THE FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS LANDSCAPE

Voices from stakeholders around the globe

JAÏR VAN DER LIJN AND XENIA AVEZOV

FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE
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Executive summary

The global security environment is changing as a result of globalization and non-traditional security challenges such as international jihadism and international organized crime. At the same time, the power balance and security relations between established and emerging powers underpinning the contemporary arrangements for conflict management, appear to be changing. Power and political influence are shifting away from the West (Europe and North America) towards other global regions and to emerging powers such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey.

This is the final report of the New Geopolitics of Peace Operations initiative, which aims to provide insights into the views of major troop- and police-contributing countries (TCC/PCCs) and emerging powers in the different regions on the following questions.

1. What are the perceived main future challenges to international peace and security, and how do these challenges influence the future of peace operations?
2. How are relevant norms and concepts in peace operations interpreted, and how might this influence the future of peace operations?
3. What are the main objectives for participation in peace operations, and what future shifts can be anticipated?
4. Which organizations are perceived to have sufficient capacity and legitimacy to address the regional and global challenges of conflict, and can future changes be anticipated?
5. What are the challenges to peace operations and what improvements are required to maintain or strengthen the commitment to peace operations?

The findings in this report are based on eight dialogue meetings with military, diplomats, police officers, civil society representatives and academics, organized in different parts of the world—seven of which included one of the above emerging powers—complemented with a national workshop, interviews and a desk study.

Overall, there was a general consensus that growing numbers of (and increasingly intense) great power conflicts are a future security challenge. Regions would be either directly subjected to these tensions, or they would suffer as a result of the United Nations Security Council being frustrated in its ability to deal with conflicts. Intrastate conflict and non-traditional security challenges, such as piracy, organized crime and international jihadism, were also seen as key security challenges. It was argued that these non-traditional security challenges thrive on intrastate conflicts. Yet, in spite of the fact that its frequency over the past few decades has been minimal, interstate conflict remains high on the agenda as well.

It appears that, in the field of international security, the long-term positions of the emerging powers are neither very unified nor very revisionist. However, most emerging powers show a clear interest in peace operations and they all see them as relatively successful and a worthwhile investment.

Although the emerging powers and major TCC/PCCs articulate different emphases, they all support the current approaches, concepts and norms in peace operations. For the most part no regional alternatives were suggested. The main issues were with how
certain norms and concepts are operationalized. A case-by-case approach, avoiding blueprints, was generally advocated.

Even in the field of armed intervention increasing convergence can be noted. Rather than refuting the responsibility to protect (R2P) concept, emerging powers and major TCC/PCCs increasingly recognize the limitations of absolute sovereignty in specific cases. At the same time, in Europe and North America the desire to intervene appeared to be declining.

There are, however, clear conflicts of interests between the great powers and these are likely to play an increasing role in peace operations and conflict management, although primarily in the regions where interests actually clash. Particularly in Africa the picture is quite different. This is the region where emerging and established powers have the most common security challenges and the least conflicting interests. It is also the region that is most open to having robust and intrusive peace operations and armed interventions on its soil. For this reason, more than ever before, peace operations are likely to become an African affair in future.

The main challenges for peace operations and the consequential implications fall into two categories: strategic issues and operational issues. Key strategic implications are:

(a) rebalance the relationship between troop- and police-contributing countries and financial-contributing countries;
(b) increase regional cooperation;
(c) improve inter-organizational cooperation;
(d) do not bank on the regionalization of peace operations;
(e) align the aims and means in peace operations;
(f) increase the attention given to conflict prevention and peacebuilding;
(g) increase the attention given to gender and misconduct issues; and
(h) operationalize the protection of civilians, the responsibility to protect and robustness in peace operations.

Key operational implications are:

(a) broaden the discussion on force generation as the UN and other organizations are in continuous need of a broad range of capabilities—including uniformed personnel, key enablers and high-tech capabilities—all of which are scarce;
(b) do not overemphasize force protection;
(c) accept the need for intelligence, as particularly missions that face non-traditional security challenges require intelligence in order to protect themselves, the populations and their mandates;
(d) further improve integrated and comprehensive approaches; and
(e) develop better monitoring and evaluation methods.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>South American Defence Council</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>Financial-contributing country</td>
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<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGP</td>
<td>New Geopolitics of Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to protect</td>
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<td>RWP</td>
<td>Responsibility while protecting</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC/PCC</td>
<td>Troop- and police-contributing country</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-contributing country</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>Union of South American Nations</td>
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1. Introduction

The global security environment is changing as a result of issues such as globalization and non-traditional security challenges such as international jihadism and international organized crime. At the same time, the power balance and security relations between established and emerging powers (together the great powers), which underpin the contemporary arrangements for conflict management, appear to be changing. Power and political influence are shifting away from the West (Europe and North America) towards other global regions and to emerging powers such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey.

The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations (NGP) initiative started in 2012, based on the hypothesis that this power shift will affect the future conduct of peace operations and conflict management.¹ The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, recently subscribed to this view when he argued that geopolitics are increasingly affecting the efficacy of the UN Security Council, stating that ‘when there is limited consensus—when our actions come late and address only the lowest common denominator—the consequences can be measured in terrible loss of life, grave human suffering and tremendous loss of credibility for this Council and our institution’.²

Aims of the NGP initiative

On 11 June 2014 the UN Secretary-General announced a new review to ‘take stock of evolving expectations of UN peacekeeping and how the Organization can work toward a shared view of the way forward’.³ The aim is to adapt peace operations in order to meet current needs in a changing security environment and comes nearly 15 years after the publication of the Brahimi report (the output of an earlier peace operations review in 2000).⁴ In line with the UN’s upcoming review, the NGP initiative aims to (a) explore the emerging landscape of peace operations as the world continues to move towards valuable input, but they are generally referred to as, or are within the scope of, armed interventions.

¹ This report uses the SIPRI definition of peace operations, which follows the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) description of peacekeeping as a mechanism to assist conflict-afflicted countries to create conditions for sustainable peace. By SIPRI definition, a peace operation must have the stated intention of (a) serving as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, (b) supporting a peace process, or (c) assisting conflict-prevention or peacebuilding efforts. It includes operations that were conducted under the authority of the UN, operations conducted by regional organizations and alliances, and operations conducted by ad hoc (non-standing) coalitions of states that were sanctioned by the UN or authorized by a UN Security Council resolution. However, it excludes good offices, fact-finding or electoral assistance missions; it neither includes peace operations comprising non-resident individuals or teams of negotiators nor operations not sanctioned by the UN. Participants in the dialogue meetings and interviewees used their own definitions, which sometimes included armed intervention, as in the case of Libya. Similarly, the concept responsibility to protect (R2P) is usually not directly used in peace operations. In this report these debates have been included as they were part of the discussions on peace operations and it would be a shame to lose this


a more multipolar security environment; 
(b) build international dialogue, in particular between established and emerging powers, around issues of international conflict management and peace operations; and (c) bring forward new thinking and practical ideas about how to promote inclusive and cooperative approaches to peace operations to meet emerging conflict challenges.

Many of the discussions at the UN in New York between established and emerging powers, between troop- and police-contributing countries (TCC/ PCCs) and financial-contributing countries (FCCs), and so forth, have become very polarized and politicized. Thus, in order to broaden these discussions, the NGP initiative consciously chose to hold dialogue meetings and interviews with experts and key stakeholders based in different regions, including among emerging powers.

Research questions

The NGP initiative aims to provide insights into the following research questions.

1. What is the perception in different regions of the world and among emerging powers of the main future challenges to international peace and security, and how do these challenges influence the future of peace operations?

2. How are relevant norms and concepts in peace operations interpreted in different regions of the world and among emerging powers, and how might their perception influence the future of peace operations?

3. What are the main objectives of major TCC/PCCs and emerging powers for participation in peace operations, and what future shifts can be anticipated?

4. Which organizations are perceived to have sufficient capacity and legitimacy to address the regional and global challenges of conflict, and can future changes be anticipated?

5. What are the challenges to peace operations and what improvements are required to maintain or strengthen the commitment of TCC/PCCs and emerging powers to peace operations?

Methodology

The NGP initiative began in 2012 with a desk study, funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, mapping the emerging landscape of peace operations as described in contemporary expert and policy literature. Subsequently, the initiative organized dialogue meetings in different regions of the world with the dual purpose of stimulating dialogue on the topic and gathering data on the various perceptions, positions and interests of the different stakeholders. These meetings were co-organized and funded by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The initiative used the methodology of focus group meetings for its data collection.

Focus group meetings are defined as ‘a form of group interview that capitalises on communication between research participants in order to generate data. Although group interviews are often used simply as a quick and convenient way to collect data from several people simultaneously, focus groups explicitly use group interaction as part of the method. This means that instead of the researcher asking each person to respond to a question in turn, people are encouraged to talk to one another: asking questions, exchanging anecdotes and commenting on each other’s experiences and points of view. The method is particularly useful for exploring people’s knowledge and experiences and can be used to examine not only what people think but how they think and why they think that way’. See Kitzinger, J., ‘Qualitative research: introducing focus groups’, British Medical
Dialogue meetings were organized in South Asia (Kathmandu, April 2012), South America (Brasilia, 22–23 November 2012), North East Asia (Ulan Bator, 11–12 April 2013), Central Asia (Astana, 5–6 November 2013), Africa (Addis Ababa, 21–22 November 2013), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (Amman, 17–19 March 2014), Europe and North America (Brussels, 7–9 April 2014), and South East Asia (Hanoi, 14–16 April 2014). About 180 participants were selected on the basis of their nationality, representing the main actors in the region and the main regional actors in peace operations. In addition, the participants were required to be a mixture of military, diplomats, police officers, civil society representatives and academics, in order to stimulate open discussion and ensure input from a variety of stakeholders. Detailed insights into these meetings can be found in the workshop reports.

In order to stimulate free and interactive discussion, participation in the dialogue meetings and interviews was strictly anonymous and statements cannot be traced to the participants. Therefore, the information gathered is referred to in terms of the region or country where the meeting took place or the origin of the interviewee.

This final report incorporates data gathered from the desk study, dialogue meetings, workshop and additional interviews. On the basis of these inputs, it draws overall conclusions with which it aims to contribute to current and emerging discussions on the future of peace operations and to international conflict management more widely.

Outline of the report

Chapter two discusses the perceptions of threat in different regions and among emerging powers, drawing some more overarching conclusions with regard to global security challenges in a changing world order. It then considers the implications of these threats and challenges for future peace operations.

Chapter three looks at how norms and concepts used in peace operations are interpreted in different regions and among emerging powers, whether TCC/PCCs or the emerging powers proposed to revise them and considers the likely future developments. It also looks at potential alternative norms and concepts. The chapter concludes with a number of general observations from the dialogue meetings and interviews and an outlook for the future.

Chapter four examines the engagement objectives of TCC/PCCs in present and future peace operations. It focuses on emerging powers as a distinct group as well as a number of common types of TCC/PCC in order to
better understand the complex set of considerations for engagement and the potential implications for contributions in the future.

Chapter five reviews the organizations that may deploy peace operations in the future and whether their capacity and legitimacy are sufficient to address the regional and global challenges of conflict. It also aims to give an insight into whether changes can be anticipated in this area.

Chapter six delves deeper into the discussions raised in the different regions and among emerging powers with regard to the challenges faced by peace operations and what solutions are required in order to maintain or strengthen commitment to peace operations.

Chapter seven draws overall conclusions on how the rise of emerging powers might influence the future of peace operations. In doing so, it also reflects on the findings of the initial desk study produced in 2012. It concludes with some ‘food for thought’ by posing a number of questions regarding future approaches to peace operations and conflict management.

Chapter eight discusses the policy implications of this report’s findings for peace operations—in order to ensure more effective policies for addressing conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding through peace operations.
2. A changing world order and future security challenges for peace operations

In a changing world, different regions and emerging powers have different emphases in their threat perceptions. These are looked at below, first by region and then more specifically for the emerging power in that region. On the basis of these analyses some more overarching conclusions can be drawn with regard to global challenges, as well as their implications for future peace operations.

Regional and emerging powers’ threat perceptions

Africa

The dialogue meeting in Africa generally focused on regional security issues, although it was also argued that the continent is affected by global power dynamics, such as growing competition between the great powers over its natural resources. A major challenge for Africa, according to participants, is ‘failing states’. Although it was argued that their number has seen a relative decline, the remaining states in which governance is weak and contested are viewed as the most difficult to deal with. It is generally in these countries that irregular armed conflict between non-state armed insurgent groups, using religion and ethnicity to mobilize their forces, takes place.

The weak policing of national borders and large portions of state territories allow groups, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army, to operate across borders and maintain regional and international alliances. It has also created the condition for regions, such as the Sahel, to become safe havens for insurgents and organized crime networks. In these unstable and ungoverned regions the causes of conflict have become so interconnected, and the sources of violence so intertwined, that restoring stability has become a complex challenge. For example, in West Africa organized crime, the trafficking of people and drugs, oil theft, and international jihadism are all mutually reinforcing and destabilizing factors. Drug traffickers attempt to take over state institutions in order to facilitate the movement of drugs through the region, while organized crime rings fund international jihadist and insurgent activity in order to create the instability needed for their activities. In the dialogue meeting it was argued that as long as Africa is a stage on which external powers compete geopolitically, it would not be able to deal with these complex problems and its large number of weak states.

From interviews it appears that South Africa will continue to push for the expansion of the UN Security Council. It hopes to change the system, but follows a conservative approach as it reasons that too much change may harm its economic growth. While South Africa aims to forge partnerships with Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC), its relationship with Russia may be under pressure due to the crisis in Ukraine. However, its relationships with Brazil, China and India are strengthening and within the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, in particular, there is a good common understanding.

South Africa aims to become a strong economic power, but it is unclear whether it is willing and able to lead Africa on security issues. Its primary focus remains on the need to resolve its
internal economic and social challenges. Nevertheless, there is the understanding that South Africa’s security and development very much depends on stability in Southern Africa and the continent as a whole. It does not have a global outlook. There is a wide range of perceived challenges for the country, including civil war spillover, piracy off the coast of Mozambique, migration, crime, the need for stability in Zimbabwe for logistical reasons, and the need for stability in Lesotho for water reasons.

According to interviewees, South Africa views peace operations as an important tool to deal with these challenges. However, it pursues more regional ownership of them, as there is an increasing frustration over external armed interventions in African affairs, including peace operations and armed interventions such as in Libya and Mali.

Central Asia

In Central Asia the discussion also focused on regional security issues and, in a similar way to Africa, great power competition between China, Russia and the United States over influence in the region was seen as a challenge, exacerbating existing tensions and insecurity. Internal social disputes, as well as international border disputes and a lack of trust between governments, persist within Central Asia. While Central Asian states share some common security challenges—including water distribution, organized crime, drugs, international jihadism and the potential spillover from the conflict in Afghanistan—a formalized regional response does not seem to be feasible. In particular, the possible spillover from Afghanistan after the 2014 drawdown of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was seen by participants as the primary challenge, as it might lead to the spread of Afghanistan-linked international jihadist or extremist groups, radicalization of the population and an increase in drug trafficking in Central Asia. The only truly global security challenge mentioned at the dialogue meeting was nuclear arms proliferation.

Interviews in Russia made it clear that the country is looking to gain an equal position to the USA. Russian interests, in particular the perceived Western encroachment on them, and the expanding Chinese influence in Central Asia appear to be prioritized. These interests are particularly located in the former Soviet Union space, and are challenged in Ukraine, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia, and to a lesser extent in the MENA region. Although non-traditional security challenges are on the agenda, in particular international jihadism, issues such as migration and the drugs trade receive less attention. Since there are few Russian interests in Africa, little attention is given to the region beyond the need to address non-traditional security challenges and humanitarian questions.

Russia’s position in the UN Security Council provides it with the means to play a powerful role in global security politics. Whereas in terms of economic power it may try to increase its influence through Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) cooperation, in terms of its outlook on security institutions, according to interviewees, it remains a conservative power. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it actually has a stake in maintaining the sanctity of that body in order to guarantee its global influence.
Russia attaches importance to UN peace operations, in line with the principles of peacekeeping, in order to guarantee stability in such regions as Africa. For it to intervene in any conflict, however, its national interests must be at stake. When this is not the case, Russia is most likely to oppose any type of peace operation or armed intervention in its immediate neighbourhood.

**Europe and North America**

The landscape of future threat perceptions emerging from the dialogue meeting in Europe and North America was much more diffused than would often be expected from this group of states, generally labelled ‘the West’.

For the USA, traditional security challenges posed by Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) remain on the agenda. At the same time, the large military capabilities of both China and Russia are a concern (although the latter is seen as a declining rather than an emerging power by the USA). At the dialogue meeting it was argued that non-traditional security challenges, such as the persistent influence of international jihadist organizations on fragile states, climate change and the resulting mass migration, drug trafficking in Central and North America, and the rise of extreme right-wing groups in Western Europe, are also priorities for the USA. Given its global security outlook, the USA is particularly concerned about the current inability of the international peace and security architecture to deal with these complex global challenges—an inability caused by lack of cooperation between emerging and established powers.

The dialogue meeting showed that West European states also have a global security outlook, although to a lesser degree than the USA. However, these states focus more on non-traditional security challenges, such as state fragility, international jihadism, cross-border organized crime, maritime piracy and cyber-security. With the exception of Russia, traditional state threats are less prominent.

South European participants shared similar security challenges but, in general, they focused on them coming from the MENA region. In addition, Southern Europe perceives environmental disputes as a future challenge.

Central and East European participants had a very different security outlook: less directed at the non-traditional security challenges. Russia is seen as the most serious threat, primarily due to its use of non-state actors to destabilize Ukraine, as Central and Eastern Europe fears that such strategies could be used against other countries in the region as well.

Participants in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting all emphasized the importance of peace operations to deal with many of the current security challenges, although they were seen by some as less relevant in relation to the perceived threat from Russia.

**The Middle East and North Africa**

The discussion in the MENA dialogue meeting gave a lot of attention to more long-standing conflicts, such as the Israel–Palestine conflict, and growing interstate tensions between regional powers, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia. In addition to interstate conflicts, civil wars—particularly internationalized ones—were seen as
one of the main challenges to stability and security. They act as arenas for competition between regional powers and as breeding grounds for international jihadism. Many felt that failed states often proliferate violence and instability. The situation in Syria was at the top of the agenda in this respect.

