



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL  
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

## **2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):**

**UN Headquarters: 27 April – 22 May 2015**

### **New York: 5 May 2015**

The 2015 NPT Review Conference opened at UN headquarters on 27 April and will continue till 22 May 2015.

On Tuesday, 5<sup>th</sup> May, the Main Committees and Subsidiary Bodies continued with their meetings. The sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB) are ‘closed’ to civil society and observers

Subsidiary Body 1 (Main Committee I) held its first session in the morning. Main Committee II met in the afternoon. Main Committee III met in the morning and in the afternoon. The busy schedule of the Review Conference is placing a strain on smaller delegations which do not have enough delegates to be able to cover all of the meetings.

In SB 1, the discussion focused on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and related issues and exposed the major fissures between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) and within the NNWS. This issue likely will remain contentious throughout the conference and it will take some heroic efforts to bridge the differences in order to be able to come to compromise text agreeable to all sides.

Statements were made in Main Committee II by: Finland, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Italy, France, Kuwait, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Austria, Philippines, Morocco, Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and Iraq.

In Main Committee III, statements were made by: Iran on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, European Union, International Atomic Energy Agency, Czech Republic, Japan, Mexico, Argentina, USA, South Africa, Australia, Cuba, Canada and the Russian Federation in the morning session. In the afternoon session, statements were made by: the United Kingdom, Brazil, Australia on behalf of the Vienna Group of 10, Germany, France, Malaysia, Syria, China, Republic of Korea, Iran, Poland, Switzerland, Netherlands, Niger, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Thailand, Kyrgyzstan on behalf of the Central Asian States, Norway, Indonesia, Egypt, Philippines, New Zealand and Finland.

Speaking in **Main Committee II**, **France** stated that the preliminary understanding on the key parameters of an agreement on the Iran nuclear issue, which the E3/EU+3 Group and Iran reached on 2 April 2015 in Lausanne, was an important step forward. France would be vigilant in the coming weeks to ensure that these parameters can be reflected in a robust, sustainable and verifiable agreement. France called on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA to settle unresolved issues regarding possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme. This was essential in order to rebuild confidence and France regretted that no progress had been made on this issue. France said it would continue to play an integral part in the negotiations so that the agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue could make a key contribution to the international non-proliferation regime and to world peace and security.

France stated that since the last NPT Review Conference, North Korea had carried out another nuclear test, and had prioritized the development of its ballistic and nuclear programmes, in defiance of its international obligations. Furthermore, it was continuing to develop its intercontinental-range ballistic missile programme. The international community unanimously condemned these serious threats to international peace and security and, in response, the Security Council had adopted Resolutions 2087 and 2094, which the European Union strengthened through independent measures. These measures made an essential contribution to block North Korea's proliferation activities in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. France called upon North Korea to take concrete measures to comply with its obligations under the NPT and the IAEA, and that its denuclearization was non-negotiable. France noted Syria still had not clarified its past or present nuclear activities.

France stated the combined implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol ensured compliance with the objectives of NPT Article III.1. This was why France called for the universalisation of these two legal instruments on a priority basis. The State level approach for IAEA safeguards would significantly help to strengthen the safeguards system through a better use of existing resources. States Parties must support the implementation of this approach.

To strengthen the authority of the IAEA, France called for better deterrence of safeguards violations. To do that, the Review Conference must encourage the States Parties to learn from cases in which countries had been declared in violation with their non-proliferation obligations, by suspending their civil nuclear cooperation. This also was a precautionary measure and a measure of responsibility, in order to prevent all risks of diversion.

The **United Arab Emirates (UAE)** noted the importance of non-proliferation pillar for the objectives of the treaty, and stated that it

was imperative that the NPT review conference addressed non-proliferation challenges, including non-compliance issues. The UAE expressed concern that the IAEA, after years of efforts, had not been able to report substantive progress in addressing outstanding issues in relation to Iran's nuclear programme, including those related to the possible military dimensions.

The UAE recalled that the international community had stressed that it was essential for Iran and the IAEA to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of all outstanding issues concerning Iran's nuclear programme and to exclude the existence of any possible military dimensions. This was affirmed by multiple resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council, which called upon Iran to take the required steps by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, personnel and documents requested by the Agency.

