/2004 (Prime Minister’s Office: Helsinki, 2004), URL <http://www.vnk.fi/vn/liston/vnk.lsp?r=88862&k=en>, p. 127.} Although cost savings have been achieved through intra-Nordic cooperation, the small, unbalanced and stagnant intra-Nordic arms market suggests that little can be achieved through common major acquisitions, especially if some nations do not participate and if military expenditure is stable or has to be reduced. For instance, a NORDAC study group on the procurement of the next generation of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs)—an important type of future equipment\footnote{Gormley, D. M., ‘New developments in unmanned air vehicles and land-attack cruise missiles’, \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security} (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp. 409–32.}—failed because the Nordic countries were not clear about what they wanted or when. Saab is studying UAVs and participates in a multinational undertaking to define armed UAVs together with Dassault Aviation (France), EADS (trans-Europe), Hellenic Aircraft Industry (Greece) and Thales (France).\footnote{‘Saab signs MoU with Dassault Aviation for UCAV demonstrator’, \textit{Nordic Business Report}, 22 Dec. 2003; and ‘Sweden pursues integrated approach to UAV/UCAV development’, \textit{Jane’s International Defense Review}, Sep. 2004, p. 8.} In addition, in 2004 three industrial associations in which Nordic defence industries participate merged to form the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe, strengthening their common base for influencing as well as implementing EU policy.\footnote{The 3 associations were the European Association of Aerospace Industries, the European Defence Industries Group and the Association of the European Space Industry. \textit{Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe}, ‘European aeronautics, space and defence industries join forces in ASD’, Press release, 22 Apr. 2004, URL <http://www.asd-europe.org/>.}

Sweden’s strong position among the Nordic countries plus the fact that it is a party to the Framework Agreement may suggest that the country is in the best position to establish itself as an EU supplier and project partner. However, this could be a misperception. Since 1992 Sweden has been involved in the most traumatic defence transformation process of all the Nordic countries. It has allocated insufficient financial resources to cope at the same time with the winding down of old structures, inventories and an oversized defence industrial base and with the parallel creation of a smaller defence structure and a slim but competitive (but basically undefined) industrial base suited for the capabilities needed to support Swedish participation in future international operations alongside foreign forces. The Swedish Government’s defence bill, tabled in September 2004, was withdrawn and amended in October after parliamentary criticism,\footnote{Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5: vårt framtida försvar [Government bill 2004/05:5: our future defence], 23 Sep. 2004, URL <http://www.riksdagen.se/debatt/propositioner/>. Summary in English: Government Offices of Sweden, ‘Our future defence: the focus of Swedish defence policy 2005–2007’, Swedish Ministry of Defence, Stockholm, Oct. 2004, URL <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/574/a/>} and the public debate on how to spend the money and implement the
necessary reductions became increasingly critical in late 2004. The outcome of the impending parliamentary vote became so uncertain that the Social Democratic and Green parties had to accommodate specific demands from the more extreme Left Party in order to save the bill in December. After a further delay, the bill was passed on 16 December. However, uncertainty remained as it became known in early December that the government had directed the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces to report by February 2005 on the consequences of further financial reductions that had not been specified in the defence bill.

It seems inevitable that, despite the problems and slow process, the equipment inventory in all the EU nations will become more similar and interoperable, although it is unclear how much of the equipment will be of Nordic origin. In September 2004 the European Commission launched a debate on possible instruments for awarding defence contracts in Europe to overcome fragmentation and inefficiencies. The outcome may have consequences for the use of *juste retour* and Article 296 of the Treaty of Rome. The role of a specific intra-Nordic arms market is likely to be reduced as the region’s governments and industries become more involved in ‘EUropean’ defence political and defence industrial structures, ambitions and projects. While Finland keeps the option of NATO membership open, the Swedish Government’s rhetoric of military non-alignment is becoming less and less convincing. The political and military ambition to sustain close defence technological relations with the USA will remain strong in Sweden, especially if the EDA and ‘EUropean’ undertakings show limited success. This could influence Sweden’s choices between European and transatlantic equipment solutions in favour of the latter, with both alternatives reducing Sweden’s interest in Nordic solutions, thereby also limiting the *raison d’être* of Nordic alternatives for the other Nordic countries.

32119/>. The parliament rejected the government’s suggestion that parliament should not decide the basic defence organization. See chapter 7 in this volume.

57 The differences in Finnish and Swedish defence political analyses were also noted. Holmström, M., ‘Skilda världar i svenskt och finländskt försvar’ [Different worlds in Swedish and Finnish defence], *Svenska Dagbladet*, 27 Sep. 2004, p. 12.

58 See chapter 7 in this volume for further details.


60 In this debate the Commission has stated 2 objectives: during a transition period the *juste retour* principle should be applied; and there should be support for countries with developing defence industries. Commission of the European Communities, ‘Defence procurement’, Green Paper, 23 Sep. 2004, URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/publicprocurement/dpp_en.htm>.


62 Finnish Prime Minister’s Office (note 52), p. 6. The political decision to keep the option of NATO membership open was based on Finnish Ministry of Defence, ‘Effects of a possible membership in a military alliance to the development of the Finnish defence system and to the defence administration, executive summary’, Helsinki, 27 Feb. 2004, URL <http://www.defmin.fi/>.

10. The Nordic attitude to and role in EU-linked defence industrial collaboration

Michael Brzoska

I. Introduction

In chapter 9, Björn Hagelin describes and analyses a number of important elements of defence industrial cooperation in the Nordic region—covering Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. He points to institutional arrangements as well as the patterns and processes of a market that is increasingly driven by commercial concerns but remains political at its core. It reveals a multifaceted reality in which ambitions and capacities, intentions and outcomes, statements and actions often conflict.

This chapter explores some of the options open to the Nordic countries, elaborating on the contradictions between and common characteristics of ‘Nordic’ and ‘European’ orientations. It considers whether the muddling through strategy described by Hagelin—with the Nordic dimension one of several factors influencing decisions by governments, defence ministries, armed forces, procurement authorities and defence companies—is avoidable, and whether there are realistic alternatives with clearer priorities, such as a dominant role for Nordic defence industrial collaboration or a full integration of the Nordic dimension into a European Union defence market.

The chapter focuses on the following three questions: can there, should there and will there be a Nordic dimension in defence industrial collaboration in Europe? The approach taken here is more conceptual than empirical, in order to provide an additional perspective to Hagelin’s factually oriented contribution.

II. Can there be a Nordic dimension?

Defence production is becoming increasingly commercialized. Private ownership of defence companies has become the rule and state ownership the exception.1 Similarly, procurement authorities are under strong pressure to economize and buy arms on a competitive basis. Consequently, defence production has become more international, particularly in Europe.2 However, in

spite of this trend towards a ‘normalization’ of the arms industry, it remains an industry shaped by political decisions. The industry is not independent of strategic political interference, and it is unlikely to avoid interference in the future. Today, the main publicly stated reason for the special government–defence industry relationship is economic: the defence industry is one of the few industrial sectors where many governments continue to take explicit responsibility for the level of employment. The economic rationale for keeping the defence industry outside the realm of anti-protection regulations purely in order to preserve employment may be questioned. However, the potential for shielding the defence industry from a more commercial approach is enhanced because the economic argument is linked to a more powerful one, related to the types of goods produced. Weapon systems remain an exceptional product both in relations with other countries and internally. Arms production continues to carry symbolic connotations of independence, alliance and power.

The special nature of government–defence industry relations carries over also to transnational and international collaboration. Defence production in Europe, particularly production by the EU member states, is becoming increasingly integrated, but this integration has been based largely on decisions made nationally. Defence producers without a ‘home base’ in one of the countries continue to find it difficult to compete for contracts. This is true even for a seemingly ‘European’ company such as EADS, as illustrated by the heated discussion in the autumn of 2004 about the continuation of a two-man French–German team at the top of the organization.\(^3\) One of the effects of the continuing control of national governments over defence production is that each country can, at least in theory, pursue alternative strategies. There remains much room for specific action to shape the future of the defence industry, but it almost always carries a heavy price tag, an issue that is taken up again below.

The continuing special nature of the relationship between governments and arms producers has several elements, including the following.

1. **Procurement.** Arms procurement will remain a national prerogative for the foreseeable future. A possible exception could be procurement for troops for joint operations, such as multinational brigades or battle groups. Even for this exception, however, it looks as if interoperability, rather than joint procurement, of major equipment will be the best that can be achieved.

2. **The defence industrial base.** While there is an industrial logic to creating large multinational units, there is also room for smaller entities. Governments, even those of small countries, can use such niche operations to promote national capacities.

3. **Defence industrial policy.** Major steps have been made in the past few years—both through national action, particularly in France, and through joint EU action, such as the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA)—to provide a common, level playing field for defence industries in

Europe. The EDA will be a useful platform for the exchange of information, the harmonization of regulations in EU member states and the further integration of defence procurement. However, with the possible exception of procurement for multilateral units within the European Rapid Reaction Force, the EDA will not be a procurement authority. National governments will remain in the driving seat, a fact that was not lost on the major European defence producers when they criticized EU member states as being too timid in the creation of the EDA. Even with the EDA, the defence markets will continue to be dominated by decisions made nationally. Larger producer countries will continue to protect their markets and all, including the smaller ones, will keep open their options to procure outside the realm of the EDA, particularly of course in the USA. The Joint Strike Fighter project, described by Hagelin, is only one—albeit a major—example of cooperation by European countries with the dominant power in the global arms market, the USA.

The defence industrial environment allows much national room for manoeuvre, inter alia by the Nordic countries. Iceland, a country without a defence industry, and Denmark, Finland and Norway, with small and selective defence industries, cannot go it alone in defence production. They can, however, at least in theory, choose between alternatives such as going with the USA, going with Europe and, in combination with the Swedish industry, going Nordic. Hagelin, however, questions the viability of this last option on the basis of the empirical evidence of the past. The next section of this chapter picks up some of the points he makes and expands the argument in the direction of asking how useful a Nordic dimension would be in a more European defence market.

III. Should there be a Nordic dimension?

In the above discussion of the possibility of a Nordic orientation of defence production in the four countries considered, a distinction was made between the theoretical possibility and the realism of such an option. While it would be possible to pursue this option, it might well be economically costly and politically harmful to the interests of Nordic states. For instance, the EU member states might see the pursuit of this option as running counter to the European Security and Defence Policy, of which Finland and Sweden are proactive members. A Nordic orientation of defence production would have several other consequences, some of which are mentioned by Hagelin, such as implications for access to technology. One particular aspect is highlighted here—the balance between cost and competition.

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4 On 15 June 2004, an open letter written jointly by the chief executive officers of Thales, EADS and BAE Systems calling for more resources and powers of the EDA was published in several European newspapers. For the text see, e.g., Ranque, D. et al., 'The new European Defence Agency: getting above the clouds'. Press release, Thales, 24 June 2004, URL <http://www.thalesgroup.com/home/home_dyna/1_7723_357_10704.html>.
The lack of integration in European defence markets continues to carry high costs, as demonstrated by well-known examples such as the variety of fighter aircraft produced and procured in Europe. The research and development costs of many weapon systems are high. The higher the number of units of a weapon system over which these and other fixed costs can be distributed, the lower the unit cost of the weapon. Longer production runs also bring savings because of the exploitation of learning costs. Weapons produced in small numbers are therefore more expensive than weapons produced in larger numbers. Procurement authorities that choose weapon systems because they are produced domestically generally pay a premium, which may be substantial if the weapon system is produced in only small numbers. If there was only one type of fighter aircraft, and all the European air forces bought it, taxpayers would be better off.

European countries have responded to this problem of small production runs by promoting the concentration of production and procurement. This two-track approach has dominated defence industrial policy in Europe for at least 30 years—since the days of the Independent European Programme Group within NATO.\(^5\) Much has been achieved in terms of greater concentration of production in several sectors of the defence industry over the years, but coordination of procurement has remained a difficult endeavour. The EDA will continue to push for this agenda.

However, as inherently logical and potentially cost-saving as further concentration of both production and procurement may be, there are limits to it. Along with the logic of falling unit prices with longer production runs goes the logic of large companies reaching dominant, or even monopoly, positions in markets and charging excessive prices. Sub-markets for defence products are particularly vulnerable to monopoly positions because of the specificity of many defence products. The recent experience in the USA is quite sobering in this respect. The consolidation wave of the 1990s has not resulted in substantially lower prices. Consolidated companies had great difficulties in reducing costs. In fact, because of the lower level of competition, they were able to develop various strategies to avoid cost cutting, such as keeping several production lines open.\(^6\) Europe continues to have a fairly diversified defence industry, with scope for further concentration in several sub-markets such as those for armoured vehicles and corvettes. However, competition for some types of military technology, including large conventionally fuelled submarines, for example, is already down to two or three producers. The jury is out on whether further integration of defence production in Europe will lead to lower or higher prices for defence equipment.


Competition is a good check against the overly high prices that can result from a near or full monopoly position. In the current situation in Europe, such competition can come both from the inside, from within the EU, and from the outside, in particular from the USA. However, perpetuating a situation in which US companies are relied on to balance the market strength of a few European companies would run counter to the idea of a competitive European defence equipment market as part of the ESDP. A viable European defence market needs to have a sufficient level of internal competition if it is not to become a burden rather than a boon for the ESDP.

The nature of the defence market—with its generally short production runs, specificity of products and, above all, close relations with governments—means that it takes policy intervention to ensure a sufficient level of competition. The arms market is so different from most civilian markets that the economic textbook prescription for open competition—government non-intervention—is not an option. Governments that do not intervene could well find themselves faced with an unsatisfactory situation of near or full monopoly. One of the main driving factors behind many European governments’ efforts to seek more intensive international cooperation in arms production—to widen national markets beyond one or, at best, a few producers—would come full circle if Europe ended up with only one or very few producers.

There is still much scope in Europe for making savings in arms procurement costs through further concentration of production and procurement, but there is also the danger of this same process leading to monopoly or near-monopoly situations. In the absence of open competition, as is the case in much of the defence sector, it is difficult to assess whether a market is still too diversified or already in danger of becoming monopolized. While there remains much scope in Europe for further concentration in most sub-markets for certain types of weapon systems, it makes sense to protect some production capabilities in order to counter monopolization tendencies. It is much more costly to rebuild a competitive market that has been captured by a monopoly than to manage competition while it still exists. One of the objectives of the EDA should be to keep a watchful eye on the various sub-markets while it promotes further integration of the defence industry in Europe. As it is not clear what the power and potential of the EDA will be, this task also needs to be performed by national governments.

Is there a Nordic dimension to the balance between cost and competition? Hagelin is sceptical, arguing on the basis of both trade data and experiences with collaboration on individual projects, and the present author largely concurs. However, there are alternatives to the current level of Nordic cooperation and what Hagelin sees as the most probable future trend. Hagelin mentions the institutional frameworks among Nordic countries that could be used for enhanced cooperation on defence industrial matters. A considerable challenge lies, of course, in the fact that this cooperation includes both EU and non-EU and both NATO and non-NATO members. In addition, industrial capabil-
National Defence and European Cooperation

IV. Will there be a Nordic dimension?

While a Nordic dimension in defence industrial collaboration would be possible politically, and even the economics of a strong Nordic dimension make sense, at least under some circumstances, Hagelin is correct in saying that it is unlikely that a greater Nordic dimension will develop in the foreseeable future. The primary reasons are the differences between defence industries in the Nordic countries and their individual links to defence industries in other European countries.

Hagelin provides both SIPRI and national data on the defence trade which attest to the central position of Sweden. This may be complemented with data for the European Union more generally.

Table 10.1 shows, in the first column, how important Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are as customers for the defence industries of select EU countries. The Nordic countries are important markets for the Finnish (68 per cent in 2002) and Swedish (42 per cent) defence industries. They are much less important for the Danish defence industry (16 per cent), but its share is still well above the average for defence industries in the EU (5 per cent). Among the major EU producers, Germany is clearly the strongest partner for the Nordic

Table 10.1. Shares of exports of defence equipment of select EU countries that went to Nordic countries, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exporter</th>
<th>Share of exports that went to Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden</th>
<th>Share of exports that went to non-Nordic EU members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All EU</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

countries: almost 9 per cent of German defence exports went to these four countries in 2002.

In table 10.2, a different question is asked of the data: what proportion of the Nordic countries’ imports of defence equipment from the EU come from Nordic countries (for which data are available)? A similar picture emerges: imports from other Nordic countries are very important for Finland (76 per cent) but much less so for Sweden (15 per cent) and Norway (11 per cent), although these two countries import much more from the Nordic countries than the EU member states do on average (4 per cent). For Denmark (4 per cent), the other three Nordic suppliers are no more or less important than they are for the rest of the EU.

These data thus support the data presented by Hagelin in showing that the Nordic dimension is of particular importance for Finland and of no importance for Denmark. Norway and Sweden are somewhere in the middle.

A picture of Swedish dominance emerges with respect to equity capital links between major companies in the Nordic countries, as shown by Hagelin. The Swedish defence industry has particularly strong links with the United Kingdom (aircraft and armoured vehicles), Germany (shipbuilding) and the USA (artillery and ammunition). While there are also equity links between Nordic defence companies, the foreign ownership of major Swedish companies is more important for the questions discussed here because of the central position of the Swedish defence industry in the Nordic area. The international orientation adopted by Sweden, as the most important defence producer among the Nordic countries, has also found expression in Sweden’s leading role in European

Table 10.2. Imports by Nordic countries from Denmark, Finland and Sweden as a share of imports of defence equipment from the EU, 2002

Figures are percentages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importer</th>
<th>Imports from Denmark, Finland and Sweden as a share of imports from the European Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All EU</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

defence industrial institutions, such as the 2000 Framework Agreement on the restructuring of the European defence industry.\(^7\)

In the end it is hard to avoid Hagelin’s conclusion that most of Sweden’s defence industry is likely to become even more interested in the wider European defence industrial playing field in the future. The Nordic dimension will remain of interest for Sweden, particularly with respect to some niche production where producers in the other Nordic countries can offer interesting technology. Finland and, to a lesser degree, Norway are also important customers for Swedish industry because they strengthen the Swedish position within their industrial partnerships. As the Swedish defence industry is an important partner for defence industries in Finland and, to an extent, Norway, the relationship is of mutual benefit.

The logic behind the existing Nordic links is not, then, primarily one of creating a common Nordic platform to further Nordic interests within the emerging European defence market. It is primarily a defence industrial logic or, to be more precise, two defence industrial logics. The first is the Swedish ambition to maintain a strong defence industry, to be among the six or so largest players in Europe. The second is the rationale of the smaller defence producers, Finland and Norway, which seek cooperation with Sweden as a medium-sized partner in order to protect themselves against overly strong competition. This does not preclude them, however, from buying elsewhere, including from the USA.

The defence market is a political one, albeit one based on economic realities that are costly to defy or to manipulate. Defence industrial structures are complex mixes of both industrial and political interests and agendas. The Nordic dimension, while potentially a strong factor in determining the course of defence production and defence industrial cooperation, is obviously not sufficiently attractive for these governments to counter the commercial logic driving the defence industries in the Nordic countries, particular in Sweden. Instead, the Nordic dimension is currently shaped by the industrial and institutional dynamics at the European level. It would nevertheless make sense for the Nordic governments to nurture this dimension in order to keep their options open, at least in those areas of defence production where this approach is not overly costly, and particularly in those areas where further European integration of defence production might lead to unwarranted monopoly situations.

Part III
Nordic handling of the broader dimensions of security in an EU setting
Editor’s remarks

Alyson J. K. Bailes

One of the more paradoxical aspects of the Nordic countries’ relationship with the European Security and Defence Policy is the eagerness all five of them have shown to take part in the ‘harder’—that is, operational—elements of the new European defence programme, while Nordic policies in general are best known in Europe for their ‘softer’ qualities—‘unselfish, moral, multilateralist and internationalist’, as Maria Strömvik puts it in her chapter. One way to resolve the contradiction is to interpret the Nordic countries’ activism in the ESDP as a new manifestation of their long-standing support for international peacekeeping, in which they have often shown considerable toughness under pressure. Another is to point out that, ever since the agenda-setting debates of 1998–89, the Nordic members of the European Union have done what they can to ‘soften’ the profile of the ESDP overall: by keeping it focused on conflict management rather than self-defence, by insisting that civilian capabilities for intervention be developed in step with military ones and by supporting the three non-military missions that were actually launched in the ESDP’s formative years. Success in these aims is what has kept compliance with EU defence ambitions a relatively ‘painless’ operation—so far—for the majority of Nordic governments.

This part of the volume opens with a chapter by Strömvik that tells these first, relatively straightforward parts of the story in more detail. She, and the other authors, also cite some well-known Nordic initiatives that fall in the broader ambit of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Finland’s ‘Northern Dimension’ programme for stabilization and joint development planning with Russia, and the Swedish initiative in 2003 to start working on the EU’s first-ever strategy against weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There are, however, not many more examples that they can find from Denmark’s nearly 32 years and Finland’s and Sweden’s 10 years of EU membership—and not only because the subject of Nordic involvement in EU security policy has thus far been distinctly under-researched. All six authors of this part of the volume end up in their different ways by asking, or illuminating, the same question: why have the EU’s Nordic members not done more to harness the possibilities of their membership, with or without the non-EU Nordics in support, for promoting the broader causes of peace, security and non-zero-sum internationalism that are supposed to be so close to their hearts?

Even in the area of civilian intervention capability, Strömvik argues, Finland and Sweden could have done more to insist on coordination and policy coherence between civilian, military and other EU inputs to a given crisis of concern to Europe. They could have pressed harder for adequate collective funding of ESDP interventions. They could have driven the Union harder to give more than just lip service to conflict prevention and pushed a more idealistic agenda on the larger issues of global security governance. Tarja Väyrynen in her chapter also sees a deficit in realistic and operational conflict prevention work. However, she argues principally that the Nordic countries should champion a more systematic and professional use of mediation as an EU peace-making (and peace-preserving) technique, preferably learning from the Norwegian experience of combining official and ‘second-track’ elements.
The plot gets more tangled with Nicholas Marsh’s and Lars van Dassen and Anna Wetter’s chapters dealing with conventional disarmament (especially small arms and light weapons, SALW) and nuclear issues, respectively. Disarmament in all its aspects is a prime example of a Nordic cause that can be both idealistic and self-interested at the same time: yet from the same cause—as van Dassen and Wetter show—quite different policy consequences and nuclear ‘styles’ have flowed in the cases of Denmark and Norway, or Finland and Sweden, respectively. Only in the case of practical measures for destruction of WMD materials in regions adjoining the Nordic region do these four countries’ policies develop in parallel, and sometimes even in collaboration. As for SALW, Marsh’s analysis of a plethora of Nordic national initiatives since 2002 shows that any given Nordic country was twice as likely to take an SALW initiative jointly with Canada, the Netherlands or Switzerland during this time as it was with a Nordic neighbour, and that Nordic donors often directed their support to other institutions—such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—or to globally active non-governmental organizations, rather than to or through the European Union.

Last but not least, the chapters by Magnus Ekengren and Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen investigate the interface between EU policies on external and internal (‘homeland’) security, and they pinpoint the latter as a still inchoate but important and in many ways fascinating growth area. On the face of it, a comprehensive approach to security that does justice to all parts of the spectrum from traditional and military to ‘human’ security dimensions is a very Nordic kind of construct, and it is certainly something that Nordic states aim at in the theory and practice of their contributions to peace-building abroad. As regards their own territory, however, Nordic governments—with Denmark increasingly an exception—still tend to draw hard lines between the military tools to be used against a foreign aggressor and the handling of ‘new’ or ‘societal’ threats. On the latter, their approach is characterized by libertarian values and the minimizing of force. As Ekengren shows in detail, all these governments are being obliged to re-examine the role of the armed forces in internal security, but they are moving at different speeds and towards diverging solutions. The Nordic countries seem unlikely, therefore, to play the role either of a pre-harmonized ‘core’ or of a ‘ginger group’ in the EU’s collective efforts to build internal-security policies and capacities for the whole European region. Some, especially from the Nordic region, might argue that it is proper for them to play instead a role of brake upon the anti-terrorist zeal that might drive some other Europeans into excessive curbing of liberties, closing of borders and so on. Others might contend that, given the particular structure of potential non-military threats in the Nordic countries’ own region, any energy that these governments are able to expend on transnational coordination of policies and readiness measures would better be deployed in a ‘Nordic–Baltic’ framework including, where appropriate, Russia.

The question remains of why ‘Nordic values’ have not left more of a stamp across the range of EU security-related policies, especially since the Nordic region accounted for 3 of the 15 members from 1995—and given the frequent keenness of Norway to associate itself with benign EU actions from outside. Three sets of hypotheses may be mentioned here for the reader to reflect on and to test when reading the detailed materials in this part. The first, for which the authors here provide much prima facie evidence, is that Nordic policies and interests are simply not similar enough from country to country and from field to field. During the cold war it was natural to play up
common values to offset the strategic segregation of the Nordic region’s five states, but as the countries realized their growing freedom of choice in the 1990s there was room both to acknowledge inherent (e.g., geo-strategic) differences and to explore divergent new paths. On first joining the EU, Finland and Sweden made a conscious effort to avoid any impression of ‘ganging up’ from the north. Since then, Nordic responses to new challenges have had both convergent and divergent features, with Denmark particularly often—at least in the areas covered by this part of the volume—playing a *sui generis* role. It appears, overall, that Nordic establishments’ common or coincident interest in seizing the opportunities offered by ESDP capabilities programmes and operations have not been matched by a similar gathering around any prominent security-policy cause, at least within the EU framework as such (see below).

A second hypothesis is that the EU’s own power system has effectively discouraged the Nordic countries from attempting security-policy initiatives and would have frustrated them, if made. Not only are two-fifths of the Nordic community outside the Union, but two of the nations inside are recent newcomers, none of them is a large power by EU standards, and none has really large military (or other security) resources. If a particular Nordic country had a vital interest in some security issue, therefore, it might do better tactically—even if the policies of the other Nordic countries were entirely compatible—to seek a larger partner or more diverse coalition for promoting it. In actual cases where Nordic EU members chose rather to go it alone, they have run the risk of seeing their initiatives fizzle out—as arguably has now happened to Finland’s ‘Northern Dimension”—or being steered by larger powers in other, less authentically Nordic directions (as van Dassen and Wetter suggest happened with the WMD Strategy of 2003). Such practical considerations might well lead Nordic policy makers, when they have a good idea on peace and security to offer either nationally or collectively, to look for a forum where they have a historically better established profile—such as the UN—or where they are less likely to be treated as ‘small fish in a big pool’. (It is interesting here to recall Jesper Christensen’s argument in part II of this volume that the Nordic countries could only create an influential new paradigm in European defence by a kind of ‘flight forward’, introducing innovations for which they would have to pay themselves with major breaks in tradition.)

There may, however—and this is the third hypothesis—be other features of the EU framework that affect Nordic choices, aside from its tendency to cramp the ambitions of medium to small member states. At least two levels of ambivalence might be detected in Nordic governments’, and indeed societies’, approaches to developing the wider security role of the Union. One lies in the recurrent Nordic concern to protect the roles of other institutions—the UN or the OSCE as in the case of SALW and other humanitarian topics, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Atlantic relationship generally in the field of ‘hard’ conflict management as well as of ‘hard’ defence. The second and more basic confusion is over whether the EU should be seen, generally speaking, as a ‘force for good’ in security from the Nordic viewpoint or for the world in general. Is the EU’s relatively ‘soft’ profile really as congenial to the Nordic mind as it would seem? Or is it attributed by at least some Nordic countries—as Strømvik hints—to the Union’s relatively powerless and divided nature, fuelling an abiding prejudice that (the EU part of) Brussels is not as serious about defence as all good Nordic countries should be? Conversely, if the EU’s growing strategic influence and potential are stressed, should Nordic countries welcome this as a useful new ‘counter-balance’ to Russia and the USA? Or does it present more of a threat to their
own individuality and to the ‘clean hands’ strand of their global policies? Is Eken-
gren’s vision of the EU as the future security provider against society’s most intimate
vulnerabilities one that the notoriously Euro-sceptic majority in Sweden can ever really
be expected to embrace?

The best message to take away from this part of the volume is probably that not
enough is known to answer any of these questions yet, so the fields opened up by all
six chapters would be excellent ones for further research. It is safe to say that the
Nordic countries’ security policies are being moulded, directly and indirectly, by the
EU experience in ways that go far beyond their responses to the ESDP itself. It is
beyond doubt that some influences have flowed the other way from Nordic capitals,
not excluding those of the non-NATO members, into the still fluid and malleable
corpus of EU security policy. The precise balance of the two processes would be
perilous to draw at this stage: but a sentence from van Dassen and Wetter’s chapter
deserves to be cited as the last word: ‘Neither large nor small states in the European
Union can ultimately escape from the logic that the strengthening of common positions
is bought at the price of national particularities.’
11. Starting to ‘think big’: the Nordic countries and EU peace-building

Maria Strömvik

I. Introduction

It would be a hard case to argue that there is any one distinguishable ‘Nordic’ identity in international politics. In their relations with the rest of the world, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden probably exhibit more differences than similarities. Furthermore, and despite their close cooperation on other matters within, for instance, the Nordic Council, today the five Nordic countries rarely coordinate their policies on international security management with a view to presenting specifically Nordic initiatives, whether in the European Union or elsewhere. Nonetheless, this chapter focuses primarily on the commonalities rather than the differences between the Nordic countries by looking at how they have adapted to the EU’s increasingly active participation in peace-building efforts in war- or conflict-torn areas and how Nordic contributions have influenced this process.

During the cold war the Nordic countries’ foreign policies were often seen collectively—correctly or not—as leaning towards an unselfish, moral, multilateralist and internationalist orientation. The five Nordic governments had a high profile on many North–South issues and were generally recognized as generous and concerned donors of development assistance. They also had a reputation as unusually active supporters of the United Nations system because of their relatively large financial contributions to various UN bodies and their relatively large troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, and because of their relatively loud rhetorical support of the UN.\(^1\) To varying degrees, and with Sweden as the most outspoken state, the Nordic countries were also occasionally perceived as daring small countries that did not shy away from criticizing the leading states of either the Eastern or Western bloc when they saw injustices against individual countries or people.\(^2\)

This image was also, to a large extent, cemented in the domestic contexts and has continued to affect the internal foreign policy debates in the Nordic countries. As discussed below, this image may help to explain why they have found it so ‘painless’ to adapt to—and embrace—the framework of the Common

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Foreign and Security Policy. It may also help to explain why the Nordic EU members have gradually reconsidered their capacity to wield influence in other parts of the world. As EU membership has given them more clout in international security management—similar to that a great power—their self-confidence has increased and they have, in short, gradually started to ‘think big’.

II. The EU’s growing role in peace-building

Over the past three and a half decades the EU member states have increasingly attempted to pursue common and distinctly ‘European’ policies on issues of peace and security in other parts of the world. Among the early examples of activities under the European Political Cooperation, the precursor of the CFSP, were the attempts of the (then) nine members of the European Community (EC) to forge an alternative to US policy on the conflict in the Middle East following the 1973 October War and in their common approach to the setting up and functioning of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in the mid-1970s. In the same period, the EC members initiated cooperation in the UN General Assembly with a view to presenting common views. In the mid-1980s they stepped up their foreign policy cooperation. One among a number of notable initiatives was the EC’s involvement in the peace processes in Central America, which, again, aimed at offering a somewhat different solution from the US policy for that region.

During the first half of the 1990s there was no lack of attempts by the EU to contribute to peace in the former Yugoslavia, even if these efforts ultimately failed. Through negotiations with the warring parties, the EU first tried ‘carrots’ (e.g., in the form of promises of increased development aid and beneficial trade agreements) and then ‘sticks’ (e.g., in the form of threats of various types of sanctions). The EC members also used previously untried common instruments, such as despatching mediators and uniformed personnel to the region in the European Community Monitoring Mission. While part of the failure to end the conflict may be attributed to the EU’s lack of other coercive means at the time—such as a military capability—and the problems of coordinating 12 national views on which strategies to pursue, other actors, such as the UN and the USA, would arguably not have found it any easier to prevent a full-scale war.

The lessons from the failure in the Balkans did, however, translate into intensified foreign policy cooperation within the EU framework throughout the rest of the 1990s. By the end of the decade, the EU members regularly discussed all major issues of international peace and security. In 1999 alone the EU directly

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3 The European Community Monitoring Mission operated in the Western Balkans in 1991–2000, financed by the EU member states and Norway and Slovakia. On 1 Jan. 2001 the mission was replaced by the European Union Monitoring Mission, an instrument of the CFSP financed from the Community budget.
addressed, in various ways, issues of peace and security in more than 60 countries throughout the world. Taking into account the more indirect and long-term EU measures, such as the adaptation of development aid and trade relations to encourage democratization, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as well as active support for a number of international organizations working to promote peace and security, it may be said that the EU has gradually begun to use most of the foreign policy instruments normally associated with a great power.

The latest addition to this toolbox of instruments is the creation of an EU capacity to carry out civilian and military crisis management missions. The ESDP has thereby filled one of the few remaining gaps in the EU’s potential to execute most of the foreign and security policy functions normally associated with state actors. One of the very few functions for which the EU still has no capacity or any active plans to develop one is that of territorial defence. So far, the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy deal only with issues of peace and security in areas outside the borders of the Union.

In addition to the gradual acquisition of instruments, the EU has successively developed a diplomatic system to convey its policies to the outside world. The ‘troika’—consisting of the member state holding the rotating EU Presidency, the High Representative for the CFSP and the EU Commissioner for External Relations—meets regularly with representatives of third states. The member states’ embassies cooperate in third countries, the European Commission has 130 delegations around the world, and the Council of the European Union has two additional representations, in Geneva and New York. Furthermore, the EU has over the past decade appointed a number of Special Representatives in war-torn countries or regions.

This has created a new, unique actor in international security management, different from both state actors and international organizations. For instance, the EU enjoys an unusual degree of legitimacy because of: (a) its multilateral character; (b) the requirements it imposes on its members regarding democracy and other norms, such as respect for human rights and the rule of law; and (c) its power of example in having established a stable peace between former adversaries. The EU has also acquired something of a ‘nice cop’ image in international politics, owing to its tendency to choose carrots over sticks to influence other states. Taken together, this image may often be of benefit for the EU in its peace-building role, in particular when it tries to use long-term strategies for conflict prevention.

However, some of these features are probably a result more of the intrinsic problems of reaching agreement among 25 member states than of conscious EU strategies. It is simply easier to agree on issues such as the virtues of democracy and human rights, peaceful conflict resolution, respect for international law and multilateral solutions than to agree on serious punitive measures, ultimately

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4 Strömvik, M., *To Act as a Union: Explaining the Development of the EU’s Collective Foreign Policy* (Lund University, Department of Political Science: Lund, 2005), p. 59.
underpinned by the threat or use of military force. Nonetheless, this development and these special characteristics of the EU are in themselves important for understanding the way in which the Nordic countries have adapted to, and recently also fully embraced, this new international actor.

III. Adapting to the EU framework

It is often argued that the states that joined the EU after the first enlargement, in 1973, have held a weak and superficial view of the political logic surrounding the EU process, and it appears that no state has joined the Union primarily because of its role in international security management. Applicant states have typically discussed EU membership essentially in terms of economic rewards. This was certainly true for Denmark in the early 1970s and for Finland and Sweden in the early 1990s. While these small, trade-dependent states saw various economic benefits from joining the EU, they saw few explicit benefits from foreign policy cooperation. Rather, their perceptions of their role in international peace-building activities were characterized, as some have put it, by a ‘small-power syndrome’. Ole Wæver’s analysis in the early 1990s—that ‘Danes tend to think more as critics of power and assume that power is something others have’—would certainly also hold for Finland and Sweden at that time. The possibility of becoming a member of a larger, and potentially very powerful, political actor was difficult for Denmark to consider, impossible for Sweden to consider and at most rarely discussed in Finland. The strong traditions and perceived value of ‘independent’ and active small-power strategies to affect the international debate during the cold war made it particularly difficult for these three states to see themselves as components of a larger collective.

However, all three governments’ perceptions of the benefits of the EU’s external peace-building role, as well as their own roles within this policy area, have changed dramatically over the past decade or so. Denmark, Finland and Sweden have all adapted and ‘internalized’ the EU’s global role in their own foreign and security policies, and all three countries are now strong and active supporters of the CFSP and the ESDP. This trend is highly visible, for instance, in the three governments’ statements about the importance of this policy area. For example, speaking about the ESDP, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller, has argued that a ‘close and committing cooperation in Europe is, for a smaller country like Denmark, a truly vital interest’. His Finnish counterpart, Erkki Tuomioja, similarly argues that ‘Finland’s membership

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of the European Union is today the crucial departure point underpinning our position on security policy\(^8\) and their Swedish counterpart, Laila Freivalds, has repeatedly pointed out that ‘the European Union is, alongside the UN, our most important foreign and security policy forum’\(^9\).

Furthermore, the three Nordic EU member states—Denmark, Finland and Sweden—are no longer satisfied with the status of the EU’s capacity to contribute to international security management. They wish to see a further strengthening and widening of the EU’s role in terms of both the instruments used by the EU and the geographical reach of its peace-building activities. Having traditionally heavily emphasized ‘soft-power means’, today these three countries call for the increased use of hard-power strategies and instruments as a last resort. They all argue in favour of a comprehensive EU arsenal of peace-building instruments, ranging from conflict-prevention strategies and soft-power instruments to a better capacity to carry out peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions.

The Danish Government, for instance, wants to ensure that the ‘EU adopts a more consistent policy and confronts regimes that violate fundamental international norms’.\(^{10}\) Despite Denmark’s formal opt-out from the ESDP, the government argues that: ‘The EU must be able to act also in a more robust way to create stability and prosperity in regions stricken by armed conflict.’\(^{11}\) Similarly, the Finnish and Swedish foreign ministers argue that ‘the EU must have the capacity to carry out all types of tasks . . . including the very complex and demanding ones’.\(^{12}\) Furthermore, all three governments believe that the EU’s peace-building role should not be limited to providing peace in Europe, but that the Union’s contributions to global security should be strengthened, by using the EU’s instruments ‘wherever needed’.\(^{13}\)

It is highly unlikely—even unthinkable—that many of these statements could have emanated from the three Nordic EU members a decade ago. The three governments have moved away from a previously somewhat downbeat image of their own possibilities to envisage wielding a comprehensive mix of both soft- and hard-power instruments in order to influence issues related to conflicts

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\(^12\) Freivalds, L. and Toumioja, E., ‘Vi vill stärka EU:s säkerhetspolitik’ [We want to strengthen the EU’s security policy], Dagens Nyheter, 11 Nov. 2003 (author’s translation).

\(^13\) On Denmark see Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (note 10); and on Finland and Sweden see Freivalds and Toumioja (note 12).
and wars. They have begun to ‘think like bigger states’ or, at least, to realize that they now have at hand a greater array of instruments as a result of being part of a larger actor.

This adaptation has presumably taken place for a number of different reasons, but two explanations stand out as particularly important. The first is related to the very nature of the EU’s peace-building activities as they have evolved over the past decades. The EU’s unusual decision-making system makes it easier to agree on carrots than on sticks and on broad multilateral solutions than on ‘unilateral’ EU policies that have not been accepted by other states. Almost by default, EU policies aimed at peace and security in other parts of the world—in contrast to EU policies in many other areas, such as trade and agriculture—are less guided by any one discernible ‘national interest’ than are the equivalent policies of many large state actors. The CFSP is also characterized by an unusually high degree of what Kjell Goldmann has called ‘internationalistic’ activities—activities characterized by ‘a desire to improve conditions generally by the application of norms thought to be universally valid rather than further one’s own immediate national interest to the best of one’s ability’.14 The EU’s foreign and security policy has gradually developed into a policy that is guided by the will to spread norms such as democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, as well as by an emphasis on compromises and negotiated solutions to conflicts. Furthermore, the EU has increasingly grown into one of the most active and outspoken supporters of the UN system, a trend that has been further reinforced since the war in Iraq in 2003.

For the three Nordic EU members this has meant that, in terms of policy content, adaptation to the CFSP has been painless and has very rarely provoked a need for difficult choices between a traditional national policy and a different EU policy. For the lion’s share of foreign policy issues there has, in effect, been something of a ‘perfect match’ between traditional ‘Nordic foreign policy’ and EU foreign policy. Put somewhat differently, for these three governments the EU’s policies have—although often not by design—almost always acted as a megaphone for the types of policy that these three Nordic countries would have pursued anyway.

In Finland and Sweden the only policy that has been gradually altered is that of non-alignment. The Finnish and Swedish governments were initially somewhat unsure about how to handle those domestic critics who argued that EU membership was not compatible with military non-alignment, but today this issue has been settled. By altering their definitions of military non-alignment—making it equivalent to not signing agreements on mutual defence guarantees—these two countries are no longer hindered in any tangible way from being active participants in all aspects of EU peace-building activities, including the military dimension. The issue of non-alignment is simply no longer relevant for

these states’ attitudes towards the EU’s security and defence policy. This has gradually been understood and appreciated by other EU members’ governments and, consequently, the policy of non-alignment seems no longer to have any deleterious effect on Finnish and Swedish influence within the CFSP and the ESDP.

One typical example of the good match between Nordic and EU foreign policy is seen in the Union’s strong support and active contributions to the UN system. For instance, the EU has, as one analyst puts it, ‘taken on a different and potentially more powerful mediating role in the UN in North–South relations based upon the European commitment to social development and social market economy’.15 Most recently, the battle group concept was developed with the intention of putting the EU’s forces at the service of the UN, a development which has been applauded by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.16 It has therefore been natural for the three Nordic EU members to see the Union as a means for further strengthening their own traditional policies and influence in the UN. As Freivalds has put it,

Sweden has always contributed actively to the UN’s peace-building activities. As EU members, we have additional possibilities to support and underpin the UN system. By working actively to provide the EU with a strengthened capacity—both politically and with civilian and military means—to contribute to the UN’s peace-building work, our Swedish UN-policy is strengthened through our EU efforts.17

Similarly, the Danish Government has expressed its wish to ‘work to ensure that the EU fully exploits the existing framework and thereby exerts an impact on the international scene, including in the UN Security Council’.18 In this context, however, the Danish Government has been obliged to note that its own ambitions may be crippled by the defence opt-out, maybe more than ever since January 2005, when the country took up a seat in the UN Security Council. Møller argues that Denmark’s opt-out may be more unfortunate than ever: ‘We may actually find ourselves in the paradoxical situation that Denmark will one day sit in New York and request the EU to carry out a crisis management task for the UN, but the next day in the Council of Ministers in Brussels, Denmark will then find it necessary to activate the Danish defence opt-out and announce that we, unfortunately, cannot contribute to carrying out the task!’19 Thus, Denmark is the only Nordic EU member that cannot fully exploit its EU

19 Møller, P. S., Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘EU’s sikkerhedspolitik: et kig frem og et tilbage’ [The EU’s security policy: one look forward and one look back], Jyllands-Posten, 22 Oct. 2004 (author’s translation).
membership to further its traditionally strong support for the UN, while the two militarily non-aligned members Finland and Sweden benefit from the possibility of promoting a comprehensive approach to UN peace-building through the EU system.20

A second important reason for the Nordic EU members’ gradual embrace of the Union’s foreign and security policy has no doubt lain in the dramatic changes in the international system after the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. During the cold war, a policy of neutrality could be used rhetorically as a morally guided ‘third way’ in international politics. With only one superpower left, neutrality has lost much of its meaning and thereby also the perceived value it may previously have added to any small state’s foreign policy. Since then, the only option left for small or middle-size powers that want to reinforce their influence in the new unipolar system has been to act collectively with like-minded states.

Among the Nordic countries, Sweden has perhaps been the most outspoken about the need to use the EU to create another strong voice in today’s international system. In the words of the late Anna Lindh, then Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, it is important for all those who worry about the development of a world which we call unipolar, where only one big country decides the agenda, where only the US makes decisions over right and wrong, that they are able to see that the EU should not develop as a counterweight or opposite pole to the USA, but that we need more committed efforts, more committed voices, and that sometimes a strong EU will agree with the USA, sometimes a strong EU will have an opposite view from the USA, but the EU is needed to balance the USA.21

Speaking more specifically about the need for an enhanced military crisis management capacity for the EU, Freivalds also relates the issue to the USA, saying that ‘it is disturbing that the EU still does not possess the capacity to halt more severe conflicts without asking the USA for support’.22 In the view of the Swedish Government, however, a further development of the EU’s role in international security management should not be interpreted as adversarial competition with the USA. The transatlantic link is perceived to be of fundamental value for European security, and the development of a more capable EU is seen as strengthening the health of that link.23 This view is shared by the Danish Government, which argues that a stronger EU is a precondition for well-functioning transatlantic cooperation. In the words of Møller: ‘Only a strong

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20 On the position of Denmark see chapter 1 in this volume.
Europe together with a strong USA can find the necessary solutions and take responsibility for forming a just and sustainable world order based on our common values.²⁴

The EU’s increasingly active role in international security management has, however, not only affected its member states. The two Nordic non-EU members now also relate to the EU’s external policies in a more intense way than before. The Icelandic and Norwegian governments are generally supportive of EU policies and regularly align themselves with the EU’s foreign policy statements. As the ESDP process took off, a former Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Thorbjørn Jagland, called it ‘One of the most dynamic processes in the EU cooperation at present’ saying that it ‘also affects fundamental Norwegian interests’ and that: ‘We are ready to contribute civil and military resources. We want Norway to be linked as closely as possible to the new EU cooperation.’²⁵ His former Icelandic counterpart, Halldór Ásgrímsson, has similarly argued that relations with the EU ‘are and will remain a dominant aspect of Icelandic foreign policy’.²⁶

For Iceland and Norway, however, the obvious problem lies in their meagre opportunities to influence EU policy making. It matters little whether they adapt their national foreign policies and strategies to EU foreign policy: they will still be absent from the decision-making table. This has led to somewhat ambivalent rhetoric surrounding Norway’s attitudes towards the CFSP and the ESDP. Seeking various ways to influence their development, Norway is a strong supporter of the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements and has been deploiring the fact that ‘there is little will to use the cooperative arrangements established between NATO and the EU’.²⁷ The Norwegian Government also sees the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the best guarantor of a strong transatlantic link and clearly sees a risk of NATO being marginalized by a strengthened dialogue directly between the EU and the USA. At the same time, however, Norway has welcomed the Union’s takeover of most of NATO’s tasks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the grounds that this will ‘contribute to more equal transatlantic relations’.²⁸

²⁴ Møller (note 11).
²⁷ Petersen, J., Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk etter utvidelsen av EU og NATO’ [Norwegian security policy after enlargement of the EU and NATO], Speech delivered at Oslo Militære Samfunn, 4 Oct. 2004, URL <http://odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/aktuelt/taler/minister_a/032171-090279/> (author’s translation). ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements are a package of agreements reached in 2002–2003 between the EU and NATO dealing primarily with the EU’s access to NATO planning capabilities but also with other assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations.
²⁸ Petersen (note 27).
IV. Nordic contributions to the EU’s role in peace-building

The Nordic countries have not only adapted to the EU’s peace-building role but also begun to participate actively in the shaping of this process. However, tracing the influence of various actors within the CFSP and the ESDP is not a straightforward task. Formally, most initiatives are presented by the rotating EU Presidency irrespective of their original authors. Often, the early stages in the drafting process also involve many authors, not the least of whom are various bodies within the Council Secretariat. Sometimes, the member state that launches an initiative will make this publicly known, but at other times outside observers—and sometimes even the participants themselves—cannot tell where a proposal originated. The conclusions and decisions reached in the end are often not particularly revealing about who the initiators were or about the various positions during the process. During the complex and continuous negotiations between 25 national administrations, others’ active support for, amendments to or rejection of an initiative may often be as important for the final outcome as the original idea. In other words, specific member states’ substantial contributions to the EU’s peace-building role are difficult to evaluate. They should be judged not only in terms of the injection of original ‘national’ initiatives into the process, but also in terms of active support (or lack of support) for various other initiatives in the policy-making process.

Furthermore, contributions should be understood in relation to the individual member states’ capacity to influence the process. This capacity is dependent on a number of different assets, both tangible and intangible, such as economic power of various sorts, military power, prestige, reputation, will power and diplomatic skills.²⁹ For small member states, the will power—or the capacity to formulate new initiatives—will also be affected by the limited resources of their ministries. The CFSP/ESDP policy-making process is a time-consuming and intense area for small national ministries, and a lot of resources are spent on just keeping up with the process and responding to the EU agenda. As a Danish diplomat has put it, the EU’s foreign policy cooperation ‘is in fact determining the agenda’ of the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.³⁰ A Swedish diplomat similarly argues that quick reaction must, by necessity, often be prioritized over a country’s own initiatives because the CFSP decision-making procedures are ‘characterised by positioning with “lightning rapidity” so that you, for example, end up with the group of countries you want to belong to in the following process. . . . It is more important in the CFSP to have the others’ views and to formulate a position of your own, than to make more in-depth analysis of the problem of your own. It is another way of working than before’.³¹

³¹ Quoted in Ekengren, M., Statsförvaltningens europeisering i tid och rum: en studie av den politiska tidens förändring till följd av EU-samarbetet [The administration’s Europeanization in time and space: a
In other words, in small EU member states the CFSP process may drain substantial parts of the ministries’ capacity to formulate their own new initiatives by virtue of the constant need to respond to others’ proposals, whether via the Coreu communication network or the multitude of CFSP/ESDP working groups, committee meetings and bilateral contacts between civil servants. While EU capitals have given varying degrees of freedom to their representations in Brussels, this is doubtless a greater problem in general for the smaller member states.

Against this background, the Nordic contributions to the CFSP/ESDP process and policies have not been so meagre. Albeit to varying degrees, the three Nordic EU members have influenced the EU’s peace-building role over the past decade. However—and perhaps rather surprisingly considering the previously quite strong Nordic identity in, for instance, the UN—very few, if any, CFSP initiatives have been proposed jointly by all three Nordic EU members. One plausible explanation, which Knud Erik Jørgensen alludes to, could be a general perception among the Nordic countries that joint and exclusively Nordic initiatives have little chance of success. The Nordic reputation in the rest of Europe may simply not match the somewhat self-satisfied domestic rhetoric on moral superiority that is sometimes found in the public debate in some of the Nordic countries.

Individually and bilaterally, however, the three Nordic EU members have contributed innovative solutions to both the institutional and policy development of the CFSP and the ESDP. In the institutional category, the Finnish–Swedish initiative to include the Petersberg Tasks in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam is one of the most frequently quoted examples. Such a solution would probably have been found even without this Nordic initiative, and one of the most important Finnish–Swedish motivations may well have been to use this initiative to avert any discussions of collective defence. Nonetheless, it did demonstrate that the newly arrived non-aligned member states were prepared to contribute constructively to the discussion on military matters in the EU framework as long as no collective defence guarantees were involved.

Since the creation of the ESDP in 1999, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have generally been among those members that have forcefully argued that this policy area should not be devoted exclusively to military crisis management. All three have cautioned about the risks of having a military bias within the ESDP, not because the military dimension is not seen to be important but

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32 The Coreu (CORespondance EUropéenne) communication network links the EU member states and the Commission to allow for cooperation in the fields of foreign policy and to make it easier for decisions to be taken swiftly in emergencies.


34 On the Petersberg Tasks see chapter 6 in this volume.
because such a bias may hinder the development of other instruments, such as civilian components. These arguments fall well within the more general philosophy held *inter alia* by the Nordic countries that the EU’s peace-building capacity must be developed within a broad concept of how to address conflicts and how to prevent them in the first place. Together with the strong emphasis on a clear distinction between external crisis management and collective defence, these ideas have been something of a pervading red thread in most initiatives of the Nordic EU members.