Nevertheless, the stability in more authoritarian states was perceived to be deceptive, because the problems that prompted the Arab Spring uprisings are far from resolved. A number of participants, therefore, warned that the short-term maintenance of the status quo might come at the cost of long-term stability. While the Arab Spring created mass instability, it might have also set in motion the long-term process needed to create strong and modern states. At present, however, the proliferation of international jihadism and political Islam throughout the region is a security challenge. The fragile democracies in the region are not equipped to deal with political, sectarian and tribal tensions, which can lead to aggression and extremism. Many participants argued that it is important to address the root economic, social and cultural causes of instability, rather than focusing on top-down political processes such as elections. Given the fragmentation of civilian populations and the inability of weak or failing states in the broader Sahel region to address these issues, there was a particular fear that instability would spread and further escalate throughout that region.

Participants argued that civil wars and interstate tensions are often the result of the acts of outsiders—from colonialism to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Therefore, Middle Eastern problems are, in fact, global problems. Moreover, human security issues, including the status of refugees, migration flows and economic disparities are global rather than localized concerns, which require global responses. For this reason, several participants were concerned that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine might lead to further fragmentation within the UN Security Council and negatively affect international initiatives in the MENA region.

At the dialogue meeting it was explained how from the mid-2000s, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey’s foreign policy direction shifted in emphasis from Westernization to promoting the country’s prestige and standing in its neighbourhood and beyond through a policy (labelled ‘neo-Ottomanism’) of zero problems with neighbours. However, Turkey’s role in the region has suffered as a result of the Arab Spring and the crisis in Syria, as well as through loss of credibility following the 2013 Gezi Park protests. It has now shifted its stance from zero problems to more active involvement in conflicts in the region.

Although Iran and Turkey have recently been working towards improving their bilateral relationship, Turkey perceives Iran’s regional ambitions and nuclear programme as a challenge. Tensions between Turkey and Iraq have declined as a result of the rapprochement over the status of the Kurdish-dominated region of northern Iraq, with which Turkey has increasingly strong economic ties.

The Turkish government feels that the failure to intervene earlier in Syria has caused a profound escalation of the conflict. In particular, the potential spillover of violence from Syria is a major concern and Syrian refugees are seen as a security and economic problem. In fact, Turkey views Syrian
President Bashir al-Assad as the main cause of the problems in Syria and argues that international armed intervention in Syria should focus on removing him, rather than on fighting the Islamic State. The Turkish population, however, is generally war wary and pushes its government to focus on Turkish economic development.

Internally, the Gülen movement (led by Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen) and the Kurdish insurgency are seen as security threats. According to a Turkish participant and an interviewee, the country is not likely to significantly change the direction of its foreign policies, continuing to focus on its direct neighbourhood. Nevertheless, with a population anxious about destabilization in its neighbourhood, Erdoğan’s re-emphasis on cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) is seen as a source of stability.

**North East Asia**

In the North East Asia dialogue meeting, non-Chinese participants raised fears that multipolarity and increased divergence between the great powers will hinder international responses to conflicts inside and outside the region. The difficulty that the League of Nations experienced in making decisions under multipolarity during the interwar period (1919–39) was given as an example. The role of the largest emerging power, China, also received a lot of attention. Its neighbours argued that given the strategic rebalancing of the USA from Europe and the Middle East towards East Asia, it is likely that China will become more forceful in the near future. During the meeting it was commonly felt that China will focus more on its own interests in the future—and that these interests are increasingly global.

In addition to these great power tensions, regional security challenges identified in the dialogue meeting included territorial disputes between states and ethnic minority issues. Interstate tensions were clearly more important in the region than intrastate conflict. North Korea, in particular, was high on the security agenda for most states in the region. However, the region has a broader security outlook than North East Asia alone. Globally, intrastate conflicts were perceived to be increasingly complex and often characterized by tensions around natural resources, religious rivalries, and lack of resilience of local societies and their institutions. Some attention was given to challenges such as international jihadism and piracy. Although the heterogeneous political and cultural conditions in the region, along with the historical burden of past conflicts, are impediments to confidence building inside the region, cooperation between North East Asian states on mutual challenges outside the region (e.g. maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa) could be a feasible way to overcome the lack of trust.

Among Chinese interviewees and participants in the North East Asia dialogue meeting there was agreement that the main challenges for China are not external, but internal. In particular, internal instability and ethnic conflict, corruption, income inequality, and environmental degradation and pollution were seen as problems, although the South China Sea was also an issue. The People’s Liberation Army also increasingly focuses on anti-terror,
anti-piracy and disaster relief operations.

In China there was general agreement that the world is moving towards multipolarity, but—contrary to the general consensus—it was argued that a multipolar world could be stable. China wants to be what Chinese participants and interviewees called a ‘harmonious power’ and is not seeking to transform the current international system. Yet it would like to improve it, among other things by increasing the role of BRICS. In the field of security, however, China has a vested interest in the current institutional framework, the role of the UN and the UN Security Council. In addition, it focuses on its internal issues and economic growth.

China has gone through a process of accepting UN peace operations: initially, it viewed them as the tools of colonialist powers, but since the beginning of the 1990s it has become an increasingly strong believer in their role—to the point that it is currently the largest contributor to UN peace operations among the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

South America

The discussion in the South America dialogue meeting focused strongly on challenges in the broader region around South America. Central America was an important focus, described as a post-conflict society where high homicide rates, rampant gang activity, transnational criminal networks and a culture of impunity for human rights violations were still affecting countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras—as well as Colombia in South America. In addition, territorial disputes over renewable and non-renewable natural resources were expected to grow, and the role of transnational corporations in fuelling these disputes was a concern. Some participants felt that obstacles to prosecuting human rights violations were threatening regional progress on human rights.

Participants in the dialogue meeting also had a global security outlook. When looking at the international system as a whole, there was a perceived acceleration towards multipolarity. As a consequence, the interests, challenges and needs of global peace and security would be changing. Growing interdependence among states and regions would require the international system to face complex environmental and social challenges in an effective and legitimate manner. The possibility of persistent stalemate over the Syrian crisis, both in the UN Security Council and within the international community in general, was of particular concern. Yet the humanitarian consequences of civil wars and weak states in Africa—and, closer to home, in Haiti—were also mentioned.

From interviewees and the Brazilian participants in the South America dialogue meeting, it appears that Brazil feels relatively secure and has a regional security outlook. The biggest challenges it faces are crime, homicide and drugs trafficking; although protecting its resources (particularly in its ungoverned spaces in the Amazon), preventing migration (e.g. from Haiti) and countering piracy are also seen as important. From the perspective of some Brazilian participants, increased multipolarity could actually stimulate multilateralism. However, according to them, this would require permanent seats for countries such as Brazil in the UN Security Council. Otherwise the
role of the Security Council would become less prominent. According to interviewees, although Brazil is ideologically much closer to the West than to China and Russia, it has good relations with the latter in the context of BRICS for pragmatic and economic reasons. Therefore, increased Brazilian influence would have a mitigating effect, as it would be able to build bridges and mediate between the West, and China and Russia, while decreasing the use of violence.

Brazil would also encourage diplomacy with—rather than isolation of—states such as Iran and Syria. Like other South American states, Brazil has a strong aversion to using force or tough sanctions, reflecting the importance of state sovereignty in the region—a tendency that Brazilian participants did not see reflected in the West. Nevertheless, according to them, increased Brazilian influence would not entail a revision of the traditional Western agenda or policies with regard to peace operations, but rather the advance of new approaches and priorities, such as focusing on the nexus between security and development in order to make conflict management sustainable.

However, Brazil’s role in South America is still undetermined. While Brazilian participants largely favoured regional integration in order to address common challenges, it was unclear whether Brazil’s position on regional integration is driven by its own interests or by rising international and regional expectations. It is in a sense playing the challenging, and at times incompatible, role of both a regional and an international emerging actor.

**South Asia**

In the South Asia dialogue meeting potential conflict triggers in the region were perceived to be, among other things, environmental degradation and scarcities of natural resources—notably water. Of prime concern was the possibility of conflict escalation in Afghanistan after the planned withdrawal of ISAF in 2014 and its expected effects on regional stability. Some participants saw international jihadism as a challenge, particularly in Afghanistan. In the current context of geostrategic competition between India on the one hand, and Pakistan and China on the other hand, cooperation among South Asian countries (within a formalized system outside the UN) to manage regional conflicts, notably that in Afghanistan, faces major hurdles. This is mainly due to mutual mistrust among countries in the region and, in particular, the relationship between India and Pakistan. However, for example, cooperation on piracy could have more potential and could also build confidence with regard to maritime security in the Indian Ocean among India and Pakistan and China.

Participants in the India workshop emphasized that India’s current priorities are domestic and regional. Above all, India focuses on its own internal problems and is committed to its own economic development, which requires all of its attention. Even a modest search for more international influence is of secondary importance. Moreover, the shift in regional power due to China’s rise is compelling India to focus on its immediate environment.

India is seen as strongly valuing the current UN system and remaining committed to UN peace operations and the broad principles that have defined them. It is at most a ‘conservative
reformer’ of international conflict management. It is hesitant to shift away from its existing relationship with the UN and its significant commitment of uniformed personnel to UN peace operations. However, it is propelled to support gradual incremental change by altering intraregional dynamics and shifting global interests and relations. Even if India’s aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council is not fulfilled, it is not likely to discard the primacy of the Security Council. However, it is uncertain about the future locus of global power, particularly as the UN Security Council itself may become a less prominent international body if disagreement among the permanent members of the UN Security Council becomes the rule rather than the exception. In the context of current global developments, participants in the India workshop argued that India is quietly building capacity in its own region, and in other developing regions, while waiting to see how the current global transition will settle before making a significant formal move on the global stage.

South East Asia

In the South East Asia dialogue meeting, participants felt that the world is changing and that non-traditional as well as traditional challenges have to be faced. Competition between China and the USA over influence in South East Asia has had an adverse affect on stability in the region. Interstate tensions in South East Asia include a persistent lack of trust between states, rooted in past experiences. The Cambodian–Thai border dispute is an example of this. The region also faces growing arms proliferation, due to concerns about China’s military power as well as territorial and maritime disputes. Further, several countries in the region are facing internal instability and conflict (e.g. Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand) and election-related violence (e.g. Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand). Key non-traditional security challenges are the proliferation of piracy, Islamic extremism and international jihadism, an escalating refugee crisis, human trafficking, money laundering and climate change. Climate change was emphasized as a particularly pressing issue for countries such as Cambodia and Viet Nam, and the Pacific Islands. Participants argued that internal and external challenges increasingly intertwine and that non-state actors and international tensions combine in a new sort of conflict.

The Indonesian participants in the South East Asia dialogue meeting and an interviewee underlined that in Indonesia, as in the rest of the region, great power rivalry at sea is seen as the main security challenge, because it destabilizes the region as a whole. The maritime and territorial disputes are seen as being driven by resource scarcity and growing nationalist sentiments in China, leading to a reinterpretation of historical borders. However, emerging powers, such as China and India, are seen as not only posing challenges but also bringing opportunities (e.g. new and larger markets for Indonesian products). Indonesia (the largest Muslim country in the world) aims to acquire a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, although it still has a long way to go economically. Moreover, it faces internal religious conflicts and has to deal with non-traditional security challenges such as international jihadism and migration. In spite of these
internal challenges, Indonesia is a great advocate of peace operations within South East Asia and also aims to become more active in UN peace operations.

A summary of global challenges

Overall, there was a general consensus that growing numbers of (and increasingly intense) great power conflicts are a future security challenge (see table 1). The effects of this great power rivalry and multipolarity were described in two ways. First, in a number of regions—Africa, Central Asia, MENA and South East Asia—there was the feeling that they are directly subjected to these tensions, exacerbating already existing conflicts and challenges. Some examples given were the supposedly clashing spheres of influence of China, Russia and the USA in Central Asia and the Chinese–US tensions that overlap with the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Second, in regions such as MENA, South America and South Asia there was a clear perception of increasing tensions between the permanent members of the UN Security Council, frustrating its ability to deal with conflicts. Such inability to act was seen as a challenge to regional and global security, and the situation in Syria was often given as a prime example. Interestingly, neither in the dialogue meetings nor in the interviews was it noted that the intensity of current tensions is probably still far from the levels during the cold war.

Intrastate conflict was seen as another key security challenge in all the dialogue meetings. Although it was not mentioned directly in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, many of the concerns in this region with regard to security in Africa and the MENA region were closely related to the issue. Intrastate conflicts were seen as becoming increasingly internationalized. Either such conflicts draw international involvement through regional or non-state actors—such as in Syria—or, in the absence of effective policing of borders, conflicts and instability spread across whole ungoverned regions, as they do not respect international borders. In these unstable regions the problems have become interconnected and intertwined, creating so-called ‘complex emergencies’, such as in the Sahel region. The debates about intrastate conflicts often went hand in hand with discussions about issues such as weak states, and resource and environmental conflicts.
Non-traditional security challenges were also high on the agenda. Piracy was dealt with in the Africa, Europe and North America, North East Asia and South Asia dialogue meetings. Organized crime was discussed in the Africa, Central Asia, Europe and North America, and (in particular) South America dialogue meetings. International jihadism was a perceived security challenge all over the world, except in South America where it was not mentioned in the dialogue meeting. It was argued that these non-traditional security challenges thrive on intrastate conflicts and on complex emergencies in particular.

Lastly, in spite of the fact that its frequency over the past few decades has been minimal, interstate conflict received a lot of attention as well. Many of the interstate tensions discussed in the dialogue meetings were the more traditional rivalries between, for example, Iran and Saudi Arabia or Pakistan and India. However, a number of these now appear to have become part of great power tensions such as between China and its neighbours (e.g. US allies in Japan, the Republic of Korea, South Korea, and in the South China Sea) and between East European states and Russia (in a struggle over spheres of influence between the West and Russia). In this context, maritime conflict was mentioned primarily in the South Asia and South East Asia dialogue meetings and nuclear arms proliferation was mentioned in the Europe and North America, Central Asia and MENA dialogue meetings.

**Table 1.** Perceptions of security challenges by region

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MENA = Middle East and North Africa

Implications for future peace operations

Peace operations will not become a stage for geopolitics

From the dialogue meetings and interviews it becomes clear that the emerging powers have some common interests in changing the current economic structures, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but in the field of international security their long-term positions are less unified and less revisionist. The two countries that clash most often with the West—China and Russia—are permanent members of the UN Security Council and have an interest in the current institutional framework. As such, they are actually relatively conservative powers. Of the other emerging powers, Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa are among the countries pursuing a permanent seat on the Security Council, and they might therefore be considered revisionist to a certain extent, whereas Turkey is not. Moreover, all of them argue that their highest priority is national development and dealing with internal challenges—not gaining more international power. Although all the emerging powers bring their own interests to the table, they also all show a clear interest in peace operations. In general, they see peace operations as relatively successful and a worthwhile investment and attach importance to the continuation of UN peace operations.

The number of peace operations is likely to decrease

Nevertheless, in spite of the importance attached to peace operations, multipolarity and the resulting increased divergence among the great powers are likely to hinder international responses to conflicts. It was commonly perceived in the dialogue meetings that as a result of increased disagreement between the permanent members of the UN Security Council (who have veto power), it would be more difficult to establish peace operations with a UN Security Council mandate in Central Asia, North East Asia, South Asia and South East Asia, and to a lesser degree in the MENA region.

Furthermore, a number of dialogue meetings did not see peace operations as the main solution to the security challenges in their regions. In the South America dialogue meeting it was noted that peace operations are still predominately focused on inter- or intrastate conflicts with relatively clear parameters, which are inapplicable to South American peace and security challenges, such as organized crime. Therefore, it was questioned (particularly in that region, but also in the Central Asia dialogue meeting) whether peace operations are a suitable instrument for dealing with non-traditional security challenges. At the same time, in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting it was questioned how traditional peace operations can address traditional challenges such as Russia’s perceived destabilizing influence, for example, in Ukraine.

Peace operations will be more comprehensive and face more non-traditional security challenges

In the North East Asia dialogue meeting it was suggested that peace operations would also be challenged by the increasing complexity of intrastate conflicts, which are likely to remain the primary type of conflict that missions
are supposed to address. Not only does this make the success of peace operations more difficult to achieve, but it also raises concern in the region about adherence to the principle of non-interference. Nonetheless, in the Africa, Europe and North America, MENA and South East Asia dialogue meetings it was argued that, due to the complexity of regional conflicts, peace operations would have to be multidimensional in nature. As security issues are inseparable from economic, social and other problems, and conflicts are often complex mixtures of internal and external challenges, non-state actors and international tensions, peace operations need to be not only military, but also multidimensional integrated missions. However, as great power conflicts may again have to be managed in the future, traditional monitoring missions may also regain importance.

In the Africa, Europe and North America, and North East Asia dialogue meetings it was noted that peace operations increasingly face dangers in mission areas (e.g. from terrorist acts and organized crime) or are actually established to deal with threats such as international jihadism, organized crime and piracy. Such non-traditional security challenges were high on the agenda in most dialogue meetings and were seen as common challenges that peace operations might be used to address. However, participants did not have real solutions for how to achieve this.

Addressing global challenges

Some out-of-the-box thinking in a number of regions led to the following suggestions in order to address these global challenges.

1. Anti-crime police missions. In the South America dialogue meeting the idea was floated that international police missions could be deployed in order to fight organized crime and gangs in Central and South America. In regions, and particularly cities, where governments are no longer in control, the deployment of an international assistance mission could help to deal with this non-traditional security challenge.

2. Maritime peacekeeping operations. In the South East Asia dialogue meeting the idea was raised that a maritime peacekeeping operation could interpose in the South China Sea in order to keep the peace in a similar way to how traditional peacekeeping operations were able to keep the peace in proxy conflicts on land during the cold war.

3. Border management missions. In the Africa, Central Asia and MENA dialogue meetings the concept of deploying international border management missions was discussed. In the Central Asia dialogue meeting the specific case of such a mission at the Afghan–Tajik border was considered in order to actively take control of border management and support sovereignty. Such border management operations could prevent the spread of conflict and instability across borders and, in doing so, prevent the regionalization of conflicts. Although the EU is already involved in border management missions, this kind of mission would be much larger and more robust.