The UAE stated it continued to support diplomacy and dialogue to address Iran's nuclear issues and hoped that the ongoing diplomatic process would contribute to reaching a comprehensive agreement to address all outstanding issues including those referred to as possible military dimensions. The UAE noted that concrete results were needed to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

The UAE noted its continuing support for convening a conference on a Middle East MWFZ/WMDfZ as outlined in 2010, at an early date. Convening such conference would be a good opportunity to start a process that could lead to the establishment of a nuclear weapons and other WMD free zone in the Middle East. The UAE stated that in light of the failure to convene the conference in 2012, the convening process needed to be strengthened to avoid further postponement. The UAE emphasized the value of consultations, dialogue, and preparatory work as an essential element for a successful convening of such conference with the participation of

all States of the region of the Middle East. These consultations and preparatory work must follow a clear mandate and timeline and should support the objective of convening the conference. The way forward required practical steps, and further efforts and assurances from the depository States which have a special responsibility as co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

The UAE stated that it would work constructively through the Review Conference to achieve a positive outcome that supported the vision of the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD.

**The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)** in its statement noted that the July 1991 agreement between Brazil and Argentina established the world's only existing bilateral mutual safeguards inspection agency. The Agreement implied a clear and definite commitment to the use of all the materials and nuclear facilities submitted to their jurisdictions or control, exclusively for peaceful purposes, and, at the same time, it recognized the sovereign right of every State to have access to nuclear technology for economic and social development. ABACC's system represented a paradigmatic framework of the long process of economic, political, technological and cultural integration by both countries.

On the 13 December 2016, ABACC will have completed 25 years of activities within the framework of the Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards – the Quadripartite Agreement. During this period, more than 1,700 inspections had been carried out in the two countries. In 2014, 62 inspections in Argentine facilities and 56 in Brazilian facilities were carried out.

The search for excellence had been a constant concern in ABACC's history; during these almost 26, ABACC had been

operating with institutional policies designed for the continued technical training of its human resources. The qualifications of its officials and staff of inspectors were always matched with “state-of-the-art” equipment, and this had ensured the success of ABACC and the independence of its safeguards/verification conclusions.

ABACC noted that its co-operation with the IAEA had been crucial in this regard and that co-operation and mutual understanding had been the basis for the joint work performed by the IAEA and the ABACC in the application of safeguards, as provided for in the Quadripartite Agreement. The good results attained in the joint safeguards activities and procedures, with regard to unannounced inspections and the joint use of safeguards equipment reflected the high level of understanding and co-operation between the IAEA and ABACC.

The **NAM** statement delivered by Iran in **Main Committee III** emphasized the importance of the realization of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination in accordance with Article IV of the NPT, as one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The NAM strongly called upon all States Parties to the Treaty to fully fulfill their legal obligations to respect this inalienable right and its full realization and underscored that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this right.

The NAM also emphasized that the Treaty did not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulated only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards and the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty were explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NAM stated that any interpretation that was

used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty.

In this regard, the NAM expressed its concerns that some States parties had made conditions on nuclear exports, such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol, in contravention of Article IV of the Treaty, and called upon those States parties to remove any such conditions promptly. The NAM further underlined that concerns related to nuclear non-proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty.

The NAM recognized the major and important role of the IAEA in assisting States parties, particularly developing States, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology. The NAM stressed the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries to sustain and further enhance their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development. The NAM called on all States parties, particularly developed States, to extend their assistance in this regard.

The NAM stressed that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should fully take into account all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter, and be economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent. Additionally, any decision thereon shall be made by consensus, taking into account the interests of all States, and above all, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of NPT States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all its aspects, for peaceful purposes, and if they so decide, to develop a

full national nuclear fuel-cycle in conformity with their obligations under the Treaty.

The NAM remained deeply concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some NWS, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The NAM strongly called for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty.

The NAM once again reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, posed a threat to international peace and security and a great danger to human beings and the environment and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA, including IAEA General Conference Resolution GC(34)/RES/533. In this regard, the Group recognized the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The NAM strongly urged all States to undertake unequivocally, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.

The NAM expressed its serious concern regarding certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations placed on developing countries that seriously hampered the



exercise of the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believed, in that regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the NAM, Article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, was equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of the Treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

The NAM made the following recommendations that the Review Conference:

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- underscore that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, including the development of a full national nuclear fuel cycle, and their right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as technical cooperation among themselves or international organizations, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries, and that the realization of these rights constituted one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty;
  - reaffirm that any measure aiming at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under Article IV of the Treaty, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of the States

