

Dutch arms export policy in 2015

Report on the export of military goods
from the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs

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1. Introduction

The present report on Dutch arms export policy in 2015 is the 19th annual report drawn up in accordance with the policy memorandum on greater transparency in the reporting procedure on exports of military goods of 27 February 1998 (Parliamentary Paper 22 054, no. 30). The report comprises:

- a profile of the Dutch defence and security-related industry;
- an overview of the principles and procedures of Dutch arms export policy;
- a description of developments relating to transparency;
- a description of developments within the EU relevant to Dutch arms export policy;
- a summary of the role and significance of the Wassenaar Arrangement;
- a description of developments relating to dual-use goods;
- a description of efforts in the field of arms control, with specific reference to the issue of small arms and light weapons.

Annexe 1 to the report lists the values of export licences issued in 2015 by category of military goods and by country of final destination. *Annexe 2* shows the trend in Dutch arms exports for the period 2006-2015. *Annexe 3* provides an overview of licences worth over €2 million issued for dual-use items with a military end use. *Annexe 4* contains an overview of licences issued for the transit of military goods to third countries. *Annexe 5* lists the denial notifications issued by the Netherlands to EU partners. These notifications are shared among partners in accordance with article 4 of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, formerly the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. *Annexe 6* provides an overview of the sale of surplus defence equipment in 2015. *Annexe 7* lists the government's letters to and responses to written questions from the House of Representatives concerning Dutch arms export policy in 2015. Finally, *Annexe 8* contains letters from the government to the House of Representatives that constitute expedited notification of several high-value licences.

2. The Dutch defence and security-related industry

With very few exceptions, the Dutch defence and security-related industry consists mostly of civil enterprises and research institutions with divisions specialising in military production and services. This sector is characterised by high-tech production, frequent innovation and a highly educated workforce. As the domestic market is limited, the industry focuses strongly on exports, which account for no less than 68% of turnover.

The 651 companies that make up this industry provide 24,800 jobs in the Netherlands, 32% of which are in research and development (R&D). Almost two-thirds of the people employed in the Dutch

defence and security-related industry are qualified at HBO (higher professional education) level or above, compared with 28% of the Dutch workforce as a whole. The sector is of great economic importance owing to its strong innovative capability. Its development of advanced knowledge and its product innovations form a source of military spin-offs and civilian spillovers. By working closely with the various elements of the Defence organisation, the sector also contributes directly to the operational deployability of the Dutch armed forces, and by extension it enhances the standing and effectiveness of the Netherlands' contributions to international missions.

Based on the operational interests and requirements of the Defence organisation, the government's policy is aimed at positioning the Netherlands' defence and security-related industry and knowledge institutions in such a way that they are able to make a high-quality contribution to Dutch security. This will also enhance their competitiveness in the European and international markets and within supply chains. To this end, Dutch companies are involved in national military tenders either directly or, where possible, indirectly through industrial participation. This policy is described in the Defence Industry Strategy (DIS) that was presented to the House of Representatives in December 2013.¹

Because the domestic market is too small to support the available expertise, the government also encourages the Dutch defence and security-related industry to participate in international cooperation in the field of defence equipment. This has led to the establishment of commercial relationships with enterprises from various other countries, including Germany, the US, the UK and Belgium. This also involves joint commitments relating to systems maintenance and subsequent delivery of components. Cooperation also plays an important role in supplying to third countries. The scope for Dutch companies to enter into long-term international cooperative arrangements therefore depends in part on the transparency and consistency of Dutch arms export policy.

The government regards the export activities of the defence and security-related industry as a prerequisite for preserving the Netherlands' knowledge base in this area. This does not alter the fact that limits must be imposed on these activities in the interests of strengthening the international rule of law and promoting peace and security. The government believes that, within these limits, the sector should be allowed to meet other countries' legitimate requirements for defence equipment. In light of these circumstances, the Dutch defence and security-related industry has pursued a policy of increasing specialisation. Companies that focus on exporting military products mostly manufacture high-tech components and subsystems. However, the maritime sector remains able to carry out all production stages from the drawing board to the launch, thus contributing to Netherlands' export of complete weapon systems.

¹ House of Representatives, 2013-2014, 31 125, no. 20: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31125-20.html>.

The most recent quantitative data on the defence and security-related industry was made available in 2016 on a voluntary basis by the companies concerned in the context of a study carried out by Triarii at the request of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and was communicated to the House of Representatives by letter of 28 April 2016.²

Table 1: The Dutch defence and security-related industry in figures

Number of companies	651
Defence and security-related turnover in 2014	€4.54 billion
Defence and security-related turnover as a percentage of total turnover	15%
Value of defence and security-related exports in 2014	€3.09 billion
Number of jobs in the defence and security-related industry	24,800
Number of those jobs in the field of R&D	7,995

Source: Triarii 2016

As mentioned above, the Dutch defence and security-related industry comprises 651 companies. That number has risen sharply over the past few years as a result of an increase in the number of jobs related to IT and services. The sector consists largely of small and medium-sized enterprises that generally operate in the supply chains for the major defence companies in Europe and the United States. In this context, it is important to note that the goods and services which the Dutch sector supplies to domestic and foreign buyers comprise more than just the goods and technology that require an export licence under the Strategic Goods (Import and Export) Decree. This explains the potential discrepancy between the above-mentioned value of defence and security-related exports and the total value of export licences issued.

In 2014, Dutch military production and services accounted for an estimated total turnover of €4.54 billion. This represents an average share of approximately 15% of the total turnover of the companies and organisations concerned. Most of them therefore focus primarily on developing their civilian activities, and only a few concentrate almost exclusively on the defence market. Military exports account for approximately €3 billion of the total exports of the Netherlands' defence and security-related industry. The companies are confident about their competitiveness, and they expect they will continue to grow in the coming years.

² House of Representatives, 2015-2016, 31 125, annexe 739 187.

3. Instruments and procedures of Dutch arms export policy

Export licences for military goods are issued on the basis of the General Customs Act (*Algemene Douanewet*) and the associated export control regulations. Companies or persons wishing to export goods or technology that appear on the Common Military List of the European Union³ must apply to the Central Import and Export Office (CDIU) for an export licence. The CDIU is part of the Groningen branch of the Tax and Customs Administration, which in turn falls under the Ministry of Finance. On matters relating to military export licences, which are issued on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, it receives its instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In principle, licence applications for the export of military goods to NATO and EU member states and countries on a similar footing (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland) are processed by the CDIU, on the basis of a procedure formulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the year under review, an exception to this rule applied to Cyprus and Turkey. Applications for exports to these two countries – and all other countries – are submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for decision. In order to verify the compatibility of such applications with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, which defines the EU's common rules for the export of military technology and equipment, the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation seeks foreign policy guidance from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This guidance plays a key role in the final decision on whether or not to issue an export licence. In the case of applications for exports to developing countries that appear on the DAC list of ODA recipients,⁴ the Minister of Foreign Affairs consults with the Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS).

In the case of licence applications for the export of surplus military equipment of the Dutch armed forces, the Minister of Defence notifies the House of Representatives in advance and, if necessary, on a confidential basis. The disposal of such equipment is subject to the regular licensing procedure, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assesses these transactions against the criteria of Dutch arms export policy, just as it does in the case of commercial export transactions.

Transit

Following an amendment to the Import and Export Act in 2001, the classification and assessment procedures of Dutch arms export policy can in certain cases be extended to the transit of military goods through Dutch territory. These transit control procedures have since undergone a number of modifications. Until 30 June 2012, companies seeking to forward military goods to or from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland or an EU or NATO member state via the Netherlands were only subject to a reporting requirement. Since 1 July 2012, this reporting requirement has been replaced by a licensing requirement in cases where a transit shipment to or from one of the aforementioned

³ Official Journal of the European Union No. C107 of 9 April 2014, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/NL/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2014:107:FULL&from=EN>.

⁴ A list of countries that receive official development assistance (ODA), drawn up by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

countries is transshipped in the Netherlands. This applies, for example, when a shipment is transferred from a ship to a train, but also when goods are transferred from one aircraft to another. If no goods are transshipped, transit shipments to or from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland or an EU or NATO member state are subject only to a reporting requirement. The authorities use these reports to build up a picture of the nature and volume of military goods that pass through the Netherlands in transit. On the basis of this information, moreover, they can decide to impose a licensing requirement on a transit shipment that would not normally be subject to such a requirement. This may happen, for example, if there are indications that the country of origin did not check the goods or if the stated destination of a shipment appears to change during transit. Transit shipments to and from countries other than those mentioned above are always subject to mandatory licensing.

4. Principles of Dutch arms export policy

Licence applications for the export of military equipment are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the eight criteria of Dutch arms export policy, with due regard for the nature of the product, the country of final destination and the end user. These eight criteria were initially defined by the European Councils of Luxembourg (1991) and Lisbon (1992) and were subsequently incorporated in the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998). On 8 December 2008 the Council of the European Union decided to transform the 10-year-old Code of Conduct into Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.⁵ The criteria read as follows:

1. Respect for the international obligations and commitments of member states, in particular the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.
2. Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law.
3. The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.
4. Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.
5. National security of the member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a member state, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.

⁵ Official Journal of the European Union No. L 335 of 13 December 2008, pp. 99ff., available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:335:0099:0103:EN:PDF>.

6. Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.
7. Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.
8. Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.

The above-mentioned criteria, along with the mechanism for information sharing, notification and consultation that applies when a country is considering an export licence application for a destination for which another member state has previously denied a similar application, continue to form the basis of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. However, the transformation of the Code of Conduct into the Common Position has also broadened its scope. Brokering, transit, intangible forms of technology transfer and production licences have been brought within the ambit of the Common Position in cases where they are subject to mandatory licensing in a member state.

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Iceland, Montenegro and Norway have officially endorsed the criteria and principles of the Common Position. In addition, Norway shares information regarding licence application denials with the EU.

It goes without saying that the Netherlands fully observes all arms embargoes imposed by the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU. An up-to-date overview of national measures implementing UN and EU sanctions, including arms embargoes, is available on the government's internet portal.⁶ In addition to the information that appears in this overview, it should be noted that an OSCE embargo against 'forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area' has been in force since 1992, in accordance with a decision of the Committee of Senior Officials – the predecessor of the Senior Council – of 28 February 1992.

⁶ <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/internationale-vrede-en-veiligheid/sancties>. Due to the online availability of up-to-date information on this issue, the present annual report no longer contains an annexe listing arms embargoes in force during the year under review.

5. Transparency in Dutch arms export policy

The Netherlands maintains a high level of transparency in its arms export policy. The government publishes information on licences issued in annual reports and online monthly summaries; most other countries only issue annual reports, which are often more general in nature. In accordance with an undertaking given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs during a debate on the foreign affairs budget in December 1997, the government presented its policy memorandum on greater transparency in the reporting procedure on exports of military goods to the House of Representatives in February 1998 (Parliamentary Papers, 22 054, no. 30). The present report concerning 2015 is the 19th public report on this subject to have appeared since that time. It is based on the value of the licences issued by category of military goods and by country of final destination. To further enhance the transparency of the figures, the categories of goods are specified for each country of destination. For the purpose of illustrating the overall trend, the consolidated figures for 2015 and the figures for the first and second half of 2015 are all presented separately. Information on Dutch licence denials reported to EU partners in the framework of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP has also been included (see Annexe 5).