4. Regional operations. In the Africa dialogue meeting a different solution was also suggested to deal with the regionalization of conflicts and the challenge of insurgents and criminal networks operating across borders, for example in Africa and the MENA region. Rather than deploying several
different operations in a single region, it was argued that a single operation for a whole region would be a better alternative. Such an operation would be deployed in a number of different host countries and could have a truly regional approach and mandate. It would, therefore, be able to tackle regional conflicts in a more comprehensive manner. However, the biggest obstacle to such an approach would be national sovereignty.
3. Challenges to existing peace operation norms

Over the course of time a broad range of norms and concepts has been developed and used in peace operations. A number of these were discussed in the dialogue meetings: liberal peace, peacebuilding and conflict prevention, local ownership; comprehensive and integrated approaches, sovereignty, responsibility to protect (R2P), armed intervention and responsibility while protecting (RWP), robustness, and protection of civilians. In order to foresee and understand future developments and challenges in this respect, it is significant how these norms and concepts are viewed in the different regions and by the different emerging powers.

Views on the existing norms and concepts

Liberal peace

The concept of liberal peace—and its underlying principles of democracy, the rule of law and a market economy—is not just a Western agenda but a global one. In general, liberal peace was not questioned at the dialogue meetings, except by some participants coming from the perspective of critical theory in the Europe and North America and the South America dialogue meetings; neither was any alternative approach put forward. Nonetheless, there were three explicit criticisms of the current implementation of liberal peace.

First, in the South Asia, South America, and Europe and North America dialogue meetings some participants rejected the perceived default imposition of the principles. There was a call for moving away from rigid templates towards conflict- and context- specific, and more locally grounded, approaches.

Second, the question of sequencing and short-term priorities was raised. In some regions (Central Asia and MENA) democratization was not always seen as a priority. Some participants viewed stability as a more realistic short-term goal for peace operations because sometimes democratization, the rule of law and a market economy would not be feasible, or they could even be counterproductive, in the short term. In the Central Asia dialogue meeting a few participants argued that it would be more practical to slowly build on existing systems—even when they are authoritarian; that these systems need to make their own mistakes and run their natural course within state-building. Nevertheless, in the Central Asia and MENA dialogue meetings the counter-narrative that stability should not be at the cost of democracy and human rights and that peace operations should actually support democratization was also very strong.

Third, in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting a number of participants believed that liberal peace had become polluted by the national interests of intervening countries, such as in the case of the armed intervention in Libya. According to them, the international approach in peace operations needs to return to stimulating and supporting the essence of liberal peace—democracy, the rule of law and a market economy.

Among the emerging powers only China is somewhat hesitant in this regard, according to Chinese participants and interviewees, but it was argued that the liberal peace paradigm of democratization and market capitalism is already incorporated into Chinese thinking. Host government consent and a UN Security Council mandate would, however, be required. The Chinese
public would stand behind the concepts, and the Chinese Government would—while already having contributed to, for example, election monitoring—likely increase its commitment and yet it would like to keep a low profile. It would prefer to maintain the current division of labour in which the political role in peace operations, including democratization, is left to Western states.

Based on the interviews and dialogue meetings, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey also operate within the liberal peace paradigm, generally supporting democratization, the rule of law and market capitalism, and see it as the way forward. Except for (to a certain extent) China and Russia, all the emerging powers are, in fact, strong supporters of democratization. They also see peace operations and conflict management as a way to support the opening of markets for their private sectors. Turkey, for example, according to one interviewee, applies a clear strategy for this purpose. Yet most other emerging powers seem to have a more indirect, less structured and organized approach. However, the emerging powers reject imposition, are often more averse to blueprint solutions and prefer to guarantee national ownership. As is increasingly the case in Europe and North America, they want to allow space for the approach to be adjusted to local circumstances.

Given the limited criticism of the concept, the principal elements of liberal peace—democracy, the rule of law and a market economy—are likely to remain core to peace operations. A paradigm shift is unlikely, but minor improvements to liberal peace inside the paradigm are probably in order to make it more conflict- and context-specific and use more locally grounded approaches.

**Peacebuilding and conflict prevention**

In the Africa, Europe and North America, MENA, South Asia and South East Asia dialogue meetings, participants called for a stronger emphasis on peacebuilding and conflict prevention in peace operations. Three reasons were given in support of this call.

First, it would be more cost-effective. In the Europe and North America and the South East Asia dialogue meetings conflict prevention and peacebuilding were seen as less costly than having to deploy military personnel in peace operations.

Second, it would be less lethal. In the North East Asia dialogue meeting the focus on conflict prevention appeared to come from the understanding that there would be less dependence on military action. However, the participants that pleaded the most for it came from the countries that invested the least, relatively, in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Moreover, the idea of more prevention was not operationalized. It was not clear what should be done and how. For example, in contrast to the discussion in the South East Asia dialogue meeting, the inherent tension between conflict prevention and national sovereignty (as the former may infringe on the latter) was not addressed in the North East Asia dialogue meeting, in spite of the fact that non-interventionism and less intrusive approaches were high on the regional agenda. As such, the call for more conflict prevention might also have been used as an excuse for not having to contribute combat troops to risky peace operations.
Third, it would be a broader approach than only a military one. In the MENA dialogue meeting conflict prevention and peacebuilding gained a lot of support because the region’s problems were perceived to be broader than just security issues and would therefore require more than just a military approach.

In the Africa and South Asia dialogue meetings the call for conflict prevention had a strong military dimension. In South Asia preventive deployments such as the UN Preventive Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP) were discussed, while in Africa a Rwandan participant made a strong argument for pre-emptive armed intervention before large-scale violence breaks out, as this would be more successful and cost-effective.

From the dialogue meetings and interviews it appears that emerging powers tend to emphasize the need to pay more attention to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. According to one interviewee this can be partly explained by the fact that emerging powers need to focus on their economies and cannot afford, and therefore do not want, to contribute much to large military adventures. In Brazil, China and Indonesia both approaches are seen as having a less military focus and, particularly for China, as being less dangerous, although one Chinese interviewee also supported preventive deployment. In addition, Indonesia and South Africa are keen to share their experiences with regard to democratization, mediation and dialogue. In Brazil and South Africa these concepts are also seen as part of a more sustainable, long-term approach that focuses more on development. According to interviewees, India and Turkey also strongly support conflict prevention and peacebuilding but prefer to contribute outside the UN system, on a bilateral basis.

In practice, the actual contribution of emerging powers to conflict prevention and peacebuilding is often not as strong as their verbal support. Interviewees from Brazil and South Africa, for example, underlined that their countries have insufficient civilian capacities and sometimes lack a clear strategy in this regard, often meaning that their contributions remain relatively focused on the military. However, according one interviewee, China is considering specializing in civilian capacity building and using the private sector as a potential venue to do so. Further, emerging powers tend to champion national sovereignty but often ignore the fact that conflict prevention and peacebuilding may infringe on it—with the exception of some interviewees in Russia.

In spite of the inherent tensions between conflict prevention and peacebuilding, on the one hand, and the principle of non-intervention, on the other, both concepts were generally supported. As long as increased attention to conflict prevention and peacebuilding does not endanger national sovereignty, it could receive more attention and funds in the future as it could be perceived as a cost-saving measure. Nevertheless, this has been the argument for conflict prevention for a long time and it has still not received dramatically more attention. As such, a lot of the support for both concepts might just be lip service.
Local ownership

Local ownership was broadly advocated in all dialogue meetings as it would increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of peace operations. Such ownership means that the focus, norms and concepts of the approaches in peace operations need to be calibrated with the requirements of the local government and population, and to do so would require two things.

First, in most dialogue meetings it was argued that peace operations should collaborate more with local communities and do what local populations require of them. For example, if security were at the top of a local population’s agenda, democracy might have to be a secondary goal.

Second, peace operations should make more use of traditional and local mechanisms of conflict resolution. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, and by a Russian participant in the Central Asia dialogue meeting, traditional informal justice systems in Afghanistan were given as an example of how to build up the country’s justice sector and make use of the traditional and local alternatives for conflict resolution. In the Africa and the Europe and North America dialogue meetings, Gacaca courts in Rwanda and truth commissions were suggested as these would place more emphasis on mediation, reconciliation and restorative justice.

Nevertheless, it was sometimes argued that it is difficult to provide local ownership because of the competing interests of different recipients, which often lie at the roots of the conflict. It is also difficult to find the sources of resilience, sufficiently strong structures or institutions to which ownership can be handed over. Moreover, in general, recipients would always think that local ownership is falling short.

In a number of dialogue meetings, regional ownership was also seen as important. However, only in the South East Asia dialogue meeting was this accepted without debate. Although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) approach to peace operations would be similar to the global outlook, the region wants to remain in control. In the Africa and MENA dialogue meetings it was argued that peace operations and armed interventions are only successful if they are grounded in regional approaches, yet they would also require support and legitimacy from the UN Security Council in order to survive. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting there was support for the idea of regional solutions to regional problems and some participants considered it a good idea to train regional actors to intervene. However, in all three regions it was also questioned whether it would be a good idea to have countries intervene in neighbouring states.

In general, the participants and interviewees from emerging powers claimed that their countries were great supporters of local ownership. Yet most of these countries believed that peace operations and conflict management should be owned by the government and not by the local population, through civil society. Therefore, in practice, most emerging powers support national ownership rather than local ownership. According to an Indonesian interviewee, Indonesia stands out as being different: it prefers to involve civil society because of the very important role that it played in the Indonesian peacebuilding process. South Africa also has a parallel track of supporting civil society; and Turkey used to have
one but lost it when the AKP became at odds with the Gülen movement.

It is likely that there will be an ongoing attempt to increase local ownership in the future, but it is also likely that a perceived lack of ownership will remain. Although lip service is paid to the idea of local ownership, interveners generally come with their own interests and are not willing to give complete ownership to the recipients. Further, local ownership is likely to remain as primarily government determined national ownership in the future. Not only do governments and international organizations (such as the UN) require counterparts, which makes working with civil society more challenging, but also most emerging powers have an emphasis on national sovereignty that is not likely to change. Although regional ownership has been requested in a number of regions and the architecture of international security organizations is moving in that direction in some regions through the regionalization of peace operations, this might not always be a good development.

**Comprehensive and integrated approaches**

In the Africa, Europe and North America, MENA, South America and South East Asia dialogue meetings it was argued that security issues are inseparable from economic, social and other issues. Conflicts are viewed as often complex mixtures of internal and external issues, non-state actors and international tensions, which require more than just a military operation. They require multidimensional integrated missions that follow a comprehensive approach, in which all instruments are synchronized on the basis of a common analysis and strategy. However, two challenges to such an approach were mentioned.

First, in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting it was argued that sometimes the thorough preparation needed for an effective comprehensive approach has to be weighed against the need to act fast in order to save lives. This can be difficult and the armed intervention in Libya was given as an example of a short-sighted solution that did not take into account the long-term implications for the country and its neighbourhood.

Second, a number of critical scholars in the South America and the Europe and North America dialogue meetings saw a growing international trend towards development tools being used to address security challenges. They argued that comprehensive approaches risk the securitization of international development and humanitarian agendas.

Comprehensive or integrated approaches are generally supported by the emerging powers. According to participants in the dialogue meetings and interviewees, particularly in Brazil, but also in China and South Africa, the perspective is that development and security cannot be separated and are complementary. At the same time, particularly in Brazil and South Africa, interviewees argued that the military would be hesitant to introduce civilians in their operations. In Russia, on the other hand, thinking about peace operations is still very dominated by military terms, and other approaches have not really been recognized yet. From the dialogue meetings and interviews it appears that discussion and criticism on the topic, such as critical thinking about the securitization of development and humanitarian assistance, is rare among emerging powers.
Given that comprehensive or integrated approaches received a lot of support, the deployment of such multidimensional peace operations is likely to continue. Criticism was limited to the regions where the comprehensive approach has been internalized the most. Moreover, such criticism was most fierce in cases such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where the consent of the parties is absent or questionable.

**Sovereignty**

In all regions, except Africa and Europe and North America, sovereignty was high on the agenda. In the Africa and the Europe and North America dialogue meetings there was full acceptance that sovereignty is limited and that armed intervention is needed, for example, in the face of grave human rights violations such as genocide. However, sovereignty and non-interference are the guiding normative principles in Central Asia, MENA, North East Asia, South America, South Asia and South East Asia, according to participants in the dialogue meetings in these regions. Although the extent to which sovereignty is absolute differs by region.

As territorial sovereignty is disputed in so many places in South East Asia, the belief in an almost absolute form of sovereignty was highest in this region. There was a strong belief that operations in the region should respect the traditional peacekeeping principles of sovereignty, non-interference, impartiality and the consent of the parties. Although there was a discussion in the South East Asia dialogue meeting on whether there is a limited trend in the region away from absolute sovereignty and towards more flexible or ‘constructive engagement’ behind closed doors or on less sensitive issues, this was not with regard to peace operations. However, South East Asia is much less sensitive about sovereignty outside the region.

In the Central Asia, North East Asia, South America and South Asia dialogue meetings, most participants agreed that the principles of peacekeeping, the UN Charter and, particularly, state sovereignty should not be abandoned lightly. Peace operations are increasingly deployed in intrastate conflicts, and operations in such conflicts have a greater tendency to encroach on the host state’s internal affairs. Therefore, participants in North East Asia feared that this could mean peace operations in general become increasingly intrusive. Nevertheless, more than in South East Asia, in Central Asia, North East Asia, South America and South Asia there was a shared understanding that the interpretation of the UN Charter must adapt to contemporary views and concerns, and not only outside the region. The legitimacy of peace operations and armed intervention is ultimately rooted in state consent, but in the face of extreme cases of human rights violations the international community has to be more flexible. Despite the importance attached to state sovereignty in these regions, it was argued that there has been a subtle but significant normative shift away from absolute sovereignty.

In the MENA dialogue meeting, in spite of the fact that sovereignty was also seen as very important, there was even wider agreement that the international community can intervene if a government is not able to enforce its sovereignty or if a state violates human rights on a massive scale. Above all, ‘respect for sovereignty’ appeared to
mean ‘respect for my sovereignty’; the sovereignty of others appeared to be much less relevant. It was argued that armed interventions might be needed, but that their aim should be to return sovereignty to the government as soon as possible. In many cases in this region the discussion was linked to Syria.

Looking at the emerging powers, national sovereignty and non-interference remain core principles—for China, India and Russia in particular. Chinese interviewees and participants of the North East Asia dialogue meeting, in particular, were worried about the perceived trend of increasing intrusiveness of peace operations. However, although the Chinese Government is likely to continue to adhere to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, it might increasingly practise ‘constructive engagement’. This would suggest that while China remains adamant about staying out of host countries’ domestic affairs, it is willing, because of emerging expectations from the international community, to go beyond strict non-interference in exceptional cases. Moreover, China has already slowly moved away from its strict interpretation of non-interference in such cases as the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mali.

For some Russian interviewees the fear of peace operations supporting ‘orange revolutions’ and being involved in removing dictators was also important. They believed that operations should respect sovereignty and that impartiality in operations equalled supporting the legal government against non-legal opposition. According to participants in the India workshop, while India keeps a steadfast commitment to the principle of non-intervention, the country is also aware that there are instances where armed intervention without government consent is the only option. For Brazil, according to interviewees, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) changed its outlook away from absolute sovereignty. An Indonesian interviewee argued that Indonesia is also less rigid in protecting sovereignty in peace operations, as it is confident about its own sovereignty. From interviews it appears that Turkey, being part of NATO, and South Africa, being part of the African Union (AU), have the least concerns about state sovereignty being affected in peace operations.

In all regions there was a clear trend away from absolute sovereignty. Africa and Europe and North America appear to have accepted that there are limits to sovereignty. This notion existed in the MENA dialogue meeting as well, albeit to a lesser extent. In the other regions, although the trend is there, it is less strong, and external armed intervention from outside the region is particularly disliked. Nonetheless, if faced with human rights violations on a massive scale, participants and interviewees in all regions (including the emerging powers of Brazil, China and India) believed that ‘something’ had to be done to save lives. However, in China interviewees argued that the country needed more time to accept this kind of decreased sovereignty, but that it would do so eventually, too.

**Responsibility to protect, armed intervention and responsibility while protecting**

In none of the dialogue meetings was the concept of R2P questioned as a whole. The concept is gradually being
perceived as a global, rather than strictly Western, norm. For example, in Africa many participants saw the evolution of the use of force in R2P as a reasonable development given experiences in the region. In the MENA dialogue meeting it was even suggested by a number of participants that the concept be included in the UN Charter. However, the current implementation of the concept is widely debated all over the world, including in Europe and North America dialogue meeting, and often judged negatively.

One of the main objections in the Africa, Europe and North America, North East Asia, South Asia and South America dialogue meetings was the aggressive implementation of the concept, in particular in Libya. In South America, several participants proposed raising the threshold for the use of force to prevent the proliferation of excessive force. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, the military implementation of the concept by NATO in Libya was also criticized because it was argued that it had led many to believe that R2P equals armed intervention.

Another concern in nearly every dialogue meeting was the misuse of the principle of R2P for the purpose of national interests. Particularly in the Africa, South America and South Asia dialogue meetings, the case of Libya was named in this context, arguing that regime change was a Western interest. In the MENA dialogue meeting, the French armed intervention in Mali was seen as an excuse for French interests. In the Europe and North America, MENA and South East Asia dialogue meetings, Crimea was mentioned in the context of R2P as misuse of the idea by Russia. In the Central Asia dialogue meeting, some participants saw R2P as part of a Western imperialist agenda, while others viewed the resistance to the concept as part of Russian geopolitical interests and imperialism.

Overall, most participants argued that a decision on whether or not to intervene is always interest-based and that it is often difficult to distinguish between interests and good reasons for a good cause. More specifically, in the MENA dialogue meeting it was argued that, if the UN Security Council does not live up to its responsibility and mandates armed intervention when needed, real politics would determine whether there will be armed intervention without the Security Council’s approval. In the case of a continued blockade of the UN Security Council, there might be more regional organizational responses. Yet regional organizations often lack funds, meaning that armed intervention could become ‘private policy for the rich’, a term meant to refer to the EU, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and NATO. Consequently, there would be more operations that are less legitimate and accountable. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, therefore, a number of participants wondered whether it is worth salvaging R2P. Following the Western use of the concept in Kosovo and Libya, it is currently ‘polluted’ and also used by Russia to legitimize armed interventions in Georgia and Ukraine.

