EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS: EU, OSCE AND NATO

NIKLAS BREMBERG*

This SIPRI Insights presents a concise analysis of how three regional inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) in Europe with a security mandate—the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—are responding to climate-related security risks. Together, these three IGOs are the main Europe-based regional organizations involved in European and international security. The rationale for the study is two-fold: (*a*) the EU, the OSCE and NATO are the most important regional IGOs supporting European cooperation in the field of security, and it is, thus, highly relevant to gain a more in-depth understanding of their work to address climate-related security risks; and (*b*) these IGOs are all crucial to Sweden's efforts to advance the climate security agenda at the international level—both in terms of the policy knowledge and the fact that several of Sweden's key partners in this policy field are members of these organizations.

I. Introduction

Research across several social science disciplines suggests that states and societies around the world are being confronted by a growing class of security challenges posed by climate change. Increased risk of famine, damage to infrastructure, houses and shelter, and violent conflict are exacerbated by climate change through gradual changes in ecosystems and extreme weather events.[1] As climate-related security risks are unavoidably transnational in character, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are instrumental in developing policy solutions and enhancing international cooperation.[2] The questions of what roles IGOs—such as, for example, the United Nations, the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

PROJECT SUMMARY

● **Research suggests that states and societies around the world are increasingly confronted by climate-related security risks. These risks are unavoidably transnational in character, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are instrumental in developing policy solutions and enhancing international cooperation. However, previous research highlights that knowledge about the conditions under which IGOs address climate security risks, and when they do so effectively, is incomplete. There is a need for further in-depth analysis of relevant IGOs in the field of climate security.**

This SIPRI Insights presents a concise analysis of how three regional organizations in Europe with a security mandate have responded to climate-related security risks. The main findings stress that all three IGOs acknowledge climate change as a 'threat multiplier' (i.e. a factor that might exacerbate existing drivers of instability and conflict) and are addressing climate security to varying degrees within their mandates. The EU and the OSCE are actively seeking to incorporate climate security in efforts to promote peace and security, whereas NATO's role currently remains more limited to disaster response.

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[1] For a recent overview, see, Mobjörk M. et al., *Climate-Related Security Risks: Towards an Integrated Approach* (SIPRI: Stockholm, Oct. 2016).

[2] IGOs refer to formal, multilateral or bureaucratic arrangements established to further cooperation among states.

Table 1. Institutional logics and organizational roles of the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

	EU	OSCE	NATO
Institutional logic	International security promoted by regional integration and effective multilateralism	International security promoted by democracy promotion and regional cooperation	International security promoted by military cooperation and deterrence
Role in international cooperation on climate-related security risks	Salient, through e.g. EU climate diplomacy and development aid/support for resilience in partner countries	Potentially salient, i.e. due to its extensive experience of environmental security and working with local partners but lacks resources	Not salient, but might become more important in the field of international disaster response

Source: Author's own conceptualization.

(ASEAN)—should play in dealing with climate security risks, and to what extent they are effective when it comes to promoting solutions, are increasingly being discussed among researchers and practitioners.

Previous research shows that although IGOs are growing steadily more important in contributing to finding remedies to climate-related security risks, they are not always successful. A recent review of the burgeoning research on IGOs and climate security reveals that the knowledge about (*a*) the conditions under which IGOs address climate security risks, and (*b*) the efficacy of those efforts, is incomplete.[3] This finding demonstrates that there is a need for further in-depth analysis of relevant IGOs in the field of climate security. Such research and its findings to a large extent hinge on the security framework that the organization under investigation uses.

Security frameworks

As a concept, climate security draws on a comprehensive understanding of security that combines state and human security.[4] In the context of climate-related risk, state security is traditionally understood as the condition where states have the capacity to manage climate-related threats to their sovereignty and power in the international system, and human security is often defined as the condition where individuals and communities have the capacity to manage (and ultimately prevent) sudden or chronic climate-related risks such as famine, disease and rights violations. Climate security bridges these concepts of security and refers to the condition where people, communities and states have the capacity to manage stress, and ultimately prevent risks, emerging from climate change.[5] Climate change is often described as a 'threat multiplier' in that it exacerbates already existing risks and threats. This might certainly be an accurate depiction in some cases, but it is important to keep in mind that in other instances climate-related security risks might be the principal risk facing certain societies and states, such as island states threatened by sea-level rise.[6]

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[3] Dellmuth, L. M. et al., 'Intergovernmental organizations and climate security: Advancing the research agenda', *WIREs Climate Change*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Oct. 2017).