It was, for instance, these convictions (among others) that led the Finnish Government to propose the Northern Dimension initiative in September 1997. Although this initiative did not specifically touch upon the more ‘traditional’ aspects of security, it did aim at contributing to regional security and promoting the further integration of Russia with the West.35 Similarly, during the Finnish EU Presidency, in the second half of 1999, Sweden began working actively to promote ‘conflict prevention’ as a parallel track to the development of civilian and military capabilities for the EU. By the end of the Swedish Presidency a year and a half later, this initiative had developed into the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts.36 Furthermore, as the establishment of new military ESDP bodies started to be discussed early in the ESDP process, Sweden highlighted the fact that the civilian crisis management track also needed new institutional solutions and proposed the creation of the EU Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM).37

More recently, and in order to match the more precise capability objectives that have guided the development of the EU’s military capabilities over the past few years, Denmark, Germany and Sweden initiated the Civilian Headline Goal. Sweden borrowed ideas from the military battle group concept and proposed that the EU should also enhance its civilian capabilities by creating multifunctional and rapidly deployable civilian crisis response teams, a concept which will be further elaborated within the new Civilian Headline Goal process.38 In contrast to many of the EU’s first military objectives, concepts and institutional solutions, which were often copied from previous arrangements


within NATO and the Western European Union, these initiatives are clearly novel and inventive contributions. They are tailor-made for the EU, in just the same way as the military battle group concept and the civil–military planning cell were. Taken together, these new initiatives will increase the Union’s opportunities—although not necessarily its political capacity—to contribute more fine-tuned and complex combinations of instruments for the promotion of peace and security in other parts of the world.

The Nordic input also includes both Danish and Swedish proposals on how to better coordinate the EU’s peace-building activities with, for instance, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN.39 Among the states in the region, Denmark has also been particularly active in influencing EU policy on the Middle East. Another notable initiative was the Swedish proposal for the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.40 This idea was first raised by Lindh in the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 19 March 2003, the day on which the Iraq war broke out.41 The initiative aimed, according to the then Greek EU Presidency, to provide ‘potential alternatives to the pre-emptive use of force against countries that pose a threat to international security’.42

Such Nordic initiatives have, in general, had quite a strong focus on the EU’s use of non-military means for peace-building. As a consequence, many Nordic and non-Nordic practitioners and analysts have a shared perception of Denmark (owing to its opt-out) and of Finland and Sweden (because of their policy of military non-alignment) as countries with an aversion to things military in the EU context. This conclusion is no longer valid, if it ever was in the first place. While it is quite natural that member states with small armed forces have less influence in defence-related issues within the EU, none of the three Nordic members, as argued above, now has any political hesitations about the need for a further enhancement of the EU’s military capability. In practice, however, Denmark has clearly not been an active contributor to the Union’s military operations, while Finland and Sweden have shown a great political readiness to contribute, although with relatively limited opportunities to deliver. Both countries participated in Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and they also participate in the EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, Sweden was the only other state to contribute combat troops to the French-led Operation Artemis in the Demo-

39 On Denmark see Jørgensen (note 33), p. 125; and on Sweden see, e.g., Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministerrådsromemoria 2001-05-09 [Cabinet memo 2001-05-09], Cabinet meeting (General questions), 14–15 May 2001.


cratic Republic of the Congo during the summer of 2003, thereby making Sweden one of the very few EU members to have participated actively in all six civilian and military EU crisis management missions.

Paradoxically, Iceland and Norway have also been more active than Denmark when it comes to contributions to the build-up of the EU’s crisis management capability and to ESDP operations. Norway has, for instance, offered 3500 troops, complemented by air and maritime force elements, for a supplement to the Helsinki Force Catalogue, and Iceland and Norway each participated in four of the first six ESDP operations. The planned Swedish-led battle group, with contributions from Estonia, Finland and Norway, will further highlight Denmark’s marginalization. As the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs has noted, ‘the closer the interaction between the military and civilian capabilities becomes, the greater the chance of us having to stay out of combined operations altogether’. In sum, however, all the Nordic countries have contributed actively to the development of the Union’s peace-building role. The three EU members have not only accepted and adapted to the CFSP and the ESDP but also shown a willingness to influence the process and to strengthen their own voices in international politics through the Union.

In addition, all the Nordic countries have seen active participation in EU military operations as one way in which they can further increase their influence on the Union’s broader agenda for international peace and security. As Urban Ahlin, Chairman of the Swedish Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, has put it, if the EU wants to ‘provide troops, the question is posed to all. The country that does not raise its hand will count as a lightweight—even in other political issues’. Something of a ‘troops for influence’ strategy has been chosen by all the Nordic countries apart from Denmark, whose government nonetheless accepts that the reverse logic is also true: Denmark’s influence is weakened precisely because of the defence opt-out. For Norway, participation in EU military missions cannot improve its influence over EU decision making but may interestingly be thought of as a strategy to avoid losing influence in NATO.

The only Nordic country that also seems to have another explicit, and different, major motivation for its active participation is Finland. In the words of the Finnish Government, active participation in the ESDP also creates the type of ‘practical capability to cooperate, on which a reliable offer of support in the event of a crisis will also rest’. Thus, and in contrast to Sweden, Finland

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43 Møller (note 19).
46 Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (note 10).
48 Finnish Parliament, ‘Statsminister Matti Vanhanen vid remissdebatten om statsrådets säkerhets- och försvarspolitiska redogörelse’ [Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen at the referral debate on the government’s
appears to see a collective defence aspect to the ESDP: indeed, this motivation may be just as important for Finland as the opportunity to actively influence the EU’s policies on distant conflicts and wars.

V. Opportunities for new ‘Nordic’ contributions

The three Nordic EU members have begun to see the new opportunities created by their membership. In terms of active input into the CFSP/ESDP process, they are not doing badly at all. They have demonstrated their willingness, their diplomatic skills and that when they try to influence the process this works well. On several issues they have managed to influence their fellow EU members and have thereby reinforced Nordic voices in the international arena. In fact, they have arguably influenced this policy area to a greater extent than they realize, or at least give themselves credit for. Nordic decision makers seem to underestimate their own opportunities to inspire new European peace-building activities around the world. To the extent that the three Nordic EU members still ‘punch below their weight’ within the CFSP and the ESDP, as one analyst has argued, their governments’ somewhat erroneous judgement of their own influence may well be a part of the explanation.

The actor that most clearly punches below its own weight, however, is the European Union itself. While Iceland and Norway, as long as they remain outside the EU, can hardly be expected to do much more about this, there is ample room for new initiatives from the other three Nordic countries. With many of the previous political sensitivities about the CFSP and the ESDP gone, nothing is preventing Finland and Sweden from further exploring the meanings of ‘activism’ within the EU context. While Denmark may be somewhat paralysed by its defence opt-out, most EU peace-building activities will still have no military component and thus, at least in a formal sense, they offer Denmark the chance to be as full a member as any other state.

There are many EU weaknesses in this policy area, and some may argue that the biggest problem is the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP and the ESDP themselves. The three Nordic members, however, are content with this overarching solution and are not likely to advocate any fundamental transformation of the whole institutional set-up in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, and within the existing system, there are still many issues that cry out for new solutions or at least reinforced efforts from the member states. One such issue is the need to improve the coherence between various external policy areas. While this is one of the most discussed problems of the CFSP, few have so far been able to come up with innovative ideas on how this will work in practice. These questions will be partially addressed—but hard to resolve—if the process of creating a ‘double-hatted’ EU minister for foreign affairs and a single external...
action service resumes in the coming years. This is an area where the Nordic countries, as unusually outspoken proponents of more comprehensive EU peace-building activities, could be expected to contribute new ideas.

Another problem for the EU, and one which is getting bigger as the Union’s ambitions in international security management increase, is the scarce allocation of funding for the CFSP in the EU budget. While the three Nordic EU members are among the net contributors to the EU budget, and are thereby also in general opposed to any budget increases, they seem to be sympathetic to an increase in the CFSP budget line. Why not be more active and collectively outspoken about this need? A related problem is that of financing national contributions to the EU crisis management missions. The Nordic countries, just as many other EU members, may sometimes have problems in quickly despatching personnel and equipment because of shortcomings in their domestic budgetary procedures. Why not provide good examples and seriously address this issue at home, and thereby show that states can adjust their national legislation and show some measure of political will even without supranational pressure?

The EU’s capacity for quick reaction when conflicts erupt also calls for further elaboration. Partly as a result of Nordic initiatives, the EU has become better at detecting conflicts at an early stage, and the EU’s Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) is now constantly monitoring a number of unstable geographical areas. However, detection is not the same thing as action. All member states are in a sense equally responsible for proposing action once an early warning has been issued, but why not make it a Nordic priority to be among the first to propose swift EU action? As the three governments constantly point out, the EU now has a unique array of foreign policy instruments. Why not be the ones who, early on, suggest the use of one or the other instrument?

Finally, why not—at least rhetorically—start pleading for a few causes that may be ‘unwinnable’ in the short term but are desirable in the long term? One such issue could of course be the apparently logical but seemingly impossible change in EU representation on the UN Security Council. Why not argue in favour of an EU seat at the table, if not as a substitute for the French and the British chairs, then at least as a complement? Similar solutions seem to have been worked out in other forums, such as the Group of Eight. In connection with the upcoming reforms of the Security Council itself, there will be plenty of opportunities to at least voice such ideas. If nothing else, this would provide new input to the public debate, both domestically and in the wider EU context. At least in Denmark and Sweden, the level of public understanding of why the governments have embraced the CFSP and the ESDP is still low. A greater and more nuanced public appreciation of these governments’ work and ambitions in this area should prima facie make it easier for the governments to increase their active contributions to the CFSP/ESDP process in the coming years.
‘The higher cause of peace’: what could and should the Nordic countries contribute to the development of conflict mediation in the EU context?

Tarja Väyrynen

I. Introduction

The locus of violence in the international system has shifted from interstate to inter-community relations. Most, if not all, of the wars today are now internal, and this change is of great significance when discussing the European Security and Defence Policy. International violence and warfare have moved away from the Clausewitzean trinity of the state, the army and the people towards violence in less definable contexts and forms. Wars between nations are replaced by intra-state warfare and by the ‘war against terrorism’, where national boundaries are no longer of central importance. Both in inter-community warfare and in high-tech ‘war against terrorism’, territoriality has new meanings. Community boundaries have replaced state boundaries, and technology and its projection have de-territorialized a part of warfare.

Civilian crisis management still remains an obscure and neglected element of the ESDP, although the management of post-Clausewitzean conflicts requires both civil and military means. New dimensions of human insecurity often spring up from assertive nationalism and from ethnic, religious, social, cultural and linguistic strife, and these can seldom be tackled solely by military means. The Nordic countries, particularly Finland and Sweden, have been active in developing a holistic approach to conflict management and have thus insisted on strengthening the civilian side of the EU’s crisis management.

International policy thinking on civilian crisis management is, however, limited: civilian crisis management is seen in terms of the provision of public order, and the priorities for developing civilian capacities are focused on the post-conflict environment rather than forming a set of policies and instruments that can be brought to bear at all stages of conflict. It is argued in this chapter that, in order fully to actualize the interlinkage between conflict prevention and crisis management that is suggested in the European Security Strat-
civilian crisis management should be more broadly defined than it is by the EU’s current priority areas for building civilian rapid reaction capacities. Mediation is one of the tools that can be used to bridge the gap between preventive action and crisis management, because it can be used at different points in the conflict cycle. Mediation is a flexible tool which has a variety of forms, including alternative methods of dispute resolution. This chapter demonstrates that the EU’s mediation capacity is, so far, limited. It is further argued that mediation, and particularly the mixture of small state mediation and unofficial facilitation used for example by Norway, could be practised by Finland and Sweden without a need for them to sacrifice their EU policies.

II. The international system and new wars

Mary Kaldor’s notions of ‘new wars’ and ‘post-Clausewitzean wars’—or post-Westphalian wars as some authors prefer to call them—offer a conceptual distinction which identifies new trends in warfare in the international system. In the new wars the distinction between war and peace does not hold, because new wars tend to be longer, more pervasive and less decisive. Post-Clausewitzean conflicts rarely have decisive endings. Even where the ceasefire has been declared, periods of low-level violence tend to follow; neither war nor peace prevails. In many post-Clausewitzean wars, states have lost their monopoly of violence and non-state actors play an important role. In the cases of ‘collapsed’ or ‘failed’ states, it is often difficult to distinguish between state and non-state actors. New wars have consequences at the level of populations: population displacement, which is associated with large numbers of refugees, and its counterpart, forcible repatriation, are typical results.

In other words, the international system has moved from the era of Clausewitzean war towards disintegrative, decentralized and fragmentative violence. Clausewitzean wars were wars between states for clearly defined political aims where victory or defeat was absolute. They were wars between modern states which were characterized by centralized and secularized power within a given territory, and which were pursued in keeping with absolutist notions of sovereignty. The modern state was organized essentially through violence and its containment. The containment of war in time and space produced a clear-cut distinction between war and peace, between inside and outside, and between military and civil. War was an instrumentally rational activity, not confined by pre-modern prohibitions. Although the Clausewitzean model of war was a very limited one—few conflicts since 1945 have fully corresponded to it and it existed for a brief period mainly in Europe—many of the post-cold war con-

Conflicts have certain shared features that are quite contemporary and post- rather than pre-Clausewitzean. Post-Clausewitzean wars cannot be tackled purely by military means. ‘Collapsed states’, human rights violations and population displacements are phenomena which often follow wars. In these types of situation, the use of traditional forms of military power can even be counterproductive. Classic peacekeeping and classic military interventions are, as the examples of the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate, sometimes ill-equipped for the kind of tasks required to restore public security, to prevent continued human rights violations and to stabilize the political and economic situation in collapsed states. Rather, what is needed is ‘state-building’, ‘nation-building’ or ‘post-conflict reconstruction’.

The international system of ‘new wars’ and the insufficiency of military means to tackle these wars contribute to the complex and interdependent environment where the European Union’s security and defence policy has to function. As Javier Solana has described the situation, the Union’s strategic environment is characterized by crises and international instability both in its neighbourhood—the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East—and in more distant parts of the world like Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Globalization has increased the interdependence of the parts of the international system, and the Europeans of the Union must, therefore—according to Solana—‘accept a growing share of responsibility in stabilizing crises, either on their own as in 2003 in DRC, or with America and other partners when they feel it is necessary’. The Union’s security and defence policy is ‘no longer a choice but a necessity’.

III. Civilian crisis management and the European Security and Defence Policy

In order to deal with the challenges set by state-building, nation-building and post-conflict reconstruction, the EU has institutionalized civilian crisis management as an element of its external policy. The EU’s non-military crisis management activities are not only carried out through the ESDP instruments but also encompass trade, aid, assistance, transport and communication, financial, and political measures. Most of the political measures are pursued under long-term

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programmes and are administered by the European Commission. Although civilian crisis management still remains a neglected element of the ESDP, the ESDP is not meant to militarize the Union.\(^8\) As recognized in the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, adopted by the European Council in June 2004, the development of a European security culture under the ESDP, encompassing both civilian and military dimensions, is a priority.\(^9\) In a similar vein, the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2004 recognized that ‘the demand for civilian instruments in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is increasing’.\(^10\)

The post-Clausewitzean conflict in Kosovo played a major role in prompting the EU to develop the instruments and capabilities of civilian crisis management. In Kosovo the difficulty lay not in the war-fighting but in enforcing and building peace. According to Renata Dwan, the challenges of public order, the inability of the military presence to mitigate civil violence and the international lack of readily available police personnel for deployment were the lessons learned from the Kosovo experience.\(^11\) Earlier, events in Bosnia and Herzegovina had demonstrated the limitations of military personnel in terms of equipment, training, policing and mediation skills in transitional phases of conflict. These experiences contributed to the development of the EU’s ‘civilian rapid reaction force’ which was declared operational in 2002.\(^12\)

In spite of the actual developments in the EU’s non-military crisis management, none of the big states of the EU has so far put any emphasis on civilian crisis management and a lot of the work in this field has been done by smaller countries, particularly the Nordic states. The establishment of the civilian rapid reaction capacity to complement the military force has been a priority for the Nordic EU members and for the Netherlands. These countries have been instrumental in putting civilian capacity on the ESDP agenda and have played a major role in its development.\(^13\)

Finland and Sweden have argued all along that military means cannot be the only means of conflict resolution and, hence, that there is a need for civil–military cooperation. They advocated the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks—humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making\(^14\)—in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and favoured a strengthened independent European ability to act on

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\(^8\) Solana (note 7), p. 6.


\(^11\) Dwan (note 1), p. 2.


\(^14\) The Petersberg Tasks were agreed in 1992 to strengthen the operational role of the Western European Union and were later incorporated in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. See chapter 6 in this volume.
these areas. They saw the EU’s strength as lying in its ability to offer a range of diplomatic means for conflict resolution and peace support. Finland and Sweden have made their mark on European security and defence policy in the shape of the development of civilian crisis management and remain the leaders in this area, while the development of the military rapid reaction force has been the main priority for most of the EU member states and more resources and attention have been devoted to its establishment.15

At the Feira European Council in June 2000, four priority areas were identified for building civilian rapid reaction capacities: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.16 Police operations are the area which has received the most attention and in which capacity development has progressed fastest. Civilian protection, on the other hand, has been the most contested area for development of civilian crisis management capacity. Little real progress has been made in this area, and it is still open to debate whether it is a subdivision of civilian administration or of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, there is little integration across the four priority areas and between the military and civilian reaction forces.17

Although civilian crisis management may remain an under-valued element of the ESDP, it is an area where the EU has made fast operational progress. Three of the EU’s five crisis management operations have been civilian: the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUPOL Proxima operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia. The EU takeover of responsibility from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in December 2004 saw EU civilian and military crisis management capabilities deployed side by side for the first time. On the other hand, all the EU’s civilian operations have been small and their mandates limited, and it is thus too early to evaluate the success of EU civilian crisis management action.18

One critique of the EU’s civilian crisis management emerges from the observation that it lays stress on post-conflict, instead of preventive, engagement. It is noted in the European Security Strategy that conflict prevention is one of the core areas on which the Union’s policy should focus.19 Underlying the recog-

17 Dwan (note 1), pp. 5–6.
18 Dwan (note 1), pp. 1–2; Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities (note 6); and Jakobsen (note 13), pp. 9–10.
nition of the importance of conflict prevention there is an assumption that violence is easier to prevent and resolve at an early phase, when the issues at stake are still specific and, therefore, more amenable to management, and the number of parties to the conflict is limited. In other words, it is easier and more cost-effective to reduce the complexity of the conflict at an early stage. There is also an assumption that the real costs of conflicts are much higher than the obvious material damage and human casualties. According to this view, ‘cost-effective’ conflict prevention is needed in order to avoid also the political costs (the demolition of democratic systems and failure of states), ecological costs (degradation of the environment), social costs (separation of families and communities), psychological costs and spiritual costs of conflict (degradation of value systems).

The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP adopted by the European Council in June 2004 states that ‘Inter-linkages between crisis management and conflict prevention must also be further enhanced’. From the perspective of conflict prevention, civilian crisis management capabilities are well placed to contribute also to sensitive pre-conflict situations. They are not as intrusive as military tools, and can act as carrots for conflict resolution. However, in order to make the most of the interlinkages between crisis management and conflict prevention, civilian crisis management capabilities should be more broadly defined than is suggested by the EU’s four current priority areas of civilian rapid reaction capacities: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.

IV. Mediation: a neglected element of civilian crisis management?

The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP states that ‘the EU should become more ambitious in the goals which it sets for itself in civilian crisis management and more capable of delivering upon them’. It calls for a broadening of the range of expertise upon which the Union can draw for its crisis missions, in order better to reflect the multifaceted tasks that it will face. According to the Action Plan, the EU ‘would in particular benefit from expertise in the field of human rights, political affairs, security sector reform (SSR), mediation, border control, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and media policy’.


21 Council of the European Union (note 9), p. 5.


23 Council of the European Union (note 9), p. 3.
Mediation is one of the tools that can be used to bridge the gap between crisis management and conflict prevention, because it can be used at the different phases of the conflict cycle. The four stages of conflict escalation—discussion, polarization, segregation and destruction—require different means of conflict resolution, but what unites them is the usefulness of mediation.

At the first, pre-conflict, stage the key dimension of concern is the quality of communication between the parties. The parties may believe that mutual satisfaction is possible, but communication difficulties occur. Mediation has proven to be a successful strategy at this stage. At the second stage, on the other hand, the fundamental concern is misperception between the parties and simplified images in the form of negative stereotypes. Research demonstrates that track-two diplomacy—that is, unofficial and non-governmental dialogue—in parallel with traditional mediation can be appropriate ways to deal with this stage. At the third stage of conflict escalation, defensive competition and hostility become main concerns. The conflict is now seen to threaten group identities. In these situations arbitration may be used, involving a legitimate and authoritative third party that provides a binding judgment. Power mediation, in which the third party has the power to influence the parties towards agreement through imposing costs or providing gains, can also produce results at this phase. At the fourth stage, where the parties attempt to destroy each other through the use of violence, a variety of crisis management measures can be complemented with mediation.24

In 2003 the European Commission’s Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit produced a list of civilian instruments for EU crisis management. These instruments include declarations, political dialogue and preventive diplomacy (e.g., mediation, arbitration and confidence building), and humanitarian aid.25 The Council, on the other hand, has developed a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) designed explicitly for urgent interventions in crisis situations. The RRM can be used to start and conduct projects and actions that require speed and flexibility. The RRM can work through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations and experts identified by the Commission, and funds from it can be used, for example, for measures to restore the rule of law; for promoting democracy and human rights; for peace-building and for mediation initiatives; and for the reconstruction of infrastructure. In other words, mediation is a recognized instrument among other crisis management instruments, but it has not been included among the priority areas of civilian crisis management. Although research demonstrates that mediation can be used at different phases of conflict as well as to bridge the gap


between conflict prevention and crisis management, the ESDP does not seem
designed at present to fully utilize its capacity.

Mediation is a malleable instrument that can be used in different situations by
different types of actor. Furthermore, in addition to traditional mediation, track-
two diplomacy can be employed in situations where there is a need for an
informal and secret communication channel between the parties.

V. Mediation and track-two diplomacy

Negotiations which engage parties in face-to-face bargaining over a negotiating
table are often difficult to arrange in conflict situations, and mediation can be
employed to meet this difficulty. In mediation, one or more outsiders (third
parties) assist the parties in their discussion. In other words, mediation is a
‘process by which the participants, together or with the assistance of a neutral
person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop
options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will
accommodate their needs’.26 The practice of settling disputes through inter-
mediaries is not a new one: different cultures at different times have used inter-
mediaries, and there is a great heterogeneity in mediation activities.

The third party can utilize different roles, functions, qualities and resources.
Seen from a wide perspective, there are five possible intermediary roles for the
third party: as an activist, an advocate, a mediator, a researcher or an enforcer.
These roles are grounded predominantly in the background and credibility of
the intervener. Thus, such questions as for whom does the intervener work, who
pays him or her, and consequently what are the structured expectations for
behaviour of the intervener in that role have different answers in these different
types of mediation. The role of an activist is characterized by an organizational
base and a relationship with at least one of the parties. The activist works
extremely closely with the parties and almost becomes one of them. The role of
an advocate, on the other hand, is based on the advocacy of certain values and
parties within the organization. The role of a mediator derives from the advo-
cacy of processes and interactions, rather than any of the parties per se, or of
any particular outcomes. The category of researcher includes such professionals
as journalists and social science researchers, whereas the enforcer has formal
power to sanction one or all of the parties.27

The functions of mediators are closely related to the role that is adopted. The
mediator’s functions include the facilitation of communication between the
parties and influencing parties towards changing their positions in order to
make agreement possible. By clarifying the issues in conflict, by helping the
parties to withdraw from their fixed positions, by reducing the cost of con-

26 Bercovitch, J. and Houston, A., ‘The study of international mediation: theoretical issues and empir-

27 Laue, J., ‘The energence and institutionalisation of third party roles in conflict’, eds D. Sandole and
I. Sandole-Staroste, Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Ap-
cessions and by offering compromising formulae and substantive proposals, the intermediary provides a framework within which concessions become possible. The good mediator has two basic qualities: impartiality and independence. A mediator is independent when he or she is perceived to be free from attachment to or dependence on a political entity that has a stake in the outcome of the crisis at hand.

The mediator’s attributes and characteristics include such features as patience; sincerity; friendliness; sensitivity; capability to accept others, to be non-judgmental and to control oneself; compassion; and tactfulness. In a similar vein, salient third party qualities include a high degree of professionalism and personal expertise, a high level of independence from the case of conflict being considered, and a lack of any formal and recognized political position.

The use of resources, on the other hand, affects mediation strategy and behaviour as well as the course and likely outcomes of mediation. Resources may include money, status, expertise and prestige.

Negotiation processes and outcomes often reflect the relative power of the parties and in such cases, while a settlement may be reached, it is likely to be short-lived as it rests on power relationships which remain static. Since post-Clausewitzian conflicts often consist of such fundamental issues as the identity of the parties and the survival of these identities, alternative means for resolution which can also tackle ‘existential’ and values-based concerns have been developed. It is argued that processes parallel to official diplomacy are needed and can support official diplomacy by offering a framework for the innovative search for solutions.

Track-two diplomacy—or consultation, alternative dispute resolution or problem-solving conflict resolution, as it is also called—encourages the parties in conflict to examine a wide range of issues including needs, values and identities. Even historical animosities and enemy and threat perceptions can be brought into the conflict resolution agenda if the parties themselves wish it. Although track-two diplomacy recognizes the psychological elements included in conflicts, it does not assume that conflicts are simply products of misunderstanding and misperceptions. Rather, the latter are seen to characterize conflicts and to form substantial barriers to their resolution. Unlike traditional

32 On track-two diplomacy see Bendahmane, D. and McDonald, Jr, J. (eds), *Perspectives on Negotiations: Four Case Studies and Interpretations* (US Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs: Washington, DC, 1986); and McDonald, Jr, J. and Bendahmane, D. (eds), *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy* (US Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs: Washington, DC, 1987).
formal negotiations and mediation, track-two diplomacy also allows the full range of parties to participate in conflict resolution. It does not aim at dealing solely with state actors, as conventional negotiations and mediation often do.

The third party in the resolution process is not an interested activist, advocate mediator or enforcer who imports his or her own views into the resolution process: the facilitator remains outside of power-political considerations. The role of the third party in track-two diplomacy differs from that of the traditional mediator. Unlike many mediators, facilitators do not propose or impose solutions. Rather, the function of the third party is to create an atmosphere where innovative solutions can emerge out of the interaction between the parties themselves. The impartial, neutral, facilitative, non-judgmental and diagnostic third party creates an atmosphere where the discussion can be raised to a higher system level, from which it can flow back into channels that are constructive for the dispute in question. The objective of this type of conflict resolution is both to create analytical communication and to generate inputs into political processes.33

VI. The EU as a mediator

The decision to establish the ESDP rapid-reaction forces led to the creation of a number of new institutions within the European Council. The most visible innovation was the post of High Representative for the CFSP, who is also the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers (HR/SG). He or she is responsible for formulating, preparing and implementing policy decisions and for engaging in political dialogue with third countries on behalf of the Council. The HR/SG is de facto crisis manager of the EU. In addition to the role of the HR/SG in crisis management and in mediation activities, he or she can appoint special representatives to assist in this work.34 Examples of recent mediation activities include the attempt of the current HR/SG, Javier Solana, to mediate in Ukraine’s political crisis in late 2004. He and other foreign envoys met outgoing President Leonid Kuchma in an attempt to smooth the way for a re-run of disputed elections. Similarly, Solana tried to resolve a row over Israel’s controversial barrier in the West Bank in July 2004.

The EU currently has seven special representatives in different locations. For example, Michael Sahlin was appointed EU Special Representative in the FYROM on 12 July 2004. His mandate is to establish and maintain close contact with the government of the FYROM and with the parties involved in the political process, and to offer the EU’s advice and facilitation in that process. Marc Otte was appointed EU Special Representative for the Middle East peace process on 14 July 2003. His mandate is based on the EU’s policy objectives regarding the Middle East peace process, which include a two-state solution

33 On facilitation see Väyrynen, T., Culture and International Conflict Resolution (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2001), pp. 15–27.
34 Jakobsen (note 13), pp. 5–6.
with Israel and a sovereign Palestinian state. Heikki Talvitie was appointed EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus on 7 July 2003. He contributes to the implementation of the EU’s policy objectives in the region, which include assisting countries in carrying out political and economic reforms, preventing and assisting in the resolution of conflicts, promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, engaging constructively with key national actors neighbouring the region, supporting intra-regional cooperation, and ensuring coordination, consistency and effectiveness of the EU’s action in the South Caucasus.

The EU is a typical regional organization mediator whose resource base includes money, status, expertise and prestige. Its qualities as mediator include a high degree of professionalism and personal expertise in the form of the HR/SG and the EU special representatives. However, it is more difficult to argue that it has a high level of independence from the conflicts considered. It often has a formal and recognized political position on the conflict in question, and by this token does not fulfil all the criteria of an ‘ideal mediator’ suggested in the mediation literature.

Research demonstrates that one of the most effective resources that any international mediator can possess is legitimacy and that mediators with the best success rate are the leaders and representatives of regional organizations. The second-best success rate can be found in mediation efforts where the mediator is a leader or representative of a small country’s government. Representatives of international organizations do not do well in this comparison. In short, regional organizations with common ideals, perspectives and interests appear to offer the best chances of successful outcomes in international mediation, whereas international organizations such as the United Nations have a poor record in this field.35

The EU’s mediation activities can be categorized under three ideal types or models, based on how the EU uses its doctrine, incentives and conditionality. These three models are characterized by the EU’s stance towards the parties in conflict and the desired outcome of the mediation process, depending on whether the EU favours: (a) a common state solution; (b) a sequential route to a common state; or (c) a two-state solution. In the first model, the EU mediates in favour of a one-state solution despite the danger of creating a dysfunctional state. The EU can also favour one of the conflicting parties and isolate the other in order to force it to return to the negotiation table. In this model, a sequential route to the common state is pursued. In the third model, the EU reluctantly concludes that it must recognize secession and aims to put pressure on both parties equally.36

The examples of the EU’s mediation activities between the communities in Cyprus, between Serbia and Montenegro, and between the authorities of

35 Bercovitch and Houston (note 26), pp. 26–28.
Moldova and Trans-Dniester demonstrate how the EU has had to switch between the three models. In other words, in these cases it has not been successful in creating the original outcome for which it aimed. When Cyprus applied for membership of the EU, the Union’s mediation behaviour followed the track of the first model: conflict settlement and reunification were required before accession. At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the EU switched from the first model to the second. The outcome of the process, however, suggests that the EU came close to the third model with Turkish Cyprus, creating a sub-state entity that is virtually EU territory. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the EU again strongly advocated the single, common state solution; Solana used forceful mediation tactics, and a settlement was achieved. However, a real transformation of the conflict has not taken place and the state is dysfunctional in many areas. In Trans-Dniester the EU geared the discussions towards a one-state solution. It offered very few incentives for the parties, however, until 2003 when Moldova was included as a first candidate for the new European Neighbourhood Policy. The Trans-Dniester authorities, on the other hand, have been isolated from these discussions. The EU has thus switched its policy to the second model.37

The case of the Middle East and of the EU’s first special representative there is particularly interesting, because it shows clearly some of the difficulties that the EU’s mediation attempts have faced. Miguel Ángel Moratinos was appointed the EU’s Special Envoy (as the EU special representative was then called) for the Middle East peace process on 25 November 1996. His mandate was to establish close contact with all the parties concerned, first and foremost with the Israelis and Palestinians but also with others in the region, and to contribute towards peace. Moratinos’s appointment was thought to add a political dimension to the Union’s economic weight in the Middle East.

Although the formulation of Moratinos’s mandate did not mention the EU’s quest for a role as a mediator in the bilateral negotiations, that option was not ruled out. Despite the intention of the EU special representative system to provide joint representation and a means of action for the EU in different regions, the EU as a foreign policy actor is composed of member states that have different interests and, to a certain extent, different values. In handling serious political crises, especially those involving armed conflict, the Union has faced difficulties in acting as one. The EU and its member states have had different views on the Middle East conflict and it has been difficult to harmonize the member states’ stances. Moratinos’s mandate was a compromise between the French ambition to offer an alternative to US mediation and the German position that the USA is the leading third party with whom the EU should work in close collaboration. There was also strong criticism aimed at Moratinos’s way of working: some of the member countries saw him as a headstrong and forceful actor who did not supply all member states with the required information concerning the Middle East conflict. There were also tensions in relations

37 Emerson (note 36), pp. 85–90.
between Moratinos’s team and Solana’s bureau, particularly when it came to sharing information. The lack of coherence persisted, and as a result people in the Middle East, especially in Israel, became more sceptical about what the EU could achieve outside its economic functions.\(^{38}\) Furthermore, the EU has not been an impartial mediator. EU declarations concerning the Middle East conflict have reflected the general European attitude that the Palestinians are the underdog, if not completely innocent. In this view, the Palestinians have been relatively powerless in the face of prolonged occupation, economic deprivation and Israel’s excessive use of force. Furthermore, the EU has emphasized the importance of good relations with the Arab world. Israel has repeatedly expressed its doubts about Europeans’ impartiality, especially in the context of French interventions. It has argued that the EU is biased and therefore not an acceptable partner for political dialogue.\(^{39}\) Theoretical views on the importance of impartiality for mediation success are divided. According to some scholars, mediator impartiality is necessary for disputants to have confidence in the mediator, and hence for his or her acceptability, which in turn is essential for success in mediation.\(^{40}\) For others, partial mediators can succeed regardless of their bias. They can persuade protagonists by using carrots and sticks to achieve a settlement.\(^{41}\) The EU has not had many carrots and sticks to offer and use in the Middle East: this lack of means has perhaps been the major obstacle to its credibility, and possibly also its efficiency.\(^{42}\)

The experience of scholars and practitioners working with alternative dispute resolution suggests that official third-party mediation is seldom successful in the context of post-Clausewitzian conflicts. The number of actors, including a variety of non-state actors, and the complex nature of issues involved make it difficult for traditional state- or organization-based mediators to be successful in resolving these conflicts. Furthermore, this type of mediator is confined by the agendas of official diplomacy, which do not include such issues as values and identities. As argued above, mediation outcomes often reflect the relative power of the parties and this is likely to make any settlement short-lived. Therefore, in this view, track-two diplomacy and a facilitator outside the power-political arena are needed for conflict mediation to be successful. Clearly, the EU in its official mediation efforts does not provide this type of alternative conflict resolution.


\(^{39}\) Kurikkala (note 38), pp. 105–14.


\(^{42}\) Kurikkala (note 38), pp. 214–19.
VII. Nordic conflict mediation: Finland, Norway and Sweden

A good success rate can be found in mediation efforts where the mediator is a leader or representative of a small government. The cases of Finland, Norway and Sweden demonstrate the characteristics and types of small state mediation. In order to examine the role of these countries in international conflict mediation, an overview of their foreign policy traditions is needed. What unites these three Nordic countries is their remote geographical position, which has historically permitted them to remain aloof from international engagement. The decision to enter military alliances was taken only after World War II, when Norway joined NATO in 1949. Similarly, Finland and Sweden were latecomers in joining the EU and Norway is not a member. Neutrality and non-alignment have remained popular foreign policy doctrines in Finland and Sweden. The prominence of social democratic institutions and consensus in policy making are also shared features among the Nordic countries. In other words, ideologically the Nordic identity has not been of the East or West, but has represented a third way based on humanitarian principles, peace, cooperation and disarmament, and on a distinctive model of the welfare state. Solidarity, internationalism and multilateralism have been strong ideological forces guiding the Nordic foreign policies. The Nordic countries have a long-standing tradition of participation in UN-led peacekeeping activities, conflict prevention through political dialogue, mediation and high levels of overseas development assistance.43

Swedish mediation

The basic principles of Swedish neutrality were established in the early 19th century during the reign of King Karl XIV Johan (1818–44; regent 1810–18). As a result of its neutrality policy Sweden managed to stay out of world wars I and II and was not forced to take sides with either of the superpowers during the cold war. The Swedish policy of neutrality did not prevent the country from pursuing international activism during the cold war period. During this time, Sweden was particularly active as a mediator, with Olof Palme, Prime Minister 1969–76 and 1982–86, openly criticizing repressive regimes. Sweden as a small neutral state acted as a critic, a mediator between the blocs and a peacekeeper.44

Swedish non-alignment was seen as a precondition for active involvement in international affairs and pursuit of international solidarity. However, with the end of the cold war, Sweden gradually began to reconstruct its foreign policy identity. The old identity—as a neutral state, minor mediator and critic in a

44 Bergman (note 15), pp. 1–14.
bipolar world—was perceived to be obsolete. Swedish security doctrine was moved away from a strict formula of neutrality, and the current formulation states rather that ‘Sweden is militarily non-aligned’. Yet the involvement of NGOs and individuals in conflict resolution, conflict prevention, democratic governance, respect for human rights, gender equality and protection for the rights of individuals still form the very core of Swedish security policy. They form the central norms that Sweden actively promotes, to such an extent that it has been called an ‘international norm entrepreneur’.

Swedish citizens have played a major role in conflict mediation: for example, Folke Bernadotte pioneered UN mediation during the Palestine conflict; Dag Hammarskjöld was UN Secretary-General from 1953 to 1961; Alva Myrdal worked as a Swedish ambassador to the Geneva disarmament negotiations; and Gunnar Jarring mediated in the Middle East and Jammu and Kashmir as a Swedish diplomat to the UN in 1956–58. In November 1980 Olof Palme was appointed as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Iran and Iraq. He made progress over the freeing of merchant shipping caught by the hostilities in the Shatt al-Arab waterway and, in 1981 and 1982, over the exchange of limited numbers of prisoners of war. Carl Bildt held, among other high positions, the post of Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General to the Balkans in 1999–2001. He served as European Co-Chair of the 1995 Dayton peace conference and as the international community’s first High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995–97. Jan Eliasson was Sweden’s ambassador to the UN in New York in 1988–92. From 1980 to 1986 he was part of the UN mission, headed by Olof Palme, mediating in the Iraq–Iran War. He served as the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Representative to Iran and Iraq in 1988–92. He was also a mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Recently, a number of Swedes have been involved in the peace process in the DRC. Ambassador Lena Sundh was the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2002–2004, and Ambassador Bo Heinebäck has made contributions as a mediator between the parties to the national political dialogue.

These mediation cases illustrate the type and characteristics of small state mediation. The individuals typically work as representatives of regional or international organizations, but bring with them also their identities as citizens of a small and non-aligned country. Their attributes include sensitivity, ability to accept others, to be non-judgmental and self-controlled, and tactfulness. There is also a high degree of professionalism and personal expertise involved. Furthermore, a high level of independence from the conflict being considered and a lack of any formal and recognized political position have been common features in these cases.

45 Bergman (note 15), pp. 1–14; and Björkdahl (note 15), pp. 75–76.
Finnish mediation

Finnish mediation follows a pattern similar to Swedish mediation, although the foreign policy traditions of these countries differ. Unlike Sweden, Finland did not engage in criticism of, for example, oppressive regimes during the cold war. Urho Kekkonen, president 1956–81, characterized Finns as ‘physicians rather than judges’, whose task was not to pass judgment but to diagnose and cure. Finnish neutrality was justified by arguing that it offered a way to stay out of the conflicts between the great powers. Finland was seen to be somewhere between East and West and therefore was assumed to have a capacity for bridge building to ease international tensions. In the Finnish foreign policy narrative, Finland’s cautious policy towards the Soviet Union was rationalized by arguing that it was an expression of sheer pragmatism given Finland’s geopolitical position.46

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland has emphasized that it belongs to the ‘West European family’. This has allowed Finland to depict itself as a moral actor in world politics. The Finnish Government’s most recent security and defence policy report to the parliament states that: ‘Finland’s line of action is based on credible national defence, the functioning of society and a consistent foreign policy as well as a strong international position and an active participation as a member of European Union.’47 Finland is described as ‘a militarily non-allied country’ that engages in crisis management outside military alliances. A strong focus in the report is on conflict prevention, and the use of both civilian and military action in crisis management is recommended.

Several Finns have been used by international organizations to monitor, mediate and report on international crises and post-conflict transition periods. Martti Ahtisaari, president in 1994–2000, headed the UN’s monitoring of Namibia’s transition to independence in 1989–90. Ahtisaari was a chief architect of the Kosovo peace plan in June 1999. He undertook this mission at the request of the US and Russian governments, which had come to the conclusion that only a third party not hitherto involved in the conflict could get Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to surrender to the will of the international community. In May 2000 Ahtisaari was appointed along with Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa to head the inspections of the arms dumps of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. Ahtisaari is currently a head of the Crisis Management Initiative, an organization which offers, *inter alia*, mediation services internationally, and in early 2005 he presided over peace talks in Helsinki between the Indonesian Government and rebels from the province of Aceh. From 1995 to 1998 Finland’s former Prime Minister Harri Holkeri was a member of the International Body, set up by the governments of

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the United Kingdom and Ireland to provide an independent assessment of the issue of decommissioning illegal weapons in Northern Ireland. He was also one of three independent chairmen of the multiparty peace negotiations in Northern Ireland. In June 2004 the UN Secretary-General appointed Holkeri as his Special Representative for Kosovo. Former Finnish Defence Minister Elisabeth Rehn was UN Special Rapporteur for the Situation of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1995–98 and UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998–99. She was a chairperson of the Democracy and Human Rights Table of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 2003.

**Norwegian mediation**

If Finland’s and Sweden’s mediation profiles are rather similar to each other—experienced diplomats working for international organizations—the case of Norway is different. In Norway’s foreign policy tradition there has been a long coexistence of two different orientations: a view that emphasizes Norway’s geopolitical position and a view that lays stress on Norway’s global responsibility in matters concerning conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict restructuring. According to Olav Riste, there were three formative periods in the evolution of Norwegian foreign policy: ‘1905–1910, when the “classic” Norwegian neutralism took shape; the inter-war period, when Norway wrapped herself in the mantle of a missionary for international law and disarmament; and the 1940s during which the country allied itself with great powers and became an active participant in international power politics’.48 Norway’s NATO membership shaped the discourse on security and defence issues, and ‘Atlanticism’ was widely accepted as the main way of framing Norway’s position.49

The Norwegian foreign policy narrative was re-shaped after the breakdown of the cold war international system. Norway now wanted to also anchor its security policy to the European security arrangements. The tendency to emphasize Norway’s ‘ethical foreign policy’ strengthened. Norway perceives itself today as a ‘humanitarian great power’ and a ‘player in international efforts for peace and security’. Norway’s Foreign Minister, Knut Vollebæk, stated in 1998 that Norway’s participation in peacekeeping operations and international crisis management is an integral part of the country’s foreign and security policy. In

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security policy terms, Norway wants to contribute to peace and stability in the world and sees itself as having a fundamental moral obligation to promote human rights and peace globally. Thus, humanitarian considerations also guide the country’s foreign policy. Mediation, support for peace processes and the focused use of development assistance are also tools for international crisis management in Norway’s foreign policy discourse.\(^{50}\)

In addition to Norwegian diplomats working as mediators in regional and international organizations, the cases of the Middle East and Sri Lanka demonstrate another—alternative—type of small state mediation. In the ‘Oslo Back Channel’, Norwegian researcher Terje Rød-Larsen was able to get the Israelis and Palestinians involved in a Norwegian-mediated peace process in the early 1990s. A set of secret meetings took place in Norway, partly outside the official diplomatic structures. Rød-Larsen’s methods—and those of his team including Mona Juul, Jan Egeland and Johan Jørgen Holst—for facilitating dialogue were based on small group psychology: he believed that a sociological approach to conflict resolution—where the parties could discuss openly and share their feelings and emotions—would allow trust to be built at a personal level. Another important role played by the Norwegians was the role of messenger, delivering information and bringing reassurance during uncertain phases of mediation. Although the Norwegians wanted to emphasize their facilitative role, the role changed into more active mediation during the process. As mediators, they suggested compromise formulae and mediated between diverging positions.\(^{51}\)

In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, Erik Solheim, the special envoy of the Norwegian Government, engaged in exploratory visits comparable to pre-negotiations. In December 2001 the new Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe, wrote to the Norwegian Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, asking Norway to continue its facilitation of the peace process. That was followed by a similar request from the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Vidar Helgesen, Norway’s Deputy Foreign Minister, chaired six rounds of talks between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE. The two sides signed a ceasefire agreement in February 2002, and the Norwegian Government is currently working in Sri Lanka to maintain the contact between the parties. The role of the Norwegian third party in Sri Lanka is closer to that of facilitator than mediator. A significant part of Norway’s efforts are focused on facilitating understanding and communication between the parties in order to minimize misunderstandings. Norway’s intervention in Sri Lanka is based on its long-term involvement in the region, the provision of facilitation without


being a party to negotiations, humanitarian assistance for confidence building and reconciliation, and secrecy and discretion.52

What makes Norwegian facilitation/mediation interesting is that it consists of elements from both official mediation and track-two diplomacy. Furthermore, Norway has made this role something of a trademark in its foreign policy. In Norway, academics, NGOs and the foreign policy establishment have found ways to work together in conflict mediation. This seems to be happening less in Finland and Sweden.

VIII. Conclusions

It is argued in this chapter that adding mediation to the ESDP and adding it to the European Union’s four priority areas of civilian crisis management—police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection—would help to bridge the gap between conflict prevention and crisis management that is one of the core features of the European Security Strategy. Mediation is a tool that can be used to bridge the gap because it can be employed at different phases of the conflict cycle. It is a flexible instrument for conflict resolution and can be used by a variety of actors.

The EU is often perceived to be a biased mediator and, therefore, is not always accepted as a partner for political dialogue. It is internally divided and has had difficulties in formulating shared positions on actual violent conflicts. Nor has it always had carrots to offer and sticks to use, as in cases where it mediates with a specific outcome in view. The lack of means leads easily to a deficit in its credibility, and possibly in its efficiency too. Therefore, alternative and complementary mediation frameworks are needed to add a new element to the ESDP.

Post-Clausewitzean conflicts are often driven by such fundamental issues as the identity of the parties and the survival of those identities, and alternative means for conflict resolution which are capable of tackling these ‘existential’ concerns are needed. In other words, processes parallel to official diplomacy are needed because they can support official diplomacy by offering a framework for the search for innovative solutions. Norway has managed to combine the methods of alternative dispute resolution with its official diplomacy, and has thereby brought a new and special element into small state mediation. It has maintained its standing as an impartial, neutral, facilitative, non-judgmental and diagnostic third party, and its facilitation services are in demand in many different parts of the world. It could, therefore, provide a model for Swedish and Finnish mediation within the EU context too. That would mean, however, that these countries should insist on adding mediation to the Union’s four priority areas of civilian crisis management, and should be ready to work more closely with the relevant academics and NGOs.

13. The Nordic countries and conventional arms control: the case of small arms and light weapons

Nicholas Marsh*

I. Introduction and historical background

During the cold war, Northern Europe was the scene of one of the continent’s largest and most asymmetric build-ups of conventional weaponry. The Soviet Union concentrated a significant part of its conventional strength—ground, air and naval forces—and also of its strategic nuclear capacity on the Kola Peninsula and in the Leningrad Military District. Through its Warsaw Pact partners the Soviet Union controlled the southern shore of the Baltic Sea as well as the intra-German border. On the Western side, there was no direct match for this localized massing of power. If strategic balance was maintained, it was essentially by means of the overall capacity (especially nuclear and naval) of the USA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization rather than by any credible counterweight in the Nordic region. As a result of special arrangements with NATO, the allied nations Denmark and Norway did not even have foreign forces or nuclear equipment stationed on their territory in peacetime. Finland and Sweden were neutral (or ‘non-aligned’) states with forces proportionate only to their own territorial needs. Moreover, of these four nations, only Sweden had a defence industry on an internationally competitive scale.¹

Paradoxes of Nordic arms control and disarmament policy

This was a situation in which the region’s responsible or vulnerable states might be expected to have had a keen interest in arms control and disarmament. Indeed, the Nordic states—and to a certain extent Poland—consistently supported the cause of nuclear disarmament.² They were among the foremost in encouraging steps and hosting events, such as the 1972–75 Helsinki negotiations on a conference on security and cooperation in Europe, designed to promote inter-bloc cooperation and the lowering of military tensions in general. The same logic did not, however, apply to the adoption of concrete arms control

¹ See chapters 9 and 10 in this volume.
² See chapter 14 in this volume.

* Section I of this chapter was co-authored with Zdzislaw Lachowski, SIPRI. Research assistance was provided by Joop de Haan, SIPRI.
measures in the Nordic region. NATO disapproved of all proposals for a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone, however much some Nordic countries advocated them, as threatening to create a breach in the West’s strategic unity and the structure of deterrence. Localized conventional force cuts were not pursued for rather different reasons. Symmetrical force reductions or constraints would merely have deepened the Nordic countries’ own comparative disadvantage. The massive degree of asymmetry in the reductions needed to cut back the Soviet threat to any worthwhile extent would, meanwhile, never have been acceptable to Moscow, while the diversity of security statuses on the Western side posed obvious structural challenges for designing any formal negotiation process.

Against this background, the Nordic states developed their defence and arms control philosophies on tenets that both varied among themselves and diverged from those of most other European partners. Norway and Denmark, as NATO members, became parties to the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the former with the status of a ‘flank’ country and the latter as part of the less rigid regime of the ‘expanded central’ zone. Norway’s flank status implied severe curbs on transfers of armaments and equipment onto its territory, mirroring similar restraints imposed on neighbouring parts of Russia. In the second echelon of Western defence, Denmark was less constrained than Norway, but the ‘hard’ arms control regime brought both countries’ defence establishments into the general CFE reduction, inspection and monitoring arrangements.

Finland and Sweden, as cold war neutral states, grounded their national defence policies on territorial defence. In turn, this territorial defence relied on large-scale mobilization and (internal) deployment plans based on secrecy and a system of dispersed small weapon storage sites. Although in principle these preparations were directed equally against all comers, in practice Swedish and, in particular, Finnish perceptions of risk were dominated by the tensions between the Soviet Union (and, later, Russia) and the West and also by developments in the Soviet Union and then the post-Soviet space. Joining an intrusive transparency regime such as the CFE Treaty, which would have exposed domestic troop and equipment dispositions to Soviet/Russian inspection, was perceived as creating much greater risks and costs for these states’ national defence than any benefits it might have brought. Thus, in the early 1990s, when the idea was mooted of ‘harmonizing’ all Euro-Atlantic arms control obligations and commitments to cover both NATO members and non-members—specifically, through a merger of the CFE Treaty and the 1992

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3 The text of the CFE Treaty is available at URL <http://www.osce.org/about/13517.html>.

4 The flank zone was intended to prevent a build-up of armed forces on Europe’s periphery, which might result from the relocation of Soviet personnel withdrawn from Central Europe. In addition, at Norway’s insistence, the CFE Treaty placed stiff limits on the extent to which heavy ground equipment could be transferred into the flank zone. On the CFE Treaty see Lachowski, Z., Confidence-and Security-Building Measures in the New Europe, SIPRI Research Report no. 18 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004).
CFE-1A Agreement systems and the regime of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) applying to a larger range of states under the Vienna Documents—Finland and Sweden did not join in the process. They preferred instead a further cautious elaboration of CSBM, both for universal application under the Vienna Documents and in suitable regional formats. Overall, it might be said that the neutral countries enjoyed the benefit of the existence of the CFE Treaty (especially its ceilings on Russia) as ‘hard security recipients’, while remaining hesitant to make a significant contribution (in this instance, in the shape of constraints on themselves) as ‘hard security providers’.

Since the mid-1990s, major changes in the political climate—notably in NATO–Russia relations, new military challenges and the responses to them in both NATO and the European Union, as well as the accession of the Baltic states to NATO—have stimulated an ongoing review of Nordic security and defence policies and broken down at least some barriers between the latter and the European ‘mainstream’. Finland and Sweden have acceded to the 1992 Open Skies Treaty, which provides for mutual aerial inspections inter alia with Russia. All the Nordic states have come round to welcoming, and materially supporting, the accession of the Baltic states to NATO, and in this context they have seen the logic of these states joining an expanded CFE regime (now in the form of the 1999 adapted CFE Treaty). Extending that regime beyond the former bloc-to-bloc structure has helped open the way to new thinking among political and military elites in Finland and Sweden. Both countries have long stressed the value of conventional arms control for limiting military capabilities and the development of transparency and stability building in Europe, including their own neighbourhood. As they witness the Baltic states’ accession being held up by the general delay in the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty, still deadlocked by disputes between Russia and the West that are not directly material to Nordic security, Finland and Sweden are demonstrating an increasing interest in helping to find ways of keeping conventional constraints

5 The politically binding 1992 Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (known as the CFE-1A Agreement) contains various provisions of a confidence-building and -stabilizing nature. The CFE-1A Agreement is available on the OSCE Internet site (note 3).