In addition to the present report on Dutch exports of military goods in 2015, information on Dutch arms export policy is also available through other sources. For instance, the CDIU has published a [User Guide on Strategic Goods and Services](#) online. This user guide is designed for individuals, companies and organisations with a professional interest in the procedures governing the import and export of strategic goods. It contains information on the relevant policy objectives and statutory provisions and procedures, as well as a wealth of practical information. The user guide, which is regularly updated in the light of national and international developments, is thus a valuable tool for increasing awareness of this specific policy area.

The government's internet portal also contains other information on the export and transit of strategic goods, such as the present annual report, important information on all licences issued for the export of military goods and monthly summaries containing key data on the transit of military goods through Dutch territory. This data is derived from notifications submitted to the CDIU under the reporting requirement for such transit shipments. The portal also contains monthly summaries of all licences issued for military goods and all licences issued for dual-use goods. As in recent years, data on transit licences issued has been included in the present annual report (Annexe 4). More and more countries are starting to publish public annual reports, but thanks to its provision of data on licence application denials and monthly summaries the Netherlands is still at the forefront when it comes to transparency.

Since 2012, the government has notified the House of Representatives about new licences for the permanent export of complete systems worth over €2 million to countries other than Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and EU or NATO member states within two weeks of deciding to issue them.

These notifications, which may or may not be confidential, are accompanied by an explanatory note. In 2015 the government submitted five such notifications. The relevant letters appear in Annexe 8.

6. Dutch arms exports in 2015

The total value of licences issued in 2015 was €872.60 million. This is considerably less than the previous year, when the figure was €2,065.35 million. The following table provides a regional breakdown of licences issued in 2015.

Table 2: Regional breakdown of licences issued in 2015

Region	Value of licences issued (in € millions)	Share of total (%)
North Africa	3.27	0.38%
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.59	0.18%
North America	151.46	17.34%
Central America and the Caribbean	0.22	0.03%
South America	33.50	3.85%
Central Asia	0.02	0.00%
Northeast Asia	76.84	8.80%
Southeast Asia	42.21	4.84%
South Asia	5.09	0.58%
European Union	167.37	19.15%
Other European countries	16.40	1.88%
Middle East	167.37	18.15%
Oceania	15.86	1.82%
Other EU/NATO+	200.49	23.00%
< 10,000	0.02	0.00%
Total	872.60	100.0%

The breakdown into regions in this table is the same as in the EU's annual reports on arms export control, which can be found on the EU website.⁷

Among the top five countries of final destination in terms of total export licence values, EU/NATO+ takes first place with a value of over €200 million. This includes general licences which allow the

⁷ http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm

supply of components for – mainly – military aircraft and military vehicles to several allied countries, in particular EU member states, NATO partners, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland. It also includes a general licence worth €30 million for the supply of missile canisters (which serve as both shipping and storage containers and launch tubes) for Patriot Advanced Capability air defence missiles (PAC-3). Second is the United States (over €149 million), mainly with licences for suppliers to military aircraft manufacturers, including a licence worth almost €66 million for wiring for the F-35 fighter aircraft. Third is the United Arab Emirates (just over €72 million), with almost all of the amount relating to a licence for the supply of parts of patrol vessels to be built in Romania. Fourth is Germany (more than €65 million), but it should be noted that more than half of the reported amount in fact represents an administrative value. As in previous years, the Ministry of Defence was issued a licence for the export of surplus and unserviceable ammunition (large and small calibre) which the Ministry has destroyed in Germany through the intervention of the NATO Support Agency. The ammunition has an administrative value, but does not represent 'income' for the Ministry of Defence. Fifth is Estonia (nearly €39 million), and there too the Ministry of Defence is by far the largest exporter, due to the sale of surplus CV90 combat vehicles. The same is true for Finland, which comes in sixth place (nearly €38 million). That amount is almost entirely related to a licence for the Ministry of Defence to supply a second batch of surplus Leopard 2 tanks, for which a contract was signed in January 2014.

As is often the case, the Netherlands' export of military goods in 2015 consisted mainly of components. However, two licences were issued that year for major system deliveries with non-allies as the country of final destination, specifically: radar and C3 systems for corvettes to be built in France for the Egyptian navy (€34 million) and AB-412 Search & Rescue helicopters for the Peruvian navy (more than €10 million). The government informed the House of Representatives of these system deliveries, and three smaller deliveries, through the accelerated notification procedure. The same goes for two disposal deliveries by the Ministry of Defence to Jordan (military vehicles and air-to-ground missiles, nearly €5 million each) and the delivery of a training system for operating communications equipment for the Omani navy (nearly €3 million). The relevant letters appear in Annexe 8.

The total value of export licences for military goods accounted for 0.20% of the total value of Dutch exports in 2015 (€425.6 billion). To put this percentage in an international perspective, it is important to note that both the Dutch private sector and the Dutch government are subject to mandatory licensing for the export of military goods. Only the equipment of Dutch military units that is sent abroad for exercises or international operations is exempt from mandatory export licensing. Unlike in some other countries, the sale of surplus defence equipment to third countries is thus included in the figures for the Netherlands.

7. EU cooperation

EU cooperation on export controls for conventional weapons takes place mainly in the Council Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM). Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs participate in COARM meetings on behalf of the Netherlands. In COARM, member states share information on their arms export policies in the framework of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and seek to better coordinate those policies and the relevant procedures. In so doing, they promote policy harmonisation and work towards creating a level playing field. The above-mentioned activities are based on Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, which was adopted by the Council on 8 December 2008.⁸

The COARM meetings in 2015 focused chiefly on preparations for the first Conference of States Parties (Cancún, August 2015) and the first Extraordinary Conference of States Parties to the UN Arms Trade Treaty (February 2016). In addition, as in previous years and at the request of the Netherlands and others, COARM discussed several specific destinations and the resulting exchange of information contributed to a more focused export policy. In 2015 the Netherlands continued to push for further harmonisation between EU member states as regards the implementation of arms export policy. For instance, the government has worked to harmonise EU member states' policies with regard to the export of demilitarised army trucks.⁹ There was insufficient support for this, however, and no consensus. The Netherlands has therefore pursued its own policy independently.

Greater transparency between member states with regard to licence denials is part of this process, as are efforts to promote the sharing of information on licences issued in respect of certain sensitive destinations. For additional details on the Netherlands' recent initiatives and aims regarding the further harmonisation of EU arms export policy, please refer to the letter to parliament of 3 July 2014 (Parliamentary Paper 22054, no. 249), the government's response to the private members' policy proposal by MPs Sjoerd Sjoerdsma and Michiel Servaes entitled 'Arms and Principles: Ambitions for a credible and harmonised European arms export policy' of 23 April 2015 (Parliamentary Paper 34103 no. 3) and the subsequent discussion of 7 September 2015.

The Netherlands is pleased that the online EU denial system for military goods and dual-use goods with military end use became operational in mid-2016. The Netherlands contributed to the test phase of this system. In the very near future (second half of 2016) consultations will also take place via this database instead of through diplomatic channels. EU member states are required to consult each other when one state is processing an application that is similar to one that another EU member state has

⁸ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:335:0099:0103:nl:PDF>

⁹ Parliamentary Papers 2015-2016, 22 054, no. 267.

already denied. It is expected that the EU denial database will make it easier for member states to consult each other and respond to consultations.

On 4 May 2016 the EU published its 17th annual report¹⁰ on activities undertaken by the EU and its member states in the framework of the implementation of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, which includes an overview of the subjects discussed in COARM. The report also contains detailed statistical data on exports of military equipment by the EU member states in 2014. The Netherlands regrets the late publication of the report and will continue to press for earlier publication this year. For each country of destination it provides information on the exporting country, the number and value of licences issued and licence denials. The information is classified according to the categories in the Common Military List and is also set out per region and worldwide.

Since exports in support of international missions (UN missions) in embargoed countries often raise questions, the report includes separate tables summarising exports to such missions. Finally, it lists the number of brokering licences issued and denied and the number of consultations initiated and received by EU partners.

In 2014 the total value of export licences issued by EU member states was €98.4 billion. France was the largest exporter, accounting for €73.3 billion. It should be noted, however, that France has changed its licensing system, as a result of which licences for potential orders are now also included in the total. Actual exports will therefore amount to a significantly lower total.

The Netherlands was in seventh place in the EU, with €2.1 billion. The following table lists the total value of licences issued in 2013 by country, as well as each country's share of the total. It should be noted that Greece and Cyprus did not provide any data.

European arms exports in 2014

Country	Value of licences issued (in € millions)	Share of total (%)
France	€73,297.26	74.3%
Belgium	€4,512.86	4.6%
Germany	€3,973.80	4.0%
Spain	€3,666.40	3.7%
Italy	€2,650.99	2.7%
United Kingdom	€2,585.63	2.6%
Netherlands	€2,065.31	2.1%
Poland	€919.83	0.90%

¹⁰ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2016:163:TOC>

Austria	€902.87	0.9%
Bulgaria	€827.80	0.8%
Sweden	€511.46	0.5%
Czech Republic	€500.53	0.5%
Croatia	€482.10	0.5%
Hungary	€432.42	0.4%
Slovakia	€267.88	0.3%
Portugal	€254.71	0.26%
Romania	€249.17	0.25%
Finland	€226.75	0.23%
Denmark	€146.80	0.15%
Ireland	€86.22	0.09%
Lithuania	€15.30	0.02%
Luxembourg	€10.14	0.01%
Slovenia	€9.79	0.01%
Malta	€8.64	0.01%
Estonia	€3.91	0.00%
Latvia	€2.60	0.00%
Total	€98,400.45¹¹	100.00%

The EU's annual report further indicates that member states issued a total of 42,449 licences and that 346 licence applications were denied and reported. The number of licence denials is lower than the average of previous years, but higher than last year (2013: 300, 2012: 408, 2011: 402, 2010: 400, 2009: 406, 2008: 329, 2007: 425). The number of consultations between EU member states regarding licence denials was 146.

In 2015 the Netherlands was involved in a total of 10 consultations. Seven of these were initiated by the Netherlands, and on three occasions the Netherlands was consulted by other member states.

8. The Wassenaar Arrangement

At the broader multilateral level, developments in the field of arms exports are discussed in the framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA). In the year under review, 41 countries, including the United States, Russia and all EU member states with the exception of Cyprus, participated in this forum, which owes its name to the town where the negotiations to establish the arrangement were conducted, under the

¹¹ The EU reports contains a small calculation error: the correct total is €98,611.18 million.

chairmanship of the Netherlands.¹² It is estimated that these countries jointly account for over 90% of global military exports.

The aim of the WA, as stated in the 'Initial Elements',¹³ is to contribute to regional and international security and stability. This is achieved through regular information sharing on the export to third countries of arms and goods that can be used for military ends. The ultimate goal is to promote greater knowledge and a stronger sense of responsibility in the national assessment of licence applications for the export of such goods. After all, more information will enable the participating states to assess more accurately whether the build-up of military resources is having a destabilising effect in certain countries or regions. If so, they should exercise greater restraint when considering licence applications for these destinations.