A third concern, which is closely related to the second—raised in the Africa, MENA, South Asia and South East Asia dialogue meetings—was the inconsistent use of the concept. Particularly in the Africa dialogue meeting there was a sense of double standards in how R2P is operationalized. For example, the EU and the USA often lacked interest in
humanitarian intervention in sub-Saharan Africa but were willing to intervene in Libya based on political and national interests. Such double standards were seen by some participants as further reasons for ensuring greater African ownership of peace operations. Similarly, in the MENA dialogue meeting it was argued that French interests in Mali led to an armed intervention in that country, whereas in places such as Syria, in spite of the perceived need for armed intervention, there is little action. In the MENA dialogue meeting this inconsistency was blamed on the UN Security Council.

Fourth, in the Central Asia and South East Asia dialogue meetings in particular, there was a fear of R2P encroaching on national sovereignty. In Central Asia participants expressed an overall ambivalence regarding how such armed interventions can balance safeguarding sovereignty and protecting civilians. While it was argued that sovereignty should always be respected, military action would sometimes be needed in order to save the lives of populations at risk. In the South East Asia dialogue meeting R2P within the region was primarily rejected as armed intervention is unwanted, but outside the region it was generally accepted.

Fifth, in the Africa, MENA, and Europe and North America dialogue meetings there were a number of operational concerns. In the MENA and the Europe and North America dialogue meetings it was argued that armed interventions should not make the situation worse. Particularly in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, the argument was heard that in the case of Libya armed intervention had been too short-sighted and did not take into account the long-term implications for the country and its neighbourhood.

In the Africa dialogue meeting one participant from Rwanda noted the importance of emphasizing the ‘responsibility to prevent’, rather than just focusing on R2P armed interventions when the conflict has already escalated. Also in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting there was the feeling among some participants that R2P should be more focused on the earlier stages of conflict escalation.

Additionally, in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting there was the concern that R2P has changed the way insurgents operate. Currently, many insurgent organizations could try to provoke governments with the aim of instigating an R2P armed intervention.

Lastly, in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting the argument was made that R2P’s main function is deterrence in order to back up diplomacy with force if needed. However, Syria proves that this deterrence is not very strong. A particular concern from the Africa dialogue meeting was that international armed interventions should not frustrate, and should actually respect, regional efforts. The armed intervention in Libya was, for example, judged negatively, because the AU felt that NATO marginalized it during the armed intervention.

There was a broad call for the further operationalization of the concept. This call included the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, where it was viewed as a way to salvage R2P. Although participants were, in principle, in favour of R2P and want the concept to work, like others they wonder what R2P really entails and how its operationalization can be improved.
One of their solutions was to have more concrete mandates of what is expected from an R2P operation—being clearer about what specific tasks coalitions that undertake R2P operations are mandated to do. In the MENA dialogue meeting it was added that R2P armed interventions should be legitimized by a UN Security Council mandate; they should be temporary, not permanent; and they should not violate human rights.

South Africa was an early acceptor of the norm and, as an AU member, is the most interventionist of the emerging powers. The AU doctrine of non-indifference purports that its member states cannot remain indifferent to large-scale human rights violations and genocide, meaning that the country had already clearly moved away from non-interference in case of major threats to international peace and security as a way to avoid having to completely subscribe to the armed intervention pillar of R2P. However, although in the Brazilian context non-indifference may not go as far as R2P, the exact operationalization is not clear either. Brazil viewed the concept of RWP as its contribution to operationalizing the R2P concept, by clarifying when armed intervention with the use of force is appropriate and by emphasizing the importance of international accountability within the UN framework in cases where armed intervention is necessary. Moving forward, however, Brazil opted for less open advocacy for RWP in the hope that the concept would be embraced as a global rather than Brazilian concept. However, according to one Brazilian interviewee this seems not to be the case. Indeed, in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting some participants saw RWP as a step back (to before R2P) because it would limit the possibilities for armed intervention.

Indonesia’s position is comparable to that of Brazil, although, according to one interviewee, civil society has less need to discuss the operationalization of R2P than the Indonesian Government. Participants in the India workshop were concerned that the elevation of the R2P principle to a UN doctrine could be misused to justify inappropriate armed interventions. Although the NATO armed intervention in Libya was strongly criticized by many in India, it

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was noted that India’s position on non-interference is certainly not written in stone—considering its humanitarian intervention in Bangladesh in 1972. Moreover, UN Security Council-sanctioned R2P armed interventions would be acceptable.

Chinese interviewees and participants in the North East Asia dialogue meeting argued that China is still struggling with the part of R2P that declares the international community’s responsibility to intervene militarily to protect civilians, coercively if necessary, if the state fails to do so. In general, it was argued that prevention and peaceful approaches in R2P were most important and that in all cases UN Security Council mandate is required. China is strongly against regime change but much more open to armed intervention at the invitation, and in support, of the host government. Further operationalization of the concept is required, and according to one interviewee, RWP could help in this context. Moreover, interviewees and participants argued that the Chinese Government likes the current division of labour, in which it provides assistance but leaves the military role to Western states. Yet the concept of R2P appears to have been quickly internalized in the Chinese debate in the past few years. In very apparent cases of genocide, China would also be likely to support armed intervention without host government support or at the invitation of an ‘opposition government’. Further, China would be cautious to use its veto to prevent armed intervention because this has not proven to be effective in the past—in the case of Kosovo, for example, NATO intervened anyway. Interviewees in Beijing repeatedly said that China will be able to fully embrace all aspects of R2P in due time.

While the appetite for R2P armed intervention seems to be waning in Europe and North America, other regions are increasingly starting to embrace the idea that there are limits to sovereignty in the face of human rights violations on a massive scale. However, it appears that the decision to intervene is determined by national interests rather than an operationalization of the concept. As different countries have different interests, the fact that armed intervention in Kosovo was not mandated by the UN Security Council, or that its implementation was controversial in Libya, allows actors other than the West to use R2P to legitimize their own armed interventions based on their own interests. Consequently, the concept of R2P is not likely to disappear or become less relevant in the future. It is likely to be used frequently for legitimization purposes, particularly by great powers or alliances intervening in their own ‘backyards’, but international agreement over such armed interventions in a multipolar world is likely to be more limited. If R2P is to regain any legitimacy, it is broadly argued that the concept needs to be further operationalized.

Robustness

The term ‘robustness’ became common following the failures of the UN operations in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and after the 2000 Brahimi report stressed the need for robust peace operations. However, the concept is poorly defined and participants used it to mean different things in the dialogue meetings, making discussions muddled and difficult.

8 Brahimi Report (note 4).
Participants seemed to refer to three different kinds of robustness.

1. **Tactical robustness.** This narrow conceptualization of robustness was applied to the initial peace operations deployed following the Brahimi report, which were mandated and equipped for the use of force at the tactical level, for the protection of civilians (POC) or to defend the peace process. In spite of the different force posture and different mandate, based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in practice this kind of operation does not use more force than previously. Some participants to dialogue meetings argued they would also be less dangerous. This is primarily because this form of robustness has the consent of at least the main party, if not all parties. Tactical robustness was not really debated in the dialogue meetings. Some countries might, however, fear contributing to such operations.

2. **Strategically defensive robustness.** Over the past decade the concept of robustness has been applied in a broader manner: a robust approach to peace operations. The tactical use of force is then framed in a broader political and operational strategy that is meant to deter spoilers to the peace process. The consent of the parties appears to be less pertinent and limited use of force is more common. In the dialogue meetings and interviews this kind of robustness was regarded as more controversial by countries that hold on to a more absolute concept of sovereignty, such as China, and countries that want to prevent the UN from venturing into peace-enforcement operations, such as Russia. However, on a case-by-case basis it is usually viewed as acceptable. In the Africa dialogue meeting, on the other hand, it was seen as essential to many operations in the region.

3. **Strategically offensive robustness.** The concept of robustness was further stretched in 2013 with the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which is mandated to actively neutralize armed groups and has a mandate phrased in counterinsurgency terms. This kind of robustness was particularly debated in the Europe and North America and the North East Asia dialogue meetings.

In the Europe and North America, North East Asia and South America dialogue meetings it was argued that the potential trend of increasing robustness, towards a strategic and more offensive or interventionist conceptualization—such as in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the FIB—is chosen without sufficient consideration of the implications. In the North East Asia and South America dialogue meetings increasing robustness was perceived as a worrying development. In both regions there was a fear that particularly strategically robust missions might end up using too much force. In the North East Asia dialogue meeting there was also the fear that such operations would be too intrusive. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting robust operations were perceived as the way forward, if implemented correctly. However, it was stressed that strategic robustness was not a ‘silver bullet’, as these operations can be very difficult. The main, more technical, concerns in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting were as follows. (These concerns were particularly strong with regard to

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9 Brahimi Report (note 4).
strategically defensive and offensive robust operations.)

1. No peace operation should end up operating in a situation where there is no peace to keep, like in the early 1990s.

2. Robust operations should not be seen as quick and easy solutions. In order to make them sustainable they should be part of a long-term comprehensive approach that includes a political framework and conflict resolution.

3. If the permanent members of the UN Security Council are too strict on budgets, robust missions cannot make an effective contribution.

4. Robust operations require systems to deal with collateral damage, such as casualty tracking and compensation.

5. Robust operations are not sufficiently developed yet, conceptually or operationally.

6. The UN Security Council is not sufficiently clear about what robust missions should and should not do in its mandates.

Interestingly, particularly on the receiving end of potentially strategically robust operations, in the Africa and MENA dialogue meetings the general perception was that the evolution towards robustness is reasonable and is the right approach following developments in these regions. In the Central Asia, South Asia and South East Asia dialogue meetings strategic robustness in peace operations was also accepted.

Yet in both North East Asia and South East Asia it was argued that a strategically robust mandate might influence the likelihood of countries contributing to a mission. In both regions the domestic political effect of potential casualties in peace operations is a primary deterrent for participation in robust missions. Countries in these regions prefer to contribute to less lethal areas of peace operations that follow the non-use of force. Some participants in the South East Asia dialogue meeting, however, preferred to participate in tactically robust operations as these kinds of operation are better equipped to defend themselves and this is safer for the peacekeepers.

Looking at the emerging powers in particular, from the dialogue meetings and interviews it appeared to be primarily China that was hesitant about further increasing the robustness of peace operations. The concept was seen as acceptable on a case-by-case basis without setting a precedent but should not become a real trend. At the same time, China contributes increasingly to robust missions. Although the Chinese public supports these contributions, the country hopes to maintain a low profile but become more open about it in the future.

In the South America dialogue meeting it was argued that Brazil had reservations about deploying peacekeepers even in tactically robust operations in the past, but that these fears were overcome in MINUSTAH in Haiti. There it forcefully pacified the slum area of Cité Soleil, using experience from, and seeing it as training for, operations in its own favelas. It would still resist deploying in strategically robust operations and views the use of force as a last resort in a gradual process, preferably with non-lethal weapons. According to interviewees, Indonesia supports robust operations but refrains from contributing to forceful operations itself. While Turkey, in spite of its support for robust operations, only
contributes symbolically to UN operations anyway.

Interviews showed that Russia has no problem with robust operations in principle and that this approach has been born from the realization that it is required to be effective. However, it prefers the UN not to implement missions with a strategically offensive robust mandate and it views regional organizations as more suitable to implement such operations. Russia has itself deployed forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region with robust assignments. Some interviewees even argued that, contrary to UN operations, CIS operations have been successful, because Russia has been willing to fight when needed. Nonetheless, in the future Russia could also support new operations like the FIB in the UN context, on a case-by-case basis—but not as standard practice.

India has no problem with robust operations or the use of force in them, but it was argued by Indian participants in the India workshop and the Europe and North America dialogue meeting that—on the basis of India’s national counterinsurgency (COIN) experience—it wants to ensure the minimal use of force, to avoid collateral damage and to ensure the support of the population. India used force in its contribution to the UN Command in the 1950–53 Korean War and in the 1960–64 UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). However, the Indian participant in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting argued that the Indian contingent of MONUSCO did not defend the population of Goma when M23 rebels seized the city in November 2012 because for that purpose they would have needed special forces.

According to dialogue meeting participants and interviewees, South Africa’s stance on the importance of robustness is probably the strongest because arguably most operations in the African context require it. South Africa has shown that it is willing to operate even in strategically offensive robust missions by contributing to the FIB. However, it does not want to deploy in robust operations by invitation, preferring to shape the agenda.

The acceptance of the different kinds of robustness differs. Tactical robustness is widely accepted, partly because it is perceived by some to actually increase the security of troops deployed. Strategically defensive robustness is not disputed, but more countries do not want to contribute to such operations as they feel that the environment is too dangerous to deploy their troops. Strategically offensive robustness is more controversial as a concept and was broadly required to be further operationalized. Some countries, such as China and Russia, do not want the UN to venture into this area.

The more UN operations that are deployed in insecure environments, the more likely it is that operations will receive strategically defensive robust mandates on a case-by-case basis, stressing that it will not be a precedent. However, strategically robust operations are likely to have more force generation problems. A structural trend towards strategically offensive robust operations is not likely because concerns with regard to the concept and a lack of willingness to contribute to them is likely to prevent any substantial move in that direction.
Protection of civilians

In spite of the fact that the armed intervention in Libya (based on a UN Security Council resolution that actually referred to the ‘protection of civilians’ not R2P) has created a lot of confusion regarding the concept of POC in the framework of UN peace operations, POC is no longer controversial in any region. In the Africa, Europe and North America, and MENA dialogue meetings it was even argued that POC should be a priority. However, there was a call for the further operationalization of the concept in the Africa, Europe and North America, Central Asia, North East Asia and South America dialogue meetings. In these meetings, a large number of issues to address regarding the concept were discussed. It was argued that the resources provided to peacekeepers are often inadequate to physically protect civilians in a sustainable manner. Therefore, mandates that contain POC elements need to reflect the realities on the ground in order to manage expectations, set achievable goals and provide adequate resources. This would also require a re-evaluation of the scope of POC and a more clear definition. In some cases it was argued that POC should be given explicit limits.

In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting there was an additional concern that POC should not be focused on at the expense of state-building, as sustainable POC cannot be done in the absence of building a functioning state. Moreover, it was argued that there could be unintended consequences of embracing POC. For example, the current the situation in South Sudan, where the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is protecting tens of thousands of civilians in its compounds, could be comparable to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993–95, which eventually led to a debacle in Srebrenica. In the same dialogue meeting it was also reasoned that there is a conflict between impartiality and robust POC. Similarly, in the South Asia and North East Asia dialogue meetings it was argued that the legitimate need to protect civilians should not be used to override the principle of state sovereignty. In the North East Asia and South East Asia dialogue meetings it was argued that the legitimate need to protect civilians should not be used to override the principle of state sovereignty. In the South Asia and North East Asia dialogue meetings it was thought that a number of countries in these regions would be less likely to contribute to the implementation of POC mandates out of fear for casualties.

Also among the emerging powers, according to interviewees and participants in the dialogue meetings, POC is less controversial than R2P. All support it, if it is done on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution and with the consent of the host government, arguing that sometimes force is needed to protect civilians. A participant from Brazil in the South America dialogue meeting said, however, that there is an inherent tension between POC and non-intervention and that POC requires further operationalization. He argued that it should be non-selective and impartial and should only have protection of civilians as an aim and no ulterior political motives. Russian interviewees also supported this view and gave the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) as an example of when the UN overstepped its mandate and supported the removal of the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo. In addition, Russian and Chinese interviewees stressed that in order to

implement POC with force, missions require enough capacity. With capacity currently a problem, POC might sometimes be impossible.

The concept of POC seems to be here to stay. The emerging powers also seem to have embraced it, although China is the most hesitant. There are, however, fears in a number of regions that POC, like R2P, could be misused and sovereignty, therefore, needs to be protected. In addition, there seems to be broad agreement that the concept of POC needs to be further operationalized.

Conclusions

Europe and North America appear to be the main norm shapers and the other regions are primarily reactive towards these norms. The emerging powers also seem to remain norm followers, rather than norm setters or norm revisionists. The main exception is Africa, where participants in the dialogue meeting claimed that the continent was the origin of many of the norms and concepts used in peace operations today. In spite of the fact that there were many calls for alternative or regional norms, in practice there were very few concrete proposals. However, participants in the different regions did feel a need to refine and calibrate existing norms on a case-by-case basis, to local contexts, in order to increase local ownership. In general, they also felt that R2P, robust missions and POC need to be further operationalized.

Unclear terminology

Discussion in a number of dialogue meetings arose as a result of the unclear usage of peace operation terms and concepts. Particularly in Central Asia, the terms ‘armed intervention’ and ‘peace operation’ were often used interchangeably in the dialogue meeting as armed intervention was seen as a type of peace operation. In the Africa dialogue meeting several participants argued that the term ‘peacekeeping’ is outdated, given the shift towards more robust mandates that require compromise on once non-debatable peacekeeping principles, such as impartiality. Their preferred term was ‘peace support operations’ to acknowledge that recent peace operations, such as the FIB in the DRC, have shifted away from traditional peacekeeping. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting it was argued that a number of concepts and norms have become ‘polluted’ and should be cleaned up. For example, the concept of R2P has not only been used to protect civilians, but also to legitimize armed interventions based on other interests, not least by the West itself. More clarity on the different concepts would certainly help participants to speak a common language in the international debate on concepts and norms.

A future outlook

In an increasingly multipolar world there is a high risk that the national interests of the great powers become even more important than upholding the shared values and norms of the multilateral system. Nevertheless, the norms and concepts of peace operations were not fundamentally challenged in any of the dialogue meetings and were, in fact, criticized remarkably little. Only in the Europe and North America and the South America dialogue meetings was more fundamental criticism heard from a critical theory perspective, questioning the role of peace operations.
in relation to the current power structures in the world. However, the majority of the participants in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting argued that the current toolbox should be looked at first. There would be no need for new concepts if the old ones are continuously adapted and updated. In the MENA dialogue meeting it was initially argued there is a need for alternative norms and concepts as the current ones are framed by the West. However, on further inspection it appeared that, as elsewhere, the norms and concepts themselves were not questioned. Rather, the debate was about the practical operationalization of norms, principles and concepts, and their application, implementation and sometimes perceived manipulation due to political interests. In general, it was argued in all the dialogue meetings that the application of norms and concepts are likely to be determined by great power interests in the future.

