CONFERENCE REPORT

Leave no one behind:
Building resilience by 2030
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PREFACE

On 5–6 April 2016, 330 policymakers, academics and thought leaders gathered in Stockholm for the annual Stockholm Forum on Security and Development. The participants hailed from 47 countries and 140 institutions, including 38 universities, think tanks and research institutes; 35 governmental bodies; 21 international and multilateral institutions; 42 civil society organizations and 4 private-sector corporations and membership organizations. The 2016 Forum, co-hosted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, challenged high-level experts to critically examine the implementation framework of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to ensure that no one is left behind.

Initiated in 2014, the Stockholm Forum on Security and Development provides a neutral platform for interdisciplinary exchange among members of the international security and development communities. In a combination of structured workshops, plenary sessions, presentations and informal meetings, participants discuss common challenges, best practices and cutting-edge research on pressing global issues. This report provides a brief summary of the main observations, takeaways and recommendations that emerged from each session of the 2016 Forum.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

SIPRI would like to recognize its co-host, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, partner organizations and key contributors. Without their intellectual, financial and in-kind contributions, the 2016 Stockholm Forum on Security and Development would not have been possible.
OPENING PLENARY

In the opening plenary, discussants Margot Wallström (Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs), Jan Eliasson (Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations), Isabella Lövin (Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation) and Emilia Pires (Special Envoy of the g7+) reflected on how to ensure peace and security for all, using the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as the foundation for increased global collaboration. Each speaker emphasized the interdependence of development, humanitarian, peacebuilding and environmental objectives and the shared responsibility of national and international actors to meet them. Referencing the 2030 Agenda’s aspiration to leave no one behind, the speakers affirmed the unique challenges posed by fragility and accentuated the need for targeted financing and strategic partnerships in response. Themes of inclusivity, human rights and good governance were woven throughout the four interventions. Although the year was marked by tremendous violence, extraordinary refugee flows and unprecedented humanitarian assistance spending, the panellists collectively remarked on the policy momentum borne out of 2015’s global agreements: Together these documents constitute a mutually reinforcing toolkit for global security and development going forward.

GREATER COLLABORATION BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ACTORS

In the context of the Stockholm Declaration of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, and the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit, this session focused on how to increase collaboration between humanitarian and development actors. The following are three of the key takeaways that emerged from the discussion, hosted by the OECD and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

• Invest in the capacity-building of local actors to enable their management and coordination of external actors and ability to monitor and evaluate multi-stakeholder responses.

• Humanitarian and development agencies should proactively identify work streams and processes that stand to benefit from increased collaboration—namely within data collection, context analysis, monitoring, information sharing and risk management.

• Increase investments in shared humanitarian and development objectives such as conflict prevention and women’s empowerment in fragile contexts, particularly when incorporated into multi-year strategic plans.
BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS TO REDUCE ILLICIT ARMS FLOWS

SDG Target 16.4 aims to significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organized crime. Linking peace promotion with sustainable development, this target represents an important step in recognizing the illicit arms trade as a development issue. However, benchmarks for measuring the success or failure of 16.4 do not exist, and there is a need for more data on the scope and nature of the problem with regard to arms trafficking. In this session, organized by Small Arms Survey, participants discussed the development of new indicators and metrics, both quantitative and qualitative, to improve analysis and action around the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Partnerships and sharing of knowledge and best practices are needed to reach this goal. One proposal put forth by the German Government has called for a ‘global partnership on SALW’ to include member states, civil society, academia and private sectors. Overall, more work is needed to realize the potential of partnerships in addressing SDG Target 16.4 with regard to the control of SALW.

ELECT THE COUNCIL

The UN Security Council (UNSC) consists of five permanent members and ten members elected on a rotating basis. In June 2016, the next UNSC election will take place. Five non-permanent seats will be elected to serve a two-year mandate, beginning 1 January 2017. However, there has been concern about the inclusiveness of the Council as well as its strategic direction. In this session, organized by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa), participants examined the need for changes in the UNSC, including a transition to refocus the conversation on regional interests (away from national ones). Proposals also call for a sea change in the council’s behaviour—to become less interventionist and to address truly global issues. Overall, participants discussed a need to create a space to have discussions about increased inclusivity and representativeness within the UNSC, including a space for civil society, academia and other actors.
THE SOCIAL COHESION INDEX

Social cohesion is characterized by resilient social relations, positive emotional connectedness to the community and a pronounced focus on the common good. This session presented new and ongoing research being undertaken by the Jabobs University Bremen and SIPRI on the value of social cohesion in relation to security and development outcomes. Participants considered the various dimensions of social cohesion (i.e. identity, degree of acceptance of diversity; development of social networks; perceptions of fairness, solidarity and helpfulness; levels of trust in institutions and people; respect for social rules and degree of civic participation), how they could be measured and the usefulness of social cohesion data in the formulation of development interventions and implementation frameworks.

GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS (GIS) FOR PEACE

This session sought to discuss the value of establishing an online platform or community of practice on how GIS can be used to inform peacebuilding. Discussants shared their experiences using GIS in different capacities related to peace within academia, policy and practice. Hosted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the session evaluated how a yearly conference, virtual network and publication series might further promote the use of GIS technology in the field of peacebuilding and provide an opportunity for GIS users to share experiences and ideas. Participants identified an examination of the data needs of the peacebuilding community that are not being met by current data platforms as a next step. There was general consensus that the proposed ‘GIS for Peace’ initiative could help connect practitioners with timely and relevant data resources, although the risk that data could be misused by malignant actors was also expressed.
LEAVE NO ONE BEHIND: BUILDING RESILIENCE BY 2030

The 2030 Agenda is the first global development framework to acknowledge the linkages between peace and development. In order to reach the most vulnerable populations, those living in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, the 2030 Agenda will need to be integrated horizontally (across the 17 SDGs, UN agencies and other development, humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations) and vertically (into local, national, regional and international policy frameworks). The migration crisis was highlighted as a security and development challenge requiring cross-sector, multi-phased interventions and having root causes linked to many of the individual SDGs. Beyond institutional collaboration, achievement of the SDGs will require broadly inclusive approaches that engage women, youth, civil society and both local and national governments in policy implementation and monitoring.

MIGRATION AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT: CHALLENGES TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

In 2015, the world witnessed a dramatic upsurge in the number of forcibly displaced people. UNHCR reports that the figure rose to more than 60 million, the highest it has been since World War II. Moreover the International Organization for Migration (IOM) asserts that there are an additional 150 million international migrants who have crossed borders for economic reasons.

Migration governance is a global challenge that requires new strategies, greater international cooperation and multilateral approaches. The upcoming UN Summit on Refugees and Migrants (UNSRM), which will be held in September 2016, will address movements, migration and refugees. Recognizing migration as a global responsibility, the Summit calls for member states to strengthen their commitments.

Of the 169 targets supporting the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), seven refer explicitly to migrants and migration. Their inclusion in the 2030 Agenda demonstrates a clear understanding that achievement of the SDGs will be impossible without consideration for migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons. This session focused on current trends in global migratory flows and their associated risks, as well as the implications for development and global security. The following emerged as key takeaways from the session discussion:

- Migration is a shared global responsibility and a public good.
- The system of protection (governance and instruments) should be improved.
- Capacity and competences related to migration—including financing commitments—need to be built and maintained.
- Migration and its governance will play a strong role in the effectiveness of SDG implementation.
CLOSING PLENARY
In the closing plenary, panellists concluded that need for collaboration, discussion and connection building is fundamental to the implementation of the SDGs. Collective effort must be dedicated at all levels and in all sectors and sub-sectors to ensure efficient, inclusive and effective approaches to planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Myriad challenges exist, including resistance to gender equality and human rights, the need to take into account local contexts and histories, a lack of resources and capacity, and the conceptual and structural barriers that isolate sectors. However, greater collaboration, partnership and dialogue, along with strong leadership, can overcome these challenges. The ultimate driving goal of the SDGs is to improve lives. This will require making more concrete efforts to establish links across relevant sectors (humanitarian, development, peacebuilding) and developing ways of working that do not duplicate efforts, but support and strengthen existing ones. Finally, as the 2030 Agenda is a universal one, collaboration among all sectors of society—governments, donors and civil society—needs to be supported.
OVERCOMING EXCLUSION: HOW TO REALIZE INCLUSIVE PEACEBUILDING

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INTRODUCTION

The parallel resolutions[^1] on the Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture that passed in the UN Security Council and General Assembly, respectively, both highlighted the importance of inclusivity in the advancement of national peacebuilding processes and recognized the conceptual framework of ‘sustaining peace’.[^2] The Stockholm Declaration, issued by the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in April, similarly commits to improving systems to ensure inclusion and accountability and to rebuild trust between states and citizens.[^3] With the recognition that peace and sustainable development are inextricably linked and an aim to leave no one behind, the 2030 Agenda provides an opportunity to re-examine the state of inclusivity in peacebuilding.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

The international community’s recognition of and recommitment to broadening the number and kind of stakeholders in peacebuilding activities is useful, but they must be coupled with implementation approaches that effectively address the main challenges to realizing inclusivity. The cultivation of authentic national ownership, a condition critical to sustaining peace, poses one such challenge. Often wrongly equated with government ownership, national ownership requires broad-based, multi-layered local participation in a peacebuilding programme’s design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation, none of which can be skipped or abbreviated.[^4]

Inclusivity, however, does not require that all stakeholders participate in every phase of a peace process. Because peace negotiations are often limited to a select group, it is essential that peace processes follow the peace agreement and engage all segments of society, and that the details of the agreement are widely and transparently communicated. To this end, how and when different stakeholders are entitled or obliged to participate must be expressed clearly to ensure that opposing or competing stakeholders do not confuse inclusion with unfair influence, and that vulnerable and marginalized groups are able to participate meaningfully.

Civil society plays a key role in building and sustaining peace. While the international community has made strides towards supporting civil society’s role in capacity and relationship building, and by increasing the engagement space available to it, systematic and evidence-based research on the role of civil society actors and the circumstances underpinning their participation in peacebuilding is still lacking.[^5] As a result, the inclusion of civil society actors is frequently overlooked or restricted to a limited group of capital-based actors.

The number of women holding key positions in peace negotiations is low and, 15 years since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, significant barriers to women’s full partici-

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[^4]: For a more on challenges to realizing local ownership see McCann, J., ‘Local ownership—an imperative for inclusive peacebuilding’, Development Dialogue, no. 63 (Dec. 2015)

pation in peacebuilding persist. Women who are included in peace processes are often members of the educated elite and are thus detached from the conflict experiences of a majority of the constituency whom they are meant to represent.

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2250 in December 2016 affirming the importance of the role of young people in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding and reconciliation. The resolution acknowledges that in countries affected by armed conflict, youth often represent a majority of the population and a large proportion of those affected by violence and displacement, and are most impacted by the disruption of public services. It also recognizes that youth radicalization and recruitment into violent extremist groups threatens global peace and security. For youth, it is especially important to counter the learned use of violence as a means of conflict resolution in order to reduce the likelihood that violent conflict will recur.

