

**2015 Review Conference of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

UN Headquarters: 27 April – 22 May 2015

New York: 20 May 2015

The 2015 NPT Review Conference opened at UN headquarters on 27 April and will continue till 22 May 2015.

On **Wednesday, 20th May**, the side negotiations chaired by the Conference President continued on the draft Chair's report of Main Committee I on nuclear disarmament. The Chairs of Main Committees II and III worked to get agreement on their draft reports in informal plenary sessions and in the working groups.

In the **President's consultations**, reportedly the differences between the NNWS and the NWS, and amongst the NNWS, continued and despite intense negotiations the differences still remained too wide to be bridged. This was confirmed by the President in a short plenary session in the afternoon.

The Chair of MC.II had appointed informal facilitators yesterday

Discussions on the Middle East, in Subsidiary Body 2, continued in the sidelines on a draft report by the Chair of SB.2 (see below) – reportedly a senior official travelled to Tel Aviv and other capitals were engaged to discuss the elements of the proposed actions for the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East NWF/WMD/FZ and the convening of a conference to start the process (picking up from the 2010 Review Conference action to convene a Middle East conference by the end of 2012 – which has not yet been convened).

The draft reports of MC.II, SB.2, MC.III and SB.3 are appended below.

Looking Ahead

On Thursday, the draft reports of all three Main Committees and their respective bodies need to be tabled in order to meet the deadline under the Rules of Procedure to have documents available 24 hours in advance of their consideration by the Review Conference. Given the continuing stalemate on the nuclear disarmament issues, and the lack of agreement on the other reports, it would take a miracle to have these documents ready by Thursday afternoon in a manner where agreement is within sight.

Tariq Rauf

Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution

Working paper of the Chair of Subsidiary Body 2

1. The Review Conference reaffirms its support for the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalls the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The 1995 Resolution remains valid

until its goals and objectives are achieved. The 1995 Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States of the Treaty (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America), is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

2. The Review Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East Peace process, as stated in the 1995 Resolution, and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

3. The Review Conference reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty. The Review Conference calls on all States in the Middle East that have not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

4. The Review Conference recalls the practical steps adopted at the 2010 Review Conference in order to launch a process leading to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution.

5. The Review Conference deeply regrets that a conference did not take place in 2012 as agreed. This Review Conference nonetheless welcomes the continuous efforts of the facilitator, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava of Finland, the States of the region, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution in undertaking preparations for the convening of the conference, including through a series of informal consultations among States of the region.

6. The Review Conference takes note of the overwhelming support expressed by the States parties to convene a Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. To that end, the Review Conference agrees on the following actions:

i. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution and the States of the region, will convene a Conference by 15 December 2015, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States.

ii. The Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the three co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution guarantee that the Conference will not be postponed.

iii. In addition to States of the region (defined as members of the League of Arab States, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel), the nuclear-weapon States, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (BWC-ISU) and the League of Arab States will be invited to attend the Conference as observers.

iv. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, or his designated representative, together with the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in cooperation with the States of the region, will spare no efforts to ensure proper preparation and a successful outcome of this Conference. The Review Conference urges all States of the region to engage without delay in intensive direct consultations in appropriate formats, at their discretion, including first and foremost through preparatory meetings to which all States of the region will be invited. The primary purpose of these consultations will be to reach consensus on an agenda and a final document of the Conference to ensure convening a successful event that will be a practical first step towards the long-held, common goal of the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

v. If the States of the region are not able to agree amongst themselves on the necessary arrangements for the Conference by 15 November 2015, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, will issue invitations to all States of the region for the Conference to be convened by 15 December 2015.

7. The Conference welcomes the efforts taken by the European Union, IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO and BWC-ISU aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution.

8. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will inform the 2020 Review Conference and each session of its Preparatory Committee on progress made and the status of the implementation of the 1995 Resolution.