From the dialogue meetings and interviews it became clear that in those regions where the great powers have common interests—primarily Africa and potentially in parts of the MENA region—they have less need to discuss the intrusiveness and robustness of operations and armed interventions. Therefore, discussions on the implementation of liberal peace; peacebuilding and conflict prevention; local ownership; comprehensive and integrated approaches; sovereignty; R2P, armed intervention and RWP; robustness; and POC become less relevant in those regions. It allows the great powers to be flexible and open to innovation and adaption in order to ‘get the job done’. There is less need to talk about the principles of peace operations, and more room for deciding on a case-by-case basis, without setting precedents, looking instead at the requirements of each new mission area.

The observation that, particularly in Africa, there is a constructive spirit has actually been confirmed by remarkable developments in the past year such as the FIB, Operation Serval, Operation Sangaris, UN support for the Somali National Army and the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in MONUSCO. It is too early to tell where this is heading, but the dialogue meetings appear to disprove the initial assumption that in the future peace operations will be put back in the box.

Although there is broad agreement, there are still concerns with regard to the norms and concepts used, but these are primarily technical in nature. The main concern with regard to robust, intrusive and POC missions, primarily heard in the South Asia, Central Asia and North East Asia dialogue meetings, was about the continued and growing gap between political support for norms and principles and the actual resources required to deliver on mission mandates. Military personnel, in particular, feel that they are often not provided with the required resources to protect civilians. More generally, TCC/PCCs feel that they are not sufficiently supported and there was sympathy for this in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting.

In regions where the great powers have conflicting interests, in which there are diverging political views, there is also disagreement over the case-specific implementation and operationalization of norms and concepts. The disagreement with the West on, for example, Libya and Syria in the dialogue meetings in such regions as Africa, Central Asia, North East Asia, South America and South Asia—and Brazil, China, India, Russia and
South Africa in particular—are a prime example. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, on the other hand, it was argued that actors such as China and Russia try to bypass the rules, although they reflected that the West did the same. Indeed, in many regions (e.g. the MENA dialogue meeting) it was argued that norms and concepts are not equally applied around the world—it is very much a pick and choose situation—and that this would negatively affect the credibility of the UN Security Council and the norms and concepts it applies. However, many of the critics are, in fact, believers in the concepts and norms. Their argument is not that there should not be any implementation of some of the norms, but that it should be done more evenly. Some participants in the MENA dialogue meeting even argued that R2P should be enshrined in the UN Charter. Nonetheless, such rule juggling is likely to increase with increasing multipolarity, as the great powers increasingly use the common normative and conceptual language for their own interests.

Apart from in Africa (and to a certain extent in the Middle East), in an increasingly multipolar world, in Europe and North America, Central Asia, North East Asia and South Asia—the regions dominated by China, the EU, India, Russia and the USA—agreement over more intrusive and robust missions, or any external intervention at all, becomes increasingly unlikely as the great powers have no common interests in these regions. The great powers themselves may intervene in these regions in an intrusive and robust manner using the existing norms and concepts to legitimate their acts, but then disagreement about their implementation is likely. South East Asia as a region, aware of the potential dangers of great power conflicts, aims to prevent any intrusive or robust external operation. Only South America, including Brazil, is potentially more open to robust and intrusive UN operations in the region, but this is limited and in the case of Haiti it was seen as a regional project within a UN operation.
4. Future contributions to peace operations

The NGP initiative has closely examined the objectives of engagement for both the emerging powers and other TCC/PCCs. Participants in the dialogue meetings and interviewees were asked to provide input on the economic, political, institutional and normative drivers of contribution and whether they expected a shift in motivations in the near future. This input has led to an evaluation of the priorities of the emerging powers and TCC/PCCs, how their motivations will affect the size and nature of their contributions, and how potential shifts in objectives will affect the future dynamic of peace operations.

Emerging powers

Brazil

Brazil’s initial engagement with UN peace operations was an attempt to reshape its image in the aftermath of the country’s democratization in the 1990s. It currently provides 1684 uniformed personnel. The figures for uniformed personnel contributed to UN operations in this section are based on 30 Sep. 2014 data collected from United Nations, Peacekeeping, ‘Troop and police contributors’, 30 Sep. 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>.

Brazilian participants in the South America dialogue meeting and interviewees noted that such engagement was driven by a new foreign policy discourse of increasing capacity and involvement in international peace and security efforts within the UN framework, particularly under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–11). Brazil’s motivations have developed along with its emerging status. Participants and interviewees claimed that Brazil views its participation as a way to contend for a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council. The importance of sharing responsibility for global peace and security and the understanding that conflicts in other regions could affect Brazil’s own long-term security are also important considerations for the country’s participation. Brazil’s participation has also led to greater cooperation and confidence building with neighbouring countries, such as Argentina and Chile, and has improved the overall public perception of the military. On an institutional level, participation facilitates training opportunities for Brazil’s armed forces and increases its defence budget. Over time, its contribution to UN operations has created a substantial capacity for deployment that has become a motivation for continued participation, particularly among the military.

A number of Brazilian participants in the South America dialogue meeting and one interviewee noted that Brazil might decrease its UN activism in the near future. Currently, the majority of Brazil’s troops are deployed in MINUSTAH and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), but it is not clear where and to what extent the country will contribute troops after the operation in Haiti closes down. Currently, its strategy for participation is somewhat unclear and unpredictable. Some participants and interviewees argued that Brazil will refocus on domestic security as well as the social, economic and environmental challenges it faces. The country might also increase its diplomatic activism in other global forums, particularly on environmental and development issues. Other Brazilian participants and interviewees did not believe that there would be profound changes in the country’s commitment to contribute. However, according to one
interviewee, this last option appears to have become less likely as a result of the re-election of President Dilma Rousseff, who favours a focus on domestic affairs. Nevertheless, if Brazil deploys to a new mission, it is likely continue to do so within the UN framework.

China

A former sceptic of UN peace operations, China has significantly stepped up its contribution in the past decade and currently contributes 2192 uniformed personnel. As such, it is the biggest contributor among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Interviewees in Beijing noted that the country has come to accept the legitimacy and function of peace operations in modern conflict and views the UN as the main organization to deploy them. However, it is likely that China’s changing status both domestically and internationally, following its rapid economic development, has also created new motivations for greater engagement at the UN. Participants in the North East Asia dialogue meeting noted that China has come to view participation in peace operations primarily as way to assuage global and regional concerns about its growing economic and military power and to project itself as a responsible emerging power, while softly balancing Western influence in the international system. Economic and security interests provide a secondary interest for participation. In Africa, for example, China benefits from relative stability for its business enterprises and from security for Chinese civilians who work there. China also benefits from the training and experience that its military gains from their deployment in peace operations.

One Chinese interviewee stated that there are three important factors that could affect China’s contribution to peace operations. First, China is not likely to accept an increase in peacekeeper casualties. Second, and perhaps most importantly, if China’s engagement were to be perceived as an attempt for international hegemony and domination, China would most likely decrease its participation. Third, despite the fact that China has evolved to accept the legitimacy of norms such as POC, it might re-evaluate its participation if the trend towards robust operations grows further. Nevertheless, several interviewees and participants in the North East Asia dialogue meeting suggested that China’s approach to, and willingness to engage in, peace operations has evolved in the past few years, so it is not likely to significantly reduce its contribution in the near future. Since 2012, although the Chinese contingents are not involved in direct combat, China has started to provide infantry units, which is a relatively sharp departure from its usual contribution of engineers and medical workers. China’s evolving attitude towards robust operations has been demonstrated, among other things, by its recent deployment of troops providing force protection to MINUSMA in Mali. Given its stated motivations, China is likely to continue to deploy with UN peace operations in the near future.

India

A veteran contributor, India has participated in UN peace operations from their institutional infancy. With 8108 uniformed personnel currently
deployed, it is the largest contributor to the UN. India shares many motivations for participation with other less developed South Asian contributors, namely being able to bolster its military surplus and provide training and career advancement opportunities to military personnel deployed in peace operations. However, according to Indian participants in the South Asia dialogue meeting and the India workshop, India is primarily motivated by normative and political objectives. On a normative level, it has been committed to the UN Charter and to the importance of contributing to global peace and security since its independence in 1947. Politically, India views its participation as a way to establish itself as an emerging power, and to that end it has used its participation in peace operations as a justification for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Competition over the quality and quantity of contributions from South Asia, particularly with Pakistan, has also been an important driver. India’s role in UN peace operations helps it to influence international attitudes towards South Asia and echoes its primacy in the region. Further, participation helps to strengthen bilateral relationships with resource-rich countries like the DRC, which is particularly important for India as it is concerned about sustaining economic development at home and safeguarding natural resources.

In the past decade the debate about participation in peace operations has increasingly shifted from a more idealistic stance to a greater focus on strategic participation that benefits the country’s national interests. A minority of participants in the India workshop suggested that the country should evaluate whether its substantial contribution has been beneficial to its global status, and whether security and development issues at home and in the region should shift its priorities. However, despite this, India remains fully committed to participating in UN peace operations and there are no indications that it will reduce its contribution in the near future, although it might change its strategy on participation. As far as focusing on regional priorities, Indian participants in the South Asia dialogue meeting noted a very low probability of any type of activism regarding peace operations within South Asia due to tensions, negative past experiences and a general lack of trust in the region.

Indonesia

Indonesia has steadily increased its contribution since the beginning of its participation in UN peace operations in the 1970s. Currently, the country’s contribution stands at about 1832 uniformed personnel. According to Indonesian participants in the South East Asia dialogue meeting, Indonesia’s main objectives for participation in peace operations are political and military. Politically, Indonesia hopes to advance its standing within the UN and substantiate its claim for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. There are also several military motivations for its participation in peace operations. As a post-authoritarian regime, participation in operations has allowed the military to reshape its image both domestically and internationally, while continuing to play an important role in Indonesia’s foreign policy through engagement on peace operations. Furthermore, participation has created a legitimate basis for Indonesia to procure new arms and modernize its army,
while providing career advancement opportunities and training to its armed forces. Troop reimbursements are not a direct motivation to contribute to peace operations, because UN reimbursements are added to the salaries of military personnel on missions. However, this is an individual economic incentive for deployed troops. Nevertheless, an Indonesian interviewee noted that the reimbursements on contingent-owned military equipment are significant for the overall military budget. Lastly, although normative considerations are secondary motivations for participation, Indonesia views its contribution as a way of fulfilling its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, which is also mandated in its constitution.

According to participants in the South East Asia dialogue meeting, Indonesia hopes to increase its contribution to around 4000 military and police personnel in the near future. The country is likely to continue contributing primarily within the UN framework, but it is also quite active within ASEAN. Although Indonesia’s proposal to create an ASEAN regional peacekeeping standby force was rejected by member states, an interviewee from the country noted that Indonesia still supports the idea of creating greater capacity in its region to allow ASEAN members to address common threats.

Russia

Russia currently contributes 92 uniformed personnel to a variety of UN peace operations. A Russian participant in the Central Asia dialogue meeting noted that this low figure is accounted for by the fact that Russia does not have any political or economic interests in increasing its contribution to UN missions. Instead, Russia spreads its contribution across many existing UN operations, helping it to gain insight that allows it to consolidate its position in the UN Security Council. However, one Russian interviewee noted that there are different points of view within the Russian administration about whether or not to increase deployment numbers to UN missions: the diplomatic community and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are in favour, but the Ministry of Finance and the military, for capacity and budget reasons, are less enthusiastic. Nevertheless, Russia views its UN Security Council membership, and its diplomatic activities beyond the Security Council, as an alternative way of pursuing political goals and maintaining influence in the international sphere. In addition to its role at the UN Security Council, Russia intends to continue its financial and other support to peace operations.

Within its own region, Russia is likely to deploy only in instances where there is either a common threat to Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) members or for its own security interests, in which case it may intervene unilaterally rather than through a coalition. Russia has also deployed uniformed personnel to peace operations within the former Soviet space, namely in South Ossetia, Georgia; Abkhazia, Georgia; Tajikistan; and Transnistria, Moldova. Of these operations, only the last, the Joint Control Commission (JCC), a trilateral force, is still ongoing. Russia’s deployment to these missions has been seen partly as a continued obligation to maintaining stability in the former Soviet space, and partly as a way to pursue its own territorial and security interests.
According to participants in the Central Asia dialogue meeting and Russian interviewees in Moscow, significant Russian deployment within the CSTO, either within the Soviet region or in external international missions, is unlikely in the near future. Russia is not likely to deploy within the CSTO area, because the organization only has the mandate to protect members from external common threats. For example, Russia declined to send assistance to Kyrgyzstan during its internal turmoil in 2010. Even in the case of deploying to protect against common threats, such as the potential spillover from Afghanistan in the aftermath of NATO’s withdrawal, Russia has offered to provide training and equipment to Tajikistan but, it is not likely to provide its own troops on the border. In spite of the enthusiasm of some Russian interviewees, most were also sceptical about potential Russian deployment to CSTO out-of-area missions, because Russia would lack sufficient motivation.

South Africa

South Africa’s extensive participation in peace operations, currently 2250 uniformed personnel deployed to UN operations, has been significantly shaped by its experience of apartheid. According to a South African interviewee, South Africa views itself as an honest broker that is sincerely concerned with human security, both globally and regionally, which the country has also demonstrated through its legacy of peacebuilding and mediation activities. South Africa’s participation in AU and UN peace operations has also been a way for the country to project its international influence and growing status as an emerging global power. A proponent for the reform of the UN Security Council, South Africa has often used its significant participation and activism as a basis for a permanent seat on the Security Council. However, according to both Africa dialogue meeting participants and South African interviewees, South Africa’s contribution is largely shaped by economic and security interests in Africa.

A cornerstone of South Africa’s foreign policy is that security, peace and economic prosperity in the rest of Africa would lead to the same in South Africa as well. Therefore, the country’s considerations for participation in a given mission are often a combination of macro regional concerns and specific national interests. Participants in the Africa dialogue meetings and a South African participant in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting noted the example of South Africa’s considerations for participation in the FIB in DRC, namely its membership obligations to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the implications of instability in the DRC for regional prosperity and its own business interests. Beyond concern about national or regional economic stability, South Africa often participates in operations as a way to prevent (a) mass migration from conflict zones, (b) conflict spillover close to its borders, or (c) piracy on its coasts.

South Africa is likely to remain committed to participation in peace operations whether within the UN or the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) framework. However, South Africa faces challenges with regard to its financial and military capacity. The South African National Defence Force is short on resources and, according to a participant in the Africa dialogue...
meeting, in the future South African deployment could be challenged by the state of its troops.

**Turkey**

Turkey contributes currently about 153 uniformed personnel to UN peace operations. According to a participant in the MENA dialogue meeting and an interviewee, Turkey has increased its contribution to peace operations in the aftermath of the cold war as a way to forge its geopolitical importance by strengthening its close ties with the EU, NATO and the UN. In recent years, however, the AKP Government has moved away from Westernization and is increasingly focusing on Turkey’s influence in its region and beyond as a way to establish its presence and influence as an independent emerging power. To this end, aspirations for greater participation in peace operations were complemented with diplomatic, economic and cultural engagement in conflicts and post-conflict areas in or close to the former Ottoman space, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon and Somalia. The events of the Arab Spring have changed Turkey’s security landscape, forcing the country to get involved in regional conflicts and move away from its policy of zero problems with neighbours.

Although Turkey’s motivation for participation has always been primarily of a political nature, according to a Turkish participant in the MENA dialogue meeting, this solidified further as the power balance shifted away from military dominance under the AKP Government. This also explains why Turkey’s contribution will probably remain low as the importance of military institutional motivations for participation in peace operations has decreased. On the other hand, an interviewee pointed out that even when the military was still strong in 2003, Turkey was not willing to participate in the invasion of Iraq. He pointed to war wariness as a further reason for Turkish hesitance to contribute. Additionally, according to a participant in the MENA dialogue meeting, Turkey currently has more alternatives for pursuing political interests as an emerging power. The government sees participation in peace operations primarily as a tool for foreign policy, and both the military and the government generally view UN peace operations as less relevant and prioritize engagement with NATO. Therefore, Turkey’s contribution to UN operations is likely to remain symbolic and directly relevant to national interests. While Turkey’s changing regional security environment and competition with other emerging powers might seem like potential motivations to re-evaluate its engagement with the UN, they are not likely to dramatically reshape its strategy.

**Common types of troop- and police-contributing country**

There are three main categories of TCC/PCC, each with its own general motivations to contribute. These categories overlap with the World Bank categorization of high-, middle- and low-income countries. Examining these categories provides a broader picture of the calculations made for participation in peace operations in a variety of regions and contexts.
High-income countries

Rich and highly developed TCC/PCCs tend to contribute symbolically to UN peace operations, and generally avoid long-term commitments. Countries in this category do not have sufficient incentives to increase their contributions to UN operations because they usually have other means through which to achieve national interests and promote international peace and security. For example, France, the UK and the USA are UN Security Council members, and the USA, Japan, France, Germany and the UK are the top five of UN peace operations funders. There are, of course, exceptions to the rule even within this group. A French participant in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting noted that France’s activism, particularly in national missions that support UN peace operations, is a way for the country to maintain its influence at the UN Security Council and to pursue its economic and strategic interests in Africa.

Furthermore, participants from European countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, but also from Australia, noted that they have refrained from contributing to UN peace operations due to negative past experiences with the command and control structure, security standards and training standards of many troops deployed by the organization. However, many of the countries named above have made significant contributions to EU and NATO operations, pointing to the fact that there is a willingness to contribute to peace operations outside the UN framework when they benefit regional security or reinforce a security alliance. A participant from Australia also confirmed this assertion during the South East Asia dialogue meeting, suggesting that the country would only consider participation in an operation that would protect regional security or an operation led by the USA, most likely through NATO.

