



# SECURE CITIES: INCLUSIVITY, RESILIENCE AND SAFETY

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## I. Introduction

As the proportion of the population living in cities increases in nearly all countries, and as cities become an increasingly important factor in the economies of those countries, closer attention is being paid to the various roles and responsibilities of city and municipal authorities. Cities are often described as the frontline in the many economic, social, environmental, political and security challenges facing the world. However, a balanced approach must recognize the appropriate division of responsibilities between the local, national and international levels.

In the past, it was states that were mainly responsible for providing security, and they continue to carry the main responsibility today. Some police forces report to city or municipal political leaders, but this is relatively rare and usually confined to the largest cities. Moreover, responsibility for responding to the most serious crimes is usually passed to national forces.

Nonetheless, city and municipal authorities are increasingly examining the role they can play as security providers, not just recipients, as they increase their role in national life. They should not be asked to carry a greater burden than they can manage, however, and the need to tackle new problems and new issues should not undermine the effective implementation of important existing tasks.

There is no universally agreed definition of a city. As McGrahan and Satterthwaite observe, ‘There is an emerging consensus that urbanisation is critically important to international development, but considerable confusion over what urbanisation actually is; whether it is accelerating or slowing; whether it should be encouraged or discouraged; and, more generally, what the responses should be.’<sup>1</sup> However, a number of projects that have tried to measure urbanization agree that there will be more—and bigger—cities in the future. According to the United Nations, the share of the world’s population that lives in cities has grown from 10 per cent in 1900 to well over 50 per cent today. The percentage is expected to approach 70 per cent by 2050.<sup>2</sup>

The movement into the cities is led by young people, who see few opportunities to achieve their aspirations in rural areas. In addition to the

## SUMMARY

● The proportion of the population living in cities is increasing in nearly all countries, and cities are an increasingly important factor in the economies of those countries. As such, the consequences of urbanization will become progressively serious if effective security strategies are not developed.

In the past, states were mainly responsible for providing security, and they continue to have the greatest responsibility today. However, city and municipal authorities are increasingly examining the role they can play. What is needed is an appropriate division of responsibilities between the local, national and international levels.

Key to finding better solutions to current and future problems, and to maximizing the positive potential of cities, is a better understanding of risk—one that is based on the needs of communities.

Drawing on the presentations made at the 2016 Stockholm Security Conference on the theme of ‘Secure Cities’, this SIPRI Insights Paper argues that the successful development of a city requires the elaboration of an integrated urban security strategy based on the three pillars of inclusivity, resilience and safety.

<sup>1</sup> McGranahan, G. and Satterthwaite, D., *Urbanisation Concepts and Trends*, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) Working Report (IIED: London, June 2014).

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision* (United Nations: New York, 2014).



movement from rural areas to towns and cities inside countries, urbanization also involves significant international movement. According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, almost 250 million people were living outside the country of their birth in 2015.<sup>3</sup> Most relocate to cities, which are becoming more diverse as they attract communities of different nationalities, faiths and ethnicities.

Cities account for a growing share of national economies and concentrate wealth. The consultancy firm McKinsey & Co has asserted that 600 cities now constitute the backbone of the world economy.<sup>4</sup> Cities, as much as countries, compete for investment, talent and influence. To compete, cities have to convince investors and inhabitants that they offer a safe and secure environment, where people want to live and invest their resources.

As the importance of cities to national life increases, the consequences will become progressively serious if effective security strategies are not developed. Although an important contributory factor, the security of cities is not limited to the question of effective policing. The security of cities also means the removal of impediments to their development. Cities are expected to be an engine for positive development. Impediments to success include the risk of fragmentation along ethnic, national, religious, sectarian or socio-economic lines. Cooperation and inclusion can transform the safety of urban environments, while also promoting other positive economic effects.

A second impediment is the risk posed by stresses and shocks, either anticipated or unanticipated, and the failure to put in place adequate coping mechanisms in case the worst should happen. The Rockefeller Foundation defines stresses as forces that weaken the fabric of a city on a daily basis and shocks as sudden events with major disruptive effects.<sup>5</sup>

A third impediment is the risk of violence against people or property. Apart from the direct damage caused, urban violence at the low end of the scale can undermine the reputation of a city as a place to invest. At the high end, urban warfare can destroy a city to the extent that recovery will take more than a single generation, if it is possible at all. Removing the impediments to the successful development of a city therefore requires a focus on inclusiveness, resilience and safety as elements of a coherent and integrated urban security strategy.

The cascading effect of a loss of economic competitiveness on employment, services, infrastructure and housing, as well as failures in governance of different kinds leading to unfair or uneven resource allocation and corruption are examples of stresses that can corrode the security of a city over time. High levels of personal violence among citizens, between either individuals or groups, would constitute a further stress factor for a city. If not addressed, such stresses can contribute to fragmentation and a loss of social cohesion, and cities can divide into many small, identity-based communities around factors such as religious or sectarian affiliations and ethnicity. Cities may also reflect a rigid segregation along the socio-economic fault lines.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *International Migration Report, 2015* (United Nations: New York, 2016).

<sup>4</sup> Dobbs, R. et al., *Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities* (McKinsey Global Institute: June 2011).

<sup>5</sup> Ove Arup and Partners and the Rockefeller Foundation, *City Resilience Framework*, City Resilience Index, Apr. 2014, <<http://www.cityresilienceindex.org>>.



Through a process of inclusive and transparent governance, cities can win public trust that resources and services are being provided in a fair and equitable way, and generate a solidarity that increases the likelihood that religious, sectarian, tribal, ideological, gender or racial identities will live shoulder-to-shoulder without becoming fragmented.

In contrast to the long-term, insidious impacts of stresses, shocks are sudden, sharp disruptions—such as extreme weather events, major industrial accidents, infectious disease outbreaks or mass-impact terrorist attacks. Responding to major shocks, whether human-induced or natural, requires preparation of a different kind.

Cities need to prepare so that they are as resilient as possible in the face of either an unexpected shock or a shock that can be foreseen but not prevented. This preparation can reduce the impact of the shock and increase the effectiveness of the response.

Through a combination of regulation, administration, coordination and practical measures, disruption to the life of a city and its inhabitants can be minimized as far as possible. In addition, promoting effective responses to stresses can increase the capacity to withstand shocks and recover from them.

From the brief introduction above, three interrelated themes emerge as elements of urban security: inclusiveness, resilience and safety. Given the diversity of cities, context will be a central factor in determining the appropriate mix of local, regional, national and international policies that can promote urban security. However, the consensus view that cities will increase in political and economic salience means that it will become increasingly important to address the security dimension of urbanization.