[4] Mobjörk et al. (note 1), pp. 3–23.

[5] Dellmuth el al. (note 3), p. 3.

[6] Mobjörk et al. (note 1), pp. 14–16.

Previous research on climate-related security risks tends to focus on IGOs working in policy areas commonly associated with a particular security framework. For example, climate-related security risks understood to affect state security have been the main focus of studies on security and diplomacy, as well as peace and conflict, whereas climate-related security risks perceived to affect human security are predominantly studied in relation to development, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and migration.[7] The limits of this approach become evident when the roles and actions of European regional IGOs in the field of climate security are considered since these organizations cover several different policy areas. For example, the EU's action on climate change is advancing, and, internationally, the EU spans several policy areas ranging from development and humanitarian aid to foreign and security policy. The OSCE has a long tradition of promoting regional cooperation on environmental security issues in Europe and has more recently started to incorporate climate-related security risks in its work in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. NATO's focus predominantly rests on territorial defence and military cooperation among its member states, but its crisis management capabilities may become increasingly relevant to enhance the capacity of European as well as neighbouring states to manage climate-related security risks. This paper uses an integrated security framework that centres on the adverse effects of climate change. Doing so makes it possible to capture analytically the work being done—and to discuss what needs to be done—to mitigate climate-related security risks.

Climate change is often described as a 'threat multiplier' in that it exacerbates already existing risks and threats

Approach

This SIPRI Insights summarizes the initial findings from a study conducted within the SIPRI Climate Change and Security Project. The findings are primarily based on semi-structured interviews with relevant organization officials and an analysis of recent policy documents.[8] This work builds on a study conducted in 2016 that specifically examined how the EU's foreign and security policy and the European External Action Service (EEAS) handle climate-related security risks.[9] It expands on the earlier analysis to also include the European Commission's work to address climate-related security risks within EU external actions.

In order to make an initial assessment of the possibilities and limitations of the work that the EU, the OSCE and NATO are currently doing in the field of climate security, this paper outlines (*a*) the institutional logics or belief systems that underpin each organization's role in international security (see table 1), and (*b*) the most relevant actions in the field of climate security undertaken by each organization during recent years (approximately 2014–17).[10]

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[7] Dellmuth et al. (note 3), p. 3.

[8] In Nov. and Dec. 2017, a total of 8 interviews were conducted with officials working at the EU, the OSCE and NATO either in Brussels or via telephone.

[9] Sonnsjö, H. and Bremberg, N., *Climate Change in an EU Security Context: The Role of the European External Action Service* (Stockholm University: Stockholm, 2016).

[10] Institutional logics in political science are defined as organizing principles in terms of a set of belief systems and associated practices guiding practitioners in specific organizational settings, see

II. The EU: Developing a comprehensive approach to climate-related security risks

Background

With 28 member states, the EU is considered by many to be the basis of peace and stability in Europe. The EU also plays an active role in promoting international security outside of Europe. The EU's role in international security expanded significantly after the cold war when the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) were established in 1993 and 1999, respectively. In 2011 the European External Action Service (EEAS) was established to carry out the CFSP, of which the CSDP is part. The EEAS was formally launched with the explicit aim of fostering greater coherence in EU foreign and security policy and the EU's external actions more generally. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy heads the EEAS, serves as the Vice-President of the European Commission and is the permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council.[11] In addition to the officials working with the EEAS and the Commission in Brussels, the EU has a vast network of EU delegations with staff in many countries across the world.

As it relates to climate change, in additional to being an IGO, the EU is a supranational entity in that it has the capacity to adopt and implement EU-wide policy, that in some cases may supersede national policy. EU decision-making affects or includes nearly all of the climate-relevant policy areas of its member states. For example, the national policies of member states on matters related to the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions, energy efficiency standards and international climate negotiations are, to a significant extent, set or guided by the EU.

This—together with the fact that the EU has exclusive jurisdiction over certain policy areas (e.g. external trade) and its own budget which represents about 1 per cent of the member states' gross domestic product (approximately €142 billion in 2015)—makes the EU a unique regional IGO—particularly in relation to its influence and action on climate change.