- parties, in contravention with the Treaty's objectives and purposes, and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
- reaffirm the sovereign right of each State party to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies that, inter alia, included an inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle, and that such rights of State parties, including expanding their own production capacity in the nuclear fuel cycle, shall not, in any way, be compromised or diminished, including as a result of any possible decision in the context of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle;
  - underline that concerns related to nuclear proliferation shall not, in any way, restrict the inalienable right of any State party to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in Article IV of the Treaty, and accordingly, to call upon the States parties to refrain from any action that would limit certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their "sensitivity", as the Treaty did not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their sensitivity but stipulated only that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards;
  - express concern that certain unilateral, politically motivated restrictions and/or limitations seriously hamper the exercise by developing States parties of their inalienable rights to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
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- express concern that some States parties had set conditions that limit the export of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to developing States parties, such as concluding and bringing into force an additional protocol. Any such conditions contravened Article IV of the Treaty, which was explicit in that regard, leaving no room for reinterpretation or setting conditions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States;
  - reaffirm that any interpretation that was used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was inconsistent with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty, and therefore, to strongly call for the fulfilment of the obligations under article 4 (2) of the Treaty with regard to exports, to other States parties, of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes;
  - emphasize that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure and facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the access by developing countries parties to the Treaty to nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
  - express deep concern over the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons, and to strongly call for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of nuclear related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty;
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- underscore the importance of IAEA assistance in particular to its developing member States in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and the need for strengthening this role of the Agency, and, in this regard, to call on the IAEA to ensure a balance between technical cooperation and its other activities;
- recognize that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States, to reaffirm the central role of IAEA in nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards, owing to its mandatory functions and longstanding expertise;
- stress that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within the IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner, with the guidance and participation of and in consultation with all member States, that shall incorporate the views of all Member States;
- recognize that the primary responsibility for nuclear security rests with individual States and that the IAEA had the mandate, the authority and the central role in the area of nuclear security; and to reaffirm that any process to develop multilateral norms, guidelines or rules on nuclear security should be pursued within the framework of the IAEA, should be driven by Member States, should be negotiated multilaterally in a gradual, inclusive and transparent manner incorporating the views of all Member States and should not encroach upon the mandate, competence and central role of the IAEA in the area of nuclear security;
- emphasize that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination;

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- strongly emphasize that any decision in the context of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle must be consistent with the IAEA Statute and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of each State party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy and sciences, in all their aspects, for peaceful purposes, and, if it so decided, to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle, according to Article IV of the Treaty, to underscore that such decisions shall be made by consensus following wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations, with the participation, and taking into account the interests of all IAEA Member States, as well as all technical, legal, political and economic implications and complexities surrounding this sensitive matter; and to underline that every effort should be made to ensure that any related mechanism is sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable, transparent and economically viable, under the auspices of the IAEA;
- reiterate a need for caution in thoroughly addressing the associated technical, legal and economic aspects, as well as the underlying political dimensions of the issue of assurances of nuclear fuel supply, and to stress the necessity to ensure that any further consideration of this issue was based on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework that adequately addressed the views and concerns of all States parties and that any proposal that eventually emerged in this regard was in full accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and took into account the respective legal obligations of States parties and the principle of non-discrimination; reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities - operational or under construction - posed a great danger to human lives and the environment, and constituted a grave violation of international law, the principles and

- purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of IAEA; and
- recognize the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument prohibiting attacks and the threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and, pending the conclusion of such an instrument, to strongly urge all States to refrain from attacks or the threat of attacks on such facilities.
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The **European Union (EU)** reaffirmed its support for the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty. The European Union was strongly committed to the objectives of Article IV. Through multilateral and bilateral cooperation programmes, the EU supported many peaceful and beneficial applications of nuclear technology, in particular in developing countries.

The EU recalled that the conditions laid down by the NPT for the exercise of the right to use nuclear energy were: the observance of non-proliferation commitments, the implementation of IAEA safeguards and the pursuit, in accordance with the good-faith principle, of purely peaceful purposes.

The EU noted that it continued to promote multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, which may help provide nuclear fuel supply security without distorting the existing well-functioning market and under the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions. The EU invited all parties concerned to engage constructively to make progress on the establishment of the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank so that concrete results could be reported on project completion and so that assurances were given that the project was developed under the best safety and security conditions.

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Through the EU Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), €524 million over the period 2007-2013, and an additional €225 million for the period 2014-2020, was allocated to the promotion of nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear materials in third countries. This instrument supported projects in the field of safety in Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, South East Asia, Northern Africa and the Middle East.

Through other EU Instruments, out of €349 million dedicated to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation worldwide, more than €260 million in the period 2014-2020 had been allocated to the EU's regional CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative.