Evidence suggests that the dissemination of information is critical to inclusive peacebuilding. Better use of technology and social media can significantly improve communication about decision-making, peacebuilding implementation and resource allocation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The international community should actively promote open, inclusive and ongoing dialogue at the national and local levels among government, civil society and other stakeholders, including women, youth and religious and traditional leaders.
   - The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) highlight the function of data availability and measurement capacity in identifying where exclusion exists and facilitating evidence-based decision making on how best to address it.
   - International actors should consider ways to positively influence legal and social norms to provide the space and practice for inclusive bottom-up deliberation about the priorities and strategies for sustaining peace.
   - Particular effort needs to be made to ensure that information about peace processes reaches marginalized groups, including those who are geographically or linguistically marginalized, illiterate or have limited access to print and digital media.
   - Actors supporting peacebuilding should consider how different groups of women are included in and excluded from peace processes in order to identify new, more inclusive engagement mechanisms. Both the number of women engaged in peacebuilding and the criteria used to select them need to be evaluated. Consideration should be given to the utility of quotas and women’s entry points into various peace processes should be identified.
   - Interventions that engage youth should consider generational tensions as well as how the historic and cultural contexts of a country might play out in peacebuilding processes. Educators play a critical role in promoting a culture of peace and in countering messages of hatred and intolerance.

2. Donors and national governments should ensure that financial resources are allocated in ways that reflect commitments to inclusive peacebuilding, with adequate funding allocated to support participation and capacity building of civil society, with an emphasis on women and youth.
   - SDG implementation should be seen as an opportunity to reassess and reinforce inclusivity in peacebuilding.
   - With support from the international community, national governments should develop and implement inclusive accountability frameworks, engaging diverse stakeholders.

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6 E.g. The Global Study on SCR 1325 points out that in a study on 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011 only 9% of negotiators were women. Only 3% of the military in UN missions are women. See p.14
PEACE BY 2030? THE REALITY OF COMPLEX VIOLENCE TODAY

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INTRODUCTION

The term ‘complex violence’ refers to conditions in which multiple, discrete and interactive forms of conflict and violence coexist in time and place—a common feature of many societies experiencing fragility. Complex violence can include civil and interstate war, organized crime, domestic political instability and social violence, and is produced and reinforced by a range of state, non-state and external actors. The challenges facing peacebuilders and those working to deliver development outcomes in the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) era in these environments are further complicated by how these forms of violence interact. This brief introduces the concept and related key trends with the aims of developing a more robust interpretation of the multidimensionality of violence, exploring how research on complex violence can yield a more dynamic understanding of risk and threat for citizens and states.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

Understanding complex violence involves a look at changing conflict dynamics. Violent actors can use different forms of violence to accomplish their objectives and often adapt due to changing power dynamics, conditions and norms. Violent outcomes can be manifestations of social, environmental or economic marginalization; political exclusion; competition politics; corruption or weak state–society relationships.

The means by which types of violence are categorized may be misleading, as the type of manifestation (e.g. war or terrorism) in two different situations may not be driven by the same underlying drivers. Unpacking the complexity of violence is an attempt to understand underlying conflict and power dynamics involving various stakeholders. This is not to suggest that complex violence is a new phenomenon—much of the complexity of violence today and its various manifestations have been used by violent actors for centuries.

The SDGs are linked to many causes of violence and fragility at different levels. SDG 16 has targets on violence but also corruption, inclusive decision-making, inequality, gender and others. Since many of the indicators reflecting components and drivers of complex violence are included in SDG 16, financial and technical support to monitor these indicators may help to measure and better understand the concept of complex violence.

As with other development activities, it is important that concepts and definitions are developed with local ownership if they are to be useful. While the concept of complex violence may be a useful one for unpacking types of violence, it will only be useful for better understanding conflict if it is understood and used by local actors grappling with the challenges of development and peacebuilding. There is a risk that terms like complex violence can be defined outside a conflict system and risk remaining ‘academic’ or ‘abstract’ if they do not reflect local knowledge. Likewise, the term ‘fragile state’ or ‘fragility’ has been found to be more confusing than enlightening at times. It is important to remember that complex violence and similar terms may have different meaning at different levels.

State capacity is central to the incidence of complex violence. While democratization may have contributed to a decrease in the incidence of interstate wars, local contests seem to have increased. State violence (by states against civilians) has also increased substantially in developing countries.

Complex violence risks being everything and nothing: Because the term is so broad, the meaning could change and measurement could be difficult. As an example, fragility rankings have had a similar evolution, as they have often become synonymous with conflict risk.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Policymakers must consider the complexity of violence and acknowledge the intricacies of violence before seeking quick fixes.
   • Building inclusive governance may be more difficult in situations where complex violence is the product of political competition between elites for access to the very political systems that should be inclusive.
   • Many emerging actors consider violence a strategic, effective tool and a legitimate mode of political competition, and have been rewarded for the use of armed force by achieving political or economic objectives. SDG 16 is a useful instrument for addressing the risks to civilians and communities from their real experience of violent competition.

2. The international community should invest in institutions that produce and use information on complex violence in the planning, implementation and monitoring of security and development interventions.
   • The most promising avenue for addressing and mitigating violence is to build the capacity of local institutions and groups who aim to identify the source, extent and outcomes of political and social violence. Building their capacity to collect, code, store, manage and analyze conflict data in a systematic way is essential.
   • In the context of SDG implementation, data collection and analysis on violence and conflict must involve partnerships with local and international research institutions (e.g. conflict observatories, homicide monitoring, human rights monitoring).
   • Both national and locally-specific data are important for developing accurate situational analyses, understanding conflict dynamics and identifying discrete triggers. Useful data might include specific types of weapons used in violence; perpetrators’ links to organized crime; ethnic, religious or communal targeting of victims; and specific strategies of intimidation around elections, collective organization or political participation.

3. Researchers of complex violence must perform and communicate in-depth stakeholder analyses.
Information about conflict stakeholders and the relationships between them is critical to understanding the complexity of violence in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Assessments should consider their motivation, history, funding sources, means, methods and limitations. This requires iterative and immersive consultations with local stakeholders.
BUILDING RESILIENT, SUSTAINABLE CITIES IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS

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INTRODUCTION

By 2050 it is projected that 75 per cent of the world’s population will live in cities. Rapid urbanization poses a number of security and development threats, from inadequate housing to crime and from improper waste management to tenuous social cohesion. Insufficient capacity to respond to these challenges could contribute to the growth of slums, whose residents are underserved and marginalized. Cities will account for a growing share of national wealth and will compete for investment, talent and influence. As cities concentrate wealth and populations, they become targets for violence or threats of violence.

Among the 2030 Agenda’s many innovations, the inclusion of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11 reflects the growing importance of cities to sustainable development and a powerful tendency towards urbanization. This brief considers how development and security challenges manifest in cities and how cities themselves will bear on global security and development, including recommendations for enhancing SDG 11 implementation, monitoring and evaluation. National governments will increasingly have to incorporate perspectives of municipal authorities when they are making policies and designing strategies for the SDGs, and will depend on cooperation at the city level for implementation.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

In addition to being greater in number and size, the cities of the future will be increasingly diverse and youthful. Cities are expected to account for a growing share of national wealth and will therefore need to compete for investment, talent and influence. National governments will increasingly have to take the perspective of municipal authorities into account when they are making policies for the country as a whole, and will depend on cooperation at city level to implement policy.

Of the agreed 230 indicators proposed by the UN Statistical Commission to measure SDG implementation, 15 are directly linked to SDG 11. Collecting data on these indicators will be a formidable challenge since much of it is not available today, even in developed countries. In countries and cities where the human, technical and financial resources of statistical services are already stretched, the collection of data on SDG 11 will be particularly difficult. Moreover, the indicator set will be under constant review, and may be adjusted as more and better information, methodologies and tools become available.

Politically sensitive indicators measuring, for example, slum populations, informal settlements, inadequate housing, direct participation of civil society in municipal governance, efficiency of service delivery, or fair access to public utilities like power and water may be either not collected or not reported. Still, this is a challenge for all performance data measured by the SDGs. Cities may, alternatively, find more political space for collecting and reporting this data (and serve as an example for countries with lagging transparency at the national level).

Where comprehensive data is collected, it may not answer the question: Is SDG 11 being implemented effectively? The indicators agreed upon in SDG 11 were simplified to things that can be quantified, rather than more subjective factors. For example, convenient access to public transportation can be measured by calculating how many people have a form of public transport within 1 kilometre of where they live. However, what if there is a train...
station, but no trains are running? What if citizens will not walk the kilometre to a bus route because they must pass through an area where the risk of crime, or harassment based on their gender or ethnicity, is unacceptably high?

RECOMMENDATIONS

Data collection by the states that have pledged to support the implementation of the SDGs is necessary, but not sufficient. The national efforts will need to be supplemented in different ways.

1. The academic and non-governmental community should contribute to SDG 11 monitoring and evaluating efforts either by building or multiplying the capacity of national governments.
   - The data that will be collected and analyzed to measure progress on the SDGs is, in many instances, already being carried out for different purposes. These data, and the means used to collect them, should be incorporated into the monitoring and evaluation framework for SDG 11.
   - Because measurement of elements of SDG 11 will be undertaken in fragile environments, it is essential that the personal security of those tasked with collecting data is given sufficient consideration and precautionary measures are taken. Many funders impose regulations to reduce security risks but which also act as barriers to important research. Private foundations, who determine their funding rules using different criteria from government authorities, could help finance capacity building and data collection in support of SDG 11 measurement.

2. National statistical reports may need to be supplemented by data acquired using different methodologies.
   - For example, methodologies designed to measure social cohesion by using large but focused citizen surveys could shed light on key aspects of urban security. The Social Cohesion Radar developed in Bremen, Germany, is one example of a methodology that measures the degree of acceptance of diversity; the development of social networks; perceptions of fairness, solidarity and helpfulness; the level of trust in institutions; the level of trust in people; respect for social rules and the degree of civic participation.
   - Combining official data with data collected using alternative methodologies could provide a more comprehensive picture of progress on SDG 11.

3. New and emerging technologies should be incorporated in SDG 11 measurement efforts.
   - The rapid spread of access to mobile, digital information and communication technology has facilitated peer-to-peer information sharing and generated large amounts of data. To give one example, anonymous citizen participation through mobile devices can be used to measure quality of city services.
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL SPENDING

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INTRODUCTION

The military expenditures of states, especially those of fragile countries, are important to understanding security and stability. According to data compiled by SIPRI, many fragile developing economies are currently increasing their spending in the military and security sectors. This trend raises questions about the relationship between military spending and peace and security, on one hand, and whether military spending is effective, efficient and transparent, on the other. In fragile contexts, the reliability of military expenditure data does pose a methodological challenge for researchers. However, much information can still be gleaned from what military spending data does exist, despite its flaws. This brief considers the aforementioned questions as they relate to security and development in fragile contexts.

FINDINGS

Military expenditure data is an important measure of the resources devoted to military security and can be a proxy indicator for other security and development targets. However, its usefulness is limited and depends on other contextual knowledge regarding, for instance, what the money is spent on and how spending is budgeted, managed, reported and overseen. Some areas of military spending may be veiled: In many cases, expenditures on arms are not included in official military expenditure data.

Governance of the security sector remains poor in many countries. This is especially true in fragile contexts where it may be easier for the military to evade oversight. Low levels of transparency in military budgets and actual expenditures are present in both developed and developing countries, and significant amounts of extra-budgetary and off-budget military spending are common. A lack of transparency in any area of public spending may facilitate corruption. In the case of military spending, it may contribute to waste or spending on goods and services that are ill-suited to the most pressing security needs.

Both developed and developing countries demonstrate irrational arms procurement decisions, those which do not reflect their actual security needs. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo purchased fighter jets for which it had no clear need, and Malaysia bought submarines that would not submerge.

Positive trends can be noted in some countries. In many countries, the increased capacity of institutions and improvements in civilian oversight achieved through, for example, ministries of finance or defence have improved accountability in the area of military expenditures.

Increases in military expenditures do not necessarily guarantee an improvement in security, especially in fragile situations. In fact, when misdirected, expanding military spending and arms procurement can lead to a loss of resources and the deterioration of internal stability. The latter is especially prevalent when in situations when the military acts in the interests of a particular faction or group. For this reason, when evaluating security threats and responses, it is important to consider for whom a proposed intervention or expenditure will provide security (e.g. the state, citizens, certain groups within the citizenry).

