SIPRI YEARBOOK 2003
ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute is an independent international institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden’s 150 years of unbroken peace.

The Institute is financed mainly by the Swedish Parliament. The staff and the Governing Board are international. The Institute also has an Advisory Committee as an international consultative body.

The objectives of SIPRI’s research are
• to promote transparency in security and arms control
• to contribute to conflict prevention and resolution
• to disseminate information to the broader public.

SIPRI publishes its research findings in books and on the Internet at http://www.sipri.org.
This booklet illustrates the type of facts and data you will find in the 847-page *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* which may be obtained through all the main bookshops or from Oxford University Press, UK.

The SIPRI Yearbook has been published since 1969. It brings together objective data and state-of-the-art analysis, offered by SIPRI’s own staff and other experts, on all major aspects of arms control, peace and security. The *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* focuses particularly on the impact and consequences during 2002 of the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the reactions of the USA and other powers to the attacks. It is also published in Russian, Ukrainian, Chinese and Arabic editions. This condensed version is available from SIPRI in English, French, German and Swedish.

On the Internet, order the Yearbook from OUP through SIPRI at http://www.sipri.org/pubs/bookorder.html. For information about recent SIPRI publications, see http://editors.sipri.org/recpubs.html.
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## Essays

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## Acronyms
The Euro-Atlantic system and global security

• The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks forced the USA to review its security interests. The main concern became how to deal with ‘asymmetric’ threats posed by international terrorism, the potential use of weapons of mass destruction and ‘rogue states’.

• The USA’s homeland security measures, military operations in Afghanistan and preparations for operations against Iraq reflected a shift in US policy. The new US National Security Strategy contemplates pre-emptive force against states or terrorist groups that may acquire WMD, and prescribes the transformation of US military forces to maintain the USA’s military pre-eminence.

• The USA’s pressure for the use of force against Iraq was widely resisted during 2002 on grounds of principle and practice and highlighted the widening gulf in security values between Europe and the USA. However, up to the end of the year a common front was maintained behind UN Security Council Resolution 1441 on the renewal of inspections in Iraq.

• NATO and the EU pursued a double agenda in 2002: enlargement of membership, and the adaptation of both institutions to the new security environment.

• Seven countries were invited to join NATO in 2004, including the 3 Baltic states. Ten states were invited to join the EU in 2004, and 2 more were given the target date of 2007.

• The change in Russia’s foreign and security policy initiated by the Putin Administration became clearer in 2002. Russia acquiesced in the enlargement processes but demanded stronger ties with NATO and the EU.
The African Union

- The African Union was officially inaugurated at Durban, South Africa, on 9–10 July 2002. It replaced the Organization of African Unity as a more integrated and more cohesive African organization. As of 1 August 2003, 53 states were members of the AU.

- The African Union’s main concerns are the integration of Africa’s political and socio-economic agendas, the promotion of democratic values and human rights, and the enhancement of the continent’s development efforts.

- The persistence of ravaging conflicts in Africa risks undermining the realization of the African Union’s vision for the continent. The AU has thus adopted a more proactive approach to conflict resolution and placed a greater emphasis on combating terrorism.

- Attracting wide international support will be a crucial factor in ensuring the success of the African Union. However, certain Western leaders remain sceptical about the organization, mainly because of the perceived influence of Libya on its agenda. Such views overlook the fact that Libya’s conception of the AU as a ‘United States of Africa’—with a common army, institutions and leadership—has not materialized, as it was not endorsed by the majority of African states.
Multilateral peace missions

• There were 48 multilateral peace missions in operation in 2002, 3 fewer than in 2001.

• The missions were conducted or led by:
  the United Nations (16 peacekeeping operations, 3 political and peace-building missions, and 1 multinational operation tasked by the UN but carried out by an ad hoc coalition of states)
  the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (11)
  the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (4)
  the European Union (1)
  the Commonwealth of Independent States (3)
  the Organization of African Unity (3)
  other organizations or ad hoc state coalitions (6).