The Fukushima accident highlighted the need to regularly assess and continuously improve, as far as reasonably practicable, the safety of nuclear installations. That shall include measures for the prevention of accidents and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents. The EU and its Member States were substantially contributing to the Comprehensive Fukushima Report of the IAEA. The IAEA Action Plan on nuclear safety reflected priority actions to be taken by the international community in this regard. The EU invited the IAEA to maintain a dynamic and multi-annual vision of priorities in the field of nuclear safety after the end of the Action Plan in 2015.

On 8 July 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted a new Directive to strengthen the safety framework for nuclear installations including NPPs, research reactors, fuel cycle facilities, as well as on-site storage facilities. This Directive, which will be transposed into the legislation of all EU Member States by August 2017 at the latest, set the objectives of preventing accidents and,

should they occur, mitigating the consequences and avoiding early and large radioactive releases. These objectives would apply to all new nuclear installations and will be used as a reference for the implementation of safety improvements to existing nuclear installations with a view to strengthening nuclear safety.

The EU welcomed the “Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety”, which aimed to strengthen nuclear safety and increasing transparency. The Vienna Declaration was adopted at the Diplomatic Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which took place on 9 February 2015 in Vienna. The EU actively contributed to the Vienna Declaration, the objectives of which were already enacted in EU legally binding legislation. The EU recalled that the implementation of the objectives of the Declaration will be subject to peer reviews in the framework of the next CNS Review Meeting in 2017, urged all Parties to the Convention to fulfil them without delay.

The EU stressed that the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should take place under the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions. In this context, the EU invited IAEA Member States to host Integrated Regulatory Review Service and other Peer Review Missions, and to conduct national reviews on a regular basis. The EU encouraged all States to enhance transparency in the field of nuclear safety, for example by publishing the results of Peer Review Missions and by announcing the programme of Peer Review Missions for the following years. The EU called on all States to review nuclear installations on the basis of a comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessment, if not already done so.

With the objective of ensuring that development of nuclear energy took place in a safe and responsible manner, the EU also encouraged all States to develop and implement policies and



national programmes for the safe and long term management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, including their disposal, generated on the State's territory.

The EU encouraged the Review Conference to express support for the further development of national, bilateral, regional and international cooperation with regard to education and awareness raising to ensure adequate training and qualification of the workforce required, including using new information technologies as appropriate, for the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The EU underlined the importance of continuing international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety and security, safe waste and spent fuel management, emergency preparedness and response arrangements and radiological protection. The EU called upon States that had not yet done so to accede to all Conventions, as appropriate as soon as possible, and to implement fully the ensuing commitments.

The **USA** emphasized that a strong non-proliferation regime was a necessary basis for ensuring robust cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United States fully recognized that no approach to non-proliferation would succeed if it was based on the denial of rights to States that played by the rules. The US also emphasized the need for new frameworks for civil nuclear cooperation so that countries could access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. These principles guided US policy. The US sought to secure and minimize the civil use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), while cooperating to develop and deploy technologies that could achieve the same benefits without use of HEU.

The US also encouraged its partners to rely on the global market as well as fuel assurance mechanisms, to which it had provided

tangible support, as an alternative to pursuing indigenous enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. For States new to nuclear power, the US commended the efforts underway in the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) to explore alternative, multilateral approaches to the back end of the fuel cycle.

The United States took pride in its record on peaceful nuclear cooperation. The US was a major promoter of global nuclear commerce, with 22 bilateral agreements in place that provided the basis for cooperation with 49 partners. These agreements bound both the US and its partners to strict non-proliferation conditions that meet NPT obligations and commitments under the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines.

The US highlighted its Working Paper 47 on the issue of NPT withdrawal. The paper focused on ways that States might misuse the NPT withdrawal provision, and specific steps that could be taken to respond to – and discourage – such misuse. By spelling out those steps, the US hoped to make clear that States could not expect to take advantage of their withdrawal from the NPT for illegitimate purposes. While the 2010 Final Document cited “divergent views” on withdrawal, this was an area where consensus should be possible if a common understanding could be reached of measures that could be put in place to dissuade countries from withdrawing.

The **Russian Federation** noted that it consistently advocated broader access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy for the States Parties to the NPT and promoted international cooperation in this sphere in compliance with Article IV of the Treaty. Russian Federation noted that there was no alternative to nuclear energy in the world. Today, this was a well-developed technology capable of addressing many modern challenges.

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The Russian Federation stated that the world community still was overcoming the psychological shock caused by the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi in 2011, which prejudiced the attitude to nuclear energy. Recent IAEA data indicated a constantly increasing demand in nuclear energy. By the end of 2014, there were 438 power units operating in the world, with a total net installed capacity of 375.9 GWe, and 70 more nuclear power reactors were under construction. This confirmed that nuclear energy remained attractive for many countries and continued to play an important role in achieving global energy security and sustainable development.