Institutional logic

It is difficult, due to its broad scope of policy competences and areas, to pin down a single dominant institutional logic within the EU when it comes to international security. However, previous research points to at least two logics, which are also relevant in order to understand the EU's limits and possibilities in the field of climate security.[12] The first institutional logic derives from the experience of European integration and concerns the notion that international security is fostered through political and economic integration of states. This is seen in the European Commission's work within the EU and towards non-member states both in Europe and in the

e.g. Bremberg, N. and Britz, M. 'Uncovering the institutional logics of EU civil protection', *Cooperation and Conflict,* vol. 44, no. 3 (Aug. 2009), pp. 288–308.

[11] Federica Mogherini has held this office since 2014.

[12] Bremberg, N., *Diplomacy and Security Community-Building: EU Crisis Management in the Western Mediterranean* (Routledge: London, 2016).

neighbourhood, as well as in the EU's general support to regional integration processes in other parts of the world such as ASEAN and AU. The second logic is derived from foreign policy cooperation among EU member states and centres around the notion that international security is best sustained by a rules-based international system. This is seen in the EU's support for the UN and 'effective multilateralism' (i.e. a rules-based international order underpinning multilateral actions to solve common global problems). These two logics inform the EU's 'comprehensive security' concept, which seeks to build on and integrate the various instruments and tools that the EU has at its disposal in order to promote peace and security beyond its borders.

Actions taken relevant to climate security

The EU began to acknowledge that climate change has security implications in the early 2000s.[13] While the European Security Strategy of 2003 mentions climate change, a report by the High Representative and the Commission in 2008 explicitly identifies climate change as a 'threat multiplier'.[14] The EU Global Strategy of 2016 consistently refers to climate change and states that it 'exacerbate[s] potential conflict' due to desertification, land degradation, and water and food security.[15] The 2016 strategy points out that the EU should assist partner countries in terms of climate action, for example through the development of renewable energy and technological transfers, as well as climate change mitigation and adaptation. In 'A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action', a joint communication from the High Representative and the Commission from 2017, it is also said that the EU should integrate environmental, climate and disaster risk assessments into its early warning systems in order to be able to identify the impact of these risks and formulate preventive and/or adaptive measures.[16]

The EU's external actions in the field of climate security take on different forms, but two strands are particularly relevant, namely climate diplomacy and climate finance

   The EU's external actions in the field of climate security take on different forms, but two strands are particularly relevant, namely climate diplomacy and climate finance. For the EU, climate diplomacy basically refers to actions undertaken by the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), the EEAS and the European Commission to shape international cooperation on climate change. The EU often portrays itself as an international leader capable of setting examples to others as well as a key driving force within climate change negotiations. For example, in terms of climate security, when the FAC adopted the priorities for the EU in the UN during 2017–18, it stressed

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[13] Zwolski, K. and Kaunert, C., 'The EU and climate security: a case of successful norm entrepreneurship?', *European Security*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Mar. 2011), pp. 21–43.

[14] Council of the European Union, 'European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World', Brussels, Dec. 2003; and High Representative for the CFSP, 'Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy—Providing Security in a Changing World', Brussels, Dec. 2008.

[15] European Union External Action Service, 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy' Brussels, June 2016.

[16] European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 'Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action', Brussels, 7 June 2017.

that the EU supports a strong role for the UN in identifying and analysing security-related risks linked to climate change.[17]

In terms of climate finance, the EU and its member states committed about €14.5 billion in 2014 for climate change mitigation and adaption measures in developing countries.[18] It should be noted that EU climate finance draws on the means of both the EU and the individual member states, which suggests that there is a large potential here to make an impact in developing countries. According to Elina Bardram, EU chief negotiator at the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UN Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2017 (COP 23), the EU's aim is to make the Paris Agreement on Climate Change work in practice and shift the focus from negotiators to practitioners on the ground.[19] Interviews with officials in the EEAS and the Commission confirmed this and that the EU will prioritize assisting partner countries to deliver on their 'nationally determined contributions' (NDCs) as well as seeking to better incorporate climate risk assessments in the EU's early warning systems, relating for example to land degradation and water shortage.[20]