• Developments in 2002 supported the trend towards smaller, short-term and mandate-specific peace missions.
  Of the 4 new missions initiated in 2002—UNMISET, UNAMA, UNMA and Allied Harmony—all but Allied Harmony tended to be of a ‘peace-building’ nature and to play an advisory role to the host governments.
  A total of 39 392 military personnel (troops and observers), 5347 civilian police and 554 civilian observers participated in the UN operations. Their total cost was $2630 million in 2002.
  By comparison, regional organizations and other multinational coalitions carried out 28 missions, involving 51 275 military personnel, 109 civilian police and 866 civilian observers. The total cost of these operations in 2002 was $316.3 million.
The International Criminal Court

• On 1 July 2002 the statute of the International Criminal Court entered into force and the ICC was formally established. It is the world’s first permanent international legal entity tasked to deal with war crimes. It is neither a UN body nor a subordinate organ to the Security Council.

• As of July 2003, 91 countries had ratified the ICC statute: 22 in Africa, 12 in Asia–Pacific, 37 in Europe, 18 in Latin America, 1 in North America and 1 in the Middle East.

• The ICC is set up under the principle of complementarity to national courts: all cases that proceed to the ICC must first have gone through national courts. The ICC has no retroactive power and can only try crimes committed after the statute entered into force.

• The USA is the leading opponent to the ICC. In May 2002 it withdrew its signature from the statute. A month later the USA threatened to use its veto in the UN Security Council against the extension of a UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, unless peacekeepers were guaranteed blanket immunity from the ICC.

• The American Service Members’ Protection Act was passed into law in August 2002. It forbids any US cooperation with the ICC, thereby restricting US participation in UN peace operations, and denies US military aid to non-NATO members of the ICC.

• The EU played an active role in promoting the establishment of the ICC and ensuring its survival. Attempts by the USA to sign bilateral waiver agreements with several European states, however, created a damaging ‘tug of loyalty’.
Afghanistan and the new dynamics of intervention: counter-terrorism and nation building

• The US-led intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001 and the subsequent peace-building and peacekeeping effort revealed a radical shift in the pattern of international military intervention. New objectives emerged, such as the dismantlement of terrorist organizations and regime change.

• The intervention was successful in many ways: terrorist bases were destroyed, most of al-Qaeda’s infrastructure was dismantled, and the Taliban regime was removed from power within just 2 months. The December 2001 Bonn Agreement established an internationally approved new government—the Interim Authority.

• The intervention also raised significant legal and ethical issues. Military action to remove a regime and attack the terrorist network it supported went far beyond the traditional interpretations of self-defence. Reports of torture and human rights abuses highlighted the dangers of relying on local allies with poor human rights records. The US internment of Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners raised questions about the applicability of international laws of war to non-state terrorist groups.

• The international community set up the International Security Assistance Force of about 5000 troops and the small UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and pledged close to $5 billion in aid over the next 6 years. The political reconstruction of Afghanistan was to be led by the Afghans, with international actors playing only a supporting role.
Major armed conflicts

- There were 21 major armed conflicts in 2002, the lowest number recorded for the 13-year post-cold war period 1990–2002 (with the exception of 1997). Six of these conflicts caused over 1000 deaths during the year, compared with 11 in 2001.
- All but 1 of the conflicts—the interstate conflict between India and Pakistan—were internal.
- The majority of the conflicts in 2002 took place in Africa and Asia: 6 conflicts were registered for Africa and 9 for Asia.
- Both external actors and the states concerned made renewed efforts to resolve the long-running conflicts in these regions: in the DRC, Somalia and Sudan in Africa, and Sri Lanka in Asia.
- Four conflicts escalated in 2002: Colombia, Israel–Palestinians, Nepal and Russia (Chechnya).
- The issue of whether and how nuclear weapons might be used in war was brought into focus in 2002. Nuclear-armed India and Pakistan confronted each other in South Asia, while the suspected efforts of North Korea and Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons played a significant part in emerging crises: the latter produced a new military conflict on Iraqi soil by March 2003.
- The war on terrorism launched after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the USA appears to have had an impact on armed conflict throughout the world. Issues such as the militarization of responses to terrorism, the global role of violent sub-state actors, and the connection between intra- and inter-state actors have become predominant. Actors hoping for international approval have had reason to distance themselves from terrorism.
• The USA has paid increasing attention to Africa, notably to the conflicts in Somalia and Sudan, because of the possibility of links between al-Qaeda and certain Islamic fundamentalist organizations in the region.

