



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL  
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

## **2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):**

**UN Headquarters: 27 April – 22 May 2015**

### **New York: 1 May 2015**

The 2015 NPT Review Conference opened at UN headquarters on 27 April and will continue till 22 May 2015.

Main Committee I (disarmament), chaired by Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey (Peru), held its first session on Friday morning, 1<sup>st</sup> May 2015, with “ General exchange of views” on Item 16 of the Agenda: *Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference: (a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security: (i) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3.*

Seventeen of the 35 delegations which had inscribed their name on the list of speakers delivered their statements in the morning session: **Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) delivered by Iran; Mexico, USA, Japan, Argentina, New Agenda Coalition (NAC) delivered by New Zealand; Australia; Nordics delivered by Sweden; Cuba; Latvia; Costa Rica; Poland; Czech Republic;**

**Russian Federation; Germany; France; Philippines; UK; De-alerting group delivered by Chile;** Malaysia; Austria; Republic of Korea; Canada; Brazil; Finland; Syria; China; Algeria; Iran; New Zealand; Italy; Norway; South Africa; European Union; and Ireland.

The **NAM statement** was delivered by Ambassador Reza Najafi (Permanent Representative of Iran to the IAEA and CTBTO in Vienna), as Iran is the current chair of the NAM. The NAM expressed its deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations of the nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty and their unequivocal undertakings under the final documents of the successive Review Conferences of the Treaty since 1995. This trend undermined the object and purpose of the Treaty and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. NAM remained deeply concerned by military and security doctrines, including that of NATO that set out the rationales for the use of nuclear weapons.

The NAM recalled the adoption by the General Assembly of two resolutions on the "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament", in which, the Assembly called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard, and declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The NAM called for the full implementation of these resolutions, which provide a concrete pathway for realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, the NAM reiterated its call to the Conference on Disarmament to immediately establish, as the highest priority, a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons.

The NAM took note of bilateral and unilateral reductions in nuclear weapons, and stressed that reductions in deployments and in operational status could not substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. Any such reductions were undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. The NAM stated that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons further undermined disarmament commitments. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities.

The NAM expressed concern over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the threat of weaponization of outer space and at the negative security consequences of the deployment of such systems, which could trigger an arms race and lead to further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. The NAM emphasized the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with relevant General Assembly resolution.

The NAM proposed the following Recommendations:

*On Principles and Objectives:*

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- To underline that the immediate and unconditional accession to the Treaty by all States not party, as non-nuclear-weapon States, is essential for the full realization of its objectives. All States parties should make every effort to achieve the universality of the Treaty and refrain from taking any actions

- that could negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.
- To strongly call on all States that are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede, without any further delay and precondition, to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

#### On Nuclear Disarmament:

- To urge the nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and completely implement their unequivocal nuclear disarmament commitments, including the 13 practical steps, that were agreed and reaffirmed by consensus at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Treaty, in order to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
  - To strongly call for the prompt and full implementation of the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, particularly the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament.
  - To emphasize the necessity to start negotiations without further delay on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time.
  - To call for the immediate establishment, as the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament, a subsidiary body to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.
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- To acknowledge that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies run counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty and undermine the realization of its objectives.
  - To reaffirm that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular international humanitarian law, and that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.
  - To fully support and call for the full implementation of resolutions 68/32 and 69/58 entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament", through which the General Assembly called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard; and designated 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
  - To establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the fulfilment by the nuclear weapon States of their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty, as well as the implementation of their unequivocal undertakings agreed at the Review Conferences of the Treaty, and to make recommendations to the Review Conference on the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
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- To call for the complete exclusion of the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons from all the military and security policies, concepts and doctrines, including the "Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts of security based on promoting and developing military alliances that pursue nuclear deterrence policies.
- To underscore the necessity of the full and non-discriminatory implementation of articles I and II of the Treaty by all States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, including through nuclear weapon-sharing with other States under any kind of security and military arrangements or alliances.

