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The Institute is financed mainly by the Swedish Parliament. The staff and the Governing Board are international. The Institute also has an Advisory Committee as an international consultative body.
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Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
which may be obtained through all the main bookshops or from Oxford University Press, UK.

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For information about recent SIPRI publications, see http://editors.sipri.se/recpubs.html
‘Like many organizations, research institutes, researchers and individuals in the field of security, the Department for Disarmament Affairs has set store on the reliability and credibility of the research and publications emanating from SIPRI, particularly the Yearbook that the Institute has published for many years. As an independent institute for research on problems of peace and conflict, disarmament and arms control, founded in 1966, SIPRI’s primary research has always been consistently objective, timely, comprehensive and clear.’

Jayantha Dhanapala  
United Nations Under-Secretary-General  
for Disarmament Affairs
‘The SIPRI Yearbook is a unique source for everyone with an interest in defence or foreign policy. It combines comprehensive data on weapons proliferation and military expenditures with sober and factual analyses of current trends in military politics and international conflicts.’

Hans Dahlgren, Head of the Swedish Mission to the United Nations

‘For decades SIPRI Yearbooks have provided an unbiased and neutral analysis of problems that were the subject of acute controversies, mutual mistrust and hostilities among states. In this way SIPRI publications have provided an informal “back-channel” for official negotiations.’

Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee, State Duma of the Russian Federation

‘The SIPRI Yearbook remains an extremely valuable resource that belongs on the shelves of any serious analyst or library. It is a major accomplishment that SIPRI can produce this enormous and enormously useful volume year after year.’

Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Major armed conflicts

• Of the 27 major armed conflicts in 1999, only two—between India and Pakistan and between Eritrea and Ethiopia—were interstate. All the others were internal conflicts.

• Over 1000 people were killed in each of 14 conflicts in 1999. In only two other years of the past decade was there such a high incidence of intensive conflict.

• The vast majority of the major armed conflicts in 1999 were waged in Africa and Asia.

• Over 50% of the conflicts in 1999 were protracted. Two of the conflicts in Africa and all the conflicts in Asia have been active for over 10 years. In the Middle East, two conflicts have been active for 25 years or more, and both of the conflicts in South America have been active for at least 19 years.

• Only 5 of the 25 intra-state conflicts in 1999 experienced foreign military intervention, defined as the use of foreign troops for the purpose of affecting the outcome or consequences of an armed conflict in another country to which at least one of the primary belligerents does not give its consent. Nevertheless, military intervention and the challenge it poses to the principle of state sovereignty are spread across Africa, Europe and South-East Asia.
There were 27 major armed conflicts in 25 countries in 1999—conflicts over control of government or territory in which at least 1000 battle-related deaths were recorded for any single year.

The 25 countries in conflict in 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria*</td>
<td>Afghanistan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola*</td>
<td>India:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Kashmir *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Republic of</td>
<td>Assam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Democratic Republic of</td>
<td>India–Pakistan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea–Ethiopia*</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Aceh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone*</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Sri Lanka*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia*</td>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia*</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These 14 conflicts each caused 1000 or more deaths in 1999—seven were in Africa.
**The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo**

- The Democratic Republic of Congo is the site of one of the world’s most complicated and troubling wars. Since 1998 the armed forces of nine states and at least nine rebel groups have fought in the DRC for control of the DRC Government; for control of the governments in Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda; over exploitation of the vast mineral wealth; and owing to ethnic hatred. The course of the war and its outcome will strongly influence political stability and economic development throughout central and southern Africa for years to come.

- Three separate Congolese rebel groups, with the support of Rwandan and Ugandan troops, control about one-half of the country. The government, with the support of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops, controls the other half.