In addition to a list of dual-use goods that applies to the Netherlands on the basis of the EU Dual-Use Regulation, the Wassenaar Arrangement maintains a list of military goods that are to be subject to export controls. Any revision of the WA list results in the amendment of the EU Common Military List and the control list of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. As regards Dutch export controls on military goods, the Strategic Goods Implementing Regulations refer directly to the most recent EU Common Military List. The same applies to export controls on dual-use goods.

In line with its mandate and with a view to ensuring effectiveness and support, the Expert Group of the Wassenaar Arrangement continued its regular consultation in 2015 on updating the list of controlled military and dual-use goods. The group discussed including various emerging technologies with military potential and the removal of technologies that are either no longer critical or widely available. 'Scope-neutral interpretations' of control texts were also discussed.

The results – various changes across the controlled categories – were put to the Plenary Meeting in December 2015, which adopted them. Some of the issues discussed proved relevant, but at this stage did not lead to consensus in the Export Group.

Further information on the best practice guidelines, the WA's principles and goals and current developments is available on the WA's website at: <http://www.wassenaar.org>. This website also grants access to the organisation's public documents.

¹² In 2015 only Cyprus was not yet a member due to Turkish objections.

¹³ The 'Initial Elements' can be consulted on the website of the Wassenaar Arrangement, at <http://www.wassenaar.org>.<http://www.wassenaar.org/>

9. Export controls on dual-use goods

This section briefly examines the main policy principles and key developments in the relevant export control regimes and the EU Council Working Party on Dual-Use Goods.

Council Working Party on Dual-Use Goods

The European Commission is expected to make proposals in autumn 2016 for amendments to the Dual-Use Regulation. Preparations were made to this end in 2015. A public consultation was held, the Swedish SIPRI institute and Ecorys from the Netherlands collected factual information and in late 2015 a stakeholder forum was held, chaired by the Commission and the Luxembourg Presidency. The results are described on the website of the Commission's Trade Directorate-General.¹⁴ On 24 December 2015 the new goods annex to the Dual Use Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the European Union.¹⁵ The individual export control regimes are responsible for maintaining their own goods lists, which are then combined by the European Commission to form Annex I to the Regulation. Lastly, in 2015 the Netherlands continued to draw attention to the further harmonisation of export control policy in order to create a level playing field, and press for better controls on surveillance technology that could be used to violate human rights.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

At its plenary meeting in Bariloche (Argentina) in June 2015, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a group that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, discussed matters including the expected membership request from India and nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan. The United States delegation said it expected a decision on Indian membership to be made at the NSG's plenary session in 2016. The Netherlands stated it would like to see evidence of India's commitment to the principles of non-proliferation, and this statement was well received. Many members, including the EU and the US, had questions about the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan. The Chinese delegation said that the cooperation was within the parameters of the China's NSG accession treaty.

In May 2016, India submitted an NSG membership request and hoped to be admitted at the annual plenary session in Seoul in June. However, several members first want to conduct an internal debate on the membership requirements for non-NPT countries.

As was the case at the 2014 plenary session, the subject of adherence was also on the agenda. Adherence means that a non-member implements the NSG guidelines unilaterally. A country cannot derive any rights from such a unilateral decision – this would require agreements with the NSG – but the NSG does acknowledge that adherents require information in order to correctly implement the

¹⁴ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/tradoc_152858.pdf

¹⁵ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/january/tradoc_154129.2015-2420.pdf

NSG guidelines, for instance on updates of control lists. Various forms of outreach can be useful in this respect, for instance briefing adherents after NSG meetings, holding individual meetings with the chair or with the troika (previous, incumbent and next chair). All members consider it important to encourage supplier states to declare themselves adherents. Many members are reticent, however, about encouraging adherents by giving them special rights, because adherence makes no distinction between intent and compliance.

The NSG also discussed the concept of *de minimis* (small quantities of materials that the NSG should not have to be concerned about) and drew up a table of various materials which in small quantities cannot be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. At the Netherlands' urging, it was confirmed that this table is intended only for decisions on licences and not for updating the control lists.

Lastly, formalising amendments to the dual-use guidelines, as proposed by the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, was postponed until 2016, as was the decision on the paper by the United Kingdom on government assurances.

Australia Group

The Australia Group (AG), which seeks to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, met in Perth (Australia) in 2015, to mark the 30th anniversary of the export control regime. As part of the outreach programme, in 2015 a dialogue was started with six non-members, to share best practices on export control. For the first time this dialogue coincided with the plenary sessions, to foster direct contact between the non-members and the group. Kazakhstan became the first non-member to officially implement the guidelines of the Australia Group. Other non-member countries are called on to implement the AG's export control lists too and to confirm their commitment in writing. The outreach programme also focuses on strengthening the catch-all instrument and on international cooperation with the industry and academia. The countries will share information on these subjects and impress their importance on non-members. In addition, the regime reviews the control lists every year and keeps abreast of new technologies. The members agreed to step up their efforts with regard to non-tangible transfer of technology. In the final declaration of its plenary session, the Australia Group underscored the importance of eradicating chemical weapons, prompted in part by the attacks using these weapons on civilians in Syria. The AG called on Syria to fully comply with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. At the same time, the Australia Group expressed its concern about the activities currently taking place in the Middle East and North Korea. Addressing the plenary session, the Australian foreign minister emphasised the Australia Group's important role in combating the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) combats the proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, such as ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles. Its members pursue a common line of policy and maintain a jointly agreed control list of goods that

are subject to export controls. The list is reviewed regularly, most recently in March 2016. In October 2015, the Netherlands and Luxembourg took over chairmanship of the regime from Norway at the plenary session in Rotterdam. One of the priorities of this joint MTCR chairmanship, led by ambassador Piet de Klerk, was to improve the regime's effectiveness. In addition to various policy initiatives, a start was made on modernising the MTCR's public website (www.mtcr.info). Visits were made to various non-MTCR partners under the joint Netherlands-Luxembourg chairmanship, mainly with a view to gaining support for and fostering better understanding of the MTCR. During these visits, recent developments were also discussed with regard to the MTCR and the export control systems of the countries visited. At a separate meeting in Luxembourg in early 2016, the export control authorities of several non-partner countries were informed of recent list amendments.

On 27 June 2016, India's accession to the MTCR was formalised. India became the regime's 35th partner, and as of that moment it has been entitled to take part in all the regime's meetings and other activities, such as outreach missions.

All three export control regimes – the NSG, the AG and the MTCR – have addressed the issues of brokering and transit. Partly on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 1540, states must operate effective export controls, including controls on transit and brokering. The EU member states have already fulfilled their obligations in this regard by amending the 2009 EU Dual-Use Regulation. The regimes are also discussing the possible accession of new members and unilateral compliance with guidance documents and goods lists by non-partner countries.

10. Arms control

There are various current issues in the area of arms control that are relevant to arms export policy.

Cluster munitions

On 23 February 2011 the Netherlands ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which accordingly entered into force for our country on 1 August 2011. As of June 2016, 100 states are party to the convention and 19 other countries have signed but not yet ratified it. A ban prohibiting financial institutions from investing directly in cluster munitions has been in force in the Netherlands since 1 January 2013.¹⁶

The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross have described the convention as a new norm of international humanitarian law. The Dutch

¹⁶ See: <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2012/03/21/kamerbrief-over-uitwerking-van-het-verbod-op-directe-investeringen-in-clustermunitie.html> (in Dutch).

government endorses this view and is actively committed to the Convention. For instance, in 2016 the Netherlands will chair the Meeting of States Parties, to be held in Geneva from 5 to 7 September. In that role, the Netherlands will endeavour to involve other countries in the convention and help strengthen the norm of non-use of cluster munitions. It does this through the usual multilateral forums, including the UN General Assembly. At meetings of the parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Netherlands has condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria and called the parties' attention to reports of the alleged use of cluster munitions in Libya, Ukraine, Sudan and Yemen.

Landmines

In June 2014, the Third Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the Ottawa Convention) took place in Maputo, Mozambique. The Netherlands was closely involved in this review conference, as one of the Friends of the Chair (Mozambique). It played an important role in the negotiations on the agreement that all States Parties will comply with their obligations under the Convention by 2025.

A Committee on Cooperative Compliance was established at the conference, consisting of Algeria, Canada, Chile and the Netherlands. The committee's aim is to discuss with countries which do not comply with the Convention what specific steps they can take to improve their compliance. The Netherlands is currently also active in the committee on the enhancement of cooperation and assistance. Together with Switzerland, Mexico and Uganda, it is looking at how cooperation with countries can be enhanced with a view to achieving the implementation goals for 2025.

In 2015, as in previous years, the Netherlands spent approximately €15 million on demining projects around the world, funding humanitarian mine action NGOs and UNMAS, making it one of the largest donors in this area.

Small arms and light weapons

The Netherlands is strongly committed to preventing the uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and related ammunition. Its efforts are aimed at reducing the numbers of victims of armed violence, armed conflicts and gun crime and increasing security and stability. This is a prerequisite for sustainable development and the attainment of poverty reduction goals.

Tackling SALW-related problems is a key issue in the field of arms control. In recent years it has been dominated by multilateral efforts, on the one hand, and attempts to deal with these problems in the framework of more wide-ranging security projects focusing on civilian security, on the other.

These multilateral efforts have produced numerous international and regional agreements, such as the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (2001) and the Geneva Declaration on

Armed Violence and Development (2006). In 2015 the Netherlands continued to contribute actively to their development and implementation. In doing so it cooperated closely with local and regional NGOs and research institutes in such places as Libya, Central America and Somalia.

- ***UN Programme of Action***

The UN Programme of Action obliges states to pursue active policies in the field of SALW at national, regional and international level. This includes the development and implementation of relevant legislation, the destruction and secure storage of surplus arms and ammunition, improved cooperation between states – for example in relation to marking and tracing illegal arms – and assisting and supporting countries and regions that lack the capacity to implement the measures set out in the programme.

The Netherlands also supports the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR). The purpose of this fund is to help countries sign, ratify and eventually implement the UN Arms Trade Treaty, implement the UN Programme of Action and identify and enhance synergies between these two instruments.

- ***EU***

EU member states report annually on national activities aimed at implementing Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons. These national reports and reports on relevant EU activities are combined in a joint annual report to which the Netherlands contributes every year. In the run-up to the biennial meetings of states parties to the UN Programme of Action, the Netherlands continues to highlight the importance of European cooperation in combating the uncontrolled spread of SALW.

OSCE

The Netherlands supports the efforts of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to tackle the illegal spread and accumulation of SALW and is committed to sharing information on SALW in the framework of the OSCE Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.¹⁷

UN Arms Trade Treaty

In March 2013 the final diplomatic conference on the UN Arms Trade Treaty took place in New York, concluding a preparatory process that started in 2006. A crucial factor is that the treaty obliges states parties to set up an export control system for conventional arms, which will force countries around the world to make responsible decisions regarding the export of military goods that fall under the scope of the treaty. The treaty's assessment criteria are similar to several that already apply under the EU's Common Position on arms exports: compliance with international embargoes, no cooperation in

¹⁷ <http://www.osce.org/fsc/68450>

violations of international humanitarian law, respect for human rights and mitigation of the risk of diversion of conventional arms to the illicit market or for unauthorised use.