In some circumstances, excessive military expenditures reflect corruption, mismanagement or improper planning, which can result in a loss of public resources that could otherwise be invested in social and human development. To this end, the concept of national defence has been manipulated and misused in a variety of contexts.
There is often a significant correlation between increases in military spending and a lack of oversight. In many developing countries, excessive resources invested in arms procurement and/or national defence appears to have been diverted to meet the interest of military factions, especially among those that maintain a strong influence over the economy. For these reasons, increases in military budgets do not always contribute to improved security.

Excessive military expenditure can result in a loss of resources for development and humanitarian challenges. The latter contribute to human insecurity and are also frequently linked to national security threats. A focus on human security, rather than national security, might generate a very different military expenditure portfolio and help governments to determine the appropriate balance of investment in military versus social spending, as it relates to improving security.

Fundamental institutional reforms, such as the publication of detailed national defence budgets, the introduction of budgetary oversight systems by legislative bodies and independent auditors, and improved transparency in defence policy formation and budgeting, are necessary to improving the governance of military expenditure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In fragile contexts, institutional capacity building initiatives and military assistance programmes should aim to improve the governance and transparency of military expenditures.
   - Cooperation among security assistance partners is essential in fragile contexts and should be rooted in an agreement on the importance of governance as it relates to the planning, budgeting and control of military spending.
   - Security assistance programs focused solely on training and equipment may not contribute to human security and may even be fuel insecurity by building up predatory forces that could then be used against the country’s own people.
   - As military expenditures are directly related to a state’s security and defence, establishing international norms around basic governance and transparency in military spending could promote such efforts, but would require considerable support from major powers.

2. Funders and technical assistance providers should invest in developing oversight and audit mechanisms for military expenditures in fragile contexts.
   - Capacity building for the control of military spending could be centred on the empowerment of existing domestic institutions and civilian oversight through legislative bodies or civil society actors.
   - The development of domestic auditing systems could be supported by security sector reform and institutional capacity building programmes.

3. Human security considerations should figure prominently in budgeting and policy formation processes.

4. Developed countries should ‘lead by example’ by exhibiting best practice in transparency and accountability.
BEYOND PARIS: USING CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS TO MANAGE RISK

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INTRODUCTION

The potentially devastating consequences of climate change are well established. However, the implications for security and development—and the transformative actions that need to be undertaken to limit global temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius (°C) or less, as agreed at the 2015 Paris Climate Conference (COP21)—are less clear. A group of 30 researchers, policymakers and practitioners gathered for two consecutive workshops during the 2016 SIPRI Forum on Security and Development to deepen the understanding of these implications.

They session examined two contrasting scenarios to consider distinctly different futures. The radical emissions reduction (RER) scenario depicted a future on track to meet the Paris Agreement, but where the requisite transformational changes could have significant repercussions on security and development. The high-end climate change (HCC) scenario described a future where the impacts of climate change themselves cause major security and development challenges.

Using the RER and HCC scenarios as a point of departure, workshop participants discussed the challenges associated with implementing four pre-selected Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): SDG 2 on food security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture; SDG 5 on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; SDG 7 on access to affordable and clean energy; and SDG 10 on inequality. The regional implications of each scenario for oil-producing countries were also considered. Saudi Arabia was selected to highlight potential impacts of each scenario in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Nigeria was selected to examine the possible effects in West Africa.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

SDG implementation challenges under the RER scenario:

- Threats related to competition over land use for food and bioenergy would likely increase, impacting the success of SDG 2 implementation. Under the RER scenario, the fate of agricultural development in poor regions is heavily dependent upon continued access to conventional fossil fuel sources.
- An increase in the incidence of gender-based violence would likely result from the population displacements cause by large-scale biofuel production. Of equal importance to SDG 5 implementation, the amount of time required to provide for basic needs would increase if agricultural systems in poor areas were deprived of easily accessible fossil energy. In fragile contexts, where gender inequality tends to be low, women often serve as caregivers.
- Food-versus-fuel conflicts would increase under the RER scenario. In countries that are economically dependent on fossil fuel extraction, new competitive tensions related to ownership of renewable technologies could forestall progress towards SDG 7. Similarly, the risk of nuclear proliferation resulting from rapid build-out of nuclear power would increase.
- SDG 10 performance would be impacted by unequal access to technologies, increased energy prices and the fact that the cost of mitigation efforts could considerably reduce Official Development Assistance levels.
Regional implications of the RER scenario:

- In Saudi Arabia, rapidly declining oil revenues could cause a collapse of the regime, which would have unpredictable effects on geopolitics. There would, however, be a short window of opportunity in which Saudi oil revenues could be used to finance a switch to a solar-based energy economy.
- In Nigeria the RER scenario presents a range of positive opportunities relating to the potential of renewables and empowering the private sector. In this sense, the loss of oil revenues could be seen as a driver of inequality and conflict but also as a chance to expand the country's economic portfolio and reduce the corruption associated with its oil market.

SDG implementation challenges under the HCC scenario:

- Achievement of SDG 2 would be negatively impacted by agricultural adaptation difficulties that could lead to declining production, food shortages and increasing conflict.
- An increase in the number of armed conflicts and the negative effect of poor economic growth on women's opportunities would likely have adverse effects on SDG 5 implementation.
- SDG 7 performance would be hindered by the consequences of increasing geopolitical disorder and more frequent production disruptions. For example, under the HCC scenario, hydropower production could be drained by lower precipitation levels and higher instances of extreme weather would increase the risk that key
- Global inequalities would increase as a result of changes in agricultural and industrial productivity, thus hampering the implementation of SDG 10. The disruptive effects of high and volatile food prices would likely have a disproportionate impact on poor communities.

Regional implications of the HCC scenario:

- Continued oil revenues in Saudi Arabia would help to preserve the regime and could cause further regional destabilization by enabling the House of Saud to spread Wahhabism through support to extremist groups. However, higher temperatures and the resulting droughts could cause migration and incite protests, which would have a destabilizing effect in Saudi Arabia and on other MENA regimes.
- In Nigeria the HCC scenario resulted in a gradual deterioration of water access, dramatically impacting agriculture. Resource conflicts would increase and likely contribute to the growing influence of Boko Haram and other extremist groups. Forced adaptation arose as an opportunity in the HCC scenario, providing produce suppliers that could modify their behaviour a competitive edge in the market.

CONCLUSIONS

While the threats posed by HCC are evident, the development and security consequences of the RER needed to comply with the 2015 Paris Agreement are not well understood. The scenarios in these workshops illustrate how the short-term geopolitical costs of taking action to meet global climate targets may surpass long-term benefits in different contexts. Without undermining the urgent need for climate action these costs should be given extensive consideration in the formulation of national climate policies. Additional research analysing the extent to which implementation of different SDGs may strengthen or weaken the performance of others is needed in order to identify optimal policy pathways with regard to the 2030 Agenda's overall achievement and its relation to related policy frameworks, like the Paris Agreement. In reality, national strategies will likely include elements of both scenarios. In order to build preparedness and manage risks associated with different pathways, policy portfolios should be robust across and capture a range of plausible developments.
IMAGINING THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

The strategic direction of peace operations will take on great importance in the coming years. Peace operations are being called on more frequently to deploy to complex and active conflict zones while at the same time facing an increasing complexity of tasks and expectations. The findings of the UN’s 2015 High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), which are now being implemented, called for holistic and tailored operations enabled by timely and flexible partnerships among key global stakeholders and mandating institutions.

Peace operations have direct relevance to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 and their ability to effectively provide peace and stability in conflict-affected countries indirectly influences performance on the other SDGs. This brief examines the challenges confronting modern peace operations and recommends actions that would reduce the impact thereof.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

The largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) today are deployed on the African continent. The UN and African Union (AU) peace operations in Africa are constantly confronted with insufficient funding. While the AU Commission is developing a roadmap to implement its 2015 decision that African member states shall fund up to 25 per cent of its peace operations by 2020, the HIPPO report urges the international community to agree on a financing modality that would cover 75 per cent of the costs. The policy process going forward must seek agreement on sustainable financing modalities, whether from the UN assessed contributions budget and/or partners and donors. On one hand, since the European Union (EU) is scaling down its co-funding through the Africa Peace Facility mechanism, the financial situation of PKOs could become critical. On the other hand, emerging actors such as China and Indonesia are willing to increase their financial contributions to UN peace operations. It is important for future peace operations that the UN embrace these new geographic financing shifts.

The inadequacy of resources available for peace operations has known consequences on the number and severity of troop and police casualties. For instance, improvised explosive device-related fatalities are higher among African peace operations troops than among Europeans deployed in UN peace operations, in part because the UN is better equipped to withstand the attacks. Moreover, insufficient force enablers make African countries dependent on their many partners and donors for technical and strategic airlifts and resources.

Mission roles and mandates also present challenges. To date, peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities have operated in different UN spheres and this fragmentation has negatively impacted their implementation. The Liberia disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) programme, for example, shows how peace operations sometimes lose speed and do not smoothly transition to peacebuilding activities. As seen in Libya, the Central African Republic and Somalia, peace operations also risk being co-opted into the counterinsurgency (COIN) and countering violent extremism (CVE) operations. Although there is consensus that violent extremism threatens global peace and security, there is disagreement about the appropriate responses and the actors best suited to implement them. The HIPPO report clearly states, ‘the Panel believes that United Nations peacekeeping missions, owing to their composition and character, are not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations’. How the HIPPO findings will be incorporated into UN peace operations is yet to be determined. The ongo-
The ongoing debate is focused on how best to optimize the comparative advantages of regional organizations, including the possibility that African regional actors could take on counterinsurgency and CVE efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Follow-through on proposed reforms that have not yet been implemented.
   - Extensive reviews of UN peace operations, including the HIPPO report, a mini-review on UN policing, and the Global Study on Resolution 1325, have already generated important recommendations.
   - To the extent that it could put constructive pressure on the UN Security Council, generate additional external analysis to confirm or deny the need to implement recommendations already put forth in the aforementioned UN reviews.

2. Integrate peace operations and their various components both horizontally and vertically within related policy frameworks and coordinate efforts amongst key stakeholders.
   - Mobilize political support for peace operations as a tool to facilitate implementation of the 2030 Agenda, given that political dynamics are constantly changing among the Security Council’s Permanent Representatives.
   - Pick ‘low-hanging fruit’ when it comes to peacebuilding within the UN framework. Find ways to include peacebuilding in peace operations mandates in a way that does not require reform. In certain circumstances, it may be beneficial to incorporate peacebuilding activities into peacekeeping mandates, while in others there may be strong reasons to keep the roles and responsibilities separate.
   - Although the primary responsibility for peace operations rests with the UN Security Council, the international community needs to recognize the abilities of the European Union, African Union and other regional organizations and raise awareness about their practical responsibilities, based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
   - Improve linkages between uniformed missions and other types of missions.
   - Connect peace operations with the humanitarian operations. This includes enhancing knowledge about and respect for international humanitarian law among troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries.

3. Peace operations should espouse a ‘people-centred’ approach.
   - Link UN peace operations to the people most in need of support and to strengthen structures of ‘active agents of security’ in-country. Civil society organizations can play a significant role in articulating local perspectives, needs and interests. Women, youth and opposition groups should be consulted with regard to peace operations at the local and regional levels.
   - Pay attention to opportunities and risks for local actors. Peace operations need to identify means of developing closer connections with communities without compromising the security of local actors. Given the limits of engagement by external actors, it is important to empower local actors to support peace within their own communities. For locals, engaging with external actors is a security risk.
   - Peacekeeping troops must be trained to a certain standard, particularly around preventing sexual exploitation and abuse.
INTRODUCTION

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are wielded and abused by diverse actors around the world, including individuals, state militaries, and non-state actors. Their widespread availability, relatively low cost and ease of concealment and transport make SALW universally appealing to violent individuals and groups during war and peace. The proliferation of SALW in fragile contexts, which often lack functioning governance structures like border controls, often catalyzes or exacerbates violent conflict. To this end, SALW function as a violence multiplier that impedes human security and sustainable development.