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#### On Nuclear Testing:

- To strongly support a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear-weapon tests without exception, as well as any nuclear explosion, and reaffirm the importance of such ban in the realization of objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- To support the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and to stress that while the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation in all its aspects, it cannot substitute the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

- To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear-weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, as they are in contravention of the objectives of the CTBT and would undermine its effectiveness and contradict the commitments undertaken at the NPT Review Conferences by nuclear weapon States.
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#### On Negative Security Assurances:

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- To reaffirm that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular, international humanitarian law. To reiterate that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.
  - To call on nuclear-weapon States to refrain, under all circumstances, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty, including, inter alia, by the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from all their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.
  - To strongly support the urgent commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, by all nuclear weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, pending the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.
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Ambassador Dell Higgin (Ambassador for Disarmament and Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva) delivered the **New Agenda Coalition (NAC)** statement. The NAC noted that its Ministers made a particular point of contrasting the achievement of the international community in concluding total and global prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons with the barren state of affairs in respect of nuclear weapons. Ministers deplored the fact that, despite countless resolutions and initiatives during the previous half-century, no equivalent outcome for nuclear weapons had been achieved. The clear disparity between the treatment of biological and chemical weapons on the one hand, and nuclear weapons on the other, stubbornly persisted. Significantly, and notwithstanding the solemn commitments that had been made and repeated, and the growing awareness of the consequences of inaction, there continued to exist a conspicuous omission in the implementation of the NPT itself through the ongoing failure of the parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for nuclear disarmament.

The NAC called on States parties to accelerate their implementation of all agreements and undertakings made at successive NPT Review Conferences. The failure to do so undermined the credibility of the Treaty and could cast doubt on the value of any additional commitments made at this or future Review Conferences. While calling for implementation of these existing agreements and undertakings, however, the NAC was firmly of the view that more was needed. States parties must also demonstrably move up a gear, especially with respect to the implementation of one of the Treaty's core provisions – Article VI. First, this Conference should explore the legal approaches available to advance the “effective measures” relating to nuclear disarmament that were required by Article VI of the Treaty. Second, it should take decisions to advance “effective measures”. Third, it should call for appropriate follow-up actions in all



disarmament fora as well as in the United Nations General Assembly.

The NAC's stated that States parties were, in effect, presented with a choice between two legally distinct approaches towards implementing Article VI. In deciding which of these two approaches to take, States would need to assess, from both a political and technical perspective, the advantages and disadvantages of each option as an "effective measure" for achieving nuclear disarmament – the goal of Article VI.

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- The first approach involved the negotiation of a stand-alone agreement, whether a Comprehensive Convention or a Ban Treaty, with the difference between the two lying not in their legal structure but in their scope and level of complexity.
  - The second approach was that of a Framework Agreement establishing obligations pursuant to a 'head', or primary, treaty which would be negotiated first and which would formulate the objectives of the overall regime and establish broad commitments of the parties. It would also institute a general system of governance for the subsequent negotiation of a series of mutually supportive secondary instruments or protocols on discrete aspects of the overall regime. This second approach was architecturally distinct from the Comprehensive Convention or Ban Treaty option in that it did not aim to create a set of obligations in one stand-alone agreement.
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The NAC noted that there were States present which cited today's troubled international security environment to justify the retention and upgrading of nuclear weapons. This opportunism was misguided and misplaced. It undermined collective efforts against nuclear proliferation and the stance of non-nuclear weapon States which, at an earlier time of greater global insecurity, committed

themselves never to develop, acquire or control those armaments. Nuclear weapons did not provide stability. Nor did they immunise us from conflict. Moreover, the devastation to health, the environment and the food chain resulting from the detonation of a nuclear weapon would itself have lasting repercussions for world order.

Following the body of evidence emerging from the recent series of meetings in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna, States parties were more aware than ever before of the risks and consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design. This evidence had demonstrated that the risks of an accident, human error or system failure involving nuclear weapons are continuing, were greater than previously suspected and were increasing. The evidence had also made it clear that the potential health and environmental effects of a nuclear weapon detonation had been amplified by growing urban populations and the comparatively greater destructive power of nuclear weapons since their first use. The evidence, moreover, demonstrated that neither States nor international agencies had adequate capabilities to respond.

The NAC stated that it was long past time for all States to deliver upon their repeated expressions of political commitment to fully implement Article VI and to take action to safeguard future generations from the catastrophic effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design. To move forward, the New Agenda Coalition believed that work to advance Article VI's "effective measures" should now focus on enabling a choice between two legal approaches: the stand-alone Comprehensive Convention/Ban Treaty or the Framework Agreement of mutually supporting instruments.