The Netherlands played an active role in the negotiations, for example by chairing one of the two subcommittees that formulated the draft text of the treaty. In addition, the government frequently consulted NGOs and the Dutch private sector regarding the Netherlands' objectives for the negotiations. For more information, see the letter to parliament on the UN Arms Trade Treaty.¹⁸

The treaty was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013. It was opened for signature on 3 June 2013, at which time it was signed by the Netherlands and 66 other UN member states. On 25 September 2014 the 50 required ratifications were reached, and the treaty consequently entered into force three months later, on 24 December 2014. Given that the Senate approved the treaty on 9 December 2014, and the Netherlands submitted the instrument of ratification before 24 December 2014, the Netherlands belongs to the first group of countries for which the treaty entered into force. As of 31 May 2016, 130 countries had signed the ATT, 83 of which had also ratified it.

The Netherlands made an active contribution to the first Conference of States Parties on 24-27 August 2015 in Cancún (Mexico) and the first Extraordinary Conference of States Parties on 29 February and 1 March 2016 in Geneva (Switzerland).

The Netherlands submitted its initial ATT report on 11 December 2015 and on 27 May 2016 it submitted the first ATT report on imports and exports in 2015. Both reports have been made available to the public on the ATT website.¹⁹

Lastly, the Netherlands has made financial contributions to the ATT Baseline Assessment Project²⁰ and the ATT monitor²¹.

Transparency in armaments and the UN Register of Conventional Arms

Every year, the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which was established in 1991 at the initiative of the Netherlands and several other countries, provides information on the countries of export, transit (where relevant) and import of military goods, as well as on the volume of the flow of goods, which are divided into the following categories: I. battle tanks; II. armoured combat vehicles; III. large-calibre artillery systems; IV. combat aircraft; V. attack helicopters; VI. warships; and VII. missiles and missile launchers.

¹⁸ Parliamentary Papers 2012-2013, 22 054, no. 220.

¹⁹ <http://thearmstradetreaty.org/index.php/en/resources/reporting>

²⁰ <http://www.armstrade.info/>

²¹ <http://controlarms.org/en/att-monitor-report/>

Since its inception, more than 170 countries, including the Netherlands, have at some time submitted reports to the register. This includes all the major arms-producing, -exporting and -importing countries. The aim is still to achieve universal and consistent participation. The UN Register of Conventional Arms is an instrument that promotes transparency, thereby preventing excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons.

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) is responsible for compiling the data submitted by the member states. In 2015 it received 46 national reports, one more than in 2014. The effectiveness of the register stands or falls on universal participation. The Netherlands therefore considers it of great importance that countries submit their annual reports, even if these take the form of 'nil reports' because they did not import or export any goods in one or more of the above-mentioned categories during the year in question.

UN-based legislative transparency

From 2002 to 2004 the Netherlands submitted the UN General Assembly resolution on national legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology every year, and from 2005 onwards it has done so every other year. The resolution urges UN member states to share information on their national legislation in the field of arms exports.

In the framework of the resolution an electronic UN database has been established to store and provide access to legislative texts and other information shared by the participating states. It currently contains contributions from 65 countries, including the Netherlands. Now that the ATT has entered into force, the UNODA database is initially complementary to the treaty, though as more countries become party to the ATT, the UNODA database will decline in importance.

Annexe 1:

Overview of the value of licences issued in 2015 for the permanent export of military goods by category of goods and by country of final destination

Methodology

The values reported below are based on the value of the licences for the permanent export of military goods issued during the period under review. The licence value represents the maximum export value, although this may not necessarily correspond to the value of the exports actually realised at the time of publication. Licences for temporary export have been disregarded in these figures, on the grounds that they are subject to a requirement to reimport. This usually concerns shipments for demonstration or exhibition purposes. On the other hand, licences for trial or sample shipments are included in the figures because they are not subject to this requirement due to the nature of the exported goods. Licences for goods that are returned abroad following repair in the Netherlands are similarly not included in the reported figures. In such cases, however, the goods must have been part of a prior shipment from the Netherlands, whose value will therefore have been reflected in a previous report. Without these precautions, the inclusion of such 'return following repair' licences would lead to duplication. Licences whose validity has been extended do not appear in the figures for the same reason. This also applies to licences that are replaced for reasons such as a recipient's change of address. However, if the value of the extension or replacement licence is higher than that of the original licence, the surplus will obviously be reported.

For the purpose of classifying licence values for individual transactions by category of military goods, it was necessary in many cases to record additional spare parts and installation costs as part of the value of the complete system. Licence values for the initial delivery of a system are often based on the value of the contract, which may also cover such elements as installation and a number of spare parts. The value of licences for the subsequent delivery of components is included in categories A10 and B10. Finally, for the purpose of classifying licence values by category of military goods, a choice had to be made regarding the classification of subsystems. It was decided to differentiate according to the extent to which a subsystem could be regarded as being stand-alone or multifunctional. This has a particular bearing on the classification of export licences for military electronics. If such a product is suitable solely for maritime applications, for example, the associated subsystems and their components appear in category A10, as components for category A6 (warships). However, if such a product is not obviously connected to one of the first seven subcategories of main category A, the associated subsystems and their components appear in subcategory B4 or B10.

2015 (first half)

Table 1: Value (in € millions) of licences issued for the permanent export of military goods during the first half of 2015, by category¹

Category A: 'Weapons and ammunition'	2015 (1) value (in € millions)
1. Tanks	-
2. Armoured vehicles	-
3. Large-calibre weapons (> 12.7 mm)	0.48
4. Combat aircraft	-
5. Attack helicopters	-
6. Warships	-
7. Guided missiles	-
8. Small-calibre weapons (≤ 12.7 mm)	0.32
9. Ammunition and explosives	37.58
10. Parts and components for 'Weapons and ammunition' ²	330.78
Total for Category A	369.16

Category B 'Other military goods'	2015 (1) value (in € millions)
1. Other military vehicles	6.91
2. Other military aircraft and helicopters	10.68
3. Other military vessels	0.08
4. Military electronics	18.93
5. ABC substances for military use	-
6. Military equipment for exercises	2.64
7. Armour-plating and protective products	4.41
8. Military auxiliary and production equipment	4.84
9. Military technology and software	11.02
10. Parts and components for 'Other military goods' ³	37.70
Total for Category B	97.21
Total for Category A & B	466.37

Table 2: Value (in € millions) of licences issued for the permanent export of military goods during the first half of 2015

by country of destination

2015 (first half) <i>value (in € millions)</i>					
Country of destination	Cat. A	Breakdown	Cat. B	Breakdown	Total
Argentina	0.29	A10	-	-	0.29
Australia	-	-	0.03	B7	0.03
Brazil	0.59	A10	-	-	0.59
Brunei Darussalam	0.25	A10	-	-	0.25
Bulgaria	0.01	A3	-	-	0.01
Canada	0.07	A10	-	-	0.07
Caribbean Netherlands	0.01	A8, A9	-	-	0.01
Chile	0.48	A10	-	-	0.48
Curaçao	0.04	A8, A9	-	-	0.04
Czech Republic	0.07	A8, A9, A10	-	-	0.07
Denmark	0.03	A8	0.06	B4, B10	0.09
Egypt	0.25	A10	0.09	B9, B10	0.34
Estonia	1.76	A10	-	-	1.76
Finland	0.16	A10	0.20	B6	0.36
France	3.73	A8, A9, A10	5.22	B4, B9, B10	8.95

Germany	40.60	A8, A9, A10	13.10	B4, B6, B7, B9, B10	53.70
Greece	0.01	A10	-	-	0.01
Hungary	-	-	0.09	B3, B4	0.09
India	-	-	0.54	B9, B10	0.54
Indonesia	0.94	A9, A10	-	-	0.94
Israel	4.23	A8, A10	-	-	4.23
Italy	0.01	A8	0.20	B9	0.21
Japan	0.12	A10	-	-	0.12
Jordan	-	-	4.77	B1	4.77
Lithuania	-	-	1.95	B1	1.95
Malaysia	0.13	A10	17.00	B10	17.13
New Zealand	-	-	15.14	B4	15.14
Norway	1.80	A3, A8, A9, A10	0.08	B4, B7, B10	1.88
Oman	2.00	A10	5.00	B4, B8, B10	7.00
Pakistan	-	-	0.40	B10	0.40
Peru	-	-	10.68	B2	10.68
Poland	0.26	A8, A9, A10	0.06	B7, B10	0.32
Qatar	0.80	A10	-	-	0.80
Rwanda	-	-	0.21	B1	0.21
Saudi Arabia	0.84	A10	0.97	B9, B10	1.81

Singapore	8.06	A10	0.33	B4, B7, B8, B10	8.39
South Africa	0.26	A8, A9, A10	-	B7	0.26
South Korea	0.55	A10	1.36	B9, B10	1.91
Spain	0.03	A8, A9, A10	0.09	B9	0.12
Sweden	0.62	A8, A9, A10	0.27	B9, B10	0.89
Switzerland	0.35	A8, A10	0.10	B10	0.45
Taiwan	18.79	A10	-	-	18.79
Thailand	0.90	A9, A10	0.11	B10	1.01
Turkey	1.07	A8, A10	3.15	B4, B7, B9, B10	4.22
United Arab Emirates	-	-	1.64	B10	1.64
United Kingdom	1.89	A8, A9, A10	0.31	B10	2.20
United States	122.15	A8, A9, A10	4.28	B4, B9, B10	126.43
Vietnam	-	-	1.20	B9	1.20
EU/NATO+⁴	155.00	A9, A10	8.85	B4, B9, B10	163.85
Countries with export licence values below €10,000: ⁵					
Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkmenistan	0.01	A8, A10	-	B9	0.01
Total	369.16		97.21		466.37

Explanatory notes for Tables 1 and 2 concerning the first half of 2015:

¹ Because all values are rounded to two decimal places, subcategories with a value below €10,000 are not listed separately in Tables 1 and 2.

² As usual, subcategory A10 (Parts and components for 'Weapons and ammunition') primarily concerns the supply of components for fighter aircraft and attack helicopters to the manufacturers of such systems in the United States and the supply of components for tanks and other military combat vehicles to the German manufacturer of such systems.

³ During the period under review, subcategory B10 (Parts and components for 'Other military goods') once again encompasses a large number of smaller shipments of electronic parts for military systems and parts for military aircraft and vehicles.

⁴ The heading 'EU/NATO+' generally relates to export licences for components falling under subcategory A10 for which several EU member states, NATO members (excluding Turkey) or Australia, Japan, New Zealand or Switzerland qualify as countries of final destination. In practice, such licences are used to supply components to manufacturers that want to be able to supply from stock to the NATO customers listed as end users on the licence.

⁵ In the Netherlands the export of pistols and rifles for sport or hunting is also subject to mandatory licensing. If they are scheduled to remain abroad for an extended period, such firearms require a permanent export licence, even if they are in the owner's possession while in transit. Some of the exports listed in the table as accounting for total export licence values below €10,000 involve transactions of this nature.