The 2030 Agenda acknowledges the development and human security threats posed by SALW and provides a unique opportunity for states to address them through Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16.4, which calls for a significant reduction in illicit financial and arms flows. The Sixth Biennial Meeting of the States on the Programme of Action (BMS6) provides states a platform to reinforce their commitments to addressing SALW and identify ways to increase political will, generate resources and increase donor coordination on SALW in support of SDG 16 implementation. This brief considers evidence related to the effectiveness of SALW control efforts and proposes tools and processes that would improve their efficacy.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

There is a broad and comprehensive set of instruments in place to control and monitor SALW proliferation; however, their implementation is inconsistent and, at times, ineffectual. Implementation approaches often lack context-specific nuances, gender analyses and links to other relevant security and development frameworks. For example, implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted in 2013, has drawn a significant amount of attention to the need for improved export control systems. The ATT does not, however, offer sufficient specificity to respond to the context-specific needs inherent in SALW proliferation.

When locally implemented disarmament programs lack sufficient context- and conflict-sensitivity, they risk creating security imbalances between stakeholder communities, within and across national borders. In Mali, for example, where previously successful programs had been able to reduce weapons flows from Libya, progress was later reversed as the result of shifting conflict dynamics that were not incorporated into the control programme.

SALW is a highly gendered issue that requires gender-sensitive approaches in any implementation efforts. For instance, SALW are often used to facilitate sexual and gender-based violence, such as the abduction of 200 schoolgirls in Chibok, Nigeria, in 2014 and mass rapes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2010. They also reinforce violent masculinities and gendered social norms wherein men must exhibit dominance and physical aggression to affirm their masculinity. The inclusion of a provision on gender-based violence in the ATT was monumental. However, little has been done to incorporate broader gender concerns into arms control and disarmament activities on the ground.

The incorporation of SALW proliferation into broader human security and development discourses is key to building political will and encouraging multi-sector approaches. The latter is especially important in fragile contexts where complex security threats and development challenges require multifaceted approaches to SALW, not least through measures that go beyond international export control. In the 1990s, coordinated efforts in the...
western Balkans successfully built networks between officials, established trust-building and information-sharing networks among key SALW control actors, and secured stockpiles.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Refocus efforts to address SALW proliferation on the UN Program of Action (POA)**
   - Recognizing context specificities does not preclude collaboration and coordination between states on common challenges. Global mechanisms like the UN POA, which promotes coordination and exchange between nations, could help to customize control mechanisms and implementation approaches to unique country contexts in a way that takes into account lessons learned and best practices.
   - States attending the BMS6 in June 2016 should articulate their commitment to the POA and recognize that it must be implemented parallel with ATT implementation.

2. **Incorporate a broader spectrum of actors and analyses into the development of arms control and disarmament approaches.**
   - Acknowledging the gendered aspects of SALW proliferation is central to understanding the social structures associated with weapons, namely the linkages between violent masculinities and gendered social norms and the proliferation and ownership of SALW. Gender-sensitive analyses might be able to identify approaches that better address the gendered aspects of SALW proliferation. Inclusion of women’s rights and gender equality advocates will ensure that gender is mainstreamed across SALW non-proliferation activities.
   - To be successful, disarmament and arms control programs must include stakeholders from different sectors and expertise areas. As such, implementation approaches should be developed in consultation with legal, political and technical experts as well as development practitioners and civil society representatives from affected communities. Civil society should play a critical role in promoting disarmament and preventing SALW proliferation by facilitating local dialogue, building local ownership and changing attitudes about weapons and violence.

3. **Use networks and new knowledge to build political will for arms control and disarmament.**
   - The establishment of parliamentary networks is one way to promote the ratification of arms control legislation and encourage and oversee national implementation efforts. Such networks can also be used to facilitate regional and global exchanges between legislators from different countries, increasing political ownership of non-proliferation. SALW-related issues must be understood in technical and political terms in order for sustainable solutions to be developed and successfully implemented.
   - Increase research on the effects of SALW proliferation and the efficacy of various control mechanisms, particularly with regard to the indicators on SALW and armed violence in the 2030 Agenda.
WHO WILL DEFEND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ORDER TO DELIVER THE SDGS?

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INTRODUCTION

The 2030 Agenda implicitly and explicitly includes a number of human rights objectives, thereby linking the performance of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to national governments’ ability to meet certain human rights principals. This connection presupposes the existence of individuals and groups that scrutinize how, where and for whom development is achieved. These human rights defenders (HRDs) function both as watchdogs and advocates for the marginalized and oppressed.

Because their work challenges norms, values, policies and institutions, HRDs are often the targets of violence and intimidation. Among HRDs, women and defenders of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights are particularly at risk. While the protection of HRDs is a challenge in all countries, their insecurity is often exacerbated in fragile contexts where corruption, poor governance and structural violence undermine accountability and reduce access to justice. Increasingly restrictive legislation directed towards civil society organizations (CSOs) and the shrinking space in which they operate further confounds the security situation of HRDs. This brief outlines the most common threats faced by HRDs and recommends means by which some of these threats could be overcome.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

The primary threats to HRDs include restricted movement, assembly and expression; access and service denial; defamation; asset forfeiture; harassment; intimidation; detention; assault; torture; disappearance and death. In addition to endangering personal wellbeing, these threats also reduce the operational effectiveness of organizations that engage in human rights work by eroding public trust, preventing them from communicating with key stakeholders and limiting fundraising capacity. While some HRDs are unable to leave their country (or even their homes), others are forced to flee to protect themselves and their families.

Telecommunications and cyberspace are also rife with insecurity. Government security services often secretly monitor HRDs’ online behaviour including public posts (e.g. social media, chat forums) and private exchanges (e.g. email, text, telephone calls). In countries where the accountability of public figures is low and access to justice is restricted, HRDs have very few means at their disposal to counter such abuses. Slander, vilification and smear campaigns are easily reinforced on social media where women HRDs are specifically targeted.

Without the incorporation of human rights provisions, legislation designed to counter violent extremism (CVE) can easily be abused by regimes that aim to silence dissidents and restrict civil society’s operations and access to resources. There are numerous examples of how CVE laws have been used to subvert the rule of law, including online surveillance of HRDs and political opponents, and arbitrary detention.

In contexts marked by political volatility, shifting conflict dynamics and tenuous social cohesion, the security of HRDs can vary significantly in a very short period of time. As a result, the promotion of human rights work by international partners can, unintentionally, endanger local HRDs, particularly when they are identified by face or name.
The SDG implementation framework provides significant space to incorporate human rights components as a function of measurement efforts. For example, one of the indicators already proposed to measure SDG Target 16.10 (on public access to information and the protection of fundamental freedoms) is the number of journalists and HRDs killed, kidnapped, disappeared, detained or tortured in last 12 months.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The UN and other international policymaking bodies should play a proactive role in ensuring the protection of HRDs and maintenance of a safe and enabling civil society environment through policy.
   - HRDs serve an essential role (watchdogs) in the evaluation of progress towards many of the SDGs.
   - The 2030 Agenda provides an opportunity to integrate human rights into global sustainable development efforts. Specifically, the indicators could be used to measure the extent and quality of human rights in a country as a function of its development progress.
   - To increase awareness of potential human rights abuses related to gender, principles of disaggregation must be adhered to.

2. International policies, treaties and agreements must include explicit rights provisions to ensure that security and economic prosperity do not come at the expense of fundamental human rights.
   - CVE and national security policies should directly refer to the freedoms of expression, association, assembly and privacy, and should carefully define violent extremism and violent extremists so that the policy cannot be easily abused.
   - The inclusion of binding human rights provisions in trade agreements is one way to ensure that vulnerable populations are not instrumentalized for economic gain. Such provisions might refer to specific national and international policies regarding indigenous rights, land rights, labour rights and the right to political participation.

3. The international community should be more conscious of the local security context and its evolution over time.
   - Do not invite HRDs or at-risk civil society representatives to speak at events attended by representatives of repressive regimes or government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) without their consent.
   - Do not promote human rights work of local HRDs without first consulting them to assess whether it could jeopardize their safety and security.
   - Provide flexible, long-term financial support to HRDs and civil society organizations so that they have the capacity to adapt their operations quickly as the situation on the ground evolves.
   - Ask HRDs about travel restrictions and associated bureaucratic hurdles to avoid passport confiscation and retaliation for unsanctioned movement.
BRIDGING THE DEVELOPMENT FINANCING GAP

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INTRODUCTION

Peacebuilding is integrally linked to development. However, only a small fraction of global official development assistance (ODA) is used for peacebuilding activities. Because the effectiveness of peacebuilding is difficult to measure relative to other development outcomes, ‘value for money’ arguments may contribute to the financing shortage.

In order to resolve on-going and future conflicts, the gap between existing peacebuilding funding and the outstanding financial need must be assessed and filled. In particular, it is important to consider the scope of global peacebuilding requirements in support of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as the range of resources that could be leveraged to meet them. Despite the challenges, new financing mechanisms are emerging to supplement existing financing for peacebuilding and development in fragile contexts.

This brief examines how existing financing instruments—such as domestic revenues, global financing, ODA, and private sector contributions—and new mechanisms could be combined and coordinated. In light of the UN’s first World Humanitarian Summit (Istanbul, Turkey, May 2016), peacebuilding needs are considered with an eye to humanitarian needs and appeals.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

In 2013, approximately 16 per cent of ODA was spent on peacebuilding activities. In its Peacebuilding Architecture Review, the UN calls for a better assessment of global peacebuilding needs. To do so, the full scope of interventions and peacebuilding activities should be identified and mapped, together with their outcomes.

Issues of ownership and dependency are often raised as barriers to comprehensively assessing peacebuilding needs, particularly as they relate to differences in self-reliance and self-sufficiency in a number of post-conflict and fragile situations. The extent to which ownership and dependency issues affect the composition of nationally- and internationally-led peacebuilding activities is also a source of debate. In the past, joint needs assessments (post-conflict and post-disaster) have been extremely useful for focusing analysis and providing a country-level evaluation of peacebuilding needs. In this respect, joint needs assessments often act as an analogue to humanitarian appeals and could be coordinated with humanitarian appeals in the future.

The scope of peacebuilding needs, globally and at the country level, is still largely unknown. The concept itself requires further defining and should be included in deeper analyses of expenditures, assessments and evaluations on the effectiveness of peacebuilding activities.

Peacebuilding needs compete with and complement humanitarian needs and appeals. The international community must respond to these assessments more strategically by, for example, integrating urgent humanitarian needs into 20- or 30-year peacebuilding and development strategies. Looking back, Korea’s post-conflict reconstruction illustrates how activities then associated with development also functioned as peacebuilding activities.

Labelling and categorizing activities (as peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development or humanitarian, for instance) can limit funding and constrains the way in they are framed and employed in response to peacebuilding needs. Coordination between development and humanitarian actors remains a challenge whereas a lack of clarity regarding the source and purpose of different funding streams is the primary issue for governments. On the other
hand, establishing special financing targets for marginalized groups, namely women youth, could help to ensure that they are included in peacebuilding and able to contribute in a meaningful way.

