



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

UN Headquarters: 27 April – 22 May 2015

New York: 8 May 2015

The 2015 NPT Review Conference opened at UN headquarters on 27 April and will continue till 22 May 2015.

On Friday, 8th May, the Conference reached its half-way stage with no major problems. The Main Committees along with their Subsidiary Bodies were functioning well, even though the differences in positions and expectations among States parties have surfaced and are well known from their opening statements, working papers and from the sessions of the Preparatory Committee held in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Under the rules of procedure, the sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB) are ‘closed’ to civil society and observers.

As already reported, consultations continued on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, the Middle East, nuclear disarmament, verification and the possible outcome(s) of the Review Conference. The two most contentious issues – the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and moving towards an international prohibition on nuclear weapons and the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East to set up a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction –

continued to dominate and will determine the eventual fate of the Conference. Thus far, *no* State party or political grouping has indicated that it would prefer a failed Conference if its views and objectives were not fully reflected in an outcome document.

On Friday afternoon, draft Reports were circulated by all three Main Committees and by SB-1 (disarmament) and SB-2 (nuclear verification). The draft Report of SB-3 will be circulated at the beginning of next week, as its meetings were scheduled for later in the programme of work of the Conference.

The **draft Reports** circulated as **Conference Room Papers (CRPs)** are for the use of States parties only, they are not circulated to civil society or uploaded on the official 2015 NPT Review Conference website. However, in the interest of transparency and accountability, some States parties have made the CRPs available to civil society and the media. **The CRPs can be found on the website of Reaching Critical Will:** <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2015>.

On Friday, at a short Plenary session the Chairs of the Main Committees and SBs gave short update oral reports. All three SBs held sessions, the Main Committees did not.

The **New Agenda Coalition (NAC)** made a statement in **Subsidiary Body I (nuclear disarmament)** of Main Committee I on “effective measures” to implement Article VI of the NPT and proposed the start of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament through a legal instrument. Any measure not establishing a legal instrument would be a mere political measure and thus not qualify as an effective measure. The NAC reiterated its proposal for a stand-alone comprehensive prohibition agreement or to have a framework agreement comprising mutually supporting agreements.

Reports (excerpts)

MC.I

The Conference:

- reaffirms the **full and effective implementation** of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as of Decision 2 “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the “Final Document” of the 2000 Review Conference and the “Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions” of the 2010 Review Conference;
 - reaffirms that the **full and effective implementation** of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security;
 - reaffirms that every effort should be made to **implement the Treaty in all its aspects and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices**, without prejudice or hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty;
 - recognizes that the **full and effective implementation of the NPT is a common responsibility of all States parties** to the Treaty and remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all parties with all its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices;
 - **reaffirms that the strict observance of all the provisions of the Treaty at all times** remains central to achieving the shared objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty’s vital contribution to peace and security;
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- **welcomes the accession of the State of Palestine** to the Treaty and reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty;
 - **affirms that the accession to the Treaty by all States not party, as non-nuclear-weapon States,** is essential for achieving the universality of the Treaty, and for all States Parties to refrain from taking any actions that could negatively affect the prospects for the universality of the Treaty;
 - emphasizes the **importance of ensuring that men and women can participate equally and at all levels in the process of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation;**
 - **recalls and reaffirms the importance of the full implementation by all States parties, especially the nuclear-weapon States, of Article VI of the Treaty** on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Review Conference decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, the practical steps for achieving nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well the action plan on nuclear disarmament agreed by the 2010 Review Conference;
 - notes the updated reports making use of standard categories submitted by the nuclear-weapon States pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the conclusions and recommendations agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, including the glossary of key nuclear terms;
 - notes the increased transparency of some nuclear-weapon States with respect to the number of nuclear weapons in their national inventories;
 - takes note of the meetings of the nuclear-weapon States held in Paris (2011), Washington (2012), Geneva (2013), Beijing (2014) and Washington (2015);
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- recognizes and welcomes the steps taken to implement the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and the significant reductions in deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons including the dismantling of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles by both sides;
- notes that, **despite the significant achievements in bilateral and unilateral nuclear arms reduction, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amounts to many thousands and many hundreds remain on high alert.** This reality does not ameliorate the environment of international peace and security and overwhelms the demands of the large majority of the States parties for achieving nuclear disarmament as required under Article VI of the Treaty;
- **affirms the importance of lowering operational readiness of deployed nuclear forces and of lowered alert levels as contributing to the process of enhanced security** through further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military security concepts, policies and doctrines;
- **emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons;**
- notes that, particularly in light of increasing international tensions, **many States parties remain concerned regarding the continuing role of nuclear weapon in military concepts, doctrines and policies** of States and regional alliances;
- welcomes the high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (26 September 2013), in which the General Assembly called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, and decided to convene no later than 2018 a high-