This SIPRI Insights Paper draws on the presentations made at the 2016 Stockholm Security Conference on the theme of ‘Secure Cities’ (see box 1). While informed and inspired by the information and insights provided by participants in their presentations at the dedicated sessions at the conference, responsibility for its content rests with the author.

## II. United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 11: a global framework for discussing the changing role of cities

On 25 September 2015 the member states of the UN adopted a set of goals to be applied as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. One of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed then was to make cities ‘inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’ (SDG 11). Like the other goals that make up the overall package, SDG 11 has specific targets to be achieved over the next 15 years.

Measuring the implementation of SDG 11 will be a challenge, partly because of the absence of a standard UN definition of a city. Countries take different approaches to defining the terms ‘urban’ and ‘urban population’. In addition, while some define cities using administrative or political boundaries, others define cities as urban areas with certain shared characteristics, such as various kinds of infrastructure, or use population size or population density.

Across cities there are also differences in the way various phenomena such as slums or areas of improvised housing are defined. India is perhaps

**Box 1. The 2016 Stockholm Security Conference: Secure Cities**

The Stockholm Security Conference on the theme of ‘Secure Cities’ was held on 14–16 September 2016. Co-hosted by SIPRI, the Swedish Riksdag and Stockholm’s City Council it brought together 197 participants in a wide-ranging discussion in order to understand how cities have succeeded in creating a more secure environment for their residents, and to identify the new challenges that cities are facing. The conference was opened in the presence of His Majesty King Carl XVI Gustav and the broad range of participants included policymakers, ministers, international and non-governmental organizations, representatives from industry, media, academia and civil society, and other key stakeholders.

The nine main sessions were:

1. Making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable: implementing United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 11.
2. Promoting safe and secure public spaces: security at mass public events.
3. Police strategies, technologies and instruments.
4. Gender, resources and violence.
5. An Aleppo city case study.
6. Counterterrorism.
7. Strengthening the resilience of vulnerable communities.
8. Reducing gang violence.
9. Combating radicalization.

The conference marked the beginning of a new initiative aimed at identifying and managing some of the world’s most pressing urban security risks. The upcoming 2017 Stockholm Security Conference will be on the theme of ‘Secure Cities in an Insecure World’.

the only country to have a clear and shared understanding of the concept of slums that is also recognized in political and administrative practice.

The lack of an agreed UN definition of a city complicates the development of measurable indicators on a global scale. However, measuring progress in the implementation of SDG 11 is also being resisted politically in some developing countries, linked to concerns that monitoring and evaluation will become a surveillance tool rather than a developmental one.

SDG 11 is perhaps best seen as an overarching political framework within which many initiatives and innovations can be developed and implemented. The success of the SDGs could rest on translating the objectives into everyday practice, embedding indicators of success into development practice, giving people responsibility through collaboration with local, national and global actors, and using community-based activities to help strengthen social cohesion.

**Innovations in implementing SDG 11**

A variety of innovations of relevance to promoting and building security in ways consistent with SDG 11 are being developed and implemented on the ground in different places. One objective of the Stockholm Security Conference was to showcase examples of innovative practice that could be replicated in other contexts.



One such innovation is the use of mobile phones to monitor security in small districts within cities—an initiative that has had interesting results in Costa Rica. Mobile phones are promoting collaboration between security personnel (the police) and the inhabitants of a neighbourhood. This is an inclusive form of community security through which citizens are directly involved in policing their own neighbourhood. In addition to surveillance cameras, the community uses various social media and mobile phone apps to register their security-related concerns in real time. Inhabitants use their mobile phones to film crimes and share information with the police.

One prerequisite for this framework to work effectively is educating citizens about their own security and how they can take responsibility for promoting it. While criminals can hide from the police, it is harder for them to hide from neighbours who take photographs and send them to the police. Citizen engagement in initiatives of this kind depends on building trust between the police and the community so they can work together in a preventative way without fear of negative consequences. One of the mechanisms that reinforces this trust is a process by which the police report back to communities on the results of their shared efforts in monthly reports.

Scholars are using new approaches to develop innovative methodologies for measuring social cohesion in cities. One methodological approach developed by the Jakobs University in Bremen uses the Social Cohesion Radar, an instrument designed by the Bertelsmann Foundation, to establish which dimension of social cohesion plays an important role in a specific community. This can be horizontal, the strength of the relationship between communities and the level of solidarity; or vertical, the degree to which communities feel connected to institutions or trust institutions.

The Jakobs University study found a positive correlation between stronger social cohesion and levels of trust, and that increased wealth correlates strongly with social cohesion, provided that wealth distribution is broadly even.<sup>6</sup> The evidence does not support the theory that increased diversity necessarily increases tensions within a community, but the current methodology should now be applied at a more local level to examine the effects of heterogeneity on social cohesion on a smaller scale. There are likely to be important differences between how social cohesion is perceived at the level of regional and local communities, and the different ways to identify and measure social cohesion need to be tailored to what is relevant at each level.

Innovation also extends to the process of revising the policies and practices implemented by key institutions, such as the police. In the United States, cities are exploring different ways to change the relationship between the police and local communities. While respecting the continuing need for police forces to investigate and solve crimes, experience from work on violence in Boston highlights that a sole focus on solving cases is not sufficient. A more comprehensive focus on how institutions are structured and how they perform is also needed.

The work in Boston sought to provide evidence-based support for enhancing the relationship between police strategies and community strategies

<sup>6</sup> Walkenhorst, P., 'Social cohesion: measuring common ground', Bertelsmann Stiftung, Global Economic Symposium, Kuala Lumpur, 6–8 Sep. 2014.

**Box 2.** The 10 essentials for making cities resilient to disaster

1. Organize for resilience.
2. Identify, understand and use current and future risk scenarios.
3. Strengthen the financial capacity for resilience.
4. Pursue resilient urban development and design.
5. Safeguard natural buffers to enhance the protective functions offered by natural ecosystems.
6. Strengthen institutional capacity for resilience.
7. Understand and strengthen societal capacity for resilience.
8. Increase infrastructure resilience.
9. Ensure effective preparedness and response.
10. Expedite recovery and build back better.

Source: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), *How To Make Cities More Resilient: A Handbook For Local Government Leaders* (UNISDR: Geneva, Mar. 2012)

to ensure that policing responds to community demand, and developing policies on, and mechanisms for, deterrence. To succeed, such mechanisms require multiple elements. Providing offenders with a fair process, and not focusing exclusively on increasing the severity of penalties, is an important element. Another is to minimize the risks to, and prevent reprisals against, individuals and community actors who step forward to provide information on crimes and criminal behaviour.