Questions remain unanswered on issues related to the gaps of unmet peacebuilding needs. For example, civil society organizations are generally underfunded and women’s organizations are an especially vulnerable subset of civil society organizations with regard to funding. It is unclear what the gendered aspects of development funding are, and what the relationship is between shrinking aid, gender-programmed aid and peacebuilding in the SDG era.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. **Improve the measurement of peacebuilding activities and outcomes.**
   - As peacebuilding is an integral component of sustainable development, indicators will be necessary now for baselining where and how peacebuilding progress is being made and how it contributes to SDG success. Such indicators can close the policy-to-practice feedback loop: External communication about peacebuilding relies on sound measures of ‘peace’.

2. **Support developing countries in developing financing coordination mechanisms.**
   - Many developing countries need support to improve coordination instruments that enable them to follow funding and project streams within their respective foci.
   - There should be formal recognition for and practical initiatives to match interventions and coordination approaches to the needs of the specific conflict context, including religious, cultural, economic and political realities on the ground.

3. **Funders should develop messaging around how to drive long-term priority setting.**
   - Short-term ‘count’-based outcomes are not sufficient to overcome challenges.
SDG 5 IN COMPLEX FRAGILE SETTINGS: PARTICIPATION, PEACE AND POLITICS

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INTRODUCTION

Fifteen years after the adoption of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), gender equality and women’s empowerment have gained significant international commitment on the level of principles, but progress in practice is slow and fails to meet the stated targets. While Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 encompasses a more comprehensive list of targets than its predecessor, MDG 3, a set of critical obstacles stands to limit its success under the new 15-year time horizon.

Because women’s political, social and economic participation is crucial to all of the SDGs, the degree to which gender is mainstreamed across the 2030 Agenda will be a determining success factor. The opposite is also true: In fragile contexts and post-conflict countries, the balancing act between strategic opportunities and obstacles is particularly delicate and challenging. In conservative environments, misinterpretations and passivity will most likely lead to conservative backlash. Broadly speaking, if SDG 5 is implemented in a context-specific way and the development process well-managed by both national and international stakeholders, relatively quick and comprehensive change is possible. This brief outlines challenges and opportunities associated with SDG 5 implementation and draws on recent research and reviews to identify policy recommendations.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

Of the 20 per cent of official development assistance (ODA) that is gender-related, only 3 per cent is allocated to projects with a principal contribution to gender. The low level of resources appropriated to gender equality and women’s empowerment suggests their de-prioritization relative to other development objectives.

When funded, gender equality and women’s empowerment activities are rarely mainstreamed. Rather, they are often ‘added on’ at the end of the planning phase when the agenda and implementation framework have already been set. The consequences of this sequencing are threefold. Firstly, when women are prevented from meaningful participation, their diverse experiences, needs and perspectives are not fully incorporated into development policy and practice. Secondly, it puts focus on the symptoms rather than the root causes of gender inequality, as it leaves out the underlying analysis that exposes root causes and consequences. Lastly, it reduces gender equality to a ‘women’s issue’, failing to recognize the essential role that men and boys play either in reinforcing or dismantling patriarchal power structures and violent masculinities.

Empirical evidence on the development impact of gender inequality is fragmented. This knowledge gap makes it difficult to design development interventions and assess their efficacy in different contexts. Moreover, the absence of comprehensive, verifiable gender equality data reduces the ability of advocates and implementing organizations to overcome prejudice and political opposition, and secure financing. Systematic evaluations of the development initiatives designed to address gender inequality, and of the level of gender-mainstreaming in development efforts in general, are needed in order to generate a body of validated and applicable best practices.

As such, SDG 5 must be strategically related to existing global policy frameworks, in particular the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the 11 UN resolutions on Women, Peace and
Security (WPS) and the New Deal. The implementation of these policies needs to be aligned in order to maximize progress and impact.

Research and policy are important instruments and levers; however, the full and active participation of women in peace and development transcends empirical confirmation and policy affirmation. Gender equality is a universal right, not an academic hypothesis or a politically negotiable cause. The implementation of SDG 5 should be driven by this understanding and approach.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Elevate gender equality and women’s empowerment on the global agenda through targeted exchanges, capacity building and increased financing.
   • Broad political reform processes, often with macroeconomic objectives, have driven gender equality progress in many countries. Data on these experiences have significant political and practical value for fragile and post-conflict settings. Best practices need to be systematically shared and implemented on a political level and should be supported by technical assistance for SDG 5 implementation.
   • Resources allocated to gender equality and women’s empowerment should be proportionate to the scale of policy commitment(s). Civil society should act as a watchdog and raise awareness about under-resourced gender equality initiatives in order to hold officials accountable.

2. Investments in analysis and data collection related to gender equality and women’s empowerment should be increased through global accountability, support mechanisms and conditional financing.
   • International policymaking bodies should follow up with national governments at established intervals to assess progress towards adopted international agreements. This process should be reinforced with financial and technical support to develop measurement, evaluation and reporting capacity.
   • Internationally and nationally co-owned instruments and processes for implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting should be further developed on both general and context-specific levels.

3. Gender equality and women’s empowerment activities should be better integrated among development actors and across global policy frameworks.
   • Gender mainstreaming throughout the activities of development and security actors remains an essential strategy.
   • Civil society organizations should be supported in establishing more operational networks and communities of practice that allow member organizations to leverage each other’s knowledge, experience and resources in support of women leaders, and SDG 5 implementation.
   • The UN should facilitate coordination between development stakeholders implementing SDG 5 (e.g. its own agencies and institutional recipients of UN support). Together with other intergovernmental bodies and financial institutions, it could initiate institutional collaborations on gender equality and promote coordination assessments as a critical incentive for support.
   • Since existing inequalities are often multiplied during times of conflict, conflict resolution instruments (e.g. peace negotiations; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategies) should be used to correct structural inequalities and promote inclusion in order to promote sustainable peace and development.
   • The ongoing UN peace operations reform efforts recognize the need to strengthen the gender equality dimension in terms of mandate and operations. Peace operations’ overall political responsibility in fragile contexts demonstrates the need to fully exploit gender equality as a strategic tool.
REFRAMING THE ‘COUNTERTERRORISM’ DEBATE: WHAT ‘VIOLENT EXTREMISM’ AND ‘RADICALIZATION’ MEAN FOR DEVELOPMENT

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INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, counter-violent extremism (CVE) programmes have emerged alongside global and national anti-terrorism efforts to address the roots of extremist violence. Such programmes are often designed and implemented by, or are otherwise affiliated with, the same actors engaged in anti-terrorism efforts—with mixed success. Development actors are affected by both emergent extremism and the policy responses to it, and the actors have also engaged in work related to these processes. This brief considers the role that development actors can and should play in the prevention of extremist violence and radicalization.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

The use of labels such as ‘radicalization’ and ‘violent extremism’ can encourage further radicalization by implying unfounded connections between radical thought (which can be progressive or liberal) and terrorism. These labels often rely on the identification of threats posed by ‘outsider’ groups and facilitate entrenchment of ‘us vs. them’ mentalities. Labelling can also inhibit development and conflict resolution. The US Patriot Act is an example of legislation that used an unconstructive ‘terrorist’ label to identify individuals and groups to whom it applied. Often these individuals and groups were key stakeholders, who were denied the possibility of participating in dialogue, mediation and other conflict resolution efforts.

There are as many drivers of radicalization and extremism as there are affected communities. However, several common drivers emerge in spite of contextual differences. These include (social, political, economic) exclusion and marginalization, real or perceived religious differences, security responses perceived as being disproportionate to the scale of a threat or inappropriate relative to the nature of a threat, external ideologies and institutional factors. The latter bear heavily on the formulation and execution of CVE responses and include the strength of political structures, the extent of institutional legitimacy, the role and size of the security apparatus (including the military), the respective mandates of local and elite authorities and the relationship between the state and the perpetrators of extremist violence.

The lack of conceptual clarity on the relationship between CVE and peacebuilding and development is problematic. On one hand, it has led to mission creep and funding competition between the three disciplines. On the other hand, the failure to clearly define each in relation to the others has contributed to siloed approaches that disregard the role of violent extremism in broader conflict systems. International actors continue to be important sources of funding and support for CVE, peacebuilding and development, but their interventions have positive and negative consequences on the local conflict dynamics. One example of this trend is the role of external actors in Nigerian counter-insurgency interventions, where bilateral assistance has concentrated on support for the Nige-
rian military. By contrast, EU assistance has been more focused on people-oriented development interventions, including investment in basic education and rehabilitation of displaced persons.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CVE development interventions should address conflict drivers rather than symptoms.
   - Conflict drivers are contextual, often localized and interrelated. CVE responses need to reflect this complexity, giving adequate consideration to the role of historical legacies, inter-group dynamics and state complicity, while simultaneously working towards response models that recognize commonalities across contexts and establish best practices.

2. The international community must be more conscious of the negative effects of labelling and framing.
   - The use of labels that reduce the potential for constructive dialogue, mediation and conflict management is counterproductive. Moreover, their use (and abuse) can have severe consequences for the operations of interlocutors, activists and humanitarian organizations.
   - External actors should be more self-critical with regard to CVE strategies underpinned by values promotion.
   - It could be useful to reframe CVE in terms of conflict transformation and peacebuilding to encourage more comprehensive responses.

3. Policymakers should work to enhance coordination between CVE, development and peacebuilding strategies.
   - Actors from relevant disciplines should have a platform to discuss conflict drivers, response alternatives and their implications, and desired outcomes. An ongoing dialogue between these communities would enable better coordination and promote consensus building on desired outcomes and the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders.

4. International actors should maximize local capacity in CVE responses.
   - Funders should increase investments in approaches that empower local communities and civil society organizations to engage in CVE activities, peace education and the development of counter-narratives.
   - CVE efforts should be better aligned with the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda and should recognize that women and women’s groups at the local, national and regional levels are key actors in CVE responses, including prevention efforts. In this regard, all CVE efforts should be gender sensitive.

5. Broaden the spectrum of CVE initiatives to include more prevention and rehabilitation activities.
   - Activities that seek to improve governance, rule of law, education, public health and economic development can reduce fragility and minimize the conflict drivers that enable violent extremism to take hold. Together with peacebuilding activities, development initiatives function as powerful preventative measures.
   - Means of rehabilitating and reintegrating individuals who have been engaged in violent extremism are under-investigated and under-resourced. Greater focus should be given to understanding how to prevent these returnees from re-engaging in violent extremism, spreading violent ideologies and participating in recruitment.
SERVICE DELIVERY IN FRAGILE SETTINGS

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INTRODUCTION

In countries experiencing fragility, the delivery of public services—such as security, social protection, education, healthcare, clean water, energy and waste management—is often inhibited by conflict, weak capacity within public institutions and insufficient infrastructure. In fragile contexts, service delivery gaps are often filled by non-state actors, including civil society organizations, armed groups and religious communities. This brief draws on recent research and best practices in service delivery from a range of fragile contexts, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sri Lanka and Uganda. It also considers how SDG 16’s goal of building effective institutions can best be pursued in fragile contexts with relation to service delivery.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

There is a commonly held belief that providing services that meet citizen needs improves public perceptions of the state. As such, many peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions use support for state service delivery as a means to improve the perception of state legitimacy. In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, where the delivery of public services such as education, healthcare, water and sanitation tends to lag behind other countries, service delivery has become a central focus of many interventions. Moreover, the resumption of services can be viewed as an important peace dividend in post-conflict states like DRC and Afghanistan, where service delivery has been disrupted or cut off entirely during certain periods.¹

However, recent evidence demonstrates that the way in which services are delivered matters more than whom they are delivered by and if they are delivered at all. In fact, effectiveness and the process through which effectiveness is achieved—often stakeholder consultation—has a greater effect on a citizen’s perception of government legitimacy than does the service provider itself. The results of cross-cutting panel surveys, conducted by the Overseas Development Institute in five countries, illustrate that service delivery models with built-in grievance redress mechanisms are perceived more positively than those without.