Some Western European countries are considering an increase in their contributions to UN peace operations in the aftermath of the drawdown from Afghanistan, mainly with much-needed niche capabilities in the form of high-tech units, specialists and key enablers. However, the perceived failure of the long-term efforts in Afghanistan, budget cuts and lack of public support for significant troop contribution are likely to play a role in limiting the number of troops deployed from Europe and North America in the near future. During the dialogue meeting in North East Asia, participants from Japan also noted that it is not likely to significantly increase its uniformed personnel contributions to UN operations despite pressure from its allies. Due to public opinion and the perceived danger to peacekeepers, both Japan and South Korea are unlikely to contribute to robust operations. Moreover, beyond public opinion, both countries are able to pursue their national interests and activism through different channels at the UN and through other forums, in which both countries plan to remain active. Relative lack of economic and military interests in contribution is the main reason for Japan’s symbolic uniformed personnel contribution.

Middle-income countries

The most prominent group within the middle-income category is the big contributors, either relative to the country’s size or due to the number deployed. They provide the majority of UN peace operation uniformed personnel. These are, in general, more
motivated by military incentives than high-income countries and are less motivated by economic benefits than low-income TCC/PCCs. They are also often guided by political motivations and view their participation as a key element of their foreign policy.

Participants in the South America dialogue meeting stressed that contributing helped to reshape the image of their militaries, as countries in the region moved from authoritarian to democratic regimes, improved civil–military relations, and facilitated regional cooperation through deployment in MINUSTAH. Activism in peace operations has also fostered independence for a region that was dominated by Soviet and US agendas during the cold war. Further, contributing has facilitated training opportunities and exposure for the armed forces and has elevated the influence and status of South American TCC/PCCs in the international system.

In Asia, Pakistan also fits this profile. According to participants from the South Asia dialogue meeting, Pakistan views its participation as a key element of its foreign policy, particularly when it comes to gaining influence at the UN. Although Pakistan does not make a national profit by contributing, participation allows it to maintain a troop surplus and sustain the prominent role of its military within the country. Training opportunities and international military prestige are also important motivators. In the MENA dialogue meeting, participants from Egypt and Jordan noted that their countries’ significant contributions had helped to positively shape their images internationally and allowed them to contend for prestigious positions at the UN.

Some middle-income TCC/PCCs contribute primarily as an indirect way of preserving national security and sovereignty, by increasing their visibility in the international community or reinforcing a protective relationship with a strong ally. Participants from Poland and Romania in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting claimed that the main motive for their contributions to UN, EU and (in particular) NATO missions was to showcase their commitment to the EU and the USA, in the hope that their allies would defend them in the event of an escalation with Russia. Participants from Mongolia in the North East Asia dialogue meeting noted that contribution to UN peace operations is a part of Mongolia’s ‘third neighbour policy’, which aims to improve its relationships with countries outside its immediate area. Mongolia hopes to foster goodwill with the international community through its contribution, which will help to secure its territorial integrity and sovereignty from its much larger, non-democratic and nuclear-armed neighbours, China and Russia.

In other instances, regional security plays a leading role in the calculations behind participation. Several participants in the Africa dialogue meeting expressed the primacy of this motivation for their countries. A participant from Ghana noted that the country contributes to UNOCI as a way to prevent the conflict spilling over into its immediate neighbourhood. A participant from Nigeria suggested that the country’s activism and leadership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in particular, is a way to safeguard regional and domestic security and to prevent the escalation of conflict in West Africa. Nigeria also contributes as
it views peace and stability as a precondition for economic prosperity in its region.

**Low-income countries**

Low-income TCC/PCCs are often guided by a mixture of economic and military incentives for participation, with political motivations of secondary importance. UN reimbursements are of great importance to low-income countries. Beyond the defence budget, UN reimbursements are also profitable on a national and individual level for countries like Bangladesh and Nepal. In addition, similarly to middle-income countries, contributions to peace operations allow these countries to (a) maintain a military surplus; (b) provide training and career opportunities for the armed forces; (c) maintain military prominence and influence domestically; (d) improve civil–military relations, in some cases by socializing the military according to international norms and in others by simply keeping the military involved in the international, rather than the domestic, sphere; and (e) showcase military prestige and network with other armed forces. Political motivations, which were seen to be of secondary importance, are advancing international standing and influencing mandates. While participants in the South Asia dialogue meeting expressed frustration over their limited influence at the UN, despite their significant uniformed personnel contributions, they were still keen to continue their participation—underlining the fact that military and economic motivations override political ones.

Some low-income TCC/PCCs are directly affected by conflict within their region and therefore view contribution and the restoration of stability as a priority. Such TCC/PCCs may contribute as a way to prevent the spillover of a conflict in their immediate region, to prevent economic degradation or even to protect populations with a shared ethnic identity in a neighbouring country. Participants from Ethiopia, for example, expressed the importance of regional security and economic prosperity as a motivation for troop contribution. Protecting Somali citizens with ethnic ties to Ethiopia was also argued to have motivated Ethiopia’s troop contribution to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) and later to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).

**Conclusions**

The diversity of approaches and attitudes to, as well as motivations for, participation among emerging powers indicate that this group is far from homogenous. While the majority of these actors are rather engaged in international peace and security, they are not likely to carry much more of the burden of uniformed personnel contribution within their regions or internationally. In the cases of Russia and Turkey, contributions are likely to remain symbolic when it comes to the UN. Despite the fact that Brazil, India and South Africa are all committed to continuing their contributions, there are reasons to expect no further increase, and perhaps even a decrease, in contributions from these countries. In Brazil there is a lack of strategic direction after its deployment in Haiti as well as domestic challenges. India’s shift towards more strategic contribution might not be a concern in terms of the numbers that it will deploy,
but it does point to the possibility of the emerging powers’ calculations for participation becoming more complex. In South Africa there are capacity issues. Despite evolving its policy towards contributions, China remains highly cautious about robust participation. Of the emerging powers reviewed, only Indonesia has a clear intention to further increase its contributions. The UN, therefore, will have to rely on fostering and reinforcing relationships with new and other existing TCC/PCCs.

The three categories of TCC/PCC examined in this chapter illustrate the fact that the majority of uniformed personnel deployed to peace operations, and in particular to UN peace operations, will come from middle- and low-income countries.

While high-income countries may not generally contribute with large numbers to UN operations, it is important to keep these countries engaged by encouraging them to share specialized capabilities and funding. If they feel their domestic or regional security is challenged, such countries may be more willing to contribute to EU, NATO or ad hoc coalition operations, although less than in the past.

The middle-income TCC/PCCs are primarily driven by a combination of international political aspirations and relatively dominant military incentives for participation. This is the group of countries that is likely to continue to provide the largest contributions to UN operations and to provide new or enlarged contributors. In the dialogue meetings, participants from Viet Nam and Kazakhstan expressed their commitment to deploying to UN operations in the near future. Mexico, which announced its willingness to start contributing to the UN in September 2014, also fits this profile. Low-income countries are also a potential pool for contribution, although most countries within this group that are in the position to contribute already do.

Across the board, regardless of income level, although normative reasons (e.g. wanting to contribute to world peace or wanting to return the favour after having been a host nation in the past) are generally mentioned for contributing, these are never primary motivations and are always complemented with more mundane reasons. In general, countries are likely to contribute to peace operations when they perceive a regional or domestic threat. Contributions from within the region are therefore often most likely.

It is worth noting that if peace operations were to depend increasingly on countries from the same region this will involve challenges. Within Africa some of the biggest TCC/PCCs (e.g. Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda) are often described as local hegemons or countries with particular political interests. Therefore, would it be wise to allow these actors, who have interests beyond regional security, to set the agenda for peace operations in the region? In some cases TCC/PCCs could themselves be in violation of international law and human rights, and in others they could actually be party to the conflict. These challenges will continue to be prevalent as the UN and other regional organizations continue to face, on the one hand, austerity measures and, on the other hand, a growing need for uniformed personnel contribution.

There are also instances where it is unlikely that a country will contribute. For example, states are unlikely to contribute within their own regions if interstate conflict and tensions are perceived as main regional security threats (see chapter 2). Therefore, in the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia, countries are unlikely to contribute within their region because such deployment could be perceived as aggression. Furthermore, there is a large group of countries that only has very limited military capacity and thus cannot contribute substantially. In other instances, states might not have sufficient political autonomy, or might disagree with international conflict resolution instruments. In Central Asia, for example, participants from both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan noted their lack of political agency to make independent decisions about participation. Other countries are interested but face international sanctions, such as Iran, and their contributions would not be accepted. Last but not least, countries that face internal conflict and instability are less likely to contribute to operations in other countries.

Lastly, from the dialogue meetings it became clear that the process of deciding whether to start or end contributing to peace operations is concentrated around two turning points. With regard to the first turning point, in general, countries that do not contribute to peace operations require individual political leadership to get involved. This can be either national leadership or international leadership (e.g. the UN Secretary-General played a decisive role in Egypt and South Korea). Once engaged, there are strong institutional motivations, both political and military, to stay involved. Consequently, in spite of changes (e.g. the end of particular missions), countries usually continue to contribute to other peace operations and such decisions are generally made on relatively technical grounds. With regard to the second turning point, only once the decision to contribute becomes political again, for example, as a result of a perceived large number of casualties or a significant change in the national political environment, do countries decide to stop contributing.
5. Future implementing organizations

Over the course of time a number of international and regional organizations have become involved in the deployment of peace operations, alternatively they have made proposals or concrete plans in that direction. In the dialogue meetings and interviews the question of which organizations have sufficient capacity and legitimacy to address the regional and global challenges of conflict was dealt with, as well as looking at the political preferences of different stakeholders with regard to the various institutions. This has provided an insight into developments within, and the future potential of, the most relevant international and regional organizations as well as other organizations and ad hoc coalitions.

Key international and regional organizations

The African Union and the African Peace and Security Architecture

In Africa, the AU and a number of Regional Economic Communities (RECs), which are part of APSA, already have a lot of experience in peace operations. In addition to the AU, both ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have a long history of deploying peace operations. Members of SADC currently have their forces deployed in the FIB in the DRC. Participants in the Africa dialogue meeting perceived the North African Regional Capability and the Eastern African Standby Force—uniting members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community—to be much weaker, in spite of the fact that IGAD has played a minor role in peace operations, and currently has a mission deployed in South Sudan.

There were three main topics of discussion in the Africa dialogue meeting with regard to the AU and APSA. First, the relations between the different bodies in APSA and the interpretation and implementation of the principle of subsidiarity (i.e. that decisions should be made by the least central unit within the greater organizational structure, when possible) were subject to debate. Currently, disagreements on approaches to conflict management and peace operations, and the often-competing interests of RECs and the AU, would constitute significant challenges to subsidiarity. Some participants argued that it makes sense to strengthen RECs if regional organizations are more efficient than the AU. Organizations such as ECOWAS would possess the legitimacy to assist in conflicts that take place in their region, because their member states are directly affected. Moreover, the command and control systems of ECOWAS, in particular, are quite sophisticated. Other participants questioned whether giving more authority to more actors would actually improve the efficiency of peace operations. A few participants even asserted that RECs such as ECOWAS are weakening the AU by increasing institutional fragmentation in the region and suggested the dismantling of those regional organizations that have not produced results.

Second, the legitimacy of armed interventions and the role of regional hegemons in particular were discussed in the Africa dialogue meeting. Regional hegemons often have the capacity and willingness to intervene and it could, therefore, make sense to

give them the lead. However, some participants argued that such hegemons intervene for their own interests and are, therefore, not always the most suitable and legitimate to lead armed interventions.

Third, relationships with outside actors, such as the UN and European actors, were discussed in the Africa dialogue meeting, and the call for more African ownership was made very clear. However, there was also a general agreement among participants that dependence on external armed intervention results from a lack of African resources and capacity. There were suggestions from participants to move ahead with plans for creating an African rapid response force and airlift capability and to acquire high-tech equipment to prevent and manage conflicts in order to reduce dependency on external actors (e.g. France). Nevertheless, participants asserted that it might not be realistic to completely abstain from Western assistance. It would still take a long time before African states, APSA, the AU and RECs have all the necessary capabilities for peace operations, let alone the development-related peacebuilding aspects that are required for multidimensional peace operations. However, participants argued that African peacekeepers have historically been more willing to suffer casualties in order to address instability in their neighbourhood. The underlying complaint in the Africa dialogue meeting was that African organizations are not currently given the desired respect or leading roles, but are rather assigned to clear and stabilize an area so that the UN or France can come in and take over the operation once it is more secure. According to most participants, the UN should play a role in assisting peace operations in Africa, but the AU and RECs should own and increasingly implement operations deployed to maintain regional security—and be given the space, resources and respect to fulfil that role.

The future role of the AU and APSA in peace operations depends very much on how these three issues are dealt with. The region has a lot of experience and wants to deal with its own problems, but it sometimes lacks the necessary capabilities and sometimes sub-regional solutions are seen as less legitimate.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

According to participants in the South East Asia dialogue meeting, ASEAN member states have historically felt strongly about the principles of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention. Accordingly, an ASEAN role in peace operations is sensitive, as it could be perceived as interference in internal affairs. Participants argued that since ASEAN was established, it has been strong at dialogue, conflict prevention and confidence building, but has lacked the trust and instruments once conflict erupts, to manage conflict and build peace. ASEAN wants to remain a neutral, honest broker and participants argued, therefore, that many governments in the region would not want the organization to take on a forceful military security role. However, although a role for ASEAN in peace operations is currently seen as a distant future, and as an organization ASEAN has no plans in that direction, participants thought it may be a possibility in the intermediate term. Since 2004 there have been repeated proposals for an ASEAN peacekeeping force, particularly from Indonesia, but
FUTURE IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONS

no other country yet supports it. However, according to the participants, there seems to be a tendency away from absolute sovereignty. For peace operations inside the region, member states would actually always look at regional frameworks first. With regard to any future operation within the ASEAN region, the organization is likely to seek involvement. There are peace agreements in the region that could be signed and which might need monitoring, and ASEAN could do that job. Nonetheless, participants argued that capacity in the region is limited, so a large role could not be expected. For the moment, according to participants, cooperation between ASEAN countries could (a) build on the network of peacekeeping training centres; (b) improve force generation and the exchange of information; and (c) focus on coordination of the participation of individual countries.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization

The CSTO is actively looking into ways for the organization to become involved in peace operations. Its roles and responsibilities within the CSTO region were debated in the Central Asia dialogue meeting. Some participants argued that the organization should expand its mandate to address conflicts within the CSTO region, in addition to protecting member states from external threats. Some participants also stated that the CSTO should deploy out of area, potentially within the context of a UN peace operation. Other participants noted that the CSTO is currently internally divided into three separate groups—Russia and Belarus, Russia and Armenia, and Russia and Central Asia—with at times divergent interests.

Given the relative inaction of the CSTO on the conflicts in Central Asia, some participants also felt that the organization is largely symbolic and used by Russia primarily to legitimate its influence in the region. Although it has some legitimacy, the CSTO would probably not be able to deploy within the region due to sensitivities over the role of Russia and the Soviet past. According to participants and interviewees, Russia also seems to be generally unwilling to deploy soldiers to Central Asia. Moreover, interviewees argued the CSTO still lacks the capability to engage in peace operations in the near future. Its current collective peacekeeping force, of 4200 personnel, could potentially deploy out of area. However, experts interviewed in Moscow thought that the force was too inexperienced and had too much of a counterinsurgency mentality to be deployed in a peace operation. Politically, they did not expect it to be deployed within 5 to 10 years, because of the lack of Russian interest to do so. The only exceptions would be to legitimize an otherwise Russian armed intervention under the CSTO flag or under particular political circumstances, for example, if the deployment of forces would be supporting a Russian role or a Russian solution to a relevant conflict. Nonetheless, even then, interviewees saw the deployment of Russian troops outside the CSTO as more likely.

The European Union

Since 2002 the EU has deployed various types of mission. The 2007 Lisbon Treaty defined the tasks of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy

(CSDP) more broadly than the original 1992 Petersberg Tasks and it now includes the whole spectrum of crisis management. The CSDP’s EU Battlegroups consist of about 1500 troops each and states participate on a rotational basis. They constitute an early and rapid response capability and there are two of them ready to deploy at all times. However, they have never been deployed, according to participants in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, due to generally incongruent national interests of the contributing states.

In spite of the December 2013 European Council Conclusions on CSDP, which called for their increased flexibility and deployability, many participants in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting deemed it unlikely that CSDP missions or EU contributions to UN operations will make use of the EU Battlegroups in the future. Outside the Battlegroup setup, the EU has provided niche operations (such as the rule of law, security sector reform and other civilian capacities), deployed military bridging operations, played the role of a subcontractor in a modular approach for UN operations, and has sometimes taken on broader civilian mandates. As such, the EU is the only (other than the UN) organization that is able to deliver both military and comprehensive civilian aspects of peace operations and has most of the instruments in-house for a comprehensive approach.

Further, in dialogue meetings outside Europe, the EU is seen as one of the few organizations able to rapidly deploy forces. However, the Europe and North America dialogue meeting showed that the CSDP is challenged by diverging strategic outlooks and differing political approaches. Eastern Europe is focused on security challenges at the eastern border of the EU and on Russia in particular. Southern Europe is much more focused on the MENA region. The Atlantic region is focused on a broader range of security challenges. With regard to differing approaches, France and the UK are more interventionist than Germany and most other EU member states, which are more risk-averse or sceptical towards the use of force. These diverging strategic outlooks mean, it was argued by one participant, that it is much easier to reach agreement on a mission to Georgia, where everyone has an interest, than in CAR where only few have. Future large-scale military operations were also regarded by most participants as unlikely due to fatigue after Afghanistan and Iraq and declining numbers of military personnel as a result of budget cuts. Moreover, although Eastern European states usually contribute a little to EU operations in Africa, they mainly do so to guarantee, among others, French support in their potential struggle with Russia. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea this focus on Russia is only going to increase, at the cost of the capacity to contribute to peace operations. A number of other EU issues were discussed in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting. First, the

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EU is not currently able to deploy large-scale military operations in the context of, for example, R2P. However, the question was raised as to whether EU operations should remain predominantly directed at the low end of the spectrum of violence, or whether the EU should be able to deploy full spectrum (as France would like).