To summarize, the SDGs provide a framework for action but these agreed, universal objectives need to be made effective at the local level by adapting them to their contexts. At the same time, there is a lot of scope for collecting and cataloguing initiatives that have been developed in one location and have the potential to be applied successfully elsewhere.

Such ideas will only take root if they are sensitive to cultural diversity. A lot of local creativity is being channelled into projects to adapt technology to local needs. Important areas of future activity will include piloting key aspects of innovation in different contexts, mapping and translating theory into practice using smaller district trials, and then reproducing these experiences on a larger scale.

### III. Building resilience in cities

The salience of urban resilience as a political issue has increased progressively in response to incidents and events, but also in response to the growing concern over the impact of future development on the climate and on the environment. As the discussion on resilience has progressed, it has become clear that there is not yet a clear consensus around how to define it, or what it means for different actors.

The Making Cities Resilient Campaign, launched in 2010 and facilitated by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), has promoted a structured approach to increasing resilience to disasters. The campaign has devised 10 essential elements to urban disaster resilience (see box 2).

The results of the Making Cities Resilient Campaign were subsequently embedded in the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,



2015–2030. While the Sendai Framework is an intergovernmental process that establishes resilience at the national level, the incorporation of the campaign underlines the importance of responding to the trend towards urbanization.

A networked dialogue in Europe and North America has helped to promote a good understanding of the roles and responsibilities of different authorities. The role of actors other than emergency responders in connection with resilience, however, has been less fully explored.

There is an increasingly fruitful discourse around resilience. The emphasis on preparedness has been complemented with closer attention to response in conditions where the needs of people affected by a disaster outstrip the help available. One feature has been to balance the emphasis on technical aspects with greater attention to the human dimension, recognizing that in recent disasters neighbours have been among the first to respond.

It is increasingly acknowledged that the social functions of society are a key part of disaster response, and their capacities should be reinforced. For example, neighbourhood initiatives can inventory the skills of residents and where they can be found in an emergency. The voluntary offers of temporary shelter made through social media have been taken up by companies that have incorporated a disaster response element into their online booking interfaces.

In some ways, the process of building resilience has become more difficult as cities and societies have become more complex and diverse, but also perhaps more integrated through shared infrastructure. Going back three decades, a sense of security in a community relied more on the collective relationship and being able to work better together. Today, in Europe and North America, there might be a tendency to think that the primary responsibility to respond to stresses and shocks lies with the public authorities and administrative systems. Rather than assuming that they exist, the plethora of stakeholders gives rise to a need to pay specific attention to promoting and building the human elements of resilience—a collaborative approach, person-to-person contact and communication, and individuals building trust and working out together what models are appropriate in a given context and how to make them work.

Measuring the different aspects of resilience is separate from identifying the pathways to more resilient communities. Developing better methods for measuring risk, assessing different and diverse risks against each other, and quantifying the cost of risk mitigation are all important. Some private sector actors, such as insurance companies, understand and quantify risk as a core task of their business model.

Cities and states should budget for disaster risk reduction and mitigation as part of their normal procedures, rather than through a separate process. It is important to understand how to take relevant factors into account when constructing budgets for city and local government. The factors can be highly diverse. Identifying all of them and understanding who sets the baseline for measurable indicators on providing the necessary services, building capacities and monitoring effective implementation are all critical functions.

If they are to make informed choices, it will also be important for communities to have a structured method for understanding their degree of risk.



While not everything can be measured, some aspects can be tracked and analysed. If the focus is placed on needs as opposed to risk—identifying what cities and communities are most likely to require—this raises additional questions about how to track progress.

The approach to planning and preparedness used in cities such as Chicago is worth examining more closely. A central element of the response to major events is the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC), which was created to bring a range of key services under one roof.

The OEMC has responsibility for providing: traffic management services; public safety information technology, including a data terminal for the police comprising up to 25 000 mobile devices and 29 000 closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras; homeland security-related planning; and the emergency services. This arrangement provides a broad view of how services are requested and provided, which facilitates planning and improved preparedness. The systematic combination of these actors facilitates not only the adoption of a strategic approach, but also day-to-day contact, joined up procedures and a common culture among services that must work effectively together in concrete scenarios. In addition, it also brings with it a high level of economies of scale.

The focus on resilience has helped Chicago plan and deliver better services by bringing a range of new partners into a dialogue with the city authorities. The OEMC has also benefited from being a participant in the Rockefeller Foundation initiative on resilient cities, which gives it privileged access to technology research.

In Baltimore, the starting point for thinking about resilience was a process to identify all the issues of major concern, ranging in diversity from drug abuse to shark attacks or the consequences of discrimination compounded by past poor policies. This approach links resilience to a particular context by determining in more detail what is important in any particular situation, who is concerned by which issue and how different issues affect different communities and individuals.

At the community level, vulnerability is a function of who wants or needs which kinds of capabilities. Levels of vulnerability will also vary in different parts of the community. In some parts, citizens have significant resources of their own that they can apply when faced with problems. Other parts may be extremely vulnerable to a shock of some kind and highly dependent on the response of the authorities. At the individual level, people will be extremely vulnerable if they live ‘on the edge’, for example, without insurance or significant personal savings and assets.

In a world of many human-induced hazards, balancing the resources devoted to risk mitigation in a fair way is seen as a lens for all planning, and for the implementation of resilience measures. To be seen to be acting in a fair and impartial way, public authorities must learn to be good listeners, and to be effective at connecting communities with what they need quickly and effectively in particular conditions.

The approach in Sweden illustrates how the understanding of resilience is now seen as a wider concept than the ability to ‘bounce back’. Introducing adaptations and changes that influence future outcomes has become a central element of thinking about resilience. Resilience is not just about restoring things to the pre-shock status quo, but a key element in planning for the





future to be better. Seen from this perspective, resilience is understood as the ability of a community to adapt, accommodate and change.

To implement this approach, Swedish services look at resilience as a process rather than an emergency response. In such an approach, continuous proactive work must be undertaken based on risk assessment. During a shock, resilience is understood as the ability to identify pathways that use available capabilities to turn what could be a catastrophe into an opportunity for positive change. After the shock has been contained and addressed, there is a need to identify what could have been done differently to enhance the positive outcome. The ideas and recommendations derived from that assessment then need to be applied in a proactive way when planning and deploying services.