The locations of the 21 major armed conflicts in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>India (2 conflicts):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Kashmir*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi*</td>
<td>Assam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>India–Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan*</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal*</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>America</th>
<th>Philippines (2 conflicts)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia*</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Europe</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia*</td>
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</table>

* These 6 conflicts each caused 1000 or more deaths in 2002. The conflict in the USA refers to that between the al-Qaeda network and the USA. The only new conflict registered for 2002 was in Nepal.
The nuclear confrontation in South Asia

• In 2002 India and Pakistan pursued the consolidation of their nuclear arms infrastructure. The slow but steady arms race that began in 1998 with the nuclear tests conducted by both countries reflects the unresolved confrontation between them.

• India’s conventional military capabilities are significantly superior to those of Pakistan.

• There were 2 recent major military crises, both involving nuclear threats: the Kargil War in 1999, and the 2002 crisis sparked by an attack on the Indian Parliament by Islamic militants.

• Both India and Pakistan see the 2002 crisis as having been resolved in their favour. Pakistani leaders point out the efficacy of nuclear deterrence in preventing military attacks from India. Indian leaders emphasize the success of ‘coercive diplomacy’, reflected in President Musharraf’s promise to restrain militant organizations based in Pakistan. This perception of victory by both sides increases the chances of similar confrontations occurring in the future.

• India’s no-first-use policy has been weakened in its 2003 nuclear doctrine, which extended the right to nuclear retaliation to cases involving attacks against India with chemical and biological weapons.
The military and security dimensions of the European Union

• In 2002 the EU made progress in the pursuit of its 1999 ‘Headline Goal’ for the European Security and Defence Policy—to be able by 2003 to deploy a corps-level European Rapid Reaction Force for crisis management missions.

• A major political achievement at the end of 2002 was the overcoming of the long-standing deadlock over the EU’s access to NATO assets necessary for launching crisis management operations.

• Rates of progress differed between the military and the civilian dimensions of the ESDP. No EU troops were deployed for crisis management tasks in 2002. Considerable progress was made in the civilian field, however—most notably with the launch of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 1 January 2003.

• The lack of coordination between the military and the civilian components of the ESDP is an obstacle to the achievement of full coherence.

• Prospects for an increase in military expenditure in the EU that could reduce the EU–US capability gap are poor. A European Capability Action Plan was set up in 2002 to develop other methods of dealing with capability deficiencies. These include increasing rationalization, flexibility and coordination in the member states’ capabilities-oriented efforts.
Security sector reform and NATO and EU enlargement

• The aim of security sector reform is to achieve efficient and effective security institutions that serve the security interests of citizens, society and the state, while respecting human rights and operating within the rule of law and under effective democratic control.

• Two recent developments have affected security sector reform in Europe: the enlargement of NATO and the EU; and the need to adapt the agendas of both institutions to deal with new challenges such as terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and threats caused by ‘rogue’ states.

• The prospect of NATO and EU membership has provided the Central and East European states with an important incentive to restructure their security sectors.

• After having experienced problems during the first round of enlargement in 1999, NATO has adopted an improved set of accession goals and a more structured reform process involving increased feedback and assistance for countries in the second round of enlargement. National achievements remain patchy, beyond a limited range of elite troops.

• New EU members are required to meet the standards of the Schengen acquis in law enforcement and border management and will join in the strengthened Justice and Home Affairs regimes developed after 11 September 2001. EU-level and national democratic controls may not yet be strong enough to ensure that individual rights are not infringed.
The processes of budgeting for the military sector in Africa

• Since the 1990s, donors of economic aid to Africa have paid increased attention to military expenditure on the continent. The establishment of a correlation between good governance and development led them to try to prevent ‘excessive’ military spending at the expense of the social sector and the alleviation of poverty.