In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, the political environment, the level of state capacity, the extent of public trust in government and conflict dynamics may determine the service provider, which may be the state or a non-state actor. In situations where non-state actors are providing services, the state’s role is to facilitate the provision of services.²

Particularly in fragile contexts with multi-stakeholder service delivery models, the flexibility and depth of relationships between service delivery partners is critical. Collaboration between funders and service providers and among the various service providers themselves is important to ensure that limited resources are applied in the most effective and impactful way. For example, the Ministry of Women should work with the Ministries of Planning and the Interior to ensure that gender responsive services are available in a given province’s districts. Some donors are reticent to work with non-state actors which, depending upon the service delivery model, could have an impact on the effectiveness of service delivery interventions.

² Denney, Mallett and Mazurana (note 1).
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Move away from blanket approaches to service delivery in post-conflict settings
   • While there is no clear evidence that service delivery directly results in statebuilding, investment in service delivery is still important to governance and stability. Donors must be conscious of context and select an intervention model that is well-suited to the given environment.
   • Conflict analyses should be conducted before service delivery interventions and during regular intervals therein to enable a results-oriented approach.
   • Blanket approaches are laden with assumptions that may or may not hold in complex environments and stand to undermine achievement of the desired outcomes.

2. Invest in approaches that build capacity and empower service providers.
   • The training and maintenance of qualified personnel in government are important for improving the effectiveness of state service delivery and its facilitation of service delivery by other providers.
   • Including service providers, such as local governments, in research on the perception of service delivery is one way to empower them to be more responsive. Such approaches should focus on assets rather than needs.

3. Service delivery as a peacebuilding tool should be inclusive.
   • In order to achieve inclusive service delivery, programmes should be designed to target vulnerable and marginalized groups, namely women, the elderly, children, people with disabilities and minorities. In Sri Lanka, a service delivery programme that focused on women’s grievance mechanisms has had very positive outcomes.
   • Citizens should be consulted about the effectiveness of services delivered and means of improving service delivery. Relationships between those who benefit from services and the service providers have a strong impact on public perception.

4. Donors should provide flexible adaptive funding to service delivery partners.
   • Partners on the ground are the most knowledgeable about evolving conflict dynamics and the political environment, and should have some room to use funding in different ways according to the circumstances on the ground.
OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT AND IMPROVED LIVELIHOODS

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INTRODUCTION

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8 aims to ensure inclusive and sustainable economic growth and full and productive employment for all. This entails increasing labour market participation and improving the quality of existing jobs to accelerate economic growth and improve livelihoods. While the size and capacity of the formal economy do contribute to employment levels, a number of social and institutional barriers also inhibit increased economic development. Vertical and horizontal inequalities, gender norms, capacity and skills gaps, access to credit and unsafe work environments are among these factors. This brief examines some of the most prevalent challenges to promoting full and decent employment, and how SDG 8 implementation could maximize underexplored economic development opportunities.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

The International Labour Organization estimates that over 200 million people were unemployed worldwide in 2014 and 1.44 billion workers were in vulnerable employment. Female labour market participation, which is particularly low in many global regions, significantly inhibits potential economic growth. Development aims related to political stability, good governance, education and healthcare contribute to long-term economic growth and should be paired with measures designed to increase employment and livelihoods in the short and medium term. Context-specific interventions designed to promote jobs among the locally unemployed can help match market needs with the available labour supply. One example is the acute demand for IT specialists in Africa. A forthcoming meta-study of 113 impact evaluations spanning 31 low-, middle- and high-income countries over a 24-year period found that active labour market policies targeting youth, such as training and skills development, entrepreneurship promotion, employment services and subsidized employment, are largely effective and have statistically significant positive effects on employment and earnings. The analysis also demonstrated that the most appropriate interventions (and combinations thereof) depend on the local context.

Partnerships between governments and other stakeholders, namely the private sector, NGOs and academic institutions, can promote the inclusion of marginalized groups and improve development outcomes. For example, one multi-stakeholder initiative supported by Sida leveraged investments by Sweden's Somali diaspora to support private businesses and NGOs in Somalia, resulting in increased awareness and knowledge on sustainable livelihoods, gender equality, and human rights. Another successful public-private partnership, a project funded by Inter-American Development Bank, engaged transnational corporations in the provision of employment services in Brazil, Costa Rica, and El Salvador to increase local knowledge, provide apprenticeships and offer skills training to local women. A collection of UN projects in Kyrgyzstan experienced similar success by empowering rural communities to contribute to the planning and implementation of local development projects to address needs in infrastructure, healthcare, education and skills upgrading.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Labour market interventions should be aligned with broader economic and social policy frameworks.
   • Multi-stakeholder initiatives can increase the scale and effectiveness of employment and job readiness programmes. Policymakers should consider specific ways to engage the private and non-profit sectors to maximize their comparative advantages.
   • Establishing regular consultations and platforms for dialogue between policymakers, civil society and academia will increase knowledge sharing and ensure that new evidence is appropriately integrated into policy approaches.
   • If the key problem for private business is lack of trust in the judicial and administrative systems, then any other specific efforts, such as promotion of entrepreneurship or foreign direct investments, will make a little difference.
   • Job creation programmes should focus on quality rather than quantity to avoid creating low-productivity jobs, which are less effective in reducing poverty and boosting economic growth.

2. Labour market interventions must be tailored to the local context.
   • It is important to consider the sociocultural factors underpinning employment and productivity figures, such as the varying levels of market and credit access available to different stakeholders.
   • Policymakers must understand how institutions reinforce and reproduce social hierarchies in order to identify sector- and region-specific opportunities that increase participation among unproductive and excluded groups.

3. Increase investments in data collection and research on the relationship between employment and other development challenges (e.g. gender equality, conflict, governance and public health).
   • While there is consensus that development initiatives in different sectors should be implemented in parallel, there is less agreement on how best to coordinate interventions. For example, how violence, political unrest and unemployment impact each other is not fully understood. Increased research could demonstrate the presence of causal relationships that would help sequence development initiatives to increase their effectiveness. It could also explain the conditions under which large-scale employment programmes might be more or less effective.
   • Emerging private-sector initiatives, like social entrepreneurship and social impact funds, are under-researched. Increasingly, companies are using their own resources, networks and business practices to create new development models. These public-private partnerships (PPPs) have the potential to promote social inclusion, increase employment and drive economic development. However, without sufficient evidence on how and when different PPP models are most effective, it is difficult to determine where they should be employed.
   • SDG 8 progress monitoring should be complemented by wider availability of labour market statistics, especially in fragile contexts. More efforts are needed to improve the data on labour and resource productivity and informal employment.
WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY RESEARCH GAPS: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS AND ADVOCATES

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INTRODUCTION

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its seven follow-up resolutions, collectively referred to as the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, represent commitments by states to increase women’s participation and to incorporate gender perspectives across UN peace and security efforts, including peacekeeping operations, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 establishes a similar commitment in the realm of development programming. Despite these important policy commitments, implementation of gender policies is lagging and the global knowledge base on gender equality and security is underdeveloped.

Although there is substantial research on women’s protection in conflict and post-conflict environments, evidence on the other two pillars of the WPS Agenda (participation and prevention) is scant. Similarly, definitions and counter-narratives related to women’s role in peace and security processes remain unclear. Broadly speaking, existing WPS research lacks important qualitative components—offering the number of women involved in peace processes, for example, but not remarking on the extent or nature of their participation. In light of SDG 5 implementation, this brief explores the practical applications of an expanded WPS evidence base and pitfalls of past research: It then recommends next steps to effectively close WPS research gaps.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Even today, many researchers, gender equality advocates and peacebuilders are asked to justify women’s increased participation in peace and security processes. Although men’s participation is rarely interrogated in the same way, discomfort with the WPS Agenda may be the result of a lack of data explaining the value of women’s participation. To the extent that investigating and communicating women’s impact on peace and security processes can encourage higher levels of inclusion and generate political will to mainstream gender across peace and security processes, it has a practical value. However, if research cannot identify clear, positive effects of women’s participation, there is a risk that the evidence could be used to further exclude them. From a rights perspective, women’s participation requires no justification: Women are equal to men and thus entitled to the same level of inclusion regardless of their assessed value.

To ensure that policymakers and practitioners can design and implement policies that best suit their respective needs, efforts to bridge WPS research gaps should focus on developing the international community’s understanding of how conflict and insecurity affect men and women differently. How gender interacts with other factors, such as race, class, religion, age and geography, is also important to understand in the context of peacebuilding, when social cohesion, or the lack thereof, can heavily influence conflict dynamics.

WPS research is often relegated to a separate category (‘women’s issues’ or ‘gender’), rather than being positioned within mainstream fields such as peace and conflict studies or security studies. Similarly, because some of the research fields that were instrumental in the formulation of the WPS Agenda ascribe to alternative conceptual frameworks and use technical jargon, mainstream security researchers often find their research inaccessible. To encourage the integration of WPS research into mainstream policy and academic discourses, topics should under-
score men and women’s equal responsibility to build and sustain peace and security using common terminology whenever possible.

Despite the many arguments for women’s participation and equally varied theories of change supporting them, resistance to implementing WPS research findings persists. When academics and practitioners (e.g. civil society organizations and implementing agencies) work together to align WPS research with information needs and policy performance on the ground, it is easier to hold leaders accountable to their commitments. Researchers’ ability to identify politically savvy ways to incorporate WPS findings into peace and security operations will be essential to achieving SDG 5 and advancing the WPS Agenda within other policy frameworks. The exchange of best practices among influential stakeholders in conflict-affected communities, such as politicians and religious and cultural leaders, is one such approach.

Some local peacebuilders have criticised WPS research topics for reflecting the assumptions and policy interests of the Global North. Similar critiques have been made of WPS research methodologies, which are not always compatible with the dynamics of conflict-affected environments. When implementing and monitoring the progress of SDG 5, researchers and practitioners could avoid this pitfall by using locally-viable data collection tools and incorporating local perspectives into their research questions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Academics should collaborate with advocates and practitioners to ensure that WPS research is demand-driven.
   - Greater collaboration also stands to reduce competition for funding and increase alignment between policy goals and implementation timeframes.

2. WPS research should not reproduce negative stereotypes.
   - That existing WPS research focuses on women’s vulnerabilities and need for special protection during conflict perpetuates the view that women are victims. New research should aim to disprove myths and explore the positive and negative effects of women’s agency, for example as peacebuilders or perpetrators of violence.

3. The means of communicating WPS findings should be tailored to different audiences.
   - Messaging and formatting must be flexible to increase the accessibility of WPS research and increase the likelihood that it will be used constructively among diverse groups.
   - Researchers should work to ensure that WPS research designs and methodologies do not impose a cultural bias.
   - Greater focus should be given to the local context and actors.
EURASIA’S PROTRACTED CONFLICTS: LEARNING FROM POST-SOViet TRANSITIONS

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INTRODUCTION

In the 20 years following the cold war, the post-Soviet space did not experience the level of major armed conflict found in other regions that have undergone decolonization (e.g. Africa and Asia in the 1950s–80s). Instead, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the conflicts transformed into protracted, ‘frozen’ conflicts. This context persisted until the 2008 Georgia–Russia war. In 2014 the internationalized Russia–Ukraine civil war broke out, followed by the recent resumption of violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

These conflicts appear to have followed a distinct trajectory in which the regional dimension has been central to the conflict dynamics, and the region is now facing an escalation of violence and conflict that threatens to spill over into neighbouring areas, such as the Middle East and South Asia. This brief examines conflict lessons of the post-Soviet space, assesses causes and catalysts of the escalating violence and considers the role of states as actors in Eurasian conflicts.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

The conflicts in Eurasia are of increasing complexity: They have multiple drivers and involve complicated interests. State-to-state warfare is becoming more common, for example between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and often involves Russia. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in particular has reached a dangerous point: Azerbaijan has exhausted the peaceful means in its toolkit and lost faith in diplomacy.