When interviewed, officials at the European Commission also pointed out that the EU has a strategic interest in enhancing climate mitigation and adaptation actions in partner countries in the Southern neighbourhood (mainly North Africa) since the adverse effects of climate change, not least water security, will be heavily felt in the region and the EU already has a range of other instruments in place within the region via its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).[21] According to officials at the EEAS, it is unlikely that the CSDP will play a large role in EU external efforts to deal with climate-related security risk because military assets in general are not seen as particularly useful. However, 'greening' the military (e.g. developing fossil-free military equipment) and deploying military assets for disaster response are areas in which EU member states are likely to be interested.[22]

Conclusions

The EU is strengthening its efforts to address climate-related security risks in its neighbourhood and in developing countries. There are indications that (*a*) climate security is more systematically addressed within the EU's international efforts today than a few years ago, and (*b*) that the EU's actions, in terms of climate finance and climate diplomacy, are now considered key components in its efforts 'to make the Paris Agreement work in practice'. Integrating climate risk assessments in the EU's early warning systems will also enhance its role in climate security as it may help prioritize among vari-

[17] Council of the EU, 'EU priorities at the United Nations and the 72nd United Nations General Assembly', Brussels, 17 July 2017.

[18] European Commission, 'EU climate funding for developing countries', Brussels, 2015.

[19] The annual Conference of Parties (COP) reviews the implementation of the UN 'Rio Convention' and the UNFCCC. The 23rd such conference was held in 2017 in Bonn, Germany; and Presentation by Ms Bardram at the Brussels Dialogue on Climate Diplomacy on Enhancing Climate Diplomacy in a Changing Political Environment, Brussels, 20 Nov. 2017.

[20] Interview EEAS official no. 1 (Global Issues), Brussels, 22 Nov. 2017; Interview EEAS official no. 2 (Global Issues), Brussels, 22 Nov. 2017; Interview Commission official no. 1 (DG Environment), Brussels, Nov. 21 2017; and Interview Commission no. 2 (DG Environment), Brussels, 21 Nov. 2017.

[21] Interview Commission official no. 1 (DG Environment), Brussels, Nov. 21 2017; and Interview Commission no. 2 (DG Environment), Brussels, 21 Nov. 2017.

[22] Interview EEAS official no. 3 (EU Military Staff), Brussels, 21 Nov. 2017.

ous development and conflict prevention measures on the ground. There is remarkable potential for the EU to contribute to addressing climate-related security risks both within and outside the EU. While struggles to coordinate its external actions will remain a key challenge, the EU's approach to comprehensive security and its toolbox of diverse instruments put it in a favourable position to address climate security. This potential would be most effectively harnessed if EU member states agree with each other on priorities for climate security, and if EU humanitarian and development policies would be explicitly designed to strengthen resilience to climate-related security risks in vulnerable countries.

III. OSCE: Bridging environmental and climate security

Background

The OSCE currently has 57 member states, and it is the world's largest regional security-oriented organization. All EU member states are members of the OSCE, and great powers such as the United States and Russia are also members. The organization dates back to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, which sought to facilitate East–West dialogue and cooperation beyond the realm of traditional security during the cold war. Confidence-building measures, such as arms control, were early matters within the organization's main focus, but already the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 recognized, for example, the transnational implications of environmental degradation and the mismanagement of natural resources. Following the end of the cold war, the CSCE was renamed and transformed into the OSCE in 1994. Subsequently, its mandate was expanded to cover conflict prevention and democracy promotion.

Institutional logic

The OSCE's institutional logic regarding international security is, to a large extent, defined by the OSCE model of comprehensive security that seeks to build stability, peace and democracy through political dialogue within three dimensions: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human rights. Environmental security—that is, policies and practices to ensure sustainability and protect natural resources—fits suitably within the OSCE model of comprehensive security as it concerns non-traditional security issues, such as DRR, water and hazardous waste management—issues that might be less sensitive for member states to cooperate on (compared with military matters). As part of its model of comprehensive security, the OSCE also seeks to raise environmental awareness, promote public participation in environmental decision-making and facilitate access to justice in environmental matters, which is in line with its model of enhanced democracy promotion.

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Actions taken relevant to climate security

Environmental security is situated at the heart of the OSCE model. This is demonstrated in the role that the OSCE plays in the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), a multi-agency partnership of five agencies—the OSCE, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC)—that was launched in 2003.[23] The initial purpose of ENVSEC was to identify and evaluate environment-related security risks in South East Europe and Central Asia.