• To change priorities in public-sector spending, donors fixed a ceiling on military expenditure for national governments which sought their support. This approach had a fundamental flaw: it failed to take into account the legitimate security needs of the countries concerned, which resulted in increased secrecy around military budgets as the aid-dependent countries tried to hide the true cost of their military spending.

• A new approach emerged by 2000 which placed a greater focus on the process by which spending levels were arrived at rather than on the level of spending itself.

• The process approach faces a number of challenges: the absence of a formalized defence policy and lack of capacity in many African countries, the weakness of certain key institutions such as the parliaments, ministries of defence and audit departments in the defence budget process, and the limited participation of civil society. Above all, the process approach has not yet been fully understood and embraced by all the donor countries.
The military sector in a changing context

• The security environment and perceptions of security are moving away from the classic view of security in terms of protection of the state, its territory and population against external threats by primarily military means. New security concepts are gradually emerging: security is seen as both broader—requiring more non-military means for providing state security—and deeper—focusing on protection of people rather than the state.

• The objectives and means of broader and deeper security agendas illustrate the shortcomings of data on military expenditure, arms production and international arms transfers. The problems involved in the use of these data as measures of the provision of security become even more controversial in a changing security context.

• One complication is the increasingly blurred borderline between military security and internal security. While they are difficult to distinguish in terms of function in the developing countries, the emergence of the terrorism issue is also likely to influence the functional balance between different security-producing institutions in the industrial countries.

• Another complication is the reinforced interlinkage between state security and humanitarian concerns.

• These developments call for innovative new measures for the provision of security. They also call for enhanced transparency in national reporting on military expenditure, arms production and international arms transfers to facilitate improved assessments of the cost-effectiveness of different types of measure to provide security.
Military expenditure

• World military expenditure in 2002 amounted to $794 billion (in current dollars). This corresponds to 2.5% of world GDP and an average of $128 per capita.

• The increase in military spending noted since 1998 accelerated sharply in 2002, reaching a rate of 6% in real terms. This figure is twice as high as the rate of increase in 2001.

• Almost three quarters of this increase is attributable to the USA, which raised its military spending by 10% in real terms, motivated primarily by its war on terrorism.

• Other countries with substantial volume increases were China (18%) and Russia (12%). In these countries, the increase reflects *inter alia* a will to reform and modernize their national military sectors.

• Five countries were responsible for 62% of total world military spending—the USA 43%, Japan 6%, the UK 5%, and France and China 4% each.

• The defence burden—the share of GDP devoted to military expenditure—is greatest in low-income countries, particularly in those located in areas of conflict.

• The US defence budget request for fiscal year 2004 amounted to $379.9 billion in budget authority, which is $84 billion higher than in FY 2000, the last budget of the Clinton Administration. The Future Years Defense Program plans further substantial increases until 2009.

• The rest of the world was not prepared, or could not afford, to follow the USA’s example in increasing military expenditure to support a war on terrorism.
Arms production

• Following a decade of profound transformation of the arms industry, the rate of industrial restructuring in 2002 was modest.
  • In the USA the main development was Northrop Grumman’s acquisition of TRW, creating the USA’s 3rd largest arms producer after Lockheed Martin and Boeing. With increasing concentration, a new risk of procurement cost growth emerged because of reduced competition in many sectors of the US arms industry.

The 5 largest arms-producing companies in the USA in 2000

1  Lockheed Martin  $18.6 billion
2  Boeing        $16.9 billion
3  Raytheon      $10.1 billion
4  Northrop Grumman $6.7 billion
5  General Dynamics $6.5 billion

• The European Union is increasing its influence on defence industrial policy through initiatives such as the Star21 review of the aerospace industry and renewed proposals for an EU arms procurement agency.

• Transatlantic armaments collaboration faces a number of barriers, including regulatory obstacles designed to protect against military technology transfers and policies to protect the national defence industrial base.