9. The Conference takes note of the reaffirmation by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

Working paper of the Chair of Main Committee II

Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolutions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference

The Conference recalls and reaffirms the decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, noting paragraph 1 of the principles and the elements relevant to article III of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 9-13 and 17-19, and to article VII, in particular paragraphs 5-7. It also recalls and reaffirms the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at that Conference. The Conference also recalls and reaffirms the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Articles I and II and first to third preambular paragraphs

Non-proliferation

1. The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The Conference reaffirms that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all parties with all its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any action that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

2. The Conference recalls that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the context, inter alia, of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty.

3. The Conference notes that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture

or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

4. The Conference notes that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

5. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of States parties to the effective implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty, the decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference adopted without a vote, the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, adopted by consensus, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by consensus by the 2010 Review Conference.

6. The Conference reaffirms that the strict observance of all the provisions of the Treaty remains central to achieving the shared objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security.

7. The Conference emphasizes that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.

8. The Conference recognizes that breaches of the Treaty's obligations undermine nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Article III and fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article IV and sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs

Safeguards

9. The Conference reaffirms that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns,

along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

10. The Conference expresses its concern with cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by States parties, and calls on those States non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.

11. The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all non-compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the IAEA safeguards. The Conference also underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA's Statute and the respective legal obligations of States parties. In this regard, the Conference calls upon the States parties to extend their cooperation to the IAEA.

12. The Conference emphasizes the importance of access to the Security Council and the General Assembly by the IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with Article XII.C. of the Statute of IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), and the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified by the IAEA.

13. The Conference emphasizes that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation.

14. The Conference stresses that the non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty are also essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation and that IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference considers that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the States parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.

15. States parties emphasize that there is a distinction between the legal obligations of States and voluntary measures aimed at facilitating and strengthening the implementation of safeguards and aimed at confidence building, bearing in mind the obligation of States to cooperate with the IAEA to facilitate the implementation of safeguards agreements.

16. The Conference recalls the importance of the application of IAEA safeguards pursuant to comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 Treaty that

have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.

17. The Conference reaffirms that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification by IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State's declarations so that there is a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

18. The Conference recognizes that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) have been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Conference notes that implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) provides, in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole and that those measures are an integral part of IAEA safeguards.

19. The Conference bears in mind that it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force or applied provisionally, the additional protocol is a legal obligation.

20. The Conference considers that, in the case of a State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol represent the enhanced verification standard for that State which enables the IAEA to provide increased assurances on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole.

21. The Conference stresses the importance of the IAEA exercising fully its mandate and its authority in accordance with its Statute to provide assurances about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in accordance with respective comprehensive safeguards agreements and, where relevant, additional protocols.

22. The Conference welcomes the fact that 124 States parties have brought additional protocols into force and that 23 of these States parties have brought the additional protocol into force since the 2010 Review Conference. The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.

23. The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties upon request in the conclusion, entry into force and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on IAEA and States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements, and adherence to additional protocols.

24. The Conference welcomes the fact that 60 States parties have amended their small quantities protocols and 5 other States parties have rescinded their small quantities protocols. The Conference also welcomes the fact that 17 States parties (Corrected) to all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference welcomes the fact that 172 States parties have in force comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA and that six additional States have brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA since the 2010 Review Conference. The Conference urges the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the accepted the revised small quantities protocol since the 2010 Review Conference and urges all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.

25. The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of the IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

26. The Conference stresses the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to implementation of safeguards in accordance with safeguards agreements, the IAEA's Statute and its confidentiality regime. The Conference notes the steps taken by the IAEA Secretariat to protect classified safeguards information and that the Secretariat will continue to review and update the established procedures for the protection of classified safeguards information within the Secretariat.

27. The Conference notes the considerable increase in the IAEA's safeguards responsibilities and the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards are functioning. The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.