Second, the EU views itself as a soft power aiming for local ownership. Yet interestingly, particularly in the Africa and MENA dialogue meetings, the EU was seen as having double standards, by actively pursuing its own interests and being primarily willing to intervene when these interests are at stake. Especially in Africa, the EU was seen to be blocking African ownership of its problems. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting it was argued that the events in Ukraine are likely to have also stimulated Russia to view EU missions in geopolitical terms as anti-Russian.

Third, France is often at the heart and origin of military EU operations. Consequently, participants in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting claimed that some of these operations are perceived as French operations and some member states do not see the need to contribute to missions pursuing French interests.

Lastly, although the withdrawal of ISAF means that EU–UN cooperation is back on the agenda, there is a fear in the EU that some countries, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, will consequently move away from the EU towards the UN.

In spite of decreasing European defence budgets and increasing attention given to Russia-focused national defence, the EU has sufficient capacity and legitimacy to continue to play a role in peace operations, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting there appeared to be a lot of willingness among the UN, the EU and their member states to look at the different formats for inter-organizational cooperation.

The Gulf Cooperation Council

The GCC was established to protect its member states against common threats. Since the 2011 Bahraini uprising, the GCC has deployed its Peninsula Shield Force in Bahrain. However, at the MENA dialogue meeting it became apparent that neither the GCC nor its member states are likely to become active on a large scale in peace operations, due to a lack of capacity and training, and to the limited consensus among member states on dealing with conflicts in the Middle East. Nevertheless, GCC member states might be willing to increase their financial contributions to UN peace operations.

The League of Arab States

In addition to the recent monitoring mission in Syria (2011–12), the League of Arab States (Arab League) has deployed three forces in the past: one in Kuwait (1961–63) and two in Lebanon (1976 and 1976–83). In spite of the Arab League’s attempts to reform its structures and the increasing willingness of its member states to support enforcement actions in cases of gross human rights violations, many participants in the MENA dialogue meeting doubted its viability as a major actor in peace operations. The Arab

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League is not regarded as having the necessary structures and procedures to play a large part in peace operations, and it is unlikely that the GCC would allow it such a role.

**The North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

Although NATO has been declared dead many times, each time it has found a new purpose. After the cold war it embarked on the field of peace operations, focusing first on the Balkans and later on Afghanistan. It has the necessary capabilities to implement all the military aspects of peace operations across the spectrum of violence. Like the EU Battlegroups, it also has a rapid response capability at its disposal, the NATO Response Force (NRF), which consists of about 13,000 troops, also on a rotational basis. According to participants in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, after the withdrawal of ISAF it is likely that the NRF will feature more prominently in NATO’s toolbox, but in a more multipolar world it is less likely to be deployed in the context of a UN-mandated peace operation. NATO’s legitimacy outside Europe and North America has often been weaker, with the exception of among its partner countries, such as Australia. NATO’s armed intervention in Libya, in particular, was questioned by participants in the Africa, South America and South Asia dialogue meetings, among others, and by interviewees in Russia as it was seen as the misuse of R2P for Western interests. Additionally, the AU felt marginalized in the effort. In the MENA dialogue meeting NATO was seen as sometimes becoming party to a conflict. On the other hand, although Russia was unlikely to allow it, some participants in the Central Asia dialogue meeting preferred increased cooperation with NATO to further collaboration within the CSTO. Partnering with NATO would provide more appropriate training to the region. Moreover, the NATO Partnership for Peace was argued to be the only security structure of which the whole region is a member.

With the drawdown of ISAF in Afghanistan and the increasing reluctance in a number of Western countries for armed intervention, according to many participants in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, NATO’s role in the field of peace operations seems to be diminishing. In the Central and South Asia dialogue meetings there were concerns about NATO’s decreasing focus on Afghanistan. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting the events in Ukraine were perceived to have shifted NATO’s attention back to territorial defence, conventional operations and deterrence, although participants did not rule out NATO’s capabilities still being utilized in armed interventions (particularly at the high end of the spectrum of violence). According to a number of participants it is also likely that, as in the case of Libya, future NATO operations will not be NATO-wide efforts but rather coalitions using NATO’s structures and capabilities. Moreover, while its armed interventions in Kosovo and Libya have already been viewed with suspicion by countries such as Russia and China, dialogue meetings in other regions made it clear that such suspicion is only

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going to rise, in an increasingly multipolar world.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Since 1992 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has gained experience in a broad variety of small-scale field missions, particularly supporting political processes and human rights, and observing and monitoring at the low end of the spectrum of violence. In the Central Asia dialogue meeting the OSCE was seen, together with the UN, as the most legitimate organization in the region. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting the organization received hardly any attention. However, the OSCE might regain some importance if tensions continue between the EU and the USA, and Russia, particularly for missions on the fringes of these two spheres of influence. Under these more tense conditions, its role is likely to become increasingly focused on monitoring and observation and less on in peacebuilding, democratization and human rights.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference

In the past the idea has been floated of setting up an Islamic peacekeeping force attached to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). According to participants in the MENA dialogue meeting such a force could make use of experienced Islamic nations such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, the suggestion has so far made no progress.

The Pacific Islands Forum

According to Australian participants in the South East Asia dialogue meeting, the Pacific Islands Forum remains the key organization in its region with regard to peace operations, alongside ad hoc coalitions. It has some experience of peace operations, having deployed the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) since 2003.

The Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations)

Although there was a perceived need to increase regional coherence and integration with regard to conflict management and peace operations in the South America dialogue meeting, there was broad agreement among participants that it is still in its infancy. Some see UNASUR and its recently established Consejo de Defensa Suramericano (South American Defence Council, CDS) as the start of a promising future. The CDS could facilitate greater regional consensus around participation in UN peace operations and potentially act as a regional conflict-management instrument. One interviewee argued that, over the past year, the CDS had not lived up to expectations. Others also argued that there was still a long way to go, faced with no cohesive identity, a diversity of different strategic choices in the region and a fatigue with MINUSTAH. One suggestion that resurfaced several times was to set up a regional civilian peacebuilding capacity at the UNASUR level.

The United Nations

Since 1948 the UN has been the main organization deploying peace
operations. Its missions have developed from traditional peacekeeping operations that monitor ceasefires to multidimensional operations that include civilian and peacebuilding instruments. Since the deployment of the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999 and the Brahimi report in 2000, most operations have included POC in their mandate and most of these mandates have been robust (i.e. they were authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter). 20 Initially, these were tactically robust mandates, but in recent years MONUSCO’s FIB (strategically offensive robustness), MINUSMA and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (strategically defensive robustness) have received even more robust mandates, showing that the UN also has the capacity and legitimacy to deploy operations towards the high end of the spectrum of violence. At the same time, UN representatives in several dialogue meetings claimed that the UN is trying to reduce the cost of personnel deployed and show that its operations are value for money. Nevertheless, the UN is seen as facing three challenges: to its legitimacy, image and organization.

First, the UN’s political legitimacy is under increasing threat. In particular, the role of its Security Council is being questioned because it is seen as applying double standards in decisions on when and where to intervene. In the South Asia and South America dialogue meetings the armed intervention in Libya was seen as potentially threatening the UN’s legitimacy. In the MENA dialogue meeting the decision not to intervene in Syria was seen as seriously affecting the legitimacy of the UN Security Council. Many participants from developing countries felt that rich countries from the West were controlling the agenda and holding all the high positions, whereas TCC/PCCs had little say. Although the UN Security Council’s consultation with TCC/PCCs in its mandate-shaping process has become more prominent in recent years, many participants believed that mandates would continue to be based on the political and financial considerations of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Furthermore, participants from the countries seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council—Brazil, Germany, Japan, Nigeria and South Africa—in particular, perceived the Security Council’s decision making as no longer representative of the evolving global power dynamics and called for further democratization. Yet the primacy and legitimacy of the UN was never disputed. For example, most participants in the MENA dialogue meeting felt that any armed intervention in the region needed to be mandated by the UN Security Council in order to be legitimate. Moreover, while reforming the Security Council was often seen as a solution, it was not generally expected to occur.

Second, UN peace operations face an image problem. Although a majority of the participants in all the dialogue meetings felt that UN peace operations were important and, particularly in South Asia, they were seen as generally effective, in the Central Asia, Europe and North America, and MENA dialogue meetings some participants questioned their effectiveness. In the MENA dialogue meeting it was argued that in a number of cases the UN had become one of the factions in the

20 Brahimi Report (note 4).
conflict. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting participants argued that the experiences of the 1990s in Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia had ‘left a bad taste in the mouth’ of much of the security establishment in North America and Europe and that, consequently, many of the countries in this region preferred not to place their troops under UN command. In the South Asia dialogue meeting, participants feared that outside their region there was fatigue and even contention with the UN model of peace operations, and that the global economic crisis as well as continued disagreement among the permanent members of the UN Security Council could set UN peace operations back. Therefore, they called for the re-evaluation of the unrealistic expectations placed on peace operations.

Yet Western countries have continued to support UN operations both politically and financially. Moreover, a number of participants in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting asserted that the UN had greatly improved, for example, in its command and control structures, security and medical evacuation procedures, leadership, and civilian components. Therefore, a number of European countries are considering, or are already, increasing their contributions to UN operations, particularly in the field of niche, high-tech and enabling capabilities.

Third, the internal and external cooperation of stakeholders in UN peace operations is in question. At the internal level, in the South Asia dialogue meeting there was particular concern about the organizational split between the UN Department of Field Support (DFS) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which essentially segregates operational and policy issues. With regard to external cooperation, in the Africa dialogue meeting, participants called for more clarity on the division of tasks and responsibilities between the AU, RECs and the UN. Criticism was raised that African organizations are not currently given sufficient respect and leading roles in UN peace operations. A number of participants noted that RECs ultimately want to be recognized as stakeholders by both the AU and the UN.

In spite of its problems and increasingly limited budgets, the UN is likely to remain the most legitimate organization able to deploy operations across the spectrum of violence, except at the highest end.

**Other organizations and ad hoc coalitions**

Other regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the CIS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and groupings, such as BRICS and IBSA, were mentioned in the dialogue meetings, but they were not seen as relevant or likely to play a significant future role in peace operations. However, interviewees in Russia stressed that the CIS approach of trilateral peace operations, as implemented in the past, was very effective: it involved the parties and was therefore impartial, and Russian willingness to intervene forcefully stabilized a conflict allowing space for negotiations.

Although rarely addressed in the dialogue meetings, ad hoc coalitions are
likely to continue to play a large role in the future of peace operations. The factors that primarily determine when ad hoc coalitions rather than existing organizations are deployed in a conflict can be distilled from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Multilateral Peace Operations database, and in the Europe and North America, MENA and South East Asia dialogue meetings these factors were also expected to play a role in future ad hoc coalitions. They are as follows.

1. When the UN has lost credibility or is seen as too much of a Western instrument, for example, some operations in the Middle East and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) between North Korea and South Korea.

2. When an operation is deployed at the high end of the spectrum of violence and implemented by Western nations, but international legitimacy is questioned, for example, the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I).

3. When an operation is deployed in a region where no regional organization is firmly established in the field of peace operations, for example, in the Pacific region.

4. When a lead nation has a clear interest in a peace operation and does not want to hand over too much of its responsibilities and command and control to an organization, for example, in some operations led by Australia, France and the USA.

Conclusions

When looking at the future potential of organizations deploying peace operations, the UN continues to be the main organization, particularly in Africa and, for more traditional monitoring peace operations, in regions where the spheres of influence of great powers meet and resulting conflicts need to be managed. In more traditional observer missions on the fringes of the Western and Russian spheres of influence, the OSCE might also play an increasing role. The EU and NATO are likely to remain relevant, in spite of their own political, capacity and legitimacy problems, primarily in Europe and the MENA region. Although the AU and RECs, within the context of APSA, are clearly looking for an increased role, capacity issues, among others, are likely to keep them dependent on external assistance for many years to come. The role of other organizations in peace operations is likely to remain limited due to either insufficient capacity or legitimacy. Proposals for an increased role in peace operations have been on the table with regard to ASEAN, the CSTO, the League of Arab States and the OIC. However, substantial regionalization of peace operations appears to be unlikely in the near future.

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6. Challenges and necessary improvements to peace operations

The different regions and emerging powers have different perceptions of the challenges to peace operations and the improvements required to maintain or strengthen commitment to peace operations. These challenges and improvements are split into two groups: strategic issues and operational issues.

Strategic issues

The relationship between TCC/PCCs and FCCs

Many TCC/PCC participants in the dialogue meetings and interviewees felt that their countries were given insufficient respect, influence and reimbursements. Most of these countries were still willing to contribute nevertheless, but these issues need to be addressed and might keep some non-contributing countries from contributing. In July 2014, after the NGP initiative’s dialogue meetings had taken place, the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly reached agreement, for the first time in years, on substantially increasing personnel reimbursements. Important steps forward were also taken with regard to reimbursements for contingency-owned equipment.22 The progress was greatly appreciated by large TCC/PCCs, but did not completely satisfy their wishes. India and Pakistan, for example, made it clear that the issue remained on the agenda. Main FCCs like the USA, on the other hand, stated that this was as far as they could go.23

Although the situation has greatly improved with the UN General Assembly agreement on reimbursements, the relations between TCC/PCCs and FCCs at the UN in New York remain too polarized and politicized. Often the requests from TCC/PCCs to have more influence in the decision-making process and to receive higher reimbursements are seen by Western FCCs as a quest for money and power. At the same time, some participants from TCC/PCCs and critics in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting argued that Western countries have double standards: on the one hand making unrealistic demands on TCC/PCCs to increase their personnel and financial contributions to UN-led peace operations, while on the other hand progressively shrinking their own personnel contributions and minimizing their financial contributions, without relinquishing their influence over mandates and agendas.

In general, the discussion in the dialogue meetings was much less polarized and politicized than at the UN in New York, and the argument made by TCC/PCCs appeared to be much more complex. Although, in particular for some diplomats and civilian

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stakeholders, influence over mandates is a way of increasing influence at the UN, for most military personnel, particularly in the South Asia dialogue meeting, it is much more a technical question. They felt that TCC/PCCs have a better understanding of what is realistic and feasible for missions and what is not. In essence, they claim that some FCCs have lost touch with reality. Since most missions operate in highly complex environments, a realistic mandate with comprehensive rules of engagement and a clear delegation of responsibility is essential to the success of a mission and the sustainability of peace. They believe that the ends and means need to be brought back in line. Moreover, military personnel from large TCC/PCCs feel entitled to have influence over these practicalities as they are the ones who put their lives at risk. Given the current circumstances, in the absence of sufficient TCC/PCC influence, there is a growing trend of national caveats—restrictions placed by TCC/PCCs on the use of their personnel in an operation—that will ultimately affect the ability of operations to implement their mandates.

In the Africa dialogue meeting the call for higher reimbursements was partly based on the fact that these had (at the time) increased very little over the previous years, whereas the demands on TCC/PCCs had increased dramatically. However, the argument was far more complex than that. Indeed, the character of missions has changed: from traditional ceasefire monitoring to robust peace operations, with an arguably much higher price both financially and in terms of casualties. Yet African states would also be willing to contribute more financially to peace operations, as most operations are deployed in their region. The issue of reimbursements was primarily seen in the context of a more broadly perceived lack of respect. Participants at the Africa dialogue meeting argued that African TCC/PCCs feel that they are doing most of the work, while their former colonial powers are continuously pointing out they are not good enough and have to improve. They felt that the concept of ‘African solutions to African problems’ was undermined—‘hijacked’—by external armed interventions, such as in Libya, Mali and Somalia. Consequently, higher reimbursements were to a large extent seen as a way for FCCs to show their respect.

In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting there was an understanding that more universality is needed and that the current divide between FCCs and TCC/PCCs is unhealthy. Participants argued that peace operations should be a joint endeavour. As such, higher financial reimbursements and more influence in command structures and the process of mandate-shaping for TCC/PCCs could be considered. However, it was stressed that focusing on quality, accountability, training and equipment would remain important.

From the perspective of a UN representative at the Europe and North America meeting, in addition to the later agreement on the level of personnel reimbursements, a lot of progress had already been made in the field of reimbursements. In particular, progress had been made on the implementation of a number of the recommendations of the Senior Advisory Group on rates of reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries. 24 He referred

especially to progress made with regard to creating a more flexible system, which rewards TCCs that operate under exceptional levels of risk and contribute key-enabling capacities. In addition, participants in the India workshop believed that the UN Security Council’s informal consultation with TCC/PCCs over mandates has become more prominent in recent years. However, it was felt that this was still insufficient and that mandates will continue to be based on the political and financial considerations of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and other powerful, developed nations.

In the Europe and North America, South Asia and South America dialogue meetings, measures were suggested that would rebalance relationships between TCC/PCCs and FCCs in peace operations, including the following.

1. **Increase the number of senior positions in the UN Secretariat given to key TCC/PCCs.** According to participants in the South Asia and South America dialogue meetings, this would be needed to address the relative over-representation of FCCs in senior positions in the UN Secretariat. One interviewee from Brazil argued that this would also require investments from TCC/PCCs, as many FCCs cover the salaries of their senior positions.

2. **Increase the number of civilian mission staff from TCC/PCCs.** In the South America dialogue meeting this was suggested to address the current division of labour, whereby TCC/PCCs contribute uniformed personnel, while FCCs take up most high-level civilian positions in missions. However, some participants argued that, in order to overcome this division of labour, TCC/PCCs first need to overcome their lack of civilian peacebuilding expertise.

3. **Use training for TCC/PCCs as an incentive, rather than a punishment, for participation in peace operations.** In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting it was suggested that TCC/PCCs that are perceived to provide insufficiently trained personnel are given training. As such, and together with the criticism, this could be seen as a punishment for those TCC/PCCs. However, it was suggested that many TCC/PCCs are actually looking for training and this could be used as an incentive to attract them.

4. **Increase regional integration among TCC/PCCs around peace operation issues.** In the South America dialogue meeting participants suggested that such integration could facilitate the building of civilian capacities and create leverage for TCC/PCCs to negotiate a more equitable share of civilian positions.

**Regional ownership and the regionalization of peace operations**

Although regional ownership was perceived to be important in many dialogue meetings, the scope for greater regional cooperation on peace operations seems to be limited in most cases.