• In Russia, arms production dropped substantially after the fall of the USSR but has been increasing since 1998 at an average rate of 23% per year. The Russian arms industry still faces big structural problems and continues to depend heavily on arms exports.
New developments in unmanned air vehicles and land-attack cruise missiles

• Only about 12 industrialized countries produce land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), but this class of cruise missile is expected to proliferate widely by the end of the decade.
  • Unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) seem likely to become a more prominent means of precise weapon delivery. They are more widely available and are also expected to experience a huge growth over the next decade.
  • This surge in UAVs will undoubtedly create increased pressure—notably from the USA—to ease the rules governing the export of unarmed UAVs.
  • The unimpeded spread of UAVs and LACMs carries risks for homeland defence, regional stability and the spread of potent terrorist capabilities.
  • To limit such adverse effects on international security, a more effective non-proliferation policy must be developed.
  • The Missile Technology Control Regime has achieved considerable success in controlling the spread of ballistic missiles but has been much less effective in dealing with cruise missiles and UAVs.
International arms transfers

- The global SIPRI trend-indicator value of international transfers of major conventional weapons in 2002 was $16.5 billion, an increase of 2% over 2001.
- The actual financial value of the global arms trade in 2001 is estimated at $24–32 billion, based on official government and industry data on arms exports.
- The volume of transfers of major conventional weapons in 1998–2002, according to the 5-year moving average for the period, was the lowest since the end of the cold war.
- The 5 largest arms suppliers in 1998–2002—the USA, Russia, France, Germany and the UK—accounted for 83% of total arms transfers.
- In 2002 Russia maintained its position as the dominant arms exporter for the second consecutive year, ahead of the USA. Russia accounted for 36% of global deliveries, compared to 24% for the USA.
- The largest arms recipient in 1998–2002 was China, with 9.5% of all imports of major conventional weapons. The 2nd largest recipient in the period was Taiwan, but its imports have been in constant decline since 1998.
- In 2002, India and Pakistan were both major arms recipients, ranking 2nd and 3rd, respectively.
- Recipients in 2002 included countries involved in wars on terrorism or in civil wars redefined as such by governments in an attempt to gain legitimacy.
The top 5 exporters of major conventional weapons in 1998–2002

Shares of world exports

1. USA 41%
2. Russia 22%
3. France 9%
4. Germany 5%
5. UK 5%

The trend in transfers of major conventional weapons, 1988–2002

The histogram shows annual totals and the curve denotes the 5-year moving average. Five-year averages are plotted at the last year of each 5-year period.
Arms control in the new security environment

• The objective of arms control is to ensure self-restraint with regard to both national military capabilities and decisions that could support military capacities in other countries. While arms control has previously been based on commitments embodied in legal instruments, events in 2002 underlined that complementary, less formal approaches are increasingly being explored.

• The objective of arms control was pursued through at least 4 distinct approaches in 2002:

  Multilateral and bilateral arms control and disarmament treaties and arrangements remained central to the framework for overall efforts to control armaments and military capabilities.

  The attempt to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was a country-specific approach that combined various political, legal, economic and military instruments to achieve disarmament.

  In June 2002, the leaders of the G8 formed a Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, involving the safeguarding, accounting and consolidation of excess weapons and materials, thus facilitating destruction efforts.

  Common standards implemented through national laws continued to be developed by the states participating in multilateral export control cooperation.
Nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and ballistic missile defence

• Two key developments in 2002 put serious strain on the nuclear non-proliferation regime and threatened a breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: North Korea’s admission that it had a secret uranium enrichment programme, followed by its formal withdrawal from the NPT in 2003; and suspicions about nuclear weapon-related activities in Iran.

• The debate in the UN Security Council over whether to authorize a US-led war against Iraq brought to the fore the question of how to deal with states that deliberately violate their legally binding arms control obligations. The debate also revealed the USA’s espousal of unilateral approaches to proliferation problems involving the pre-emptive use of force and its mistrust of multilateral agreements.

• On 24 May 2002 Russia and the USA signed the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Under SORT, each state must by the end of 2012 reduce its strategic offensive nuclear forces to 1700–2200 operationally deployed nuclear warheads. This amounts to a two-thirds cut in the current number of deployed nuclear warheads.