28. The Conference emphasizes the importance of maintaining the credibility, effectiveness, and integrity of IAEA safeguards, and stresses that safeguards implementation should remain technically based, effective, transparent, non-discriminatory, and objective. The Conference welcomes the assurances, clarifications and additional information provided by the IAEA Secretariat in 2014 on the implementation of safeguards in the context of the State-level concept, following the intensive consultation process between the Secretariat and Member States, and also the intention of the Secretariat to continue to engage in open and active dialogue with States on safeguards matters. The Conference notes the work of the IAEA to develop and implement State-level safeguards approaches within the scope of States' safeguards agreements and encourages States parties to support the IAEA to effectively develop and implement State-level safeguards approaches in close consultation and coordination with State and/or regional authorities.

29. The Conference reaffirms that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented by all States parties.

30. The Conference welcomes efforts to strengthen safeguards and notes the IAEA's Secretariat activities in verifying and analysing information provided by Member States on nuclear supply and procurement in accordance with the Statute and relevant safeguards agreements.

31. The Conference welcomes additional technical and financial contributions by States to help the IAEA meet its safeguards responsibilities, and to enhance the related technology base, including the modernization of its Safeguards Analytical Laboratories. It notes the assistance provided by Member States and relevant organizations to the IAEA, including through Member State Support Programme, to facilitate capacity building, including related research and development, and implementation of safeguards. The Conference welcomes the fact that such assistance will continue to be provided towards that end.

32. The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA Statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA. The Conference also encourages States concerned to promote early consultations with the IAEA at the appropriate stage on safeguards relevant aspects of new nuclear facilities in order to facilitate future safeguards implementation.

33. The Conference considers that the strengthening of IAEA safeguards should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation. The

allocation of resources should take into account all of the IAEA's statutory functions, including that of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of

to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.

39. The Conference stresses the importance that all States parties improve their national capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their national legislation and relevant international obligations. The Conference notes the work of the IAEA in support of the efforts of States to combat such trafficking, including the IAEA's activities undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information and the continued maintenance of its incident and trafficking database. The Conference calls upon all States to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear material throughout their territories, in accordance with their national legislation and relevant international obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

40. States parties express concerns related to the threat of terrorism and the risk that non State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The Conference recalls the obligation of all States to implement fully the United Nation Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

41. The Conference encourages all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

42. The Conference welcomes the contribution made by the Nuclear Security Summits in Washington, Seoul and The Hague and the commitments of participating States to further strengthen nuclear security and looks forward to the summit to be held in the United States in 2016. The Conference stresses the central role of the IAEA in strengthening the nuclear security framework and emphasizes the need for the involvement of all States in nuclear security-related activities and initiatives in an inclusive manner. The Conference encourages the IAEA to continue, in coordination with Member States, to play a constructive and coordinating role in other nuclear security-related initiatives, within their respective mandates and memberships, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials Mass Destruction, and to work jointly, as appropriate, with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions.

Export controls

43. The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

44. The Conference recognizes that national rules and regulations of States parties are necessary to ensure that the States parties are able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to all States taking into account articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and for States parties, also fully respecting article IV. In this context, the Conference urges States parties that have not yet done so to establish and implement effective national rules and regulations. The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.

45. The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.

46. The Conference underlines that any supplier arrangement should continue to be transparent and to ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty.

47. The Conference recalls that the 1995 Extension and Review Conference noted that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

48. The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.

49. The Conference encourages all States parties to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

50. The Conference welcomes cooperation among States parties and assistance available, including through the IAEA, to promote and implement high standards of safeguards, nuclear security and export controls. The Conference encourages States parties in a position to contribute to such efforts to do so. The Conference also encourages States parties in need of assistance to make use of the assistance available.

Article VII

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

51. The Conference reaffirms the conviction that the further establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. The Conference reaffirms its support for internationally recognised nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

52. The Conference recognizes the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia are making towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference welcomes the parallel declarations adopted by the nuclear-weapon

States and Mongolia on 17 September 2012, concerning Mongolia's nuclear weapon-free status. The Conference also welcomes the increased cooperation amongst the parties to the zones. States parties note the convening in 2015 of the Third Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Established Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia.