Elsewhere in the region, Russia’s perceptions of its interests have different impacts on the conflict. On one hand, Eurasian power dynamics are now treacherously asymmetrical. On the other hand, the shortcomings of the international response to these regional conflicts, notably in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, have exacerbated the situation. The OSCE’s failure to deliver any lasting measure of peace in Ukraine has become regarded as a conflict driver. The European Union’s ostensible neutrality has made it party to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in a certain sense. It has not criticized either actor after the violation of terms and agreements, nor has it praised good behaviour. If the European Union (EU) applied a stronger conditionality-based approach to the post-Soviet conflicts, it might forestall the acceleration of violence.

Diplomatic relations have been increasingly important in the region, yet there is little trust in diplomacy, which makes effecting change from outside the region difficult. In order for diplomatic engagement to be perceived as legitimate, there must be a minimum consensus on the security ‘rules of the game’ within the region.

Eurasia’s conflicts have a tendency to become intractable in the sense of being non-reconcilable due to the existing political and social structures. In this regard, the complexity of the conflicts requires broader efforts to understand and address the current dynamics. It is especially important to emphasize the governance challenge that arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which must be taken into consideration, together with internal societal and socioeconomic dimensions of conflict, to understand the conflict dynamic in the region today.

The thawing of conflicts in Eurasia is taking place in conjunction with increased authoritarian politics and human rights abuses. Increased attention should be given to ongoing human rights abuses, such as torture and
restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, as necessary conditions for reducing conflicts. Women’s rights are increasingly at risk. In the 1990s, women became increasingly active in the liberation movement and even participated in combat. Since the ceasefire, they have been relegated to more traditional, passive roles and have not had a substantial role in official conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. Greater regional analysis on transitional justice and gender-based violence during the 1990s and since could shed light on the regional gender dynamics of these conflicts.

The security–democracy nexus is an important issue across the region. Poor governance and a lack of genuine legitimacy are characteristics of many of the countries in the post-Soviet space. These conditions create an environment wherein politicians can use regional conflicts as tools to generate internal support. In large part, these conflicts are fuelled and sustained by nationalism, which surges each time violence recurs or a truce is broken. In this regard, the conflicts serve as convenient distractions that politicians can manipulate to avoid addressing difficult development questions. Without addressing governance and legitimacy problems, it is unlikely that these conflicts will be completely resolved as the political elite would rather stay in power than transform their own societies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. External actors should set norms and stand by them.
   - A lack of consistency in creating support for peacebuilding engagements has enabled the conflict to escalate very quickly.

2. The international community should reassess its expectations of existing peacebuilding structures.
   - The structures established in the 1990s were designed to manage the conflict, not to generate or sustain transformative settlements between parties to the conflict.

3. Identify stakeholders that support constructive change and the establishment of transitional justice instruments.
   - The international community and local civil society have the power to transform the situation from opposite directions.

4. Increase research and analysis of the local contexts in which these conflicts transpire.
   - The new conflict paradigm of the post-Soviet space requires an in-depth analysis of what went wrong over the past two-and-a-half decades, and should take into account conflict drivers, the motivation of Russian behaviour, structural factors like declining education, negative demographic and health trends, a lack of social cohesion, corruption, inequality and poor governance.
   - The relationship between various conflict catalysts, such as rising nationalism and the energy market, and their knock-on effects, such as human rights abuses and increased militarization, must be better understood.

5. Refrain from using the expression ‘frozen conflict’.
   - As long as there are casualties, the conflict should not be referred to as frozen but rather protracted, reflecting the continuing conditions for violence and the possibility of a new escalation to major violence.
LEARNING WHILE DOING: EXPERIENCES FROM PILOTING THE SDGS

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INTRODUCTION

The breadth and ambition of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) pose practical questions about the capacities and actions needed to deliver and monitor SDG 16’s aim of building effective institutions. Of the utmost importance is the question of how to ensure that the SDGs become tools for government authorities in promoting development, rather than a distraction or an additional demand on institutions already limited by resource and capacity constraints. This brief explores how to ensure that the SDGs become tools for government authorities in promoting development, rather than a distraction or an additional demand on institutions already limited by resource and capacity constraints.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

Security, justice and governance are all interrelated and need to be approached together. This can and should be done in a manner contextually appropriate to specific countries and specific issues. It is necessary that non-state actors develop independent but complementary roles to national governments in supporting and monitoring implementation. Support and solidarity between developed and developing countries is vital to achieving the goals.

Implementing SDG 16 is a security and financing challenge. Because many fragile and conflict-affected countries face ongoing security and development threats in parallel with severe financial restrictions, they struggle to balance funding priorities. The question of how to achieve sufficient stability to foster development with limited resources is, therefore, key and is an essential consideration for SDG implementation.

Capacity is often another limiting factor in those states for which progress towards the SDGs is arguably the most urgent. Most countries—developed and developing, fragile and stable, donors and recipients—learned lessons from the process of implementing the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which they may now bring to bear on the SDGs. However, for the reasons mentioned above, capacity in fragile and conflict-affected countries is often stretched thin. In order to implement and monitor the SDGs effectively in these contexts, additional training, structural support and technical assistance may need to bolster existing capacity.

SDG implementation requires a strategic, integrated approach. The SDGs are highly interdependent and will, as a result, oblige diverse stakeholders to work together in order to deliver the desired outcomes in a comprehensive and sustainable manner. There will inevitably be tensions between goals such as security and fundamental rights. It is important to note that while priorities and emphases will differ by national context, the universality of the SDGs and the development of common indicators to measure progress towards each target is important for ensuring that some goals are not sacrificed in pursuit of others.

That the SDGs are expressed as verbs without subjects (e.g. ‘End poverty in all its forms everywhere’) may encourage their adaptation to national contexts and facilitate ownership at the national and local levels. Leaving out the subject creates space for collaboration and partnership among a broad range of actors which, in circumstances where national resources are limited, will enable stakeholders with a mutual interest in a particular SDG or target to collectively champion its implementation. This opportunity is accompanied by a responsibility for increased dialogue with domestic and civil society actors, as well as national and local government agencies.
Implementation and measurement of the goals will be a considerable challenge, demanding cooperation and a common understanding across sectors and levels of government. However, the goals do provide a ‘universal language’ reflecting a broad consensus at the global level. Translating this into mobilization of sufficient resources and political will for success at the national level will require cooperation and solidarity, and will present a challenge to both developing and developed countries. Examples of such solidarity would include efforts to assist developing countries in securing stolen assets as well as relieving the burden of odious debt.

The implementation of SDGs should build upon the infrastructure, systems and processes from the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and in doing so utilise existing strengths, capacities and lessons. Measurement will require determining data needs and working to develop common and complementary indicators capable of aggregating nationally meaningful data into a global measurement framework. Networks developed via the MDG process at the regional, sub-regional and grassroots levels can also support SDG implementation.

The most fundamental challenge to SDG 16 and other goals will be posed by regimes that lack political incentives to implement them. In contexts where political will exists but resources or capacity are an issue, it will be important to keep measurement and reporting manageable.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. **Develop institutional cooperation between states to build solidarity and promote exchange**
   - Establish new structures in support of SDG implementation such as working groups, implementation teams and communities of practice
   - It will be important for developed countries not only to provide support and technical assistance, but also to listen to the experiences of developing countries in implementing the MDGs, and build on their experience.

2. **Invest in statistical capacity**
   - In fragile and conflict-affected states, where there may not be an existing bank of data on these indicators, the capacity to collect and analyse data is restricted by a number of factors. On one hand, it may be unsafe or infeasible to travel to dangerous areas or those which are inaccessible due to lack of infrastructure. On the other hand, if trust in government is low, individuals may be wary about sharing their personal information.
   - To be sure that no one is left behind, data will need to be disaggregated in many ways. There’s a limitation to the level of disaggregated data that surveys alone can provide.
   - Donors and partners should support statistical capacity through financing, IT infrastructure and training for national statistics personnel to ensure that baseline data and future progress can be measured methodologically.

3. **Countries should be prepared to support one another in the prioritization of the SDGs and targets.**
   - Different national contexts must sequence their interventions and invest their resources according to the urgency of different development needs. In fragile and conflict-affected states, prioritization is of the utmost importance.
   - In many cases national governments will need to delegate roles and responsibilities to local authorities. Assistance to help them coordinate these is vital.
SHADOW ECONOMIES: INFORMAL AND ILLICIT MARKETS IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS

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INTRODUCTION

Although informal economic activity is a global phenomenon, many developing countries face particular challenges linked to formal economic participation. These challenges have implications for revenue generation as well as governance more broadly. In addition, illicit markets linked to organized crime or terrorism often thrive in fragile contexts in which state capacity is low. ‘Shadow economies’ have a more multifaceted relationship to poverty alleviation, employment rates and economic productivity than is generally depicted. This brief examines linkages between illicit, informal and formal markets and the implications that shadow economies have for good governance as well as equitable development.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

The term ‘informal economy’ refers to markets employing unregistered workers whose labour is not taxed by the state and does not provide codified labour protection. Informal markets include both the self-employed and employment in formal organizations that is not recorded (i.e. construction or services). Informality is not necessarily illicit and often results from a lack of state-led regulation. In this regard, informal economies can serve as a source of resilience in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

There are arguments for and against the formalization of informal markets. Not all informality is ‘bad’ for economic growth and informality does sometimes serve purposes not captured in traditional macroeconomic measures, such as the change in gross domestic product (GDP) over time. Formalization, then, is a process that should occur naturally when the market conditions are right (e.g. when states and businesses find it in their best interest).

Although informality often arises in the absence of state regulation or when state capacity is limited, states also voluntarily support informality when it benefits them. Fragility and parallel economies are not necessarily correlated. Even in the stable Soviet Union where regulation was high, there was a high degree of informality. If the state is illicitly profiting from the informality, through illegal mining or the expropriation of land, for example, it is unlikely to encourage formalization.

In many African countries with small economies, the social contract between governments and their citizens is often weak: Governments cannot amass sufficient income from taxes to offer services in return. Paying taxes is one way to increase one’s personal stake in the society. Recent trends towards ‘informalization’ in relatively developed countries suggest that the need for government services and oversight may decrease as development increases, and that the need for government, namely the provision of basic social services and public goods, may be higher in relatively less-developed economies. The exact level of formalization that is necessary in different contexts at different development stages remains uncertain.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Policymakers should consider how informal markets fill a trust deficit before implementing formalization policies.
   - The informal economy is regulated by trust, which allows for relationships to be built between stakeholders even in the absence of the state.
   - The informal economy does provide a certain level of regulation without state oversight: The penalty for non-compliance with these unofficial ‘rules’ is exclusion. However, informal regulation is not bound by legal standards and may reinforce market failures and externalities that preclude the participation of certain segments of society or inhibit growth beyond a certain level.
   - Alternative regulation mechanisms include blockchain mobile payment technology and peer-review systems of enforcement that remove the government as regulator.