• SORT does not require the 2 parties to implement the reductions in an identical manner or to destroy warheads removed from service, leaving them free to transfer the warheads into non-treaty-accountable categories.

• On 13 June 2002 the USA formally withdrew from the ABM Treaty, allowing it to develop a considerably more expansive BMD system than the one envisaged by the Clinton Administration.
### World nuclear forces: numbers of warheads as of January 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of first nuclear test</th>
<th>Deployed warheads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>7,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>8,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>30–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>30–50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>c. 200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: c. 16,500

The USA’s active deployed stockpile consists of 5,948 strategic and 1,120 non-strategic warheads.

Russia’s active deployed stockpile consists of 4,852 strategic and 3,380 non-strategic warheads.

The nuclear arsenals of India, Pakistan and Israel are thought to be only partly deployed.

• At the beginning of 2003 an estimated total of about 16,500 warheads were deployed. If all nuclear warheads are counted—including non-deployed spares, those in active and inactive storage, and ‘pits’ (plutonium cores) held in reserve—the nuclear weapon stockpile of the 5 states defined by the NPT as nuclear weapon states—the USA, Russia, the UK, France and China—amounts to 36,500 warheads.
Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control

- By January 2003, there were 147 states parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and 148 parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

- The CWC is now firmly established and, for the first time, large-scale destruction operations are taking place in all 4 of the declared CW possessor states—India, South Korea, Russia and the USA.

- The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which implements the CWC, faced financial and organizational difficulties in early 2002. Steps were taken to ease these difficulties at the Seventh Conference of the State Parties in October 2002.

- The development of non-lethal weapon programmes by the USA and the use of a chemical by Russia against Chechen hostage takers in a Moscow theatre raised the question of whether the use of chemical or biological substances for law enforcement purposes constitutes a breach of the CWC.

- Following the adoption of a new resolution on Iraq in the UN Security Council, UNMOVIC inspectors were mandated to resume the work of UNSCOM, which had been interrupted in December 1998. Iraqi compliance with relevant UN resolutions continued to be questioned.
Conventional arms control in Europe

- European arms control is by far the most developed regime worldwide. However, the entry into force of the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty has been hindered by Russia’s non-compliance with the political commitments it made regarding troop withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova.

- Thirty states have signed the Agreement on Adaptation, but only 2 states have ratified it.

- The admission of the Baltic states to NATO in the next phase of enlargement is a cause for concern in Russia. Fearing the emergence of an arms control ‘gap’ on its borders, Russia is pushing for the Baltic states to be constrained by the CFE regime prior to their NATO membership.

- The threat of terrorism has had an increasing influence on security building in Europe. The OSCE has made substantial efforts to adapt its arms control instruments to better deal with this threat.

- At the regional level, the implementation of arms control and CSBM agreements in the Balkans has been successful, and it may soon be possible to hand over responsibility to the regional actors.

Landmines and destruction efforts

• About 230 million anti-personnel mines are stockpiled by about 94 states.

• Two legal instruments—the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mines Convention and the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the ‘Inhumane Weapons’ Convention—together with the global movement for an APM ban, have contributed to the emergence of an international norm against the use of landmines.

• There is now increased international and bilateral assistance and cooperation in ‘mine action’—the broad term for efforts to limit the damage caused by landmines, including mine clearance, mine risk education, victim assistance, advocacy in support of a total ban on anti-personnel landmines, and stockpile destruction.

• There is growing concern that the pace of new ratifications and accessions to the legal instruments has slowed and that some countries outside the APM Convention—India, Pakistan and Russia—are using mines.

• The engagement of non-state actors is fundamental for the achievement of a ban on APMs. The majority of non-state actors which use mines are active in countries that have not signed the APM Convention.

• International assistance and funding for mine action are important for helping states parties meet the rapidly approaching deadlines for stockpile destruction in 2003 and mine clearance in 2009.
**Supply-side measures**

- The increased political focus on the question of weapon non-proliferation has enhanced multilateral discussions on export control cooperation.