Seen in this light, building resilience is a continuous effort, which means it cannot be separated out and viewed as a discrete project. Instead, the necessary capacities and capabilities must be built into the relevant services and mechanisms at the local, national and international levels to ensure continuity into an indefinite future.

Existing budget processes and methods of risk assessment should therefore incorporate measures to strengthen resilience. Rather than trying to establish a separate ‘resilience account’, problems are being framed in ways that require budgets and policies to be integrated in a new way.

After levels of taxation have been set and the scale of available resources is known, the opportunities to bring about change depend on planning. Deriving multiple benefits from different policies without having to budget for each separately will require problems to be framed in a way that embeds resilience into the day-to-day activities of a wide range of agencies and departments.

Agencies will only pool resources if they understand how they will receive a return on their investment. Therefore, defining risk—and agreeing on what is at risk—requires an alignment of interests that can help different actors better understand the practical benefits of cooperation.

Thinking of capacity also means planning for times when the available resources do not correspond with the need. Community engagement and finding more effective ways to bring in the private sector, civil society and the voluntary or third sector will be needed in order to increase capacity.

Solidarity around social equity is an important factor in enabling priority action to safeguard particularly vulnerable communities, some of which have been disadvantaged for an extended period. The vulnerable are the ones who are likely to be hit the hardest, but they also have strengths and capacities. They need to be listened to in order to understand what they need, but also what they can provide within society.

Building effective communication strategies with vulnerable communities—which may also be among the most marginalized—presents significant challenges. The message matters but the messenger and the way the message is delivered matter more. The messenger must be trusted in a marginalized community, and the message must promote social equity. There is an important political dimension in that issues identified as a priority by elected officials are more likely to receive sustained engagement from public authorities.



#### IV. Resources, gender and violence

A shared finding from research in different locations is that there is often a heightened level of violence in marginalized communities. An important factor in marginalization is the definition of citizenship—and who is eligible to become a citizen. There are many cases where people who are born in a country still face the most basic forms of discrimination in finding employment, in the workplace or in gaining access to housing, utilities and services.

Marginalized communities are often excluded from decision making, and only learn about decisions that have a direct impact on them at the point when the policies are being implemented. Where communities have no opportunities to participate in consultative or democratic processes, the likelihood of violence increases.

There are a multitude of linkages between marginalization in resource allocation and service delivery, on the one hand, and urban violence, on the other. Many policies are also poor in terms of gender sensitivity. There is a tendency to elaborate distinctive policies that separate men and women—but this does nothing to protect women from the diverse sources and forms of violence directed against them. Instead of elaborating separate policies, addressing the relation between men and women should be a priority.

In understanding the gender dimension of urban violence, a starting point should be to clarify the kind of violence and the constraints on the choices of individuals. Women are not a homogenous social group, and clarity about the target group is essential to understanding the gender dimension of urban violence. Research can help to promote understanding if it pinpoints which women are vulnerable to which forms of violence without losing its emphasis on inclusiveness and effectiveness.

How gender roles intersect with gender violence can be a complex issue. For example, public violence and private or domestic violence against women lie on a continuum in the sense that, for example, when access to some basic resources, such as water, is restricted, this can create conditions of frustration that increase the likelihood of domestic violence.

Research was conducted in Beirut to identify the kinds and sources of violence in the community. It focused on unequal access to water and sanitation services, violence against women, and the role of young men in alleged terrorism. The results of a dialogue with a reference group, 50 per cent of which were men and 50 per cent women, underlined that insecure livelihoods were the principal threat factor for both genders. The research itself was a positive experience in the context of Beirut because it promoted an open debate about issues of great concern to the community. When women were given an opportunity to participate on the same basis as men, they quickly became fully engaged with the programme and much more active in the discussion. Inclusion on an equal basis produced better results and had a positive impact on project delivery.

An assessment of projects in Zimbabwe suggests that although women have access to the political sphere, this does not necessarily translate into adequate responses to the problems that women face regarding fair and adequate access to resources. The main challenge there is promoting a better understanding of the situation for women, and why it requires changes in policy.



In Zimbabwe, women could not access townships freely during colonial rule. Nearly 40 years after independence, they remain marginalized. They still lack access to resources in spite of being more present in the townships. Gaining access to resources and utilities is now a priority issue for civil society organizations working in the space provided by social media.

Technology is an enabler and the positive impact of technology transfer from north to south, including its effect on job creation and the empowerment of communities, needs to be understood in greater detail. However, in relation to gender equality, empirical evidence from projects being implemented by the Swedish Programme for Information and Communication Technologies in Developing Regions (SPIDER), implemented by Stockholm University, suggests that technology can also exacerbate existing practices and amplify inequalities. In terms of mobile phones and use of social media, for example, men often use such platforms as instruments of social control or to victimize women. This gender dimension needs to be understood in greater depth, including the importance of different cultural backgrounds and contexts in the process. At the same time, initiatives that promote fair and equal access to technology—including education on the opportunities that modern technology can offer and how to make use of them— need to include a gender dimension.

The evidence from research projects suggests that promoting participation and encouraging participants to take ownership of the information collected by researchers leads to better and more usable results. Research design should strive for widespread inclusion, and explore approaches that increase the involvement of women. Participatory research can enlarge the space for women to express themselves, especially in contexts where their access is restricted by other processes. This can help to build capacity.

Given the multiple stakeholders in any crisis in a city, an effective communication strategy will be an important element of resilience for responsible authorities. The questions of how to understand and communicate risk, and how to frame crises are areas where there are still significant knowledge gaps in different societies. The way in which messages are communicated can have a decisive impact on whether and how people can be brought into a common framework in the preparatory phase, or during and after an emergency.

There is an increasing focus on how to use digital technology, including social media, as part of an effective communications strategy. However, while the technology is increasingly available, it is still the case that half the population in developed societies either does not have access to social media or chooses not to use it. Furthermore, any role for messaging through a medium such as Facebook must take account of the way information is created and shared within peer groups. Information shared in this way tends to be reinforced as true. This means that there is not only growing pressure for early communication in a crisis, but also a growing imperative to only pass on information that is accurate.

## V. Safe and secure public spaces

Cities use events to profile themselves as part of their branding and to compete successfully with each other. Events generate revenue and a city that



demonstrates that it can host a range of activities successfully is more likely to be seen as dynamic and creative. More and more public events take place in cities—especially in the summer—as part of this wider effort by cities to profile and promote themselves as important meeting places and hubs for international as well as national engagement.