- After intense diplomatic efforts through the Southern African Development Community, the main warring parties signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999. Successful implementation of the accord is uncertain because of the intransigence of the two sides and the reluctance of other states to provide peacekeeping troops. Continuation of the war risks laying waste to one of the most densely populated and mineral-rich regions of the continent.
Armed conflict prevention, management and resolution

There were 61 peace missions in operation in 1999, as compared to 57 in 1998. The greatest increase in new United Nations operations since the beginning of the 1990s occurred in 1999. The missions were run by:

- **UN** (21 peacekeeping operations)
- **UN** operations not officially defined by the UN as peacekeeping operations (3);
- **OSCE** (13);
- **CIS** (4, of which 2 were carried out by Russia);
- **ECOMOG** (3);
- **NATO** and NATO-led operations (4);
- **EU/WEU** (3);
- **OAU** (3); and
- Other organizations or ad hoc groups of states (7).

In December 1999, 18 460 UN military and police personnel—12 768 UN peacekeepers, 1256 military observers and 4436 civilian police officers—were deployed throughout the world, an increase of more than 4000 personnel over the number in 1998. These personnel were drawn from 82 of the 188 UN member states. The total cost of these deployments was $1453.7 million. There were 17 fatalities in the UN operations in 1999. Six regional organizations conducted UN-approved peace missions.
Russia: separatism and conflicts in the North Caucasus

• Russia’s resolve to fight the threat of separatism, widely supported by Russian public opinion, brought it into a new protracted war in Chechnya, a part of the Russian Federation.

• Although the Russian federal authorities attempt to combat separatism by political means, in Chechnya and Dagestan they resorted to the use of force in 1999 in order to defeat the Chechen-led armed rebellion. By the end of the year the federal forces had re-established their control over most parts of Chechnya lost in the previous war, in 1994–96, but they failed to achieve a decisive military victory over the separatists. Nor was there any political resolution of the conflict.

• The conflict in Chechnya in 1999 caused many casualties and a massive refugee problem among its civilian population. The Russian Government came under strong criticism from the West on humanitarian grounds.
Europe: the new transatlantic agenda

- European security developments were dominated in 1999 by the NATO intervention in Kosovo and Russia's war in Chechnya.

- Transatlantic security and defence cooperation were advanced in decisions adopted by NATO, the EU and the OSCE. NATO approved its new Strategic Concept, describing its security tasks for the 21st century. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was launched on the initiative of the EU and placed under OSCE auspices. The OSCE Charter for European Security codified arrangements for closer cooperation between all the security-related international institutions in Europe.

- The future of transatlantic relations is dependent on how the differing economic, political and military interests of Europe and the USA are resolved. European states face the dilemma of deciding how to secure the United States' politico-military commitment and leading role without acquiescing in US domination. The USA's dilemma concerns how it can help to consolidate the EU's independent capability to act in the field of security and defence policy without undermining NATO and its own leading role.

- The EU has gained recognition as a partner with NATO on defence matters, although it may take a long time for the EU's politico-military dimension to be complemented with a defence union.
Military expenditure

• World military expenditure, amounting to roughly $780 billion, increased by 2.1% in real terms in 1999. This is almost one-third less than in 1990, but represents 2.6% of world GNP.

• The rise in military expenditure in 1999 is primarily the result of increases in the major spender countries, including the USA, France, Russia and China. Their military expenditure has a great impact on the world total, since they account for a major share of it—the USA 36%, France 7%, and Russia and China 3% each.

• Russian military expenditure increased sharply in 1999, by an estimated 24% in real terms. In a longer-term perspective, the level of Russian military expenditure in 1999 was 53% lower than in 1992, while most other countries have reduced their military expenditure by less than one-third over the entire decade of the 1990s.

• The countries with the heaviest economic burden of military expenditure are generally poor countries involved in armed conflict and/or located in areas of tension. In many of the countries at war, official military expenditure figures significantly understate the economic burden of their military activities.
Military expenditure in Africa

• Military expenditure in Africa has been increasing since 1997—after a fall of c. 25% in real terms over the seven-year period 1990–96—primarily because many armed conflicts are being fought in this region.