8 The Treaty on Open Skies was signed on 24 Mar. 1992 and entered into force on 1 Jan. 2002. The text of the treaty is available at URL <http://www.osce.org/about/13516.html>.


\textbf{Why small arms and light weapons?}

For all this, however, there is at present no hard arms control regime for major conventional items that applies throughout the Nordic area, and no specific proposals for moving towards one—whether inside or outside the CFE framework—are on the table. Moreover, such questions have been regarded, despite the demise of the formal bloc-to-bloc approach, as belonging to NATO’s competence and that of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) rather than to the European Union. The documents of the European Security and Defence Policy and the European Security Strategy\footnote{12}{Council of the European Union, \textit{A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy’}, Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003, URL <http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266>;} make no mention of conventional arms control as a factor in or a goal for the EU’s vision of Europe’s own security evolution, although the EU Constitutional Treaty does create an option for ESDP missions to support disarmament processes elsewhere.\footnote{13}{The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 19 Oct. 2004 but has not been ratified. The text of the treaty is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm> and selected articles are reproduced in the appendix in this volume. Article III-309, which reformulates the Petersberg Tasks, states that: ‘The tasks . . . of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.’}

If the interaction between the policy goals of the Nordic governments and the evolution of the ESDP and other EU security policies is to be examined, therefore, the only field of arms control where there is a real and strong foundation for doing so is that of the international drive to control the proliferation and diffusion of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and to reduce or prevent ‘gun violence’. The EU, under the auspices of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, has played a key role in international attempts to control the trade in and use of SALW. The Nordic governments all give high salience to this topic in their own policies, and their national approaches have many similarities to that of the EU. They have all stated that they are in favour of broadly similar policy objectives: control over the black market, responsible export policies, and the collection and destruction of surplus SALW. Furthermore, they all support other regional and multilateral initiatives, such as the 2001 United Nations Pro-
However, when the pattern of recent Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish activities in this field is examined, it is difficult to discern a ‘Nordic’ approach. There is no evidence of regional cooperation, or even of the formulation of a regional common position. Furthermore, the three Nordic governments that are EU members have placed much more emphasis on international activities (including campaigning) than on the development of EU policy as such. The remainder of this chapter explores these connections and contradictions in more detail, in an endeavour to show that the Nordic–EU policy interface is just as complicated and problematic in a field related to curbing the excesses of military activity as it is in relation to more positive defence objectives.

Section II defines small arms and light weapons and the characteristics of the challenge they pose for international society. Section III then traces the record of the European Union as an actor in this field and in related but broader dimensions of the armaments trade. The performance—or lack of performance—by Nordic member states in influencing the handling and development of this policy area in the EU is analysed in section IV, followed in section V by consideration of other forums and other patterns of cooperation that have also, or preferentially, been used by the Nordic countries. The concluding section raises some questions for further research.

II. The small arms and light weapons issue

Definitions and features

*Small arms* are broadly defined as weapons designed for personal use and capable of being carried by an individual (e.g., pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns). *Light weapons* are also easily portable and sometimes require a team to operate them. They include heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-aircraft guns, mortars, recoilless rifles and light anti-aircraft missile systems. In addition, the terms small arms and light weapons include their ammunition and components. Alternative definitions exist and are important in the context of negotiating precise restrictions, but for the purposes of this chapter—and except where explicitly stated—the term SALW will be used to refer to small arms and light weapons respectively and collectively.

Four facets of SALW distinguish them from major conventional weapons. First is their low cost: second-hand weapons (such as the ubiquitous Russian Kalashnikov rifle) can be purchased for as little as a few US dollars in some

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markets.\textsuperscript{15} Second is their ease of use; their use requires relatively little training, and large quantities of SALW are in fact in the possession (legally or illegally) of private, non-trained individuals in most states of the world. Third is their easy maintenance; and fourth is their durability—if properly maintained, firearms can remain effective weapons for decades.

These facets contribute to two further factors concerning the employment of SALW that differentiate them from major conventional weapons. First, ownership of SALW by civilians and non-state actors is widespread. For example, the Small Arms Survey estimated that a narrow minority (some 45 per cent) of global firearms stockpiles are owned by state forces.\textsuperscript{16} Second, a large black market exists: the small size and low cost of SALW make them particularly amenable to trafficking, and traffickers have an interest in obtaining them from irregular sources.\textsuperscript{17}

All these features, combined with a concern for the consequences of their use, have led to somewhat different focuses in the research on SALW compared with the trade in major conventional weapons. Work on the former has tended to emphasize, on the one hand, their impact in areas suffering high levels of criminal violence—which may exist even in ‘advanced’ countries; and, on the other hand, their role in the intra-state or trans-state conflicts that especially plague ‘weak’ or developing states. Research and campaigning activities have also had a strong humanitarian colouring. As one consequence, while there is a large body of literature on the international trade in major conventional weapons, the trade in SALW—as a distinct category—has received less academic attention and poses many different methodological problems.\textsuperscript{18}

\section*{The international context}

Governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations have, since the mid-1990s, placed a considerable emphasis on SALW issues—particularly on the illegal trade, and on weapon collection and destruction in post-conflict regions. Governments have developed a plethora of international instruments designed to control the illicit trade in SALW. They have negotiated two high-profile UN instruments concerning SALW: the non-legally binding UN Programme of Action,\textsuperscript{19} and the legally binding 2001 UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Com-

\textsuperscript{15} While some SALW are more expensive than others—particularly man-portable missiles—the fact remains that they are significantly cheaper than the vehicles and aircraft that comprise major conventional weapons. They are also easier to use, maintain, and so on.


\textsuperscript{17} There are, of course, some potentially serious examples of major conventional weapons being trafficked, particularly in the context of violations of UN arms embargoes.


\textsuperscript{19} United Nations (note 14).
ponents and Ammunition, supplementing the UN Convention against Trans-
national Organized Crime.\textsuperscript{20}

In addition, some 16 further regional and international agreements either deal
with small arms specifically or cover small arms together with other con-
ventional weapons. Measures focused on SALW include the 1997 Inter-
American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials;\textsuperscript{21} the 1998
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium on the
Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons;\textsuperscript{22} and the 2000
OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons.\textsuperscript{23} As Owen Greene
observes: ‘Efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking are high on the inter-
national agenda. Since 1997, they have been the focus of high-profile initiatives
by several regional organisations [and two UN processes] . . . The relationship
between these local, national, regional, and international institutions is inevit-
ably complex.’\textsuperscript{24}

However, it is important to note that governments and international organiza-
tions have failed to develop global instruments to control or outlaw the supply
of weapons by states to armed groups opposing governments. Such a measure
was discussed at length during the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Such controls were sup-
ported by many states but the opposition, led by the USA, prevented their inclu-
sion in the conference’s UN Programme of Action.\textsuperscript{25} Meanwhile, it has been
widely asserted that the period after the end of the cold war has witnessed a
relaxation in supply-side controls in the global arms trade (at least for military-
style weapons).\textsuperscript{26} After the dissolution of the Soviet Union many of its suc-
cessor states, and former members of the Warsaw Pact, disposed of cold war
stockpiles of SALW and excess production by their arms industries on world
markets.\textsuperscript{27}

org/unodc/crime_cicp_resolutions.html>.

\textsuperscript{21}The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Fire-
arms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, was opened for signature on 14 Nov. 1997

\textsuperscript{22}ECOWAS, Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light

\textsuperscript{23}OSCE, Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) doc-
pdfhtml/1873_en.pdf.html>.

\textsuperscript{24}Greene, O., ‘Examining international responses to illicit arms trafficking’, Crime Law and Social

\textsuperscript{25}United Nations (note 14).

\textsuperscript{26}See, e.g., Klare, M., ‘An overview of the global trade in small arms and light weapons’, eds J.
Dhanapala et al., United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Small Arms Control: Old Weapons,

\textsuperscript{27}Bailes, A. J. K., Melnyk, O. and Anthony, I., Relics of Cold War: Europe’s Challenge, Ukraine’s
also Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Conversion Survey 2005: Global Disarmament,
III. The record of the EU

The EU, the conventional arms trade, and small arms and light weapons

The EU is a significant actor in global efforts to address the SALW problem. Its activities have involved both specific measures concerning SALW and others covering SALW and other conventional weapons. The most important EU measures are the 1998 Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and the 1998 Joint Action on Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports has the status of a political commitment in the framework of the CFSP. The Code of Conduct contains eight criteria that EU member states (and non-members that follow the Code) commit themselves to use when evaluating arms export licence applications. These include reference to violations of human rights, armed conflict and diversion of weapons into the hands of terrorists. In addition, the Code established a common system for notification of and consultation on arms export licence denial. EU member states are required to notify each other when they refuse a request to export arms, and other states considering an ‘essentially identical’ transaction are required to consult with the state that originally denied the export licence. At the end of each year, the Council of the European Union issues an annual report under the Code of Conduct (which is prepared by the EU Working Group on Conventional Arms, COARM, discussed below). Over the years, this document has provided more information on EU members’ arms exports.

The EU Joint Action was adopted by the Council in December 1998, but it was modified in July 2002 to include ammunition. The Joint Action covers the control and registration of exports, transparency and the evaluation of potential importers. Its general guidelines state that members should ‘combat and contribute to ending the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms’ and...
‘contribute to the reduction of existing accumulations of these weapons . . . to levels consistent with countries’ legitimate security needs’. The Joint Action covers only those weapons ‘specially designed for military use’.

Article 3 of the Joint Action includes a commitment by exporting countries to supply SALW only to governments. The sale of military-style SALW to non-state groups is not permitted, and the EU member states have renounced this form of military assistance as an instrument in their foreign and security policy. The Joint Action also permits the EU to provide financial and technical assistance to solve problems caused by existing accumulations of SALW. In this context, the EU has supported the activities of international actors such as the Red Cross and the United Nations. It has also implemented EU projects in Albania, Cambodia, Georgia and Mozambique.

The EU Council of Ministers has primary responsibility for decisions concerning armament issues. This division of responsibility dates back to Article 223 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which stipulates that arms production and trade are exempted from the general provision of the treaty relating to competition policy and the Single Market. No subsequent EU agreement has changed this status, although modifications to the relevant article (now Article 295 of the consolidated treaty) have been discussed for some time and are still under consideration.

These institutional constraints notwithstanding, the EU has developed into an important forum in which member states discuss national policies and multi-lateral cooperation in areas related to (small) arms transfers. The two major working groups under the Council of Ministers in which member states discuss these matters are COARM and the Ad Hoc Working Party on a European Armaments Policy (POLARM).

COARM’s aim is to harmonize EU member states’ arms export policies and to promote transparency. It makes recommendations to the Council of Ministers under the framework of the CFSP. It is the forum in which information on arms export policy is shared, and it publishes an annual report under Operative Provision 8 of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

POLARM makes recommendations to the Council of Ministers concerning the trade in military equipment among EU member states. It aims to implement

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32 Council of the European Union (note 31), article 1.
a European arms policies and thereby simplify and harmonize the production and procurement of equipment within the EU.

The specific initiatives and actions adopted in this field by the EU include: the 1997 Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms; the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; the 1998 EU Joint Action on Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons; the 1999 EU Development Council Resolution on Small Arms; the 1999 EU–USA Declaration of Common Principles on Small Arms and Light Weapons; the 1999 EU–Canada Joint Declaration on Small Arms and the subsequent establishment of the EU–Canada Joint Working Group on Small Arms; the 2000 EU Common List of Military Equipment; and the 2003 Council Common Position on the Control of Arms Brokering. 37

The European Parliament has also adopted numerous resolutions on both SALW and conventional arms. These include a resolution on small arms38 and the Parliament’s responses to the annual report on the Code of Conduct.39

The EU member states have made joint statements at UN discussions on SALW, most notably at the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,40 and the first Biennial Meeting of States held as a follow-up to that conference in July 2003.41 Last, but not least, the EU has at various times initiated specific arms embargoes on Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Croatia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Indonesia, Liberia, Libya, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Myanmar (Burma), Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Sudan, Yugoslavia (the Socialist Federal Republic and the Federal Republic) and Zimbabwe.42

The CFSP and small arms and light weapons

The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports is one of the most important and perhaps most successful elements of the CFSP. In 2005 the Code was reviewed in discussions in the COARM committee, and the draft of a new version was

circulated; this review had become controversially linked with the possible lifting of the EU arms embargo on China.\textsuperscript{43} The EU Joint Action constitutes a major part of the non-proliferation and disarmament dimension of the CFSP, currently accounting for about half of the CFSP activities covering these areas (the other half being focused on weapons of mass destruction). Non-proliferation and disarmament accounted for €7.2 million of the total CFSP budget of €62.2 million in 2005.\textsuperscript{44}

IV. Nordic regional cooperation

All the Nordic governments are committed to measures against SALW, and the same concerns, stemming from at least three basic Nordic values—humanitarian thinking, conflict prevention and restraint in the arms trade—are widely shared at parliamentary and popular level. Nevertheless, initiatives aimed at introducing Nordic Council\textsuperscript{45} resolutions on arms issues have not met with success. For example, in October 2003 the Socialist–Green group in the Nordic Council tabled a draft resolution on ‘openness and increased parliamentary influence in arms export policies’.\textsuperscript{46} This resolution was not passed, leading Kristin Halvorsen, the head of Norway’s Socialist Left party, to state that ‘Nordic arms export—it is never mentioned’.\textsuperscript{47}

Defence equipment procurement is, in fact, subject to two Nordic arrangements.\textsuperscript{48} The first is the 1994 Nordic Armaments Co-operation (NORDAC) Agreement, which has involved over 60 inter-Nordic cooperation projects. An updated agreement, which came into force in 2001, concerns support for industrial cooperation in the military equipment sector between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.\textsuperscript{49} In terms of supply-side control, the most important aspect of these agreements is that the Nordic countries do not require end-user information on a reciprocal basis. End-user certificates are standard export control documents that define the ultimate ‘end-user’ of a defence export. To waive the requirement for such a certificate implies that a high degree of trust

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{45} The Nordic Council is a joint parliamentary body formed in 1952 with the aim of promoting cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. On the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers see URL <http://www.norden.org/>.
\bibitem{46} ‘Member’s proposal on openness and increased parliamentary influence in arms export policies (A 1295/Presidium)’, Nordic Council, 29 Oct. 2003, URL <http://www.norden.org/session2003/program/uk/program.asp>.
\bibitem{47} Halvorsen, K., Press meeting on Nordic Arms Export Control, Oslo, 28 Oct. 2003, URL <http://search.norden.org/>.
\bibitem{48} On these arrangements see chapter 9 in this volume.
\bibitem{49} Agreement between the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of Sweden Concerning Support for Industrial Cooperation in the Defence Materiel Area (NORDAC Agreement), 9 Nov. 2000. For more information see the NORDAC Internet site, URL <http://www.nordac.org/>.
\end{thebibliography}
must exist between the Nordic partners, even across the dividing lines of EU and NATO membership; arms transfers can and do take place, for example, between Finland and Norway.

A further Nordic initiative of note is the Baltic–Nordic consultations on export control. These take place annually and place emphasis on improving the Baltic states’ export control regimes. These regular seminars are the only area concerning conventional arms in which the Nordic states have defined a collective relationship with states outside the Nordic region.

**Nordic engagement in EU policy**

The COARM and POLARM committees are not subdivided into regional blocks. Instead, ad hoc groups of governments tend to coalesce around specific issues. It is therefore difficult to point to a distinctively Nordic relationship between the three Nordic EU members, respectively, and the other member states in these committees. Moreover, it is difficult to discern a trend of Nordic leadership in the sources of significant EU initiatives concerning SALW and conventional arms (see table 13.1).

The lack of Nordic leadership in the EU might be explained by the fact of these states’ smaller input to the arms trade—although this is hardly smaller than that of Ireland; and by the fact that Finland and Sweden joined the EU only on 1 January 1995. Perhaps it takes time to develop the confidence to lead initiatives. As reported elsewhere in this volume, however, these two countries did take decisive joint action at several stages in the development of EU policies on ‘active’ defence and security, as well as jointly promoting other causes, such as transparency in EU governance. The only possible conclusion is that—since Nordic governments’ SALW policies remain so similar—they have not seen the EU as a primary means of pursuing their policy objectives concerning SALW or have preferred to keep their activism in the EU on a national basis.

**EU initiatives and the non-EU Nordic states**

Iceland and Norway have stated that they will voluntarily follow the principles of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. A consultative meeting with Norway to discuss the revision of the Code of Conduct was held in November 2004. COARM has also discussed providing information on licence denials by EU members to Norway. In addition, and in harmony with a long Nordic tradition of acting in concert at the UN, Iceland and Norway have

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50 See, e.g., the Introduction to this volume.
The Oslo meetings

Three international meetings on SALW have been hosted by the Norwegian Government, representing the most high-profile activity on the SALW issue in the Nordic region. The 1998 Oslo Meeting on Small Arms (Oslo I) emphasized the dangers associated with trafficking of SALW and, consequently, stressed the need to prevent diversion from legal manufacture or trade and the need for states to exchange information and be transparent in their arms transfers. The Second Oslo Meeting on Small Arms and Light Weapons (Oslo II), held in 1999, built on the concerns of the first meeting and also emphasized arms brokering. Both these concerns were reflected in the EU’s 1998 Joint Action

Table 13.1. EU initiatives concerning small arms and light weapons and other conventional arms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader(s)</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>European Union Joint Action on Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| United Kingdom, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden | European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports  
Netherlands, Germany, Sweden | European Union Code of Conduct review | Council of the European Union Common Position on the Control of Arms Brokering |


aligned themselves with the joint EU position at the UN in debates on conventional arms.  


on Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

A more specialized interim meeting was held in Oslo in April 1999 at which the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons was developed. The EU participants declared their intention to propose that the EU provide financial, political and moral support for the establishment of the West African moratorium. A third Oslo meeting, organized by the Netherlands and Norway in April 2003, focused on developing a common understanding on regulations to control arms brokering. Whether by chance or design, this meeting occurred just before the EU’s Common Position on arms brokering was finalized.

Governmental attendance at all three meetings was global in nature, but with many representatives from EU states. For example, at the 2003 meeting on SALW brokering, 9 of the 27 governments represented were EU members: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

V. The methods chosen by Nordic governments in pursuing the small arms and light weapons issue

If Nordic governments have not opted to pursue their shared or parallel concerns on SALW through joint initiatives at the EU, to what other methods have they given preference and why? This section presents the result of an analysis designed to answer these questions, based on the first three annual reports on the 2002 EU Joint Action on Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Nordic states’ reports in

55 Council of the European Union (note 29).
56 Council of the European Union (note 28).
57 ECOWAS (note 22).
58 See UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa with Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons (NUPI: Oslo, 2000), URL <http://www.nisat.org/publications/moratorium/> , p. 106.
61 Dutch–Norwegian Initiative (note 59).
2003 to the UN on their implementation of the UN Programme of Action. Iceland, which is not an EU member, did not report on its activities under the Joint Action, nor did it make a report on its implementation of the UN Programme of Action during the period in question.

In total, these reports contained information on 54 initiatives by one or more Nordic governments. These initiatives may be broken down into three categories: bilateral activities, funding support for international programmes and funding for individual projects.

**Bilateral initiatives**

There were three bilateral initiatives: a Norwegian–US small arms working group; a Dutch–Norwegian initiative on arms brokering; and a British–Swedish initiative in support of children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is noteworthy that all three bilateral initiatives involve Nordic governments working with governments from outside the region rather than with each other.

**Funding international organizations**

The Nordic states reported 16 instances of support for international organizations. Eight of these were for support of UN activities: four by Sweden, two by Denmark, one by Sweden and Norway concurrently, and one by Norway and Finland concurrently. These eight concerned general support for the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Trust Fund for the Reduction of Small Arms Proliferation and for regional UN initiatives in West Africa, South America, Albania and the Republic of the Congo. The two projects supported by more than one Nordic government were the UNDP in Albania (by Finland and Norway) and the Program for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED), the body charged with assisting the implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium (supported by Norway and Sweden). Otherwise, there were no coincidences of support for UN activities by Nordic governments.

The remaining eight instances of support for international organizations were for the World Bank and the OSCE. Sweden supported four World Bank initiatives: SALW management projects in Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and the Great Lakes region of Africa. Three OSCE initiatives were supported by Finland alone, of which two concerned support for the OSCE’s general
SALW activities and one was for a project in Georgia. Denmark and Finland supported an OSCE project in Moldova.

This pattern of support appears to reflect sometimes divergent priorities among the Nordic governments as regards both regions of interest and preferred institutional partners. Sweden has focused on UN and World Bank projects, while Finland has placed most of its emphasis on the OSCE. All four Nordic states, however, have supported UN activities to some degree.

**Funding individual projects**

Similar trends are evident in support for SALW projects run by individual organizations, whether entailing research, advocacy or operational work. Only two projects of this kind were funded simultaneously by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in support of research work by, respectively, the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa and the Swiss-based Small Arms Survey. One further project was funded by Finland and Sweden—support for the work of the Arias Foundation of Costa Rica. In addition, Norway and Sweden both funded cooperation by institutes in their countries on training for the disarming, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.

Sweden gave sole support to 16 activities. These included inter-parliamentary exchanges on SALW issues between representatives from Latin America and Sweden, the work of the advocacy organization International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA); and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in Guinea-Bissau and southern Sudan. Six activities were funded by Norway alone. These ranged from supporting Operation Moufflon—the South African National Defence Force’s destruction of surplus SALW—to support for the advocacy organization SaferAfrica. A further five were funded solely by Finland, ranging from SALW control and police training in Guatemala to supporting transparency and SALW control in Kenya. Denmark was not the sole supporter of any such project.

Furthermore, as many as nine projects were supported by either Denmark, Finland, Norway or Sweden and one or more non-Nordic governments (compared with the five that involved more than one Nordic government). In general, the Nordic governments were more likely to support the same initiatives as Canada, the Netherlands or Switzerland than they were to work with another Nordic government.

**Support for campaigning and advocacy**

Previous global campaigns, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, involved Nordic governmental support for advocacy organizations which used this funding to campaign for policy change by other governments. The SALW issue has witnessed a continuation of this trend. Campaigning organizations supported by the Nordic governments have included the Arias
Foundation, Biting the Bullet, IANSA, SaferAfrica and Saferworld. Sweden provided funding for IANSA, while the other organizations were funded by Finland and Norway.

Biting the Bullet, IANSA and Saferworld are based in London, but it is worth noting that they all have global campaigning agendas. There is no evidence in the reports studied of the Nordic governments funding campaign work specifically focused on European nations, regions or institutions, including lobbying of the EU itself.

As of early 2005, the Control Arms campaign, run by Amnesty International, IANSA and Oxfam, is the highest-profile international campaign in the SALW field. One of its main components is the call for a legally binding treaty governing the arms trade. It is publicly supported by Finland, but not by the other Nordic governments.

VI. Conclusions

The Nordic governments have a very similar approach to the small arms and light weapons issue. They have all defined the proliferation, diffusion and misuse of SALW as an issue of concern. They have expressed this concern at the UN, and EU statements in that forum to the same effect have been endorsed by the two non-EU Nordic governments, of Iceland and Norway. However, beyond the level of rhetoric, it is difficult to discern the development of an identifiably ‘Nordic’ approach to the issue. There have been no joint initiatives involving all the Nordic governments (other than export control discussions with Baltic states), nor is there any evidence of a distinctively Nordic position being promoted at the global—or even regional—level in contradistinction to the positions of other interested European governments.

Similarly, there is no evidence of a conscious and coordinated Nordic involvement in the development of the European Union’s policy on SALW. Nordic EU member governments have participated in the development of EU policy but have not taken a leadership role in this particular field. That place has been left to countries such as France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK. The only clear instance of a Nordic state taking leadership in the EU in the field of SALW was Sweden’s introduction, during its presidency of the EU Council of Ministers in 2001, of guidelines on arms brokering. This initiative aside, it is interesting to note the absence of SALW-related priorities being promoted by Finland or Sweden in the programmes of their recent presidencies of the EU Council of Ministers (in 1999 and 2001, respectively).

Instead, the Nordic governments have followed two different strategies. First, they have made alliances with states (some of which are EU members) on particular issues. The Dutch–Norwegian initiative on arms brokering referred to

65 Biting the Bullet is a project developed by Bradford University, International Alert and Saferworld; see URL <http://www.international-alert.org/policy/biting.htm>.
above is perhaps the best example. Second, they have followed their long-established global orientation in supporting activities by the UN, the World Bank and—at European level—the OSCE, which has a much wider membership than the EU. Similarly, their support for advocacy and campaigning work has been channelled towards work on global issues for a global audience rather than towards lobbying specifically designed to influence European audiences or EU policy.

These findings are all the more striking inasmuch as some other (non-Nordic) members seem to hold a belief in the EU as a progressive entity that, through changes in its own policy and its actions, can both add value in the specific area in view and positively influence the policies of its neighbours, of other nations (such as the USA) and of other international organizations. The reasons why the Nordic governments apparently assign less (relative) value to the European Union in this respect—force of historical habit, the inconvenience of their differing security and institutional statuses, an inbuilt recoil from regional approaches in the arms control field generally, a preference not to act as ‘small fish in a large pool’ or something to do with a deeper Euro-scepticism—would make a fascinating subject for further study.

66 Dutch–Norwegian Initiative (note 59).
14. Nordic nuclear non-proliferation policies: different traditions and common objectives

_Lars van Dassen and Anna Wetter*

I. Introduction

Some 95 per cent of all the states that exist today and are members of the United Nations do not possess nuclear weapons, and with a few exceptions they have no ambitions to change this status. This is fortunate since the nuclear non-proliferation regime would otherwise not hold or could be maintained only by strong pressure from the few major powers that (as a matter of fact and irony) already have nuclear weapons. This is not to say that the power of states such as China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States to dissuade others from acquiring nuclear weapons is not a part of the existing non-proliferation dynamic. These countries play a large role, but they cannot do so without damaging the credibility of the whole system, simply because double standards become blatant when the holders of nuclear weapons try to convince or force other states to accept that they are better off without them. The states on the receiving end of this argument are bound to feel, rightly or wrongly, that they live at the mercy of the states with nuclear weapon.

The non-proliferation regime therefore depends, to a greater degree than is usually acknowledged, on a mixture of the willingness, good faith, activity, enthusiasm, obliviousness, naïveté and positive incentives that many Non-Nuclear Weapon States possess and they bring with them into the regime. The importance of these benevolent states is well depicted by Jonathan Schell: ‘The world’s safety ultimately depends not on the number of nations that want to build nuclear weapons but cannot, but on the number that can but do not’. 2 The

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1 The terms ‘Nuclear Weapon State’ and ‘Non-Nuclear Weapon State’ (with initial capitals) are used in the context of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) and refer to the position of specific states that are party to this treaty. The text of the NPT is available at URL <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/>. All important states without nuclear weapons are also Non-Nuclear Weapon States (i.e., they are signatories to the NPT); the semantic distinction is mainly relevant when distinguishing the classes of states with nuclear weapons and of Nuclear Weapon States. The NPT identifies 5 states as Nuclear Weapon States: China, France, Russia (formerly, the Soviet Union), the UK and the USA. By the final stage of the negotiations on the NPT, these 5 states had conducted nuclear weapon tests. Another 2 states, India and Pakistan, had not carried out such tests at that time but have since done so and are known to have arsenals of nuclear weapons. Israel has not admitted to having tested a nuclear weapon and has refused to confirm or deny that it has such weapons, but there is little doubt that it is the 8th state with nuclear weapons.


* The authors wish to thank Alyson J. K. Bailes for help in the preparation of this chapter.
Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are four such states. They could, most probably, have developed nuclear weapons, but they wisely and for different reasons either never considered the option (Denmark and Finland) or chose to forgo it (Norway and Sweden). Instead, they have invested a lot of capital in convincing others to do the same.

II. Underlying factors in the formation of Nordic nuclear non-proliferation policies

It may seem that the Nordic countries are similar or even identical when it comes to their nuclear non-proliferation policies. There are good reasons for believing this, given that all four countries are long-standing supporters of the UN and of the development of international law and given that they have a general preference for rule-based, multilateral solutions to international problems. A study of their voting record—for example, in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, where inter alia nuclear weapon issues are discussed—strengthens the perception that they generally share the same opinions. However, the four states have different points of departure as regards some of the background factors that influence their political choices and priorities. The most salient factors are: (a) security policy choices—alliance membership versus neutrality; (b) the choice to use or not to use nuclear power as a source of energy; and (c) the extent to which there has been a tradition of nuclear weapon issues influencing foreign policy thinking (and the traditions of openness or, conversely, of elite decision making that surround the issues). It is difficult to separate these factors and to a certain extent they influence each other.

The policies of each of the Nordic states have been shaped by these choices and traditions, and they have developed over decades to meet specific national requirements and preconditions. The results of this development determine what each state has brought and can still bring into the European Union policy context. Denmark has been a member of the European Community/EU since 1973, and it has a long tradition of participation in EU policy work in the framework of the European Political Cooperation, which started in an informal manner in the early 1970s. Finland and Sweden participated in this process in the early 1990s during their membership negotiations and became full members in 1995, by which time the EU’s foreign policy process had been formalized as the Common Foreign and Security Policy in Article J of the 1992 Treaty of

3 Iceland is not considered in this chapter.
4 The First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which convenes each autumn, is responsible for questions of disarmament and international security. The Nordic states have a long-standing practice of coordinating their positions on these and other issues at the UN.
Maastricht. Norway also attended CFSP meetings during its membership negotiations before the 1994 national referendum vote against joining the EU. Since then, Norway has used other bilateral channels of communication with the EU and its member states to maintain an involvement with the EU’s non-proliferation policy, which benefits both the EU and Norway.

**Security policy: alliance membership or neutrality**

The four states’ political choices related to security are easy to define in formal terms, yet beneath these official choices there are further significant differences. Neutrality is not a static condition, just as alliance membership does not dictate what the members must think and do. The Nordic countries have placed themselves at different points along the spectrum of possible positions and have modified their positions from time to time.

The lesson learned by Sweden in World War II was that it was possible for neutrality to function but that a degree of flexibility towards the prevailing forces was required. In the cold war era, Sweden is reported to have established contacts with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and neighbouring Western powers as a back-up measure in the event that neutrality should fail. A strong national defence was established and, until the late 1960s, consideration was even given to making nuclear weapons a part of the defence posture.

Norway, on the other hand, learned through experience that neutrality did not work during World War II and therefore concluded in 1949 that membership of NATO was its best option. Before receiving formal security assurances from

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7 There are few comparative studies of the Nordic countries concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the 1970s and 1980s a number of monographs addressed issues such as the proposals to establish a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone. For analysis of the broader perspectives and developments see van Dassen, L., *Stumbling-Blocks and Stepping-Stones for the Embracement of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: A Theory-Based Comparison of Four Nordic Countries, 1945–2001*, Doctoral dissertation (Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research: Uppsala, forthcoming 2006).

8 This has long been suspected but the evidence is limited and for obvious reasons there are few available documents to support this view. Nevertheless, memoirs and interviews with decision makers indicate that such relations with the West existed. See, e.g., Holmström, M., ‘Erlander och Palme misstrodde neutralitet’ [Erlander and Palme mistrusted neutrality], ‘USA:s styrkor garant för både Palme och Carlsson’ [US forces a guarantee for both Palme and Carlsson] and ‘Sovjet trodde inte på neutralt Sverige’ [Soviets did not believe in a neutral Sweden], *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2, 3 and 7 Aug. 1998, respectively.

NATO and the USA, Norway started an embryonic nuclear weapon programme that survived until the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{10}

Denmark shared Norway’s experience concerning the reliability of neutrality and made the same choice to join NATO in 1949. At no stage did Denmark consider an independent nuclear option. On the other hand, it became a shareholder in the USA’s nuclear deterrent posture when, yielding to US demands during the 1950s and 1960s, it tacitly allowed the USA to station nuclear weapons in Greenland.\textsuperscript{11}

Finland was also neutral or non-aligned during the cold war but in a different fashion from Sweden. In practical terms, Finland was under pressure from the Soviet Union because of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance that the two countries signed in 1948. However, Finland was unwilling to accept the existing and potential Soviet influences on its alignment and used the international advocacy of non-proliferation (among other security issues) to remove itself from the Soviet shadow and seek additional room for manoeuvre.\textsuperscript{12}

The use or non-use of nuclear power as a source of energy

The choice to develop or not to develop nuclear energy has had and continues to have a significant influence on national non-proliferation policies for at least two reasons. First, as a result of the choice, different degrees of interest are attached to the nuclear fuel cycle, access to nuclear materials, export controls and so on. Second, a nation’s choice to use or not to use nuclear power determines the expertise it has available for international cooperation activities, and to a large extent this influences the contribution it can make to the development


\textsuperscript{11} The largest and best study of Denmark’s nuclear weapon policies is Danish Institute of International Affairs, Grønland under den kolde krig: dansk og amerikansk udenrigspolitik 1945–1968 [Greenland during the cold war: Danish and American foreign policy 1945–1968], vols 1 and 2 (Dansk udenrigspolitis: Copenhagen, 1997). The study deals with the inconsistencies of Danish nuclear weapon policies, explaining how Denmark declared its unwillingness to allow nuclear weapons on Danish territory in peacetime while allowing the USA to station nuclear weapons in Greenland and to fly over its airspace with such weapons. A number of monographs have been written on Danish policies vis-à-vis the 1979 NATO ‘double-track decision’ on intermediate-range nuclear forces and the following period. These studies are, however, memoirs by decision makers of the time and do not provide solid analysis based on access to official archives. See NATO, ‘Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (the “double-track” decision on theatre nuclear forces)’, Brussels, 12 Dec. 1979, URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b791212a.htm>.

of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards (or international inspection) system applied to nuclear materials in Non-Nuclear Weapon States.

For Sweden, its early ambition to consider developing nuclear weapons paralleled its ambition to develop nuclear energy. The path of development changed when it became obvious that the best option for weapon production was not the most economically efficient technological method for the development of nuclear energy. The nuclear weapon option was abandoned in the late 1960s, and a civilian nuclear energy infrastructure was established in the early 1970s and developed thereafter. Four nuclear power plants were built with a total of 12 reactors.

Norway had early ambitions to develop nuclear energy and was a pioneer in the field of nuclear research. Eventually, its ready access to hydroelectric power, oil and gas—coupled with political and public scepticism about nuclear energy—made it unnecessary to consider further development of nuclear energy. Norway has since expressed varying degrees of scepticism with respect to the international promotion of nuclear energy.

Denmark was engaged at an early stage in nuclear energy research and it possesses large uranium deposits in Greenland. However, in the 1980s Denmark decided that it would not develop nuclear energy. Like Norway, Denmark has questioned whether nuclear energy is a sound option for any country to pursue and this has been reflected in its policies towards the IAEA.

Finland entered the field of nuclear research rather late and slowly. This was both because of the constraints imposed by its relations with the Soviet Union and because Finland chose to await the complete negotiation of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) before building nuclear power reactors. Four reactors are now in operation at two nuclear power plants, and the decision was taken in 2002 to begin construction of a fifth reactor, making Finland the only Western country that in recent years has decided to expand its use of nuclear energy.

**National traditions and the discussion of nuclear weapons**

The national settings in which nuclear weapon issues are discussed and in which decisions are reached are important because they indicate the extent to which a certain level of activity can be expected to be short lived or long lasting. It makes a difference whether there are interest groups and movements that force issues onto the agenda and oblige parties and governments to take a certain stand. It also matters whether the government has a tradition of permanent reflection on and attention to nuclear weapon issues and whether there are structures that allow for openness and for broader discussions in the country. In this context there are great differences between the four Nordic countries.

Sweden has the longest and deepest tradition among the four states of discussing nuclear weapon issues at the national level, and it is also a champion of
disarmament and non-proliferation internationally.\textsuperscript{13} Many Swedish political and social movements, non-governmental organizations and labour unions have been active in this area, and most political parties have pursued policies that by international standards can be seen as progressive. A policy elite continues to work to keep attention focused on the challenge of nuclear weapons in international settings, thus maintaining nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as a prioritized foreign policy issue.

In Norway, nuclear weapons have long been the focus of public attention and this has been reflected in the national debate. Nuclear weapon issues have had a political character that has kept many groups and movements engaged and this, in turn, has led most political parties to keep considerable attention focused on the issue.

In Denmark, on the other hand, the relevant political decision-making processes have been closed and exclusive. The government has had and has frequently used a prerogative to make decisions over the heads of the parliament and the population. The late 1970s and the 1980s were an exception, but in recent years the public attention given to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation has all but disappeared again.

Similarly, Finland has had little national debate about its positions on nuclear weapons. This tradition dates back to the 1950s, when the name of President Urho Kekkonen was synonymous with the Finnish foreign policy of adjustment to and balance with external (Soviet) pressures. Public engagement in this issue has generally been limited to rallying in support of the president and the government. Nevertheless, Finland’s dedication to further non-proliferation and disarmament at the international level has remained high and can be defined as an issue that receives particular foreign policy attention.

\section*{III. General policy outcomes and ‘national nuclear styles’}

Any brief depiction or synthesis of national styles for handling, pursuing and deciding on nuclear non-proliferation issues is bound to attract criticism and there will always be exceptions that do not fit into the general pattern. Such a description may, nevertheless, furnish a meaningful starting point for studying the way in which national views have moulded or been moulded by, or have been reconciled or failed to be reconciled with, the collective policies of the relevant international organizations.

The basically anti-nuclear or nuclear-sceptical stance of the two Nordic NATO members, Denmark and Norway, may seem to sit uncomfortably with membership of a collective defence alliance relying on the US (and British)

\textsuperscript{13} E.g., on 16 Dec. 2003 the Swedish Government established the international Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission, under the chairmanship of Hans Blix, to investigate ways to reduce the danger of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons and their means of delivery. See the Internet site of the WMD Commission at URL <http://www.wmdcommission.org/>. 
nuclear umbrella.\textsuperscript{14} The basic and still extant ‘fix’ for dealing with this tension was the agreement made at the time of Danish and Norwegian entry into NATO that neither state would have any nuclear objects or forces stationed on its territory in peacetime. Norway subsequently tended to play down the overall imperative of nuclear disarmament but—not surprisingly in view of the enormous concentration of Soviet nuclear assets just across its border on the Kola Peninsula—was repeatedly tempted to pursue de-nuclearization or at least the limitation of nuclear confrontation in its backyard. The temporary Norwegian interest in the 1980s in the idea of a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone—anathema to the rest of NATO under the notion of indivisible security—was a case in point.\textsuperscript{15} During the run-up to and implementation of NATO’s 1979 double-track decision on deploying new intermediate-range missiles, Denmark and Norway repeatedly vacillated in their support for the missile deployment, showing particular concern to avoid the programme’s encroaching on its own region. More recently, Norway has settled into a less controversial combination of a ‘transatlantic’ strategic philosophy\textsuperscript{16} with ‘universalistic’ touches. This is manifested in a strong sense of responsibility to support the global non-proliferation regime (i.e., by strengthening export control regimes) and a special interest in practical measures to reduce nuclear dangers in its neighbourhood (see below).

The Danish policy tradition was very similar to Norway’s at the end of the cold war, and in fact Denmark went further in registering its concerns about nuclear innovations. Denmark became NATO’s most persistent ‘footnote state’ in 1982–86, when a left–centre majority in parliament forced the liberal–conservative government at the time to add footnotes to NATO communiqués to mark dissent from statements supporting the deployment of intermediate-range missiles and the USA’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or Star Wars).\textsuperscript{17} Since 1990, however, a new focus has brought Denmark closer to the USA and thus to the mainstream of NATO in its security policy thinking and actions. In this purely ‘transatlantic’ orientation, nuclear disarmament is no longer given specific consideration as part of nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Denmark supports improved export control systems and improved safeguards but does so without contributing significantly, for example, to technical assistance. The new transatlantic alignment—symbolized in another context by Denmark’s prominent and lasting role in the coalition operation in Iraq in 2003—was underlined


\textsuperscript{15} Honkanen (note 14), p. 56.

\textsuperscript{16} It might be argued that Norway’s inclination to question the basis of US deterrent cover for the northern region has declined as its fears grow that the US commitment might be weakened and that NATO generally might move away from its traditional territorial defence functions.

\textsuperscript{17} Honkanen (note 14), pp. 53–54. Danish government representatives were bound to follow mandates on international issues given by the Danish parliament. For a full treatment of this policy and its context see Petersen, N., Europeæisk og globalt engangement 1973–2003 [Europea and global engagement 1973–2003], Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie vol. 6 (Gyldendals Folag: Copenhagen, 2004).
by the way in which the Danish Government in 2004 agreed to allow the USA to upgrade its radar systems in Greenland in connection with the development of the US national missile defence system. Many experts both in Denmark and abroad, as well as residents of Greenland, have criticized this decision out of concern that the US missile ‘shield’ could drive the world into a new nuclear arms race and aggravate rather than reduce proliferation risks.

Sweden has such a long and uninterrupted tradition as an ‘activist’ and ‘universalist’ in international settings that it was always inherently unlikely that its EU membership would have much of a dampening effect on this tradition. Indeed, on the eve of membership in 1995 Swedish representatives voiced some of the most outspoken criticism anywhere of the decision by France—its new partner in integration—to persist with nuclear testing. This was only one instance of many harsh and direct Swedish judgements on the Nuclear Weapon States and their lack of demonstrated progress in nuclear disarmament. Sweden takes seriously Article VI of the NPT on the obligations of the Nuclear Weapon States to work for nuclear disarmament and works actively to promote strengthened international safeguards, export controls and the establishment, for instance, of regional nuclear weapon-free zones. It is one of the few European states (sometimes together with Finland) to have persisted in drawing attention to the unregulated problem of tactical nuclear weapons stationed by Russia and the USA on European soil. Within the EU framework, however, Sweden has had to face the reality that it cannot single-handedly initiate discussion of or judgement on British and French nuclear weapons. It has chosen to push hard for progressive joint positions in those areas where an EU consensus is attainable, such as the strengthening of international legal instruments and the increase of EU material aid for disarmament and weapon disposal, while expressing the more rigorous and idealistic aspects of its own anti-nuclear policy in purely national initiatives.

Finland’s approach constitutes a fourth, different style that can be labelled as ‘bridge-building’ and ‘European’. In the cold war conditions Finland used non-proliferation, like other arms control and confidence-building initiatives, as a tool to reduce the distance between the Soviet Union and the USA—thus giving itself more room for manoeuvre. Whenever the East–West climate was harsh, the Soviet Union tried to drag Finland closer to the East. In this sense, non-proliferation and disarmament were measures that served Finland’s national interests. Even after joining the EU, Finland has tended to view non-

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19 See the statements by Swedish officials at Greenpeace, ‘Government and opposition statements on the resumption of nuclear testing’, URL <http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/rw/pol26.html>. E.g., ‘Sweden deeply regrets that France has decided to resume its nuclear tests. We have also conveyed this directly to the French government, says prime minister Ingvar Carlsson’ and ‘I wish to reiterate that it is deeply regretful that France insists on its decision to conduct new nuclear weapons tests, even if it is for a limited period. The growing criticism and indignation about the French decision expressed in all EU states and in many other countries, is damaging to the stability and credibility of the European Union as a foreign political and security political actor . . .’; Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallén'.
proliferation in a pragmatic manner. Despite occasional joint statements of a more ambitious kind with Sweden, Finland’s efforts in the arms control and disarmament field have generally been directed at maximizing European outputs on a basis of consensus and cooperation with other EU partners.

IV. Policy issues and inputs in recent years

Since 2000, Nordic contributions in the context of disarmament and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) non-proliferation have increased as a function of the generally increased international activism in this context. Examples of recent global WMD-related endeavours in which the Nordic countries have taken a standpoint or an active role are the 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the work of the New Agenda Coalition.

Sweden was, in general, pleased with the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Anna Lindh, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in her statement at the conference drew attention to four areas of specific concern: reducing nuclear weapon arsenals, bringing into force the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), halting the development of new weapon systems and reducing the risk of use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts.


22 The Global Partnership was initiated by the G8 nations at the 26–27 June 2002 summit meeting in Kananaskis, Canada. It aims to prevent terrorists and those who harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological or biological weapons, missiles or related equipment and technology. Its operational activities are heavily focused on destruction of surplus WMD materials, following the earlier US-led Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union. See G8 Kananaskis Summit, ‘Statement by G8 leaders: the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction’, June 2002, URL <http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/glob part-en.asp>.


24 The New Agenda Coalition was announced through a 1998 Joint Declaration by the foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden to put more focus on nuclear disarmament. So far the First Committee of the UN General Assembly has adopted 5 resolutions (in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2003) as a consequence of the New Agenda Coalition. On the New Agenda Coalition see URL <http://www.acronym.org.uk/nac.htm>.

the light of these concerns the Swedish Government welcomed Russia’s ratification of the 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) and of the CTBT on the eve of the review conference. One area where the conference ultimately failed, as seen from a Swedish perspective, was the continuation of US plans for a national missile defence system, which Sweden feared might restart the nuclear missile race. Another disappointment was the unwillingness of the US Senate to approve ratification of the CTBT, which has not entered into force.

In the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Laila Freivalds, Swedish minister of foreign affairs, expressed concern over the poor results in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament since the 2000 NPT Conference. Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway have all warned in recent years that the NPT is facing a series of challenges, from both inside and outside the treaty regime, which threaten to undermine its effectiveness and future viability. This was repeated by all the Nordic ministers of foreign affairs at the conference. For this reason, none of the countries wanted to raise new questions at the conference but emphasized instead the need to implement previously agreed measures to reinforce and strengthen the NPT.

The Swedish Government supports the PSI, the Global Partnership and the implementation of Resolution 1540. The Swedish Government perceives these three initiatives *inter alia* in the context of reducing WMD-related threats posed by non-state actors.

The initial Swedish total pledge of funds to the Global Partnership, made at the G8 Global Partnership summit in Sea Island in 2004, was approximately $32.2 million. At the following summit in Gleneagles in June 2005, an additional funding commitment of $7.2 million was made for 2005 and a further €6 million ($7.2 million) for the period of 2006–2008. The Swedish contributions were committed mainly for the nuclear ‘window’ of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) Support Fund ($5.7 million to nuclear safety in 2005 and $1.5 million to nuclear security in 2005). In the biological area the Swedish contributions are spent on bio-safety and bio-security projects (approximately $135 700). Finally, €220 000 ($264 000) will be contributed to a Green Cross project on chemical weapons destruction sup-

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29 Hellström, E., Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Personal communication, 11 Oct. 2005. The NDEP was created in 2001. It aims to coordinate international support for tackling the legacy of environmental damage, from nuclear pollution and other sources, in the area covered by the EU’s Northern Dimension. The NDEP Support Fund has 2 ‘windows’: 1 for nuclear safety and 1 for environmental projects. See the NDEP’s website at URL <http://www.ndep.org/>. 
Sweden is the only Nordic country contributing to bio-safety and bio-security projects within the Global Partnership framework.

As noted above, Sweden has sometimes taken national initiatives (or joined in multilateral ones) that go beyond the limits of EU common policies for the reduction of WMD threats. Its membership of the New Agenda Coalition since 1998 can be seen in this light: Sweden joined with progressive states from other regions to push demands for disarmament (and other matters) which at that time were not even the subject of explicit EU policies. As a recent example of Sweden’s action in this area independent of the EU, at the 2005 NPT Review Conference it used its membership of the New Agenda Coalition to insist that the Nuclear Weapon States make concrete progress towards fulfilling their legally binding commitment in the NPT to work towards complete nuclear disarmament. Later in 2005, at the High Level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly, Göran Persson, Swedish prime minister, complained about the lack of recent progress in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

In the EU context, in early 2003 at a time of general European concern about the destabilizing effects of proliferation, Sweden pushed for the Union to develop its own, first-ever strategy on WMD. The initiative quickly led to guidelines and an Action Plan on the subject (adopted in June 2003) and, in December 2003, to a WMD strategy formally adopted by the European Council. These documents were, however, still of a moderate and pragmatic nature, skirting around the sensitive issues of disarmament. This may explain why Sweden reverted in December 2003 to a unilateral initiative to establish the WMD Commission, which has nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation on its agenda.

Norway generally shared the views of the Swedish Government concerning the success of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. However, the Norwegian Government added a focus on the environment to the agenda of the conference when Thorbjørn Jagland, Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, spoke about Russia’s need for international assistance to secure radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, in particular that stored on the Kola Peninsula and in the Arkhangelsk district. Norway had already in 2000 taken steps towards negoti-

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30 Green Cross International was founded in 1992, at the suggestion of Mikhail Gorbachev, as a ‘Red Cross of the environment’. It helps to deal with damage caused by industrial and military disasters and with cleaning up contaminated sites from the cold war period.


33 See note 13.

ations with Russia and some donor countries that were willing to assist in the project, and the Norwegian Government itself spent more than $100 million on nuclear safety measures between 1995 and 2003. Norway can claim considerable success in its efforts for bilateral cooperation to help Russia deal with the radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel stored within its borders. In 2003 the Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation was signed, with Norway as the driving force.

At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Jan Petersen, Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, expressed concerns similar to those of his Swedish colleague over the recent international setbacks regarding non-proliferation and disarmament.

When determining the size of the Norwegian contribution to the Global Partnership, the calculation depends on whether or not projects initiated by Norway fall within the framework stipulated for G8 projects. Taking advantage of the opportunity for states that are not members of the G8 to contribute to the programme at a level of their own choosing, in 2004 Norway became the largest contributor among such states by pledging approximately €100 million ($120 million) to the Global Partnership. By June 2005 Norway had provided €35 million of this total pledge. Norway has also supported the PSI since March 2004, and the government has declared its openness to concluding bilateral boarding agreements in accordance with the PSI.

Neither Denmark nor Finland made an official statement at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, although they took part in the preparatory committee meetings. Finland contributed to the Chairman’s paper presented at the conference by introducing a proposal on increased transparency regarding tactical nuclear weapons. Denmark had a lower profile than the other Nordic coun-


36 The Framework Agreement was signed on 21 May 2003 by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the UK, the USA, the European Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. It aims at providing instruments to cope with radioactive waste, the secure storage of spent nuclear fuel and the safety of nuclear reactors. The text of the agreement is available at URL <http://www.ndep.org/files/uploaded/MNEPRAgreementENGLISH.pdf>.

37 G8 Gleneagles 2005 (note 28).


tries—possibly as a symptom of its growing alignment with the USA (see section III above)—while generally supporting the development of the NPT.40

Both Denmark and Finland are contributors to the Global Partnership. Finland joined the programme at the 2003 Evian Summit,41 while Denmark joined at the 2004 Sea Island Summit.42 Finland pledged €15 million ($18 million) to the Global Partnership for the period 2004–14,43 and Denmark announced pledges totalling €17.2 million ($20.6 million) for the period 2002–2004, including a pledge of €1 million made at the Sea Island Summit.44 These totals were almost unchanged by the summit in Gleneagles in July 2005. By this stage Finland had spent €7.85 million ($9.42 million) of its total pledge. Denmark on the other hand did not report any spending for the period 2002–2004 but did confirm commitments amounting to €17.3 million ($20.7 million).45

Finland has, to mention a few examples, provided funds for projects on nuclear material safeguards and waste management totalling €430 000 ($516 000) in the period 2003–2005, and has earmarked €2 million ($2.4 million) of its pledge of €10 million ($12 million) to the NDEP for nuclear clean-up activities. In addition, Finland is providing technical assistance at the Russian chemical weapon destruction facility in Gorny, Saratov oblast, by delivering and installing a technical control system for the safe storage of lewisite and contributes to a Green Cross project on facilitating Russian chemical weapons destruction.46

Denmark has committed most of its funds to the NDEP (€10 million) but has in addition spent significant funds on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Chernobyl Shelter Fund (€2.5 million, $3 million) and Ignalina International Decommissioning Support Fund (€2.7 million, $3.24 million).47

Both Denmark and Finland support Security Council Resolution 1540. As a current member of the Security Council, Denmark is taking part in the 1540 Committee and will actively work to strengthen the resolution and states’ compliance with it.48 Furthermore, Denmark is currently chairing the Security Council.