Nuclear energy development was a priority for the Russian Federation. Since 1954 when the world's first nuclear power plant was put into operation in Obninsk, the Russian Federation had accumulated great experience in nuclear energy development. Today, Russian nuclear industry comprised 350 plants and organizations with over 255,000 employees. This industry ensured a complete production cycle in the sphere of nuclear energy: from uranium mining to NPP construction and electric power production, as well as a wide range of research and development activities. At present, 33 power units were in operation in Russia; their total net installed capacity was 25.2 GWe. Nine power units of 10 GWe capacity and one floating nuclear thermal power plant "Akademik Lomonosov" of 80 MWe capacity were under construction. The Russian Government had set the goal to increase the share of nuclear power in its energy mix from 16 up to 25 per cent by 2030; which meant opening 28 new nuclear power units by then.

In the long run, the Russian Federation supported nuclear power development with 4th generation fast-neutron reactors of closed nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). Russia was the only country in the world where a 600 MW fast-neutron reactor (BN-600) had been operating successfully for many years. The Russian Federation

also had completed the construction of the 800 MW reactor (BN-800). An experimental fast-neutron reactor based on Russian technology was operating in China. The Research Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dimitrovgrad was implementing a project on the construction of a new multipurpose research fast reactor (MBIR), which was intended to replace its only functional research fast reactor with sodium coolant BOR-60. The Russian Federation was planning to create an international research centre on the basis of the MBIR.

For many years, Russia had been providing assistance to States Parties to the NPT for developing nuclear technology, as well as constructing and operating NPPs. The first unit of the Belarusian NPP and the third unit of the Tianwan NPP in China were currently under construction, a contract was signed for the construction of the Hanhikivi-I NPP in Finland. The documentation on the construction of the Akkuyu NPP has been elaborated and submitted to government authorities of the Republic of Turkey. In March 2014, intergovernmental agreements on cooperation on the project to expand and modernize the Paks NPP were signed with Hungary. The first NPP in Jordan would be constructed on the basis of Russian technology.

Russia attaches great importance to promoting cooperation with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the sphere of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Since 2010, all the elements of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) in Angarsk had been implemented in cooperation with Kazakhstan. Its creation was part of the 2006 Initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin to develop global nuclear energy infrastructure and create international centres providing services of the nuclear fuel cycle, which was aimed at controlling the spread of sensitive NFC technologies, without hindering world nuclear energy development. This initiative was the Russian contribution to the solution of the important task of ensuring reliable access to the

benefits of nuclear energy for all the interested countries, with due observation of the requirements of the non-proliferation regime.

On the basis of the Russian initiative and the agreement with the IAEA, the reserve of low-enriched uranium (LEU) was established to ensure a guaranteed supply, with 120 tonnes of LEU with up to 5 per cent enrichment. At the end of 2010, all the necessary nuclear material to create such a reserve was deposited at storage facility in Angarsk and placed under IAEA safeguards. Russia covered all the costs associated with the storage, maintenance, nuclear safety and security, as well as the application of the LEU related safeguards. The Russian Federation reaffirmed its unwavering support for the IAEA project to establish its own “LEU bank” with the participation of the Russian Federation. Russia welcomed the consent of the Republic of Kazakhstan to provide a site for the LEU bank.

The Russian Federation noted that the issues of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste were known obstacles to the widespread use of nuclear energy. This was not only a complex technological issue, but also a key aspect to consider in case of opting for nuclear energy. For many years, leading experts, including those from the IAEA, had noted that the solution to this problem was possible through the establishment of inter-State, regional and global cooperation at the final stage of the nuclear fuel cycle. The decision may also be based on an NPP supplier country providing a comprehensive service package which include not only the construction of a NPP, but also the supply of nuclear fuel for it as well as the removal of spent nuclear fuel for further handling. Russia used this approach in cooperation with some countries and would continue the practice of the return of spent fuel from research reactors of Russian design. The return of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for research reactors from third countries was carried out in cooperation with the United States and with the participation of the IAEA. In total, since the launch of the

programme, 800 kg of fresh fuel and 1346 kg of exposed HEU fuel were exported from 14 countries. Russia also supported the IAEA programme aimed at reducing enrichment of nuclear fuel for research reactors to a level below 20%, and this would significantly reduce the level of risk associated with HEU proliferation.

### **Looking Ahead**

On Wednesday, Main Committee I and Subsidiary Body 1 will be back in session, along with Main Committees II and III.

Tariq Rauf

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