53. The Conference welcomes the progress toward ratification by the nuclear weapon States of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and the continuing efforts in this regard of the parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and the nuclear-weapon States pertaining to the Protocol to that Treaty. States parties look forward to the nuclear-weapon States signing and ratifying the Protocol to that Treaty as soon as possible. The Conference welcomes the signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The Conference stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to the

treaties that establish nuclear weapon-free zones in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty.

Chairman's working paper: Main Committee III

Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolutions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference

1. The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The Conference reaffirms that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all parties with all its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

2. The Conference has reviewed the operation of Article III (3) and IV of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference. The Conference reaffirmed the need to uphold obligations and commitments and urges the full implementation of all previous agreements.

3. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty. The Conference recognizes that this right constitutes a fundamental pillar of the Treaty. In this connection, the Conference confirms that each State party's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including its fuel cycle policies, should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. The Conference reaffirms that all States parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so should also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States parties or international organizations to the further

development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for their development needs, in accordance with Article IV.

5. The Conference urges that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear weapons States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.

6. The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular State parties that are developing countries, to the fullest possible access to nuclear materials, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes. Transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty are to be encouraged. They would be facilitated by eliminating undue constraints that might impede such cooperation.

7. The Conference underlines the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, through the development of effective and efficient programmes aimed at improving their scientific, technological and regulatory capabilities.

8. The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place. Moreover, the Conference emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is one of the core objectives enshrined in the Statute of the IAEA. The Conference encourages all States parties to actively cooperate among themselves, and through the IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

9. The Conference reaffirms that the unimpeded exercise of the inalienable right in accordance with article IV of the Treaty is essential to maintain the balance between rights and obligations of States Parties under the Treaty, including the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

10. The Conference thus encourages, to the extent possible, transparency and inclusiveness in export control policies which should ensure and facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the access by developing States parties to nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

11. The Conference recognizes that science and technology, including nuclear science and technology, are an indispensable element in achieving social and economic development for all States parties.

12. The Conference underlines that IAEA activities in the field of nuclear power and non-power applications have contributed in an important way to meeting energy needs, improving health, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources and optimizing industrial processes, thus helping to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and that organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for their development needs, in accordance with Article IV.

5. The Conference urges that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear weapons States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.

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extent possible, the access by developing States parties to nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

11. The Conference recognizes that science and technology, including nuclear science and technology, are an indispensable element in achieving social and economic development for all States parties.

13. The Conference calls upon Member States to cooperate with, and support fully, enhanced international cooperation, including the efforts of the IAEA, to expand the extent that nuclear sciences and applications are utilized to promote sustainable development for States parties, taking into account, in particular the needs of developing countries, including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and, when adopted, the post-2015 development agenda.

14. The Conference encourages States parties and relevant organizations in a position to do so to provide assistance, in particular to States parties that are developing countries, in order to enhance access to nuclear science and technology, through various measures including capacity-building, the provision of equipment, strengthening regional networking and regional cooperation frameworks and facilitating cooperation among developing countries.

15. The Conference reaffirms that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied at all stages by commitments to, and ongoing implementation of, safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States parties' national legislation and respective international obligations.

16. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the obligations under article IV (2) of the Treaty with regard to exports, to other States parties, of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

17. The Conference welcomes the IAEA Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL) project, which is central to the IAEA's efforts to provide opportunities for nuclear applications in broader areas and to enhance the access of States parties, in particular developing countries, to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The Conference welcomes the contributions already pledged by countries in support of the ReNuAL project and calls upon all States parties to provide the necessary financial and other support for this project. The Conference further notes that the ReNuAL project is scheduled to commence during the course of 2015, and supports appeals for timely, additional funding to make possible the projects scheduled for commencement.