44 Official in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Personal communication with the authors, 15 Feb. 2005.
45 G8 Gleneagles 2005 (note 28).
46 G8 Gleneagles 2005 (note 28).
47 G8 Gleneagles 2005 (note 28).
Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, a position which Denmark uses to prioritize cooperation between the Security Council subsidiary organs dealing with aspects of terrorism.\textsuperscript{49} Neither Denmark nor Finland is a member of the New Agenda Coalition, but both countries support the PSI and take part in PSI exercises and unofficial expert meetings.

V. Conclusions: Nordic traditions and priorities in the EU context

Nuclear issues are a clear case of an area in which common Nordic ‘values’ exist at both the elite and popular levels and where Nordic moral and practical considerations appear to coincide. The whole Nordic region remains particularly vulnerable, if less so than during the cold war, to the consequences not just of an actual nuclear exchange between the great powers but also of nuclear accidents, leakages and pollution. The contamination carried to the north after the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union (now in Ukraine) and the consequent social, economic and environmental damage remain a potent memory throughout the region and have strongly marked these countries’ general thinking about emergency risks and management. This line of common interest and experience helps to explain the parallel and (by general European standards) substantial efforts made by Finland, Norway and Sweden to directly reduce the threat from ‘loose’ WMD materials in their region.

Nonetheless, the broader conclusions drawn by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden for their national and international policies, and their ‘style’ of handling nuclear issues domestically, exhibit striking differences that seem to reflect different governance traditions as well as geographical and historical factors. Longer-term practices of intra-Nordic consultation have, consequently, been limited to a rather specific range of (notably UN) issues where the countries’ own policies are not directly at stake and it is rather a matter of passing judgement on and influencing other states’ behaviour.

Has entry into integrated European institutions brought Nordic positions closer together? The only possible answer on the above showing is ‘Yes and No’. Denmark and Norway reacted in parallel ways, but to different degrees, when their interests and public attitudes were placed under stress by NATO’s nuclear policies in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the end of the cold war, however, their policies have begun to plainly diverge on nuclear matters as, indeed, on other aspects of alliance policy and European–US relations more broadly—with Denmark moving into the NATO mainstream or even somewhat ‘to the right’ of it. A rough parallel might be drawn between this and the respective experiences of Finland and Sweden within the EU. These two countries have

often found their positions coinciding when they have pressed for positive pro-
arms control developments in EU common policies, rather as they made
common cause at key points in the development of the European Security and
Defence Policy. Their underlying motivations and priorities have, however,
remained somewhat different. Sweden has frequently reclaimed its freedom to
adopt more ambitious and idealistic positions outside the EU framework, while
Finland has preferred to stay within (or, indeed, help consolidate) the European
mainstream. Moreover, while the three Nordic EU members now have a prac-
tice of regular top-level consultations before European Council meetings, there
is no evidence of this leading to joint positions à trois on WMD issues. Rather,
there is reason to believe that the discussions of the leaders of these three coun-
tries on security-related matters often turn on how to minimize the fallout from
irreducible Nordic differences.

Last, but not least, have Nordic values and objectives influenced EU policies?
In the case of the EU’s 2003 WMD strategy and its follow-up the answer is
clearly ‘Yes’, and in many other instances Finnish and Swedish inputs have
helped to goad the EU into maintaining a positive and proactive role on arms
control and proliferation-related issues. There are further openings for them to
play their role as the EU starts to plan for the next phase of development of the
WMD strategy and its associated funding in the medium-term budget period
from 2007 to 2012. The limiting factor on Nordic influence is simply that ‘the
smaller states propose, the larger dispose’, particularly on an issue as sensitive
within the EU’s membership as the possession of nuclear weapons. The
interesting question for Sweden, in particular, will be how long the limited
ambit of collective EU policies will leave it free to promote its own higher-prin-
cipled views outside them. Neither large nor small states in the European Union
can ultimately escape from the logic that the strengthening of common pos-
tions is bought at the price of national particularities.

50 Council of the European Union (note 32).
15. The interface of external and internal security in the EU and in Nordic policies

Magnus Ekengren

I. Sources and implications of the external–internal security interface

The wars in the Balkans in the 1990s, the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak in the United Kingdom, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, the flooding in Central Europe in 2002, and the terrorist bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and in London on 7 July 2005 are all crises that highlight the interface of external and internal security. Assuming that the attack in Madrid constituted a security crisis for the European Union and was carried out by terrorists in ‘reaction’ to Spanish participation in the 2003 Iraq war, was the attack an issue of internal or external EU security? Given that the Nordic countries responded to the 2001 attacks on the USA in both the international and domestic arenas, were those attacks a threat to external or internal national security for these countries?

Clearly, a distinction between the two aspects of security is difficult to make. The close interface of external and internal security not only is due to the ‘trans-boundary’ character of threats and crises but is also reflected in recent EU policies at both the official and the practical level. The 2003 European Security Strategy states that ‘internal and external aspects are indissolubly linked’. 1 Renata Dwan notes that the concerns driving the implementation of the European Security and Defence Policy in the Balkans are clearly both domestic and international in character: ‘At least part of the reason why EUPM [the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina] received good support in its call for organized crime experts is because of the interest many internal affairs ministries and police departments have in tackling the smuggling and crime routes through the Balkans that end up in their capitals.’ 2

This chapter sketches a theoretical framework for analysis of the interface of external and internal security and then explores some of the driving forces behind the increasingly close interface (section II). It also discusses the impli-


cations of this interface for the security role of the EU in general (section III). It examines one of the most important sources of change—the responses to the September 2001 attacks—at EU member state level as well as European Union level. In order to illustrate an important case of national policy adaptation, the chapter investigates the positions of the Nordic countries with regard to the use of military assistance in ‘domestic’ counter-terrorism activities (section IV). At the EU level, an overview of the measures adopted in the external as well as internal EU pillars is presented (section V) together with an analysis of the Union’s solidarity clause on terrorism adopted on 25 March 2004 (section VI). The clause is perhaps the most significant example of the external–internal interface in EU policies and it states that the EU member states ‘shall mobilise all the instruments at their disposal, including military resources to: prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of one of them’. The member state and EU levels are closely linked because national military assistance for internal EU use is of central importance for the effective implementation of this clause.

The closer interface makes the development of the EU’s security policies increasingly dependent on the contributions of the member states. In order to put the national resources requested at the disposal of the EU, governments must fundamentally rethink state security and defence—including the traditional division of roles between the police and the military—as well as the meaning of European mutual assistance. Finally, the chapter addresses the question of whether the current security identity of the EU is being transformed from a European security community to a secure European community—a homeland defence à la Europe (section VII).

II. Towards a theory of the interface of external and internal security

‘European Union security’ has often been analysed using concepts and frameworks borrowed from the study of national security. Consequently, a strong distinction has been made between internal ‘desecuritization’ of relations between EU member states and an external Common Foreign and Security Policy, which has been analysed in the context of international security dynamics. This division originates in the tradition of territorial security and border defence based on spatially defined units of analysis: states. It is also a

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3 The ‘first pillar’ of the EU refers to Treaty of Rome-based activities (‘Community’ activities such as trade, the common market, etc.), the ‘second pillar’ to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (and now the European Security and Defence Policy), and the ‘third pillar’ to cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs.


product of the EU’s ‘pillar’ construction where the second pillar (the CFSP) has been contrasted—formally as well as analytically—with the ‘internal’ domains of the first and, more recently, the third pillar. However, the question is to what extent a line between external and internal security can be drawn for a political entity that is not first and foremost territorially defined and one of whose aims was to erode borders for the purpose of inter-state security. The questions of what is inside and what outside the EU and of external and internal EU security thus have aroused significant analytical interest.

Theories on the dissolution of boundaries between internal and external national security have been elaborated in relation to international relations and to EU governance ‘beyond the states’. By adopting a different epistemological outlook, Didier Bigo has come furthest in demarcating a new trans-boundary ‘field of security’ in Europe. Bigo’s approach is based on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of field, which uses an ethno-methodological approach to the practices of security agents (military agencies, secret services, customs, police forces, etc.) to seek an understanding of why they securitize certain phenomena and not others and how they use these ‘devices’ as a ‘technique of government’. The role of the EU is described as a ‘platform’ for negotiations between the security agencies of the EU countries, such as the police and military forces. The roles of national actors are changing; both the police and the military forces are now increasingly oriented towards the common task of ‘internal’ European security. This has led to the development that security analysis and planning are pre-occupied with crisis situations and the prevention of conflicts and international crimes rather than traditional wars. Pan-European police cooperation is described as taking place in informal networks and through practices which are not officially recognized but created by police agencies as a ‘necessary’ answer.


to the new challenges and threats of the border-free Europe. The current theoretical challenge, however, is that the EU is no longer just a platform for national security agents working for internal European security: it now possesses both internal and external safety and security instruments of its own. The span of ‘EU security’ stretches from food and aviation safety to international peace and stability. This creates a need for an understanding of how the different EU instruments relate to each other, not only in the European field of security but also internationally. Before an ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimension can be discerned, however, the notion of EU security must be further defined.

What values, system, ‘functions’ or perhaps territory do the ESDP and the solidarity clause on terrorism aim to secure? One approach is to analyse the EU as an emerging domestic system and use theories of system and societal vulnerability. There is, for instance, a growing body of social theory literature on the consequences of major disturbances on society (i.e., system effects). At the international level, Robert Jervis has examined the generally strengthened interconnections that make international relations increasingly system-like and thus change the conditions for effective state action. Other scholars have discussed the need to conceptualize the international system in terms of an emerging civil global society. Regional systems have been understood by Hans Günter Brauch to be the result of the reconceptualization of security related to, for example, environmental conflicts in the Mediterranean area. Ulrich Beck has introduced the concept of ‘risk society’ as a description of today’s domestic systems. According to Niklas Luhmann, ‘the horizon of the future becomes shorter and more foreboding’ as a result of a new type of world society, which is characterized by complexity and a short-term, ‘crisis management’ style of politics. The systemic dimension of EU security could also be approached


through the new trans-governmental dynamics stemming from European policing.\textsuperscript{22}

Another approach is to consider European security from an international angle and to compare the EU’s global security identity with traditional actors such as the nation state.\textsuperscript{23} The West European nation state has secured the basic values it embodies—democracy, human rights, societal order and safety—through the overarching security goal of territorial integrity. The foremost security crisis for the nation state has been equated with the violation of the border, implying a threat to the sovereignty and indeed the very existence of the state. The main institutional instrument for this security is territorial defence, assured through military capabilities and with the support of international law. The analogous question with regard to the European Union is what values it aims to protect and through what security goals and instruments. What is the international security threat to the EU? Has it changed over time? The confusion evoked by this kind of question is due to the fact that the Union traditionally has not been conceived of as an international security object; it has, for example, no collective defence in the traditional sense. Nor has it been analysed as a subject pursuing an active security policy because ‘security policy’ has been adjudged to remain within the competence of the EU member states (or to be taken care of in other organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). The EU has traditionally most often been viewed as an outcome or reflection of the considerations of other players. Its success was that it created security by not discussing security. The consequence is that the EU until recently has lacked its own international security identity, which makes it difficult to capture in theoretical language the explicit and active EU security role that is taking shape today. The way in which the ESDP has evolved since 1999 has been interpreted as being ‘the end of territorial defence’ for the EU,\textsuperscript{24} but the definition of the EU’s security identity cannot be made with negations alone. The question remains of how to conceptualize the interface of internal and external security for a post-national European Union with little tradition of a security policy.

III. Widening the field of EU security

By mixing the domestic and international perspectives on EU security this section defines the Union security field as including areas beyond the formal EU borders. EU security can thus be defined as a sequence of concentric circles,


rather than on the basis of a strict distinction between internal and external security.

The EU has mainly responded to its neighbours in the wider Europe not as a traditional security actor but by extending its internal system of governance through enlargement and through the integration of external actors and resources into joint policy-making processes. The consequence is a blurred boundary between ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ in many EU security initiatives. In the light of earlier CFSP history (the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s and EU enlargement), the capabilities developed for the ESDP will probably be used primarily in the areas bordering the EU—whether defined as the ‘enlarged European security space’, the ‘internal’ European security area, ‘sub-regional institutional security frameworks’ or as the EU security field. These areas are defined not only by the incidence of trans-boundary threats and risks, but also by expanding economic and security networks—the EU’s traditional method of crisis and conflict prevention. The networks include first pillar systems to minimize societal vulnerabilities and prepare for emergencies. The main task of the new military and civilian actor capabilities of the ESDP is to manage crisis and conflict outside the borders of the EU. This is intended to make the EU better-equipped as an ‘international’ security actor in the same ‘boundary lands’ for which it is attempting to build a ‘domestic’ European infrastructure through inter alia the solidarity clause on terrorism. Forthcoming enlargements and the EU’s ‘new neighbourhood policy’ underline the need for

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26 On the basis of the growing collection of case studies of the EU’s external actions it is safe to conclude that the CFSP has been politically strongest within (‘collective at any cost’) and on the EU’s frontiers. See Piening, C., Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs (Lynne Rienner: London, 1997). This development has been underlined as a consequence of the extended cooperation with candidate states in the 1990s. See Friis, L. and Murphy, A., ‘The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: governance and boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 37, no. 2 (1999), pp. 211–32.


approaches that can transcend the internal–external distinction in an EU security field that is steadily moving east and south.

Further away from the EU heartland, the security identity of the EU is gradually changing character. European Union security is a hybrid of an international organization and a would-be polity whose object is both the protection of EU and universal values wherever they are threatened in the world and the safety of the EU citizens in a more narrow sense. European security crises might best be defined by threats to the core values of the EU—free trade and free passage, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and so on—and, increasingly, to international law and the values embodied by the United Nations. According to the EU’s Constitutional Treaty, ESDP missions should be carried out for the purpose of peacekeeping, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The EU’s first independently launched military operation—Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 2003—was carried out at the request of the UN (under a Chapter VII resolution). If the early practices involving UN requests and mandates have set a precedent for future ESDP operations, EU security might increasingly encompass all people who are involved in a grave international crisis. The evolving security role of the EU might perhaps best be characterized as that of a regional body for the implementation of UN decisions. In that case, EU security would equal international security, and the EU would have no specific external security space.

IV. The September 2001 attacks and the emerging new roles of the Nordic armed forces

There are many areas where fundamental revisions of national security and defence structures have been initiated as a result of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as mentioned above. The EU member states have started to redefine

34 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 19 Oct. 2004 but has not been ratified. The text of the treaty is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm> and selected articles are reproduced in the appendix in this volume
political and administrative divisions in their national governments. The Nordic countries responded to the events of September 2001 in both the international and domestic arenas, thereby *inter alia* bringing into the open the tension between upholding the principles of the rule of law and efficiency in counter-terrorism measures. The result for national systems is that, currently, the dividing line is less clear between internal vulnerability and external security: between military and police forces, military and civil intelligence, and the ministries of justice, foreign affairs (and development) and defence; and between policies of defence, preparedness and civil protection. This national development is a strong driving force behind the further erosion of borders in the Union security field insofar as it is creating new roles for security agencies and agents in practice. The demands of the ESDP and the solidarity clause on terrorism can only add impetus to this deepening of the security field (see below).

The security policies of the Nordic countries have converged around the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ since the end of the cold war. This development has included a shift of focus from the narrower notion of military defence to the goal of safeguarding the basic functions of society. The national legal frameworks concerning military assistance to civilian authorities and the police that evolved during this process have, more recently, constituted an obstacle to the creation of new means to counter terrorism. The possible kinds of assistance that could be required for the latter purpose include intelligence, the deployment of special forces, transport support, nuclear, biological and chemical weapon expertise, command and control to medical support and evacuations, logistic support and maritime patrolling. The EU member states have adopted many different solutions for providing and regulating these functions. In all of

42 Sallinen, A., ‘Från det traditionella militära försvaret till trygget av samhällets livsviktiga funktioner’ [From traditional military defence to the safeguarding of the basic functions of society], eds B. Sundelius and P. Daléus, *Från territoriella försvar i krig till samhällssäkerhet i fred: Analys av förändrade säkerhetspolitiska synsätt och verkligheter i de nordiska länderna efter den 11 september och Madrid-attentatet* [From territorial defence in war to societal security in peace: analyses of changed security policy visions and realities in the Nordic countries after 11 September and the Madrid attacks], Report ACTA B32 (Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security and Strategic Studies: Stockholm, 2004).
43 The French Gendarmerie Nationale is made up of paramilitary forces and is organized under the Ministry of the Interior. Austria, Belgium, Greece (to a certain extent), Italy and Luxembourg have similar forces. All these forces are specialized in terms of training, equipment (often comprising heavy weaponry,
the Nordic countries there has historically been a strict division between the military’s defence of the state border and national security and the maintenance of order by the police. In the aftermath of September 2001, however, the Nordic governments have begun to re-examine their legal frameworks with regard to the use of military assistance to combat terrorist attacks on their territory.

**Finland**

Finland’s 1980 Act on the provision of assistance by the defence forces to the police allows military assistance to be given only in cases where the resources of the police are inadequate. After a request from the police, the defence forces are allowed to assist in the search for and arrest of persons, the isolation of locations, the control of traffic, the protection of personnel or property, and so on. The decision on whether to provide military support is taken by the concerned military authority. After September 2001, a commission established to consider the act proposed amendments in areas related to the combating of terrorism. The rationale for such assistance is that terrorist acts may demand the use of military force and that the demand for additional police capabilities is so rare that it is not economically justifiable to allocate new resources to the police. Under the proposal, the police can ask the Ministry of the Interior to request assistance from the Ministry of Defence. The two ministers together decide whether this type of assistance ought to be provided. The naval and air force units of the defence forces can be put at the disposal of the police if the nature of the terrorist threat calls for these resources. The 2004 amendment to the 1980 act also specifies the conditions for military assistance. The police may receive assistance from the armed forces in order to prevent or avert certain criminal acts as specified in the Finnish Criminal Code. In emergency situations when there is a ‘serious’ and ‘direct’ threat to ‘particularly important’ functions of society, the police force’s request for assistance can be made directly to the top military command. The government is to be informed of such

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a request. In the Finnish Government’s strategy for national preparedness the basic functions of society are defined as ‘state leadership, external capacity to act, the nation’s military defence, internal security, functioning of the economy and society, securing the livelihood of the population and its capacity to act, and their ability to tolerate a crisis’.

Sweden

Military assistance by the Swedish Armed Forces to the police has not been permitted since 1931, when the military opened fire on a strike demonstration in Ådalen and 5 participants were killed. In 2003 the Swedish Ministry of Justice published the report of a government commission on the implications of the attacks of 11 September 2001, suggesting legal reforms to enable military assistance. The report proposed that, on the request of the police or coastguard, the armed forces could intervene against non-state actors with the degree of force necessary to avert immediate danger to the safety of the state or to human life or to prevent extensive destruction of property. The commission suggested that the government could deploy the armed forces to combat an armed attack against the Swedish state even if the attack did not emanate from a foreign state. This opened a new field in which the armed forces could be used: military assistance would be allowed in cases of large-scale terrorist attacks threatening the security of the state. Less serious terrorist attacks that could be classified as armed attacks against the security of the state would continue to be a matter for the police. Currently, the armed forces may respond to surprise attacks against the Swedish state by a foreign state without awaiting a decision by the government. The report suggested that this condition should also apply in the event of threats from terrorists. The report further recommended enhanced cooperation between the military and police, for example through joint task units, to improve readiness to meet the threat of attacks with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

The report and the proposed bill did not obtain political support other than for its overview of Swedish intelligence needs and structures. The Prime Minister, Göran Persson, instead established in September 2004 a commission to investigate the role of the military in assisting the police ‘in the event of major attacks

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on [Sweden’s] democracy’. One task of the commission was to specify situations where the police might be assisted by the armed forces and, if necessary, present proposals for changes in the law. The commission’s report was presented in August 2005. It proposed that a new act be passed to regulate the support of the police from the armed forces and other governmental bodies.

In the framework of the EU solidarity clause on terrorism, the Swedish Government predicts that military support for civilian crisis management, including the police, will most likely concern the provision of nuclear, biological and chemical expertise, logistics and command resources.

Denmark

One of the tasks for the Danish Armed Forces, according to the 2001 defence forces act, is assistance to the civilian authorities, including both assistance in rescue operations and assistance to the police. The guiding principle is that military units providing assistance are subordinated to the command of the requesting authority and should obey the latter’s rules of engagement. There are no particular statutory limitations concerning the character of the assistance.

According to the act, among the assets that could be provided by the armed forces are helicopters and boarding expertise. The Danish police do not possess their own helicopters, and it is primarily the Royal Danish Navy that could provide boarding expertise to the police. Danish law does not exclude assistance for combating organized crime. Decisions on this kind of assistance are taken jointly by the ministries of Justice and Defence.

Norway

Military assistance to the Norwegian police is regulated in ‘Instructions concerning the defence forces assistance to the police’, the latest version of which was adopted in 2003. The police are allowed to request military assistance in

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56 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Instruks for Forsvarets bistand til politiet’ [Instructions concerning the defence forces’ assistance to the police], Royal resolution, Oslo, 28. Feb. 2003.
extraordinarily dangerous situations when the police lack the competence or equipment needed. In such situations, the police can request help in order to search and arrest dangerous criminals or mentally deranged persons ‘when it is necessary to avert an immediate danger to lives or health’ or in order ‘to prevent immediate, widespread danger . . . to society’s key interests and for countering and combating such threats’.57

The task of special units of the defence forces is to assist the police in combating terrorism and sabotage against oil installations and ships at open sea and sabotage on land. The Ministry of Justice and the Police has elaborated a number of scenarios for military assistance in cases of offshore terrorist attacks. In hypothetical cases of ‘massive attacks’ against oil installations and when there is uncertainty as to whether the country faces a peacetime crisis, security policy crisis or war the government will give the armed forces the main responsibility for meeting the threat.58

In summary, the emerging new internal role of the Nordic armed forces is a significant example of the closer interface of internal and external national security that constitutes the basis of the EU security field. Sections V and VI below illustrate how the interface of internal and external EU security and the feasibility and strength of the EU’s policies depend to a large extent on this national interface. The ability of the EU member states to provide for capacities such as military assistance to civil crisis management will be decisive for the EU’s possibilities to transcend the internal–external Union security boundary through the ESDP and the solidarity clause against terrorism.

V. The September 2001 attacks and the EU’s response as ‘functional’ security

The EU’s security answer to the September 2001 attacks on the USA was non-military in nature. The focus was put on the crisis management capacities that exist in all three EU pillars. In practice, this made the EU responsible for the paradox of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ non-territorial security and contributed to the widening of the EU security field. In general, the events of September 2001 started a process which has led the EU to rethink its previous demarcation lines between trade, aid, diplomacy and the new crisis management capacities created under the ESDP. Discussions on whether or not to employ the capacities of the EU’s third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs—for example, in the areas of personnel and threat identification—signalled a development towards a broad trans-boundary security approach to the ESDP. For internal as well as external security reasons, many argued that there was an urgent need for better

57 Norwegian Ministry of Defence (note 56), chapter 3, paragraph 11, p. 6 (author’s translation).
coordination between non-military ESDP activities, work under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, and the European Commission. It was also suggested that security thinking should be ‘mainstreamed’ into other areas of EU cooperation as well. According to the solidarity clause on terrorism, the EU should make the most of its multi-sectoral character—including the possession of military instruments\(^{59}\)—in action on its own territory.\(^{60}\)

In the first pillar, the EU elaborated a new ‘rapid reaction mechanism’ for international civil crisis management and a ‘community mechanism’ for civil protection\(^{61}\) and adopted a range of security measures across a wide area of its competences.\(^{62}\) Emergency preparedness was one of five areas prioritized by the EU in the fight against terrorism.\(^{63}\) Crisis management in the second pillar includes military and civil capacities. Under the ESDP, the EU will be able to deploy up to 5000 police personnel for international missions and will also be able to undertake missions designed to strengthen civil law systems and administration and provide for civil protection. The EU’s military crisis management capacities build on close cooperation with NATO.\(^{64}\) In December 2003 the EU adopted (after amendment) the European Security Strategy proposed by the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana.\(^{65}\) One of the greatest threats identified in the security strategy is the use of ‘weapons of mass disruption’ by terrorists, which could result in power outages, water supply problems and a breakdown in basic infrastructure.\(^{66}\) In the third pillar, police and judicial cooperation (handled by the Commission’s Directorate-General for

\(^{59}\) On the role of the military in national functional security see Stålvant (note 43).

\(^{60}\) European Council (note 4).


\(^{62}\) A whole range of security and safety measures have been adopted since late 2001 under the competences of the first pillar. These include measures for: (a) economic security—the protection of technical infrastructure, the combating of terrorist funding (under the Directorate-General (DG) for Internal Market and Services); a rapid reaction mechanism for international civil crisis management (DG External Relations); and programmes for civil aviation security (DG Enterprise and Industry)—and (b) civil protection—a Community mechanism (DG Environment); a rapid reaction network in the field of ‘health security’, programmes for the control of communicable diseases, preparedness and response to biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks (DG Health and Consumer Protection); general vulnerability reduction; security of energy supply; diplomacy (e.g., in the UN); a Joint Research Centre (including a new security programme); and policies of common risk analysis and intelligence. Jarlsvik, H. and Castenfors, K., Säkerhet och beredskap i Europeiska Unionen [Security and preparedness in the European Union], Krisberedskapsmyndigheten temaserie 2004:3 (Krisberedskapsmyndigheten: Stockholm, 2004), URL <http://www.krisberedskapsmyndighetens.se/>.


\(^{65}\) Council of the European Union (note 1).

Justice, Freedom and Security) formed the basis for the EU’s measures to directly combat terrorism. The EU adopted a European arrest warrant, a common definition of terrorism and a common list of terrorist organizations. It also established an exchange of information between the member states and Europol, an anti-terrorist team within Europol and a Eurojust network for coordination between prosecutors, police officers and the like. The Commission is investigating the possibility of creating a common EU agency for the control of EU borders.

Some of the measures taken by the EU since 2001 are easier to identify and categorize than others. The Commission’s work for the improvement of the security of the global sea-container shipping system is aimed not only at the protection of the smooth functioning of free trade, but also at the safety of passengers and personnel. Other, for example ‘non-protective’, measures that dominated the EU’s response to the September 2001 attacks are more difficult to characterize. What do the strengthened instruments and cooperation in the spheres of intelligence, police and justice contained in the EU’s anti-terrorism action plan of 2001 aim to secure? Is it the survival of: (a) the citizens of the EU and the individual member states; (b) democracy, governance and government in the EU and the member states; or (c) national and international justice? In practice, the EU has in many fields moved towards a strengthened capacity for securing EU citizens against external or domestic threats as well as from the deadly consequences of major emergencies. In addition to an evolving capacity for the management of crises outside the borders of the EU, Europeans have come to expect the EU to be able to cope with emergencies within the borders of the enlarged Union.

Amid the variety of EU instruments and practices a new security task is emerging for the EU. The goal is to safeguard the functions of governmental and societal institutions by methods that include rapid reaction networks, the stockpiling of vaccines, securing energy and transport flows, and receiving

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69 The ‘network for the epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases in the Community’ (established 1999) and the ‘health security programme’ (2001) provide a system for early warning and response among the EU member states. The system links the national health and civil protection authorities with the Commission and provides for an EU coordination mechanism, an EU-wide capability for rapid detection, identification and diagnosis of cases and agents, and an inventory of available medicines (including stockpiling and medical development strategies) and experts. The EU health and security committee has established a Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats (RASBICHAT) for 24 hours/day service. In 2004 the EU decided to set up the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (in Stockholm). The threats that were identified in the discussions on creating the EU system include the ‘normal’ spreading of epidemics (such as severe acute respiratory syndrome, SARS) and food related diseases (e.g., BSE) as well as strategic attacks (e.g., anthrax) against vital infrastructure. Matzén, N., ‘European “functional” security: a study of security practices in the public health sector’,
immigrants.\textsuperscript{70} Securing these functions is a prerequisite for upholding the values embodied by the European Union. This is not only a matter of maintaining infrastructure but also concerns the functioning of national government and EU governance: the ability to lead society and to articulate political goals.\textsuperscript{71} Early experiences in EU-level civil protection have also revealed the strong role of symbolic goals. After September 2001 more than 1000 rescue workers from the EU member states were coordinated through the Community mechanism for the protection of shipping across the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{72} This was a strong manifestation of Europe’s solidarity in matters of security with the USA. It helped to stress that security-relevant ‘functions’, in contrast to ‘territories’, are not delimited by spatial borders but are rather defined over time.

The creation of EU infrastructures for safety, security and defence is not only a question of coordinating the resources of the member states. New demands are placed on the capacity and willingness of the EU member states to cooperate over a longer period of time. A common European outlook on threats and security questions is now forming. The need to coordinate national civil and military defence structures so that the resources of the member states and of the EU could be rapidly used has been recognized. Regional and local authorities—the backbone of civil crisis management and defence in many countries—need to be involved in such efforts. The solidarity clause on terrorism has demonstrated the need for the member states to have linked or compatible multi-sectoral EU infrastructures that act to establish norms and standards.\textsuperscript{73} These should include national administrations as well as civil society, the private sector, business and non-governmental organizations. This can only be achieved to a limited extent through EU legislation, central EU coordination or binding commitments. The problems are similar to those encountered in other areas where the EU has progressed from negative to positive integration: from the abolition of obstacles to cooperation to more active policy making for common goals. The aim of the solidarity clause on terrorism is—with the support of the new civil and military crisis management tools—to transform the

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EU’s multi-sectoral instruments for ‘passive’ conflict prevention and security into an ‘active’ defence policy.\(^\text{74}\)

The first cases of EU civil protection assistance,\(^\text{75}\) and related exercises,\(^\text{76}\) showed that it would probably be sufficient and more efficient if only a subset of member states participate in each instance in order to avoid problems of logistics and coordination.\(^\text{77}\) There will be strong political pressure on the nations possessing the appropriate means of assistance to provide it. One of the lessons learned so far is that to work with a limited number of states with the most suitable tools would probably be more efficient than to ‘mobilize all Union instruments’.\(^\text{78}\) Voluntary EU solidarity, rather than treaty-based obligations to provide a certain type of support, would appear to be sufficient for the mobilization of the European resources and actions needed in EU crisis management.


\(^{75}\) The mechanism has been used 7 times since its establishment. The coordination of more than 1000 rescue workers from the member states to be sent to the USA after the 11 Sep. 2001 attacks was mentioned above. Among the first tasks in Europe was the coordination of assistance to the Czech Republic during the floods in the summer of 2002. The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) subsequently made requests for assistance in connection with the *Prestige* oil-tanker accident off the Spanish coast in the autumn of 2002. Ships, aircraft, equipment and experts from different participating countries were put at the disposal of the Spanish, French and Portuguese authorities. The mechanism was also used to meet a request for high-capacity pumps during the floods in France in Dec. 2003. Following the Feb. 2004 earthquake in Morocco, the MIC requested assistance from the EU member and candidate states in the form of search-and-rescue teams and power-generating plants. The civil protection operation engaged more than 17 European countries. Moreover, the Commission, through the European Community Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) department, adopted an emergency decision with 6 partners in order to assist the victims of the earthquake. Several capacities were tested in these first EU interventions. The value added by the mechanism over the system of bilateral requests for assistance is its provision for a response that is more consolidated and, theoretically, quicker and more precise. Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Reinforcing the civil protection capacity of the European Union’, COM (2004) 200 final, Brussels, 25 Mar. 2004, URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/docum/>, p. 10.

\(^{76}\) EUROTOX, the first full-scale exercise to test the EU’s ability to respond to a terrorist attack, was carried out in Canjuers, France, in Oct. 2004. The mechanism performed well as a clearing house for assistance. However, a number of technical problems occurred, which were mainly related to communication between the various national teams. Piana (note 64).

\(^{77}\) ‘Hon driver Sveriges ståndpunkter i Bryssel’ [She’s pursuing Swedish standpoints in Brussels], Interview with Pia Övelius, defence councillor, Swedish Representation to the EU, Brussels, *Kris–Beredskap*, no. 3 (2004), pp. 9–11.

\(^{78}\) Piana (note 64).
VI. The Solidarity Clause: codifying the interface of internal–external EU security

In 2003 the European Convention proposed to codify the evolving practices of EU functional security in the form of a new treaty-based ‘Solidarity Clause’ covering possible terrorist attacks and their consequences on European soil. Later this clause was included in the Constitutional Treaty. The European Council adopted the clause, ahead of the constitution as a whole, as a political declaration in the aftermath of the March 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid. The clause states that the EU shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including military resources, to: ‘(a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; [and] (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster’.

To this end, the member states will coordinate activities between themselves in the Council of the European Union. The Council will be assisted for this purpose by the Political and Security Committee and by a new standing Internal Security Committee. The European Council will regularly assess the threats facing the EU.

The Solidarity Clause on terrorism legally codifies the external–internal interface by formally recognizing the new object of EU security discussed above: the functions of democratic institutions are to be safeguarded and populations are to be protected. Compared to the case of the traditional nation state, functional specification is given a relatively stronger position than territorial delimitation as a basis of EU security and defence. This weakens the rationale for a dividing line between internal and external EU security, in practice as well as in theory. The territorial dimension is weakened due to the vagueness of the clause as regards where assistance should be deployed in order to prevent terrorist threats and protect democratic institutions. The formulation ‘in the territory of the Member States’ points to a new kind of international security and defence cooperation. ‘In the territory’ of the Union takes on a more far-reaching meaning because the EU could soon comprise more than 30 member states. In addition, the EU will probably increased cooperation with Russia and other

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79 This section is largely based on Ekengren, M. and Larsson, S., Säkerhet och försvar i framtidens EU: en analys av försvarsfrågorna i det europeiska konventet [Security and defence in the future EU: an analysis of the defence questions in the European convention], Report no. 2003:10 (Swedish Institute of European Policy Studies (SIEPS); Stockholm, 2003), URL <http://www.sieps.se/_eng/forskning.htm>. See also the SIEPS Internet site at URL <http://www.sieps.se/>.


81 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (note 34), Article I-43.

82 European Council (note 4).
neighbouring states in the Middle East and North Africa. The goal of the EU is not the defence of the territory at the borders of a geographically delimited area, but rather the defence of an unspecified ‘people’ and an undefined institutional capacity for democracy. Moreover, this applies to a territory that in practice stretches beyond the borders of the EU member states in the context of the imperative to prevent terrorist threats internationally, as envisaged by the European Security Strategy. The Solidarity Clause thus opens the way for both a deepening and widening of the EU security field.

The clause is clearer regarding when mutual assistance should be carried out. The EU members should take preventive measures before an attack, constantly protect each other and assist after a member state has been attacked. The EU is attempting to redefine the basis for defence from a question of where—inside or outside, internal or external—to an issue of when. This change in security and defence thinking involves a shift of focus from space to pace. European Union assistance to a member state will occur at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack. It is still an open question whether and in what form the EU would assist in cases of emergency when the political authorities of a member state are unable to articulate such a demand. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to posit EU assistance also in such hypothetical cases, considering that the EU and its member states, according to the clause, ‘shall act jointly in the spirit of solidarity’ if a member state is attacked. The wording evokes the image of an emerging European system to be protected and a European society to feel responsible for. However, the question remains: what kind of threat or crisis would be truly ‘European’ and thus activate the clause?

With the Solidarity Clause on terrorism, the EU might, as the first international entity of its kind, be able to take a step towards a new type of transnational, functional or ‘societal’ defence, in contrast to state defence. The goal of the EU will be not territorial but functional integrity. Bengt Sundelius concludes that the Solidarity Clause attempts to combine state security and human safety in the ‘intermestic sphere’ (international–domestic)—as he defines the security domain for the EU. If successful, the clause will probably have a strong positive impact on the long-term formation of an EU (defence) identity. This emerging EU ‘total defence’ concept would differ from collective territorial defence for ‘internal’ security as well as from external EU crisis management. In harmony with its uniquely transnational character, the EU could become a defence union rather than a defence alliance. It could be a step that, with time, might be a model also for other parts of the world. Perhaps Europe could be linked together with similar regional systems into a global defence network for the combating of today’s network-based global terrorism.

84 The author thanks Carl Einar Stålvant for this observation.
85 Sundelius (note 71), p. 8.
The Solidarity Clause on terrorism will serve as an instrument that contributes to the dissolution of the boundary between internal civil protection for emergencies and external crisis management for security. It could be interpreted as bridging the two main views that have coexisted so far on the finalité of EU defence: collective defence, on the one hand, and crisis management and security through networks on the other. An EU defence within the territory of the EU is more easily reconciled with European integration’s traditional role of creating a long-term zone of peace, in contrast to the defence of territory for its own sake. The latter is more closely associated with traditional military instruments of power, which could be detrimental to relations with certain third countries and to the image of the EU as a security model. The EU could thus become a defence power while simultaneously avoiding a new and potentially destabilizing balance-of-power relationship with neighbouring regions. The EU candidate states could be involved at an early stage of the accession process, and neighbouring and other states should be allowed to participate as far as possible. Gustav Hägglund, former chairman of the EU Military Committee, has proposed the development of an EU ‘homeland defence’ which would also involve military measures. One thing is clear: the current discussion on the coordination of civil–military instruments in external missions will parallel the debate about defence within the EU territory. Intensive horizontal, trans-sectoral coordination will be needed within the EU. The question is who will take on the prime coordinating responsibility.

VII. Towards a new trans-boundary EU security role: from a European security community to a secure European community

This chapter elaborates the concept of a deepening and widening European security field as a way to understand and transcend the division between internal and external EU security. The new roles of Nordic armed forces are a key factor behind the increasingly closer interface of national internal and external security and the deepening of the security concept. The EU response to the attacks of September 2001 has been a driving force for both deepening and widening this interface, and this has implications for the role of the EU in terms of functional security and an eventual defence union.

In a longer-time perspective, the transformation of the EU security field points in the direction of a new historical stage in the security role of the Union. An important observation from the history of war and conflicts is that nation states have had a strong tendency to plan their security and defence in accordance with the lessons learned from the most recent war. In the 1950s the European Community helped the West European states to break this vicious circle of

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86 de Wijk (note 72).
retrospection and, instead, enabled them to think ahead in terms of active common security through transnational cooperation. With the EU’s transcending of national internal–external boundaries, Western Europe emerged as a security community: defined by Karl Deutsch as a group of people integrated to the point where there is a ‘real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other ways’.88 For the European security community, there was no sharp division between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security.

Since the end of the cold war the EU has been prone to the same weaknesses as nation states when forming its security and defence policy. It has reacted to events and created tools for ‘fighting the most recent war’. The EU reacted to the Balkan wars by creating the ESDP for strictly ‘external’ use, and to September 2001 by strengthening its ‘internal’ security and adopting a security strategy modelled at least in part on the National Security Strategy of the USA. One of the reasons for the growing gap between expectation and capability in current European security and defence policy may lie in the fact that the EU has lost its lead in developing new kinds of international relations for the creation of security. This explains inter alia why the EU is being compared with traditional international actors such as NATO and the USA. In such a comparison the EU fares badly and its image is damaged. Historically, this was not the approach that made the EU successful. The European Community’s unique transboundary approach was developed on its own merits and comparative advantages. The current challenge is to try again to make the most of European innovative thinking on conflict prevention, crisis management, peace and stability.

In the 1950s the European Union was able to transcend the division between external and domestic security for its member states by generating cooperation and community through transnational networking. Fifty years later, it has begun to dissolve the boundary between external and internal EU security by expanding its internal safety, police and defence cooperation to neighbouring areas and linking it to the EU’s contribution to international security. This chapter examines some of the clearest and most visible signs of this development. The trans-governmental security and safety cooperation that has evolved since September 2001, and that has been codified by the Solidarity Clause on terrorism, might provide the EU with an opportunity to take the lead again in the creation of post-national security systems and communities.

As in the case of the security community, however, the new EU security identity does not imply the transformation of Europe into a state. It is also unlikely to be based on a military defence alliance. Instead, the Solidarity Clause and the ESDP point to a new type of regional security identity. The question is whether the EU will manage to deepen the European security community into a secure European community—a homeland defence à la Europe.

A secure community could tentatively be defined as a group of people that is integrated to the point where there is real assurance that the members of that community will assist each other to protect their democratic institutions and civilian populations—the basic functions of their societies and governments. In this kind of community there would also be no clear distinction between internal and external security. It is in the light of this emerging new European—and perhaps transatlantic—secure community that the further evolution of the EU’s security role should be assessed.
16. Muddling through: how the EU is countering new threats to the homeland

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen

I. Introduction

The European Union has always been characterized by a diversity of views, objectives and priorities. Atlanticism and Europeanism, activism and reticence, supra-nationalism and nationalism have coexisted in the area of security policy since the idea of a common European security and defence policy first emerged, in the 1950s. When France and the United Kingdom launched the European Security and Defence Policy in 1998, the minefield of divergent European world views was avoided by focusing on the pragmatic goal of upgrading Europe’s military capabilities. The questions of where, with whom and for what Europe intended to use its military capabilities were left open. Thus, the ESDP can be said to have thrived on a deliberate ambiguity as to strategic questions and the final goal of the process.”

The emerging area of EU cooperation in enhancing societal security and countering new transnational threats, described in chapter 15 by Magnus Eken gren, is similarly characterized by ambiguity as to strategic goals, priorities and methods. Recognizing that the Union has a crucial role to play in this area, policy makers have launched a number of initiatives, spanning judicial and legal cooperation, intelligence cooperation, and cooperation to enhance transportation security, maritime and port security, health, food security and civil protection. Documents listing the numerous initiatives exist and the EU’s Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism outlines seven so-called strategic priorities ranging from combating factors leading to radicalization via strengthening the international consensus in the effort against terrorism to improving the security of international transportation systems.” Yet, none of the many documents spells out the goal of the Union’s effort, setting clear priorities and relating means to ends. In other words, there is no overarching strategy to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU’s efforts to protect its citizens against new risks and threats within Europe’s borders.”


Modern societies have countless points of vulnerability and face a diverse range of threats and risks. Without a clear strategy to guide the efforts, scarce resources are likely to be wasted. Therefore, this chapter argues, the bottom-up processes described by Ekengren—where emerging practices define the field of EU societal security—need to be complemented with a deliberate top-down effort to formulate goals and set priorities. Based on lessons from the Nordic countries, this chapter discusses the challenges in formulating an EU strategy for societal security and suggests how the EU could nevertheless proceed.

While there is no consensus on how to define a strategy, two key elements appear in most definitions: any strategy should contain a description of its goal and a plan to reach that goal in a cost-effective way.\footnote{Baylis, J. et al., *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), p. 4.} Table 16.1 identifies three essential components of a European strategy for societal security and indicates some of the major challenges entailed in formulating such a strategy. Sections II–IV study the three components identified. Section V considers Europe’s need to take responsibility for its own societal security and section VI contains the conclusions.

II. Formulating goals, setting priorities

Any effective strategy requires that the goal of the effort be defined in a clear and realistic way. This is the case when it comes to traditional notions of military and national security, and it is no less the case for the emerging area of societal security.\footnote{For a US attempt to develop such a strategy see Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, ‘Forging America’s new normalcy’, 5th Annual Report, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, Washington, DC, Dec. 2003, URL <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/>.} Considering the multiplicity of vulnerabilities, the interdependence between countries and sectors, and the long list of potential targets and attack or accident scenarios, it becomes obvious that there can be no such thing as absolute security. Modern societies face a variety of risks, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and associated materials, organized crime, environmental and natural disasters, extreme weather, epidemics, man-made accidents and breakdowns in critical infrastructure. It is necessary to determine which risks have an acceptably low probability of occurrence and which do not, and to prioritize preventive and protective efforts accordingly, taking into account the potential scope of the damage associated with the different risks.

Leaders of the EU should consider carefully who and what the Union should be able to protect its citizens against. Logically, the EU should take responsibility for EU-wide threats and risks that cannot be handled effectively by any one country in isolation, as well as for new risks that result from the EU integration process and the internal market. Prevention and protection against
In order to set priorities, however, it is crucial to have an overview of EU-level vulnerabilities. Those risks and attack scenarios that will require an EU-level response should be identified so that they can be averted or handled effectively, and they should be ranked according to a combination of their relative probability and the potential consequences. No such overview or ranking exists today. One possible way to fill this gap would be to appoint an EU vulnerability commission along the lines of the national vulnerability commissions of the Nordic countries. These commissions have undertaken comprehensive analyses of the vulnerabilities in different sectors of society as well as the interdependence between the sectors.

An overview of the EU’s vulnerabilities would provide a factual basis for defining EU homeland security goals, for prioritizing the numerous possible initiatives and for allocating scarce resources in a way that ensures the maximum improvement in security and resilience. Even based on such an overview, however, it would remain politically difficult to set clear priorities. Defining who and what the EU is dedicated to protect entails simultaneously making

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Components of a strategy for societal security</th>
<th>Challenges in formulating an EU strategy for societal security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formulating goals, setting priorities</strong></td>
<td>There is no overview of EU-level vulnerabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What and whom should the EU protect and against what?</td>
<td>It is politically tricky to set priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competence and capabilities</strong></td>
<td>There is no overview of capabilities at local, national and EU level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the EU have the instruments and capabilities to realize the goal?</td>
<td>There is limited interoperability and an absence of common standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td>It is necessary to effectively coordinate a multiplicity of stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How can means and ends be connected in the most effective and efficient way?</td>
<td>The use of risk assessment and regular evaluation of societal security programmes is necessary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WMD incidents would belong to the first category; border protection would be an example from the latter category.

Table 16.1. Components of a strategy for societal security and major challenges in formulating such a strategy for the EU

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clear who and what it will not be able to protect. Decision makers would probably prefer not to have to make such distinctions. Moreover, for such decisions to be legitimate it would probably be necessary to allow for public debate and the involvement of civil society in the priority-setting process—things that are notoriously difficult to obtain at the EU level. Terrorism experts might also counsel that being excessively specific and public about defensive priorities is tactically unwise, as it could provide terrorists with a roadmap for target selection, albeit a rudimentary one. Yet, for the sake of democratic legitimacy, it is still preferable to set the priorities by design, rather than by default, and openly, rather than implicitly. Although the European Parliament does not have within its purview all the sectors that an EU strategy for societal or homeland security ought to cover, it might still provide a useful and open forum for a comprehensive debate about goals and priorities.

III. Competence and capabilities

Once the goal of the strategy has been formulated, the next set of challenges is to determine whether the EU has the competence and capabilities required to reach that goal. The EU does already have competence in some of the relevant policy areas, such as transportation, food safety and nuclear safety. However, key areas such as policing, intelligence, defence and civil protection remain member state competences. Depending on the homeland security goals that the EU sets itself, it might be necessary for the member states to grant the EU competence to coordinate or to promulgate standards in additional areas, for example, in the area of civil protection against non-conventional threats and risks.

It would also appear logical to extend the area of EU competence when it comes to new potential security concerns arising from the EU integration process itself. The EU’s internal market, for example, has created competitive pressure on operators of power grids and telecommunication networks that could conceivably have a negative effect on safety and security standards. If national authorities are reluctant to impose costly security requirements on national providers operating in a highly competitive EU market, the lowest common denominator in security will end up predominating in the entire EU area. In such circumstances, it is worth considering whether the EU should be authorized to issue common and binding standards for all companies operating in the EU in order to avoid a downward spiral. A similar logic is at play when it comes to protection of dangerous materials, which could be stolen and used in a terrorist attack anywhere in a Europe with no internal border controls. The EU might need to be able to issue common security standards to ensure that a borderless Europe does not become a less secure Europe. One framework for this would be a common EU approach to the implementation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1540 on WMD transfer and trafficking, although there might be other ‘dangerous materials’ that this would not cover.

As mentioned above, policing, intelligence, defence and civil protection remain areas of member state competence. Whereas in the wake of 11 September 2001 the EU strengthened its legal and judicial cooperation and created common analytical capabilities within Europol and Eurojust, there has been relatively little focus on creating common civil protection capabilities. A common database covering member state capabilities exists, but equipment and standards currently vary widely between member states, compromising interoperability between national services.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on Madrid on 11 March 2004, EU leaders pledged with the so-called ‘Solidarity Clause’ to come to each others’ aid in case of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, with all available civil and military means. If policy makers are serious about the Solidarity Clause, it would be logical to move towards common EU standards and procedures for civil protection and emergency response in order to ensure interoperability between national services. In that way, solidarity would be more than just a political signal: it would have practical value for ‘first responders’ on the ground and for citizens in a disaster area. Naturally, strong national economic interests would complicate a move towards common standards, emphasizing again the need for political courage in order to improve the security of EU citizens against new threats.

Standardization would in itself provide a tremendous boost to common EU civil protection capabilities. However, specialized capabilities—for example, to prevent and protect against WMD incidents—might be in short supply. In addition to charting and ranking EU vulnerabilities, an EU vulnerability commission could also formulate headline goals for societal security, assuming that the commission concludes that current capabilities are not sufficient to meet EU societal security needs.

IV. Implementation

Societal security spans a broad field. If the effort to maintain societal security is to be effective, numerous agencies, different levels of government, private companies and the public need to be persuaded to play a part.

Table 16.2 lists some of the major functions included in the emerging area of societal security. Using Denmark as an example, the table illustrates the number

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8 Europol was established by the EU in 1995 with the objective of improving police cooperation between the member states in order to combat terrorism, illicit traffic in drugs and other serious forms of international crime. Eurojust was established in 2002 by the EU with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of member states’ authorities in dealing with the investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border and organized crime.
of actors involved in providing security on the member state level. The right-hand column lists the additional actors involved at the EU level.

The long list of stakeholders indicates the difficulty of ensuring effective cross-governmental coordination. The Danish experience indicates that even at the national level it can be extremely difficult to persuade governmental agencies and companies that do not have security as their primary mission to give priority to vulnerability reduction and emergency planning. 10 If this is the case even in a small country where homeland security is among the top priorities of the government, where most top bureaucrats know each other and where most ministries are located within walking distance of each other, coordination and prioritization of homeland security in the EU will not be an easy task. Persuasion and voluntary coordination might not suffice when it comes to motivating and coordinating a large number of less than enthusiastic actors.

As shown in table 16.2, responsibility for protective and preventive initiatives in the EU is divided between the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, between several different directorates-general, between authorities at the EU and national levels, and between different organizations and levels of government within the EU member states. After the March 2004 terrorist attacks on Madrid, EU leaders appointed an anti-terrorism coordinator to coordinate the work of the Council and to ‘maintain an overview’ of all EU instruments for the prevention of and protection against terrorism. 11 Yet, lacking line management authority over most of the actors listed in table 16.2, the EU anti-terrorism coordinator has to rely on the power of persuasion—an inadequate instrument judging from the Danish experience. Arguably, if Europe is to forge an effective societal security policy, a stronger anti-terrorism coordinator with a staff and budget will be needed. Such a person, armed with discretionary funds that could be distributed in order to promote the upgrading and standardization of member state capabilities, could also be charged with following up on the implementation of societal security headline goals, should the EU decide that current capabilities are insufficient.

The final elements of the effective and efficient implementation of a strategy for societal security are instruments for regular evaluation. The ultimate measure of success in the large area of societal security, at least in terms of prevention and of improvement of resilience (as distinct from emergency response), is the absence of events. This obviously complicates programme evaluation. An EU vulnerability commission would thus also have to consider what proxy variables the EU could monitor to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the effort. It also remains important to monitor programmes and initiatives for unintended side effects. Raising security in one area—for example, around one category of potential terrorist targets—might compromise security in other sectors or geographical locations. Security measures involving the


11 Council of the European Union (note 9).
screening, profiling, detention and search of potential terrorist suspects may not only compromise civil liberties and the right to privacy, but also alienate segments of the population whose cooperation is crucial in the counter-terrorism and societal security effort. In some areas—for example, aviation security—security measures may have a negative impact on safety; this was the argument of a number of European pilots’ associations when the USA requested that armed air marshals be placed on board certain transatlantic flights. Finally, the economic costs of security measures imposed on private companies need to be taken into account when attempting to strike a balance between security and other EU priorities, such as growth and freedom of movement.

