



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):

UN Headquarters: 27 April – 22 May 2015

New York: 4 May 2015

The 2015 NPT Review Conference opened at UN headquarters on 27 April and will continue till 22 May 2015.

On Monday, 4th May, the Review Conference swung into full gear with all three Main Committees holding meetings.

In Main Committee I, statements on nuclear disarmament were made by: Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries; Latvia; Costa Rica; Philippines; Malaysia; Chair of Group of Governmental Experts on FMCT (Canada); Austria on behalf of the Humanitarian Initiative; Republic of Korea; Canada; Brazil; Finland; China; Iran on behalf of NAM; Italy; New Zealand; Norway; South Africa; Switzerland and Morocco.

In Main Committee II, statements were made by: the Facilitator for the Middle East NWFZ conference, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava of Finland; IAEA; Iran on behalf of NAM; Argentina in its capacity of chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; South Africa; Japan; Mexico; European Union; Czech Republic; Germany; Tunisia on behalf of the Arab Group; Australia; Egypt; Cuba; Poland; Canada; Russian Federation; Vienna Group of 10; USA;

Malaysia; United Kingdom; Brazil; Syria; China; Iran, Switzerland; Norway; Saudi Arabia; Thailand; Argentina; Netherlands and Libya.

In Main Committee III, statements were delivered by: Iran for the NAM; European Union; IAEA; Czech Republic; Japan; Mexico; Argentina; USA; South Africa; Australia; Cuba; Canada and the Russian Federation.

In Main Committee I, the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – recommended that the Conference reaffirm the commitment by all States Parties to pursue policies that were fully compatible with the NPT and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. They recommended that the Conference call for effective disarmament of all nuclear weapons, strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed. Any reductions must be based on the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency.

The Nordic countries highlighted the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament”, given at the 2000 NPT review conference, as well as their recent statement recommitting to achieving a world without nuclear weapons to which all parties were committed under Article VI of the Treaty. The Nordic countries all subscribed to the humanitarian perspective on nuclear weapons and recommended that the Conference express its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapons use. The international discourse during the review cycle must be taken duly into account. The risk and consequences of nuclear weapons were a threat to, and a concern of, all humanity, and the responsibility to prevent the use of nuclear weapons rested with all States.

The Nordic countries also subscribed to a world free of nuclear weapons and the principle of effective disarmament. They recommended that the Conference emphasize that disarmament needed to be pursued without conditions through multilateral, regional, bilateral or unilateral means. They deeply regretted that the Conference on Disarmament had failed to produce tangible results, and urged that forum to begin work according to its mandate without delay, including on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The Nordic States noted that the United Nations disarmament machinery as a whole should be used to pursue multilateral disarmament, especially when the Conference on Disarmament remained stalled.

As confidence-building measures and steps towards disarmament, the Nordic countries recommended that the Conference urged the nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency regarding nuclear weapons, to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines.

Austria expressed grave concern about the disappointing degree of implementation of Article VI of the Treaty on nuclear disarmament, the commitments undertaken in 1995 and 2000 and of the actions contained in the disarmament part of the 2010 Action Plan.

Austria stated that it had the honor to coordinate the latest statement on the humanitarian consequences by the so-called "Group of 16". This latest statement, delivered by Austria's Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz, was supported by 159 States. This was the highest number of UN Member States ever supporting a cross regional declaration on a particular substantive issue. It reflected the shared sense of concern about the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons and the deep implications for human survival, for the environment, for socio-economic development, and for the health of future generations. It

was in the interest of the very survival of humanity that these weapons were never used again, under any circumstances. The catastrophic effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident or miscalculation or design, cannot be adequately addressed. All efforts must thus be exerted to eliminate the threat of these weapons of mass destruction. The only guarantee for this was through their total elimination.

Austria introduced Working Paper 30 on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons on behalf of Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Holy See, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. The working paper made the following recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference for inclusion in the forward looking part of the final document:

- i. To welcome that during the past review cycle, findings and evidence on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had been presented in fact-based discussions, including at international conferences.
- ii. To recognize that the immediate, mid- and long-term consequences of nuclear weapon detonations inter alia on health, environment, infrastructure, food security, climate, development, social cohesion and the global economy were significantly graver than previously understood, interlinked, and would not be constrained by national borders but have regional or global effects, and may even threaten the survival of humanity.
- iii. To be aware that the risk of a nuclear weapon explosion was significantly greater than previously assumed and was further increasing with proliferation, the lowering of the technical threshold for nuclear weapon capability and with the danger of the access to nuclear weapons and related material by terrorist groups.

- iv. To express dismay at the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and to reaffirm the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.
- v. To recognize that new evidence that had emerged about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons that cast further doubt on whether these weapons could ever be used in conformity with international law, in particular international humanitarian law.
- vi. To emphasize that the consequences of nuclear weapon detonations and the risks associated with this weaponry concern the security of all humanity.
- vii. To affirm that it was in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons were never used again, under any circumstances.
- viii. To be cognisant of the fact that the risk of nuclear weapons' use could only be avoided through the total elimination of nuclear weapons and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons.
- ix. To emphasize that the scope of consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation and risks associated raised profound moral and ethical questions.
- x. To commit to further enhance awareness of the humanitarian impact of and risks associated with nuclear weapons with a view to increasing the urgency with which a world without nuclear weapons was pursued and achieved.
- xi. To call on the nuclear-weapon States, pending the total elimination of their nuclear weapon arsenals, to take concrete interim measures with urgency to reduce the risk of nuclear weapon detonations and to increase their transparency and accountability in this regard.
- xii. To stress that in light of the growing understanding of the risk posed by nuclear weapons and their devastating humanitarian consequences, there was an urgent need for the full implementation of existing obligations under the NPT

and its previous Review Conferences to identify and pursue effective measures for the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons, and to call on all States parties to spare no efforts in this regard.