- The issues of how export controls can increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures and the role of export controls in managing weapon programmes of concern were much discussed in 2002.

- The opening of the European Union to 10 new members is an opportunity to extend the geographical scope of EU security benefits through the harmonization of national export control regimes.

- After EU enlargement, roughly 70% of the participants in all multilateral export control regimes will be constrained by a common EU legal framework.

**Multilateral export control regimes and number of members as of 1 January 2003**

- Zangger Committee: 35
- Nuclear Suppliers Group: 40
- Australia Group: 33
- Missile Technology Control Regime: 33
- Wassenaar Arrangement: 33
The International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

• The issue of ballistic missile proliferation is prominent on the international agenda. It has been recognized that there is a need to develop international norms on the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles comparable to those in the field of weapons of mass destruction.

• In November 2002, over 90 states declared their willingness to subscribe to the International Code of Conduct.

• The ICOC, developed within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime, is a multilateral instrument stressing the need to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The ICOC is not a legally binding treaty: its provisions are of an aspirational rather than an imperative nature.

• About half the states of the world remain outside the ICOC. None of the states that have been identified as actively seeking to build long-range ballistic missiles—India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan—has joined the ICOC.

• The ICOC was seen by many states as the first step towards building a normative regime on ballistic missile non-proliferation. Work will continue within the UN.
Essays in SIPRI Yearbook 2003

• Terrorism and the law: past and present international approaches. This essay is a critical analysis of the international efforts to devise a coherent, usable definition of terrorism and to develop a common approach to dealing with the threat of terrorist attack.

• The non-military threat spectrum. This essay describes the different types of non-military threat that may affect a nation or a society. Focusing on the case of Switzerland, it examines the security risks that political, human-dimension, economic, social and environmental developments may pose.

• The paradox of space weapons. This essay analyses the United States’ use of space for military purposes. It provides evidence of the USA’s superiority and emphasizes the importance of space systems for US and global economic performance. It also warns against the destabilizing effect of the weaponization of outer space.

• Is deterrence dead? This essay assesses the relevance of the concept of deterrence in the post-cold war environment. It concludes that, while deterrence has been losing ground in recent years, it remains a powerful technique for providing international security, in particular when combined with other approaches.

• Weapons of mass disruption? This essay examines the threat to human security and welfare from non-conventional weapons, which include biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological agents. It also studies the possible policy responses to terrorism involving such weapons.
Arms control and disarmament agreements and agreements on humanitarian law of armed conflict in force as of June 2003

1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol)

1948 Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-defence among Western European states (Brussels Treaty)

1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)

1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

1954 Protocols to the 1948 Brussels Treaty (Paris Agreements on the Western European Union)

1959 Antarctic Treaty


1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT)
1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty)

1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC)


1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, PNET)

1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (Enmod Convention)

1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts

1977 Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts

1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention, or ‘Inhumane Weapons’ Convention)
1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)
1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)
1991 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty)
1992 Treaty on Open Skies
1992 The Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1A Agreement)
1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC)
1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)
1996 Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1996 Amended Protocol II to the 1981 CCW Convention, on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices
1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control concerning Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia (Florence Agreement)
1997 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM Convention)
1999 Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions
2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT)

Treaties not in force as of June 2003
1993 Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty)
1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Acronyms

ABM    anti-ballistic missile
APM    anti-personnel mines
AU     African Union
BMD    ballistic missile defence
BTWC   Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CCW    Certain Conventional Weapons (Convention), also called the ‘Inhumane Weapons’ Convention
CFE    (Treaty on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIS    Commonwealth of Independent States
CSBM   confidence- and security-building measure
CTBT   Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
CW     chemical weapon
CWC    Chemical Weapons Convention
DRC    Democratic Republic of the Congo
ESDP   European Security and Defence Policy
EU     European Union
EUPM   EU Police Mission
FY     fiscal year
G8     Group of Eight (industrialized nations)
GDP    gross domestic product
ICC    International Criminal Court
ICOC   International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
ISAF   International Security Assistance Force
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