In sum, there are a number of political and practical challenges when it comes to forging a European strategy for societal security. However, the alternative is that European citizens will not enjoy the protection at home that they should and could with a more focused EU effort; and that the EU will not allocate the

Table 16.2. Functions and actors in homeland security at the national level in Denmark and at the EU level

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homeland security functions</th>
<th>Actors in Danish homeland security</th>
<th>Actors in European Union homeland security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and warning</td>
<td>Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (defence intelligence service)</td>
<td>Council of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border- and transportation security</td>
<td>Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (Danish Security Intelligence Service)</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic counter-terrorism</td>
<td>Ministries of:</td>
<td>Directorate-General for:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect critical infrastructure</td>
<td>Defence, including</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent and defend against</td>
<td>Beredskabsstyrelsens</td>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chemical, biological,</td>
<td>(Danish Emergency Management Agency)</td>
<td>Energy and Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radiological or nuclear</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Health and Consumer Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attack</td>
<td>Interior and Health</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency preparedness and</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
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<td>Environment</td>
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<td>Knowledge, Technology,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and Education</td>
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<td>Commerce</td>
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<td>Counties and municipalities,</td>
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<td>the private sector and the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>population</td>
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money that it does spend on societal security to the areas where the need is highest and the payback greatest.

V. Europe’s responsibility

After World War II, Western Europe grew strong under the sheltering wing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Through NATO’s collective defence clause, the USA in effect guaranteed Europe’s territorial security against the threat of a Soviet attack. Throughout the 1990s, the USA continued to prove willing, albeit at times belatedly, to engage in the management of threats to Europe’s security emanating from the wars in the former Yugoslavia. In the area of societal security, in contrast, there is no external actor to take responsibility.

Today, both the threats to security and the USA’s willingness to manage them on Europe’s behalf are changing. The USA is neither willing nor able to protect the European homeland against risks such as infrastructure breakdowns, epidemics, organized crime and terrorist attacks. On the contrary, when it comes to terrorism, instead of contributing directly and positively to EU security, the USA is currently—although indirectly and inadvertently—increasing the threat to Europe’s homeland. At least in the short and medium terms the US-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have spurred strong anti-Western feelings in the Muslim world and enhanced the recruitment opportunities of terrorist organizations and cells, including among minorities in Europe—witness the bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 2005.12 At the same time, US homeland security efforts, while in no way foolproof, have made it more difficult to strike the USA proper, thus conceivably redirecting some attacks towards US targets in Europe or towards European targets.

In sum, when coping with new threats to the European homeland, no one but the Europeans themselves can take responsibility. In this respect the stakes of European security cooperation have increased. Although many of the new risks and threats, barring the prospect of terrorists coming into possession of WMD, are certainly less existential than the threat of a Soviet attack, they do threaten European lives.

VI. Conclusions: difficult, not impossible

Forging an EU strategy for societal security is fraught with practical and political difficulties. Threat perceptions vary between member states; jealously guarded national competences will be at stake; institutional set-ups, procedures

and equipment differ; and large numbers of actors have to be persuaded to play their part. To some extent, homeland security will have to be an exercise in muddling through: it will have to continue to be based on bottom-up processes.

A common European domestic intelligence service, a European police force and a seamless judicial system might still be a distant, and arguably undesirable, prospect.13 However, this is not the case for other areas of societal security cooperation. Reinforced European cooperation on protecting critical infrastructure and services, securing dangerous materials and protecting civil populations against unconventional threats do not, like traditional areas of security policy, threaten the core pillars of national sovereignty and identity. Clearly, political will and courage are required, but the obstacles to cooperation ought to be less formidable than the obstacles that for so long prevented the formulation of a common European security strategy for external security.

Considering the strides that have been made towards a common European external security strategy—in December 2003 EU leaders for the first time managed to agree on an EU strategy that outlines threats and international strategic goals in a broad way14—it becomes even more difficult to argue that formulating a common strategy for societal security is not politically feasible. Effective protection of the citizens of EU countries against new risks and threats calls for close EU cooperation guided by a clear strategy. Formulating such a strategy, agreeing common standards and implementing them will prove difficult, but it should not be impossible. With high-level political commitment and courage, Europe has the opportunity to forge a common strategy and enhance societal security before instead of after a major disaster with significant cross-border repercussions hits.

The Nordic countries have, since the end of the cold war, converged around a concept of comprehensive security, encompassing security and safety in the face of a broad range of risks and threats. All the Nordic countries have, as pointed out above, completed extensive societal vulnerability analyses and are currently working towards expanded civil–military cooperation in providing security for their respective homelands. In the Öresund region, around the Danish capital Copenhagen and the Swedish city Malmö, emergency management cooperation is also being expanded. Arguably, a stronger EU role when it comes to dealing with trans-border threats to societal security ought to be both compatible with Nordic security concepts and a necessary complement to current national and regional efforts.


Part IV
The Nordic countries, their region and Europe: additional perspectives
Editor’s remarks

Alyson J. K. Bailes

This part of the volume may seem at first sight to consist of chapters united only by their diversity. Its main organizing principle is, in fact, to fill gaps in the coverage of the foregoing parts. The latter have been built around functional themes, using individual Nordic countries and their experiences chiefly as illustrations. In this part, some chapters take a deeper look at particular countries in order to explain what is special about their approach to the European Security and Defence Policy and, perhaps, to defence in general. Other contributions tell the stories of those who are often left out of account in analyses of Nordic security—Iceland and the special-status territory of Åland. (Greenland and the Faroe Islands are touched on in chapter 1.) While the earlier parts of this volume deal to a great extent with aspects of state policy and the actions of bureaucratic or business elites, this part also tries to reflect the roles and attitudes of other players such as parliaments and the media—groups that are represented by authors Tarja Cronberg and Nils Morten Udgaard, respectively. In counterpoint to this ‘disaggregating’ approach, however, the chapter by Pernille Rieker attempts a comparative review of Nordic policies that, appropriately enough, comes back full circle to some of the issues raised in the introduction.

A special word of explanation may be needed about the chapters by Karlis Neretnieks and Elzbieta Tromer. The decision was made to focus this volume, and the conference that preceded it, on the five Nordic states in the belief that these countries’ histories and political systems have led them into a distinctive, and partially parallel, set of challenges regarding the ESDP and European integration generally. The Baltic states neither caused these Nordic problems nor do they provide a model that (currently) offers any hope of solving them, nor can the Nordic countries offer the answer to the security worries that preoccupy the Baltic states themselves. Rather than leaving these judgements as mere assertions, Neretnieks’ and Tromer’s chapters have been included to explain in more detail what is different—and, in its way, also special—about the three Baltic states’ appreciation of regional and European security. These authors, both of whom have been deeply engaged in the process of Nordic–Baltic cooperation, come to very much the same conclusions about the limited or secondary place that the ESDP itself currently holds in Baltic perceptions; as well as the limited power or wish of Nordic states to give the Baltic states what the Baltic states think they need in terms of security. This conclusion is important and sobering for anyone who dreams that a more united voice from the Nordic–Baltic region will gain greater influence in the ESDP and related European policy making. At least some of this volume’s contributors still see hope of a more convergent Nordic position; but far greater changes of landscape would be needed to let this region’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europeans speak as one.
I. Introduction

While the Nordic countries are similar in many respects, they have had different positions on and approaches to the European Security and Defence Policy and the European Union’s security policy in general. These differences have partially been a result of their different formal relations with the EU: two are full members—Finland and Sweden; one is a member with an ‘opt-out’ in security matters—Denmark; and one is an ‘associated’ member—Norway. Also, and perhaps more importantly, these differences are a result of different national security policy traditions: there are two neutral or non-aligned states—Finland and Sweden; and two are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Denmark and Norway.

During the cold war period, the security policies of the Nordic countries were often understood as creating a ‘Nordic balance’: a combination of policies that aimed at preserving a balance between the two superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union. While the end of the cold war paved the way for a different and more complex security approach, it took some time before the Nordic countries responded to this new security context. Despite their differences and owing to their geographical location, they all continued to maintain a rather traditional security policy, emphasizing either territorial defence or the military aspects of security for longer than most of their European counterparts. Today, important changes seem to have taken place in all of the Nordic countries in the direction

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1 Iceland, which, like Norway, is ‘associated’ with the EU through the European Economic Area and is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is not considered in this chapter.  
2 This concept was developed by Arne Olav Brundtland as describing the Nordic countries’ security policies during the cold war period. For further detail see Brundtland, A. O., ‘Nordisk balanse før og nå’ [The Nordic balance past and present], Internasjonal Politikk, no. 5 (1966), pp. 491–541; and Brundtland, A. O., The Nordic Balance and its Possible Relevance for Europe (Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt: Oslo, 1981). Finland’s close relationship with the Soviet Union and Norway’s strong Atlantic orientation was of particular importance here. See also the Introduction to this volume.  
3 While Denmark initiated a transformation of its military forces in the early 1990s, the ‘dominant security discourse’ (as expressed by the Danish Ministry of Defence) still continues to be focused on the military aspects of security.  

* This chapter was written with financial assistance from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. The author would like to thank Kristin Marie Haugevik for her assistance.
of a more comprehensive security approach. These changes seem to have been initiated or accelerated in response to the European integration process.\textsuperscript{4}

The argument of this chapter is twofold. First, the Nordic countries’ security approaches, which have traditionally diverged, are increasingly converging and that this process started with the end of the cold war. Second, this convergence must be seen in relation to the European integration process and the development of EU security policy. It is this process of ‘Europeanization’ that is the focus of the chapter.

Section II starts with a clarification of what is meant by ‘EU security policy’. While some look only at the ESDP process, a broader approach is advocated here that also includes the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts and the European Commission’s activities in the area of conflict prevention. Section III reviews developments in the Nordic countries’ security approaches since the early 1990s and discusses whether and to what extent it is possible to argue that they have been Europeanized. In particular, it examines the impact of three important changes in the EU: the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and the establishment of the CFSP;\textsuperscript{5} the 1998 Anglo-French St Malo summit as a milestone in the creation of the ESDP; and the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), a constitution for the EU and the concretization of what is here called ‘a comprehensive European security policy’ in 2003–2004. Section IV makes some overall comparisons on the basis of these findings and draws some conclusions.

II. EU security policy: more than the European Security and Defence Policy

It is no longer sufficient to look only at the ESDP when discussing the EU’s security policy. In fact, the ESDP is, at least as it is most often defined, only one part of the EU’s security policy. It is difficult or perhaps impossible to isolate the ESDP not only from the rest of the EU’s foreign and security policy, but also from the EU’s activities with regard to external relations and the fight against terrorism. The ESS, adopted in December 2003,\textsuperscript{6} provides a much better indication than any previous EU document of what the Union’s security policy is all about: a comprehensive approach to security.\textsuperscript{7}


\textsuperscript{7} Rieker, Doctoral thesis (note 4).
This indicates that the discussion about EU security policy cannot be separated from a discussion about the concept of security. In fact, whether or not one agrees that the EU has developed a distinct approach to security depends on how one defines ‘security’. While there is general agreement that there is a relationship between integration and security, those who defend a more traditional and more militarily focused definition of security still tend to ignore the EU as an important security actor. The EU’s persistent lack of any military power that is comparable to that of the USA makes it difficult for these traditionalists to characterize the EU in this way. For those who understand security in a broader sense, however, the situation will look quite different. For them, the EU’s potential to coordinate diverse tools of security policy—economic, political and military—makes it one of the most important security actors of the post-cold war period. Not surprisingly, it is also the latter view that is emphasized by the EU itself (represented by both the Commission and the Council of the European Union) through its official documents and speeches.

While existing multilateral security policy frameworks, such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), have also adapted to the new security context, the most interesting development has occurred within the EU. This is because the EU is the only multilateral framework without a security policy legacy from the cold war period. While this may be understood as reflecting a certain reluctance by the member states to relinquish national sovereignty in the traditional security area, it is precisely this reluctance that seems to have facilitated the development of a somewhat ‘innovative’ approach to security—an approach that emphasizes the value of combining different security policy tools.

What, then, is the precise content of this comprehensive EU security policy? Is it more than just wishful thinking and declarations? There are in fact many concrete manifestations of this policy, which are looked at here under the categories of external and internal security policy. The most obvious examples of a comprehensive external security policy are the EU’s enlargement process, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, and the increased focus on civilian and military ‘integrated missions’ within the ESDP framework, which include the missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Examples

of a comprehensive internal security policy are the various efforts made in both the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and European Community (EC) pillars of the EU to combat terrorism and to provide civilian protection. In addition, there is a growing recognition among EU actors that the internal–external divide is becoming less sharp, making it appropriate to use external tools for internal purposes and vice versa. For example, conflict prevention and international crisis management in third countries are seen inter alia as a means to reduce the threat of terrorism and the spread of international crime to EU countries, while instruments taken from JHA and other internal community policies constitute important elements of the civilian parts of EU conflict prevention efforts in third countries. The adoption of the ESS is also a manifestation of this comprehensive approach to security: it shows that the EU, despite the lack of a coherent and clearly defined common foreign and security policy, does have a distinct approach to security that is implemented by both the Commission and the Council, and that includes—in addition to the CFSP—parts of both the EC and JHA.

Some have questioned the EU’s capacity to deliver an efficient coordinated approach to security, and it has been argued that bridges between the different policy areas are still lacking. However, both the member states and the EU itself have expressed their wish to strengthen the EU’s powers in this area further. The events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent emphasis on the need to combat terrorism have also further favoured such an approach. Several of the proposals in the draft Constitutional Treaty put forward by the European Convention, such as a common foreign minister, the Solidarity Clause, and structured cooperation in the area of security and defence with the creation of

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10 These efforts include the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, the common arrest warrant, Europol and Eurojust’s joint investigation teams, the Solidarity Clause of the Constitutional Treaty and various initiatives to coordinate national civilian protection measures.

11 On conflict prevention and crisis management see chapter 11 in this volume.

12 For a more detailed presentation of this understanding of the EU as a security actor see Rieker, Doctoral thesis (note 4), chapter 2.


16 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, European Convention, Brussels, 18 July 2003, URL <http://european-convention.eu.int/DraftTreaty.asp>. The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 19 Oct. 2004 but has not been ratified. The text of the treaty is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm> and selected articles are reproduced in the appendix in this volume.

17 See chapter 15 in this volume.
multinational battle groups, also indicate a clear will to embed a coherent and comprehensive approach to security in the future functioning of the EU.\textsuperscript{18}

III. Nordic countries and their relationship to the EU as a security actor

The policies of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden and their relationship to the EU are examined here with regard to the three major changes since the early 1990s that have been most crucial in making the EU an increasingly independent security actor. These changes were: first, the establishment of a political union and a common foreign and security policy; second, the development of a European security and defence policy and an EU competence in international crisis management; and third, the adoption of the ESS and the emergence of a comprehensive European security policy.\textsuperscript{19}

The Common Foreign and Security Policy

The reluctance towards the European integration process that was felt in Norway and Sweden in the early 1990s was partly owing to security policy considerations. In Norway it was feared that a European political union with a common foreign and security policy would weaken NATO, and hence Norway’s position in the European system. In Sweden the EU’s security policy ambitions were seen as incompatible with the doctrine of Swedish neutrality. Despite this general scepticism, parts of the political elite in both countries recognized the importance of the integration process and began to work for a closer relationship with the EU.

Once Sweden had submitted its application for membership of the EU, an intense domestic debate concerning neutrality took place, and some change in the understanding of this concept was perceived as necessary in order to permit membership. While the first change in the national security doctrine was made in 1992, the debate concerning the need for more radical change continued after Sweden joined the EU, in 1995. In addition, there was also a greater focus on the need to reorganize Swedish national defence forces.

Norway’s security policy approach was perceived in the early 1990s to be compatible with EU membership, but at this time NATO membership and transatlanticism dominated Norwegian security policy. After the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht, however, the Norwegian political elite wished to strengthen their country’s relationship with the EU. The dominant security discourse also changed towards a more balanced view of the EU and NATO, emphasizing the EU’s role as a soft security actor, with a special emphasis on

\textsuperscript{18} The negative results of the referendums in France and the Netherlands in May and June 2005 mean that the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty has been postponed.

\textsuperscript{19} For a more detailed analysis of this process see Rieker, Doctoral thesis (note 4), chapters 4–7.
its role in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. While the majority of the Norwegian political leadership was largely in favour of Norway’s membership of the EU, the negative result of the referendum in November 1994 kept Norway formally outside the integration process. However, in the years leading up to and following the referendum, Norway has managed to achieve a close relationship with the EU, resulting in several agreements and cooperation arrangements—such as the 1992 European Economic Area Agreement, accession to the Schengen Treaty in 1996 and association arrangements with the ESDP—and thus exposing Norway to even further Europeanization.

The Finnish political leadership was in general far more favourably inclined to the integration process than its Norwegian and Swedish counterparts. With the end of cold war constraints, EU membership was seen not as a threat to Finland’s national sovereignty or freedom of action but as a way for Finland to confirm its long-repressed Western identity. The establishment of a political union made EU membership interesting with reference to security political considerations. Membership of the EU was actually seen as a possible substitute for Finland’s traditional policy of neutrality. While the old interpretation of Finnish neutrality was abandoned and the EU was recognized as an actor in security policy, there was no national debate about possible change in the role of the Finnish defence forces at that time. The rationale for Finland’s EU membership continued to be based on traditional security policy arguments and was seen as a complement to a national, independent and credible defence.

While tendencies for increased interest in the EU could be identified at the time in the three non-members of the EU—Finland, Norway and Sweden; albeit for different reasons—the opposite seemed to hold for the longer-standing EU member Denmark. In the early 1990s the Danish political leadership actually supported the Treaty of Maastricht and the establishment of a political union. The people’s rejection of the treaty in June 1992, however, led to a (self-imposed) opt-out of Denmark from important parts of the integration process, including the security dimension, before the treaty’s acceptance in a referendum in May 1993. This meant that there were few references to the EU in the Danish security discourse, and the EU continued to be perceived as primarily an economic project. Despite this weak interest in the EU’s security dimension, the Danish security discourse and policy underwent important changes in the early 1990s. The reorganization of the national defence forces was initiated earlier in Denmark than in most other European states; but this should be seen as an early response to the end of the cold war rather than as an effect of the Treaty of Maastricht. Indirectly, however, the initial rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht may have contributed to this change. The opt-out made it even more important for Denmark to be a ‘good pupil’ in the new NATO (in which international crisis management now was becoming the major task), as this was the sole

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20 See tables I.1–I.4 in the introduction to this volume.
21 See chapter 1 in this volume.
arena within which Denmark could participate in terms of an integrated approach to European security.  

This shows that the Treaty of Maastricht and the establishment of a political union had an impact on the changes in the Nordic countries’ approach to security in 1992–95. The degree and the character of Europeanization have varied, however, and historical and geopolitical differences have arguably contributed to these differences. During this period there was a recognition in all four countries of the EU’s security dimension, but this was interpreted differently in each country. As argued above, the impact was most evident in Finland and Sweden, where it led to changes in these countries’ national security policy doctrines and a move away from the formulation and content of their traditional neutral orientation.

The European Security and Defence Policy


For Sweden a future security and defence dimension of the EU was particularly problematic; and, once inside the EU, Sweden strove to use its influence to prevent this process from developing into a collective defence arrangement. With support from Finland, Sweden managed to have the Petersberg Tasks included in the Treaty of Amsterdam in a way that effectively limited the collective European ambition in crisis management. While this was perceived as a successful policy action in both countries, the fact that the Petersberg definition covers tasks that might go beyond traditional peacekeeping with regard to the use of military force also indicates an important change in the security identity of the two countries. This change was most important for Sweden, which was more attached to a policy of neutrality than was Finland.

However, the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the Treaty of Amsterdam also made it easier for Denmark to accept and support the EU’s security dimension. This is evident in the Danish security discourse at that time. Even so, there was no sign of Denmark’s defence opt-out being abandoned. The Danish Defence Commission’s report of 1998 emphasized that the country’s relationship to the EU continued to be based on arguments linked to economic

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23 The Petersberg Tasks were agreed in 1992 to strengthen the operational role of the Western European Union. They include humanitarian intervention and evacuation operations, peacekeeping and crisis management, including peace making. See chapter 6 in this volume.

24 This change has recently been confirmed with the creation of a Nordic battle group (with the participation of Norway) as the Swedish and Finnish contributions to an EU rapid-reaction force.
cooperation and free market structures. While Denmark held on to its opt-out strategy, this development in the EU led to the opposite strategy in Norway. After the Anglo-French St Malo summit of December 1998, the Norwegian Government really started to fear marginalization in European security, and several attempts were made to achieve some form of association with European security policy. This is why the Norwegian Government proposed a significant contribution to the EU’s 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal—a policy that has been referred to as a ‘troops for influence’ strategy.

As argued above, Finland, Norway and Sweden have been slow to transform their national defence forces. While the changes in the Danish defence forces were a (rather immediate) reaction to the end of the cold war, this was not the case in the three other countries. These countries focused on possible negative developments to the east, and this was used to legitimize the continued emphasis on significant territorial defence capacity. Not until the late 1990s, after the ESDP was launched, were concrete proposals for transforming the national defence forces presented in Finland, Norway and Sweden. Although the ESDP process is not the only explanation, it seems to have at least accelerated the transformation processes in all three countries. In Norway and Sweden the important changes that have been introduced into the defence structures in recent years have been followed by a change in the dominant domestic security discourses. In Finland, however, a more traditional security discourse has been retained and any alterations were legitimized by reference to their importance for bolstering the Finnish national defence capacity. As argued above, Denmark undertook such a transformation of its defence forces at an earlier stage; yet the launch of the ESDP also had some impact here. In fact, the establishment of the ESDP led to a discussion about the value of the Danish defence opt-out, focusing especially on the risk that Denmark could become marginalized within the European security system.

This shows that the development towards a European security and defence policy has influenced the national security discourse in all the Nordic countries, but that differences in each nation’s relationship with the EU and its security policy traditions have generated differences between national responses. In Norway and Sweden the emergence of the ESDP accelerated the move towards modernization of the defence forces, also involving some changes in the conception of security. In Finland it led to greater emphasis on the international dimension, but combined with a continued traditional view of security. In


27 Græger, N., ‘Norway and the EU’s defence dimension: a “troops for influence” strategy’, eds N. Grøger, H. Larsen and H. Ojanen, _The ESDP and the Nordic Countries: Four Variations on a Theme_ (Ulkopolitiittinen Instituutti: Helsinki, 2002), pp. 33–89. While most Norwegian politicians have accepted this strategy, Norway’s participation in the EU’s new Headline Goal 2010, which includes multinational battle groups operating on the demand of the UN or the OSCE, is seen as more problematic. Some argue that such participation contravenes Norway’s constitution, while others argue that Norway’s non-participation in the EU’s decision-making bodies makes participation in such an integrated force difficult to defend; see chapter 19 in this volume.
Denmark, which had already undergone such internal changes, it led to a debate on the value of its defence opt-out.

The development of a comprehensive approach to security

The adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003 clarified the EU’s security policy and made it possible for the first time to speak of that policy as having a comprehensive approach. The ESS must be understood as a response to the new US security policy, formalized in the USA’s National Security Strategy of 2002.²⁸ the European strategy emphasizes the same threats as the US strategy—terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime—but focuses on different security policy tools for countering them; that is, a comprehensive approach to security based on effective multilateralism. It also defines four concrete policy conditions for success: the EU has to be more active, more coherent, more capable and better at working with others. Recent decisions such as the establishment of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in the Council framework, the European Defence Agency, and a new Headline Goal aiming to create several multinational battle groups, as well as the institutional changes proposed by the Constitutional Treaty—such as the Solidarity Clause and an EU foreign minister representing both the Council and the Commission—are crucial steps towards these goals. It is possible to argue that all this represents an institutionalization of a comprehensive European security strategy, which has been the aim ever since the programme for comprehensive conflict prevention and the development towards ‘an area of security, freedom and justice’ were launched in the late 1990s and early 2000.

The impact of the EU’s comprehensive security approach is evident to some extent in all the Nordic countries. There are, nevertheless, some important differences, both between the four countries and in relation to the external and internal dimensions of this approach.

External security

All four Nordic countries have long experience of civilian crisis management and conflict prevention, especially through the United Nations, but these tasks have been viewed largely as separate from those that define national security policy. This explains why such aspects have received scant attention in documents and speeches designed to present each country’s national security approach and have been promoted mostly by foreign affairs ministries. As international crisis management has become an increasingly important function of the defence forces in all four countries, they have begun to show greater interest in civil–military cooperation and in integrating military and non-military cap-

abilities; yet here, too, there are important differences with respect to how well these aspects are integrated into the dominant national discourse on security issues.

Among the Nordic countries, it is Sweden that has been the most committed to a comprehensive approach to security, yet it is only recently that this has become an important part of the security orientation espoused by the Swedish Ministry of Defence. This is why it is possible to talk about a Europeanization of the Swedish security orientation in this respect as well. In fact, it could be argued that there has been ‘feedback’ from the agenda of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the EU—such as the Swedish initiative for a comprehensive programme for conflict prevention—into the Swedish Ministry of Defence, which has resulted in a heightened focus on comprehensive security there also. This has led to a greater interest in civil–military cooperation but also, more generally, to a clear ambition to base national policy on a broader concept of security. The establishment in Sweden of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, an international academy for the training of both civilian and military crisis management personnel, is an important example.29 While this institution has been placed under the authority of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, one of its aims is enhanced cooperation with the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre. Another example is the creation of a new central crisis response authority, the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, with a multifunctional research capacity to assess internal threats.

Sweden has shown a positive attitude towards the ESS, which (in its final form) is perceived by the government as a concretization and strengthening of the EU’s comprehensive approach to security, especially in relation to external security. The EU is increasingly seen as strengthening multilateralism and the UN and as implementing initiatives for conflict prevention.30 The Swedish input is also becoming increasingly prominent within EU defence policy, and a Swedish diplomat, Ulf Hammarström, is one of the directors of the newly established European Defence Agency. While some would argue that Sweden has become more willing to participate in international defence cooperation across the board,31 it is also possible to argue that it is precisely the comprehensive character of the EU’s security approach that makes increased Swedish participation possible. An April 2004 article by the ministers of defence and development on the issue of conflict prevention also indicates that it is the comprehensive approach to security that has become the main element of the Swedish approach to national security.32

29 For more information see the Folke Bernadotte Academy’s website, URL <http://www.folkebernadotteacademy.se/>.
31 On cooperation in defence equipment procurement see chapter 9 in this volume.
Similarly, the need for a more comprehensive approach to external security has recently also been introduced into the discourse in the Finnish Ministry of Defence. Explicit references in the ministry’s documents to developments within the EU indicate that this is a direct result of a process of Europeanization. While the notion of comprehensive external security also builds on Finland’s traditional activism in the UN, the integration of such a comprehensive dimension into the Ministry of Defence’s work is quite new. The changes are, admittedly, carefully judged in relation to whether or not they strengthen Finland’s traditional defence capability, and territorial defence is still given primacy. The fact that non-military aspects already seem so well integrated into Finnish security and defence policy seems to have been facilitated by the strong Finnish tradition of inter-ministerial coordination in security issues.

Finland has also taken a positive attitude in general towards the ESS, which it perceives as compatible with the Finnish policy of military non-alignment. The ESS’s comprehensive character and the fact that it does not define a collective defence ambition for the EU make this possible. Nevertheless, the Finnish Government focuses less on the comprehensive character of the ESS than the Swedish Government does and continues to devote more attention to the need to develop more efficient military capabilities. While Finland supports comprehensive security in the EU, this seems to be perceived as a necessary adaptation rather than a profound change in the Finnish approach to security policy. Finland’s reluctance to sign the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mines Convention is one symptom of this traditional territorial concept of security. Despite the continued application of such traditional arguments, however, Finland’s recent joining with Sweden to create a battle group as a contribution to the EU’s new Headline Goal indicates willingness to contribute to an active and comprehensive EU external security policy.

In Denmark and Norway the defence ministries have placed less emphasis on such a comprehensive approach to external security. As a result, civilian and military aspects of international crisis management have remained separated in different ministries. Some emphasis on the need for greater comprehensiveness can be identified in parts of the security discourse within, especially, the foreign affairs ministries and, in Norway, in the Ministry of Justice and the Police, but not yet to the same extent within the defence ministries. This is interesting since Denmark and Norway have been perceived as front-runners when it comes to civilian crisis management. Denmark has been particularly active in the EU’s

civilian crisis management forces and even supports the comprehensive security approach at the EU level. While this can be interpreted as Denmark compensating for its non-participation in EU military cooperation, the implementation of a comprehensive security approach at the EU level will limit Denmark’s participation in the civilian dimension as long as the defence opt-out prevails. On the whole, however, civil–military coordination has been more limited, and the dominant security discourse in both Denmark and Norway has been more militarily focused than, for instance, the discourse in Sweden.

Denmark has found itself in a paradoxical position in its relationship to the EU security policy because of its self-imposed European defence opt-out. Denmark may, therefore, not participate in the international operations that are led by the EU. The resulting problems are especially obvious now that the EU is taking over most of the NATO operations in the Balkans, to which Denmark has been an important contributor. In principle, the Danish Government supports the EU’s comprehensive security approach and in its report on the fight against terrorism made many references to the work of the EU. However, as long as the Danish opt-out prevails, Danish participation in the EU’s comprehensive security approach will remain limited.

In Norway the government has begun to realize that the development of an EU security policy is going to become increasingly important and that non-participation is reducing Norwegian influence on European security. However, there is still little indication that the Norwegian Government sees the ESS as amounting to the institutionalization of a comprehensive approach to security. Rather than a comprehensive security project, it has been seen as a step towards an independent EU military capacity and thus as a competitor to NATO. The creation of battle groups has received special attention in this context. While the Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold, successfully argued in favour of Norwegian participation in the EU’s planned battle groups as necessary to avoid a marginalization of Norway, this was questioned by both those who favour and those who oppose Norwegian membership of the EU. It is interesting to note that in Norwegian discussions on EU security policy the comprehensive dimension is often ignored while the main emphasis remains on military aspects.

38 Norway will participate in the Swedish-led battle group along with Finland. Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Utdrag fra EUs forsvarsministermøte 22. november [Extract from EU defence ministers meeting, 22 November]: Declaration by Sweden and Finland and Norway on the establishment of a joint EU battle group’, Brussels, 22 Nov. 2004, URL <http://odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuelt/nyheter/010051-990085>. See also chapter 19 in this volume.
Internal security

For a long time Nordic national defence was exclusively concerned with defending national territories against military threats. As described above, the first change came during the 1990s with an increased focus on the external dimension (i.e., international crisis management), while national defence, although toned down, was still characterized by territorial defence. Today the need for a more comprehensive approach also in the internal or domestic area has become increasingly evident. The EU has for some time focused on what could be called ‘comprehensive internal security’, for instance, with its moves towards the creation of ‘an area of security, freedom and justice’ and several initiatives to enhance cooperation in the area of civil protection.39 The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA highlighted the importance of such a development. While these attacks put the need for a more coordinated approach to internal security firmly on everyone’s agenda, the EU had a particular impact on the consequent developments in national security discourses—a development that started prior to September 2001.

Norway was the first to put these issues on the agenda, with its decision in September 1999 to establish a commission to investigate the vulnerability of Norwegian society.40 Some references to EU developments can be identified in the ensuing debate.41 At the time, however, the report was not treated as part of the dominant national discourse on security, but as a separate exercise, reflected in the fact that it was carried out by the Ministry of Justice. The report did make reference to the EU and especially to Norwegian participation in the Schengen arrangements: references to terrorism were added later, when these challenges came to be considered an integral part of the national security approach. Recently, there has been some emphasis on the need to improve interministerial coordination, and a high-level civil–military cooperation group and a new directorate have been established for that purpose. The traditional concept of total defence has been somewhat redefined, with more emphasis on civilian preparedness.42 Close cooperation has also been developed with the EU in these areas.

In Finland and Sweden a similar process started somewhat later than in Norway. In contrast to the Norwegian process, the Finnish and Swedish processes have been viewed from the very outset as integral parts of the national security discourses on security. This has been facilitated by the greater salience of the concept of total defence in these countries, including the placing of both civil-

39 On the EU approach to homeland security see chapter 16 in this volume.
ian and military defence under the authority of the defence ministries. In both countries it was the defence ministry that actually initiated the debate. Interest in these questions has been especially strong in Sweden; and while there are few specific references to the European integration process in Swedish government documents on this subject, it is possible to hypothesize a more indirect influence. In Finland the corresponding changes are explicitly linked to the EU processes, but—as would be expected—they are legitimized by traditional arguments about national security.

In Denmark the political leadership showed little or no interest in these comprehensive internal security issues prior to the attacks of 11 September 2001. Only after these tragic events did such questions begin to appear in the Danish security discourse. As in Norway, this discourse has taken place outside the ambit of the Ministry of Defence and makes few references to the EU.

IV. Conclusions: from divergence to convergence

Nordic security policies are changing and many of the changes seem to be closely related to developments in the EU. While there are still differences between the national security policies of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, the differences seem much less pronounced than in the past. Instead of creating a ‘Nordic balance’ or a special security community based on the differences between them, and between them and the rest of Europe, the Nordic countries now seem to have become an integrated part of a larger European security project in which the EU plays an increasingly important role in comprehensive security.

This convergence actually represents a great opportunity for Nordic cooperation in an area—defence and security—where cooperation has traditionally been impossible. The most important problem is no longer the content of security policy, but rather the different institutional relationships of the different countries. Insofar as these differences are likely to become less important, Nordic cooperation may gain a renewed importance and could even affect the region’s prospects of becoming an important player in shaping the EU’s comprehensive approach to security. The joint Nordic battle group is perhaps a step in that direction. Of ultimately more importance, however, are the potential for creating stronger Nordic cooperation in conflict prevention; a closer coordination of civilian and military crisis management capacities; and, last but not least, closer Nordic cooperation and coordination in the area of internal security, with a focus on ‘societal defence’ and the protection of vulnerable modern societies.
I. Introduction

The five Nordic countries have made different choices as to where to look for their security. Denmark, Iceland and Norway are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Finland and Sweden participate in the European Security and Defence Policy, while Denmark has an opt-out from this area of European Union activity. Differences in Nordic security policy are, however, not only institutional. There is a deeper divide related to national identity and the ‘will to defend’.

This chapter focuses on the difference between Finland on the one hand and the three Scandinavian countries—Denmark, Norway and Sweden—on the other. Three dimensions are considered in this context: the perceptions of threat, the role of conscription in the armed forces and the way in which ‘help from others’ forms part of the national security policy. The gap between Finland and the three other countries is seen as a result not only of geography and history but also of modern identity construction.

Section II of the chapter considers the definition and measurement of the ‘will to defend’ in the Nordic countries. The role of conscription is assessed in section III while the different threat perceptions and policies on territorial defence are discussed in section IV. The relationship between the Finnish ‘will to defend’ and the ESDP in the future is explored in section V, and conclusions are presented in section VI.

II. The will to defend: what it is and how it is measured

According to the Swedish National Board for Psychological Defence, the will to defend is: (a) a characteristic of the individual; and (b) represents a mental state of support for the total defence of the country.1 It is an individual’s state of mind during peacetime, as opposed to the will to fight, which: (a) is a phenom-

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1 Swedish National Board for Psychological Defence, Försvarsvilja 2000 [The will to defend 2000] (Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar: Stockholm, 1996); and Alanen, P. ‘Puolustustahto: ja miten se mitataan’ [The will to defend: and how it is measured], Sotilasaikakauslehti, vol. 72, no. 744 (1997), pp. 52–57. A distinction may be made between the will to defend and the necessary spiritual strength, ‘the spirit to defend’. For detailed definitions see Hultinen, A.-M. and Sinkko, R., Maanpuolustustahto tutkimuksella ehdolla: kylmästä sodasta informaatiosotaan [The will to defend as a subject of research: from cold war to information warfare] (Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu: Helsinki, 2004).
The will to defend in the Nordic countries is measured regularly in surveys. In Denmark these surveys are carried out by the Defence Academy; in Finland by the Advisory Board for Defence Information, a permanent parliamentary committee; in Norway on behalf of Folk og Forsvar, an association of defence-related organizations; and in Sweden by the National Board for Psychological Defence.2

Unfortunately, the questions asked in the four countries differ. In Finland and Sweden the interviewees are asked whether they would be ‘willing to defend their country by weapons in all situations, even when the outcome is uncertain’. In Denmark the will to defend is measured as an index based on eight questions. These reflect very different aspects such as the role of defence in maintaining peace in Denmark, in keeping Denmark independent and in giving Denmark a voice internationally. The question closest to the Finnish and Swedish question asks ‘whether an attack against Denmark should be resisted with weapons’. The question asked in Norway is a very general one: ‘Do we need a military defence in the present situation?’

Given the general nature of the question, 88 per cent of Norwegian respondents answered ‘Yes’ in February 2005.3 The answers to the question of whether one’s country should be defended by weapons in all situations, even when the outcome is uncertain.4 In Denmark in 2002, 65 per cent of respondents were willing to resist an attack with weapons.4 In Sweden in 2004, when asked whether they would defend their country with weapons, even if the result were uncertain, 50 per cent said yes; 26 per cent were more hesitant and answered ‘Probably yes’.5 In Finland in 2004, 80 per cent support resistance by weapons, even with an unknown outcome.6 The will to defend is by no means constant. In Finland in 1970, only 42 per cent said that they were willing to defend with weapons, while 51 per cent said that they were not.7 In Denmark, the total index for the will to defend rose from 3.8 in 1975 to 5.5 in 2002, out of a maximum index of 10.8


4 Kousgaard (note 2), p. 4.


6 Finnish Advisory Board for Defence Information (note 2), kuvio 20, p. 28. See also Alanen (note 1), p. 53.

7 Finnish Advisory Board for Defence Information (note 2), kuvio 20, p. 28.

8 Kousgaard (note 2), p. 3.
As reflected in the above results, defence is seen positively in all four Nordic countries. This extends to a will to defend with weapons by the majority of those asked. These results can be viewed in a European context. In a review of public opinion on European defence, Philippe Manigart compared how much trust the different nations have in their own armies. Finland had the highest score: 91 per cent expressed trust in the Finnish Army. The equivalent figure was 72 per cent in Sweden and 66 per cent in Denmark. The European average was 71 per cent.

III. The role of conscription

The will to defend is closely related to conscription, using ‘citizens in arms’, rather than trusting the task of defence to a professional army. The degree of conscription—the percentage of the (male) age group drafted—is consequently an indicator of how the will to defend is maintained in a country. Conscription levels and the role of conscription in the national identity are therefore important dimensions of the will to defend.

All four Nordic countries base their defence on conscription. However, in Denmark, Norway and Sweden recent defence reforms have radically changed the role of conscription: it is now seen as a recruitment arena for professional soldiers. Consequently, the percentage of an age group actually drafted has been reduced dramatically. The opposite is true in Finland. There no reduction has been proposed in the level of conscription, which is currently above 80 per cent. The Finnish Government’s report _Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004_, discussed in the Finnish Parliament in the autumn of 2004, explicitly stated as a starting point that general conscription would be maintained at this high level.

The defence reform in Norway in 2000, at the same time as stressing the importance of conscription in the relationship between society and the armed forces, proposed a modern and ‘flexible’ selective conscription. Around 40 per cent of an age group goes through armed service in Norway. In Sweden a defence reform is currently being carried out. Conscription is to be retained, even though only a small proportion of an age group is expected to be drafted. Currently, Sweden’s plans are that less than 20 per cent will participate in armed service. In addition, a more voluntary form of recruitment has been envisioned. Traditionally, the Danish armed forces have been the most professionalized of the Nordic countries. Only around 20 per cent of each age group enters the armed services. The length of compulsory in Denmark service has now been reduced from 10 months to 4.

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11 See chapter 7 in this volume.
In Finland the high level of conscription enjoys the full support of the population. The current Finnish model of 80 per cent general (male) conscription is supported by 79 per cent of citizens. In comparison, in 2004 only 36 per cent of Swedes supported general conscription (down from 45 per cent in 2003), while 31 per cent considered a professional army to be the best solution (up from 21 per cent) and 22 per cent considered that armed service should be voluntary (unchanged). In Finland less than 10 per cent support a reduction in the level of conscription and less than 10 per cent support a move towards a more professional army. It is interesting to note that the Danish and Norwegian surveys did not include questions about conscription.

IV. Threats and territorial defence

The European Union’s security doctrine defines a number of the threats to Europe, at the same time pointing out that Europe has never been so stable, wealthy and secure as it is today. The current threats are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and organized crime. A massive attack on the EU’s borders is considered highly unlikely. Russia is seen as a strategic partner, not an enemy.

This general European outlook is also reflected in the security and defence policies of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Russia is no longer seen as a threat in any of these countries and all three consider a large-scale attack highly unlikely. The position of Sweden, for example, is that, should the threat of a large-scale attack re-emerge in the future, signs will be seen in advance and there will be ample time to prepare for the new situation.

Traditional territorial defence is thus being pushed strongly into the background in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The new direction of attention and effort is both towards internal security, given the new threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and crime, and towards international interventions reflecting the global nature of these new threats. All three countries have consequently carried out institutional reforms to redefine the relationship between internal and external security.

The Danish Emergency Management Administration has moved to the country’s Ministry of Defence with the explicit goal of merging internal and external security. In Norway internal security is coordinated by the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning in the Department of Justice. A new National Security Directorate has been established in the Department of Defence. The Swedish Emergency Management Agency is already under the

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13 Swedish National Board for Psychological Defence (note 2), tabell 43, p. 87.


15 See chapter 16 in this volume.
Ministry of Defence, although with a sharper distinction between internal and external security than is the case in Denmark. The current Swedish defence reforms have had the expressed objective of transferring resources from external to internal security, in particular to the police forces.

In Finland territorial defence is still the assigned role of the armed forces. Although the Finnish Government’s report *Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004* discusses the new threats, it draws no conclusions for the organization and tasks of the defence forces.\(^\text{16}\) Defence planning is still based on three possible threats: regional crisis, military pressure and military attack. The Russian threat is still on the agenda, although not explicitly. History, geography and a long land border with the neighbour to the east are still factors that strongly affect Finnish security and defence policy in spite of the general rhetoric about the new threats.

To some extent territorial defence has also been questioned in Finland. Recent discussion has taken place in the Finnish policy community and Parliament over whether only strategic positions should be defended rather than the whole territory. In its report on the *Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004*, the parliament’s Defence Committee explicitly underlines the need to defend the whole country.\(^\text{17}\) The need for territorial defence also explains the high level of conscription. In the past a mobilized force of 450,000 men was seen as necessary for territorial defence. As a result of the new defence policy this level will be reduced to 350,000 men.\(^\text{18}\) By way of comparison, Sweden has 262,000 men in reserve.\(^\text{19}\)

A concrete indication of the importance of territorial defence are the responses to the question of anti-personnel mines. Denmark, Norway and Sweden have ratified the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mines Convention and have agreed to remove anti-personnel mines from their arsenals.\(^\text{20}\) In Finland a new round of intensive debate took place during 2004 on whether and when to sign the convention. Although earlier defence agreements have required that Finland sign in 2006, the *Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004* states that Finland will accede only in 2012.\(^\text{21}\) All landmines would be destroyed by 2016, by which time the army will have had enough time to compensate for the loss in fighting power. For this purpose an additional €200 million will be allocated to the defence forces in 2009–16.\(^\text{22}\)

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\(^\text{16}\) Finnish Prime Minister’s Office (note 10).


\(^\text{21}\) Finnish Prime Minister’s Office (note 10), p. 87.

\(^\text{22}\) Finnish Prime Minister’s Office (note 10), p. 130.
V. The Finnish will to defend and the European Security and Defence Policy

The defence solutions of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, such as the low level of conscription and the abandoning of the concept of territorial defence, imply that in case of attack help from others is expected. For Denmark and Norway this help is institutionalized by NATO’s Article 5 collective defence guarantee. For Finland and Sweden, the ESDP provides security guarantees, but without military strength: these guarantees are a political declaration of will. While in Sweden this seems to be sufficient in the case of unexpected attacks, this is not the case in Finland.

Although, for Finland, joining the European Union was to a significant and conscious degree a question of security, membership has not reduced the Finns’ will to defend themselves. On the contrary, the Finns believe in their own army and not necessarily in European solutions. To quote the Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004: ‘Finland will participate fully in the development and implementation of the Union’s common security and defence policy. The

23 This refers to Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (Treaty of Washington), the text of which is available at URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>.
Union’s coherence, solidarity, and common commitments in this area, too, will serve to enhance Finland’s security.”24 However,

Finland maintains and develops its defence capability as a militarily non-allied state and monitors the changes in its security environment. The aim of a credible national defence capability is to prevent security threats against Finnish territory. Finland must be able to guarantee the country’s independent capability and secure the functioning of a democratic society under all circumstances.25

The discourse states that ‘we will defend ourselves’. The historical understanding has been that ‘others will not help us’, and this has now been extended to the future. Finland does see its place in European Union security, but it has its own special view of Finnish security and defence. The cornerstones of this view are the perceived Russian threat, the concept of territorial defence and a high level of general conscription. Together, these form the foundation of the will to defend, a characteristic of the Finnish state of mind and even of Finnish national identity.26

Recently, Kari Laitinen and Arto Nokkala studied the Finnish model of conscription both in a historical perspective and in the context of current changes in Europe. Their conclusion was that the Finnish military political culture is under pressure owing to the professionalization of European armed forces, the focus on international interventions, technological development in the armed forces and even the question of how the younger generation in Finland will view conscription. On the other hand, the authors conclude that: ‘The military political culture in Finland seems to be particularly unified with respect to territorial defence. The close relations between the armed forces and society and the strength of society’s believe in a citizens’ army combined with uncertainties related to Russia are factors maintaining it.’27

To understand what this might mean for the future, the relationship between the ESDP and the ‘will to defend’ needs to be examined. This is done graphically in figure 18.1. One dimension represents the will to defend, seen as becoming either stronger or weaker. The second dimension is the ESDP, which also either gathers strength or weakens (or is not developed further; e.g., if the Constitutional Treaty is abandoned).

Two of the possible combinations seem to be unproblematic. The first is the case where the will to defend in Finland becomes weaker and the ESDP gains in strength. This would mean that European identity and security guarantees will become the basis of Finnish security and defence policy. The second case is where the will to defend either remains the same or gains in strength while

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24 Finnish Prime Minister’s Office (note 10), p. 79.
25 Finnish Prime Minister’s Office (note 10), p. 87.
26 See, e.g., Harle, V. with Moisio, S., Missä on Suomi? Kansallisen identiteettipoliitikan historia ja geopolitiikka [Where is Finland? The history of national identity and geopolitics] (Vastapaino: Tampere, 2000); and Laitinen and Nokkala (note 12).
27 Laitinen and Nokkala (note 12), p. 218 (author’s translation).
the ESDP weakens. In this case national defence will be the foundation of Finnish security.

A conflict situation arises in the case where the will to defend remains strong or becomes even stronger and the ESDP evolves and gains in strength. In this case the question is the extent to which an EU member state, even a border country such as Finland, can differ in relation to European security and defence policy. A stronger ESDP will put additional pressures on conscription, on territorial defence and on the harmonization of threat perceptions.

The fourth alternative is where both the ESDP and the will to defend become weaker. This combination is unlikely, as the Finnish will to defend will probably become weaker only as a result of a stronger ESDP. However, in this scenario the question is how to guarantee the security of the citizens. Obvious solutions are to try to strengthen either the will to defend or the ESDP. A further solution is to look at the European Union as a peace project, where a security community is created through economic, political and cultural ties, without a military dimension. An alternative to this would be to apply for NATO membership and to be included in NATO’s collective defence.

VI. Conclusions

The Nordic countries have a positive attitude towards defence. A large majority of the population is even willing to defend their country with weapons in case of attack. However, there is a great Nordic divide in defence and security policy. In recent Danish, Norwegian and Swedish reforms, conscription has been increasingly seen not as a cornerstone of defence but rather as a recruitment arena for professional soldiers. This is diametrically opposite to the Finnish position, in which conscription is the basis of territorial defence. The decrease of conscription levels to 20 per cent in Denmark and Sweden indicates a focus that is shifting from national defence to international interventions and professionalization of the armies. While Finland also supports international interventions, this is motivated by the support they offer for the defence of Finland, by making the country appear more trustworthy.

The security and defence policy solutions in the Nordic countries will thus continue to be very different unless strong pressure for harmonization is exerted. The Finnish ‘will to defend’—as a state of mind with strong popular support that forms an important part of national identity—may prove more difficult to change than if it were ‘only’ a question of security and defence. A critical question is, of course, how the relationship between the European Union and Russia evolves. If a strategic partnership is developed together with strong economic ties, it will be incongruent for an EU member state to remain on guard against a perceived Russian threat. However, current problems in the EU–Russia partnership support the maintenance of such a threat perception.
19. The Norwegian predicament in European defence: participation without direction

Nils Morten Udgaard

I. Introduction: a tactical choice

In the autumn of 2004 the Norwegian Government made the decision to support Norway’s participation in a European Union battle group,¹ along with Swedish and Finnish troops. That decision triggered a broad domestic debate on the modalities of participation and, in particular, on the wisdom of entering into a scheme for military cooperation under the overall political direction of a body—the Council of the European Union—in which Norway is not represented.

The speed with which the EU was advancing the European Security and Defence Policy thus, once again, forced the Norwegian Government to take a stance on important EU matters without guidance from an agreed strategy on Norway’s relations with the Union. There is a consensus within the new government, which took office in October 2005 and is led by Jens Stoltenberg of the Norwegian Labour Party, that Norway should pursue active involvement in European affairs, and EU affairs in particular. This approach was shared by the out-going, non-socialist coalition government of Kjell Magne Bondevik. However, there was and still is no agreement on what direction Norway’s relations with the EU should take; that is, whether the intention is to facilitate ultimate Norwegian membership of the Union or to make membership superfluous through extensive practical cooperation.

The fact that the coalition governments have been split down the middle on the EU issue—which has been perennially divisive in Norwegian politics—is well known and openly acknowledged. The issue has been defused through a so-called ‘suicide clause’ in both the current and preceding coalition agreements to the effect that the government will dissolve itself if the question of a renewed application for EU membership is put on the agenda again. However, no Norwegian political party is currently proposing that the membership question be reopened. The real issue is whether any Norwegian government can conduct its EU policy without having to clarify the direction of its ultimate goals vis-à-vis the Union.

¹ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Utdrag fra EUs forsvarsministermøte 22. november [Extract from EU defence ministers meeting, 22 November]: declaration by Sweden and Finland and Norway on the establishment of a joint EU battle group’, Press release, Oslo, 29 Nov. 2004, URL <http://odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuelt/nyheter/010051-990085/>. The Nordic battle group will be headquartered at Northwood, United Kingdom. On the battle groups see chapter 6 in this volume.
It was during the Bondevik administration (2001–2005) that the opportunity for participation in EU defence activities first arose. While Bondevik is a member of the anti-EU Christian Democratic Party, the largest party in his coalition government was the Conservative Party, which has never made a secret of its ultimate aim of making Norway a member of the EU. In the public debate on battle groups, the Conservative Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold, stated that ‘Norway cannot isolate itself from what happens in Europe [or] remain on the sidelines as passive spectators while watching European security policy cooperation take shape without us’. At the same time, her fellow cabinet member Dagfinn Höybråten, Minister of Social Affairs, was sending out the opposite message. Speaking in his capacity as chairman of the Christian Democratic Party, he told the national convention of Nei til EU, the Norwegian anti-EU movement, that Norway could best pursue its policy of international peace mediation by not getting involved with the great powers—including, by implication, the EU and its leading members. Instead, Norway’s policy should emphasize its independence of those powers.

II. The background: Norway’s (lack of) policy on the EU

A striking feature of Norway’s foreign relations over the past 100 years is the country’s lack of political involvement in European affairs. This started with the 1907 Integrity Treaty, through which the great powers of the day promised to protect the sovereignty of the newly independent kingdom. Norway was placed on the periphery of European affairs, and since then a lack of diplomatic tradition has been evident. The one important exception to the rule of political non-involvement in peacetime is Norway’s decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 and the country’s active participation in the alliance since then.

Norway has made three applications to join the EU or its predecessors. The first, in 1962, was vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle in 1963; the second application, in 1967, and the third, in 1992, were rejected by the Norwegian people in referendums in 1972 and 1994, respectively. The political handling of these last two rejections varied greatly: in fact, completely different strategies were chosen.