Austria also issued a national pledge which highlighted a number of inescapable conclusions that needed to be drawn from the evidence that had been presented in the course of the humanitarian initiative. Consequently, Austria pledged inter alia:

- i. to present the facts-based discussions, findings and compelling evidence of the Vienna Conference, which built upon the previous conferences in Oslo and Nayarit, to all relevant fora, in particular the NPT Review Conference 2015 and in the UN framework, as they should be at the centre of all deliberations, obligations and commitments with regard to nuclear disarmament;
- ii. call on all States parties to the NPT to renew their commitment to the urgent and full implementation of existing obligations under Article VI and to this end, to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and Austria pledged to cooperate with all stakeholders to achieve this goal; and
- iii. cooperate with all relevant stakeholders, in efforts to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences.

Austria thanked the more than 70 States that had decided to support and/or endorse this pledge to date.

In **Main Committee II**, the **NAM** stated that it fully recognized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, and as the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfillment of safeguard obligations assumed by

States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

The NAM noted that it while supported the verification activities of the IAEA, it underlined the importance of strict observance of the IAEA Statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities. In that connection, the NAM stressed the importance of safeguards but underlined the essential responsibility of the IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's Statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency was the only organization that received highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of Member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the NAM emphasized that the confidentiality of such information must be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needed to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the NAM, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The NAM recalled IAEA General Conference resolution GC(58)/RES/14, paragraph 34, in which the IAEA Director General was urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and was requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the IAEA secretariat.

The NAM stressed that all States members of IAEA should strictly observe its Statute and that nothing should be done to undermine the Agency's authority. Furthermore, the NAM called upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.

The NAM emphasized the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and called upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

The NAM stressed the statutory role of the IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognized the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements. The NAM strongly believed that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.

Furthermore, the NAM called upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In that regard, the NAM supported the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of the IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The NAM further urged the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

The NAM emphasized that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty were a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or

equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The NAM confirmed that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless those conditions were met.

The NAM strongly supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and called for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which was an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. The resolution remained valid until its objectives were achieved.

The NAM recalled that the 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date. The NAM expressed its serious concern that no progress had been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

The NAM expressed deep concern over the long delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. While appreciating the efforts made by the Facilitator of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, the NAM expressed profound disappointment over the lack of progress in the implementation of the plan of action on the Middle East adopted by the 2010 Review Conference, in particular over the failure of the conveners to convene the conference in 2012 as scheduled. This failure contradicted and violated the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of

the Treaty, contravened the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

The NAM also expressed deep concern, in this context, that Israel continued to undermine the convening of the Conference by not declaring its intention to participate in it. The NAM urged the three co-sponsors of the Resolution to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay.

The NAM reiterated that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it was the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In Main Committee III, the **USA** stated that it was fully committed to promoting access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT and continued to pursue practical measures to implement that commitment. Secretary Kerry made this abundantly clear during his statement in the Review Conference's plenary session, including through his announcement that the United States would make an additional commitment of \$50 million over the next five years to the IAEA's Peaceful Uses Initiative. This was just one important part of the US' long-standing and continued support for IAEA efforts to expand access to nuclear energy and technology.

The US stated that nuclear safety remained critically important to the future of peaceful uses, and was another area where the IAEA played an essential role. The impacts of the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plants were still with us, and the US welcomed efforts to review the foundations of nuclear safety, to include the recent Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety,

which the US strongly supported. The US also underlined its strongest support for implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on Nuclear Safety. And finally, the US welcomed the entry into force of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. Improving nuclear safety in the future required dealing with legacy issues of the past, in particular the accident at Chornobyl. As the largest bilateral donor to the Chornobyl Shelter Fund, the United States worked closely with the G7 and the European Commission to support Ukraine in returning the Chornobyl site to an environmentally safe and stable condition. The US welcomed the successful pledging conference last week that raised €165 million toward completing the job.

The United States was proud to be the single largest contributor to IAEA technical assistance programmes. Since 2010, the US had provided close to \$200 million in support of these efforts. US support was helping to upgrade the IAEA nuclear applications laboratories at Seibersdorf. The US was pleased to announce last week that it would provide an additional \$2 million to ensure that these laboratories could continue to share the benefits of nuclear sciences with IAEA Member States. As noted by Secretary Kerry, the US would contribute another \$50 million towards the IAEA's Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI), making the US' total pledge \$100 million since 2010.

Looking Ahead

On Tuesday, Subsidiary Body I (Main Committee I), chaired by Ambassador Benno Laggner (Switzerland) will meet in the morning session to discuss the forward-looking (2015 to 2020) aspects of “nuclear disarmament and security assurances”. Main Committee II (safeguards and regional issues) will meet in the afternoon, and Main Committee III (peaceful uses of nuclear

energy) will meet in the morning session and its subsidiary body will meet in the afternoon session.

Tariq Rauf