These events are in diverse fields such as the arts, sports, music and exhibitions of various kinds. There might also be major political events such as conferences or summits, global professional gatherings in fields such as science or medicine, or commercial events.

To have its desired impact, a mass gathering or public event will require adequate security preparedness. However, a security response that is proportionate to the risk will depend to a certain extent on the culture of a city. The risks associated with mass gatherings are not assessed in the same way even across an integrated region such as Europe.

The risk spectrum covers low-probability, high-impact events such as a terrorist attack to high-probability, low-impact events such as petty crime targeting the participants at an event. Digital technology now also plays a role in thinking about risk and risk mitigation. Potential cyber threats to mass events are taken seriously. At the same time, digital simulations and digital forms of communication are being used to engage the public in thinking about the different aspects of safety and security.

The sensitivity to risk has increased around major events because there have been an unacceptable number of incidents. For example, attacks on police officers were anticipated during the recent Olympic games in Rio, and a plan to reduce risk was put in place, but four Brazilian police officers were murdered during the event. In another example, a French police officer and his partner were murdered during the European football championships in a politically motivated attack intended to achieve maximum publicity. These kinds of incidents have changed the risk thresholds for major events, and increased the scale of investment by public and private security actors.

A successful security strategy means raising awareness without scaring people. The security response must be designed in a way that does not deter public participation in an event, which would defeat the purpose of organizing it. The language of health and safety might therefore be more appropriate than the language of, for example, counterterrorism.

Risk is now thought about as a process that is not static, but continually evolving. A risk mitigation strategy or plan is not something that can be established once and for all time, but something to be embedded in procedures that adapt to changing conditions. Promoting security at mass gatherings is not limited to the event itself, or its location, but must take account of travel to a site, the site itself and travel from the site.

Thinking about risk and how to manage it is closely linked to the nature of the event. Different kinds of mass gatherings raise different questions and pose different kinds of problems. Mass gatherings might take place in a predictable location at regular intervals. Providing security at an airport or large shopping mall, or at a regularly scheduled sporting event would fall into this category, since it is known that large numbers of people will congregate in the same place at a known time. In such cases there can be investment in permanent, fixed equipment and infrastructure, and routines



can be embedded in the work practices of public and private sector security providers.

A second type of mass gathering might be held at a predictable location, but at irregular intervals. Many major sporting events, such as an Olympic Games or a Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup, fall into this category. A temporary security operation implemented at this kind of mass gathering will need to be appropriate to the specific context. The investment in equipment and infrastructure is likely to be temporary, and the engagement of security providers scaled to the nature and size of the event, which might mean going beyond their normal working procedures.

A third kind of mass gathering might take place in open, public spaces that do not provide the same context for a security operation. For example, if many people gather to celebrate a public holiday, at a music festival or at a political demonstration, they may well be in a city square or in a park where there are few, if any, dedicated security measures in place on a routine basis.

Risk assessments need to be based on a dialogue with the site owners and event organizers in order to understand both the site and the event, and consider the ways in which the site could be vulnerable given the specific features of the event. In cooperation with security advisers, a security improvement plan should reduce vulnerabilities to the extent possible, in proportion to the threat that exists.

From a generic point of view, a security response needs three elements. First, the objective has to be agreed, that is, what the security operation is expected to achieve and—since risk can never be eliminated—the acceptable level of risk.

Second, the operational procedures needed to match risks and responses must be agreed. To manage and mitigate risk during mass gatherings, a multi-agency response team will need to find a common language across the public, private and third sectors, as well as the academic community. The different actors will all have a part to play, but they will all look at the problems through a different lens. This requires trust within the group that the other partners know what is needed and will deliver what is expected of them. Trust is also an enabler of information sharing.

Third, the need for physical hardware, such as cameras, sensors and crowd barriers, and who is responsible for providing and paying for it must be agreed. The resource issue can often be the biggest impediment to effective security at mass gatherings. Where the event organizer is a small or medium-sized company, there is often a reluctance to invest significant resources even where a security plan has been agreed, so compliance must be monitored.

Below this generic level, the value of general models and approaches as opposed to tailored responses is the subject of debate. There has been a tendency to customize responses to specific events, but there is now more momentum behind efforts to monitor, evaluate and learn from events in order to generate approaches that can be applied more generally. At the same time, there are many context-specific factors that can limit the usefulness of generic approaches. One example is the use of CCTV cameras, which are ubiquitous in some cities but very difficult to install in others because of different attitudes to privacy and data protection.



Centres of excellence could be one way to promote best practices and common understanding of security at mass events. There is always an intention to understand and spread good practice, but experience suggests this is difficult to sustain beyond the short-term focus on a particular event. Sharing knowledge internationally from one event to another is a big challenge, even though the same problems tend to recur in different places around the world.

There have been some noteworthy attempts to introduce harmonized approaches. At the national level, there have been efforts in the United Kingdom to standardize to the extent possible the approach taken by police counterterrorism advisers across the country to mass gatherings. In Italy, a formal structure links different police forces in a committee at the national level to exchange information and coordinate action related to mass gatherings. Italy is carefully examining recent events, such as the use of the army to augment the protection of critical sites. The army has no law enforcement authority, but can be deployed at the perimeter of crowded areas and in other potentially high-risk areas during a mass gathering, so that police resources can be available in increased numbers closer to the heart of the event.

Project Stadia is a Qatar-funded initiative established by Interpol in 2012. It has two objectives: (a) to put in place the security arrangements for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, which will be held in Qatar; and (b) to create a Centre of Excellence that will help the member countries of Interpol plan and execute security preparations for major sporting events.

Linking the law enforcement communities internationally is already a major challenge, but building a framework that involves all the relevant stakeholders is a huge task. To keep good practices alive, they must be embedded in institutions rather than discrete projects. Project Stadia is an opportunity to develop and share best practice on how to link the many stakeholders, both local and international, that need to work together to deliver safe mass events.

When providing security at mass gatherings the balance of responsibility has tilted from full reliance on public security actors to a more mixed effort, where both public and private sector security firms have key roles. All event staff, as well as police and law enforcement officers, need to have the relevant skills to identify a threat and understand the procedures to follow in response to it. During the coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, for example, a bomber was denied access to an international football match at the Stade de France by a private sector security officer who was well trained, motivated to do his job, and performed his duties effectively in a pressure situation.

### **The role of the built environment**

The need to engage major players such as investors, developers, construction companies, tenants and residents in thinking about protection in a proactive, rather than a reactive, way is increasingly understood. Thinking about when, where and how security measures will be needed in a built environment during planning and construction is much cheaper than retrofitting measures to a built site. However, while safety plans for events such as a fire are always an important design element in the built environment, a structured approach to security is less common.