Ambassador Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel (Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament)

delivered the statement by **France**. France noted its commitment to disarmament was solemnly recalled by the President of the French Republic, François Hollande, in the speech on French nuclear deterrence delivered in Istres on 19 February 2015. France shared the objective of a world without nuclear weapons, when the strategic context so allowed. But nuclear disarmament cannot be declared - it must be built. It can only be reached through a series of concrete measures, step by step. France was well aware that some parties were impatient, considering that disarmament was not being achieved as quickly or as fully as it should. And yet impressive progress had indeed been made in the last 20 years: arsenals reduced by over three quarters, tests ceased by the nuclear weapon States. Approaches which failed to take into account the strategic context would not help to make progress. The NPT approach was pragmatic: nuclear disarmament, under Article VI, fell in the context of general and complete disarmament. It fully took into account the strategic context. The action plan adopted by consensus in 2010 provided an ambitious and long-term roadmap, which must continue and be strengthened step by step, without deviating from the chosen path.

France stated that it was fully aware of its commitments under Article VI. France was working towards disarmament and had taken measures which were exemplary because they were irreversible. France had dismantled its nuclear test site. The process was complete and it was irreversible. It had also dismantled its fissile-material production facilities. This was already irreversible, although the programme would take many more years, with an estimated cost of over €8 billion. This was a significant effort. France had also completely dismantled the ground-to-ground component of its nuclear deterrence. It had reduced its submarine and air components by a third. These were major decisions, which required constant effort, time and money to implement. France stressed that nuclear disarmament had been a daily reality in France for the past two decades. France had

adopted a responsible, restricted nuclear doctrine based on the principle of strict sufficiency; it maintained its arsenal at the lowest possible level compatible with the strategic context. France was fully aware of the serious consequences of nuclear weapons and thus categorically ruled out using nuclear weapons as battlefield weapons. French nuclear deterrence was thus purely defensive and strictly limited to defending its vital interests under extreme circumstances of self-defence, a right recognized by the Charter of the United Nations. French nuclear deterrence was in full compliance with international law.

Last year, in this very place, France signed the Protocol to the Treaty creating such a zone in Central Asia. France was the first nuclear weapon State to ratify it. France hoped to soon sign the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and it supported the objective of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

France noted that it had set an example. On 19 February 2015, President Hollande announced new transparency measures. He gave unprecedented figures on the composition of the French arsenal: 3 sets of 16 submarine-borne missiles; 54 air-to-ground missiles. He also announced that French arsenal would open up further dismantled or converted nuclear military sites to the international community. On 16 April 2015, some CD ambassadors were given a tour of the Luxeuil air base and its former nuclear weapons storage facilities, to observe the site's conversion for conventional purposes. The opportunity was given to observe the rigorous security conditions under which the nuclear weapons were once stored, under a double control chain. The visitors saw for themselves that there was no risk of the weapons being used non-intentionally. France calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to make the same effort of transparency for all the categories of nuclear weapons.

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The statement by the **United Kingdom** was delivered by Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Conference on Disarmament, Guy Pollard. The UK noted that it had made a strong contribution to the overall reductions in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons. In the late 1970s, when the UK's stockpile was at its highest, the UK had approximately 460 warheads in-service across five types. Since the end of the Cold War, the UK had steadily reduced the size of its nuclear forces and since 1998, had reduced to a single platform, a single delivery system and a single design of warhead.

In January 2015, the UK announced that the commitments made following the 2010 Review Conference to reduce the number of operationally available warheads had been implemented across the submarine fleet. The UK had reduced the number of warheads on each of its deployed ballistic missile submarines from 48 to 40, and the number of operational missiles on each of those submarines to no more than eight.

The total number of operationally available warheads was no more than 120. This would enable the UK to reduce its overall nuclear warhead stockpile to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s. The UK also had a strong record of reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in its defence and security policy. The UK viewed its nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent - they were political, not military weapons. The UK would employ nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of NATO Allies, and would not use any of its nuclear weapons contrary to international law.

UK nuclear weapons were not on high alert, nor were they on a "launch on warning" status. The patrol ballistic missile submarine operated routinely at a "notice to fire" measured in days, rather

than in minutes, which was the case during the Cold War. Since May 1994, patrol submarines' missiles had been de-targeted.

The UK had announced in 1995 that it had ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All facilities used for the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the UK had either been decommissioned, or were undergoing decommissioning, or were now used for peaceful purposes only. All enrichment and reprocessing in the UK since 1995 had been conducted under Euratom safeguards and the terms of the UK/Euratom/IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and all civil nuclear material in the UK was subject to these arrangements. In 1998, the UK placed nuclear material excess to defence requirements under international safeguards.