After the 1972 referendum, and in the aftermath of the 1968 upheavals throughout Europe, there was a loosening of Norway’s modest ties to the EU, a turning away from Europe and an increased focus on development aid and

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3 Nei til EU, ‘Dagfinn Höybråten’s hilsen til landsmøtet’ [Dagfinn Höybråten’s greetings to the national convention], 19 Nov. 2004, URL <http://www.neitileu.no/show.php?page=single&id=9030>.

4 The Norwegian Integrity Treaty was signed on 2 Nov. 1907. As well as Norway, parties to the treaty included Germany, France, Russia, Sweden and the UK.
developing countries. Association with the EU was politically taboo from that time until the Iron Curtain started coming down in the late 1980s.

In the aftermath of the November 1994 referendum, the then Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, opted for intensified cooperation with the European Union. She apparently interpreted the motive behind the ‘No’ vote as instinctive support for traditional sovereignty rather than as a rejection of extensive cooperation with the EU. Brundtland’s chosen course suggested itself even more strongly since two of Norway’s neighbours, Finland and Sweden, were to join the Union in 1995.

It could be said that, whereas Finnish voters in 1994 saw both economic and security benefits in becoming an EU member and Swedish voters expected clear economic gains, the voters in Norway could see neither economic nor security benefits for the country or themselves in joining. What remained as the main argument in favour of Norwegian membership was the opportunity for political participation: a share—albeit small—in European decision-making processes. As could be expected, however, the political argument did not carry sufficient weight to sway the vote in the referendum.

The free trade framework of the European Economic Area (EEA), which had come into effect as recently as January 1994, served as a generous fallback option for the Norwegian economy. As originally proposed in January 1989 by Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, the EEA was to be a means of deferring the applications of a number of potential members of the EU, thus giving the Union time to consolidate. The fact that the EEA was operational at the time of the 1994 referendum probably persuaded some Norwegian voters that a ‘No’ vote would have few economic repercussions.

Since then, the policies of all Norwegian governments, and the course of events in the EU and Europe in general, have led to intensified cooperation and involvement by Norway in EU matters. The Single Market has been developed further, and Norway has adopted all measures applicable to it via the EEA without making any veto attempts in the framework of the EEA institutions. Norway participates fully in the Schengen Agreement on the free movement of people and in EU-based cooperation on research and teaching, and has become a substantial financial contributor to the new Central European member states since the enlargement of the EU on 1 May 2004.

In addition, Norway has taken a keen interest in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and, lately, in the European Security and Defence Policy, in order to counter a possible marginalization of NATO and of Norway’s own role in defence cooperation in Europe.

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5 Agreement on the European Economic Area, EFTA Secretariat, Geneva, May 1992, URL <http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/LegalCorner/>; The members of the EEA are Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, the EU and its member states. Austria, Finland and Sweden were members before their accession to the EU in 1995. The EEA is managed by the secretariat of the European Free Trade Area, of which Switzerland is also a member.

III. Latest moves on the European Security and Defence Policy

The Norwegian Government’s support for participation with Finland and Sweden in an EU battle group, to become operative in 2008, is of course a political signal. Norway’s contribution is intended to be a mere 150 soldiers. At home, the government has pointed out that the use of the forces will be subject to a national veto, as will be the case for all EU contributing countries. A number of agreements on the practical arrangements surrounding the use of the forces remain to be worked out. The persistent question, however, is the degree of Norwegian participation in the overall political discourse before a decision is made to deploy one or more battle groups.

The EU can be expected to protect the integrity of its decision-making process, as the very essence of the decision to form battle groups is to emphasize the EU’s political clout. Thus, Norway is under no illusions that it will be admitted into the deliberations of the EU’s political institutions. Yet again, Norway is facing a situation in which it can count on a strong will to cooperate on the technical and practical level on the part of Finland and Sweden, but without a corresponding opportunity for it to take part in the political deliberations of the Union as a whole. When it comes to specific ESDP decisions, Norway will again face a ‘take it or leave it’ situation, as is already the case with the huge volume of legislation on the Single Market that Norway adopts in accordance with the EEA Agreement.

The latter arrangements have been accepted for economic reasons, at the same time as the net loss of de facto Norwegian sovereignty is deplored. The question posed by the issue of the battle groups is whether that kind of arrangement should now be extended to cover a new sector—one as politically important as the deployment of forces abroad. Moreover, the decision to opt for participation in the EU battle groups—and possibly the decision to deploy them—will be made by a government that is deeply split over whether, in the long term, Norway should work towards EU membership or whether it should keep its distance from the EU. This applied to the Bondevik administration, which initiated defence cooperation with the EU, and it applies to the new Stoltenberg administration as well.

The majority coalition government formed by Stoltenberg consists of the Norwegian Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party. While

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7 Norwegian Ministry of Defence (note 2).
10 For an explanation of the procedural framework for non-EU member states’ participation in the ESDP see chapter 20 in this volume.
Stoltenberg himself is pro-EU, his party is split on the EU issue and the other two coalition parties resolutely reject Norwegian participation in the EU. In the coalition government’s platform the three parties agreed to tighten the conditions for Norwegian participation in an EU military venture by stating that the government will only agree to sending Norwegian troops ‘when a clear and unequivocal UN mandate’ supports the operation. This is a small move away from the commitment of the Bondevik administration and of its Minister of Defence, Devold.

The United Kingdom has been active in promoting the idea of a Nordic battle group with the participation of Norway, not least in view of the latter’s position as a NATO member. Norwegian involvement should ensure a close link to the alliance and associate the neutral countries Finland and Sweden more closely with NATO. This would also be a step towards closer Nordic defence cooperation and could even be welcomed by the United Nations, as the EU battle groups will be well suited for undertaking UN-mandated military tasks. However, all these choices and their implications are being shouldered by a Norwegian government that will not be privy to the decisive political considerations and debate that will precede any deployment of Norwegian forces in an EU framework.

To proceed further on the road of practical, ad hoc arrangements with the EU risks blurring, in the minds of many Norwegians, the difference between being an EU member or not. The political implications are also increasingly unclear, since the long-term effects of participation in the battle groups are being interpreted in a completely different manner by different members of the same Norwegian government. It is this author’s view that, as long as Norway cannot support the idea of a political Europe with a distinct role in world affairs, it would be wrong to extend ‘cooperation without political participation’ to a field whose ultimate question concerns the life and death of Norwegian citizens.

20. Iceland and the European Security and Defence Policy

Alyson J. K. Bailes and Baldur Thorhallsson

I. Introduction: Iceland as a special case

Iceland, a republic on the extreme north-west periphery of Europe with a population of about 300,000, has a *sui generis* relationship with the concept of European defence. As to the term ‘European’, Iceland is the only Nordic state (and one of very few in Europe) never to have applied for membership of the European Union. As to ‘defence’, Iceland has refrained from establishing armed forces throughout its existence as a modern independent state since 1944.

The functional solution that Iceland has found for its relations with the European integration process is membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), to which it belongs together with Norway, Liechtenstein and the EU, and participation in the EU’s Schengen border control system. The EEA, in essence, brings Iceland within the scope of application of the EU’s Single Market but involves it in no more than a ‘dialogue’ relationship with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and does not, of itself, oblige Iceland to take any particular part in the European Security and Defence Policy.

The functional solution that Iceland has found for its defence is a direct defence agreement with the USA, signed in 1951, combined with Iceland’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The US forces stationed at the Keflavik base in south-western Iceland, which form the Iceland Defense Force, are seen as guaranteeing the necessary deterrent and (initial) response capacities for Iceland’s protection in a crisis, while in peacetime they provide air defence cover. Iceland has, of course, its own police force, coastguard and emergency rescue services, but it depends a good deal in practice on the US

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1 Agreement on the European Economic Area, EFTA Secretariat, Geneva, May 1992, URL [http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/LegalCorner/](http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/LegalCorner/). The EEA Agreement, signed by the then member states of the European Free Trade Area and the EU, came into force in 1994.

2 Iceland and Norway were given the opportunity to participate in Schengen in view of the Nordic Passport Union, the application of which had been safeguarded by the terms of Denmark’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s accessions to the EU. An agreement on Norway’s and Iceland’s participation in Schengen following its full incorporation in the EU treaty structure was concluded in May 1999. ‘Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters’ association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis—Final Act, Brussels, 18 May 1999’, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, vol. L 176 (10 July 1999), URL [http://eurropa.eu.int/eur-lex/](http://eurropa.eu.int/eur-lex/), pp. 36–62.

3 The text of the Defense Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Iceland pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 5 May 1951, is available at URL [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/iceland/ice001.htm](http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/iceland/ice001.htm).
ICELAND AND THE ESDP

assets at Keflavík even for the function of air–sea rescue. While all the Nordic
states have some degree of acknowledged or existential dependence on US
military power, Iceland thus represents an extreme case of an ‘Atlantic’ choice
in terms of defence identity and an exceptionally clear rejection of the ‘Euro-
pean’ choice in terms of joining the integration process. Icelanders do, however,
see themselves as ‘Europeans’ and take pride in that identity in a historical and
cultural sense.

A number of explanations have been offered for these choices, the strongest
of which refer to the importance of notions of national identity and independ-
ence in the political tradition and popular consciousness of modern Iceland.
While the US defence relationship has, itself, been characterized by a
(declining) minority of Icelanders as an offence to their independence and
indeed their values, the mainstream view is that it is a bulwark for the national
identity and one that, moreover, comes entirely free of charge. Far from exact-
ing a price for its protective services, the USA has given substantial economic
aid to Iceland over long periods of its post-independence history, while the very
existence of the Keflavík base brings profits to the Icelandic economy in the
form of foreign exchange earnings and employment. The European Union,
conversely, is seen as threatening both the nation’s independence—through the
loss of sovereignty it entails—and its economic interests—because of the
impact it is feared that the Common Fisheries Policy would have on Iceland’s
control of its own fish stocks. The relative rigidity and persistence of the pro-
US, anti-EU positions that have been produced by these considerations have
been further explained by analysts as a function of: (a) the proportional over-
representation in the Icelandic Parliament of the countryside regions most
dependent on agriculture and fisheries sectors (which firmly oppose EU
membership) and these sectors’ hold over government policy making in gen-
eral; (b) a ‘realist’ tradition in foreign policy—this tradition makes even the
political elite relatively immune to the seductions of ‘Europeanization’ and
endows them with a notion of ‘power’ under which the USA and NATO are
seen as the strongest protectors available while the EU is not rated as a security
actor at all; (c) the central administration’s weak tradition of long-term policy
making and its reliance on interest groups in this context; (d) the widely held
view that the EEA sufficiently guarantees Icelandic economic interests through
the access it provides to the EU market; and (e) the long tenure in government
of the Independence Party—of all the Icelandic parties, the one with the hardest
position against the EU.’ These added factors are required to help explain why

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4 Hálfdanarson, G., ‘Discussing Europe: Icelandic nationalism and European integration’, ed. B. Thor-
pp. 145–60.
7 ed. Thorhallsson (note 4). The Independence Party, which corresponds to conservative parties else-
where, has been in office for 47 of the 61 years since Iceland’s independence in 1944. Davíð Oddsson,
who was leader of the Independence Party from 1991 to Oct. 2005 and Prime Minister from Apr. 1991 to
the issue of EU membership has been kept off the Icelandic Government’s formal agenda right up to the present, although the latest available opinion polls suggest that as many as 54.8 per cent of Icelanders would like to start negotiations with the EU about the conditions of membership and that 43.1 per cent support membership outright.\(^8\)

Other small states in Europe have more typically seen the integration process as a means of protecting their national identity because of the equal rights and ‘place at the table’ that it accords them alongside their larger neighbours. The loss of technical sovereignty involved in EU accession may be seen as a part of a profitable trade-off when the permanent and inevitable exposure of small states to economic, strategic, social and cultural influences from outside is taken into account. As a member of the EU, the small state can contribute to collective policy making and seek to master and control these processes at European level. Indeed, the small state can hope for influence in the global community that it could never even dream of achieving on its own.

Iceland, like any other state, is exposed to the effects of globalization and other such intrusive processes. Its EEA membership obliges it to give effect internally to a constant flow of EU legislation that it hardly has the capacity to examine in advance, let alone to modify.\(^9\) If Iceland’s assessment of the benefits of full EU membership in terms of resolving the country’s own challenges as a small state has, nevertheless, been negative, this may reflect some objective peculiarities of its situation in addition to the historical and systemic points already mentioned. Iceland’s geographical remoteness means that it has no close large neighbour against whose dominance (even if benign) EU membership could protect it, in the way that Luxembourg is protected vis-à-vis Germany and France. It enjoys an unusually high level of energy self-sufficiency thanks to the use of geo-thermal power.\(^10\) Its natural environment is self-contained and not subject to major sources of external pollution. It has not experienced problems with terrorism or international organized crime. It has maintained (with help, recently, from the Schengen arrangements) a restrictive immigration policy and has no non-native ethnic minorities. On all these counts, it may be argued that Iceland—almost alone of the small states in

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8 Gallup Iceland, Opinion poll conducted for the Federation of Icelandic Industries, 1 Sep. 2005, URL <http://www.si.is/malaflokkar/althjodlegt-samstarf/frettir-og-greinar-um-althjodamal/nr/2191/> (in Icelandic). Two questions were asked: (a) Are you for or against starting negotiations on membership with the EU? Result: 54.8% for, 30.2% against, 14.9% undecided. (b) Are you for or against Iceland’s membership of the EU? Result: 43.1% for, 37.1% against, 19.8% undecided.

9 Iceland has coped well with implementing the ensuing obligations but has only very rarely sought to express concerns in advance on a proposed EU/EEA measure, e.g., the European Commission proposal in late 2000 to ban fishmeal and fish oil from use in animal feed. See Thorhallsson, B. and Ellertsdóttir, E., ‘The fishmeal crisis’, eds Á. Ó. Bernhardsdóttir and L. Svedin, Small-States Crisis Management: The Icelandic Way, Crisis Management Research and Training vol. 25 (Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm, 2004).

10 Iceland’s energy self-sufficiency is about 70% according to the Icelandic National Energy Authority, URL <http://www.os.is/page/energy_use>.
Europe—has not yet perceived any reason to seek ‘soft security’ cover from the EU, and Icelanders may quite logically have seen a combination of dialogue with the USA and of global activism as a more appropriate way to serve what might be called their functional security interests.

II. Iceland and the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy

As a NATO member Iceland was involved in the earliest attempts to develop a ‘European pillar’ of closer and more effective defence cooperation within the alliance. However, Iceland’s own lack of armed forces and of a defence industry prevented it from becoming a member of the NATO Eurogroup, established in 1968, or of its successor from 1976, the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG).

Iceland remained a non-member when the IEPG was transformed in 1993 into the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) outside NATO, in the broader framework of the Western European Union (WEU). Somewhat ironically, therefore, Iceland’s first really active involvement in any form of European defence discourse came in the framework of the WEU when the latter organization went through a second phase of ‘revival’ in the 1990s. Following the decision at Maastricht in February 1992 to allow EU members to become ‘observers’ in the WEU, the WEU decided to offer non-EU members of NATO—at that time, Iceland, Norway and Turkey—the relatively strong status of ‘associate members’ in its institutional structure. All three nations accepted, and Iceland took part thereafter in WEU Council and committee meetings—except for the rather infrequent meetings restricted to full members (dealing, e.g., with staff matters and security)—and in all joint meetings between the WEU and NATO and between the WEU and the EU. However, Iceland could not take up the offer to second military officers to the WEU Planning Cell as Norway and Turkey did, and it did not contribute to WEU operations. Like other associate members, rather than appointing a separate ambassador it used its NATO delegation to ‘service’ WEU activities at all levels.

Iceland remained a low-key but non-problematic participant in the WEU up to 1999, when the 15 EU members—following an original Franco-British initiative—opted to absorb the operational business of European defence into the EU framework. During the period of preparation for the EU’s formal decisions

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11 For more on the WEAG, see URL <http://www.weu.int/weag/>.
12 The Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) was signed on 29 July 1992 and entered into force on 1 Nov. 1993. The consolidated text of the treaty as amended is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/index.htm>. See in particular Article 17 and ‘Declaration on Western European Union’. Denmark (a NATO member) and Ireland became WEU observers.
establishing a new ‘European security and defence policy’, considerable discussion of and preparation for the implications of this change took place also within the WEU and NATO. NATO’s Washington Summit of 23–25 April 1999 conveyed a kind of conditional approval. The summit indicated that NATO would be willing to offer to lend its assets and its defence and operational planning services to the EU on the same or better terms than it had to the WEU, on the understanding, inter alia, that its non-EU European members would have full access to ESDP activities. In the same year, the WEU prepared an ‘audit’ of European force capabilities that was designed to help the EU define its own capabilities requirements and discussed modalities for transferring ongoing operations and relevant information into the EU’s hands.

As it gradually become clear that the EU’s 15 members did not, in fact, intend to offer the non-EU members of NATO anything like the same access to meetings and possibilities for co-decision that they had enjoyed in the WEU, the Icelandic delegation both in the WEU and NATO became one of the most vocal in demanding better treatment. In a break with tradition, the Icelanders were on several occasions among the toughest ‘hold-outs’ in the final process of reaching agreement on communiqués that contained allusions to future EU–NATO relations. Given the lack of material implications for their national security arrangements, it seems clear that Icelandic politicians and officials were primarily concerned (a) by the loss of their former seat at a security ‘table’, at a time when general Icelandic policy was to become more active in all international forums, and (b) by the risk that an EU-led defence policy would compete with and divide NATO, thus damaging joint US and European interests and perhaps weakening the Atlantic solidarity on which Iceland’s own safety depended. As Iceland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Halldór Ásgrímsson, explained in a statement of 7 December 2000, Iceland had made and had to make ‘every effort not to have to choose between Europe and North America in its cooperation on security and defence’. In the event, the modalities for treatment of WEU associate members adopted by EU member states in decisions at the Helsinki European Council of 10–11 December 1999 and thereafter offered Iceland something approaching the value of half a loaf. Although Ministerial Council meetings were closed to non-EU members, the non-EU European members of NATO—at that time six: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as well as Iceland, Norway and Turkey—were offered periodic meetings with the EU’s new permanent, ambassador-level Political and Security Committee, which oversaw the development of the ESDP together with CFSP affairs. Meetings could take

15 This NATO offer became known as ‘Berlin Plus’ because it offered terms that were somewhat of an advance on the terms offered to the WEU in a decision of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Berlin on 3–4 June 1996, especially in regard to the automatic provision of many of the services in question.

16 Thorhallsson and Vignisson (note 5).

place both in a ‘15 + 15’ format with all the non-EU members of the WEU’s former institutional system (including a number of Central European applicants to the EU and NATO) or in a ‘15 + 6’ mode with only the non-EU members of NATO. In addition, when joint NATO–EU meetings took place to develop the cooperation foreseen between the two institutions, Iceland would of course have a full place at the table on the NATO side. Any non-EU state that offered personnel for an EU-led operation and was accepted could become part of a contributors’ committee which would have considerable say over the detailed implementation of the operation concerned.\(^{18}\)

Turkey had expressed even sharper concern than Iceland in the run-up to the Helsinki decisions, motivated not just by institutional considerations or those related to the USA and NATO, but also by worries that Greece (as a full EU member) might take advantage of Turkey’s exclusion to steer ESDP activities in a direction directly injurious to Turkish interests. From this viewpoint, Turkey concluded that the Helsinki offer to non-EU members was simply not good enough to complete the bargain that NATO had offered the EU at the Washington Summit in April 1999. It decided to block the implementation of the relevant provisions on NATO–EU cooperation until additional arrangements and assurances could be negotiated to meet its concerns, which in the event took two full years (up to December 2002).\(^{19}\) Had Turkey not spearheaded the active opposition to the ESDP in this way, Iceland would undoubtedly have acquiesced in the implementation of the Helsinki decision and did not itself raise any particular difficulties,\(^{20}\) even in the light of Turkey’s firm opposition. As it was, both Iceland and Norway were probably disadvantaged on balance by the ensuing two-year blockage that affected much of the EU–NATO dialogue relationship. The building of ESDP institutions and doctrines went on within the EU almost unaffected, and the EU managed to launch one (police) operation without NATO’s help, while the number of EU–NATO meetings—in which the non-EU members of NATO could have gained insight into and commented upon these developments—was kept unnaturally low. It was surely a relief to all concerned when the blockage was lifted from early 2003, opening the way for rapid committee work to put the necessary detailed inter-institutional agreements in place. At the same time,

\(^{18}\) Council of the European Union, ‘Arrangements to be concluded by the Council on modalities of consultation and/or participation that will allow the non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU to contribute to EU military crisis management’, Appendix 1 of ‘Presidency report on strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy’, Annex 1 of ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19–20 June 2000, URL <http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/fei2_en.htm>.


\(^{20}\) Official of the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Interview with the authors, Reykjavik, Jan. 2005.
Iceland regarded as beneficial the clearer understandings that Turkey secured concerning the implementation of the Helsinki package.21

Even before the resolution of the Turkish impasse, Iceland had followed the example of Norway and several other non-members of the EU in using direct contributions to ESDP activities as one means of buying status and influence in the process. Iceland has contributed (on average over the mission’s duration) four police officers to the EU’s Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, as of September 2005, still has one police officer stationed there. When the EU took over from NATO the precautionary military deployment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in March 2003, the Icelandic Crisis Response Unit (ICRU) contributed one press officer and an Icelander who worked for the special envoy of the NATO Secretary General in Skopje.22

III. An Icelandic crisis-management capacity

Considerations related to the ESDP may have combined with others in prompting the Icelandic Government’s decision in April 2000 to establish the Icelandic Crisis Response Unit, a non-military ‘peacekeeping force’ of individuals (police, doctors and nurses, lawyers, air traffic controllers, administrators, etc.) who would be available for rapid deployment abroad.23 The ICRU formally started to operate in September 2001 and on average 25 personnel have been deployed abroad at any one time, although the number has temporarily risen to around 40 on occasions when new missions have been established before others had finished. In early 2004 a special department with three officials was established in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to manage the unit. The ICRU was originally designed to have a strength of 50 personnel, and the Icelandic Government’s official aim is that from early 2006 up to 50 personnel should actually be working abroad on its behalf at any given time. In practice, this goal will not be met on time as a result, among other things, of the high and concentrated costs of missions already undertaken abroad, notably in Afghanistan. It was (unofficially) foreseen that 27 or 28 persons would be deployed abroad in January 2006, that the number should rise to 35–40 by the end of the year and that the target of 50 deployable persons at any one time could be met in 2007. The ICRU’s response list already includes the names of 200 Icelanders and its budget for 2006 is 570 million krónur (€7.8 million).24

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21 Official of the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs (note 20).
23 The first steps towards the creation of the ICRU date back to 1994 when the Icelandic Government deployed medical professionals to a Norwegian-run hospital in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was part of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission. This ‘Icelandic mission’ continued, in cooperation with the British contingent, when the mission was taken over by NATO as IFOR and subsequently SFOR.
24 Official of the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Interview with the authors, Reykjavik, Oct. 2005. The budget for 2005 was 463 million krónur (€6.3 million) and for 2004 was 329 million krónur (€4.5 million).
The annual budget is supposed to increase as the scope of the unit increases and as more personnel are deployed abroad. The ICRU is explicitly earmarked for possible use by the EU as well as NATO, the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In 2001 and 2002 it contributed to missions of all these four bodies in the Balkans. Its main mission from mid-2004 to early 2005 was the running of Kabul International Airport, as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which is now commanded by NATO in support of UN resolutions on Afghanistan. Around 16 Icelandic personnel were deployed at Kabul International Airport, and approximately 60 per cent of the ICRU’s budget for 2004 was spent on the Kabul mission. The decision that the ICRU should take over management of the Kabul airport was based on its successful running of Pristina Airport in Kosovo from October 2002 to April 2004, under the auspices of KFOR and NATO. The running of Pristina Airport was a turning point for the ICRU, which had never overseen such a big project nor accepted such responsibility before.

While the Icelandic Crisis Response Unit withdrew from the management of Kabul airport in February 2005 (see below), Afghanistan remains the unit’s single largest assignment. Eighteen ICRU personnel are deployed there with two of NATO’s provincial reconstruction teams: in northern Afghanistan along with personnel from Finland and Norway and in western Afghanistan with personnel from Denmark and Lithuania. The aims of the Icelandic personnel in Afghanistan are: (a) to demonstrate ISAF’s presence in remote regions; (b) to gather information on, for example, the security situation, the health of the population and water supplies; and (c) to forward this information to international aid organizations. Five ICRU persons are deployed with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, a Norwegian-led Nordic mission established to oversee the ceasefire between the Government of Sri Lanka forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. It supplies a specialist to the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) project in Kosovo and is present in Sarajevo with the European Union Police Mission, as mentioned above. In the winter of 2003–2004

27 Official of the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs (note 22).
29 The ICRU oversaw airport management and trained local personnel in all aspects of running an airport. Local personnel have now taken over the management of Pristina Airport under UN supervision and with the help of the Icelandic Civil Aviation Administration (which has made a service deal with the UN).
30 The ICRU has also participated in election monitoring, mainly in cooperation with the OSCE. The ICRU provides the official liaison point with the International Rescue Team of Landsbjörg, the Icelandic Association for Search and Rescue, which is a specialized unit allied with the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva and a member of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INASRAG). The team was deployed to Morocco in 2004 and had previously worked in Turkey and Algeria, following major earthquakes—a challenge with which Iceland is familiar. See Hannesson, H. W., Iceland’s permanent representative to the UN, ‘Friðaræsla vex að umfangi og nær til
two bomb experts of the Icelandic Coastguard went to Iraq on behalf of the ICRU as a part of a Danish team searching for and removing bombs in the southern part of the country and the ICRU currently has one person with NATO’s national training mission in Baghdad. The ICRU has no plans to deploy more personnel to Iraq.31

The Icelandic Government agreed to conduct airport missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan following requests by NATO, after NATO had experienced difficulty in finding any member nation to take on these tasks. Iceland had been criticized by NATO for being only a beneficiary of, not a contributor to, the alliance, aside from its small input in the Balkans. This pressure grew as the scope of NATO operations increased, and by 2002 the Icelandic Government felt that the time had come for it to demonstrate that it could accept peacekeeping responsibility and manage substantial projects. However, the decisions by the government to take on the airport management tasks—no light ones for a small and newly created response unit—and, indeed, the decision to establish the unit itself, particularly in the light of Iceland’s traditionally more reactive role within NATO, the UN and other international organizations,32 also need to be viewed in connection with the government’s constant aim of keeping the US military present in Keflavik unchanged.

Historically, up to this time, Iceland had shown very limited interest in participating actively in the NATO framework—in any respect. In the late 1980s, for example, all Icelandic relations with NATO were handled by one civil servant in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Icelandic delegation to NATO consisted of only three officials and two staff secretaries. The Danish and Norwegian delegations were much larger at this time, each containing 30–40 officials.33 In the 1950s Iceland was openly criticized by the USA for speaking so seldom at NATO meetings.34 Even by the late 1980s very limited knowledge existed within the Icelandic administration about military plans for Iceland and NATO’s Northern Region35 or, indeed, about any other NATO activity. In the late 1990s, however, the Icelandic Government was aware of growing pressure within the US administration to further limit its activity at the Keflavik base as the USA’s focus shifted from the North Atlantic to the east and south of Europe and outside of NATO territory. Given the Icelandic Government’s determination to preserve the military base and the view often stated by Icelandic ministers that any further cuts there would threaten Iceland’s samfélagsþróunar’ [The scope of peacekeeping has increased and reaches into societal development], Speech in the 4th Committee of the General Assembly, 27 Oct. 2004, URL <http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/frettaefni/ymis-erindi//nr/2407/>.

31 Morgunblaðið (note 28).
34 Ingimundarson, V., Í eldlínu kalda stríðsins [In the line of fire of the cold war] (Vaka-Helgafell: Reykjavík, 1996), p. 409.
35 Jónsson (note 33), p. 17.
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core security, greater activism in NATO could seem a price well worth paying in order to demonstrate that the country was not just a consumer of security and merited the continuation of US military protection.

These circumstances help to explain why the two biggest missions of the Icelandic Crisis Response Unit to date were conducted either under the NATO umbrella or in close cooperation with NATO and its member states. This choice of a NATO link, as opposed to the possibility of a greater involvement in UN peacekeeping, has been criticized within Iceland but it provides an ideal showcase for the government to try to prove that, despite its smallness and lack of a military force, it can contribute significantly to allied peacekeeping missions.

The airport missions have, in fact, received considerable attention in NATO, the EU and Washington. They have strengthened Iceland’s negotiating position in the ongoing talks with the US Government on the future of the Keflavík base, although this is still unlikely to determine the outcome (see section IV below).

The sharp contrast of these actions with Iceland’s former limited involvement in NATO has helped to attract attention, and the Icelandic Government seems to have succeeded in showing that Iceland can ease the burden on its fellow allies, even if its missions are bound to be limited in scope. The smallness of the Icelandic administration, and its access to a wide range of civil expertise (some of it as a result of experience of dealing with military personnel at the Keflavík base), may in fact have helped the ICRU to respond swiftly to the requests to manage the Pristina and Kabul airports. In this respect Iceland has provided an example for another small NATO member, Luxembourg, which has shown interest in the model of the response unit.

The development of the ICRU has received considerable attention within Iceland: particularly the fact that Icelanders working for the unit in Pristina and Kabul were granted military status, wore military uniforms and carried arms. (The Icelanders were granted a legal military status within NATO, according to international law, in case something should happen to them.)

This has led to debate in Iceland on whether the government has created a de facto Icelandic army, an accusation that the government itself firmly denies. Parliamentarians of the Left-Green Movement have on several occasions criticized the ‘military’ missions of the ICRU, and the leader of the Movement has asserted that the unit should concentrate solely on civil missions and not be involved in ‘cleaning up after the Americans’. Some Social Democrats have also criticized the

36 Official of the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs (note 22).
38 Official of the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs (note 22).
39 ‘Hafa réttarstöðu hermanna í NATO’ [Have the same legal status as NATO soldiers], Morgunblaðið, 4 Nov. 2004, URL <http://www.mbl.is/mm/gagnasafn/grein.html?radnr=788608>.
40 Morgunblaðið (note 39).
Pristina and Kabul deployments, accusing the government of mixing up the concepts of peacekeeping, military activity and aid missions, and of actually prioritizing missions where ‘peacekeeping’ can be combined with military activity—with purely humanitarian missions coming second best. These and other critics argue that maintaining the distinction between peacekeeping and aid missions would be better for the safety of ICRU staff and for gaining the confidence of the local population. The government has accordingly been urged to engage in actions on behalf of the Icelandic International Development Agency and aid organizations such as the Red Cross and Icelandic Church Aid, rather than so-called ‘peacekeeping’ activity for NATO.\(^{42}\)

As this critique underlines, any discussion of the possible creation of an armed force is very sensitive in Icelandic politics. Iceland’s struggle for independence in the 19th and early 20th centuries was conducted without the use of force, and the image of Iceland as a civil power that has no militia and does not participate in violent enforcement is an important one for many Icelanders. For example, Iceland did not become a founding member of the UN in June 1945 since it refused to declare war on the ‘enemy’ states (at that time, Japan)\(^{43}\) but joined a year later when a declaration of war was no longer a requirement for membership. This self-image also played a big part in the initially fierce opposition to the establishment of the military base in Keflavík and the Defense Agreement with the USA.\(^{44}\) More recently, Iceland’s self-image has contributed to the popular opposition to the Icelandic Government’s decision to put the country on the list of the ‘coalition of the willing’ for the war in Iraq.

Against this background, the outcry in Iceland which followed a suicide bomb attack on ICRU personnel in Kabul in October 2004 did not come as any great surprise. A suicide bomber blew himself up on a Kabul street where six Icelanders, in uniforms and fully armed, were shopping, injuring two of them. Three other people were killed: an 11-year-old Afghan girl, an American woman and the bomber himself.\(^{45}\) This was the first time that members of the ICRU were injured in an operation,\(^{46}\) and it caused fresh questions to be asked—by some politicians and the media—about whether the response unit was heading in the right direction when it led to operations that put Icelandic


\(^{44}\) On 2 occasions it seemed likely that the Defense Agreement would be cancelled or reviewed and the Keflavík base closed. The first occasion was in 1956–58, during the leftist coalition government of the Progressive Party, the People’s Alliance and the Social Democratic Party, and the second was in 1971–74, when another leftist coalition was in power, this time including the newly formed Association of Liberals and Leftists in place of the Social Democrats. Neither of these governments wished to withdraw Iceland from NATO.


\(^{46}\) ‘Íslenskr friðargæsulíðar ekki slassast áður’ [Icelandic peacekeeping soldiers have not been injured before], Morgunblaðið, 25 Oct. 2004, URL <http://mbl.is/mm/gagnasafn/grein.html?radnr=786975>. 
participants at risk. The head of the ICRU’s Kabul mission, who had organized the shopping trip to buy rugs and escaped without injury, was replaced soon after the attack.

Even before this incident the Icelandic Government had decided to end the ICRU’s management of Kabul International Airport four months earlier than originally planned—on 1 February instead of 1 June 2005—despite having promised to look positively at the possibility of an extension if requested. The reason given for this decision by the head of the ICRU was that other member states of NATO had not deployed as many personnel to work at the airport as they had promised: 320 people were needed to run the airport at its current level of activity, but for most of the time 120–30 of these posts had been unfilled. After Belgium declared that it would withdraw nearly 60 personnel from its mission at the airport, Iceland had informed NATO that air traffic would have to be limited and the hours of the airport’s opening would have to be cut. After careful examination, NATO decided in September 2004 that Turkey would manage the airport for six months after the Icelandic withdrawal, to be followed successively by Portugal, Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania for a period of four months each until 2007. However, Iceland continued to deploy 13 personnel at the airport under Turkish management until 1 June 2005.

In retrospect, it seems that the Icelandic Government and the ICRU underestimated the task of running the airport and overestimated the ICRU’s ability to take on such a huge project. The ICRU was very confident at the outset, promising to run the airport for 12 months or even longer, while such tasks are usually only taken on by individual nations for 6 months at a time. However, other NATO members remained reluctant to deploy personnel to the Kabul airport mission throughout the period of Icelandic management, although Iceland had underlined the importance of access to other states’ larger capacities from the outset. The October 2004 suicide bomb attack on the ICRU’s personnel, and the intensive media attention that followed, made the project less attractive for the government than it had seemed initially and has led to a critical examination within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the deployment of ICRU personnel and their role in international operations.

At the time of the suicide attack, the Icelandic Government and the ICRU tried to minimize the political damage by arguing that Icelanders faced little danger at Kabul airport, where they were based, and that members of non-

47 Morgunblaðið (note 41); and Morgunblaðið (note 39).
48 ‘Hætta stjórn fjörum mánuðum fyrir en ráðgert var’ [Cease control four months earlier than planned], Morgunblaðið, 17 Nov. 2004, URL <http://www.mbl.is/mmgagnasafin/grein.html?radnr=790923>.
49 Official of the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs (note 22).
50 Morgunblaðið (note 48).
52 Official of the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Interview with the authors, Reykjavík, Oct. 2005.
uniformed international aid organizations (e.g., the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières) faced as much danger outside the airport as those in uniform. The head of the ICRU pointed to the facts that its personnel had had to wear uniforms and carry weapons from the time of Iceland’s first international peacekeeping deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994; that they had done the same at Kabul only at NATO’s request; that they carried guns only for self-defence; and that they had never been attacked directly before.53 Halldór Ásgrímsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs 1995–2004 and now Prime Minister, has repeatedly stated that it is ‘ridiculous’ to argue that the creation of the ICRU is a step towards an Icelandic army. ‘There is no interest in creating an army in Iceland and the government has no plans whatsoever for creating an army’; on the contrary, it wants to create a peacekeeping unit.54 Ásgrímsson argues that Iceland has gained a lot of respect and status within NATO for its conduct of the missions in Kabul and Pristina,55 and the head of the ICRU has added the familiar argument about Iceland’s role in NATO changing from that of a recipient to that of a contributor.56 Furthermore, Ásgrímsson stated that Iceland has earned international recognition for its readiness to conduct such big operations precisely because it did not have an army:

I think that a country without an army will always be a more convincing peacekeeper . . . I foresee that Iceland will participate in more and more projects . . . and I think that we [Iceland] will work more closely with the other Nordic states but at the same time we have used the opportunity to gain status within NATO . . . It can be said that the projects in Pristina and Kabul are part of what Iceland contributes to NATO. We regard this contribution as very important in the light of the importance of NATO.57

Ásgrímsson has rejected all forms of participation in ‘military operations’ and states that Iceland’s mission starts only ‘when peace has been established and it is our role to keep the peace’.58 He emphasizes that Iceland has become a more active member of NATO and that ‘the member states are under enormous pressure to contribute more to NATO. A contribution from every member state is expected’.59


54 Ásgrímsson, H., Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs, Interview in ‘Herlaust land er sannfærandi boðberi fröðar’ [A country without a military is a convincing messenger of peace], Morgunblaðið, 8 June 2004, URL <http://mbl.is/mm/gagnasafn/grein.html?radnr=764247> (authors’ translation).

55 Ásgrímsson (note 54).

56 Sigurjónsson (note 53). In accordance with a promise made by the Icelandic Government at the NATO Heads of State meeting in Prague in Nov. 2002, Iceland has contributed to the costs of the transport of equipment for member states to Afghanistan; e.g., it paid for the transfer of 6 helicopters from the Netherlands.

57 Ásgrímsson (note 54).

58 Ásgrímsson (note 54).

59 Ásgrímsson (note 54).
IV. New disturbance to the new equilibrium?

As of late 2005, the stress and challenges caused for Iceland at the broader political and institutional level by the first emergence of an EU-based European security and defence policy seemed to have been largely laid to rest. In particular, the successful mounting of two successive EU operations with NATO planning support showed that the institutions could work together in a complementary fashion. The view of the ESDP in Washington (always carefully observed from Reykjavík) had mellowed considerably as a result of this and of NATO’s own demonstrated ability to re-invent itself for new tasks such as peacekeeping in Afghanistan. There appeared to be room in the security universe after all for a strong NATO and a defence-capable EU to co-exist: perhaps all the more so since the EU was becoming increasingly explicit in conceptualizing, and attempting to use, the non-military strengths that made it such a different creature from NATO in the first place.60 However, this very distinctness of the two institutions has set the scene for a possible new phase in Iceland’s own thinking about its place in the security architecture and the best solution for its own national security needs.

The least stable element in the Icelandic security picture today is what used to be its bedrock: namely, the future of the US military presence. Shifting priorities have caused the USA to reduce the total number of its personnel at Keflavík by more than 60 per cent since the end of the cold war, from around 3300 in 1990 to 1350 in October 2005. Moreover, in terms of export earnings, the net income to Iceland from the Iceland Defense Force fell from 7.2 per cent of all such earnings in 1990 to 2.7 per cent in 2004 and the income as a proportion of GDP fell from 2.6 per cent to 1.1 per cent in the same period.61 In 1994 the USA reduced the number of its jet fighter aircraft at the base to (a minimum of) four, and was planning to make more drastic cuts in its operations in Iceland by withdrawing all jet fighter aircraft and the Defense Force’s helicopter rescue team and by dismantling the US naval monitoring and detecting system in stages, adopting instead a remote sensing system based on satellites. In negotiations with the USA, the Icelandic Government managed to guarantee the con-

60 Since the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the EU has prepared capability goals for non-military operational inputs (police, law and justice personnel, political advisers, etc.) in addition to its military rapid reaction forces and more traditional humanitarian capacities. Two of the early EU operations (in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FYROM) were police missions, and in July 2004 a new-style ‘rule of law’ mission involving a small group of civilian advisers was launched in Georgia (EUJUST Themis). More broadly, the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in Dec. 2003 sets out a view of the EU’s security mission and methods in which internal security measures for the EU’s own territories; the security impact of enlargement and ‘new neighbourhood’ policies; and the use of the EU’s economic and aid resources to promote stability, democracy and development are all portrayed as contributions to the EU’s own security interests and the interests of the international community on a par with (or even preferable to) the use of direct methods of intervention. Council of the European Union, ‘A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003, URL <http://register.consilium.eu.int/>.

61 Eydal F., Iceland Defense Force, Interview with the authors, 2 Oct. 2005. Of those 1350 personnel, 700 are there on behalf of the US Air Force and about 650 on behalf of the US Navy, which manages the military base.
tinuation of a US air defence capacity based in Iceland, the presence of the helicopter rescue team, and the continuation of the naval monitoring and detecting system. It thereby conserved not just the minimum air defence capacity but also the protection enjoyed by Icelanders and a number of the Icelandic jobs at the US installations.

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the launch of new military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld identified the Keflavík base as being among those overseas assets that were no longer required for the USA’s new strategic concept, making clear that he saw no justification for maintaining US forces in Iceland. The collapse of the former Soviet threat had reduced the strategic significance of the waters off the north-western coast of Europe, and Russian naval and air activity in the area was now minimal, removing—in the US view—any tangible threat to Iceland itself as well as any need to tie down US military assets in the area. Accordingly, in early May 2003, just a few days before a general election in Iceland, the USA notified the Icelandic Government that in four weeks it would start to withdraw the remaining four F-15 jet fighters and the helicopter rescue team based at the Keflavík base. The Icelandic Government reacted with fury, but managed to keep the issue away from the media and the parliamentary opposition until after the election. It demanded that the US decision be changed, arguing that under the 1951 Defense Agreement no changes could be made in the agreement itself or the operations of US forces in the country without the approval of both parties. The government demanded the continuation of the US air defence presence in the country, stating that Iceland’s defence would not be credible without it—or, indeed, with any further cuts at the Keflavík base. Reflecting his government’s outrage at the unilateral US decision, the Prime Minister, Davíð Oddsson, went so far as to state that the withdrawal of the jet fighters was tantamount to ending the Defense Agreement and that he saw no point in keeping the Defense Agreement and the US military base if the US Government was going to leave Iceland without credible air defence. These were strong words indeed, coming from a politician and a party (the Independence Party) that, as noted above, had been strongly committed to a close relationship with the USA and the Defense Agreement.

The Icelandic Government managed to raise the issue with US President George W. Bush and his national security adviser, Condolleezza Rice, with the

62 Thorhallsson and Vignisson (note 5).
63 ‘Við höfum reynst að draga úr viðbúnaði á Íslandi’ [We have tried to reduce the preparedness in Iceland], Morgunblaðið, 20 Apr. 2002, URL <http://www.mbl.is/mm/gagnasafn/grein.html?radnr=629162>.
64 The Prime Minister, Davíð Oddsson, had made the same point on several occasions before the USA’s 2003 decision; see Thorhallsson and Vignisson (note 5).
help of Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General.\textsuperscript{66} As a result of this and subsequent conversations between Oddsson and his Foreign Minister, Halldór Ásgrímsson, on the one hand and top US cabinet members, advisers, and White House and State Department officials on the other, President Bush suspended the US decision for the time being.\textsuperscript{67} During the summer of 2003 further USA–Iceland talks took place on the matter, ending with a decision by the USA to postpone the withdrawal of the jet fighters and the helicopter rescue team, and to combine the US–Icelandic talks with the wider ongoing negotiations between the US and European governments over the future of the US military presence in Europe. The fate of the four F-15 jet fighters and other US operations in Iceland thus became linked with the overall restructuring of US military operations.\textsuperscript{68}

At the time of writing (October 2005), no formal decisions had been taken on the future of the jet fighters and the other US activity at Keflavík, but the USA continued to cut back its operations in Iceland without the approval of the Icelandic Government. The OP-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft were removed from the Keflavík base;\textsuperscript{69} about 550 US soldiers were recalled to the USA in the period from January 2003 to October 2005; about 250 Icelanders at the base were made redundant by the Iceland Defense Force and about 350 Icelanders lost their jobs with contracting firms working for the Force in the period from April 2003 to October 2005. This leaves about 900 Icelanders working for the Iceland Defense Force and for contractors providing services to the base. In December 2004 the previously suspended decision to replace the US naval monitoring and detection system with a satellite-based system was implemented, making some of the Icelanders in the four monitoring stations in Iceland redundant. The downsizing of the Keflavík base is also manifested in the fact that a major from the US Air Force now heads the base instead of an admiral from the US Navy (a change equivalent to one grade’s reduction in rank). A proposal has been put forward within the US Defense Department for the US Air Force to take over the management of the military base altogether from the US Navy: if accepted, this could mean further cuts at the base since

\textsuperscript{66} It seems to have been by coincidence that Lord Robertson became involved in the case. He was on his way to meet President Bush when he was contacted by the Icelandic Government and asked to intervene, and he agreed to take up the issue with the president.

\textsuperscript{67} ‘Mikilvægur áfangasigur’ [Important piecemeal victory], Morgunblaðið, 16 Aug. 2003, <http://mbl.is/mm/gagnasafn/grein.html?radr=709843>.


\textsuperscript{69} Eydal (note 61); ‘Vopn tengd Orien-vélunum flutt burtu frá Keflavíkurflugvelli’ [Weapons related to the Orion aircraft transported from Keflavík airport], Morgunblaðið, 29 Oct. 2004, URL <http://mbl.is/mm/gagnasafn/grein.html?radnr=787652>; and ‘Stjórnvöld hafa enga hugmynd um hvert stefnir’ [The government has no idea where we are heading], Morgunblaðið, 4 Nov. 2004, URL <http://mbl.is/mm/gagnasafn/grein.html?radnr=788652>.
half of the 1350 US personnel still deployed there are from the Navy, and naval personnel account for most of those already withdrawn.\(^70\)

There has been an ongoing dialogue between the Icelandic and US governments at both official and ministerial levels about US operations at the base since May 2003. A number of formal meetings have taken place, but these have not addressed the issue of the future scale of US activities and of which party should pay in future both for the costs of the Keflavík base itself and the international airport located there—currently part of the US defence structure and run largely at the US Government’s expense. At the same time there have been many indications of tension between the two sides, including repeated US delays in setting up meetings, but also a decision by the Icelandic side to cancel a planned formal session in October 2005 and fly its representatives back home after first contacts with the US delegation proved unpromising. The Icelandic Government explained this incident as being provoked by non-negotiably high resource demands from the US side, but the media also speculated that the USA had proposed moving the four F-15 jet fighters from Keflavík to an airfield in the United Kingdom, while retaining (greatly reduced) facilities at Keflavík to deploy them in a crisis.\(^71\) For their part, Icelandic ministers and officials claim that they have managed to guarantee that Iceland’s air defence will continue to be provided by the USA through the four F-15 jet fighters based in Keflavík: US officials have not confirmed this publicly but have stated that the US security guarantee for Iceland will continue without change.\(^72\) All in all, it can only be concluded that great uncertainty remains over the presence of the US military force in Iceland; that solutions are hard to envisage under which the costs, especially of Keflavík airport, do not shift substantially from the US taxpayer to the Icelandic budget; and that, in the last resort, the USA has demonstrated that it can simply keep on downsizing its operations in Iceland without Iceland’s approval.

The future intentions of the USA regarding the Keflavík base thus constitute a sword of Damocles that still hangs over Icelandic heads and few officials expert in international affairs would disagree that the closure of the base is now a matter of ‘when’ rather than ‘whether’. The resulting crisis of confidence in the bilateral Defense Agreement has been aggravated by Icelandic awareness of parallel developments in NATO as a whole which are making the alliance less

\(^70\) Eydal (note 61).


evidently a stable and sufficient protection for Iceland’s territory and an adequate platform for Iceland’s international defence diplomacy. Since 2000 NATO has turned its operational focus rapidly away from Europe and towards needs in other areas: its defence capability targets are now rather narrowly focused on the provision of expeditionary forces; it has no general defence plan for Europe’s own territory; and it has ruthlessly cut back its regional headquarters system, leaving only two supreme headquarters, one on either side of the Atlantic and both with essentially functional rather than territorial duties.  

A further, and unwelcome, signal of change for Iceland was the transfer in the autumn of 2002 of the USA’s national higher command over the Keflavík base to USEUCOM (the US European Command) at Stuttgart, followed by the switch of the NATO element in command to Mons. While the technical reason for these changes was related to the re-dedication of the former SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) command at Norfolk, Virginia, to duties connected with NATO, they were bound to be perceived in Iceland as a diminution of the decades-old link between the nation’s defence and the USA’s own extended territorial security. On top of these specific national worries, Iceland—like all the other Nordic countries, but perhaps with keener anxiety than any of them—has been observing the USA–Europe tensions spawned by the Iraq crisis in 2001–2003 and the growing evidence of fundamental divergences across the Atlantic in security priorities, methods and even values. To put it briefly, Iceland has cause today to worry about whether NATO will survive at all as a strong and credible political and strategic community: but, even if the alliance does continue on its present course, it clearly no longer offers—and most likely will never again offer—Iceland the combination of superior protection and ideal platform for projecting the Icelandic voice in world affairs that it provided for five decades.

For other countries hard hit by the same or equivalent changes (e.g., Turkey), or at least for their elites (as in Norway), a natural reaction has been to look more seriously at what the EU can provide as a defence and security community. The European Union already covers issues of internal security (justice and home affairs, border management, and asylum and immigration), energy security, environmental security, transport security, nuclear safety and the handling of animal disease, which NATO has never aspired to do and as no other single international forum can. Since September 2001 the EU has significantly strengthened its efforts against internal and international terrorism, and its new package of anti-terrorism measures adopted after the Madrid bombings of March 2004 includes a ‘solidarity’ commitment by all 25 member states to

74 Thorhallsson and Vignisson (note 5), pp. 114–15.
76 See chapter 19 in this volume.
come to each other’s aid with all necessary means in the event of terrorist strikes on their territory. The continually enhanced scope and depth of ESDP as such, and the conceptual tightening up and deepening of other areas of EU security policy such as the new Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, offer means that are not inferior but rather different in kind to those of NATO for protecting and promoting Europe’s security interests and its goals and values in the wider world. In short, the EU already offers a remarkably full menu of ‘soft’ security protection to its members in their own homelands; it has ‘hard’ (military) as well as unusually strong ‘soft’ instruments at its disposal for promoting its members’ interests abroad; and—many would say—it is moving down a slippery slope towards providing full formal territorial guarantees, even if it still falls well short of a credible ‘alliance’ at present. Even without a positive wish to enhance its defence role, the EU might find itself drawn into taking greater responsibility for the all-round security of its members as a consequence of NATO’s gradual retreat from a territorial defence function, combined with the sheer expanse of the EU’s new territory (following the ‘big bang’ enlargement of May 2004) and the challenging security dimensions of its relationships with ‘new neighbours’ on every front.

Of all the states in Europe, Iceland perhaps has the strongest internal barriers to recognition of these factors and the fundamental policy change needed to adapt to them. As noted above, pro-USA and anti-EU sentiments are deeply ingrained in the political mainstream, linked with concepts of national independence and with the defence of Iceland’s fisheries (which is seen as an important component of security in itself). Membership of the Schengen system and the EEA already gives Iceland ‘soft security’ cover from those areas of EU competence that are of direct relevance to the country, whereas (for reasons explained above) it is not much of a customer for the other security-related services that the EU can offer. Also relevant is the Icelandic tendency, so far, to think of national security and deterrence in extremely concrete, military terms: thus, when threatened with withdrawal of the US F-15s in 2003, some Icelandic officials speculated about whether similar aircraft might be provided by friendly European states such as Germany or the UK. This is not a currency in which the EU, as such, is ever likely to be able to satisfy Iceland’s wants.

Nevertheless, a growing number of leading Icelandic politicians, particularly in the ranks of the Social Democratic Alliance, argue that by joining the EU and adopting its security and defence policy Iceland could go some way to solving the problem of diminishing US military interest in the country. This seems also to be the view of the conservative Minister for Justice, Björn Bjarnason, who is the main specialist on defence and security within the Independence Party. He

stated that if the partnership between the USA and Iceland were to break down—as it was on the brink of doing in 2003—it would be necessary for Iceland ‘both to take radical measures regarding security and also to formulate a new policy on Europe’. At the same time, he stressed that the CFSP and the ESDP cannot in any way replace the enormous security benefits that are guaranteed to Iceland by the Defense Agreement with the USA and Iceland’s membership of NATO.