• The official military expenditure data for Africa considerably understate the actual cost of military activities in the African states. The armed conflicts in this poverty-stricken region have diverted vital, scarce resources to military purposes in far more of the countries than at any other time in the recent past.

• The costs and methods of financing armed conflict vary but usually involve legal or illegal appropriation of national resources outside the official defence budget. This makes it difficult to accurately report the amount of economic resources committed to military activities. While African military expenditure represents a small share of the world total, it constitutes a heavy economic burden in many African countries where social needs are competing for scarce economic resources.

• With little prospect of an early end to many of the conflicts and the involvement of some states in conflicts in other states, this new increase in military expenditure is set to continue for some time.
Arms production

- The 1990s was a decade of profound change and restructuring of the arms industry in most parts of the world.

- During the first half of the decade there was a significant downsizing of the arms industry. This decline slowed down considerably in the latter half of the decade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National production</th>
<th>Military R&amp;D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- A number of major company mergers and acquisitions—particularly in the USA and the UK—resulted in an increased rate of concentration in the top layer of the industry in the latter half of the 1990s. The average annual arms sales of the 5 largest arms-producing companies increased over the period 1995–98 from $8.7 billion to $12.8 billion.
• The value of the combined arms sales of the top 100 arms-producing companies in the OECD member states and the developing countries (excluding China) was $155 billion in 1998.

• US and West European companies account for the overwhelming share of total sales—c. 56% and 36%, respectively.

The 5 largest arms-producing companies in 1998

Aggregated value of arms sales, $64 billion

1. Lockheed Martin (USA)
2. Boeing (USA)
3. Raytheon (USA)
4. British Aerospace (UK)
5. GEC (UK)

• In order to compensate for lost arms sales, there was a significant diversification from military to civilian sales. Data for 53 of the top 100 arms-producing companies in 1990 which were directly affected by the decline in the defence market show that 68% of these companies increased their civilian sales over the period 1990–98.

• Cuts in domestic arms sales have been met in some countries by an increase in exports. The share of exports in total national arms sales increased significantly in France and the UK in the latter half of the past decade.
Transfers of major conventional weapons

- The global SIPRI trend-indicator value of international transfers of major conventional weapons in 1999 was $20.6 billion, only a little higher than that in 1994 ($20 billion), the lowest level since 1964.

- The USA maintained its position as the dominant exporter, accounting in the five-year period 1995–99 for almost as much as all the other suppliers combined.

- Russia was again the second largest exporter, with less than 30% of the US level.

- The largest recipient in 1995–99 was Taiwan, followed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The USA was the major supplier for all three countries.

- The increasing importance of commercial considerations has led to more competition and therefore recipient leverage on the arms suppliers. This is part of the explanation why arms embargoes, while reducing arms transfers, are not sufficient to stop them. In 1999 six of the main recipients of weapons from the major suppliers were involved in major armed conflicts.
The top 5 exporters of major conventional weapons in 1995–99

*Shares of world exports*

1. USA 48%
2. Russia 13%
3. France 11%
4. UK 7%
5. Germany 5%

The trend in transfers of major conventional weapons, 1985–99

The histogram shows annual totals. The curve shows 5-year moving averages, plotted at the last year of each 5-year period.
Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation

- The controversy over ballistic missile defence and the future of the ABM Treaty moved to the top of the nuclear arms control agenda. In the USA there was an emergent consensus in favour of developing a limited national missile defence system designed to protect US territory against attack by a small number of ballistic missiles launched by ‘rogue states’ or ‘states of concern’. The US proposals for amending the ABM Treaty to permit the deployment of a limited NMD system were rejected by Russia, which warned that the entire Russian–US nuclear arms control framework was in danger of collapse.