Ambassador Michael Biontino (Permanent Representative of **Germany** to the Conference on Disarmament) in his statement noted that the NPT community and many partners were wondering whether the step-by-step-approach was still valid. Some asked whether it might not be more appropriate to accelerate the process towards a world free of nuclear weapons by already starting negotiations on a nuclear weapon ban or convention today. Germany did not share this view. As Sam Nunn, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz put it succinctly: "A world without nuclear weapons will not simply be today's world minus nuclear weapons". In other words, effective and verifiable nuclear disarmament could not take place in a vacuum, but in a concrete security and political context. For the time being, nuclear weapons were still assigned a role in military doctrines. This also applied to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, of which Germany is a member.

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Germany stated that US nuclear weapons assigned for NATO defence had been stationed in Germany and elsewhere in western Europe before the NPT and thus were “grandfathered”.

Robert Wood (Special Representative to the Conference on Disarmament) delivered the statement by the USA. The United States remained unequivocally committed to Article VI of the NPT and to its full implementation. As President Obama had declared in the 2009 Prague Speech, and reiterated in Berlin in 2013, the United States sought to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. And as Secretary Kerry reiterated at the outset of this Conference, achieving this worthy goal would not be easy and will require patience, cooperation, and persistence to complete. Secretary Kerry also made clear that the United States can and must lead the way toward that goal, and it had done so consistently.

It was well known that US stocks of nuclear weapons were at their lowest level in over half a century, more than 80% below the levels existing when the NPT entered into force in 1970. This was largely the result of unprecedented efforts on the part of the nuclear-weapon states. At the same time, these major reductions had been bolstered by several States seizing historic opportunities to rid themselves of nuclear weapons and join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

The US record on disarmament was indisputable. Since the last time NPT Parties gathered to review the implementation of the Treaty in 2010, the United States and the Russian Federation in February 2011 brought the New START Treaty into force. Despite challenges elsewhere, both sides were faithfully implementing New START obligations. When New START was fully implemented in 2018, it would have reduced operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to their lowest levels since the 1950s. The United States also had made clear its readiness to

pursue further nuclear reductions with the Russian Federation, but progress required a willing partner.

The mission of the US nuclear complex had been totally transformed since the Cold War. Now, its investments were geared to ensure the safety and security of the existing stockpile and the dismantlement of retired warheads. Modernization of the US nuclear enterprise would over time allow for still greater reductions in the number of weapons the US retained in reserve as a hedge.

Disarmament was taking place every day in the United States. Over the past two decades alone the United States had dismantled 10,251 nuclear warheads. That worked out to dismantling an average of more than one warhead per day, every day, for 20 years. And this complex and costly work continued. And, at this NPT Review Conference, the United States reported that approximately 2,500 warheads were retired and awaiting dismantlement, and that the administration would seek funding to accelerate dismantlement of retired U.S. nuclear warheads by 20 percent beginning in fiscal year 2017.

Underpinning all of the US' efforts, stretching back decades, had been the clear understanding and recognition of the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. But the issue was not whether nuclear weapons were a security issue or a humanitarian issue – they were both. That was the message the United States put forward with the Baruch Plan to eliminate nuclear weapons in 1946 and had carried ever since. It was the same message the US took to the December 2014 Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna. The US participated in that conference to reinforce its message that the practical step-by-step path it was following remained the only realistic route to a world without nuclear weapons. Step by step did not mean one step at a



time. It means the US would pursue all available avenues, with steps building on and creating opportunities for others.

Looking ahead, the US saw growing verification challenges as it moved to smaller and smaller numbers of nuclear weapons. Verification would become increasingly complex at lower numbers of nuclear weapons, while the level of intrusiveness of verification to provide assurance to the international community would increase. It was for this reason that the United States, in partnership with more than 25 countries and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, launched in March 2015, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. The International Partnership was designed to develop a common understanding among States with and without nuclear weapons of monitoring and verification challenges across the nuclear weapons lifecycle -- from material production and control, warhead assembly and deployment, to storage, dismantlement, and disposition.

## **Looking Ahead**

Main Committee I (disarmament), chaired by Ambassador Enrique Romàn-Morey (Peru), will meet in the morning session on Monday, 4<sup>th</sup> May. In the afternoon session, Subsidiary Body I (Main Committee I), chaired by Ambassador Benno Laggner (Switzerland) will meet in the afternoon session to discuss the forward-looking (2015 to 2020) aspects of “nuclear disarmament and security assurances”.

Tariq Rauf

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