18. The Conference encourages all States parties and relevant organizations to strengthen their public communication activity, considering that education and public

communication play an important role in disseminating information to, and raising the awareness of, the public in general on the utility of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.

19. The Conference welcomes efforts by States parties to encourage national, bilateral and international activities to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

20. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA, and stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to States parties, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account, for the sustainment and further enhancement of their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development in areas such as electricity production, human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, and the use of nuclear techniques in environmental protection, water resources management, industry, food security, nutrition and agriculture.

21. The Conference underscores the importance of IAEA assistance, in particular to developing countries that are States parties, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, and the need for strengthening this role of the IAEA, and, in this regard, calls on the IAEA to maintain an appropriate balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the IAEA, and to consider the increasing demand for technical cooperation by States parties, especially by developing countries.

22. The Conference acknowledges the central role of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP), to enhance the application of nuclear science and technology in many States parties, in particular, in those that are developing countries, and recognizes the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) as the most important mechanism for the implementation of the IAEA TCP. The Conference calls on the IAEA Member States to make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are assured, predictable and sufficient to meet the objectives mandated in article II of the IAEA Statute.

23. The Conference notes that the IAEA TCP, as one of the main vehicles for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, is formulated in accordance with the IAEA Statute and guiding principles, as contained in INFCIRC/267, and in accordance with relevant directives of the IAEA General Conference and the Board of Governors.

24. The Conference notes the ongoing collaborative efforts by the IAEA and its Member States, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme.

25. The Conference acknowledges the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) as a flexible mechanism to mobilize additional resources for IAEA programmes, and complements the TCF together with other extra-budgetary contributions to the IAEA. The Conference welcomes the contributions already pledged by Parties and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities, as well as the IAEA's Resource Mobilization efforts, and encourages those States parties and relevant organizations in a position to do so to provide necessary assistance and contributions, including to the PUI, as well as to promote cooperation to this end. Such additional resources can contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and, when adopted, the post-2015 development agenda.

26. The Conference recognizes that regional cooperative arrangements for the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy can be an effective means of providing assistance and facilitating technology transfer, complementing the technical cooperation activities of IAEA in individual countries. It notes the contributions of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Advancement of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific and the Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology, as well as the strategy for the IAEA technical cooperation programme in the European region.

27. The Conference acknowledges that each State party has the right to define its national energy policy.

28. The Conference recognizes that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world, and that States parties may pursue different ways to achieve their energy security and climate protection goals.

29. The Conference notes the Second Regional Conference on Energy and Nuclear Power in Africa organized by the IAEA in Cape Town, South Africa in May 2011, the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century, organized by the IAEA in Cooperation with the OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency in Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation in June 2013, and the Third Conference on Energy and Nuclear Power in Africa, co-organized by the IAEA and the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation in Mombasa, Kenya in April 2015.

30. The Conference recognizes the safety and security issues associated with nuclear energy, as well as the important issue of managing spent fuel and radioactive waste in a sustainable manner, while also recognizing the continuing international efforts to address

those issues. Nuclear fuel suppliers are encouraged to work with and assist recipient States, upon request, in the safe and secure management of spent fuel.

31. The Conference recognizes that the development of an appropriate infrastructure to support the safe, secure and efficient use of nuclear power, in line with relevant IAEA standards and guidelines, is an issue of central importance, especially for States that are planning for the introduction of nuclear power.

32. The Conference emphasizes the need for States embarking on nuclear energy programmes to develop a robust national, technical, human resource, and regulatory infrastructure to ensure safety and security for all reactor and fuel cycle activities consistent with IAEA standards, guidelines, and recommendations at a very early stage of the process.

33. The Conference encourages all States, in particular those operating, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors that have not yet taken the necessary steps to become party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, to do so.