- The US Senate voted to reject ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. This did not undermine the no-testing norm codified in the treaty since President Clinton reaffirmed the USA’s intention to continue to observe its nuclear weapon testing moratorium, but it did heighten international concern about the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Nuclear verification: the IAEA strengthened safeguards system

The IAEA adopted a Model Additional Protocol in 1997 to strengthen NPT safeguards measures—a milestone in the process of establishing a more extensive and effective nuclear non-proliferation verification regime. However, progress towards acceptance of the new measures by IAEA member states has been disappointingly slow.
Operational nuclear forces of the NPT-defined nuclear weapon states:
numbers of warheads as of January 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Land-based missiles</th>
<th>Sea-based missiles</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3 540</td>
<td>1 576</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>3 456</td>
<td>1 750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In accordance with Article IX of the NPT, a nuclear-weapon state is defined here as one which manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

The figures for Russia and the USA are for their nuclear warheads deployed with strategic (long-range) nuclear delivery vehicles; they do not include warheads for their tactical (short-range) nuclear weapons.

At the beginning of 2000, the total Russian stockpile was estimated to contain over 22 000 nuclear warheads and the US stockpile c. 12 000 nuclear warheads—both strategic and tactical—including those held in reserve and/or awaiting dismantlement.
Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control

- Political will is the key to successful implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the achievement of a meaningful protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In 1999 agreement on technical matters ensured the advancement of the CWC treaty-building process and the negotiation of the protocol to the BTWC.

- Russia's internal political, social and economic problems raised questions about its ability to meet and enforce its treaty obligations under the CWC. Russia was the only declared possessor not to have started the destruction of its CW stockpile. Taking Russia's domestic situation into consideration, the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the CWC, meeting in May 2000, agreed to the Russian request to have the first CW destruction deadline extended.

- Serious international concern persists that Russia still has illegal biological weapon programmes.

- During 1999 the USA was increasingly perceived as not fully committed to multilateral chemical and biological weapon disarmament. It strongly opposed compliance mechanisms for the future BTWC regime and was in technical non-compliance with the CWC regarding initial industry declarations—required within 30 days of the entry into force of the convention for the party. Prior to the Fifth Conference of States
Parties, the USA submitted the required initial industry declarations, which eased tensions among the states parties. In 1999 the US Congress reduced the appropriations for assistance programmes that provide funding to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of CBW in Russia.

- Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons remained a major concern in 1999. Some states are unwilling to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, despite the effect on their national economies in terms of reduced access to certain key chemicals for their industry as of 29 April 2000—the third anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC, after which so-called Schedule 2 chemicals may not be exported from parties to non-parties. This may indicate a determination to maintain major chemical and biological armament programmes in the face of strengthening international norms.

The 4 declared possessors of CW stockpiles with a commitment to destroy them under the CWC
India, South Korea, Russia and the USA

States alleged to be acquiring CW
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Sudan and Syria

States alleged to possess or be seeking an offensive BW capability
China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Russia and Syria
Terrorism and the use of chemical and biological weapons

- In the light of the potential consequences of a terrorist attack with chemical and biological weapons, no government can remain unprepared. These weapons represent a new qualitative element in the threat of terrorism.

- The processes for manufacturing and disseminating chemical and biological weapons in large quantities, however, are complex. There is little likelihood of the recurrence of an event like the 1995 release of sarin in the Tokyo underground by the Aum Shinrikyo religious sect. Governments thus face a threat of terrorism with chemical and biological weapons, but it is unlikely to occur.

- The key issue is to devise and execute balanced policies. Overreaction can easily lead to country-wide anxiety and paranoia. In such an atmosphere, hoaxes may become as efficient as actual attacks with chemical or biological weapons.
The future of chemical and biological weapon disarmament in Iraq

- Despite the efforts of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in 1990–99, it was unable to complete the total elimination of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapon capabilities. UNSCOM also failed to set up a long-term monitoring mechanism to ensure that Iraq does not acquire these weapons in the future. The UN Security Council, succumbing to the short-term interests of some members, was unable to deal with Iraq’s blatant and determined violation of the UN’s rules.