- level United Nations conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard. The Conference also welcomes the decision by the General Assembly to designate 26 September as the “International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”;
- **recalls the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament**, and affirms the importance of achieving a world without nuclear weapons through the negotiation of a mechanism with clearly defined benchmarks, timelines and a strong system of verification. The Conference **further affirms treaty-based nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation** and the need to revitalize multilateral disarmament negotiating efforts and bodies;
 - **welcomes the extensive international discourse on the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons**, especially the conferences held in Oslo (March 2013), Nayarit (February 2014) and Vienna (December 2014) which deepened collective understanding of this matter. In this regard, the Conference also welcomes of the Austrian Pledge endorsed by [70] States Parties including the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The fact-based discussions at the Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons underscored the unacceptable humanitarian consequences caused by the immense uncontrollable destructive capability and indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons, with deep implications for human survival and for the health of future generations;
 - **recalls its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. The Conference acknowledges the new information presented and facts-based discussions on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons**, including at international conferences;
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- **affirms that the use of nuclear weapons would have immediate- and long-term consequences**, which are significantly graver than previously understood and that no State or international organization could adequately address the humanitarian emergency caused by such use. The Conference stresses the importance of spreading awareness of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons across borders and generations;
 - **expresses its concern over the growing risk of use of nuclear weapons**. The Conference affirms that in light of the devastating humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons, the risks associated with nuclear weapons concerns all humanity;
 - **reiterates its deep concern at the continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament**, including the persistent failure to agree on, and implement, a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, despite further attempts to achieve consensus. The Conference notes the efforts and discussions pursued within the United Nations General Assembly related to revitalizing the multilateral disarmament machinery on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, in particular the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/56;
 - **welcomes that [183] States have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and that [164] States, including 36 whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, have deposited instruments of ratification**. In this respect, the Conference welcomes the ratification of the CTBT since the 2010 Review Conference by Angola, Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Congo, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iraq and Niue;
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- reaffirms the importance of the entry into force as soon as possible of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), recalling the responsibility of all States to promote that Treaty; the urgency of the signature and/or ratification of the CTBT by the remaining eight Annex 2 States necessary for the entry into force of the CTBT; and pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the maintenance of moratoria on nuclear test explosions and refraining from any action that could defeat the objective and purpose of the CTBT;
 - **further reaffirms the importance of the CTBT as a vital multilateral instrument for nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.** The Conference recognized that clear actionable steps are required to achieve the entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization. All States Parties can contribute to the full development and continued operational maintenance of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and the International Data Centre (IDC) of the CTBT;
 - **reaffirms the necessity of the early commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament of a verifiable and non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;** pending the conclusion of such negotiations the maintenance of an effective international and verifiable restriction must apply on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons; the designation and placement under IAEA safeguards of fissile material no longer required for military programmes to ensure the irreversible removal of such fissile material; the initiation of processes to dismantle or convert associated fissile material production facilities; The Conference takes note of the work of the group of governmental experts established pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/53;
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- **recalls the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances** pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions 255 (1968), 984 (1995) and in connection with treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones;
 - **notes the urgency for the Conference on Disarmament to consider effective, universal, non-discriminatory legally binding arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States**, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, including an internationally legally binding instrument, and recognition of the need to fully honour and uphold all existing security assurances given unilaterally and multilaterally;
 - **welcomes efforts towards the development of nuclear disarmament verification capabilities that will contribute to providing assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament** agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world, including the new and continuing initiatives pursued by Norway, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.
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SB.I (draft substantive elements)

The Conference:

- **underlines the necessity of implementing fully article VI of the Treaty, Decisions I and 2 and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Extension and Review Conference, the Final Document adopted by the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference;**
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- agrees that understandings and concerns pertaining to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons should underpin and lend urgency to efforts by all States leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It is **in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances;**
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- notes the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI;
- acknowledging that some progress has been made in implementing disarmament commitments since the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference recognizes that greater and accelerated implementation efforts are required, particularly on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, including through the specification of concrete benchmarks and agreed timelines;
- **reaffirms that significant steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament should promote international stability, peace and security**, and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all;
- **recalls the commitment of all States parties to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons** as well as the need for all States to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons;
- **affirms that effective measures for the full implementation of article VI can be multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral or unilateral**;
- recalls that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control;
- agrees that awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons should serve as a unifying factor and compel urgent action for the full implementation of article VI;
- affirms the need for all nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking, and pending the establishment of a legal framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons, to reduce further and