Embedding a security approach into the built environment will mean that conflicts between the interests of different stakeholders must be resolved. For example, when designing built areas in ways that can mitigate the impact of climate change, there is an emphasis on encouraging the use of different kinds of glass in construction. In the discourse on security, however, the message is to discourage the use of glass, or to use types of laminate that defeat the aims of climate change mitigation.

The issue of resources is often a critical factor in thinking about the security features of the built environment. To keep down costs there is often a reluctance to pay for providing security. It is tempting to define security as the responsibility of the police and forces of law enforcement, and assume that those actors will carry the cost.

A major current project in Sydney to renovate and develop a waterfront site is worth highlighting because security factors are being embedded in the project. One element is a major strategic communications exercise with the owners, tenants and residents in the area to develop a common understanding of risk, and the implications of different kinds of risks. This will lay the foundations for the investment that will be needed to produce and implement a security strategy that all agree is proportionate.

This approach reinforces the view that communication is most effective if it is brought back to the features of a site or event, rather than focused on generic threats such as terrorism. A focus on reducing vulnerabilities that could be exploited is more understandable to a wider spectrum of actors, and this increases their willingness to engage in the dialogue. The focus of attention is then placed on protective security rather than prevention, because participants and the community have to be protected against a range of potential risks.

## VI. Reducing urban violence

Exploring and trying to understand the different kinds of violence that cities are exposed to is worth a significant investment of time and effort.

### **Urban warfare**

The fragmentation of violence has changed the nature of armed conflict. First, it is not uncommon for multiple armed actors to be fighting in the same location. The dynamic of conflict may not be fighting between two warring parties or, where there are multiple parties, between tightly aligned groups of allies within a unified common command structure. Instead, multiple conflicts may take place contemporaneously in the same location, with alliances of convenience that shift according to changing conditions.

Second, the identity of the warring parties may be diverse. It is relatively rare for modern conflict to be restricted to clashes between the organized armed forces of states at the external perimeter of states. Conflict often involves fighting between a variety of different kinds of state and non-state armed actors, and non-state actors may include groups with political or criminal motivations.

The combination of advanced surveillance technology and highly accurate weapons has made armed forces that operate in open terrain extremely

vulnerable. To reduce this vulnerability, it has become common for forces that consider themselves technologically inferior to station themselves close to, or among, civilian populations.

Cities are a natural place of concealment for forces that cannot defend themselves against attacks from modern weapons. However, urban warfare creates new and different challenges for armed forces. In carrying out its most basic combat tasks in a city—to locate the enemy force, bring it to combat and destroy it—an armed force will put civilian populations at risk. These risks include injury and death from armed attack, but also the risk that the destruction of infrastructure and loss of essential services will have fatal consequences.

The siege and urban warfare in Aleppo, Syria, is a tragic case in point. It illustrates the impact on civilian populations that are both under direct attack and deprived of basic resources and services such as electricity, water, food and medical care. The legal and practical challenges facing international organizations and non-governmental actors that are trying to deliver humanitarian relief have become a more central focus of attention.

### **Counterterrorism**

Cities have become key targets for groups that use violence for political means in terrorist attacks. Cities in open societies are extremely vulnerable to terrorist acts because open spaces and mass gatherings are difficult to protect. The evolving nature of terrorism, including that carried out by individuals or small cells, needs to be better understood.

A focus on ‘radicalization’ as a root cause of politically motivated violence is problematic. Framing programmes as engagement to help vulnerable individuals escape exploitation may have a greater chance of success than language focused on counter-radicalization.

Experience in the field suggests that problems are less likely to be resolved by focusing on the ideology of individuals or groups, and that programmes to prevent and mitigate violent extremism are more likely to succeed where people are encouraged to pursue non-violence. This is not to suggest that attempts to justify violence on ideological or religious grounds should be ignored, since both ideology and religion are abused to legitimize violent extremism. However, the main priority is preventing violence—first and foremost, through efforts at the local level.

Efforts to mitigate violent extremism need inputs from a wide range of disciplines, and they need engagement from different kinds of agencies, institutions and actors. City and municipal authorities are well placed to facilitate communication and cooperation between local actors, including both civil society and non-governmental actors with direct connections to target groups or individuals.

Evidence-based findings on which methodologies and approaches are most effective at reducing violent extremism are scarce. Few studies provide detailed analysis of trends and patterns. Most build on anecdotal data from a limited number of interviews. The data that is available focuses either on people who have been convicted of offences or those who self-identify as





militants willing to use violence.<sup>7</sup> It is more difficult to assess who could be vulnerable to recruitment into extremism. This hampers evidence-based assessments of the potential scale of the problem, whether it is increasing and whether the types of people that are being recruited in different places have any common characteristics.

The role of government in fostering violent extremism has been highlighted as a particular factor of concern, since a state has resources and instruments at its disposal to promote violent extremism that might overwhelm the capacity of local actors to counter it.

Effective responses to terrorist attacks can be improved significantly by implementing strategies that are well understood. A key factor in training for the police and the military is ensuring that response routines are well rehearsed and regularly exercised. The need for training and rehearsal applies to the people on the ground who are carrying out their areas of responsibility and those at the higher command levels. If those at the higher level are only coming together when a major incident occurs, the whole process will 'creak' hugely.

A greater response challenge is to develop an effective strategy for information sharing and communication with the public. While raising awareness is crucial, there is also a need to strike a balance and avoid scaring people unnecessarily. Communities that are terrified about imminent terrorist attacks may modify their behaviour in ways that help terrorist groups achieve their goals.

Tackling terrorism requires building trust with relevant communities, and this can only be achieved through effective and open processes of information sharing. This also applies in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack. There is a high demand for authoritative, real-time information after an attack, while rumours and false information can spread very quickly in the digital and social media. The need for a rapid response has to be balanced against the need for accuracy, and there is no right or wrong answer to where the balance lies.

#### *Attacks by individuals acting alone*

The validity of the 'lone-wolf terrorist' concept is the subject of considerable discussion and debate, and the usefulness of the term is much contested. There is no consensus on either a single definition or its validity. Furthermore, the concept appears to merge several phenomena: (a) individual mass murderers with political aims, but without ties to or the support of a larger organization; (b) acts by individuals that are inspired by a terrorist organization but not ordered by it, although the action may be claimed in retrospect; and (c) attacks by individuals as a tactic by terrorist organizations in order to blur the relationship or wholly distance the attacker from the organization, protect others involved or hinder investigations.