34. The Conference encourages bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote cooperation on future approaches to nuclear power such as the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation and the Generation IV International Forum, and encourages further development of nuclear reactor technologies that are safer, more economic, more resource efficient, and reduce proliferation risks.

35. The Conference acknowledges that competent human resources are a key component for all nuclear power programmes, including new and expanding ones. The Conference underlines that partnerships and collaboration with the IAEA, as well as amongst States parties, make a valuable contribution to developing such capacity. The Conference welcomes initiatives directed at expanding nuclear knowledge and expertise, as well as training in the field of nuclear energy.

36. The Conference stresses the importance of nuclear safety and nuclear security for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While nuclear safety and nuclear security are national responsibilities, the IAEA should play a key role in the development of safety standards and nuclear security guidance.

37. The Conference recognizes that nuclear safety and nuclear security have the common aim of protecting human health, society and the environment, while acknowledging the distinctions between the two areas, and affirming the importance of coordination in this regard.

38. The Conference recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States and reaffirms the central role of the IAEA in promoting international cooperation on nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards, owing to its statutory functions and longstanding expertise.

39. The Conference stresses that any possible review of the IAEA safety standards should be carried out within the IAEA in a gradual, inclusive and transparent manner.

40. The Conference underscores the need to facilitate the effective participation of all interested States in the IAEA Safety Standards Committees given their importance.

41. The Conference recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear security rests with individual States and the IAEA plays a central role in the area of nuclear security and that the UN, also has an important role; and reaffirms that any process to develop international norms, guidelines or rules on nuclear security, should be developed multilaterally in a gradual, inclusive and transparent manner.

42. The Conference emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security should be in conformity with relevant articles under the Treaty including the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

43. The Conference encourages the efforts of the IAEA, as well as of other relevant forums, in the promotion of safety in all its aspects, and encourages all States parties to take the appropriate national, regional and international steps to enhance and foster a safety culture. The Conference encourages the continuous improvement of nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety and appropriate subsequent actions, by recognizing the role that further analyses of the lessons learned from past experience have to play in reinforcing national, regional and international nuclear safety frameworks that serve for the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.

44. The Conference welcomes the activities of the IAEA directed towards the strengthening of nuclear safety in operating power and research reactors. The Conference further endorses the work of the IAEA, including in the organization of international peer review services, the support to the regulatory bodies and other relevant areas of the infrastructure of Member States through the Technical Cooperation Programme.

45. The Conference acknowledges the primary responsibility of individual States for maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear installations, and the crucial importance of an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure in nuclear safety, radiological protection and spent fuel and radioactive waste management, as well as an independent and effective regulatory body.

46. The Conference encourages efforts to assist States parties upon request in implementing IAEA safety standards, bilaterally and through the IAEA. In this regard, the Conference recalls that special efforts should be made and sustained to increase awareness in those fields, through the participation of States parties, in particular those from developing countries, in training, workshops, seminars and capacity-building in a non-discriminatory manner. The Conference underlines the fundamental importance of sustainable programmes, through national, regional and international efforts, for education and training in nuclear radiation, transport, waste safety and nuclear security, while focusing on building institutional capacity and technical and managerial capabilities in States parties.

47. The Conference welcomes the efforts made by the IAEA in the aftermath of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The Conference notes the

50. The Conference encourages all States that have not yet done so, to become party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

51. The Conference encourages States parties to strengthen their national, bilateral, regional and international emergency preparedness and response mechanisms, as appropriate, to facilitate timely information exchange during a nuclear emergency, and improve bilateral, regional and international cooperation to that effect.

52. The Conference notes that the IAEA plays a key role, supported by States, in facilitating international cooperation with regard to preparedness and response to nuclear emergencies. The Conference encourages States to make use of the various services and activities offered by the IAEA to improve preparedness and response to nuclear emergencies.