Each organization within ENVSEC has specific, but complementary, mandates and expertise regarding environmental security. The OSCE's long experience in this field gives it a leading role in ENVSEC in terms of managing projects and liaising with local partners. ENVSEC's decision-making and management structure enables the targeting of various issues falling within the confines of environmental security, such as natural resource management, DRR and climate change. Ultimately, ENVSEC aims to build mutual trust and provide a regional approach to transboundary challenges.[24]

The original focus of both the OSCE and ENVSEC was environmental security, not climate-related security risks. However, according to interviews and previous research, that has changed in recent years. For example, the 2007 OSCE Madrid Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Security recognizes climate change as a long-term challenge and underlines the OSCE's responsibility to address its region-specific consequences.[25] In 2015, the OSCE's Secretary General, Lamberto Zannier, organized a conference on climate change and security where participants from member states, IGOs and academia discussed the security consequences of climate change and what role the OSCE should play in addressing these risks.[26] Moreover, between 2013 and 2017 the OSCE led and implemented the ENVSEC project 'Climate Change and Security in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus', which aimed to further the understanding and awareness of climate change as a security issue, to enhance regional and transboundary cooperation, and to improve the ability of local and national stakeholders to anticipate, prevent and mitigate climate-related security risks.[27] According to the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, Ambassador Vuk Žugić, the OSCE sees itself as a platform that brings climate diplomacy and security together. It would like to build on the experience gained from the ENVSEC project on Eastern

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[23] Hardt, J. N., *Environmental Security in the Anthropocene* (Routledge: New York, 2018); and Hakala, E., 'Environmental and human security in the Western Balkans', Unpublished PhD dissertation (University of Helsinki, [n.d.]). Note: NATO was an associated member of ENVSEC from 2004 to 2015. It withdrew from the ENVSEC due to changed priorities of NATO members.

[24] However, it should be noted that projects carried out through the ENVSEC framework are completely dependent on external funding, with Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland among the main donors.

[25] OSCE, 'Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security', 30 Nov. 2007.

[26] OSCE, 'Climate Change and Security: Unprecedented impacts, unpredictable risks', 28 Oct. 2015.

[27] This ENVSEC project was financed by the EU's Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcPS) and the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Europe, Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus and expand the project to include the Western Balkans.[28]

Interviews and previous research suggests that the work with ENVSEC reflects one of the OSCE's main strengths as a security actor: it has the capacity to effectively engage stakeholders and actors at the subnational level through its extensive presence at a local level in member and partner countries.[29] This is further evident in the OSCE's handling of its primary responsibility for implementing the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice, also known as the Aarhus Convention. The convention has given rise to so-called Aarhus Centres, which are local platforms for environmental and security dialogue among citizens, governments and the private sector. Furthermore, the OSCE's presence at the local level enables a region-specific understanding of climate-related security risks, and its work with ENVSEC has also culminated in three region-specific reports.[30] For example, this work has recognized avalanches and glacial flooding as region-specific climate risks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whereas the South Caucasus region and Eastern Europe are deemed to be greatly affected by sea-level rise and floods. The assessments in the separate regions have also identified 'security hotspots' which are predicted to have regional security implications.

Conclusions

Climate-related security risks have gradually become more important in the work and activities that the OSCE carries out to build stability and peace, as climate change is now acknowledged to be a 'potential additional contributor to conflict'.[31] There are indications that there has been a shift in terms of how the OSCE perceives the link between environmental security, conflict prevention and climate change. In the early 2000s and at the early stages of ENVSEC, security threats were largely defined in terms of conflict, ethnic tensions and economic crises in the post-Soviet space. Now, the OSCE (e.g. within ENVSEC) defines threats more in terms of climate change, unemployment and environmental hazards in a wider context of economic, political and social development in vulnerable societies. The OSCE has gone from using environmental issues to encourage regional stability in general to more specifically focus on building environmental security early warning systems and reducing energy use. In many ways, the OSCE appears to be using climate security as a mechanism for fostering regional cooperation, and ENVSEC is seen as one of several frameworks that can be used to facilitate the 'transformation

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[28] Presentation by Amb. Žugić at the Brussels Dialogue on Climate Diplomacy on Enhancing Climate Diplomacy in a Changing Political Environment, Brussels, 20 Nov. 2017.