- Serious doubts exist as to whether the UNSCOM successor organization—the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)—will be able to complete UNSCOM’s tasks in Iraq. As of mid-2000 Iraq had not accepted UN Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999), which created UNMOVIC and established the future disarmament and monitoring regime, and no inspections had taken place.
Responses to proliferation: the North Korean ballistic missile programme

- For many governments, the spread of ballistic missiles to states and regions where they did not previously exist poses a serious security threat. Concern about the North Korean ballistic missile programme is linked to the suspicion that it has a clandestine programme to assemble the material base, production technology and know-how needed to make a nuclear weapon.

- North Korea has not met its obligations under its bilateral safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

- In the 1990s North Korea accelerated the development of large missiles, which have been tested in various configurations and could provide the capability to deliver a warhead over intercontinental ranges.

- Responses can be divided into three types—actions by the UN, other multilateral political responses and unilateral actions by states. The USA has been the primary actor in addressing the negative consequences of North Korea’s missile development and production programmes.

- In September 1999 the USA decided to ease its sanctions against North Korea, and North Korea is expected to suspend its long-range ballistic missile testing programme.
Multilateral weapon and technology
export controls

• After a period in which new states joined the multilateral forums in which export controls are discussed annually, the pace of expansion in membership and participation has slowed down.

• The participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement conducted an assessment in 1999 which led to minor improvements in the efficiency of the information exchange. The EU member states carried out an evaluation of the first five years of the EU dual-use export control system which may lead to changes in the system.

• Developments in 1999 illustrate that the international cooperation in developing national export controls which evolved in the 1990s is still seen as an important instrument of policy by many of the participating governments.

Multilateral export control regimes and
number of members as of 1 January 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zangger Committee</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia Group</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassenaar Arrangement</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conventional arms control

- The Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document 1999 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures were signed in 1999, in spite of differences between NATO and Russia over NATO enlargement, the Kosovo intervention and the war in Chechnya.

- Entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty could pave the way for the remaining parts of the OSCE agenda for arms control to be put into effect.

- The modernization of CSBMs in Europe in the Vienna Document 1999 was modest, but its new framework for regional measures is promising. Hopefully, the evolving network of arms control-related agreements in the Balkan region will inject enough stability and security to help make the peace process for that region irreversible.


- Other than in Latin America—where a regional transparency regime was created by the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions—there was little progress in conventional arms control outside Europe.
Arms control and disarmament agreements
in force as of May 2000

1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
(Geneva Protocol)

1948 Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Social and
Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-defence
among Western European states (Brussels Treaty)

1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)

1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

1954 Protocols to the 1948 Brussels Treaty (Paris
Agreements on the Western European Union)

1959 Antarctic Treaty

1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water
(Partial Test Ban Treaty, PTBT)

1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(Outer Space Treaty)
1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT)

1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty)

1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC)

1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM Treaty)


1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, PNET)

1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (Enmod Convention)
1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts

1977 Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts

1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention, or 'Inhumane Weapons' Convention)

1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)


1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

1992 The Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1A Agreement)


1991 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty)
1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC)

1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

1996 Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina

1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (Florence Agreement)

1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM Convention)

Agreements not in force as of May 2000

1992 Treaty on Open Skies

1993 Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty)


1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

1999 Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>anti-ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>anti-personnel mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTWC</td>
<td>Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>biological weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>(Treaty on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSBM</td>
<td>confidence- and security-building measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>chemical weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of Seven (leading industrialized nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Seven and Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>gross national product</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMD</td>
<td>national missile defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOVIC</td>
<td>United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOM</td>
<td>United Nations Special Commission on Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Governed by

Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, Chairman (Sweden)
Dr Oscar Arias Sánchez (Costa Rica)
Dr Willem F. van Eekelen (Netherlands)
Sir Marrack Goulding (United Kingdom)
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