This opinion is shared by an overwhelming majority within the governing parties, and as long as the Defense Agreement stays in place and the USA maintains a ‘credible’ (in the eyes of the Icelandic Government) defence force in Iceland, there is little sign that this will change. On the other hand, the leaders of the Social Democratic Alliance are increasingly pointing to the option of joining the CFSP and the ESDP on the somewhat different grounds that this will offer Iceland ‘soft’ as well as ‘hard’ security. They will undoubtedly try to convince the Progressive Party to join them in this effort after the next general election (which will take place no later than May 2007).

Halldór Ásgrímsson, leader of the agrarian Progressive Party, has been Prime Minister since September 2004, when he swapped his position as Minister for Foreign affairs with Oddsson, leader of the Independence Party. Oddsson stepped down in September–October 2005 as both party leader and Foreign Minister; Geir Haarde has taken over both these posts. There seems to be a sharp contrast between the opinions of Ásgrímsson and Haarde on the EU in general, and they disagree on whether Iceland should seriously consider the possibility of joining the Union. On the one hand—as noted above—Oddsson’s policy has prevailed for the past 15 years in maintaining the government’s decision not to apply for EU membership. As Foreign Minister, Ásgrímsson repeatedly tried to put EU membership on the agenda by producing detailed reports on Iceland’s position in Europe, but Oddsson had such a strong position within his party that his leadership and policy stance were not open to question. As reflected in Haarde’s attitude, the Oddsson line on the EU question is likely to prevail for some time longer in his party and in the present government. The Independence Party, under Oddsson’s leadership, has been strongly pro-US—it could even be said that it has been pro-Bush—as reflected by the government’s decision in 2003 to put Iceland on the list of the coalition of the willing for the war in Iraq, and Haarde as the new party leader is expected to maintain this stand. On the other hand, Oddsson’s phased withdrawal from politics may change the political landscape in Iceland in the longer run. His departure opens up the possibility of a debate on the EU within the Independence Party and might ultimately lead to a change in the party’s own stand against EU membership, opening the possibility of a conservative pro-European government.

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80 Bjarnason, B., *Í hita kalda striðsins* [In the heat of the cold war] (Nýja bókaforlagið: Reykjavík, 2001), p. 316 (authors’ translation).

In summary, the Independence Party continues for the present to exercise a blocking role vis-à-vis the possibility of EU membership, and ‘a revolution’ would be needed to change the Independence Party’s position on Europe so long as Oddsson’s legacy remains. It might take the closure of the Keflavík base or termination of the Defense Agreement to trigger such a change, if combined with the continued doctrinal and practical build-up of the CFSP and the ESDP. Icelandic politicians still think as much in terms of territorial guarantees as they did during the cold war—although some of them are changing—and attach much higher value to the ‘hard’ security protection that the USA provides than the ‘soft’ security protection that EU membership offers. It is thus difficult to see the Independence Party or even the Progressive Party enthusiastically advocating membership of the CFSP and the ESDP without either a definitive US withdrawal or a fundamental shift in their security philosophy towards a policy based as much on soft instruments as hard ones. This is why any move by the EU to provide more serious ‘hard’ security guarantees for its members could play a literally pivotal role in making EU membership more attractive for Iceland’s current political elite.
I. Introduction

The Åland islands form in many ways an interesting case in European security policy and in the gradually evolving European security system. Åland is an autonomous region of Finland with a largely Swedish-speaking population. Its legislative autonomy and a strong protection for its population’s Swedish language and culture are enshrined in the Finnish constitution.

Owing to its location, Åland has for centuries been of great strategic interest for states in its neighbourhood. When Finland—and Åland with it—were transferred from Sweden to the Russian Empire in 1809, Sweden started to push for the demilitarization of Åland. After the 1854–56 Crimean War, during which major operations took place on Åland, an appendix to the 1856 Treaty of Paris forbade Russia from establishing fortifications or maintaining or building up a military presence and naval forces on the islands.\(^1\) After Finland gained independence from Russia in 1917, Åland became for a number of years a source of controversy between Finland and Sweden as a result of the Ålanders’ demand for Åland’s reunification with Sweden.

In the summer of 1921 the League of Nations resolved the Åland question. Åland should remain a part of Finland but would be granted autonomy, which—along with the historically rooted principles of neutrality and demilitarization—would be supported by international guarantees. In October 1921 the Convention relating to the Non-fortification and Neutralization of the Åland Islands was signed by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.\(^2\) Russia was not accepted as a party to the convention because the Western powers did not regard Bolshevik Russia as a sovereign state after the revolution of 1917.

The convention placed two types of obligations on the signatories. Under the demilitarization provisions of the Åland Convention, Finland confirmed its commitments in the 1856 treaty.\(^3\) The 1921 convention prohibits the building or

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1 The parties to this treaty were France, the United Kingdom and Russia. Ahlström, C., *Demilitariserade och neutraliserade områden i Europa* [Demilitarized and neutral areas in Europe] (Ålands freds-institut: Mariehamn, 1995), p. 24.

2 The Convention relating to the Non-fortification and Neutralization of the Åland Islands was signed on 20 Oct. 1921 and came into effect on 6 Apr. 1922. The original French text of the convention is available at URL <http://www.kultur.aland.fi/kulturstiftelsen/traktater/>.

maintenance of any military, naval or air force installations or bases of operation on the islands as well as any other installations intended for military purposes.4 The Åland Convention also contains provisions on the neutralization of the territory in case of war and states that it may not, directly or indirectly, be used for military purposes.5

Åland’s status received renewed attention in the 1990s in view of the changes taking place in European security structures and Finland’s policies vis-à-vis them. This chapter deals with these challenges. In section II the position of Åland with respect to the deepening of the European Security and Defence Policy and Finland’s commitment to it is considered. Section III considers what would happen to Åland’s demilitarized status if Finland were to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Finally, the approach of the Åland Government itself is considered in section IV.

II. Åland, Finland and the European Security and Defence Policy

Åland’s demilitarization drew fresh attention in the 1990s against the background of a radically different political and security context. The role and validity of the islands’ demilitarization have been reassessed in different ways by the various parties involved. Åland’s demilitarization and neutralization have a solid foundation in public international law, but demands are now being made for an examination of whether this foundation still holds.

There is wide agreement among experts in international law that Åland’s demilitarization and neutralization remain beyond question, despite the changes that have taken place in the political context.6 However, the current status of Åland’s demilitarization in international law does not appear to be entirely satisfactory, as many of Finland’s neighbours are not parties to the 1921 Åland Convention. Allan Rosas therefore proposes that Lithuania, Norway and Russia should be invited to become parties to the convention and Lauri Hannikainen,  

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4 Ahlström (note 1), p. 28. There are a few exceptions to these rules. All marine vessels have right of innocent passage through the demilitarized area. The Finnish Government can also permit foreign marine vessels to visit the islands and temporarily anchor in Åland waters. In exceptional circumstances Finland also has the right to send armed forces to Åland if this is strictly necessary for the maintenance of order. Finland has the right to allow ships of war to anchor temporarily in Åland waters and, if necessitated by special circumstances, other types of marine vessels, although not submarines, may also enter these waters. Finland may also let its own military aircraft fly through Åland’s airspace.

5 The neutrality provisions also contain a number of exceptions. In case of an armed conflict involving the Baltic Sea, Finland has the right to lay mines and take any maritime measures that are strictly necessary to ensure respect for the neutrality of the zone. In case of a sudden attack against Åland, Finland has the right to take any measures that are necessary to contain and repel the attacker until the other contracting parties are able to intervene.

who also argues for Russia’s accession to the convention, puts forward the idea that the European Union should become one of the parties to the convention.7

Internationally, too, Åland’s status in international law has received support. The issue was raised in Finland’s membership negotiations with the EU. The additional protocol to Finland’s accession treaty on the special status of Åland in international law suggests that there is still broad international agreement on the special position of Åland.8

The current development of the ESDP does not appear—at least in the short term—to imply any challenge to Åland’s demilitarization or neutralization. For the time being, the EU lacks both legal competence and political will to disturb this historical arrangement. The situation might be changed if the EU’s members should decide to use the opportunity given in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht for the establishment of a common defence.9 The position of Åland would then start to be considered from the point of view of common strategic planning. The obligations of international law would, of course, continue to apply unless the EU and its relevant member states should specifically seek to rescind them.

III. Åland and Finnish membership of NATO

Membership of NATO means that a country is integrated into NATO’s structures; in practice the integration of each new member may have specific features based on the nature of its national defence system or on conditions specified in its bilateral negotiations with NATO. The end results of the negotiations generally have certain common traits. Denmark and Norway, both founding members of NATO, do not permit foreign troops to be permanently stationed in their territories during peacetime and, in 1957 and 1961, respectively, declared that nuclear weapons could not be stationed or stored on their territories. NATO has applied the same principle to the incorporation of the new Central and East European member states.

Last but not least, it is the member country’s geopolitical and strategic position that ultimately decides the terms under which it is incorporated into NATO’s military structure. As long as NATO remains first and foremost a

7 Rosas (note 3), p. 35; Hannikainen (note 6), pp. 643–51; and Hannikainen, L., ‘Ålandskonventionens framtid’ [The future of the Åland Convention], Åland på den säkerhetspolitiska agenda: [Åland on the security policy agenda] (Ålands högskola: Mariehamn, 1996), pp. 17–22. As Rosas shows, the problem with the EU’s accession to the convention is that, unlike its constituent element the European Community, the EU is not a subject of international law.


defence union based on the collective duty of its members to assist in each 
other’s defence, the admission of new members must also be preceded by an 
assessment of the strategic implications of the enlargement.

The question of whether Åland would retain its demilitarized status if Finland 
were to become a member of NATO can be approached by examining the legal, 
political and strategic significance of Åland’s demilitarization in today’s 
Europe and the consequences of a potential termination of the demilitarization 
regime.

To a large extent, the fate of Åland’s demilitarization would appear to be in 
the hands of NATO, which means that the political and strategic aspects are the 
crucial factors. Ultimately, Åland’s demilitarization and neutralization rest on 
the Åland Convention, whose contracting parties (with the exception of Finland 
and Sweden) are all members of NATO. Under the international law of treaties 
the contracting parties have the right to decide collectively on the termination of 
any treaties to which they are party. In the event that a majority of the contract-
ning parties to the Åland Convention were to request the termination of Åland’s 
demilitarization and neutralization, it is likely that only Sweden and the 
Ålanders themselves would oppose the decision.

Sweden’s standpoint would depend on whether Sweden itself decided to join 
NATO or not. Russia, on the other hand, would not formally be able to prevent 
the termination of the Åland Convention, although it would probably attempt to 
do so by political means. NATO’s member states and Finland would in any 
case be forced to reach an agreement with Russia on points arising from the 
1856 Treaty of Paris to which the former Russian state was party. Russia also 
has a bilateral agreement with Finland on Åland’s demilitarization.10

Åland’s demilitarized and neutralized status has a strong foundation in inter-
national law. Some experts in the field regard this position as an ‘objective 
regime’—that is, it imposes obligations on non-party states—while others argue 
that it is a part of customary law within the European legal system.11 Although 
in principle there are no legal obstacles to the termination of Åland’s demilitar-
ization by the parties to the Åland Convention, such a step would require a 
broad political agreement among the countries of northern Europe.

In the event that Finland were to become a member of NATO, Åland’s future 
would be decided on the basis of strategic and political considerations. If 
relations among the countries of Europe remain good, NATO’s military strat-
egists would probably argue for the termination of the demilitarized regime 
while the alliance’s political strategists would try to prevent this. Anders Gard-
berg, who has studied Åland’s position from a strategic perspective, has 
summarized the key points in the islands’ strategic position.12

10 The Treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union was signed on 10 Oct. 1940. The text of the treaty is available at URL <http://www.kultur.aland.fi/kulturstiftelsen/traktater/>.
11 Rosas represents that latter opinion and refers, e.g., to Niklas Fagerlund and Hannikainen, who represent the former. Rosas (note 3), p. 29; Fagerlund (note 8); and Hannikainen (note 6),
most, he says, Åland is important for the defence of Finland: the islands could serve as a base for the country’s naval forces in case of a sea attack against southern Finland. Åland is also important for Finland’s foreign trade and its ability to function in a crisis situation. The same applies to Finland’s telecommunication lines, most of which run across Åland.

Åland’s position is also important from a wider north European perspective, according to Gardberg. If Finland were believed to have no credible ability to resist an attack and monitor the area, this would add to speculation about the future of the territory, with the result that more countries would include Åland in their military plans. Gardberg points out that whoever controls Åland in a crisis situation would be able to isolate the entire Gulf of Bothnia.

On the basis of this brief summary it seems clear that Åland’s strategic position is sufficiently important to assume that NATO’s strategic planners, in the event that Finland were to join the alliance, would attempt to end the territory’s demilitarization. As far as NATO is concerned, it should not in this respect matter whether Sweden becomes a member or not. Åland’s location in the Gulf of Bothnia is sufficiently important to warrant a reappraisal of its status.

Even if strategic considerations would seem to favour a termination of Åland’s demilitarized status, it does not automatically follow that the leading NATO countries would attempt to persuade the other parties to the 1921 convention to agree to such a solution. Political factors and the NATO countries’ assessment of the overall political dimension of the Åland question would in practice determine the outcome. This author believes that after assessing the political situation NATO would eventually decide not to alter the historical arrangement and leave Åland’s international position unchanged.

Finland is more likely to apply for membership of NATO for political reasons—and because of the country’s general role in the EU system—than because of a significant change in the strategic situation in northern Europe. In such a case, Finland would be inclined to avoid highlighting the strategic meaning of the change, as any move to end Åland’s demilitarization would undoubtedly do.

If Finland were to join NATO without a change in Åland’s status, this would not be the first time that the alliance has incorporated a country with demilitarized zones. The islands of Svalbard retain their status as a demilitarized zone in spite of the fact that Norway is a member of NATO.13 Svalbard’s demilitarization is based on international agreements similar to those that govern the Åland regime. In the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, which confirms Norway’s title to the islands, Norway undertakes not to establish or permit the establishment of any naval base or fortification in the zone.14 The treaty states that the area may never be used for military purposes. When Norway entered NATO, Svalbard

13 Svalbard was previously known as the Spitsbergen archipelago. Spitsbergen (formerly West Spitsbergen) is the largest island of the archipelago.

was placed under NATO command, but the demilitarization provisions continued to be observed. Svalbard has been the subject of a historical dispute between Norway and Russia or the Soviet Union, and Norway has therefore been aware that the slightest attempt to alter the status of the area would meet with violent protests from Russia.

Other examples of demilitarized zones can be found in the Greek islands. Corfu and Paxoi in the Ionian Islands and the Aegean islands of Chios, Lesvos, Limnos, Nikaria and Samos have all been demilitarized through international treaties. The fact that the demilitarized status of these islands has been contested or qualified is not due to Greece’s membership of NATO, but to the tense relations between Greece and Turkey. In fact, the Greek islands’ demilitarization has been better respected by NATO’s leadership and Greece’s NATO allies than by Greece itself. In these cases, too, NATO membership in itself has not created any pressure for an end to demilitarization.

In Åland’s case, the islands’ fate could be decided in the bilateral membership negotiations between Finland and NATO, but it seems more likely that NATO will choose not to demand a review of the Åland Convention.

IV. Åland’s security from Åland’s own perspective

The autonomous Åland Government has formulated Åland’s policy and objectives in the European integration process. Despite the positive attitude of the islands’ population to European integration, which was confirmed in a referendum in November 1994, the Åland Government has continued to insist on a number of conditions, or premises, for Åland’s participation. In the reports it has adopted, the preservation of Åland’s demilitarized and neutralized status has figured as an unchallengeable premise for Åland’s participation in the integration process.

Generally speaking, the Åland Government has taken the view that Finland’s and Åland’s membership of the European Union does not call into question or endanger Åland’s status in international law. It is a view that is based on the objectives and intergovernmental forms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in general, as well as on the fact that the signatories to the Åland Convention have the right to change or terminate Åland’s demilitarized and

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16 According to Ove Bring NATO has avoided involving the island of Limnos in its exercises, which has led to protests from Greece. Bring (note 15), p. 307.
neutralized status. In reference to this circumstance, the Åland Government has stated that, even if Finland were to consider membership of a defence union, there is no reason for the issue of Åland’s demilitarization to be on the agenda. The Åland Government’s faith in the future of the islands’ demilitarization and neutralization within a Finland that is a member of the EU has been reinforced by the recognition of Åland’s status during the country’s EU membership negotiations.

The Finnish Government has thus far shown no inclination to challenge the Ålanders’ position. The strongest demands for change in Åland’s status have come from certain Finnish military personalities and commentators who have seen problems in Åland’s demilitarization. Their criticism has been based on arguments about Åland’s increased strategic importance and increased vulnerability in the light of modern weapon technology. It has also been argued that Finland should take advantage of the current good political atmosphere in the Baltic Sea region in order to strive for a change.

However, not even in today’s peaceful situation can Åland’s status be a question of concern only to Finland. Åland’s special position in the context of European security is still a matter of concern to several countries around the Baltic Sea and beyond. The considerable attention given to the Åland question over the years, from the debate in the League of Nations in the early 20th century to the current debate, demonstrates this; and it is an attention that would surely be bound to increase were either of the more radical scenarios discussed above—a ‘real’ defence community in the EU or Finnish entry to NATO—to loom on the horizon.

18 Hannikainen refers to this discussion, which was initiated in the mid-1990s. E.g., Major Mikko Taavitsainen has argued that Finland should attempt to end Åland’s demilitarization. Both Commodore Jan Klenberg (Chief of Defence in 1990–94) and General Gustav Hägglund (Chief of Defence in 1994–2001) have referred to the increased strategic importance of Åland in the Baltic Sea. Hannikainen (note 6), pp. 627–30.
22. The Baltic states and security in northern Europe

Karlis Neretnieks*

I. Introduction

At first glance, the enlargement of the European Union to the east in May 2004 and the three Baltic states’ membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in March 2004 could appear to provide the perfect framework for the countries around the Baltic Sea to agree on a common security policy. Such an agreement would give them a larger say in different forums such as the United Nations, the EU and NATO, thus putting them in a better position to promote their common interests. With few—if any—serious unresolved problems between them and with a common interest in promoting peace and stability in the region, this should be an attractive option for the region’s states.

The aim of this chapter is to try to identify and discuss some of the obstacles that make it difficult to reach common solutions to the questions of how stability and security are best promoted in the Baltic Sea region and, in particular, to agree on what are the threats to the region’s states. As the title of this chapter implies, the problem is examined mainly from the viewpoint of the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This is not to insinuate that it is the Baltic states that are to be blamed for the difficulties in agreeing on a common security policy for the region. All the states around the Baltic Sea are pursuing agendas or have views that make it difficult for them to agree on common solutions. Of course, if all the states around the Baltic Sea belonged to the same military alliance—NATO—it would be much easier to coordinate military and other security activities; but the absence of this common platform should not preclude the possibility of reaching common standpoints on ‘hard security’ within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy and the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The fact is, however, that such common positions are not forthcoming.

II. A history of cooperation

To a large extent, the states around the Baltic Sea share a common history; filled with conflicts, but in which common interests have often prevailed. The

* The views presented in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI), the Swedish National Defence College (Försvarshögskolan, FHS) or any other organization.
Hanseatic League of the 14th and 15th centuries was perhaps the most striking example: although more or less all countries in the region were at odds with each other during that period, commerce between them flourished. During the 1700–21 Great Northern War, although Denmark and Sweden were at war they continued to run the Nindingen lighthouse jointly to facilitate navigation in the Kategatt. The fact that Sweden lost one-third of its territory—Finland—to Russia in 1809 did not stop the exchange of people and goods between the two countries. The extensive activities of Swedish companies such as Ericsson and Nobel Industries in Russia before World War I, at a time when Russia was seen as the main military threat to Sweden, is a further example of the Baltic Sea acting as a unifying rather than a dividing factor. The period 1945–89 was the great exception.

Since that dark period ended in 1989–90, a great deal of the earlier cooperation has been restored and developed to levels far above anything that existed before. Swedish financial institutions are now major players in the banking business in the Baltic states. Some Finnish companies have moved their headquarters to Tallinn. There are plans to create a ‘Baltic grid’ connecting all countries around the Baltic, thereby making it possible not just to trade electricity freely between the countries but also to handle emergencies such as the loss of production in a particular area or facility.

Common intergovernmental institutions such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States¹ and the Helsinki Commission² have been created to handle questions concerning disease control, combating organized crime, civil security, nuclear safety, border control, customs, protection of the marine environment and other security-related issues. The EUROBALTIC Programme for Civil Protection has been initiated to develop cooperation between the rescue services in the Baltic region. Parliamentarians from the Nordic countries and the Baltic states meet regularly within the frameworks of the Nordic Council, the Baltic Assembly and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference.

During the past 10 years extensive military cooperation has developed between the Baltic states and the Nordic countries. Military units from the Baltic states have participated in peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina as integral parts of Danish and Swedish battalions. Sweden, in addition to donating equipment equivalent to the needs of approximately three infantry brigades, has had some 50 officers working full-time as instructors and advisers in the Baltic states during the past five years, mainly in Latvia and Lithuania. Finland has made similar efforts in Estonia. Denmark and Norway have also been active in providing both donations and advice. The Nordic countries were

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¹ The Council of the Baltic Sea States was established in Mar. 1992 as a regional forum for intergovernmental cooperation in any field of government other than military Defence. The 12 members of the Council are Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden and the European Commission. See the Council’s website at URL <http://www.cbss.st/>.

² The Helsinki Commission is the governing body of the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (the Helsinki Convention). The 10 parties to the Convention are Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Sweden and the European Community. See the Commission’s website at URL <http://www.helcom.fi/>.
instrumental in starting the Baltic Defence College in Tartu and still provide a substantial proportion of the staff. The fact that these activities are declining now, when the armed forces of the Baltic states have acquired enough competence to run their own business, is quite natural and nothing to be sorry about. On the contrary; much of the cooperation is in fact continuing, but on a more nearly equal basis. Both Latvia and Lithuania are procuring ground-to-air missiles from Sweden, the exchange of students in military schools continues, joint mine-clearing operations are conducted in the Baltic, and so on.

III. Different outlooks

Why, then, with the extremely close connections between the countries in the Baltic Sea region, is it so hard to agree on questions concerning the ultimate threats—those that endanger the very survival of the states in question? This

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3 In 2004, more than one-fifth of the staff of the Baltic Defence College come from Nordic countries: Denmark provided 3, Finland 1, Norway 2 and Sweden 4 staff members out of a total of 46.

seems especially strange when all the states are far too small to pursue independent security policies of their own.

The main reason for this lack of agreement is the way in which the Baltic states (and to some extent also Finland and Poland) perceive Russia. Alternatively, to put it the other way round, the way in which Sweden, Germany and others do not perceive Russia. For the Baltic states, Russia is a threat when it comes to both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security. This remains the case regardless of what the rest of the region (or the rest of Europe) may or may not think.

It would be quite extraordinary, in fact, if the 50-year occupation of the Baltic states had not affected the collective memory of the people. Earlier periods of Russian occupation are also a part of this heritage; especially during the latter part of the 19th century, when the government in St Petersburg pursued a harsh ‘Russification’ policy. National identities in all the Baltic states are strongly linked with their emancipation from Russia. Anything emanating from Russia that could be interpreted as a threat to their freedom or culture will be treated with great suspicion.

Developments in Russia during recent years have in no way lessened the concerns about Russian intentions. Approximately 70 per cent of the members of the Russian Parliament belong to parties that have a nationalist agenda.\(^5\) This, combined with Russia’s reluctance to ratify border treaties with Estonia and Latvia, Russian pressure on the Baltic states to join the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,\(^6\) and harsh rhetoric concerning how Estonia and Latvia are handling their Russian-speaking minorities,\(^7\) serves to keep their suspicion alive. The 2003 Russian military doctrine has also contributed to a more sinister interpretation of Russia’s intentions and of how it could use Russian minorities in other countries as a pretext for military or other actions. The doctrine states that a task of the Russian armed forces is to safeguard Russian economic and political interests, which includes ‘ensuring the security of Russian citizens in the zones of armed conflicts and political or other forms of instability’.\(^8\)

Taken together, all this makes military security an important part of the overall security policy of the Baltic states. Consequently, if the EU does not become a credible military alliance with a real war-fighting capability, the Baltic states will do everything they can to make NATO—and especially the USA—a part

of the security system in the Baltic Sea region. The role of the USA is crucial as it is the only country that has both the means and, in many people’s eyes, the resolve to act if there should be some kind of serious political crisis involving Russia and the Baltic states.9

Although this might seem a straightforward, and not an unreasonable, position for the Baltic states to take, it is not without problems when these states try to find common ground with the policies and thinking of their neighbours. First, this position runs the risk of upsetting Sweden, and perhaps also Germany, by pressing for a US military presence in the region—or at least some kind of credible contingency planning by NATO. In addition, it could lead to strained relations with other influential NATO members if it causes the Baltic states to back US policies on questions where the USA’s views differ from those of other allies. The Baltic states’ aim when they do so is, of course, to secure US support for their own cause when needed—Iraq being a case in point. In a worst-case scenario this could lead to a vicious circle in which actions taken by the Baltic states to gain the support of the USA undermine the will of other NATO members to support them, which in turn could lead to a still greater reliance on the USA, and so on.

Even if NATO could act quickly and decisively in the event of a political crisis in the Baltic Sea region, the alliance would have difficulty making a convincing case that it has the ability to defend the Baltic states. The small salient formed by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is vulnerable to being easily cut off with modern weapon systems deployed on Russian territory. The Baltic states would probably be quickly overrun if reinforcements were not to arrive in good time or if a massive air campaign were not quickly launched. Considering NATO’s resources, current and future, it boils down to a question of the USA making credible its capacity and its will to act. In such a situation the possibility of using Finnish and, in particular, Swedish territory and airspace would be a great advantage. There is of course the nuclear option, but that would lead to deliberations beyond the scope of this chapter.

There are also areas other than the military where the Baltic states have a different outlook compared with many of their neighbours, immigration and investments perhaps being the two most important.10 Neither of these is considered by Germany, Poland or the Nordic countries to be a potential threat to the survival of the state. For Estonia and Latvia, with their large Russian minorities and their recent experiences, the situation looks different. Even a limited—by European standards—inflow of Russian immigrants would in their eyes be a threat to the identity of their states; and, as they see it, the prerequisites for such

9 For more on the Baltic states’ understanding of the role of NATO and the USA in their region see chapter 23 in this volume, which also explains Baltic ambivalence about the relative value of the EU and its defence and security policies.

10 For a full analysis of the Baltic states’ published defence and security policies and their actual threat perceptions see chapter 23 in this volume.
a development already exist.11 Both countries have well-developed infrastructure for Russian speakers—such as schools, media and organized interest groups—and there are no problems in getting along in society speaking only Russian. If the economies in Estonia and Latvia continue to grow by about 6–7 per cent each year, the difference in living standards between them and Russia will become very obvious.12 The temptation for many Russians to seek a better life on the other side of the border might become overwhelming, leading to large-scale illegal immigration. If that happens, the Baltic states’ borders with Russia will become like the Rio Grande along the Mexican–US border.

Immigration on such a large scale would be totally unacceptable for the governments of the Baltic states, and they will probably go to almost any lengths to prevent it. This could create problems in many areas. First, they will have a hard time convincing the other EU member states—with the possible exception of some on the Mediterranean—that illegal immigration is such a threat to the security of the state that it should be a part of the ESDP and that the EU should act forcefully to make Russia stop the flow of immigrants. Second, the use of harsh methods to handle the problem is likely to provoke negative reactions in Moscow, which in turn might lead to strained relations between the Baltic states and those EU countries that prioritize good relations with Russia. Lastly, the governments of the Baltic states will have to seriously consider the human rights aspect of their actions. Otherwise, public opinion in many other countries may force their governments to put pressure on the Baltic states to ‘behave better’, creating a situation in which the Baltic states could become politically isolated. This would leave them bereft of political support in a situation in which such support would be more important than ever.

When it comes to investments, the Baltic states have become a bridge between Russia and the EU. The Baltic states’ ‘Russian infrastructure’ and the many personal connections between the business communities in Russia and the Baltic states make it easy to invest Russian money in the Baltic states. Russians themselves see this not just as a way to get involved in profitable activities in the Baltic states, but perhaps even more as a way to get inside the EU, with its free flow of capital and services. From most viewpoints this can be seen as a positive development. It brings Russia closer to the EU; capital is made available for investments, which promotes economic growth; and new contacts are built between individuals as well as organizations. All of this is advantageous for all parties concerned, but there is one drawback. The economies of the Baltic states are so small that even limited investments can give the investor control of large parts of strategically important sectors13—energy perhaps being

11 In 2000, Estonia had a population of 1.37 million and Latvia 2.38 million. Turner (note 7). Even a limited number of immigrants would therefore upset the balance between Estonians/Latvians and Russians. See also note 7.
13 In 2002 the gross domestic product of Estonia was $6.4 billion, of Latvia was $8.4 billion and of Lithuania was $13.8 billion. Turner (note 7), pp. 602, 1039, 1068.
the most obvious case. Combined with the current developments in Russia, where the state seems to be trying to take control of what are considered vital parts of the economy, this opens up the possibility that Russia will use its assets in the Baltic states as a tool for promoting its political interests.

Although they are perhaps of only minor importance in today’s world, there are some historical facts that should be taken into consideration when trying to determine to whom the governments in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius might listen when security issues are discussed. There is a lingering discomfort with Sweden’s and Germany’s dealings with the Soviet Union in the past. The 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany has not been forgotten. Nor has Sweden’s prompt recognition of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states in 1940 and its action in surrendering some 140 Latvian and Estonian soldiers who had fought in the German army during World War II. Finland, on the other hand, is often held in high esteem owing to its tenacious struggle to preserve its freedom during World War II and its pragmatic view on security matters. Even such distant events as the British support during the wars of liberation in 1918–20 are remembered.

IV. Conclusions

It is improbable that there will be anything like a common ‘northern’ security policy in the near future. The countries concerned have ways of viewing the world that are too divergent and have different views on what should be considered as threats to their security.

The European Security and Defence Policy, as it currently seems to be developing, will not be an answer to the security needs of the Baltic states. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will continue to rely on NATO, or rather on the USA, when it comes to hard security—which will continue to be a very important part of their security thinking overall. The areas where more cooperation can be expected between the Baltic, Nordic and other European states in the defence field will probably concern military equipment and peace operations: none of them really related to the security of the Baltic Sea region, but nevertheless giving openings for continued contacts on defence matters.

It would be very much in the interest of the Baltic states for Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Apart from enhancing the defensibility of the Baltic states it would also, to some extent, counterbalance the influence of Germany and Poland when it comes to military matters in the Baltic Sea region, giving the governments of the three Baltic states more partners to choose from when developing their capabilities and making them less dependent on the agendas of their big neighbours. From a Swedish—and perhaps to some extent from a

14 The ownership by the Russian oil company Yukos of a 53.7% stake in the Mazeikiu oil refinery in Lithuania—the only refinery in the Baltic states—is often mentioned as an example. See, e.g., ‘Lithuania, Yukos complete talks over disputed stake in Mazeikiu refinery’, Moscow News, 19 July 2005, URL <http://www.mosnews.com/money/2005/07/19/>.

15 See chapters 6, 9, 10 and 11 in this volume.
Finnish—viewpoint, to be tied up in the defence of the Baltic states is a night-
mare scenario. Especially in Sweden, such a situation would run counter to all
traditional wisdom concerning security policy. This is also one of the reasons
why Sweden is so lukewarm about moves to making the ESDP a more potent
instrument.

The only reason for the Baltic states to put their trust in the ESDP would be if
they came to the conclusion that they could no longer trust the USA as a
guarantor of their security. Their alternative would then be to push hard for the
ESDP to be developed into a real military alliance. In a scenario of reduced US
involvement, it is hard to imagine that the problems connected with such a
development of the ESDP would be much easier to solve than those of today
when it comes to creating a common security policy in the Baltic Sea region.
I. Introduction

Given the choice between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Security and Defence Policy as providers of their national security, the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—look to the USA. One reason is their perception of Russia as a source of instability. Another is their lack of confidence in the ability of the ESDP to deal with present-day threats. Although these three states are eager to be ‘normal’ members of the European Union and thus to join in its initiatives, their enthusiasm for the EU’s development of its own military muscle is lukewarm. An EU with some military capability but without the USA’s military strength and leadership holds little promise for them. Since the ESDP vehicle is already on the move, the Baltic states see their main function as ensuring coordination between the ESDP and NATO. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania want to be ‘Atlanticists from within the ESDP’.1

The Baltic states see themselves as exposed to challenges similar to those confronting the Nordic countries: notably the challenge of the new transatlantic dynamic, which makes it almost impossible to avoid taking sides between the US and Europe on an increasing range of global and specific issues. Being torn in this way is bound to be especially painful for Scandinavian [and Baltic] societies which have strong ties of history, culture and values with both sides of the Atlantic, and which in strategic terms are relatively dependent both on American military and European economic strength.2

The Nordic countries are seen by the Baltic states as allies in this context. Being just as Atlanticist as the Baltic states, the Nordic countries could be of great help in countering what the former see as some EU members’ efforts to push the USA out of Europe. As one Baltic security policy maker expressed it: ‘If only the Nordics had more courage to speak their minds, if only they were younger in spirit and less frightened of becoming “noise makers”.’3

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1 The Baltic opinions quoted in this chapter were expressed in 20 interviews conducted by the author in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in ministries of defence and foreign affairs, in foreign embassies, and with local and foreign scholars in Nov.–Dec. 2004. They are also supported by conversations with students at the Baltic Defence College in 2003–2004. Some additional interviews were conducted by the author in Denmark and Sweden.


3 Interviews (note 1).
Since not all the Nordic countries can be expected to join both the EU and NATO, the Baltic states must look elsewhere to optimize the experience gained in a wide range of Baltic–Nordic defence cooperation projects. Their ‘partners of choice’ for participation in the EU battle groups are, however, not available: Sweden prefers cooperation with Finland and Norway, although Norway is not an EU member, while ‘Denmark is able to join any peace support mission but those under the EU cap’. The Baltic states briefly contemplated, but abandoned, the option of security cooperation within the ESDP. Thus, the Baltic states, like the Nordic countries, are currently in the process of separately finding their own paths to security. As with the five Nordic countries, it will be interesting to see whether ‘at the end of the process they will find themselves drawing together again or be split among themselves in new ways’. The hope expressed in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius is for a northern Baltic sub-group of the transatlantic or European security community. Meanwhile, the security discourse in the Baltic states is influenced both by enthusiasm at the opportunity to join in the new structures and the democratic decision-making process of the ESDP and by frustration over the lack of leadership and the time wasted on discussions in the same structures. The Baltic states have confidence in a safer future where soft security issues are handled jointly with international security cooperation, and they are concerned about hard security threats that call for traditional power politics and sabre-rattling. The younger echelons in the Baltic ministries of defence and foreign affairs must deal with the tempo of the EU’s evolution and the braking effect of their own societies. The outcome is complicated and sometimes confusing, since contradictory opinions may be expressed in reaction to the sheer complexity of the task of formulating national security policy.

The postmodern approach to security that is characteristic of the EU member states is gradually being internalized by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Many younger security managers, in particular, have taken to their hearts the European Security Strategy’s words about the importance of new threats and of international security cooperation. The new generations of public servants in the Baltic states do their utmost to become involved in the integration process and to become valuable and reliable partners to the EU and NATO. To them, the ESDP is an opportunity to become providers, rather than merely consumers, of security. However, as keen students of history, they are nevertheless wary of their situation as small states and retain a pragmatic approach to alliances. Norman Davies’s conclusion that the chemistry of international coalitions is a complex business, and that actions and reactions within them are by no means

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4 Gade, S., Danish Minister of Defence, ‘Forsvarsforbehold spænder ben’ [The defence opt-outs are a hindrance], Berlingske Tidende, 3 Dec. 2004, URL <http://forsvaret.dk/FMN/Ministeren/Taler+og+artikler/BT_031204.htm> (author’s translation). On the Danish opt-outs as a factor constraining regional cooperation see chapter 11 in this volume.

5 Bailes (note 2).

predictable, is widely shared by the new members of NATO and the EU. Just as democracy is not the best but the least deficient political system, however, security alliances are the best option available—and, in awareness of their defects, ‘it can never hurt to have the USA as a friend’. Thus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will do ‘everything, everything’ to enhance and enforce their relationship with their most important ally, the USA.

This chapter looks in turn at definitions of national security (section II); definitions and perceptions of threat (section III); Russia as a hard security issue (section IV); providers of national security in the Baltic (section V); and the Baltic approach to the ESDP and the role of the Nordic countries (section VI). Conclusions are given in section VII.

II. Definitions of national security

The classic elements of the Westphalian state provide the backbone of definitions of national security in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The newly gained independence which made possible the three countries’ return to Europe, to the West or to ‘Yule-land’ is sacrosanct. The state is the focus and the referent object. Sovereignty and territorial integrity are to be preserved and protected along with their dividends: democracy and the market economy; constitutional order; and public safety. Security is understood as a broad spectrum of issues divided into hard and soft security. A two-tier hierarchy persists, where the distinction is between political and military issues in the principal tier, and economic, environmental and other dimensions as secondary issues. The principal tier includes issues that affect the state directly, while the secondary factors have an impact on the state by affecting the political and military sectors. While the first-tier issues—sovereignty and territorial integrity—are identical for all three states, the second-tier priorities vary from country to country. They generally include such issues as economic security, protection of the country’s natural environment, integration of society, protection of human rights and protection of the long-term development of the state and society. The essence of

7 Davies, N., Rising ‘44: The Battle for Warsaw (Pan Books: London, 2004), p. 620. According to Davies, the Warsaw rising demonstrated ‘that great powers may have democracy on the tip of their tongues but not always on the tip of their priorities. Anyone who joins them should not expected to be treated as an equal, or to see their interests fully defended.’

8 Interviews (note 1).


national security remains protection of the autonomous nation state and its territory, features that are related to the definition of a ‘modern state’ and are linked with a focus on military security and state borders as lines of closure. This definition of security also reflects the understanding of national security among large segments of the societies of the Baltic states.11

Nevertheless, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have joined the EU. The member states of the EU are heading towards another definition of national security and a post-Westphalian form of international relations. Their security agendas address a postmodern world in which classic threats are exchanged for new ones: threats to the stability of global economic and environmental systems and to openness to the international system.12 Postmodern states are no longer governed by the territorial imperative. They are embedded in an international framework in which the distinction between domestic and international has been eroded, where borders matter less and where force is prohibited.13 A dilemma in relation to the ESDP is that, while protection of democracy and the market economy as such is supported by the EU, the protection of national territories is not an issue for the ESDP. Although there is substantial overlap between the Baltic and EU visions, the EU is aiming higher in its definition of security, seeking to build ‘an area of freedom, security, and justice with respect for fundamental rights’.14

III. Definitions and perceptions of threat

Despite their modernist definitions of security, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania apply a postmodern definition of threats. Terrorism, trafficking and other forms of organized crime—issues which do not affect state security directly—are at the top of their lists while issues with a direct impact on sovereignty and territorial integrity—such as military conflict—are assumed to be unlikely in contemporary Europe. Lithuania’s National Security Strategy does not even contemplate the contingency of a military attack from another state.15 Estonia and Latvia do not totally preclude the occurrence of military conflicts in the region but rely on the prevailing power structure in Europe as a guarantee against invasion.

11 E.g., in 2003 the Estonian public’s perceptions of what guaranteed Estonia’s national security were: NATO membership (52%); good relations with Russia (45%); Baltic defence cooperation (36%); strong national defence (33%); economic prosperity in the world (33%); membership of the EU (31%); strong border control (19%); strong national feelings/patriotism (16%); neutrality policy (15%); and high standard of living (13%). More than one option could be selected. Estonian Ministry of Defence, Avalik Arvamus ja Riigikaitse 2000–2003 [Society and national defence 2000–2003] (Eesti Vabariigi Kaitseministeerium: Tallinn, 2003), URL <http://www.mod.gov.ee/?op=body&id=83>, table 4, p. 7.
The dilemma is that membership of NATO and the EU has also brought insecurity. First, belonging to NATO and the EU has significantly expanded the Baltic states’ security interests into regions of no previous security relevance. Local and regional crises can now be expected that affect the Baltic states irrespective of geographical distances. Second, the list of ‘securitized’ issues has become long and abstract. None of the ‘new threats’ emphasized in the general Western discourse is directly related to the modern understanding of security and the focus on the state that are predominant in the Baltic states’ definitions of national security. For example, ‘terrorism’—the issue most strongly emphasized within the ESDP and in the ‘Solidarity Clause’—is not necessarily accepted in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as a threat to the state as a political or military entity. The Baltic states’ reason for joining the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ in Iraq in 2003 was not fear of terrorism or of weapons of mass destruction, but determination to guarantee the USA’s friendship even after NATO membership had become a reality. It was explained to the Baltic publics as a demonstration of loyalty that was necessary ‘if we want others to come to our help when we need them’.

Thus, while applying the same terminology as the other EU member states, the Baltic states’ understanding of the character and origin of threats differs from the understanding of West European or Mediterranean countries such as France, Germany and Italy. It also differs among the three Baltic states. For example, Estonia’s 2004 National Security Concept articulates threats of social origin, and lists alcoholism, HIV/AIDS and other contagious diseases among them, but it sees such threats as emerging in ‘Estonia’s vicinity’, that is, as external threats; for Latvia, alcoholism, HIV/AIDS and similar problems are a.
direct consequence of social and economic developments within the country, that is, the origin of the threats is internal.  

Economic security is a major concern for all three states. For Estonia a threat of economic origin means the fear that its economy, which is highly integrated into the world economic system, will be vulnerable to worldwide crises or instability in foreign markets. Lithuania’s National Security Strategy expresses concern about the dominance of the country’s economy by foreign capital investments of unclear origin. The issue is about investments by Russian companies or foreign capital with Russian background, and it is a worry shared in Estonia and Latvia. The problem arises from a lack of transparency in the Russian companies and their business methods, from Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, and from the potential security policy repercussions of the NATO and EU states’ increasing dependency on Russian energy supplies.

Indeed, substantial differences in business law and practices persist between Russian and EU companies. Some of the main reasons are the absence in Russia of: (a) accounting and auditing standards, and corporate governance and accounting rules; (b) legislation on intellectual property rights; and (c) banking system regulations. The Western business community investing in Russia is continually calling for these absences to be rectified, but the EU’s initiatives aimed at prompt economic and political reforms in Russia seem to have had little effect. Among the numerous calls for change are those made by the EU–Russia Industrialists’ Round Table, a regular event which brings together private economic operators, providing opportunities to develop contacts and stable networks between top industry representatives on both sides. The sixth Industrialists’ Round Table, held in November 2004, requested that Russia continue its reform process of transition to a rules-based market economy and emphasized the measures needed to improve the business and investment climate. The absence of appropriate corporate legislation both acts as a stumbling block for Western companies’ investments in Russia and hinders insight into Russian companies that are seeking investment opportunities in the Baltic states (and elsewhere). While the concerns voiced at the EU–Russia Industrialists’ Round Table by EU companies focused on barriers to Western investment opportunities in Russia—for example, ‘excessive government regulations of business activities’—for the three Baltic states the Russian Government’s

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20 Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), sections 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.
21 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 1.3.
22 Lithuanian MND (note 9), section 4.1.3.
23 Interviews (note 1).
regulation of business activities gives rise to the different concern that Moscow is exploiting Russian investment in the Baltic states for political purposes.

The oil pipeline in Ventspils, Latvia, illustrates the reasons behind the Baltic states’ fear of Russia exercising its geopolitical ambitions through energy policy. Until February 2003 nearly one-eighth of Russia’s oil exports were piped to this port, helping make Ventspils’ gross domestic product per head among the highest in the country. Then Russia’s state pipeline monopoly, Transneft, shut off the oil. The theory in Latvia was that Russia was strangling Ventspils in order to force the Latvian Government to give Transneft its remaining 39 per cent stake in the oil pipeline. Similar steps were taken in December 2004 in Ukraine—or, at least, Baltic observers assumed that Russia was the driver behind Turkmenistan’s threat to cut gas supplies just three hours after the results of the second round of Ukraine’s presidential election were announced.26

The Baltic concern about Russia’s geopolitical appetite being exercised by means of investments and energy policy is supported by US analysis. Fiona Hill of the Brookings Institution states that Russian ‘foreign policy and domestic policy are inter-twined’.27 This is seconded by a US diplomat’s recollection of his experiences from Vilnius: ‘Russian energy policy is used as an instrument by the Kremlin and its power ministries as leverage to affect foreign security policy in importing countries, particularly in East Central Europe.’28 It is claimed that Russia has recently experienced ‘dramatic increases’ in the numbers of former intelligence officers occupying senior positions in its government and energy firms, and that this has led to a return to the period when energy companies were more political instruments than profit centres.29 Usually, national embassies’ commercial departments are expected to be at the service of their countries’ industrialists, but these reports indicate that the relation is reversed in Russia and that it is Russian government officials who steer their industrialists’ investments—using capital whose origin is, at best, unclear.

Finally, the assumption that NATO and EU countries might become more likely to pander to Russia’s demands since they depend on Russian energy supplies is widespread in the Baltic capitals, although some point out that Russia is equally dependent on cash from the EU.30 The fear is that Russia may be trying

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29 Although this is an argument repeated in interviews with Baltic officials, here it is a direct quotation from Smith, K. C., Seminar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 26 Aug. 2004.
30 Such views are in line with those expressed in an EU report: ‘EU–Russia economic relations are increasingly important for both sides . . . The European Union is the major destination for Russian exports and more than 50% of Russia’s total external trade is with the EU. The EU is also the main source of technology, know-how and investment for Russia. In turn, Russia has immense resources and a qualified
to weaken the Baltic states’ membership of the EU by imposing ‘special provisions’ for economic relations between Russia and the Baltic states, thus turning the latter into ‘second rank’ EU members that cannot fully comply with EU rules. An example substantiating the Baltic concern might be the conclusions drawn at the EU–Russia Industrialists’ Round Table in 2003. The impact of EU enlargement on bilateral EU–Russia relations was extensively discussed during the sessions: the Russian participants argued that application of the EU internal market rules might hurt Russian industry’s traditional trade interests in Central and East European states and, further, that subordination of the national legislation of acceding states to EU laws would invalidate a large number of bilateral trade and economic agreements with these states. The response from the European participants—none of whom was from the Baltic states, although Hungary and Poland were represented—was not calculated to lessen Baltic concern. It was concluded that special provisions have been negotiated and are still being negotiated in areas of Russian interest in order to avoid or reduce the problems.\(^{31}\) Yet such ‘special provisions’ are exactly what the Baltic states fear. In particular, they are aiming for membership of the Schengen Agreement on the free movement of people and consider any ‘special provisions’ as endangering this target.

One of the burning issues between the Baltic states and Russia, and also between the Baltic states and the West European democracies, is the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities.\(^{32}\) The national security guidelines of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania take different approaches to the issue of Russian-speaking minorities. In Latvia’s 2002 National Security Concept considerable attention is given the goal of integrating society, defined as ‘one of the most significant factors which stabilises [the] internal political situation in the country’.\(^{33}\) The Estonian National Security Concept is preoccupied with external threats, while the Russian-speaking minority is considered to be an internal problem that would only become a security issue if it were exploited by a foreign power, for example, by placing Estonia in a negative light vis-à-vis its EU partners.

Progress on the minority issue is reflected in recent reports from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In Estonia and Latvia treatment of the Russian-speaking minorities has been of considerable concern to both the OSCE and the EU. The OSCE Mission in Estonia focused its attention on broad-reaching issues such as the language law, election law and the labour force. Furthermore, Russia’s energy supplies to the EU can help to enhance Europe’s energy security. European Commission, ‘The EU’s relations with Russia: overview, economics and trade’, Material from the EU–Russia Summit, The Hague, 25 Nov. 2004, URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/eco_trade.htm>.

\(^{31}\) EU–Russia Industrialists’ Round Table (note 25), section 2, ‘The EU enlargement and bilateral cooperation’.


\(^{33}\) Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 2.2.4.
ombudsman. The mandate of the OSCE Mission to Latvia initially focused on citizenship issues and gradually extended to a wider range of social integration issues such as citizenship, non-citizens’ language and education, the Latvian Government’s integration programme, and the regime for protection of civil rights. The issues outstanding in these missions’ 2003 reports are related to social guarantees for military pensioners and their families residing in Latvia (18,438 people); and the issue of permanent residence permits not being granted to military pensioners (450 people) in Estonia.

The attitudes expressed in interviews conducted by the author for this study are best summed up in the following quotation: ‘This is a small country on the crossroads of big politics. Therefore, we must reduce all possible threats, including the threat posed by instability of society. We must integrate the Russian-speaking community. It makes things easier when minorities are from civilisations with whom we can still find common principles. It is not easy, but it is possible to integrate them.’ Integration remains a problem, nonetheless. It is difficult to find names of Russian origin among political decision makers, in the higher echelons of the civil service and in public life. The absence of Russian-speaking voices in public debate on issues other than those of minorities is striking. Although some other minorities seem to be coping better, nationality problems lurk below the surface and frequently appear as a complication in the Baltic states’ domestic and international relations.

While Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are eager to become part of the international community and they emphasize their strong commitment to the EU and NATO, they view globalization not just as the major generator of economic and technological development but also as the force driving the spread of non-military threats. Penetration of the three countries by, for example, economic crime, HIV/AIDS and illegal migration typifies the negative impact of globalization on their societies. Eager to take part in the globalization process and to benefit from its positive effects, Estonia in particular is concerned with global threats originating outside its borders and penetrating its society. Latvia is concerned about becoming the breeding ground of global threats because of the country’s uneven economic development. Lithuania’s approach is that threats originate globally and should be fought globally, while not denying its own share in both processes.

35 OSCE (note 34), p. 34.
36 Some of these ex-servicemen have been denied extension of their short- (1–3 years) or longer-term (4–5 years) visas, and they and their families are facing expulsion as a result. While Latvia is cooperating with the responsible Russian authorities to solve the problems, Estonia appears to take a firm stand on this issue. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Annual Report 2003 on OSCE Activities: Security and Co-operation for Europe (OSCE: Vienna, Oct. 2004), URL <http://www.osce.org/publications/>, p. 124.
37 Interviews (note 1).
The semantic gymnastics executed in the national security guidelines of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in order to avoid mentioning the words ‘Russia’ and ‘Russian’ among potential threats are remarkable. Nevertheless, Russia cannot help spring to mind when passages such as the following are read: ‘due to the contradictory democratization processes and foreign policies of certain neighbours of these alliances, it is still not possible to rule out threats to Estonia’s security’;38 or ‘While the likelihood of a direct military confrontation in the region is low, such conventional risk factors as the demonstration of military force, the threat to use force, the presence of undemocratically controlled military forces, the failing states and unresolved regional conflicts still threaten the security of the Republic of Lithuania’.39 Russia lurks behind every second sentence of the threat analyses of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

IV. Russia as a hard security issue

The absence of reference to Russia in the Baltic states’ national security guidelines compared with its presence between the lines of the same documents, and in nearly every conversation on the Baltic states’ security, reflects a ‘do not provoke the bear’ attitude. It also reflects a concern not to upset EU partners and not to expose the Baltic states to renewed accusations that they are playing the Russian card in order to keep the USA engagement in Europe.40 Finally, an explicit mention of Russia might open a Pandora’s box of internal debates, including debates on the usefulness of the ESDP.41

West European views on Russia are perceived by the Baltic publics and security managers as being slightly naive. They hear that Western Europe believes Russia to be a democracy with a kind of market economy—not stable, yet, but with a vast economic potential.42 Russian President Vladimir Putin’s build-up of a dictatorship is looked on as a setback in a laborious but ultimately progressive process. Although he has centralized the formulation of foreign policy, Putin is seen in Western Europe as a pragmatic and cautious leader. The present state of international affairs far from satisfies Russia’s ambitions for the status of a great power, but it is believed that Russia still prefers it to the alternative of being ousted from the ‘good society of civilized countries’. Indeed, if Russia wanted to recreate its empire it would have to recreate its military: but the Russian military is perceived as being in such poor condition that the

38 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 1.3, p. 6.
41 Interviews (note 1).
42 This section is based entirely on the author’s Interviews (note 1) and conversation with students and staff at the Baltic Defence College in 2003–2004. Where other references are made (to books and articles) it is with the intention of cross-checking information or because similar views were expressed in print by others. Many interviews were conducted at the time of the election crisis in Ukraine in late 2004. The mounting concern for Ukraine’s fate might have sharpened some of the opinions on Russia.
West’s warning period of an attack has been expanded from 10 hours, as it was during the cold war period, to a comfortable 10 years.\textsuperscript{43} It is not, therefore, a problem for West European analysts if Russia’s defence remains structured according to a cold war threat perception—against a military attack from the USA and NATO.\textsuperscript{44}

Furthermore, Russia is seen by West European analysts as a country where state institutions are weak and the armed forces have little legitimacy.\textsuperscript{45} A true reform of the defence system is thus thought to be highly unlikely to succeed.\textsuperscript{46} Reform would require an assessment of the internal and external security threats to the country—both current and in the foreseeable future—and the organization, training and equipping of the armed forces would have to be based on proper threat assessment.\textsuperscript{47} In Russia, however, elements of reform such as structural changes to the conscription system, professionalization of the forces, improvement of the defence management system, enhancement of capabilities and, above all, the introduction of proper civilian control of the armed forces all seem far away. The West European conclusion is that Russia’s internally praised defence reform is best likened to a Potemkin village: it appears impressive, but lacks substance.\textsuperscript{48}

Much as Baltic security managers might agree with this assessment of Russia’s failed reforms, they do not believe that Russia acts according to the logic of a rational cost–benefit analysis. Nor do they put their faith in any strong urge for democracy in a country that lacks civil society structures or education in the most basic democratic principles. Furthermore, they express doubts about how much the membership of the club of ‘civilized states’ really means to President Putin.