53. The Conference notes the principles and objectives of the non-legally binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors, and underlines the important role of the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

54. The Conference encourages States parties to strengthen the national and multinational efforts to recover orphan sources and maintain control of disused sources, and further encourages States parties to consider developing arrangements, as practicable, to permit the return of disused sources to the supplier States.

55. The Conference encourages States parties concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible. The Conference welcomes efforts to use non-highly enriched uranium technologies for the production of radioisotopes, taking into account the need for an assured and reliable supply of medical isotopes.

56. The Conference notes the efforts to apply best practices and basic principles, as promoted by the IAEA, in mining and processing, including those related to environmental management of uranium mining.

57. The Conference encourages States parties to promote the sharing of best practices in the areas of nuclear safety and nuclear security, taking into account confidentiality of the information concerned, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.

58. The Conference welcomes the attention to problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear programmes, and all aspects of their remediation, including, where appropriate and technically and economically feasible, safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas.

59. The Conference encourages all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance as may be requested for remedial purposes in these affected areas, while noting the efforts that have been made to date in this regard.

60. The Conference recognizes that, historically, the safety record of civilian transport, including maritime transport, of radioactive materials has been excellent, and stresses the importance of international cooperation to maintain and enhance the safety of international transport.

61. The Conference reaffirms maritime and air navigation rights and freedoms as provided for in international law and as reflected in relevant international instruments.

62. The Conference endorses the IAEA standards for the safe transport of radioactive material and affirms that it is in the interest of all States parties that the transportation of radioactive materials continues to be conducted consistent with international safety, security and environmental protection standards and guidelines. The Conference takes note of the concerns of small island developing States and other coastal States with regard to the transportation of radioactive materials by sea and, in this regard, welcomes continuing efforts to improve communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.

63. The Conference notes the guidelines on best practices for Voluntary and Confidential Government-to-Government Communications on the transport of MOX Fuel, high level radioactive waste and, as appropriate, irradiated nuclear fuel by sea, and encourages the continuation of the positive dialogue process between shipping and coastal States aimed at improving mutual understanding, confidence-building and enhanced communication in relation to the safe maritime transport of radioactive material, taking into account necessary confidentiality for security purposes. The Conference notes the Tabletop Exercise to be conducted within the Framework of the Dialogue between Coastal and Shipping States in June 2015.

64. The Conference considers that attacks or threats of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety, have dangerous political, economic and environmental implications and could raise serious issues pertaining to international law, and therefore calls upon all States parties, pursuant to action 64 of the

2010 Action plan, to abide by the decision of the IAEA General Conference of 18 September 2009, GC(53)/DEC/13, on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.

65. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage on 15 April 2015.

66. The Conference recalls the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention, the Joint Protocol Related to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention and the protocols amending these conventions, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, and notes that these conventions can provide the basis for establishing a worldwide nuclear liability regime based on the principles of nuclear liability law.

67. The Conference stresses the importance of having effective nuclear liability mechanisms in place both at national and international levels to ensure prompt and adequate compensation for nuclear damage to people, property and the environment as well as actual economic loss due to a radiological accident or an incident during the transport of radioactive material, including maritime transport, and notes the application of the principles of nuclear liability, including strict and exclusive liability, in the event of a nuclear accident or an incident during the transport of radioactive material.

68. The Conference notes the establishment of a reserve of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in the Russian Federation in December 2010 for the use of IAEA Member States, as well as the establishment of an IAEA owned and operated LEU Bank, approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in December 2010 and welcomes Kazakhstan's offer to host the IAEA LEU Bank.

69. The Conference notes discussions undertaken under the auspices of the IAEA or other regional or international forums to develop multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities to create, in a non-discriminatory and transparent fashion, mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Such approaches, without restricting States parties' rights under the Treaty and without any prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, should address the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including the application of IAEA full scope safeguards, nuclear safety and nuclear security norms, in a manner wholly consistent with the inalienable right of States parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, acknowledged in article IV of the Treaty.