[29] Interview OSCE official (Economic and Environmental Activities), Telephone, 15 Dec. 2017; Interview Commission official no. 1 (DG Environment), Brussels, 21 Nov. 2017; and Interview Commission no. 2 (DG Environment), Brussels, 21 Nov. 2017. See also Hardt (note 21).

[30] Novikov, V. et al. and OSCE/ENVSEC, 'Climate Change and Security in Central Asia', 2017; Rucevska, I. et al. and OSCE/ENVSEC, 'Climate Change and Security in the Southern Caucasus', 2017; Nikolayeva, L. et al. and OSCE/ENVSEC, 'Climate Change and Security in Eastern Europe', 2017.

[31] OSCE (note 25).

of risks into cooperation'.[32] However, it should be noted that the OSCE is a consensus-based organization. This means that its agenda is ultimately set by its member states and their political interests, and, in terms of funding projects, it relies on donors. The political clout of the OSCE might, thus, seem limited in the short-to medium-term, at least compared to the EU and NATO, but as a regional platform its potential seemingly lies more in its ability to affect long-term change in perceptions and practices.

IV. NATO: The prevalence of traditional security concerns

Background

NATO was established in 1949 as a US-led transatlantic military alliance of mainly West European states. Throughout the cold war its main purpose was deterrence against the Soviet Union, but it also served to enhance military cooperation among its member states. After the end of the cold war, NATO's mandate expanded to include peacekeeping and crisis management operations, and several states in Eastern Europe joined the alliance. As a result, NATO currently consists of 29 member states, out of which 22 are also EU member states and all NATO members belong to the OSCE. Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Ukraine are members of NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme, and NATO has developed a range of other partnerships with non-member states in Europe and across the world (e.g. Colombia, Japan and Morocco).[33]

Institutional logic

NATO is based on a traditional perception of state security with a predominant focus on military cooperation that prioritizes territorial defence and deterrence. Its core mission—and institutional logic regarding international security—is spelled out in Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. However, the end of the cold war changed the perception of what kind of security threats NATO should counter and how it should counter them.[34] As a result of the civil wars in the Balkans in the 1990s and the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan in 2001, NATO expanded its institutional logic to also include cooperative security with non-members and peacekeeping operations outside of Europe. Currently, counterterrorism and cyberdefence are also on NATO's agenda although Russia's ongoing incursions in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea in 2014 has to a large degree shifted NATO's focus back to territorial defence and deterrence in Europe.

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[32] Hardt (note 23).

[33] Russia joined the Partnership for Peace Programme in 1994 and the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) was established in 2002. However, all practical military and civilian cooperation between NATO and Russia was suspended in April 2014 as a reaction to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.

[34] This change can be seen in the evolution of NATO's Strategic Concepts. The most recent was published in 2010 and it identifies NATO's core tasks as collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security and recognizes that 'the modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO's territory and populations'. See NATO, 'Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization', 19–20 Nov. 2010.

Actions taken relevant to climate security

NATO has been engaged in environmental aspects of security since the 1960s, predominantly in relation to tasks such as protecting the environment from the damaging effects of military operations, adapting military assets to hostile physical environments, preparing for and responding to natural and man-made disasters, and addressing the impact of climate change. In recent years NATO has taken further steps towards specifying the link between climate change and international security.

For example, NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept identifies climate change and environmental challenges as being among the key factors shaping security in NATO's areas of interest and that they will have significant bearing on defence planning and military operations.[35] In 2015, Resolution 427 of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly calls for 'actions, measures and rules on climate change mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency'.[36] NATO's Economics and Security Committee published a report in 2017 identifying climate change as a 'factor in triggering violent conflicts linked to declining food production, water shortages or economic crises linked to these phenomena'.[37] Similar notions are expressed in a report by NATO's Science and Technology Committee, linking climate change with food and water security and societal stability in the Middle East and North Africa.[38] The security implications of climate change in the Arctic are primarily understood in terms of resource competition with regard to Russia's more assertive posture in the region, and a NATO report forecasts a greater strategic relevance of the region in the future as more states become involved.[39] Also, a recent NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis identifies climate change as a factor in international security because an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather might contribute to increased migration and illegal activities.[40]

NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept identifies climate change and environmental challenges as being among the key factors shaping security in NATO's areas of interest—factors that will have significant bearing on defence planning and military operations

Although climate change is recognized as having security implications that might affect the security of NATO member states, the role of the organization is perceived to be limited in the field of climate security. According to NATO's Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, 'NATO is not the first responder to climate change. We are a military alliance . . . the most important things that can be done with climate change is more related to energy, to ministers of the environment, to other areas than defense'.[41] It is important to note that NATO reports and analyses are not necessarily embraced by NATO

[35] NATO (note 34). See also Causevic, A., 'Facing an unpredictable threat: Is NATO ideally placed to manage climate change as a non-traditional threat multiplier?', *Connections: The Quarterly Journal,* vol. 16, no. 2 (2017), pp. 59–80; and Lippert, T. H., 'NATO, climate change and international security: A risk governance approach', PhD dissertation, Pardee Rand Graduate School, 2016.

[36] NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 'Resolution 427 on climate change and international security', 2015.

[37] NATO PA, Economics and Security Committee, Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Economic Relations, 'Assessing and mitigating the cost of climate change', 2017.

[38] NATO PA, Science and Technology Committee, 'Food and water security in the Middle East and North Africa', 2017.

[39] NATO PA, Political Committee, 'NATO and security in the Arctic', 2017.

[40] See e.g. NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis, '2017 Report'.

[41] 'Politico Brussels playbook cocktails with Jens Stoltenberg', POLITICO, 6 June 2016.

headquarters, meaning that they are not always used to guide policies and decisions. Furthermore, NATO is a consensus-based organization; thus, its agenda reflects what members can agree on. According to interviews, there is little interest at the moment among NATO members to enhance NATO's engagement in addressing climate-related security risks, although NATO members are concerned with energy security and the Arctic region—which both have obvious links to climate change.[42]

Nonetheless, the role of NATO could be important in supporting member states and partners in adapting to climate change, not least when it comes to improving disaster response. In the event that climate change will lead to more extreme weather events and, in other ways, increase the likelihood of natural disasters, NATO has significant and relevant civil and military resources that it can mobilize.[43] A chief example here is the European-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), which has been responsible for NATO's disaster response operations since 1998. EADRCC regularly consults with other IGOs in international disaster response, such as the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). For example, in September 2017 Georgia requested assistance through EADRCC to curb wild fires in the Samtshke-Javakheti region and similar operations were undertaken in 2016 to assist Israel, as well as relief efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina following severe floods and landslides in 2014. EADRCC also organizes exercises (e.g. on extreme weather events) on a regular basis to facilitate international cooperation.[44] A recent field exercise took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2017. The exercise attracted personnel from 34 NATO member and partner countries and included water rescue and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) detection, protection and decontamination.[45]

Conclusions

NATO acknowledges that climate change is part of a changing international security landscape and that its adverse effects will most certainly affect its members and partners. The emphasis that NATO puts on cooperative and collective security makes it hard for the organization to completely discard climate-related security risks as these risks will ultimately effect NATO members and thus call for a collective response. However, given the re-emergence of geopolitical contestation in Europe, it does not prioritize these issues at the moment. NATO does not perceive that it is, or should be, a leading organization in the field of climate security. Nevertheless, when it comes to international disaster response, NATO is an important actor and might become even more so if the frequency and/or magnitude of extreme weather events and disasters increase as a result of a changing climate.

[42] Interview NATO official no. 1 (Emerging Security Challenges Division), Brussels, 20 Nov. 2017; Interview NATO official no. 2 (Emerging Security Challenges Division), Telephone, 15 Dec. 2017; and Interview EEAS official no. 3 (EU Military Staff), Brussels, 21 Nov. 2017. See also Lippert (note 33).

[43] Interview NATO official no. 2 (Emerging Security Challenges Division), Telephone, 15 Dec. 2017.

[44] Lippert (note 33).

[45] NATO, 'NATO and partners exercise disaster response in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Press release, 25 Sep. 2017.

V. Implications for future research and policy

A key initial finding from this research project is that the EU, the OSCE and NATO are all engaging with climate-related security risks to varying degrees within their organizational mandates, although none of them sees climate security as part of its core mandate. The EU and the OSCE are seeking to incorporate climate security into their institutional security agenda, whereas NATO is not placing a particular emphasis on climate security at the moment. In NATO, there is an awareness that its activities will most likely be affected by climate change, but it is not preparing operationally for climate-related security risks.