2015 (second half)

Table 1: Value (in € millions) of licences issued for the permanent export of military goods during the second half of 2015, by category¹

Category A: 'Weapons and ammunition'	2015 (2) value (in € millions)
1. Tanks	37.00
2. Armoured vehicles	41.40
3. Large-calibre weapons (> 12.7 mm)	2.47
4. Combat aircraft	0.04
5. Attack helicopters	-
6. Warships	-
7. Guided missiles	4.75
8. Small-calibre weapons (≤ 12.7 mm)	0.27
9. Ammunition and explosives	0.46
10. Parts and components for 'Weapons and ammunition' ²	255.20
Total for Category A	341.59

Category B 'Other military goods'	2015 (2) value (in € millions)
1. Other military vehicles	-
2. Other military aircraft and helicopters	-
3. Other military vessels	0.25
4. Military electronics	9.01
5. ABC substances for military use	-
6. Military equipment for exercises	0.61
7. Armour-plating and protective products	0.33
8. Military auxiliary and production equipment	1.95
9. Military technology and software	40.47
10. Parts and components for 'Other military goods' ³	12.02
Total for Category B	64.64
Total for Category A & B	406.23

Table 2: Value of licences issued for the permanent export of military goods during the second half of 2015

by country of destination

2015 (second half)					
<i>value (in € millions)</i>					
Country of destination	Cat. A	Breakdown	Cat. B	Breakdown	Total
Algeria	1.00	A10	2.27	B4	3.27
Australia	-	-	0.69	B10	0.69
Bangladesh	0.03	A10	-	-	0.03
Canada	1.36	A10	0.30	B3, B4	1.66
Caribbean Netherlands	0.04	A8, A9	0.02	B7	0.06
Chile	-	-	0.06	B4	0.06
Czech Republic	0.05	A8, A9, A10	-	-	0.05
Denmark	0.04	A8, A9, A10	0.18	B4, B10	0.22
Egypt	34.00	A10	0.05	B9	34.05
Estonia	36.96	A2, A10	-	-	36.96
Finland	37.17	A1, A10	0.05	B4	37.22
France	0.29	A8, A9, A10	1.53	B10	1.82
Germany	10.17	A2, A8, A9, A10	1.26	B6, B7, B8, B10	11.43
Ireland	-	-	0.03	B10	0.03
India	2.60	A10	1.05	B6, B9, B10	3.65

Indonesia	0.02	A10	-	-	0.02
Israel	0.99	A4, A10	0.28	B4, B7, B10	1.27
Italy	2.47	A8, A10	-	-	2.47
Japan	31.10	A10	-	-	31.10
Jordan	4.82	A2, A7	0.02	B7	4.84
Kazakhstan	-	-	0.02	B7	0.02
Lebanon	-	-	0.10	B9	0.10
Malaysia	-	-	1.23	B4, B9, B10	1.23
Norway	5.46	A3, A10	2.17	B4, B8, B10	7.63
Oman	0.94	A10	1.55	B4, B10	2.49
Pakistan	0.38	A10	0.09	B9, B10	0.47
Peru	0.75	A10	-	-	0.75
Philippines	0.31	A2	-	-	0.31
Poland	3.81	A8, A9, A10	-	-	3.81
Qatar	24.48	A10	0.08	B8	24.56
Singapore	-	-	0.31	B10	0.31
South Africa	0.93	A8, A10	0.19	B7, B9, B10	1.12
South Korea	6.00	A10	0.86	B10	6.86
Spain	0.44	A4, A10	-	-	0.44
St Maarten	-	-	0.11	B7	0.11

Sweden	0.40	A8, A9, A10	0.28	B9, B10	0.68
Switzerland	0.50	A8, A10	0.29	B7, B9, B10	0.79
Taiwan	1.06	A10	17.00	B9	18.06
Thailand	7.74	A10	0.08	B4	7.82
Turkey	1.33	A10	0.10	B4, B9	1.43
United Arab Emirates	70.37	A10	-	-	70.37
United Kingdom	1.08	A8, A9, A10	0.69	B8, B9, B10	1.77
United States	18.85	A2, A8, A9, A10	4.45	B4, B9, B10	23.30
Venezuela	3.04	A10	17.61	B9, B10	20.65
Vietnam	-	-	3.60	B9	3.60
EU/NATO+ ⁴	30.60	A10	6.04	B4, B7, B10	36.64
Countries with export licence values below €10,000:⁵					
Austria, Gabon, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia	0.01	A8, A10	-	-	0.01
Total	341.59		64.64		406.23

Explanatory notes for Tables 1 and 2 concerning the second half of 2015:

¹ Because all values are rounded to two decimal places, subcategories with a value below €10,000 are not listed separately in Tables 1 and 2.

² As usual, subcategory A10 (Parts and components for 'Weapons and ammunition') primarily concerns the supply of components for fighter aircraft and attack helicopters to the manufacturers of such

systems in the United States and the supply of components for tanks and other military combat vehicles to the German manufacturer of such systems. However, in the second half of 2015 this subcategory also included a licence worth €70 million for the delivery of parts (components, modules) for patrol vessels to be built in Romania for the United Arab Emirates.

³ During the period under review, subcategory B10 (Parts and components for 'Other military goods') once again encompasses a large number of smaller shipments of electronic parts for military systems and parts for military aircraft and vehicles.

⁴ The heading 'EU/NATO+' generally relates to export licences for components falling under subcategory A10 for which several EU member states, NATO members (excluding Turkey), or Australia, Japan, New Zealand or Switzerland qualify as countries of final destination. In practice, such licences are used to supply components to manufacturers that want to be able to supply from stock to the NATO customers listed as end users on the licence.

⁵ In the Netherlands the export of pistols and rifles for sport or hunting is also subject to mandatory licensing. If they are scheduled to remain abroad for an extended period, such firearms require a permanent export licence, even if they are accompanied by the owner. Some of the exports to countries of destination listed in the table as accounting for total export licence values below €10,000 involve transactions of this nature.

2015 (whole year)

Table 1: Value (in € millions) of licences issued for the permanent export of military goods in 2015, by category¹

Category A: 'Weapons and ammunition'	2015 value (in € millions)
1. Tanks	37.00
2. Armoured vehicles	41.40
3. Large-calibre weapons (> 12.7 mm)	2.95
4. Combat aircraft	0.04
5. Attack helicopters	-
6. Warships	-
7. Guided missiles	4.75
8. Small-calibre weapons (≤ 12.7 mm)	0.59
9. Ammunition and explosives	38.04
10. Parts and components for 'Weapons and ammunition' ²	585.98
Total for Category A	710.75

Category B 'Other military goods'	2015 value (in € millions)
1. Other military vehicles	6.91
2. Other military aircraft and helicopters	10.68
3. Other military vessels	0.33
4. Military electronics	27.94
5. ABC substances for military use	-
6. Military equipment for exercises	3.25
7. Armour-plating and protective products	4.74
8. Military auxiliary and production equipment	6.79
9. Military technology and software	51.49
10. Parts and components for 'Other military goods' ³	49.72
Total for Category B	161.85
Total for Category A & B	872.60

Table 2: Value (in € millions) of licences issued for the permanent export of military goods in 2015

by country of destination

2015 (whole year)					
<i>value (in € millions)</i>					
Country of destination	Cat. A	Breakdown	Cat. B	Breakdown	Total
Algeria	1.00	A10	2.27	B4	3.27
Argentina	0.29	A10	-	-	0.29
Australia	-	-	0.72	B7, B10	0.72
Bangladesh	0.03	A10	-	-	0.03
Brazil	0.59	A10	-	-	0.59
Brunei Darussalam	0.25	A10	-	-	0.25
Bulgaria	0.01	A3	-	-	0.01
Canada	1.43	A10	0.30	B3, B4	1.73
Caribbean Netherlands	0.05	A8, A9	0.02	B7	0.07
Chile	0.48	A10	0.06	B4	0.54
Curaçao	0.04	A8, A9	-	-	0.04
Czech Republic	0.12	A8, A9, A10	-	-	0.12
Denmark	0.07	A8, A9, A10	0.24	B4, B10	0.31
Egypt	34.25	A10	0.14	B9, B10	34.39

Estonia	38.72	A2, A10	-	-	38.72
Finland	37.33	A1, A10	0.25	B4, B6	37.58
France	4.02	A8, A9, A10	6.75	B4, B9, B10	10.77
Germany	50.77	A2, A8, A9, A10	14.36	B4, B6, B7, B8, B9, B10	65.13
Greece	0.01	A10	-	-	0.01
Hungary	-	-	0.09	B3, B4	0.09
Ireland	-	-	0.03	B10	0.03
India	2.60	A10	1.59	B6, B9, B10	4.19
Indonesia	0.96	A9, A10	-	-	0.96
Israel	5.22	A4, A8, A10	0.28	B4, B7, B10	5.50
Italy	2.48	A8, A10	0.20	B9	2.68
Japan	31.22	A10	-	-	31.22
Jordan	4.82	A2, A7	4.79	B1, B7	9.61
Kazakhstan	-	-	0.02	B7	0.02
Lebanon	-	-	0.10	B9	0.10
Lithuania	-	-	1.95	B1	1.95
Malaysia	0.13	A10	18.23	B4, B9, B10	18.36
New Zealand	-	-	15.14	B4	15.14
Norway	7.26	A3, A8, A9 ,A10	2.25	B4, B8, B10	9.51
Oman	2.94	A10	6.55	B4, B10	9.49

Pakistan	0.38	A10	0.49	B9, B10	0.87
Peru	0.75	A10	10.68	B2	11.43
Philippines	0.31	A2	-	-	0.31
Poland	4.07	A8, A9, A10	0.06	B4, B7, B10	4.13
Qatar	25.28	A10	0.08	B8	25.36
Rwanda	-	-	0.21	B1	0.21
Saudi Arabia	0.84	A10	0.97	B9, B10	1.81
Singapore	8.06	A10	0.64	B4, B7, B9, B10	8.70
South Africa	1.19	A8, A9, A10	0.19	B7, B9, B10	1.38
South Korea	6.55	A10	2.22	B9, B10	8.77
Spain	0.47	A4, A8, A9, A10	0.09	B9	0.56
St Maarten	-	-	0.11	B7	0.11
Sweden	1.02	A8, A9, A10	0.55	B9, B10	1.57
Switzerland	0.85	A8, A10	0.39	B7, B9, B10	1.24
Taiwan	19.85	A10	17.00	B9	36.85
Thailand	8.64	A9, A10	0.19	B4, B10	8.83
Turkey	2.40	A8, A10	3.25	B4,B7,B9,B10	5.65
United Arab Emirates	70.37	A10	1.64	B10	72.01
United Kingdom	2.93	A8, A9, A10	0.78	B8, B9, B10	3.71
United States	141.00	A2, A8, A9, A10	8.73	B4, B9, B10	149.73

Venezuela	3.04	A10	17.61	B9, B10	20.65
Vietnam	-	-	4.80	B9	4.80
EU/NATO+ ⁴	185.60	A9, A10	14.89	B4, B7, B9, B10	200.49
Countries with export licence values below €10,000:⁵					
Austria, Gabon, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkmenistan	0.02	A8, A10	-	-	0.02
Total	710.75		161.85		872.60

Explanatory notes for Tables 1 and 2 concerning 2015:

¹ Because all values are rounded to two decimal places, subcategories with a value below €10,000 are not listed separately in Tables 1 and 2.