70. While recognizing that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management rests with the State, the Conference encourages

international cooperation in the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, including exploring multinational approaches to their storage and disposal.

Working paper of the Chair of Subsidiary Body 3

Article V

1. The Conference affirms that the provisions of article V of the Treaty with regard to the peaceful applications of any nuclear explosions are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.¹

Article VIII

2. The Conference reaffirms the purpose of the review process as set out in the relevant decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference, and notes the relevant discussions undertaken in the 2010 Review Conference.

3. The Conference recognizes the importance of ensuring efficiency, coordination and continuity in the review cycle of the Treaty, and, in this context, urges that past and incumbent Presidents and Chairs consult with the incoming President and Chairs, if necessary, regarding practical matters related to their responsibilities. Participation in these meetings will be voluntary and will not affect the costs assessed to States parties.

4. The Conference reaffirms the need for increased accountability and transparency from all States parties through regular reporting, as agreed in Action 20 of the 2010 Action Plan, as an essential part of strengthening the review process. The Conference recalls Action 21 of the 2010 Action Plan by which nuclear-weapon States were encouraged to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals. The Conference notes the proposals made by several States for nuclear-weapon States to provide annual reports, starting in 2017, on the implementation of their obligations, commitments and undertakings with numerical information such as the number and type of nuclear weapons in their holdings, the number of nuclear weapons dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts, and the amount of fissile material produced for military purposes. The Conference notes divergent views from States parties about the establishment of mechanisms to monitor the implementation of specific articles of the Treaty.

5. The Conference calls for increased efficiency in the review process by considering the consolidation and streamlining of meetings, especially with regard to Preparatory

Committee meetings. The Conference encourages a more flexible use of time in particular by giving preference to interactive substantive discussions. The Conference recognizes the potential efficiency gains of using digital recordings and encourages the use of the PaperSmart platform.

6. The Conference further recognizes the importance of enhanced engagement with civil society, academia and experts; as well as making possible use of alternative meeting locations to promote the participation of States parties from all regions, while giving due consideration to cost implications.

Article IX

7. The Conference welcomes the accession of the State of Palestine to the Treaty, without prejudice to the positions of State parties, and reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence is essential for the full realization of the objectives of the Treaty and calls upon all States not parties to the Treaty, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan to accede to it without further delay and without any conditions as non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference calls upon all States parties to make every effort to achieve the universality of the Treaty and refrain from taking any actions that would negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty. The Conference notes divergent views from States parties on cooperation with non-parties to the Treaty.

Article X

8. The Conference reaffirms that each State party, in exercising its national sovereignty, has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. The Conference notes that a number of States parties indicate that there is no intention to amend or reinterpret any provision of the Treaty and that a holistic approach to withdrawal should be pursued to respond to the interests of all parties. The Conference underscores that any consideration of article X should take into account, in a holistic and balanced manner, all three pillars of the Treaty and the importance of demonstrating tangible progress in their implementation.

9. The Conference also reaffirms that notice of withdrawal shall be given to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance and shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the State party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. The Conference notes that a number of States parties suggested that the notification be made in writing.

10. The Conference encourages that, without prejudice to the sovereign right to withdraw, States parties could undertake efforts to consult, as relevant, with the State

party invoking article X, in order to uphold the principle of universality and preserve the integrity of the Treaty.

11. The Conference notes that some States indicated that a withdrawing party remains responsible for violations of the Treaty committed prior to its withdrawal, and that such withdrawal would not affect any right, obligation or legal situation between the withdrawing State and each of the other States parties created through the execution of the Treaty prior to withdrawal.

12. The Conference notes that several States proposed that nuclear supplying States could consider, without prejudice to the provisions of articles IV and X, incorporating, as appropriate, in arrangements or contracts concluded with other States parties, clauses detailing measures, such as dismantling or return clauses and provisions for maintaining safeguards, to be taken in the event of withdrawal in accordance with international law and national legislation.