Attacks by individuals come without warning, which makes a shift to lone-wolf attacks a dangerous threat even though coordinated attacks can have a higher level of sophistication and are likely to be more destructive. However,

<sup>7</sup> A useful survey of different efforts to sort identified violent extremists into various classifications is Borum, R., 'Radicalization into violent extremism II: a review of conceptual models and empirical research', *Journal of Strategic Security*, vol. 4, no. 4 (Winter 2011), pp. 37–62.

**Box 3. The 12 enablers of crime and terrorism**

1. Criminal use of the Internet.
2. Money laundering.
3. Availability of weapons.
4. Vulnerable borders.
5. Abuse of legitimate reasons to remain in a foreign country.
6. Corruption of public servants.
7. Prisoner networks formed during custodial sentences.
8. Activities of foreign national offenders.
9. Fraud against private individuals.
10. Trafficking in commercial goods (e.g. vehicles, alcohol).
11. Trafficking in illegal goods (e.g. drugs, weapons).
12. Trafficking in people (e.g. people smuggling, modern slavery).

Source: British National Crime Agency (NCA), *National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2015* (NCA: London, 23 June 2015).

there is no consensus on whether individuals acting alone, even if influenced by more organized groups, constitute a new frontline in terrorism, and little authoritative evidence to support the notion that we are currently experiencing a major shift in terrorist tactics.

Greater emphasis on protection and a strong role for community-based initiatives can be key in both preventing and responding to attacks by individuals. From a policing standpoint, better protection, including a focus on making access to weapons more difficult, can also contribute to more effective prevention, as can training key actors at the local level to recognize the signs of violent extremism. The knowledge to recognize changes in individual behaviour that may indicate a growing risk of violent extremism is needed by education, welfare and social services, and medical professionals, as well as the police. These approaches tend to emphasize combining counterterrorism and anti-crime operations at the local level, since criminal gangs and terrorist groups often recruit from among the same pool of individuals.

There are similarities between the methods for tackling terrorism and other crimes, such as organized crime and sexual exploitation. The 12 enablers of terrorism are the same as those for organized crime, which suggests that effective responses to crime should be applicable to terrorism (see box 3). Different authorities are often charged with law enforcement and counterterrorism, and the approach to secrecy can create unnecessary barriers to information sharing.

The police and security services are becoming more adept at sharing information without disclosing their sources, and there is an increased understanding of the need to convert intelligence information into evidence that can be used in legal processes.

From a policing perspective, dealing with attacks by individuals introduces new difficulties and new opportunities for prevention and investigation. There is a greater emphasis on making use of 'soft facts' rather than technical monitoring and surveillance methods, and in particular information provided at the community or even family level. Uncovering changes in pat-



terns of behaviour or in the content of communication with people around them such as family, friends and colleagues, should be central to prevention. A key common concern is how to work with communities to extract relevant information.

The next stage in counterterrorism has a lot in common with evolving thinking about preventing violent crime—early identification of the people who are susceptible to recruitment into criminal gangs or who may move towards a terrorist environment. Countering attacks by individuals will depend on finding ways to expand the scope of cooperation so that anyone in a relevant community who can make best or constructive use of information will be given access to it. This will mean finding effective ways of communication between the security services, law enforcement authorities and a large number of other actors that have a role to play in reducing urban violence.

The process of creating a shared understanding and practical cooperation across a broad spectrum of highly diverse actors is still in its infancy. To give one example, the criminalization of various terrorist-related activities can make it harder for the authorities to develop cooperation with individuals who have travelled to conflict zones but returned home without engaging in any violent acts. A major source of information about people contemplating travelling abroad but who have not yet done so is their immediate friends and family. These people will be less willing to give the police information if it involves their friend or relation being charged with a criminal offence.

Ensuring that international, national and local initiatives do not contradict each other is important. For example, the criminalization of membership of particular organizations, or any act that can be seen as preparatory to terrorism, is often in response to UN Security Council resolutions that call on states to adjust their national laws.

## **Gang violence**

A point of departure for the discussion on gang violence is that gangs emerge in conditions of chaos, and thrive where there is a breakdown in established order and authority. Young people in marginalized communities may see the police as part of the problem, because they are an arm of the state and the public authorities that have let them down. Where background conditions exist that are characterized by, for example, high levels of unemployment, poor housing, high levels of petty crime and a sense that things are out of control, sooner or later gangs will emerge as a means of establishing a certain kind of order. In a chaotic situation, there is a tendency to organize in subcultures as a defensive mechanism.

Gangs are inevitably violent: it is part of their rationale and an important part of the ways and means in which they operate. Gang violence can be focused. For example, violence is the way in which different gangs compete for control of territory, or control over criminal activities. It is also the instrument that enforces discipline within gangs. However, gang violence can also be chaotic. When gang violence spills over, it can have an impact on the general public or the law enforcement community through collateral deaths and injuries or as a result of police shootings.



The degree to which gang violence represents a threat to the security of a city varies in relation to the access gang members have to weapons of different kinds. Access to heavy weapons, such as automatic firearms, will increase the risk of escalation and the destructive impact of violence when it occurs.

The political side of the response to gang violence needs to be kept in focus. Elected officials and political leaders need to have the confidence to tackle the problems in areas for which they have responsibility. Any tendency to downplay the fact that there is a serious problem with criminal gangs, or a refusal to highlight the problems in order to protect the brand of a city, can hamper effective action against gang violence. If political leaders only act when the situation becomes so critical that it cannot be ignored, they will have missed opportunities to act effectively.

Political leaders are likely to be better equipped to recognize and evaluate the seriousness of the problem of gang violence if they reflect and represent the diversity of a community or society in all its aspects, including its gender, social, ethnic and faith dimensions. Even where police efforts to solve specific crimes are successful, political leadership is critical to ensuring that public spaces are used to bring people together safely while respecting their identity, and in the promotion of social cohesion.

There is also a close connection between political engagement and the issue of resources. Developing long-term strategies to lift a priority area out of its current state is difficult to combine with a political cycle that demands results within a two-year time frame. In conditions where resources are tight, there can be a knock-on effect on activities, and a tendency to draw in initiatives that really need to be sustained over time and projected outwards. Where there is an effort to combine budgets, there will be inter-agency issues around the benefits to each agency of pooling resources. Managing the resources needed for effective action requires strong political engagement.

At the operational level there can be a tendency to see combating gang violence as police business. However, the gang-related violence that leads to a police investigation and a police intervention is recognized as being connected to a web of issues such as social deprivation, exclusion and marginalization, lack of affordable housing, lack of access to education, dysfunctional family circumstances, and drug or substance abuse, among other things.