^{2,3} For information on the main deliveries in categories A10 and B10 in the reporting year, please refer to the explanatory footnotes to the tables on the first half of 2015 and the second half of 2015.

⁴ The heading 'EU/NATO+' generally relates to export licences for components falling under subcategory A10 for which several EU member states, NATO members (excluding Turkey), or Australia, Japan, New Zealand or Switzerland qualify as countries of final destination. In practice, such licences are used to supply components to manufacturers that want to be able to supply from stock to the NATO customers listed as end users on the licence.

⁵ In the Netherlands the export of pistols and rifles for sport or hunting is also subject to mandatory licensing. If they are scheduled to remain abroad for an extended period, such firearms require a permanent export licence, even if they are in the owner's possession while in transit. Some of the exports to countries of destination listed in the table as accounting for total export licence values below €10,000 involve transactions of this nature.

Annexe 2: Dutch arms exports in 2006-2015

(value of export licences issued in € millions)



* As of the report of 2015, in the table giving the value of licences issued for the permanent export of military goods by country of destination, the heading 'NATO other' is replaced by the heading 'EU/NATO+' for the purpose of showing the value of global licences. As of 2015, therefore, in this diagram 'Of which NATO' should be read as 'Of which EU/NATO+'. In 2015 the following 28 countries were members of NATO: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. From 2015, this heading also includes the values for Australia, Finland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.

Annexe 3: Overview of export licences worth over €2 million issued in 2015 for dual-use goods intended for military end use

Type of equipment ¹	Value (in € millions) ²	Country of final destination	End user
Image-enhancing tubes for inclusion in night-vision equipment	5.42	Chile	Ministry of Defence
Total rounded value of licences concerned			€5.42 million

Explanatory notes:

¹ Applications for dual-use goods destined for the military, police or security services in the country of final destination are assessed against the eight criteria laid down in the EU's Common Position on arms exports.

² The amount shown represents the value of licences issued in 2015. Some of the goods in question were not actually delivered in 2015. The renewal of licences was not mentioned here again.

Annexe 4: Value of licences issued in 2015 for the transit of military goods by country of final destination¹

(in € millions)

Country of destination	Category A	Breakdown	Category B	Breakdown	Total
Algeria	0.03	A9	2.18	B10	2.21
Belize	0.08	A9	-	-	0.08
Brazil	0.05	A7	-	-	0.05
Colombia	-	-	0.46	B6	0.46
Curaçao	0.03	A8	-	-	0.03
Georgia	-	-	0.04	B6	0.04
Guyana	0.06	A8	-	-	0.06
Jordan	0.23	A2, A9	-	-	0.23
Malaysia	0.42	A9	-	-	0.42
Mauritania	0.84	A9	-	-	0.84
Nigeria	0.28	A10	-	-	0.28
Oman	0.67	A9	-	-	0.67
Paraguay	0.01	A9	-	-	0.01
Qatar	1.39	A9, A10	-	-	1.39
Saudi Arabia	-	-	7.33	B1	7.33
South Africa	0.26	A9	-	-	0.26
United Arab Emirates	0.87	A8, A9, A10	-	-	0.87
United States	0.35	A8, A9	-	-	0.35
Total	5.57		10.01		15.58

¹ Transit without transshipment involving allies (EU/NATO+) is subject to a reporting requirement. Information on these reports is available on the government's internet portal at: <http://www.government.nl/export-controls-of-strategic-goods>. More information on the transit licences whose value is listed here is also available there, but in the monthly summaries of military goods rather than in the transit reports.

**Annexe 5: Licence application denials reported in the framework of Common Position
2008/944/CFSP in 2015**

Date of denial	Country of destination	Brief description	Recipient	End user	Reason for denial
12/02/2015	India	Lithium batteries (for artillery production)	Machine Tool Prototype Factory (MPF)	Army and special forces	Criterion 4
14/08/2015	Venezuela (transit)	Ammunition parts (percussion caps for 9mm bullets)	Compañía Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares (CAVIM)	Unknown	Criteria 2, 3 and 7
01/09/2015	Thailand	Parts for an M109 howitzer crew trainer and simulator	Signal Department c/o: CT Link att. Totsaporn	Army	Criterion 4
03/09/2015	United Arab Emirates	Cartridge belt links for 30mm ammunition	ARCUS Company (Bulgaria) and Eurolinks - SIPR Defense (France)	Army	Criterion 4
03/09/2015	United Arab Emirates	Aircraft tyres for F-16 fighter aircraft	AMMROC, Abu Dhabi	Air force	Criterion 2
04/09/2015	Saudi Arabia	Aircraft tyres for F-15 fighter aircraft	Al-Raha Group for Technical Services, Riyadh	Air force	Criterion 2
11/09/2015	South Africa	Image-enhancing tubes for optronics with targeting systems	ECM Technologies (Pty) Ltd. and Airbus DS Optronics (Pty) Ltd.	Unknown	Criterion 7
15/09/2015	Saudi Arabia	Aircraft tyres for F-15 fighter aircraft	Al-Raha Group for Technical Services, Riyadh	Air force	Criterion 2
18/09/2015	Ukraine	Image-enhancing tubes for night-vision equipment (for periscopes in armoured vehicles)	UA.RP LLC	Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior	Criteria 3 and 4
27/10/2015	United Arab Emirates	Aircraft tyres for F-16 fighter aircraft	AMMROC, Abu Dhabi	Air force	Criterion 2
15/12/2015	Qatar	Parts for PzH 2000 self- propelled howitzers	Krauss-Maffei Wegmann GmbH & Co. KG (Germany)	Qatari armed forces	Criterion 2

15/12/2015	Qatar	Cooling equipment for PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers	Krauss-Maffei Wegmann GmbH & Co. KG (Germany)	Qatari armed forces	Criterion 2
29/12/2015	Saudi Arabia (transit)	Missile parts (for Cougar helicopters)	Chemring Countermeasures Ltd (United Kingdom)	Air force	Criterion 2
30/12/2015	United Arab Emirates (transit)	Batteries for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)	Progressive Technologies LLC	Presidential guard	Criterion 2

Explanatory note:

¹ In the case of dual-use goods destined for the military, police or security services in the intended country of final destination, the Netherlands is also required to report licence application denials to its EU partners.

Annexe 6: Overview of surplus defence equipment sold by the Netherlands to foreign parties in 2015¹

Type of equipment	To/via ²	Country of final destination	End user
Spare parts for F-16 and C-130 aircraft	Fieldtech Avionics & Instruments, Inc (US)	Indonesia	Ministry of Defence
F-16 landing gear	Fokker Landing Gear BV	Netherlands	Fokker Landing Gear BV
AB-412 SAR helicopters	n/a	Peru	Ministry of Defence
Spare parts for Lynx helicopters	Aviation Trading (UK)	Denmark, UK, Norway, Germany, Portugal and France	Ministry of Defence
Mobile Combat Training Centre	n/a	Finland	Ministry of Defence
Various army vehicles	n/a	Lithuania	Ministry of Defence
120mm exercise ammunition	Rheinmetall Waffe Munition GmbH (Germany)	Germany	Rheinmetall Waffe Munition GmbH (Germany)
Spare parts for Leopard tanks	ZF Services Nederland B.V.	Netherlands	ZF Services Nederland B.V.
Spare parts for Lynx helicopters (2nd contract)	Aviation Trading (UK)	UK and Denmark	Ministry of Defence
YPR vehicles	Sabiex International S.A.	Philippines	Ministry of Defence
Aramid anti-ballistic material/fibres	Teijin Aramid GmbH (Germany)	Germany	Destruction
Spare parts for Leopard tanks	Gunter Langkopf Maschinenbau (Germany)	Canada and Germany	Ministry of Defence
Various army vehicles (2nd contract)	n/a	Lithuania	Ministry of Defence
Diemaco C8 simulation rifles	Thales Electronic Systems GmbH (Germany)	Germany	Thales Electronic Systems GmbH (Germany)

120mm live ammunition	Rheinmetall Waffe Munition GmbH (Germany)	Greece	Ministry of Defence
Spare parts for Patria vehicles	n/a	Estonia	Ministry of Defence
Spare parts for Lynx helicopters (3rd contract)	Aviation Trading (UK)	UK and Denmark	Ministry of Defence
Counter-IED unmanned aerial vehicle	Delft Dynamics B.V.	Netherlands	Delft Dynamics B.V.
Spare parts for Leopard tanks	Star Defence Logistics & Engineering (Spain)	Canada	Ministry of Defence
Spare parts for Lynx helicopters (4th contract)	Aviation Trading (UK)	UK and Denmark	Ministry of Defence
9mm ammunition	Energy Containment Concepts Ltd (UK)	United Kingdom	Energy Containment Concepts Ltd (UK)
Special monitoring vehicles (Jeeps)	n/a	Belgium	Ministry of Defence
YPR vehicles and related equipment/spare parts	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Jordan	Ministry of Defence
Spare parts for F-16 fighter aircraft	ILN Technologies, Inc. (US)	Indonesia	Ministry of Defence
Spare parts for Lynx helicopters	NATO Logistics Stock Exchange	Denmark	Ministry of Defence
Spare parts for Lynx helicopters	NATO Logistics Stock Exchange	Portugal	Ministry of Defence
Spare parts for Lynx helicopters	NATO Logistics Stock Exchange	United Kingdom	Ministry of Defence
Spare parts for Lynx helicopters	NATO Logistics Stock Exchange	Germany	Ministry of Defence
Spare parts for Lynx helicopters	NATO Logistics Stock Exchange	Spain	Ministry of Defence
Spare parts for Lynx helicopters	NATO Logistics Stock Exchange	Belgium	Ministry of Defence
Total value of contracts			approx. €20.5 million

Explanatory notes:

¹ The amount shown is based on the value of contracts concluded in 2015. Some of the goods in question were not actually delivered in 2015.

² Surplus defence equipment is occasionally sold to the original manufacturer. In some cases, it can also be sold through a private company to an end user who is known and approved at the time of sale or to a private company for its own use. Yet another option involves selling to a private company in another EU/NATO+ country without yet knowing the specific final destination and end user of the equipment. In such cases, an International Import Certificate is used to ensure that any attempt to export or re-export the equipment in question will be subject to the control of the EU/NATO+ country concerned.