2. Interventions that promote formalization should be considered in instances when the conditions are ‘ripe’.
   - To assess the prospects for formalization, development actors should evaluate how the informal market is functioning (Who is benefitting and who is missing out?) as well as how the government, quality of governance and regime type are related with regard to the informal economy. Such an evaluation should also consider the costs (public and private) of formalization in the short- and long-term.
   - Unemployment and underemployment are functions of the extent of formalization of labour, including subsistence agriculture.
   - When citizens do not need to rely on governments for regulation, the state becomes increasingly obsolete and trust-based regulation takes on new forms. In these contexts, informality erodes public trust and governance capacity. Increasingly the degree of economic formalization may improve trust in state institutions.

3. When formalization is determined to be the best option, changes should be phased in slowly.
   - Extending labour and other protections as incentives to attract informal businesses to register before implementing a system of taxation might ease the transition.
   - Start incrementally by identifying informal sectors that could be formalized with relative ease. For example, in Kenya, the ‘jua kali’ sector of entrepreneurs began in the informal sector and is now regulated by government. Table banking is another example of small, informal businesses that could benefit from formalization.
   - With each step towards formalization, communicate the benefits. For example, by providing equal access to competitive markets and labour and property protections, formalization can reduce marginalization and inequality.
As evidence demonstrating the relationship between conflict and underdevelopment mounts, the task of building and sustaining global peace seems almost unattainable. This relationship is particularly precarious in countries experiencing high levels of fragility, where a failure to address conflict and underdevelopment in parallel could result in increased violence, poverty and inequality. Over the past 15 years, the world has spent at least 1.7 trillion dollars on official development assistance, and yet 700 million people still live in poverty on less than $1.90 a day. Today, 450 million of the world’s poor live in the 100 most dangerous places. In these countries, 350,000 people die from violence every year and another 60 million have been displaced.

**INNOVATION AND INTEGRATION FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT**

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015, is the first international policy to explicitly recognize peace, justice and inclusive institutions as the foundation for sustainable development. Comprising 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets, the 2030 Agenda has been criticized for being too ambitious, even unrealistic. Yet its scope and breadth is well founded. On one hand, the ambition of the SDGs reflects the shortcomings of their predecessor: Because the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) did not sufficiently address the priorities of fragile and conflict-affected countries or the implementation challenges they face, progress on the MDGs was uneven.

On the other hand, the scope of the SDGs also reflects shifting security dynamics, wherein new and evolving threats challenge long-held distinctions between humanitarian and development needs and their associated responses. For instance, the global migration crisis—which is largely attributed to forced displacement emanating from fragile and conflict-affected countries—cannot be resolved through humanitarian or development responses alone. While humanitarian-only responses risk perpetuating persistent emergencies by ignoring underlying root causes, the development-only responses lack the capacity and flexibility of resources to respond to urgent demands.

Despite the scale and complexity of the challenges posed by fragility, the international community is making strides towards delivering more collaborative, better-coordinated responses. For example, in March 2016, a host of UN agencies, NGOs and multilateral development banks agreed to work together to bridge the humanitarian-development divide. Their joint commitment aims to leverage new financing mechanisms, greater investment in research and multi-stakeholder interventions based on institutional synergies. Similarly, in April 2016, the Fifth Global Meeting of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (Global
Meeting) convened to renew members’ dedication to the principles of the New Deal and to articulate additional commitments in the Stockholm Declaration on Addressing Fragility and Building Peace in a Changing World.

WHERE THE RUBBER MEETS THE ROAD

Wide-reaching global agendas and high-level pacts are indeed important, but the test of any policy lies in its implementation. As such, at the third annual Stockholm Forum on Security and Development, held in conjunction with the Global Meeting, participants delved deeper into some specific operational challenges associated with implementing the 2030 Agenda in fragile situations. Co-hosts SIPRI and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs joined forces with 13 partner organizations and numerous experts to move from the theoretical ‘what’ towards the practical ‘how’. Among other questions, they considered the following with regard to specific SDGs and geographic regions:

- How should global development targets be adapted to reflect national contexts?
- How can governments develop institutional monitoring capacity within the constraints of their limited infrastructure and resources?
- How can scenarios, new technologies and other tools be used to manage risk and improve security?
- How do existing institutional structures, mandates and financing streams exacerbate or reduce the effectiveness of security and development interventions?
- How does exclusion inhibit the full implementation of the SDGs and what mechanisms could facilitate the participation and protection of marginalized populations?

Some Forum sessions—like those on complex violence, migration and violent extremism—sought to generate a more nuanced understanding of known challenges. Broadly speaking, these sessions illustrated how interventions that try to simplify complex threats to fit political narratives or traditional security frameworks without analysing conflict dynamics are less likely to achieve success than more comprehensive approaches. Other sessions—like those on service delivery, inclusivity and women, peace and security—focused on identifying possible solutions. These sessions used new research to demonstrate the value of evidence-based approaches that oblige practitioners and policymakers to question their assumptions and incorporate lessons learned from past interventions.

TOWARDS A COMMON FUTURE

A handful of themes exemplifying the universality of the 2030 Agenda emerged from the Forum’s 18 roundtables and plenary sessions. The first theme was inclusivity, which arose in various forms during the two-day programme. From the political and social inclusion of women, youth and other marginalized groups, to the inclusion of civil society and non-state actors in peacebuilding and service delivery, each session touched on the
pitfalls of excluding stakeholders from development processes, particularly in fragile situations.

Although underdevelopment and insecurity impact all countries, their effects are multiplied in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. In this vein, the second theme that emerged relates to the challenge of prioritizing different security and development needs. In countries with a combination of weak institutions, poor governance, poverty, violence and inequality, it can be difficult to determine how best to sequence interventions and appropriate resources to maximize impact. It may also be more convenient, for political or financial reasons, to prioritize certain needs over others. In the session on military expenditures, discussants carried the prioritization theme further by assessing what relative spending levels (military vs. social) indicate about national governments’ perception of threats and their sources.

Perhaps the most important theme related to the absolute necessity of horizontally- and vertically-integrated implementation approaches. Again and again participants highlighted the interconnectedness of the individual SDGs and their humanitarian, development and security components. For example, the importance of horizontal integration in relation to addressing human rights within the 2030 Agenda’s implementation framework was poignant in the session on the role of human rights defenders. Discussants in that session demonstrated the relationship between the physical safety of watchdogs and advocates and the health of a country’s governance and justice systems. As United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson remarked on the second day of the Forum, To end violent and intractable conflicts in today’s world, we need comprehensive, holistic approaches. Political and security actors, humanitarian, human rights and development actors must work in parallel around the common challenges.
KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
On 25 September 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, along with a set of new global goals known as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).¹

The Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS)
CSPPS is a South–North non-governmental coalition of peacebuilding organizations that coordinates and supports civil society participation in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.²

COP21
The 21st Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.³

Fragility
While there is no generally agreed definition of ‘fragility’, the OECD recently proposed a working model for analysing countries’ risks across five clusters of fragility indicators: (1) violence, (2) justice, (3) institutions, (4) economic foundations and (5) resilience. The five proposed dimensions of fragility reveal distinct patterns of vulnerability.⁴

Fragile settings
Fragile settings, especially in terms of service delivery, refers to situations where the government or relevant authority is insufficiently trustworthy or capable of providing services directly to its people, due to the existence of various dynamics such as different levels of violent conflict.⁵

The g7+
The g7+ is a voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development. The group was established to give a collective voice to conflict-affected states, and a platform for learning and support between member countries. There are currently 20 member countries of g7+.⁶

The Global Study on 1325
‘The Global Study on 1325’ refers to the study Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. The study is the result of the UN Secretary-General’s decision to commission a report to inform the discus-

¹ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf>
² <http://www.cspps.org/>
³ <http://www.cop21paris.org/>
⁶ <http://www.g7plus.org/en/>
sion around the High-level Review on implementation of Resolution 1325 in response to the Secretary Council’s invitation contained in Resolution 2122, which was adopted in 2013.7

**International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS)**

The IDPS or International Dialogue (ID) is the first forum for political dialogue to bring together countries affected by conflict and fragility, development partners and civil society. The ID is composed of members of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), the g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states, and member organizations of the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS).8

**The International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)**

INCAF is a unique decision-making forum that brings together diverse stakeholders to support development outcomes in the world's most challenging situations. Based on a whole-of-government approach, INCAF adopts an inclusive approach to its work by engaging with multiple policy communities and partner countries. INCAF was established in 2009 as a subsidiary body of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).9

**The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (New Deal)**

The New Deal is a key agreement between fragile and conflict-affected states, international development partners and civil society to improve current development policy and practice in fragile states. It was developed through the forum of the ID and signed by more than 40 countries and organizations at the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, on 30 November 2011. The New Deal calls for five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) to be at the forefront of all international efforts in fragile and conflict-affected countries.10

**Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs)**

The Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals are the priorities of the New Deal and represent agreement on what is required to move towards peace and recovery. The five PSGs are legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenue and services.11

**UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325)**

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security on 31 October 2000. It was the first Security Council resolution to

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7 [http://wps.unwomen.org/en](http://wps.unwomen.org/en)
specifically address the impact of armed conflict on women, and women’s contribution to conflict resolution and sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{12}

**UN Security Council Resolution 2242 (UNSCR 2242)**

UN Security Council Resolution 2422—the eighth resolution on women, peace and security—was adopted on 13 October 2015, during the High-level Review on implementation of Resolution 1325. Resolution 2422 strengthens commitments to integrate a gender analysis on the drivers and impacts of violent extremism; urges greater consultation with women’s organizations affected by such violence; sets new targets for the number of female peacekeepers in UN peacekeeping operations; and stresses the need for more women in senior positions in political, peace and security institutions.\textsuperscript{13}

**UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review (AGE Report)**

On 29 June 2015, the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) designated by the UN Secretary-General submitted its report on a 10-year review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), which was agreed in 2005. The UN PBA is composed of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The report represents the first part of a two-stage review of the role and positioning of the UN PBC, PBF, PBSO and other UN operational entities active in peacebuilding. The review is intended to support the second, intergovernmental stage, which will lead to concrete actions to strengthen the UN’s approach to sustaining peace.\textsuperscript{14}

**UN Peace Operations Review (HIPPO Report)**

The UN High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was established on 31 October 2014 to make a comprehensive assessment of the current state of UN peace operations and to assess emerging needs for future peace operations. Its report, released on 17 June 2015, calls for four essential changes—recognizing the primacy of politics, a full spectrum of UN peace operations, stronger global–regional partnerships, and field-focused and people-centred approaches—to ensure that UN peace operations are better able to play their role in building and sustaining peace.\textsuperscript{15}

**Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS Agenda)**

The WPS Agenda is a collection of eight UN resolutions which seek to address the role of women in peace and security processes. The WPS Agenda has four pillars: participation, protection, prevention and peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{16}

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\textsuperscript{12} <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/WPS%20SRES1325%20.pdf>

\textsuperscript{13} <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2242.pdf>

\textsuperscript{14} <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/968>

\textsuperscript{15} <http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf>

ABBREVIATIONS

ACLED  Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
ATT   Arms Trade Treaty
BSI   Budget Strengthening Initiative
COIN  Counterinsurgency
CSO   Civil society organization
CVE   Counter-violent extremism
EU    European Union
FCS   Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (also FCSs)
FCV   Fragility, conflict and violence
GDP   Gross domestic product
GIS   Geospatial information systems
HCC   High-end climate change
HRDs  Human rights defenders
ICTD  International Centre for Tax and Development
ILAC  International Legal Assistance Consortium
IOM   International Organization for Migration
ISS Africa  Institute for Security Studies Africa
LGBT  Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
ODA   Official development assistance
ODI   Overseas Development Institute
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PKO   Peacekeeping operation
RER   Radical emissions reduction
SALW  Small arms and light weapons
SDGs  Sustainable Development Goals
SGBV  Sexual and gender-based violence
Sida  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SLRC  Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR (Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSRM UN Summit on Refugees and Migration
WILPF Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
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