Baltic military analysts are not convinced that Russia lacks instruments to pursue its imperial ambitions. First, they point out that such conclusions are based on studies of the Russian armed forces, while Russia also has a security

\textsuperscript{43} A recent report assumes a warning time of 1 month for invasion of the Baltic states, however. Larson, E. V. et al., \textit{Assuring Access in Key Strategic Regions: Toward a Long-Term Strategy} (RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, Calif., Oct. 2004), URL \texttt{<http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG112/>}.  
\textsuperscript{45} This view was expressed in guest lectures at the Baltic Defence College, including Kværnø, O., department director, Royal Danish Military Academy, Copenhagen, Lecture at the seminar on Obstacles and Possible Ways Ahead in Russian Military Reform, Baltic Defence College, Tartu, 22 Nov. 2004.  
\textsuperscript{46} Cottey, A., Edmunds, T. and Forster, A. (eds), \textit{Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards} (Palgrave: London, 2002), in particular the editors’ Introduction, pp. 1–17. See also Karkoszka, A., ‘Defence reform in Poland 1989–2000’, eds I. Gyarmati and T. Winkler, \textit{Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States} (Brassey’s: Washington, DC, 2002), pp. 165–88. These authors define true reforms as establishing effective democratic civilian control over defence policy (Cottey et al.) and as actions which are undertaken with a clear purpose of improving the defence system, rather than merely adapting it to worsened economic conditions (Karkoszka).  
\textsuperscript{47} Donnelly, C. N., ‘Reshaping Russia’s armed forces: security requirements and institutional responses’, eds Aldis and McDermott (note 44), pp. 296–315.  
\textsuperscript{48} Kværnø (note 45).
establishment whose uniformed and civilian personnel outnumber the armed forces. Second, the Russian military is not perceived in the Baltic states as thoroughly impotent: although its equipment is elderly and rusty, Russia’s army is still the biggest in Europe. With the Russian economy having overcome its crisis and with oil prices soaring, the Russian military is getting new injections of cash. While Western defence forces are facing budgetary reductions, the Russian defence budget increases annually. Finnish estimates, quoted particularly often in Estonia, conclude that the Russian defence budget has increased since the year 2000. Although Russian gross domestic product may still be at the level of a South American country, as it rises more funds will be available for Russia’s military procurement.

Third, although the Russian forces overall may be ageing, some priority areas for military development are maintained. The one that is particularly worrying for Russia’s Baltic neighbours is the Leningrad military district. A concentration of resources on units at permanent high readiness, such as motorized infantry brigades and air regiments, is taking place in this region. ‘Troops stationed there retain the capabilities to use tactical nuclear weapons’, states the Finnish Security and Defence Policy, a document which is respected in Estonia as expressing concerns more freely than Estonia can.

49 Saranov, V., ‘Critical mass: there are too many armed formations in Russia’, Versiya, no. 47 (11–17 Dec. 2001), CDI Russia Weekly, no. 184 (14 Dec. 2001), URL <http://www.cdi.org/russia/>. Citing Saranov, McDermott (note 44) states that the security forces include ‘the Internal Troops (<200 000 servicemen), the Special Assignment Units of Interior Ministry (3–4000), Federal Border Guard Service (planned reduction to 183 000 by 2003), Civilian Defence Troops (30 000), Railway Troops (50 000), Federal Service of Special Construction (<14 000), Main Directorate of the Special Programmes of the President (20 000) and others, such as Special Assignment Units Alpha and Vympe1, et al. In total, there are about 531 800 to 533 500 servicemen available in forces that are growing in strength and numbers.’ A similar opinion is expressed in another context in Trenin, D., ‘Gold eagle, red star’, eds S. E. Miller and D. Trenin, The Russian Military: Power and Policy (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Moscow, 2004), URL <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/books/71318.htm>, pp. 219–34.


51 Finnish Prime Minister’s Office, Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004, Government Report no. 6/2004 (Prime Minister’s Office: Helsinki, 2004), URL <http://www.vnk.fi/vn/liston/vnk.lsp?q=88862&k=en>, p. 71. According to this source, the budget for 2004 was €13.4 billion, representing 3.1% of Russian GDP; the aim is to increase the budget to 3.5% of GDP: a drop in the ocean compared to NATO’s spending, but nevertheless of concern to Russia’s small neighbours.

52 See also Suthcliffe, P. and Hill, C., ‘An economic analysis of Russian military reform proposals: ambitions and reality’, eds Aldis and McDermott (note 44), pp. 278–95. Suthcliffe and Hill’s study, concluded in 2002, expresses concern for the Russian economy’s dependence on energy exports and its lack of investments but suggests that a ‘financial window of opportunity exists for significant progress towards the reform of the Russian armed forces’.

53 The city of Leningrad changed its name to St Petersburg in 1991, but the military district did not.

54 Finnish Prime Minister’s Office (note 51), p. 67.

55 Estonian military officers have sincere respect for Finland as the only country that fought 3 wars in the period 1939–45, practically alone. That is why many officers trust the Finns’ military expertise more than any number of West European reports. In addition, a good number of Estonian officers have been trained in Finland.
Fourth, Russian defence policy guidelines are studied closely by the Baltic military leaderships.\textsuperscript{56} It has been noted in the Baltic capitals that Russia’s defence priorities have changed in favour of nuclear forces at the expense of conventional forces. From this it is understood that those arguing for a deterrence strategy have the upper hand in Moscow over those in favour of forces trained and equipped to handle Russia’s regional conflicts. This could, ironically, be good news for the Baltic states if it did not reflect a persistent cold war attitude. Another important change alerting the Baltic states is Russia’s declared doctrine of resorting to nuclear weapons both to defend its national territories and to prevent significant military defeat. Specific reference is made in this context to defence of Russian citizens in zones of ‘political and other forms of instability’.\textsuperscript{57} The deterrence strategy is openly aimed at Russia’s strategic partners, NATO and the EU. Since the nuclear capabilities of the Leningrad military district are only a few hundred kilometres from the Estonian border, this is considered sufficient reason for the Baltic states to be on guard. These weapons, when aimed at NATO, are now also pointed at the Baltic capitals.

Finally, there is constant concern in the Baltic capitals about Russia’s attempts to gain influence within NATO. These attempts are interpreted as a Russian hope to transform NATO from a defence alliance to merely a security alliance: a hope that might be further encouraged by some EU states’ wish to edge the USA out of Europe. Since the influence of big states such as France and Germany on potential EU responses to Russia is strong, the EU’s response when its help is really needed might be unpredictable at best, and negative at worst, for the three Baltic states.

The above arguments, which reflect the worst-case scenarios for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, should not be seen as constituting the Baltic governments’ day-to-day agenda as of 2005. Russia is not considered an immediate threat to their hard security. The concern is, rather, for the potential failure of Russia’s military, political and economic reform and for the prevalence of still stronger nationalistic trends. The pockets of efficiently functioning military capability might then be used with or without the consent of Moscow. What is frustrating for Baltic military analysts and security managers is their West European partners’ lack of will to take the Baltic security concerns seriously, combined with European anger when the Baltic states turn to the USA on these


issues. The lesson they draw is that Russia is a strategic partner in the eyes of the other European states and is not to be mentioned as a threat. ‘The best thing is to shut up and do our work’, was one Baltic conclusion on how to ‘muddle through’ in the EU context.58 ‘However, if the EU gets a strategy it could be helpful in discussions with Russia because it is large and has more tools to bargain. All our experience on discussions with Russia demonstrates that Russia prefers to deal with bigger partners.’59

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have adopted the position of not singling out any state as a potential enemy in their national security concepts. Lithuania, in particular, also stresses the need to cooperate with Russia. All three countries take active approaches towards the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in particular in the Caucasus region. While they aim at a cooperative approach with Russia, it is seen as a country capable of swift and dramatic changes and with an ability to manipulate developments in Belarus and Ukraine. Therefore, unless Russian political, economic, administrative and military reforms become deeply anchored and the country becomes more predictable, transparent and democratic, the Baltic states will continue to see a need to balance Russia with another strong power. The EU is not assumed to have the will or the ability to play this role; it simply does not have the muscle. Furthermore, Russia tends to ignore the EU if the Europeans are not supported by the USA.60 Therefore, on hard security issues the Baltic states turn to the USA.

V. Providers of national security in the Baltic

The national security concepts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania each list a number of actors with an impact on their countries’ security: the USA; NATO and the EU; and regional partners such as the other Baltic states, the other countries around the Baltic Sea and the Nordic countries. The decisive role in the Baltic states’ national security, understood as the defence of their territorial integrity and sovereignty, lies with NATO backed by the USA. Generally speaking, NATO is in charge of military security, the EU of economic security.

For Estonia, the ‘cornerstone of European security is the U.S. military presence and consistent participation in the ensuring of this security’.61 Military security is entrusted to NATO as the ‘only effective international defence and security organisation’. NATO provides the ‘common defence of its Members and the ensuring of international stability’.62 Although people both inside and outside NATO are increasingly challenging the existence of any automatic

58 Interviews (note 1).
59 Interviews (note 1).
61 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 2.4.1.
62 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 2.1.
effect of NATO’s Article 5 collective defence guarantee, the Estonian security concept emphasizes this guarantee. As Stan Sloan has observed, while the major West European powers no longer rely on the USA to defend them against Russia, some of the new allies still see NATO as an important hedge against Russian power. However, the value of a NATO without the USA is questioned: ‘What will happen if the USA is unwilling or unable to assist Estonia? What is NATO’s guarantee worth without the USA?’ asks a commentator in an Estonian newspaper. The role assigned to the EU in Estonia’s 2004 National Security Concept is as provider of non-military security, covering the issues from the second tier which are important for the state’s development rather than for its basic existence. The ESDP, and the military role that the EU is developing, may rely on participation by this dutiful new member, but the ESDP and its battle groups are not assigned any significant role in relation to Estonia’s national security priority: the ‘defence of Estonian statehood’.

For Latvia, the USA, through NATO, is also the main provider of territorial security and the lead actor in the sphere of common defence. The role of the USA is strong in both multilateral and bilateral relations: ‘Co-operation with the United States of America is one of the priorities of the foreign policy of Latvia which should further the resolution of security problems of Latvia’. However, the major part of Latvia’s national security concerns relates to state and society, to the risks to internal security created by economic disparities, and to efforts towards social integration. In order to attain security, Latvia focuses on economic and social development, and in this context the national doctrine pays substantial tribute to the European integration process. A list of specific recommendations is elaborated in the 2002 National Security Concept, including guidance on diversification of the economy, stability in the energy sector, and the liberalization of the agriculture and food industries as a means to improve public health. The aim of security policy in this context is to prevent poor socio-economic conditions developing into security threats. It is difficult to envisage the USA or NATO being particularly useful in achieving any of those objectives. The EU, in contrast, possesses a wide range of economic, social and other instruments ranging from regional development funds to the coordination of structural measures and, if necessary, the use of the civilian and military tools of the ESDP. Therefore, Latvia’s security political orientation is

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63 The text of Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (Treaty of Washington) is available at URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>. During a 16 Mar. 2004 seminar at the Baltic Defence College, Rob de Wijk of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence argued to civil servants from the Estonian Ministry of Defence and the Estonian General Staff that Article 5 does not come into effect automatically and it is doubtful whether an action would be initiated at all. See also Wijk, R. de, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: the Battle for Consensus* (Brassey’s: London, 1997), pp. 116–51.
64 Sloan (note 40).
65 Lobjakas (note 17) (author’s translation).
67 Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 3.1.
68 Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 2.2.
focused on the EU and its instruments, and this trend will continue and become stronger.

Lithuania seeks enhancement of its security through international cooperation, as stated in its National Security Strategy. Although interviews indicate a very strong affiliation with the USA as security provider, Lithuania’s National Security Strategy lists NATO, the EU, the United Nations and the OSCE as the organizations that constitute the framework for Lithuania’s international involvement. NATO has the highest priority—when supported by the USA. Any overlap between NATO and the ESDP should be avoided: ‘Lithuania will aim to ensure that NATO and EU military structures complement rather than duplicate each other.’ The unstable state of transatlantic relations is a major concern and, in a 2004 agreement, Lithuanian political parties promised to engage in improving the transatlantic link. This is not a simple task for a small—but ambitious—European country.

Lithuania perceives itself as being both Nordic and Central European and also as belonging to the Baltic Sea region. Estonia defines itself as a Nordic country. Latvia emphasizes its Baltic roots and the need for cooperation between the three Baltic states. The three countries’ respective focuses on different roots and cultural heritages seem to blur the vision of joint interests. They emphasize the same, or nearly the same, priorities and preferences in security policy, as well as the same frustrations. However, when bringing up cooperation or coordination issues they point to how time-consuming trilateral consultations are in relation to the limited value added. They declare their readiness to cooperate on an ad hoc basis—a pragmatic case-by-case approach—but then rush to point out how one of the others has ruined the opportunities for this or that project. As a result, they prefer to seek other partners: Estonia is marketing itself as a Nordic country, linking up to Finland; Lithuania turns first to the Nordic countries and then to Poland, but rarely to Estonia or Latvia; Latvia has nowhere to go with its good intentions for Baltic cooperation, so it turns increasingly to the EU.

VI. The Baltic states, the Nordic region and the European Security and Defence Policy

Eager as they were to join the European Union, the European Security and Defence Policy was not the driving motive for Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. None of the new Baltic members wished for an EU with hard capabilities: crisis management and soft security were quite enough. The ambiguous description of


70 Section 1.1 of the Lithuanian accord on defence policy (note 69) states that Lithuania ‘will contribute to the strengthening of the transatlantic ties and use its membership of NATO and the EU as the fora offering possibilities of co-ordination of the allies’ foreign and security policies, which promote mutual integration, security and stability within as well as outside the Euro-Atlantic community’.
the EU forces’ mission—taken from the Western European Union’s Petersberg Declaration of 1992 and enshrined in the 1996 Treaty of Amsterdam, then in the 1999 Helsinki documents on the ESDP—was acceptable to the Baltic states. Any evolution of the EU into a security political actor is, moreover, only reluctantly accepted. The Baltic states’ participation in European security and defence policy is essentially symbolic, and they will set limits to it if and when they perceive that the ESDP is competing with their NATO commitments. For Baltic security managers, the principal policy goal is to keep the transatlantic link strong. They are therefore particularly alert to anything that could be perceived as efforts to push the USA out of Europe.

This does not mean that they are wary of European security and defence policy per se. In particular, the younger bureaucrats of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are eager to join the ESDP structures. They are excited about participating in building up the policy, rather than just joining in. ‘When there is a new structure we want to participate; we do not want to be left out’, was a comment in Lithuania.71 ‘It is interesting, challenging and allows us to take an active role; in the ESDP we work to gain credibility in Europe’, echoed a speaker in Estonia. The emphasis is placed on participation in decision making and on the chance of acquiring new abilities. One important skill is the art of compromise: ‘Only after we became members [of the EU] did we learn how important compromise is in this culture in Europe. We were—and from time to time we still are—frustrated when the decision-making process is slow’, admitted a speaker in Tallinn. However, the ESDP decision-making process ‘permits other countries to participate and is therefore more advanced and more flexible than NATO’s’, was a positive view of the EU culture from Latvia. This enthusiasm is impressive, given the workload the EU bureaucracy imposes on such small countries. A foreign diplomat observed: ‘Sometimes we call them and ask for their country’s position on this or that. Nobody knows the answer, because this particular issue is dealt with by someone who happens to be in Brussels or somewhere else. There is not a sufficient number of people to “back up” in case of absence. So, altogether the workload is enormous for them.’

Two elements of the ESDP were highlighted in interviews with Baltic respondents: the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the battle groups. The decision to create a defence agency emphasized the need to harmonize national efforts in: development of defence capabilities; research into future defence and security needs; coordination of the production and acquisition of armaments; and identifying and implementing policies towards strengthening the EU defence-industrial base.72 Within this framework, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

71 In this section, quotations from Baltic observers are, unless otherwise referenced, from Interviews (note 1).
are joining in the activities to be coordinated by the EDA. Estonia foresees opportunities to use its youthful ‘intellectual capital’ in the area of defence-related science, technology and research programmes as well as openings for its small-scale defence industry. Both Estonia and Lithuania are also planning to support the EDA with personnel, but Latvia does not foresee its experts working there. ‘We have many people working in NATO’, was the explanation given.

While the interest in the EDA is significant, Baltic enthusiasm for the EU battle groups is lukewarm. The battle group concept was proposed in order to address one of the shortfalls identified in the Headline Goal process: the lack of an ability to deploy smaller rapid-response elements from the pool of more than 100,000 personnel, 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels contributed by member states to the EU. Africa is envisaged as the most likely area for battle group operations.

When an ESDP initiative risks calling on resources that are also needed to meet NATO commitments, the ESDP is viewed with significant reservations by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This has a strong impact on their attitude towards the battle groups. The first issue is that of complementarity with NATO; the second is possible diversion of resources from NATO; the third is a concern that failure to resolve these first two issues will affect force planning and training for some, resulting in two tiers of participants; and the fourth issue is the likely geographic direction of ESDP interventions, Africa.

In theory, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania express their support for the concept of battle groups: the official attitude is that ‘EU Rapid Response Forces are the most important element of the Headline Goal 2010’. However, all three states emphasize their limited resources, and in the same breath point to the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangement. Under the principle of a ‘single set of forces’, the larger part of the EU’s most capable troops will be wearing two hats, available for both ESDP and NATO missions. The Baltic states’ concern is, however, that the different political imperatives underpinning the NATO and ESDP initiatives
will lead not to coherent capability development, but to a situation where they themselves are torn between different loyalties.\textsuperscript{78}

Although training and equipment for participation in the NATO Response Force and the EU battle groups should be the same—since the ESDP is supposed to adhere to NATO standards and doctrine whenever possible—Baltic security managers foresee the differences that will occur. They argue that, if for no other reason, these differences will occur because ‘the standards might be the same but will not be identical’ when the NATO Response Force has more than 20 000 troops while the EU battle groups each have 1500. The consequent differences in demands to be met by contributors will also affect force interoperability and compliance with NATO standards.

For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the proximate problem has been to find partners for a battle group formation and decide whether to create a new battle group or to join an existing one. At stake are both the capabilities they can offer and more subjective issues of compatibility. When looking for partners, as Latvia and Lithuania were doing in late 2004, it is important to ensure coordination with NATO, internal coherence, interoperability and a similar mentality. The limited ‘niche’ capabilities offered by each Baltic state must fit into the structure of the battle group in question. The Baltic states are concerned that the principle of a ‘single set of forces’ might be ignored if the training and development of forces and the terms of availability are not coordinated over the long term with NATO. Without proper coordination the bigger countries that can afford to have two sets of forces, one for NATO and another for the ESDP, will choose this option. Some of these countries’ forces will thus be trained to meet the specific needs of the ESDP and others the needs of NATO. At the same time, forces from the smaller countries will need to be trained for both NATO and ESDP purposes, but they will never be adequately adapted to either of them.

Transparency is another principle that is supposed to guide ESDP–NATO cooperation, in order to promote the coherent provision of forces to both. Situations may be envisaged where battle group forces which are also earmarked for the NATO Response Force are urgently required by both institutions, and decisions on where to engage the forces must be coordinated between NATO and ESDP. It is precisely decision making that the Baltic states perceive as the EU’s Achilles heel. ‘It is very difficult to reach any agreement because it seems more important who is going to take orders from whom’, was a comment arising from Baltic frustration on the EU battle groups.

Another problem is that of mentality: ‘Multinational forces look very good on paper. But out there you need to cooperate, to understand each other. Our forces need to accept commanders from another nation.’ It is widely known that the Latvian forces in Iraq did not feel comfortable working under Polish command, and a separation into two different camps was the result. Military leadership by

\textsuperscript{78} Interviews (note 1). The problem of follow-up standards and procedures is not limited to the ESDP; it is also frequently discussed within NATO.
the USA is by far Latvia’s preferred option: but the USA is not in the ESDP. Meanwhile, for Estonia, one benefit of the ESDP is the possibility of re-entering military cooperation with Finland. Such cooperation was intensive in the first years of Estonia’s post-1991 independence, but it declined when Estonia decided to join NATO. Working together with Finland is possible again in ESDP peacekeeping operations. Unlike the two other Baltic states, Estonia seems not to doubt that it belongs with Finland and the other Nordic countries. The Swedish–Finnish battle group, however, is said to have a preference for Swedish speakers. The acceptance of Estonia’s participation in this battle group conveyed by the Finnish Government in the very last days of 2004 was conditional on Estonia’s ‘coming to terms’ with Sweden, the group’s lead nation. According to Estonian President Arnold Rüütel, defence cooperation between Estonia and Finland—which is continuing through the Nordic battle group—is working well; and this is precisely because of the ESDP. As of October 2005, Estonia’s contribution to the Nordic battle group is 25 personnel.

Another nation high on the Baltic states’ list of priorities for military cooperation within the ESDP is Denmark. Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian officials choose their words carefully in order to avoid expressing disappointment or imply political pressure, but Finland, Norway, Iceland and Denmark ‘are now a bit backwards, after we have joined both the EU and NATO’. Although Denmark is embedded in both NATO and EU structures, it is only able to take part in former NATO ESDP civilian missions. The Danish ‘handicap’, highlighted by the increasing takeover of missions by the ESDP, has made it necessary for Estonia to revise its long-term defence cooperation strategy. Although most Baltic–Nordic military cooperation still takes place within NATO, the fact that Denmark cannot participate in ESDP military actions is an obstacle to using the experience of joint Danish–Baltic peacekeeping missions dating back to 1995. It was stressed in several interviews that ‘to have cooperation experience and to share mentality is the key issue’. If this is true, then cooperation with Finland, Norway and Sweden, and perhaps one day also with Denmark, might ultimately render the battle groups more attractive to the Baltic states.

81 Estonia’s expected total contribution is 45 personnel. In addition to an approximately 30-strong protection unit, Estonia will send staff officers, logisticians and medics to serve with the battle group. Sweden will contribute an 1100-strong battalion, Finland 180–200 personnel and Norway c. 150 personnel. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden Concerning the Principles for the Establishment and Operation of a Multinational Battle Group to be Made Available to the European Union, 23 May 2005 <http://www. sweden.gov.se/sb/d/5108/a/44972>; and Estonian Ministry of Defence, ‘Estonia signed Memorandum of Understanding on EU battle group’, Press release no. 36, 23 May 2005, URL <http://www.kmin.ee/?op=news&id=756>. See also chapter 6 in this volume.
At the end of 2004 both Latvia and Lithuania decided to ask to join the Polish–German–Slovakian battle group, led by Poland. They did not consult or coordinate with each other beforehand, but in the end they were both accepted by the group. Latvia decided in this context to offer combat support and combat service support units starting in 2007: specific assets provided could include one mine countermeasure vessel with 10 days’ readiness; a military police platoon with 30 days’ readiness; and an explosive ordnance disposal platoon with 30 days’ readiness. Lithuania aimed to provide a substantial contribution (possibly a company-size infantry unit) for the Polish-led battle group, expecting it to be available after 2008.

As well as the Poland-led battle group, Lithuania has considered participation in the Netherlands-led battle group with Finland and Germany. While Poland seems like a natural political and military partner, Lithuania is already engaged with the Netherlands in the NATO Response Force. Cooperation with the same partners in both the battle group and the NATO force has advantages in organizational terms—with simpler legal agreements and decision-making procedures, for example—and also brings significant military benefits in terms of interoperability, training and personnel rotation. In addition, the Netherlands is seen as a good example of a small country with influence in both the EU and NATO. However, Lithuanian–Netherlands discussions on the matter ave been affected by the fact that any Lithuanian contribution to the Netherlands-led battle group is not likely to take place before 2010.

The initial geographical focus for the ESDP has been Africa, but Africa seems very far away for some Baltic politicians and even more so for the taxpayers. There is little understanding as to why European countries which consider themselves still relatively poor should engage with the colonies of the ‘old Europe’. The Baltic states’ own focus is oriented towards the Caucasus and other parts of the CIS; regions with failed or failing states that lie closer to ‘their’ Europe. Taxpayers are much more willing to pay their dues to NATO than to the ESDP and, if the ESDP is to focus on Africa, this will make matters no easier—not to mention the possible effect of casualties. After many internal discussions about whether and how to present the issue to the electorate, the Baltic elites have chosen the theme of the price of ‘solidarity’. ‘If we want to be treated as serious partners and rely on support in times of crises, if we want to have influence, we need to make a contribution to the ESDP, too.’

The ESDP is not a provider of hard security for Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. The refrain in all three capitals is that the new structure, still under development, is ‘not able to contribute to the security of our country’. Despite the Baltic states’ absorption into the postmodern structures of the European Union

82 The alleged reason for the lack of coordination was that, because the capabilities offered by the Baltic states would be so similar, they did not expect to be joining the same battle group.

and their increasing adaptation to postmodern national and international threats, the definition of security in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is related to the modern state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The ESDP is not able, and was never meant to, address such issues. Nor, indeed, do the Baltic states expect or desire such a service from the ESDP. The preferred provider of territorial security for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is NATO, the ‘old NATO’ with strong backing from the USA. The three Baltic states are not ready to abandon collective defence. The EU’s present ‘Solidarity Clause’ is not quite the same, aimed at addressing terrorist threats, not threats to territorial integrity.

VII. Conclusions: the Baltic states, the Nordic countries and the EU—closing the gap in discourse?

Russia is the litmus test for the relevance of ESDP to the national security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. If the ESDP is to be useful for the Baltic states’ national security, it must be able to address their major security concern. This requires a more widely shared understanding of Russia within the EU. It also requires courage to admit that the EU objective of achieving democracy in Russia has failed. On the other side, if the Baltic states are to join the ESDP fully they must define their place in Europe and the purpose of their NATO and EU memberships in terms that go beyond hard security cover against the perceived threats from Russia. This requires new decisions on their security priorities: decisions that should not be made by groups of experts but should draw in the electorate through public debate. What needs to be discussed is the relevance of the threats that Russia and its allies can pose to its neighbours, and the ways to address these threats. Russia must be explicitly mentioned, just as the option of building a security community with Russia must be discussed.

Developments in Russia worry many other Western politicians and analysts as well, but they fail to state it publicly—and to act adequately. The conclusions of independent EU and US analyses suggest that EU–Russia relations are ‘high on rhetoric, but light on substance’; the dialogue on security is ‘wide but thin’; and economic interdependence has not resulted in greater political cooperation. Such analyses conclude that an important element of Russia’s foreign policy is to re-subjugate the previous Soviet states, and President Putin

84 Gnesotto (note 72), p. 74, concludes that the Helsinki Headline Goal made it clear that the EU aimed to acquire capabilities sufficient for the full range of Petersberg tasks: ‘On the other hand . . . it was obvious that territorial defence was excluded from those tasks.’


is moving his country still further away from the ‘common values’ on which the
EU–Russia ‘strategic partnership’ is supposed to be based. These values were,
indeed, never accepted in Russia and were only rarely and vaguely referred to
in the joint statements of the EU–Russia summits.88 Russia’s departure from a
Western-style democracy should thus constitute a problem for the EU; but the
fact that President Putin’s policies enhance his domestic popularity reinforces
the Baltic states’ discomfort. In this context Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are
on their guard against patronizing Western reactions to their need for hard
security, but they have given up the hope of open discussion on the issue with
such major EU powers as France, Germany and Italy. Their hopes are directed
towards the other new EU members and the other countries on the fringe of the
EU that border on Russia. In this situation, the Nordic countries could play the
role of bridge-builders. They have experience of building a security com-

munity; they also have a tradition of paying close attention to non-military
aspects of security. They could contribute with both.

The EU Common Strategy on Russia expired in 2004 and is to be replaced by
four ‘common spaces’.89 Whether the common spaces will prove to be more
common to Russia and the EU than were the ‘common values’ referred to
above depends on whether the EU’s post-enlargement policy towards Russia
will be agreed internally among the member states and consistently imple-
mented by the EU—not, as hitherto, by the EU in one way and the individual
member states in bilateral relations in another.90 In 2004 the EU’s membership
was enriched with a number of states that combine a vivid interest in positive
developments in Russia and the CIS with a first-hand experience of those
countries. The lessons of these experiences might be biased, but they are none
the less valid and must be taken into consideration. Baltic security managers
have too often found their comments on Russia discounted as ‘emotions over-
shadowing analytical skills’ or as ‘feelings too visceral to make them reliable
guides for a policy towards Russia’.91 In the EU these reactions are perceived as
being designed to defend policies that are based on interests rather than values:
the European values of democracy, human rights and solidarity. If the EU is not
to be split over its approach to Russia, a proper internal dialogue on these
matters is badly needed.

88 For a thorough analysis of the EU–Russia relationship based on summit statements and on Western
politicians’ comments on Russia see Schuette, R., ‘E.U.–Russia relations: interests and values—a Euro-

pean perspective’, Carnegie Paper no. 54, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC,
89 ‘Common strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia’, Official Journal of the Euro-

relations/ceeca/com_strat/>. The 4 common spaces are: economic; freedom, security, and justice; coopera-

tion in the field of external security; and research, education and culture. The exact content of each
‘space’ is still being elaborated. EU Directorate General for External Relations, ‘EU/Russia: the four
relations/russia/intro/>.
90 Schuette (note 88).
91 Interviews (note 1).
The EU is not alone in needing courage on the issue of Russia. Baltic security managers also need to decide whether there is any purpose in avoiding explicit mention of Russia in their security policy guidelines when so many hidden references to it are made in the same documents. How sensible is it to require the same skill from their societies in 2005 that were basic for every newspaper reader in Soviet times: the ability to read between the lines? Even if Russia is not mentioned as a threat, it is still mentioned when internal support for the ESDP and NATO has to be mobilized. The argument about the price of solidarity—‘if we want to get support in time of crisis . . .’—sounds to many in the Baltic states like a reference to the ‘threat from Russia’. Frankly addressing the hard and soft security considerations related to Russia is likely to stir up heated discussions in the Baltic societies, but public debate is paramount in the formulation of security policy.

Having obtained membership of NATO and the EU, the Baltic states now lack a ‘grand target’. After an intense period during which everyone worked together towards the goals of NATO and EU membership, political conflicts were put aside and even personal sacrifices were made in terms of long working hours, a ‘what now?’ attitude pervades. Numerous options are open: working towards greater security for the region through involvement in rephrasing the EU’s neighbourhood strategy is one; working towards better and more integrated homeland security standards in the region could be another. As this volume shows, both are important issues for the Nordic countries as well; they might open the way for further Baltic–Nordic security cooperation that would also include Central Europe. However, the prerequisite is that the Baltic states properly define their place in the ESDP and NATO. The integration process is not possible without head-on discussion of priorities: economic, social, environmental and military. Since the ESDP’s hard capabilities will develop further and the Baltic states will be drawn further into its workings, the assumption that threats travel faster over short distances than long must be scrutinized through public debate. That will naturally lead to discussion of future ESDP operations and their directions: failed or failing states in Africa, or states closer to the Baltic states’ borders in the CIS and the Caucasus. Beyond that, however, is the need for recognition in the respective Baltic societies that national sovereignty is increasingly becoming a chimera. A fully fledged Baltic engagement in the ESDP with backing from the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian publics is not possible without a public debate on the countries’ geo-strategic priorities: conducted both internally and together with the Nordic and other EU partners.

The Baltic perception is that the USA is the partner most open to discussing their hard security fears, to listening and to understanding. Most outside analyses that address Baltic security concerns are prepared by US institutes. The RAND Corporation, as an example, undertook a study on assuring access to key

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92 The European Neighbourhood Policy was first outlined by the European Commission in Mar. 2003. See the website of the European Neighbourhood Policy at URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/>. 
strategic regions in time of crisis, including the Baltic states. In one scenario in this study Russia is preparing an invasion of the Baltic states, allegedly to defend its national minorities. The report openly discusses the related—and often very sensitive—themes and issues ranging from the potential impact of the German peace movement to Poland’s poor roads and bridges. The message that the Baltic states’ hard security concerns are being treated by US analysts as something more than ‘anger and suspicion towards their former oppressor’ has a value going far beyond the study’s military conclusion that the Baltic states are not—as many local military experts fear—in danger of being overrun within a few days because of lengthy EU decision making. The Baltic states’ perception that the USA has a more sympathetic approach to them may owe something to a number of other factors. One of them is a congruency of perspectives between the USA and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on certain key issues, such as a preference for interventionist foreign policy and a sceptical attitude towards multilateralism. Finally, there is also the feeling that a relationship with the USA is beneficial for the Baltic states’ security vis-à-vis other European states. Perhaps most important of all, however, is the memory of Western Europe’s passive attitude towards Baltic security needs in the 1990s and of what the Baltic states saw as a European tendency to refer them back to NATO and to the USA as the sole arbiters of their fate.

Although the Baltic states may find it difficult to concentrate on any aspects of security that go beyond the military factor, they do not discount the importance of non-military security. The many references to other aspects of security in their official documents indicate a growing awareness of non-military threats. The example of Latvia and its tendency to turn to the EU for socioeconomic support is indicative of developments in the region. It is difficult to envisage the USA being able to assist directly on issues of economic, societal or environmental risks. Although each Baltic country’s threat perception differs slightly from the others and all three differ from other, West European members of the EU, the instruments required to address these threats for Baltic purposes lie within the same range and are in fact available within the EU.

The Nordic countries have earlier impressed the Baltic states, among others, by having the courage to remain faithful to their values; by the attention they have paid to non-military aspects of security; and by the frankness of their public debates. They could continue to be of assistance to the Baltic states

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93 Larson (note 43).
94 See Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (note 9), section 1.2: ‘the ability of international organisations to solve certain security problems has . . . not improved’.
96 Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, then Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, was the driving force behind Western Europe’s support for the Baltic states’ struggle for independence. See also Asmus, R. D., ‘The Atlantic alliance at a new crossroads: what does it mean for Denmark and northern Europe?’, eds P. Carlsen and H. Mouritzen, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004 (Danish Institute for International Studies: Copenhagen, 2004), URL <http://www.diis.dk/sw3668.asp>, pp. 26–48.
today. The situation has, of course, changed since EU and NATO enlargement in 2004: in some aspects of security cooperation the Nordic countries have been overtaken by the Baltic states, now organizationally embedded in both NATO and EU. The ESDP could, nevertheless, be a route for a revival of Baltic and Baltic–Nordic cooperation. After an enthusiastic period when many joint Baltic defence and security projects were supported by external advisers, the policy distance between Estonia and Lithuania is now endangering the continuation of several of them. The withdrawal of Nordic and other foreign advisers, justified by the argument that the Baltic states are now members of the EU and NATO, also bodes ill for trilateral cooperation projects.97 The rush towards ‘Baltification’ has ignored the fact that there is no such thing as a Baltic identity and that it takes time to adopt the skills of international and, in particular, regional cooperation, just as it took time for the Baltic states to acquire the skills of EU compromise. Thus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are in the process of being split by the strong attention they are paying to their different roots and national identities: Nordic, Baltic and Central European, respectively. Should all the Nordic countries decide to engage in NATO and the ESDP, with Denmark abandoning its opt-outs, they might be able to offer a new framework for Baltic involvement in the ESDP’s civilian and military instruments, as well as a framework for security cooperation between the Baltic states themselves. Much of the security-related activities remaining under the umbrella of the EU are supposed in the first instance to take place within a sub-region, between countries bordering each other. The Baltic states’ concern from the period before NATO and EU enlargement that such initiatives might be used as obstacles to and replacements for full-scale membership is now no longer relevant.

Countries cannot move to another place if they dislike their neighbours; but they can re-shape their geo-strategic position by changing their relations with them. Poland has done so in relation to Germany.98 The Baltic states could achieve the same in relation to Russia. A Baltic–Russian security community sounds far-fetched, but would be much better than the prevailing tensions. Germany and Poland have already gained experience with each other; and Poland’s experience in building security communities with its former foes Germany and Ukraine, and with Lithuania was of key importance for the standing it gained vis-à-vis Western countries in the 1990s especially. Poland is now deeply involved in further building of its security community with Ukraine and has ambitions to be a regional leader. Lithuania, in the same spirit, is maintaining good relations with Russia over—or despite—the Kaliningrad exclave. Germany, meanwhile, continues to shy away from its potential role as a regional player despite numerous calls for it to become involved in the sub-

97 The projects still active are the Baltic Defence College, the Baltic Battalion, the Baltic Naval Squadron and the Baltic Air Surveillance Network.
The Nordic countries have traditions of avoiding wars with each other, of building regional identity and of contact between their civil societies. The most relevant Nordic ‘export product’ relevant to the Baltic states’ search for identity and security is, as pointed out by Hans Mouritzen, the experience of having constructed and maintained the Nordic security community. Therefore, the role of the Nordic countries in relation to their Baltic neighbours is potentially crucial. The Baltic states already identify themselves as belonging to the Nordic culture, and they are eager to carry on the Nordic tradition of following ‘policies aimed to ensure stability and a high standard of living in their own countries while actively providing aid to regions and countries in need of assistance’.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the EU and NATO primarily for the same reasons that motivated the founding fathers of the EU: to avoid a repeat of history. For the Baltic states the history is that of 1941–44, when the major powers were making deals over their heads. This is why Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania want to be part of the EU decision-making processes, including those on the ESDP. While taking part in the ESDP, however, they are searching for a way to reconcile the conflict between their perceived need for a US presence in the region and some major EU partners’ dislike of having the USA so heavily engaged in European matters. They want to maintain the special relationship with the USA, their guarantor of hard security, and assume that the Nordic countries are sympathetic to this objective. The EU members close to Russia are also assumed to share both the need for a US strategic engagement and a similar approach to developments in Russia and the CIS. The voices of these EU members are expected to become louder as time goes on.

These EU members all certainly have a joint interest in influencing the progress of democracy in Russia and the CIS, and in achieving a situation where they no longer fear Russia and the CIS. There is, however, only a slowly growing recognition of the benefits that these states could gain from cooperating to achieve change in EU policies towards Russia. As suggested by Ronald D. Asmus: ‘Having succeeded in integrating the new member countries into the West we wonder what next? Belarus, Ukraine? Well, Russia? Now it is time for the Baltic states, Poland and Denmark to come together and push for democracy, for nation building. It is a huge agenda and Denmark is a small country, but small countries matter.’


102 For more on this see Buzan and Wæver (note 12).

103 Asmus (note 96).
Support for democratic reforms must include more than an offer of a ‘special relationship’ with Russia and it must demand more than promises and ‘Potemkin village’ reforms. The building of a security community in the region must in the longer run include Russia and it must be a joint project. International cooperation in the region is paramount. The region’s problems, huge as they are for the populations around the Baltic Sea—in the Baltic states, the Nordic countries, Poland and Germany—will be in tough competition for attention with other problems that are much more serious in the broader world perspective. It is not to belittle the importance of the USA’s presence in this region for the Baltic states’ current security agenda to suggest that in the longer run the USA is likely to find bigger fish to fry or that the Baltic states’ long-term strategy should be to find a replacement.\textsuperscript{104}

The European Security and Defence Policy is the fruit of a recognition that it is time for Europeans to deal with their own problems and with the problems on their doorstep. It is also time for the Baltic states to participate fully in the ESDP. They must do this not just as dutiful EU members carrying out the tasks assigned to them, but as actors using alliances with each other and with the Nordic countries or Poland in order to make their influence felt on the definitions both of the problems that are to be tackled and of where Europe’s ‘doorstep’ lies, in the CIS or in Africa. They must push for a joint strategy that would enable the projection of security beyond their eastern borders. The potential for extending the region’s collective influence is not restricted to the EU. The Danish membership of the UN Security Council (in 2005–2006) is another platform for exercising influence on developments in troubled regions, including Belarus, Ukraine and the southern Caucasus. If the effort to influence developments in Russia fails, all of the EU—particularly Russia’s neighbours, and not least the Baltic states and the Nordic countries—will face grave consequences for economic, societal, political and environmental stability.

Appendix

Extracts from the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe

The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 19 Oct. 2004 but has not been ratified. Articles of the treaty that refer to foreign, security and defence policy are reproduced below. The full text of the treaty is available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm>.

Part I

Title III. Union competences

Article I-12. Categories of competence

4. The Union shall have competence to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy.

Article I-13. Areas of exclusive competence

2. The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.

Article I-16. The common foreign and security policy

1. The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.

2. Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union’s common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area. They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union’s interests or likely to impair its effectiveness.

Title IV. The Union’s institutions and bodies

Chapter I. The institutional framework

Article I-28. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs

1. The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. The European Council may end his or her term of office by the same procedure.

2. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy. He or she shall contribute by his or her proposals to the development of that policy, which he or she shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence policy.

3. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council.

4. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He or she shall ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action. He or she shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and only for these responsibilities, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be bound by Commission procedures to the extent that this is consistent with paragraphs 2 and 3.
Chapter II. Specific provisions

Article I-40. Specific provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy

1. The European Union shall conduct a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States’ actions.

2. The European Council shall identify the Union’s strategic interests and determine the objectives of its common foreign and security policy. The Council shall frame this policy within the framework of the strategic guidelines established by the European Council and in accordance with Part III.

3. The European Council and the Council shall adopt the necessary European decisions.

4. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and by the Member States, using national and Union resources.

5. Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and the Council on any foreign and security policy issue which is of general interest in order to determine a common approach. Before undertaking any action on the international scene or any commitment which could affect the Union’s interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.

6. European decisions relating to the common foreign and security policy shall be adopted by the European Council and the Council unanimously, except in the cases referred to in Part III. The European Council and the Council shall act on an initiative from a Member State, on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs or on a proposal from that Minister with the Commission’s support. European laws and framework laws shall be excluded.

7. The European Council may, unanimously, adopt a European decision authorising the Council to act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in Part III.

8. The European Parliament shall be regularly consulted on the main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy. It shall be kept informed of how it evolves.

Article I-41. Specific provisions relating to the common security and defence policy

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States, it shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.

Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. An Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) shall be established to identify operational require-
ments, to promote measures to satisfy those requirements, to contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, to participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and to assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.

4. European decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs or an initiative from a Member State. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article III-310.

6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article III-312. It shall not affect the provisions of Article III-309.

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

8. The European Parliament shall be regularly consulted on the main aspects and basic choices of the common security and defence policy. It shall be kept informed of how it evolves.

**Article I-43. Solidarity clause**

1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

   (a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;

   (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

2. The detailed arrangements for implementing this Article are set out in Article III-329.

**Part III. The policies and functioning of the Union**

**Title V. The Union’s external action**

**Chapter I. Provisions having general application**

**Article III-292**

1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

   The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.

   2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;
(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters;
(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

3. The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s external action covered by this Title and the external aspects of its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.

Chapter II. Common foreign and security policy

Section 1. Common provisions

Article III-294

1. In the context of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy.

2. The Member States shall support the common foreign and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

3. The Union shall conduct the common foreign and security policy by:
   (a) defining the general guidelines;
   (b) adopting European decisions defining:
      (i) actions to be undertaken by the Union;
      (ii) positions to be taken by the Union;
      (iii) arrangements for the implementation of the European decisions referred to in points (i) and (ii);
(c) strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.

Article III-295

1. The European Council shall define the general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.

If international developments so require, the President of the European Council shall convene an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in order to define the strategic lines of the Union’s policy in the face of such developments.

2. The Council shall adopt the European decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council.

Article III-296

1. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, who shall chair the Foreign Affairs Council, shall contribute through his or her proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure implementation of the European decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. He or she shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in international organisations and at international conferences.

3. In fulfilling his or her mandate, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a European decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.

Article III-297

1. Where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary European decisions. Such decisions shall lay down the objectives, the scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary the duration, and the conditions for implementation of the action.

If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to such a European decision, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that decision and adopt the necessary European decisions.

2. The European decisions referred to in paragraph 1 shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.

3. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a European decision as referred to in paragraph 1, information shall be provided by the Member State concerned in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of such a decision.

4. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a review of the European decision pursuant to the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency, having regard to the general objectives of that decision. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.

5. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a European decision as referred to in this Article, a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the action or impair its effectiveness.

Article III-298

The Council shall adopt European decisions which shall define the approach of the Union.
to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the positions of the Union.

**Article III-299**

1. Any Member State, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, or that Minister with the Commission’s support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council and may submit to it initiatives or proposals as appropriate.

2. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, of the Minister’s own motion or at the request of a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary meeting of the Council within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.

**Article III-300**

1. The European decisions referred to in this Chapter shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously.

   When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the European decision, but shall accept that the latter commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position.

   If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.

2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the Council shall act by a qualified majority:

   (a) when adopting European decisions defining a Union action or position on the basis of a European decision of the European Council relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article III-293(1);

   (b) when adopting a European decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs has presented following a specific request to him or her from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the Minister;

   (c) when adopting a European decision implementing a European decision defining a Union action or position;

   (d) when adopting a European decision concerning the appointment of a special representative in accordance with Article III-302.

   If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a European decision to be adopted by a qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he or she does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a European decision by unanimity.

3. In accordance with Article I-40(7) the European Council may unanimously adopt a European decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.

**Article III-301**

1. When the European Council or the Council has defined a common approach of the Union within the meaning of Article I-40(5), the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States shall coordinate their activities within the Council.

2. The diplomatic missions of the Member States and the Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall cooperate and shall contribute to formulating and implementing the common approach referred to in paragraph 1.

**Article III-302**

The Council may appoint, on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. The special representative shall carry out his or her mandate under the Minister’s authority.
**Article III-303**

The Union may conclude agreements with one or more States or international organisations in areas covered by this Chapter.

**Article III-304**

1. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall consult and inform the European Parliament in accordance with Article I-40(8) and Article I-41(8). He or she shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. Special representatives may be involved in briefing the European Parliament.

2. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council and of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs or make recommendations to them. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy.

**Article III-305**

1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the Union’s positions in such fora. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall organise this coordination.

   In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the Union’s positions.

2. In accordance with Article I-16(2), Member States represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter, as well as the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed of any matter of common interest.

   Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council shall concert and keep the other Member States and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs fully informed. Member States which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the United Nations Charter.

   When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs be asked to present the Union’s position.

**Article III-306**

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Union delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organisations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the European decisions defining Union positions and actions adopted pursuant to this Chapter are complied with and implemented.

They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information and carrying out joint assessments. They shall contribute to the implementation of the right of European citizens to protection in the territory of third countries as referred to in Article I-10(2)(c) and the measures adopted pursuant to Article III-127.

**Article III-307**

1. Without prejudice to Article III-344, a Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the latter, or of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the powers of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. Within the scope of this Chapter, the Political and Security Committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations referred to in Article III-309.

   The Council may authorise the Committee, for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant measures concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation.
The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Constitution for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles I-13 to I-15 and I-17.

Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Constitution for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter.

Section 2. The common security and defence policy

Article III-309

1. The tasks referred to in Article I-41(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

2. The Council shall adopt European decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.

Article III-310

1. Within the framework of the European decisions adopted in accordance with Article III-309, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.

2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the European decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary European decisions.

Article III-311

1. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency), established by Article I-41(3) and subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its task to:

(a) contribute to identifying the Member States’ military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;

(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;

(c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;

(d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs;

(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.

2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a European decision defining the Agency’s statute, seat and operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of effective participation in the Agency’s activities. Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects. The Agency
shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary.

Article III-312

1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article I-41(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation shall notify their intention to the Council and to the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall adopt a European decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Council shall adopt a European decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take part in the vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council representing the participating Member States, comprising at least 65% of the population of these States.

A blocking minority must include at least the minimum number of Council members representing more than 35% of the population of the participating Member States, plus one member, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained.

4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a European decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned.

The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council representing the participating Member States, comprising at least 65% of the population of these States.

A blocking minority must include at least the minimum number of Council members representing more than 35% of the population of the participating Member States, plus one member, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained.

5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate.

6. The European decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating Member States only.

Section 3. Financial provisions

Article III-313

1. Administrative expenditure which the implementation of this Chapter entails for the institutions shall be charged to the Union budget.

2. Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise shall also be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council decides otherwise.

In cases where expenditure is not charged to the Union budget it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal
declaration under Article III-300(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.

3. The Council shall adopt a European decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article I-41(1) and Article III-309. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.

Preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article I-41(1) and Article III-309 which are not charged to the Union budget shall be financed by a start-up fund made up of Member States’ contributions.

The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, European decisions establishing:

(a) the procedures for setting up and financing the start-up fund, in particular the amounts allocated to the fund;

(b) the procedures for administering the start-up fund;

(c) the financial control procedures.

When the task planned in accordance with Article I-41(1) and Article III-309 cannot be charged to the Union budget, the Council shall authorise the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs to use the fund. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit.

Chapter VIII. Implementation of the solidarity clause

Article III-329

1. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council.

2. The arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause referred to in Article I-43 shall be defined by a European decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council shall act in accordance with Article III-300(1) where this decision has defence implications. The European Parliament shall be informed.

For the purposes of this paragraph and without prejudice to Article III-344, the Council shall be assisted by the Political and Security Committee with the support of the structures developed in the context of the common security and defence policy and by the Committee referred to in Article III-261; the two committees shall, if necessary, submit joint opinions.

3. The European Council shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union and its Member States to take effective action.

Title VI. The functioning of the union

Chapter III. Enhanced cooperation

Article III-419

2. The request of the Member States which wish to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves within the framework of the common foreign and security policy shall be addressed to the Council. It shall be forwarded to the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, who shall give an opinion on whether the enhanced cooperation proposed is consistent with the Union’s common foreign and security policy, and to the Commission, which shall give its opinion in particular on whether the enhanced cooperation proposed is consistent with other Union policies. It shall also be forwarded to the European Parliament for information.

Authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation shall be granted by a European decision of the Council acting unanimously.

Article III-422

1. Where a provision of the Constitution which may be applied in the context of enhanced cooperation stipulates that the Council shall act unanimously, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with the arrangements laid down in Article I-44(3), may adopt a European decision stipulating that it will act by a qualified majority.

2. Where a provision of the Constitution which may be applied in the context of
enhanced cooperation stipulates that the Council shall adopt European laws or framework laws under a special legislative procedure, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with the arrangements laid down in Article I-44(3), may adopt a European decision stipulating that it will act under the ordinary legislative procedure. The Council shall act after consulting the European Parliament.

3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.

Part IV. General and final provisions

Article IV-440

4. This Treaty shall apply to the European territories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible.

5. This Treaty shall apply to the Åland Islands with . . . derogations . . .

6. . . . this Treaty shall not apply to the Faeroe Islands . . .

Article IV-447. Ratification and entry into force

1. This Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. . . .

2. This Treaty shall enter into force on 1 November 2006, provided that all the instruments of ratification have been deposited, or, failing that, on the first day of the second month following the deposit of the instrument of ratification by the last signatory State to take this step.
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