- eliminate, in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, all types of nuclear weapons, strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed, regardless of location, including through negotiations as well as unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures;
- **calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to commence negotiations at an early date to achieve greater reductions and transparency in their stockpiles of nuclear weapons**, including non-strategic nuclear weapons, with a view to concluding such negotiations prior to the expiration of the New START Treaty;
 - acknowledges the importance of addressing issues pertaining to other types of related strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems with a view to facilitating and accelerating the nuclear disarmament process;
 - further calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to engage the other nuclear-weapon States over the course of the next review cycle of the Treaty with a view to achieving rapid reductions in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons;
 - **calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to cease the development of new nuclear weapons and the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapon systems** that support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities;
 - **encourages all States that have not yet eliminated nuclear weapons from security doctrines to abandon, as soon as possible but not later than the 2020 Review Conference,** concepts, doctrines and policies that envisage the first use of nuclear weapons and to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;
 - calls upon nuclear-weapon States to ensure that their policies address fully all risks associated with nuclear weapons, which are greater than previously assumed, including, inter

- alia, those stemming from threats posed by non-State actors and by the vulnerability of command and control systems to cyber threats;
- pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the Conference emphasizes the need to reduce rapidly, as an interim measure, the operational status of nuclear weapon systems, leading to a phased removal of all nuclear weapons from high alert levels, noting that such reductions would increase international stability and security while lowering the humanitarian risks associated with nuclear weapons;
 - encourages the nuclear-weapon States to build upon and expand their efforts to enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence, including by intensifying their discussions on definitions and terminology related to nuclear weapons with a view to facilitating and accelerating nuclear disarmament;
 - **calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to provide annual reports on their nuclear disarmament-related undertakings and, starting in 2017,** to include the following standard information on: (i) the number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads; (ii) the number and the type of delivery vehicles; (iii) the measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (iv) the measures taken to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; (v) the measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems; (vi) the number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts; (vii) the amount of fissile material for military purposes;
 - agrees that each session of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference should allocate specific time to review the reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon States;
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- calls upon non-nuclear-weapon States to increase the quality, quantity and consistency of their reports as a contribution to enhanced transparency;
- pending the establishment of the necessary legal framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons, **the Conference endorses the accelerated pursuit of various practical building blocks for a world without nuclear weapons** that can be realized simultaneously, including through multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral and unilateral measures;
- **reaffirms and recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the humanitarian risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons**, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States, which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
- pending the urgent conclusion of an international legally binding instrument on negative security assurances, all States concerned are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols and to review and withdraw any related reservations and interpretive declarations by the 2020 Review Conference;
- bearing in mind the legacy of health and environmental consequences resulting from nuclear tests and the disproportionate effects on children`s and women`s health, the Conference calls upon the eight remaining States listed in Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to sign and ratify that Treaty without waiting for any other State to do so;
- pending the entry into force of that Treaty, all States commit to cease and refrain from any action that would defeat its object and purpose, to uphold moratoriums on nuclear test

- explosions and to close, dismantle or convert any sites used for nuclear test explosions;
- **urges States to commence immediately and to conclude rapidly substantive negotiations**, before the end of the next review cycle, preferably in the Conference on Disarmament, on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices **in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein**. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the Conference calls upon nuclear-weapon States and all other relevant States to maintain or implement moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
 - encourages all States, in cooperation with international organizations and civil society, **to pursue and intensify efforts towards the development of nuclear disarmament verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements** for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, including through the new and continuing initiatives pursued under the leadership of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification initiated by the United States of America;
 - noting that **a majority of States parties believe that a legal framework is necessary for the for implementation of article VI**, the Conference encourages all States to engage, without delay, within the framework of the United Nations disarmament machinery, in an inclusive process **to identify and elaborate the legal provisions required for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons**. These legal provisions could be enacted through various approaches, including, inter alia, **a stand-alone**

instrument, which could take the form of a nuclear-weapons-ban treaty or a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention that includes a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe; a framework agreement comprising mutually supporting instruments that would establish the key prohibitions, obligations and arrangements for time-bound, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament; or other arrangements;

- encourages all States, in cooperation with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and the private sector, to continue and intensify efforts to raise the awareness of the public, and younger and future generations in particular, on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons;
 - also encourages all States to make use of new information and communications technology in these efforts;
 - in view of the 70th anniversary of the use of nuclear weapons, the Conference notes the proposal for world leaders, disarmament experts and youth to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to witness first-hand the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and to hear the testimonies of the survivors (hibakusha).
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Looking Ahead

On Monday, SB-1 will meet in the morning session, while MC.I will meet in the afternoon. MC.II will meet in the afternoon session, and SB.3 will meet in the morning session. The draft reports circulated on Friday will be discussed with a view to reaching agreement on consensus texts.

Tariq Rauf