Annexe 7: Overview of letters to the House of Representatives and responses to written questions concerning Dutch arms export policy and policy on dual-use goods in 2015

Letters to the House of Representatives – arms export policy

04-12-2015, Parliamentary Paper **22054, no. 266**, Arms export policy; Letter from the government in response to the request by the parliamentary committee on foreign trade and development cooperation concerning Amnesty International's findings alleging that Dutch insurance companies invest in the arms trade

20-11-2015, Parliamentary Paper **22054, no. 265**, Arms export policy; Letter from the ministers presenting the report 'Dutch Arms Export Policy in 2014'

20-11-2015, Annexe to Parliamentary Paper **22054, no. 265**, 'Dutch Arms Export Policy in 2014'

01-09-2015, Parliamentary Paper **22054, no. 264**, Arms export policy; Letter from the government concerning the issue of a licence for the export of military equipment to Oman

01-09-2015, Parliamentary Paper **22054, no. 263**, Arms export policy; Letter from the government concerning the issue of a licence for the export of military equipment to Egypt via France

25-08-2015, Parliamentary Paper **22054, no. 262**, Arms export policy; Letter from the government concerning the issue of a licence for the export of surplus defence equipment to Jordan

25-06-2015, Parliamentary Paper **22054, no. 261**, Arms export policy; Letter from the government concerning the issue of a licence for the export of surplus defence equipment to Peru

04-03-2015, Parliamentary Paper **22054, no. 260**, Arms export policy; Letter from the government concerning the issue of a licence for the export of surplus defence equipment to Jordan

16-02-2015, Parliamentary Paper **22054, no. 259**, report of a meeting on arms control policy between the permanent parliamentary committee on foreign trade and development cooperation and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, held on 11 December 2014

Letters to the House of Representatives – dual use

25-08-2015, Parliamentary Paper **34000 V, no. 79**, approval of the budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (V) for 2015; Letter from the minister on the deal between P3+3 and Iran on Iran's nuclear programme

Responses to written questions – arms export policy

05-11-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2015-2016, no. 496, Questions by MP Jasper van Dijk (SP) to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs about arms exports to Egypt (submitted 16 October 2015)

15-10-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2015-2016, no. 292, Questions by MP Jasper van Dijk (SP) to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs about arms exports to Egypt (submitted 4 September 2015)

22-09-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2015-2016, no. 79, Questions by MP Jasper van Dijk (SP) about a report by Stop Wapenhandel [Stop Arms Trade] on the supply of arms to Myanmar by the Dutch company Thales (submitted 10 July 2015)

02-09-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 3296, Questions by MP Sjoerd Sjoerdsma (D66) to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation about the report that military trucks were supplied to Sudan without an export licence and in violation of the EU arms embargo (submitted 26 June 2015)

02-09-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 3295, Questions by MP Raymond Knops (CDA) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation about the report that army military trucks disposed of via a Dutch trading company had come into the possession of the Sudanese army (submitted 1 July 2015)

14-07-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 2884, Questions by MP Rik Grashoff (Green Left Alliance) to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation about reports that insurance companies invest billions in controversial arms trade (submitted 25 June 2015)

16-06-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 2567, Questions by MP Harry van Bommel (SP) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the use of cluster munitions in Yemen (submitted 3 June 2015)

02-06-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 2431, Questions by MPs Sjoerd Sjoerdsma (D66) and Michiel Servaes (Labour Party) to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the report that the United Kingdom has spent over £5 billion on arms exports to countries that are blacklisted due to human rights violations (submitted 15 April 2015)

08-05-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 2202, Questions by MPs Fred Teeven and Ronald Vuijk (both VVD) to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Economic Affairs about an article entitled 'Experts kritisch op wapenexportplan' ['Experts critical of arms export plan'] (submitted 16 April 2015)

10-04-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 1903, Questions by MP Jasper van Dijk (SP) to the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation about the results of the economic mission to Abu Dhabi and arms trade with Saudi Arabia (submitted 12 March 2015)

12-02-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 1284, Questions by MP Raymond de Roon (Freedom Party) to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the halting of German arms exports to Saudi Arabia (submitted 26 January 2015)

Responses to written questions – arms export policy

23-12-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2015-2016, no. 965, Questions by MPs Sjoerd Sjoerdsma, Wassila Hachchi and Stientje van Veldhoven (all D66) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation about the licence issued to Urenco for the export of 1,000 tonnes of depleted uranium to Russia (submitted 9 December 2015)

14-10-2015, Parliamentary Papers 2015-2016, 34300 V, no. 6, approval of the budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (V) for 2016; List of questions and responses about the response to the request by the Permanent Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs concerning the deal between P3+3 and Iran on Iran's nuclear programme

24-09-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2015-2016, no. 92, Questions by MP Sjoerd Sjoerdsma (D66) to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Security and Justice about the pharmaceutical company Mylan which has established itself in the Netherlands and possibly supplies medication for carrying out death sentences to US prisons (submitted 31 August 2015)

17-09-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2015-2016, no. 6, Questions by MP Han ten Broeke (VVD) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the report that Syria is still in possession of chemical weapons (submitted 28 July 2015)

08-09-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 3296, Questions by MP Sjoerd Sjoerdsma (D66) to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation about the report that military trucks were supplied to Sudan without an export licence and in violation of the EU arms embargo (submitted 26 June 2015)

13-07-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 2864, Questions by MPs Sharon Gesthuizen, Jasper van Dijk and Arnold Merkies to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation about reports that insurance companies and pension funds invest billions in controversial arms trade (submitted 19 June 2015)

12-05-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 2202, Questions by MPs Fred Teeven and Ronald Vuijk (both VVD) to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Economic Affairs about an article entitled 'Experts kritisch op wapenexportplan' ['Experts critical of arms export plan'] (submitted 16 April 2015)

12-02-2016, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2015-2016, no. 1470, Questions by MPs Fred Teeven and Ronald Vuijk (both VVD) to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Defence about the investigation into the export of controversial goods by RH Marine Group (submitted 30 December 2015)

19-01-2015, Questions from parliament and the minister's responses 2014-2015, no. 1050, Questions by MP Han ten Broeke (VVD) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the report that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has confirmed that chlorine gas was used in Syria (submitted 12 January 2015)

Annexe 8: Letters sent to the House of Representatives under the accelerated parliamentary notification procedure in 2015

In accordance with the letter of 10 June 2011 announcing a stricter arms export policy (Parliamentary Papers, 2010-2011, 22 054, no. 165) and the motion submitted by MP Arjan El Fassed and others on 22 December 2011 on lowering to €2 million the threshold triggering the accelerated parliamentary notification procedure for certain arms export licence applications (Parliamentary Papers, 2011-2012, 22 054, no. 181), the House of Representatives received the following letters in 2015:

Parliamentary Paper	Number	Date	Country
22 054	264	01/09/2015	Oman
22 054	263	01/09/2015	Egypt
22 054	262	25/08/2015	Jordan
22 054	261	25/06/2015	Peru
22 054	260	04/03/2015	Jordan

Letter of 1 September 2015 from the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Lilianne Ploumen, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders, to the House of Representatives concerning the issue of a licence for the export of military equipment to Oman (House of Representatives 2014-2015, 22 054, no. 264)

In accordance with the stricter arms export policy announced by letter on 10 June 2011 (Parliamentary Papers, 2010-2011, 22 054, no. 165) and the motion submitted by MP Arjan El Fassed and others on 22 December 2011 on lowering to €2 million the threshold triggering the accelerated parliamentary notification procedure for certain arms export licence applications (Parliamentary Papers, 2011-2012, 22 054, no. 181), the government wishes to present the following information concerning a licence worth €2,998,750 issued by the Netherlands for the export of military equipment to Oman.

A Dutch company recently obtained a licence to export a training system and related equipment for the purpose of operating a communications system to Oman. The end user of this system is the Omani navy. The entire communications system will be installed on patrol vessels being built for the Royal Navy of Oman by Singapore Technologies Marine Ltd in Singapore.

The licence application was assessed against the eight criteria of the EU's Common Position on arms exports.¹ The most relevant parts of this assessment, which resulted in the approval of the application, are summarised below.

Human rights (criterion 2)

The human rights situation in Oman raises several concerns, in particular with regard to freedom of assembly and association and freedom of expression. However, the end user, the Royal Navy of Oman, plays no part in these concerns. In addition, the goods in question are not connected to human rights violations in Oman.

Internal conflicts (criterion 3)

There are no sharp divisions between the various ethnic and religious groups in Oman. In addition, the Royal Navy of Oman was *not* involved in the internal skirmishes that took place during the Arab Spring of 2011. The export of the goods in question will not contribute to any renewed internal tensions.

Regional stability (criterion 4)

Oman charts its own course in the Gulf region and aims to have good relations with all countries in the region. It is an active member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which works to enhance

regional stability. The present transaction will therefore not have a negative effect on regional stability.

Risk of diversion (criterion 7)

Given the identity of the end user (the Royal Navy of Oman) there is no cause for concern regarding the risk of diversion.

¹ Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

Letter of 1 September 2015 from the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Lilianne Ploumen, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders, to the House of Representatives concerning the issue of a licence for the export of military equipment to Egypt via France (House of Representatives 2014-2015, 22 054, no. 263)

In accordance with the stricter arms export policy announced by letter on 10 June 2011 (Parliamentary Papers, 2010-2011, 22 054, no. 165) and the motion submitted by MP Arjan El Fassed and others on 22 December 2011 on lowering to €2 million the threshold triggering the accelerated parliamentary notification procedure for certain arms export licence applications (Parliamentary Papers, 2011-2012, 22 054, no. 181), the government wishes to present the following information concerning a licence worth €34,050,000 issued by the Netherlands for the export of military equipment to Egypt via France.

A Dutch company recently obtained a licence to export radar and C3 systems and related technology for system integration to Egypt via France. In accordance with the selection criteria listed in the government's letter of 10 June 2011, this licence is being reported to parliament in accordance with the accelerated notification procedure.

The radar and C3 systems are to be integrated in French corvettes. In June 2014, the Egyptian navy signed a contract with the French company DCNS in Lorient for the delivery of four Gowind combat corvettes. The vessels are designated as 'combat' corvettes because they can be fitted with on-deck French Mica anti-air missiles and Exocet anti-ship missiles. The vessels are being built at the DCNS shipyard in Lorient and at an Egyptian shipyard in Alexandria. Delivery of these French corvettes is taking place in the context of modernising the Egyptian fleet, which will contribute to maintaining and improving maritime security and coastal protection in the area near Egypt.

The licence application was assessed against the eight criteria of the EU's Common Position on arms exports.¹ The most relevant parts of this assessment, which resulted in the approval of the application, are summarised below.

Human rights (criterion 2)

Serious human rights violations take place in Egypt. However, there are no indications that the goods to be exported are connected with the human rights violations or internal repression observed in Egypt. In addition, the Egyptian navy is not involved in the human rights violations in Egypt.

Internal conflicts (criterion 3)

The internal situation in Egypt is currently stable, but fragile. In the long term, the crackdown by the authorities may have a destabilising effect. The opposition, critics and NGOs are being repressed.

However, there is little risk that the delivery of radar and C3 systems to the Egyptian navy will contribute to internal repression. It is mainly the security services and the police who are deemed responsible for abuses and repression. It is also unlikely that the goods in question will be used for internal repression as they can be used only for maritime purposes. As a result, the assessment for criterion 3 was positive.

Regional stability (criterion 4)

Egypt plays an active, generally political role in the region. It is involved in the Middle East peace process (particularly with regard to Gaza and reconciliation among Palestinians) and is working to negotiate a solution to the conflict with neighbouring countries over the construction of a dam in the Nile. Egypt supports international action against terror group ISIS in Iraq, but is not providing a military contribution itself.