Convicting people and punishing them, including sending them to prison, is necessary where crimes have been committed, but it does not solve the problem of a semi-organized structure that will simply replace one member taken out of circulation by the prison system with another. Experience suggests that a key factor in successful efforts to reduce gang violence is to combine different efforts to find the most effective path away from potential engagement in crime for vulnerable individuals. The groups of people that are on the cusp of crime, such as young people most vulnerable to being recruited into criminality and violence, are often well known to social services and to organizations in the third sector, while also being subject to a degree of monitoring by the police and law enforcement agencies.

Solutions to the problems of gang violence require partnerships between multiple actors. Local and municipal authorities are well placed to facilitate cooperation and communication between: (a) elected officials; (b) the



various services operated by local and city government, such as social services, family services and schools; (c) the police; (d) charities, including children's charities; (e) civil society and the third sector; (f) community groups, including faith-based organizations; (g) families, in particular the mothers of both victims and perpetrators of violence; and (h) various experts and advisers.

Many mechanisms that may have been used already—such as social services, family services, education and interventions by civil society—often fail to connect with or include the people who should be the highest priority in outreach. The earlier interventions can begin, the better—starting with creating good citizens by taking action from birth and in preschool.

Establishing a shared understanding of the type of gang problem that a city is facing is a priority for the different stakeholders, since if they are based on a false understanding, some proposed solutions could be counterproductive and help gangs to build themselves more effectively. The influence of territorial gangs, crime families, or sectarian or ethnic gangs can change over time, so these problems will need to be kept under constant review. For example, in many parts of major cities in Northern Europe, outlaw motorcycle clubs have been displaced by street gangs, which are more territorial, more violent and less structured.

In understanding the problems posed by gang violence, the key metric is the degree of organization and engagement of gangs in criminal enterprises, not the branding or identification of the gangs as political or religious.

The police cannot provide a durable solution to the problems of gang violence, but they must handle the effects. Restoration of order is the first priority, so that people who live in priority areas feel something is being done. In areas where criminal gangs operate, there are issues with extortion of local businesses and the control of illegal markets, but also higher rates of murder and assault. There is an imperative to establish police control, and law and order. It is crucial that the police earn the confidence of the people who live in the areas where gangs operate by demonstrating that they are able to exert a degree of control. The ability to tackle and solve cases is therefore an essential requirement, but effective police work is more difficult in priority areas because of the difficulties of information collection and securing witness testimony.

Where there is popular resistance to gang violence, there is a responsibility to give it effective support. When people challenge gang activity they put themselves at risk, so witnesses must be protected and the people who come forward to help challenge gangs have to see results in the form of successful investigations, prosecutions and fitting punishments. Otherwise, if they see no results, the public will quickly stop supporting the police by providing information and testimony.

## VII. Conclusions

This SIPRI Insights Paper has argued that the successful development of a city requires the elaboration of an integrated urban security strategy based on the three pillars of inclusivity, resilience and safety.

A better understanding of risk is an important part of finding better solutions to current and future problems, and to maximizing the positive

potential of cities. Understanding risk should be based on the needs of the community. Values and community norms are not static, however, so there is a need for processes that support positive change on a continuing basis rather than security initiatives that are limited in duration.

While recognizing the diversity of cities across the world, many already have structures and systems in place that can play an essential role in security building. At the local level there are already ways and means to: (a) support education, including preschool education; (b) provide social services, family services and local health care; (c) interact with civil society in areas such as culture, sport and the arts; and (d) design public transportation networks and so on.

Before establishing new, dedicated programmes focused on security that will not necessarily be easy to connect within existing structures, and that might be difficult to sustain over time, the responsible officers in cities should first examine how their existing system can be used to address identified concerns. An inventory of existing assets and how to use them is the starting point for building protection strategies and systems.

There is a great need to better understand the security aspects of urbanization. There are existing networks that link the officials responsible for many relevant aspects of urban security. These networks can provide valuable information about risks and challenges, good practices in responding to identified problems and lessons learned from past successes and failures. However, to make full use of the information generated by such networks, the wealth of relevant knowledge and experience held by diverse experts and practitioners needs to be brought together in both research and policy.

There is no network linking researchers who are active in investigating the different dimensions of urban security, or working in disciplines and fields of direct relevance. For example, bringing together research on violent extremism, mass-impact terrorism and gang-related violence could be the starting point for developing a more coherent and integrated strategy to combat urban violence. Understanding the security of cities is a new area for academic research, and the development of urban security as a separate discipline poses problems concerning the availability of both theory and data.

The recognition that isolation and segregation can be side effects of recent strategies to promote economic and social development could promote more widespread engagement on developing the tools to measure social cohesion. As these efforts to construct social cohesion indexes of different kinds in different locations bear fruit, their results can be applied to the analysis of urban security.

Theories of urban security are lacking, with the possible exception of work on 'global' or 'mega' cities which might not be applicable everywhere, given the great diversity of cities in size and context. Theories developed in other contexts could be applied to analyses of cities, as a starting point for working towards general theories of urban security. To offer two examples, both ontological security theory and social network theory might be promising approaches to explore.

Ontological security is an emerging field that seeks to explain how individuals respond when rapid change disrupts their individual sense of



order and continuity. Social network theory maps the ‘nodes’ in connected networks and explores how information flows between them.

In addition to theoretical approaches to urban security, there is a need to develop more and better data sets keyed to the specific situation of cities. For example, while instruments to measure social cohesion have been developed, data sets need to be populated and the measurement tools need to be fine-tuned to specific urban contexts.

While the creation of a Centre for Urban Security might be premature, the modern instruments for communication and network-based research could facilitate a dedicated initiative to link relevant and interested researchers at relatively low cost.

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# SECURE CITIES: INCLUSIVITY, RESILIENCE AND SAFETY

IAN ANTHONY

## CONTENTS

I. Introduction	1
II. United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 11: a global framework for discussing the changing role of cities	3
Innovations in implementing SDG 11	4
III. Building resilience in cities	6
IV. Resources, gender and violence	10
V. Safe and secure public spaces	11
The role of the built environment	14
VI. Reducing urban violence	15
Urban warfare	15
Counterterrorism	16
Gang violence	19
VII. Conclusions	21
Box 1. The 2016 Stockholm Security Conference: Secure Cities	4
Box 2. The 10 essentials for making cities resilient to disaster	6
Box 3. The 12 enablers of crime and terrorism	18

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