There are various indications of exchanges among the three organizations in the field of climate security, and there seems, thus far, to be possibilities for positive synergies among them. For example, there is significant overlap in membership of the EU, the OSCE and NATO. Officials and diplomats from these organizations and their member states regularly interact with one other in various formats and venues, meaning that policy learning on climate-related security risks can occur within and across these organizations. The EU's focus on strengthening resilience through climate finance and climate diplomacy, the OSCE's model of regional and local cooperation on environmental and climate security, and NATO's crisis management capacities are not mutually exclusive, and their possible synergies could be further explored, especially in relation to partner countries in Europe and neighbouring regions. Further qualitative research on policy learning across these organizations might lead to a better understanding of where the limits and possibilities lie in terms of interorganizational cooperation in the field of climate security. It would be naive to assume that policy learning across these organizations would always be effortless since bureaucratic inertia or political sensitivities might hamper such processes. However, to what extent this is the case is ultimately an empirical question.

It is crucial that member states and partners to all three organizations sharpen their climate-security related priorities regarding what they want the various EU, OSCE and NATO agendas to focus on

Climate security as a field of international cooperation has developed rapidly in recent years and the organizations are still seeking to define their roles. As a result, it is crucial that member states and partners to all three organizations sharpen their climate-security related priorities regarding what they want the various EU, OSCE and NATO agendas to focus on. For example, should the EU devote resources to integrate climate risk assessments in its early warning systems? If so, what can EU member states do to help advance this aim? Should the OSCE continue to incorporate climate security into its model of regional cooperation? If so, what can OSCE members do to facilitate it? Should NATO enhance its role in international disaster response as a means to help members and partners adapt to climate change? If so, what can NATO members and partners do to strengthen this cooperation?

Each regional organization has a number of strengths on which the member states can build. The broad scope of EU international efforts makes it well placed to help secure support for the Paris Agreement among developing and neighbouring countries, and in this way EU climate finance and climate diplomacy can be seen as key components in the EU's comprehensive

approach to security. The EU also wields political influence internationally, especially in multilateral organizations, which should be used to the extent that it is possible. The OSCE model of comprehensive security incorporates regional and local cooperation on transnational issues and this seems particularly useful in order to assess and diffuse knowledge on climate security risks in different regions. NATO's long experience of military cooperation and civil emergency planning make it well suited to provide valuable expertise as well as exercises related to how armed forces can contribute to international cooperation on disaster response in the face of natural disasters and extreme weather events.

Even though climate change requires global action, there seems to be much to be gained from a well-measured regional response—and not least from like-minded states in Europe working closely together

In addition to member states developing existing organizational strengths, all three organizations could do more to seek to effectively mitigate climate-related security risks, not least when it comes to enhancing risk assessment capacities, which subsequently can inform the organizations' responses. Furthermore, interorganizational cooperation on climate security should be further strengthened, for example in terms of joint projects and intelligence sharing—and here, the ENVSEC Initiative provides practical lessons.

Finally, the international order is currently experiencing great uncertainty with regard to the future of liberal norms and institutions, not least due to the actions undertaken by the US administration under President Donald J. Trump. In the light of the United Kingdom's decision to leave the EU ('Brexit') and the growing global influence of China, there is a strong incentive for states that value a rules-based international system to seek to strengthen the cooperation with like-minded states within IGOs that can be seen as providing a basis for such a system. Needless to say, the EU, the OSCE and NATO are all important parts of such a rules-based system—despite the current US administration and the uncertainties surrounding Brexit—and even though climate change requires global action, at this point in time, there seems to be much to be gained from a well-measured regional response, and not least from like-minded states in Europe working closely together.

Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DDR	Disaster risk reduction
EADRCC	European-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENVSEC	Environment and Security Initiative
EU	European Union
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council (European Union)
IGOs	Intergovernmental organizations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDCs	Nationally determined contributions
OSCE	Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe
REC	Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework on Climate Change
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS: EU, OSCE AND NATO

NIKLAS BREMBERG

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr Niklas Bremberg (Sweden) is Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and researcher at the Department of Government, Uppsala University.