An exception in this respect is the crisis in Libya. Although the Egyptian authorities deny any involvement, there are strong signs that Egypt was involved in air strikes on Libya, by providing logistic support to the United Arab Emirates. Egypt also bombed ISIS targets in Libya in retaliation for the beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians earlier this year. It also supported the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and sent naval vessels to the Gulf of Aden in response to the increased security risk.

Regional stability is very volatile. However, the Egyptian navy has a legitimate need for security, for instance in counterterrorism operations in the Sinai and the protection of maritime areas and sea trade routes. The present transaction for the navy will also contribute to the maritime security of Egypt and the wider region, which is also in Europe's interest. The Egyptian navy also plays an important role in operations to combat smuggling of people and goods.

¹ Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

Letter of 25 August 2015 from the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Lillianne Ploumen, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders, to the House of Representatives concerning the issue of a licence for the export of military equipment to Jordan (House of Representatives 2014-2015, 22 054, no. 262)

In accordance with the stricter arms export policy announced by letter on 10 June 2011 (Parliamentary Papers, 2010-2011, 22 054, no. 165) and the motion submitted by MP Arjan El Fassed and others on 22 December 2011 on lowering to €2 million the threshold triggering the accelerated parliamentary notification procedure for certain arms export licence applications (Parliamentary Papers, 2011-2012, 22 054, no. 181), the government wishes to present the following information concerning a licence worth €4,750,000 issued by the Netherlands for the export of surplus defence equipment to Jordan.

The Ministry of Defence recently obtained an export licence for the export to Jordan of 52 Maverick air-to-ground missiles and associated equipment, including launchers, training missiles, test sets and spare parts, worth €4,000,000, plus mission-related equipment for F-16 fighter aircraft (30 underwing adapters #15 and 30 wing weapon pylons) worth €750,000. The end user is the Jordanian air force.

It concerns the first delivery of a contract concluded with Jordan on 17 December 2013 to supply 15 F-16 fighter aircraft in the Mid-life Update M5 configuration, with mission-related and other auxiliary equipment and the supply of 52 Maverick air-to-ground missiles, worth a total of €81.5 million, which the House was informed about by the Minister of Defence on 25 September 2014 (Parliamentary Paper 22 054, no. 232). Jordan has procured the Dutch F-16 aircraft to replace its own, outdated F-16 aircraft. The first delivery is scheduled for August/September 2015. The second delivery, which mainly concerns aircraft, is scheduled for the end of 2017.

The licence application was assessed against the eight criteria of the EU's Common Position on arms exports.¹ The relevant parts of this assessment, which resulted in the approval of the application, are summarised below, with particular attention to the regional context (criterion 4).

Human rights (criterion 2)

The human rights situation in Jordan is better than in many other countries in the region. In comparison, Jordan is stable and its government policy moderate. Yet there is still cause for concern. There is concern over incidents of maltreatment of prisoners, violation of the human rights of Palestinian refugees and limiting of the freedom of the press, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. On 21 December 2014 Jordan lifted its eight-year moratorium on the death penalty and executed 11 people. Another 113 people have been sentenced to death in various murder cases. Jordan is failing to sufficiently implement many of the reforms it has promised.

However there is no connection between the Jordanian armed forces and the human rights violations observed. As a result, the assessment for this criterion was positive.

Internal conflicts (criterion 3)

The country's economic situation remains troubling. Many Jordanians are dissatisfied with the economic situation. Unemployment is high. The civil war in Syria and ISIS's recent advance in Iraq and Syria has had a considerable spillover effect in Jordan. The influx of migrants has led to major shortages in the areas of healthcare, education, housing and water, and is putting pressure on Jordan society.

Despite all the turbulence in the region, the internal situation in Jordan is relatively stable. The government does its best to maintain peace and calm, and the risk of conflicts emerging is limited. In addition, Jordan has legitimate security interests, particularly in view of its current support for the anti-ISIS coalition and the increased risk of attacks that is partly the result of that support. Although heated demonstrations take place, they are generally not violent. In recent years the Jordanian armed forces have not been deployed to contain demonstrations. The goods in question are not suitable for use against Jordan's own population.

Regional stability (criterion 4)

Jordan plays an important stabilising role in the region, for instance in the Israeli-Palestinian talks and with regard to ISIS and Syria. Jordan's international position was strengthened when it was elected to the UN Security Council. Its role in the reception of Syrian refugees has also enhanced its importance in the international arena.

Until recently, Jordan adopted a cautious approach towards Syria and tried to find a political solution. On 22 September 2014 Jordan joined the anti-ISIS coalition along with the US and a number of Gulf states. Early this year images were shown in the media of ISIS burning a crashed Jordanian pilot alive.

Jordan has a very legitimate need for security. It has no intention of acting as an aggressor towards other countries or staking territorial claims, and it is part of a broad international anti-ISIS coalition in which the Netherlands also participates. As a result, the assessment for this criterion was positive.

¹ Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

Letter of 25 August 2015 from the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Lillianne Ploumen, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders, to the House of Representatives concerning the issue of a licence for the export of military equipment to Peru (House of Representatives 2014-2015, 22 054, no. 261)

In accordance with the stricter arms export policy announced by letter on 10 June 2011 (Parliamentary Papers, 2010-2011, 22 054, no. 165) and the motion submitted by MP Arjan El Fassed and others on 22 December 2011 on lowering to €2 million the threshold triggering the accelerated parliamentary notification procedure for certain arms export licence applications (Parliamentary Papers, 2011-2012, 22 054, no. 181), the government wishes to present the following information concerning a licence worth €10,680,000 issued by the Netherlands for the export of surplus defence equipment to Peru.

The Ministry of Defence recently obtained an export licence for the export of three AB-412 helicopters to Peru. The sale also includes a package of spare parts, testing equipment and special tools. The end user is the Peruvian navy.

The licence application was assessed against the eight criteria of the EU's Common Position on arms exports.¹ The relevant parts of this assessment, which resulted in the approval of the application, are summarised below, with particular attention to the regional context (criterion 4).

Human rights (criterion 2)

The human rights situation in Peru has been improving. President Ollanta Humala has explicitly affirmed the importance of respecting human rights. An emphasis on reducing poverty and promoting social inclusion can lead to further improvements.

Yet a number of concerns remain. Institutions operating in areas related to the legal order, stability and security are weak and less than transparent. Peru's indigenous population has little say in the running of the country, even though certain provisions to this effect are enshrined in law. There are also concerns over the violent crackdown by the security forces on various protests, especially in the extraction sector in poorer parts of the country.

The goods in question (search-and-rescue transport helicopters) are in no way connected to the concerns cited above. The end user (the navy) is not involved in these human rights violations.

Internal conflicts (criterion 3)

There is no internal conflict in Peru. One challenge that does exist is the fight against cocaine production in Peru. The weakened resistance movement the Shining Path has in recent years become active again in the drug trade, and cocaine production in Peru has grown sharply during that time. Peru has passed Colombia as the largest producer and exporter of cocaine. In response to this development President Humala presented a new strategy for the 2012-2016 period and announced his intention to set aside a greater proportion of the budget to deal with the drug problem. The Peruvian army is being deployed to fight organised crime and destroy drug farms. As far as is known there have been no civilian casualties.

Regional stability (criterion 4)

A maritime border dispute with Chile, which has led to occasional flare-ups in bilateral tensions, was settled by the International Court of Justice on 27 January 2014 to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. The outcome is expected to form a good basis for the enduring stability of bilateral relations. President Humala has expressed a willingness to pursue improved relations with Peru's neighbours. Peru also plays a positive role when it comes to regional integration, and it was also one of the founders of the Pacific Alliance in 2012.

¹ Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

Letter of 25 August 2015 from the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Lillianne Ploumen, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders, to the House of Representatives concerning the issue of a licence for the export of military equipment to Jordan (House of Representatives 2014-2015, 22 054, no. 260)

In accordance with the stricter arms export policy announced by letter on 10 June 2011 (Parliamentary Papers, 2010-2011, 22 054, no. 165) and the motion submitted by MP Arjan El Fassed and others on 22 December 2011 on lowering to €2 million the threshold triggering the accelerated parliamentary notification procedure for certain arms export licence applications (Parliamentary Papers, 2011-2012, 22 054, no. 181), the government wishes to present the following information concerning a licence worth €4,766,800 issued by the Netherlands for the export of surplus defence equipment to Jordan.

The Ministry of Defence recently obtained an export licence for the export to Jordan of various types of DAF trucks, DAF parts and DAF tools, as well as YPR armoured tracked vehicles for cannibalisation purposes, YPR parts and YPR testing and other equipment. The end user is the Jordanian armed forces.

It concerns a first delivery of DAF trucks and YPR armoured tracked vehicles and related equipment and documentation, as part of a contract concluded with Jordan on 15 October 2014 worth €6,339,300. The delivery is scheduled for April 2015. A second and final delivery is scheduled for April 2016.

The YPRs are being supplied without armament and are intended solely as donor vehicles for reuse of parts. The DAF and YPR parts will be used for vehicles supplied previously by the Netherlands.

The licence application was assessed against the eight criteria of the EU's Common Position on arms exports.¹ The most relevant parts of this assessment, which resulted in the approval of the application, are summarised below.

Human rights (criterion 2)

The human rights situation in Jordan is better than in many other countries in the region. In comparison, Jordan is stable and its government policy moderate. Yet there is still cause for concern. There is concern over incidents of maltreatment of prisoners, violation of the human rights of Palestinian refugees and limiting of the freedom of the press, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. On 21 December 2014 Jordan lifted its eight-year moratorium on the death penalty and executed 11 people. Another 113 people have been sentenced to death in various murder cases. Jordan is failing to sufficiently implement many of the reforms it has promised.

However there is no connection between the Jordanian armed forces and the human rights violations observed.

Internal conflicts (criterion 3)

The country's economic situation remains troubling. Many Jordanians are dissatisfied with the economic situation. Unemployment is high. The civil war in Syria and ISIS's recent advance in Iraq and Syria has had a considerable spillover effect in Jordan. The influx of migrants has led to major shortages in the areas of healthcare, education, housing and water, and is putting pressure on Jordanian society.

Despite all the turbulence in the region, the internal situation in Jordan is relatively stable. The government does its best to maintain peace and calm and the risk of conflicts emerging is limited. Nonetheless, Jordan has a legitimate need for security, particularly in view of its current support for the anti-ISIS coalition and the increased risk of attacks targeting the country. Although heated demonstrations take place, they are generally not violent. Over the past years the Jordanian armed forces have not been deployed to contain demonstrations. The risk of the armoured vehicles being used against Jordan's own population is thus considered very slight.

Regional stability (criterion 4)

Jordan plays an important stabilising role in the region, for instance in the Israeli-Palestinian talks and with regard to ISIS and Syria. Jordan's international position was strengthened when it was elected to the UN Security Council. Its role in the reception of Syrian refugees has also enhanced the country's importance in the international arena.

Until recently, Jordan adopted a cautious approach towards Syria and tried to find a political solution. On 22 September 2014 Jordan joined the anti-ISIS coalition along with the US and a number of Gulf states. It has since bombed ISIS targets.

Jordan has a very legitimate need for security, has no intention of staking territorial claims, and is part of a broad international anti-ISIS coalition in which the Netherlands also participates.

¹ Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.