European integration was often given as an example at the dialogue meetings, but at the Europe and North America dialogue meeting it was stressed that the EU struggles with its many strategic directions, war wariness and budget cuts. Further, the EU has a shortage of strategic airlift and intelligence capabilities and is often dependent on the USA. The EU would need to further increase its cooperation in order to offset budget cuts and maintain its current capabilities. However, there is currently no such trend.
In the Africa dialogue meeting there was a strong desire for regional ownership, but in spite of some progress, the APSA structures are not yet strong enough to stand on their own without external assistance. Moreover, cooperation between the AU and RECs continues to be hampered by questions of subsidiarity.

In other regions, further regional cooperation and regionalization of operations appears to be even further away. Regional tensions and increasing competition between the great powers makes cooperation on peace operations more difficult in those regions.

In Central Asia, tensions between Russia and China and memories of the Soviet era are obstacles for cooperation. The participants in the Central Asia dialogue meeting were unified in their response that the region could not be seen as a single unit. The possibility of joint training and deployment, such as the re-establishment of a Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT), a joint policy on peace operations or common lobbying at the UN is currently regarded as unlikely.

In the Middle East, in addition to regional tensions, there is, according to participants in the MENA dialogue meeting, a general lack of political will and trust between states. Moreover, states within the region are unlikely to obtain the necessary capabilities to address the region’s complex and internationalized conflicts. In fact, many of these conflicts are international, rather than regional, problems and would therefore require international, rather than regional, responses. Participants expressed strong concerns about the possibility of Western powers withdrawing from the region, believing that Arab and Western states should share ownership of and responsibility for peace operations in the region.

In the North East Asia dialogue meeting it was argued that cooperation in the region is limited due to historical conflicts and the tensions with North Korea.

In the South Asia dialogue meeting, limited cooperation appeared to be primarily the result of tensions between India and Pakistan, which interestingly cooperate very well in such peace operations.

According to participants in the South America dialogue meeting there is a growing potential for regional cooperation in that region, partly stimulated by the successful cooperation in the UN operation MINUSTAH, but the forum and approaches are still unclear, and the dominant position of Brazil complicates the process further. For the moment, it seems that MINUSTAH—within the UN system, but dominated by South American states—is likely to be the model for future peace operations in the region.

In the South East Asia dialogue meeting it was stressed that the traditional preoccupation with near absolute sovereignty (part of the ASEAN values) seems to preclude any substantial South East Asian regional cooperation and integration on peace operations. Yet preconditions are not as bad as they might seem and increasing cooperation is taking place in the form of, for example, a network of peacekeeping training centres. In addition, the logic of isolating the region from great power influence and rivalries might provide future incentives to deploy traditional peacekeeping operations on a regional basis.

For those regions where cooperation on peace operations is weak or absent, participants in the dialogue meetings
frequently suggested starting regional cooperation, through:  

(a) increased dialogue and exchange of ideas at both track 1 (official diplomacy) and track 2 (unofficial, often non-governmental) levels;  

(b) increased cooperation between national peacekeeping training centres, including joint training operations for military personnel;  

(c) forming informal or formal regional networks of military and police advisors at the missions to the UN in New York and cooperation on joint policy initiatives; and  

(d) bilateral cooperation and coordination efforts, particularly when countries are participating in the same mission.

However, there were serious concerns about the trend towards regionalization in the Africa, Europe and North America, and South Asia dialogue meetings. In the South Asia dialogue meeting there was a strong concern that the UN’s leadership in peace operations and conflict management is challenged by regional organizations. In spite of the problems faced by the UN, the ‘outsourcing’ of peace operations to regional organizations was not seen as a solution. Participants in the Africa, Europe and North America and South Asia dialogue meetings had strong reservations about the political implications of involving regional actors early on, because they intervene for their own interests and are partisan, and this could affect the impartiality of missions.

In spite of agreement on the progress made by APSA, in the Africa dialogue meeting there was a discussion between those who favoured a strong AU and those who preferred to have strong RECs. The first group saw operationalizing the whole APSA structure as a challenge. They questioned whether giving more authority to more actors would actually improve the efficiency of peace operations and argued that perhaps the AU should receive more focus. Some even suggested the dismantling of regional organizations that have not produced results. Other participants felt the RECs are inherently better positioned and more legitimate to deploy operations.

In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, participants questioned whether assisting regional organizations, referring to APSA, really was increasing the capacity for peace operations. Some participants argued that in practice, in spite of assistance, APSA’s capacity had not really improved and they wondered whether training the weak parts of APSA actually just sets them up for failure.

**Inter-organizational cooperation**

Particularly in the Africa, Europe and North America, and South Asia dialogue meetings there was an understanding that the future of peace operations will involve complex constellations of missions in single-mission areas. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting the example of Mali was given, where—following an AU bridging operation—the EU deployed niche missions parallel to a UN mission, with French forces to protect them in case of emergency. In the meetings it was discussed what such cooperation between regional organizations and between regional organizations and the UN should look like, as well as how, in spite of the many stakeholders, unity of effort, a comprehensive approach and regional ownership can still be maintained.

In the Africa dialogue meeting it was argued that regional approaches often
fail, because the UN ‘hijacks’ them and takes over once they start to be successful. In other cases, such as in Somalia, the UN would seek leadership from the AU because it would not be able to mobilize the political will for taking casualties, whereas the AU has historically been more willing to suffer casualties in order to address instability in its neighbourhood. In order to overcome the resentment that this generates, some participants argued that the decision-making and governance structures of the AU–UN partnership should be further clarified, as that would strengthen the international governance structures in Africa. Despite efforts, according to participants, there is currently an absence of guidelines for the partnership, the application of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is vague, and the doctrines and points of view of the AU and UN often diverge. A clear division of tasks would better address the complexity of modern conflicts.

In order to have more ownership and control over peace operations in Africa, African states need to mobilize their own political will, financial resources and capacity. Particularly the richer states in the region would be crucial in this respect, in order to enable APSA to carry out stand-alone operations. A couple of participants suggested that moving ahead with plans for creating an African rapid response force would reduce dependency on external actors, such as France, and could therefore be a step in the right direction. Airlift capability is seen as particularly crucial for any potential African rapid response force. The need for better technology to prevent and manage conflicts on the continent was also mentioned. However, there was an understanding that for the short to medium term it would not be realistic to completely abstain from making use of Western assistance, and for the time being mediation and preventive diplomacy could provide more means to regain African ownership.

In the Africa dialogue meeting the need to improve cooperation between different RECs was also expressed. For this purpose, it was argued it is important to standardize training for peace operations across regional organizations. While improving coordination efforts will lead to greater trust and cooperation between the AU and RECs, acknowledging the divergent points of view of different bodies and respecting each country that participates would be crucial to building trust. More importantly, RECs ultimately want to be recognized as stakeholders by both the AU and the UN.

In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting the African feeling of an unequal partnership with the UN was absent in the discussion. In this region the discussion was much more technical in character and there seemed to be more acknowledgement of a division of labour. The UN focuses on larger peace support and traditional peacekeeping operations, primarily outside Europe and the Middle East. NATO operates more at the high end of the spectrum of violence, primarily in Europe and the MENA region. There also seemed to be general agreement that the EU focuses more on acting as a niche subcontractor. Only France saw a potentially larger role for the EU in military operations. As a consequence of this perceived division of labour, participants in this region’s dialogue meeting also had more technical solutions to deal with the problem of the EU, NATO and the UN competing for the same TCC/PCCs. A suggestion for reducing organizational
The competition was, for example, a joint assessment that would clarify which organization is best able to do what. Such an assessment would show European TCC/PCCs where they get the most value for money, while allowing organizations to focus on their strengths.

Many participants in the Africa, Europe and North America, and South Asia dialogue meetings agreed that there was a greater need for creative solutions for AU, EU and UN cooperation. It was argued that these could be found in modular approaches, early entry bridging operations, parallel missions and the re-hatting of forces. According to representatives of the UN, if regional organizations require visibility within such constructions in order to participate, solutions should be available. However, although some participants championed the effectiveness of hybrid answers, there were also strong concerns among participants about coordination in such missions and during transition phases from one mission to another. If hybrid forms of operations become more common, it was generally argued that improved cooperation between the AU, the EU and the UN will be required in the fields of analysis, intelligence and information sharing, and mission and transition planning. Moreover, it would seriously challenge a comprehensive approach, as each organization would strive for its own comprehensive approach. Developing a single comprehensive mission plan for all the different operations would therefore be the challenge.

**Aims and means**

A common concern among the main TCC/PCCs to the UN and, in particular, among the military—raised in the Africa, Europe and North America, North East Asia, and South Asia dialogue meetings—was the need to bring resources in line with mission mandates. Either more adequate resources are needed for robust missions and such tasks as POC or mission mandates need to be toned down. Some participants argued that the whole approach to peace operations should be more focused, as the current model would be too expensive and unsustainable. Without additional resources, three alternatives were suggested.

1. **Focus on prevention.** In the Africa, Central Asia, Europe and North America, North East Asia and South Asia dialogue meetings it was suggested that more resources could be spent on preventing conflicts from escalating, either through diplomatic measures such as mediation, or through preventive deployment before conflicts erupt. This would reduce costs both in financial terms and in terms of human suffering. Prevention, however, often intrudes on national sovereignty, yet this was generally overlooked when the argument for prevention was made. Moreover, prevention was often used as an excuse for not having to act forcefully once conflicts have escalated.

2. **Focus on POC.** In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting a UN representative referred to its current approach of putting ‘rights up front’ and focusing its activities more on POC and human rights.\(^\text{25}\) Although state-building would continue, it would no longer be


the sole purpose of peace operations. This should help in cases such as South Sudan where state-building had been the main aim, but where POC and human rights are now in a deplorable state. However, the response from participants was mixed. It was argued that less state-building in itself was fine, but that POC cannot be done without it. Moreover, if POC is the main focus it could have unintended consequences. For example, the POC focus of UNMISS could possibly lead to new Srebrenica-like situations, as it could be difficult to protect all the civilians currently in its compounds, if these were to be attacked. Although this focus was not discussed in other regions, it is also likely to face some resistance elsewhere.

3. Focus on exit strategies. This approach was particularly stressed in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting. It not only limits costs but might also increase the overall success of operations by freeing up personnel and equipment that are currently tied to missions that have become institutionalized.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding

In the Europe and North America, MENA, South America, South Asia and North East Asia dialogue meetings, participants often felt that more attention and resources were needed for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In the South Asia and the Europe and North America dialogue meetings it was suggested that the UN could ensure a sustained engagement in conflict areas by deploying more political missions focusing on managing political and institutional change. In the South Asia dialogue meeting, India workshop and interviews in China, it was suggested that foreign investments could be an alternative way of contributing to peace. In South America it was also argued that civil society organizations from the Global South should be more proactively involved.

Although the perceived insufficient attention given to conflict prevention and peacebuilding is a genuine concern—as they are more cost-effective than military solutions during a conflict and prevent a lot of suffering—in some cases it seemed to also be a convenient argument for more risk averse or less active actors to hide behind. In practice, such actors are often not actively involved in conflict prevention and peacebuilding either. Moreover, in the Africa dialogue meeting it was suggested that prevention, mediation or dialogue alone would not be able to address the kinds of conflict that the region currently faces, involving non-traditional security challenges such as international jihadism and international crime.

Gender and misconduct issues

Gender and misconduct issues appear to have relatively low priority in most regions, but they were discussed in the Europe and North America, South America and South East Asia dialogue meetings. In these three regions the need to increase female participation in peace operations was highlighted. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting it was emphasized that all personnel should be gender-aware. In addition, in that meeting it was stressed that more women are needed in leadership positions, and that the UN is actually streamlining its senior recruitment aimed at women. Moreover, in the South America dialogue meeting
the need to avoid misconduct was also stressed, as the actions of uniformed personnel could put the success of a mission and its complex mandate at risk. In general, however, gender seemed to be primarily a box-ticking exercise.

POC, R2P and robustness

It was generally agreed that the concepts POC, R2P and robustness in peace operations are insufficiently operationalized. Further clarity would be required to address the fact that they have become to a certain extent ‘polluted’.

Particularly Russian and Chinese interviewees and participants in the Europe and North America and North East Asia dialogue meetings noted that operations currently have insufficient capacity at their disposal to implement POC by force and that this means putting the concept into practice, if required, is sometimes impossible. As mandates of operations are not sufficiently clear as to what they will and will not do, the current mission mandates with regard to POC and robustness would raise false expectations among local populations and the international community. At the same time, due to the lack of operationalization of the POC concept, some Chinese and Russian interviewees felt operations could also overstep their mandate, as was suggested to be the case with the removal by UNOCI of President Laurent Gbagbo.

Similarly, the current limited operationalization of the concept of R2P would allow double standards in its implementation, meaning that interests of intervening countries would determine where interventions do or do not take place. This would explain the debates about the interventions in Kosovo, Libya, Mali and Syria. The call for the further operationalization of the concept was broad and included the Europe and North America dialogue meeting, where it was viewed as a way to salvage R2P.

Operational issues

Force generation

It was generally noted in the dialogue meetings that the UN and other organizations are in continuous need of a broad range of capabilities, and consequently uniformed personnel, key enablers and high-tech capabilities. In order to encourage countries to contribute to peace operations, in the Central Asia, Europe and North America, MENA and North East Asia dialogue meetings it was suggested that the discussion on force generation between potential TCC/PCCs and the organizations deploying operations should build more on country niches and added value. This would mean that, in many cases, the discussion would be less focused on personnel and more on other capabilities. For example, it was argued in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting that within Europe not every country is in the position—capable or willing—to provide large contingents of troops, but they can and are increasingly willing to provide high-tech capabilities and enablers such as airlift, engineering and intelligence, planning, police trainers and specialized troops. In the Central Asia dialogue meeting it was argued that in that region some countries have specific high-demand capabilities (e.g. aerial and demining expertise). In the MENA dialogue meeting it was not deemed likely that the Gulf countries
would deploy significant contingents, but it was argued they might consider increasing their financial contributions to UN operations. Although countries like Algeria consider deploying their forces abroad as contrary to their policy of non-intervention, in the future they might consider providing training to military and policy officers as a less controversial option. Lastly, in the North East Asia dialogue meeting, in order to avoid combat situations, non-combat entry points were discussed for increased participation in peace operations. This could potentially involve, among other things, technological capabilities, medical support, higher financial contributions and police training. The UN already provides capability gap lists to focus attention on its needs, and this is seen as a step towards further tailoring the discussion to the capabilities of countries.

Nevertheless, the UN still requires numbers of troops. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting a NATO representative pointed out that, contrary to the current political preference for more efficient and light-footprint mission types, European member states also need to improve their capability to deploy large conventional military forces because these are needed for, among other things, POC and crowd control. At the same time, in the South Asia dialogue meeting it appeared that countries that have traditionally contributed large contingents are also looking at alternative forms of engagement, such as providing training to other TCCs. Therefore, the search for numbers remains important. In the Central Asia dialogue meeting participants discussed potential first steps for increasing numerical engagement, including joint training exercises, and partnering with established TCCs and deploying as part of their contingents.

In general, on the basis of an analysis of TCC/PCC motivations to contribute, significant contributions to UN operations are likely to come primarily from middle- and low-income countries, which are either already contributing to them or are about to do so. With regard to middle-income countries, increased contributions might come from relatively stable states, which (a) have significant military capacity; (b) are looking to increase their influence in the international theatre; (c) want to preserve their military capacity; (d) maintain a role for their military in foreign affairs; or (e) hope to indirectly maintain national security by increasing their visibility or upholding good relationships with their allies. Among low-income countries increased contributions might come from countries that are directly affected by regional conflict. Furthermore, low-income countries that have some military capacity, are relatively stable internally and stand to benefit from personnel reimbursements might also increase their contributions.

**Force protection**

In the Europe and North America and the South Asia dialogue meetings participants noted a growing tendency to overemphasize force protection (e.g. the safety and security protocols placed on mission personnel) and how this could unwittingly hamper the work of missions. Based on the dialogue meetings in those regions, countries in North East Asia and South East Asia appear to be particularly sensitive to casualties. Although risks will always exist, the UN does its best to mitigate
them. Perhaps with some self-reflection, in the Europe and North America and the South Asia dialogue meetings it was noted that troop security could not be the main priority because if the mandate and POC are not, missions become irrelevant. However, as discussed earlier (see Force generation), by selecting the right TCC/PCCs for the right tasks, even the more risk-averse countries can make an important contribution.

**Intelligence**

In the Europe and North America and the South Asia dialogue meetings there were repeated calls for better access to intelligence for peace operations. In spite of all the sensitivities surrounding this issue, particularly missions that face non-traditional security challenges, such as terrorist attacks, but also operations with strategically defensive or offensive robust mandates, such as MINUSMA and the FIB, require intelligence in order to protect themselves, the populations and their mandates. Such intelligence is primarily needed for situational awareness. Within this context, the deployment of UAVs for surveillance purposes was also deemed essential in both dialogue meetings. The argument that such intelligence would be at the cost of sovereignty was regarded as incorrect as these operations would actually support the government and the sovereignty of the country. In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting it was also stressed that intelligence sharing between civilians and military has to improve. In spite of the sensitivities at the UN in New York, in none of the dialogue meetings was intelligence for situational awareness purposes flagged as problematic.

**Integrated and comprehensive approaches**

In the Europe and North America dialogue meeting there was a strong drive to further improve the integrated or comprehensive approach, which was also supported in the Africa, MENA, South America and South East Asia dialogue meetings. The only criticisms, warning that development and humanitarian assistance should not be securitized, were heard in the Europe and North America and the South America dialogue meetings. Yet this drive for comprehensiveness was combined with awareness that such an approach is inherently difficult. The main challenges were perceived to be: (a) coordination between different instruments in operations, as they are sometimes in conflict with each other (e.g. impartiality and robust POC); (b) developing common strategy, analysis and planning processes within and between organizations, as these issues are still too political; (c) balancing analysis and implementation, as too little attention is given to analysis and too much to implementation, and in emergency situations in particular the joint analysis is often skipped; and (d) overcoming the tendency to be inward looking, as organizations that implement integrated or comprehensive approaches (in their search for policy coherence) are too focused on their own instruments and approaches, and consequently are less open to external cooperation and views, including local perspectives. Nonetheless, it was argued that in spite of problems, non-traditional security challenges require new thinking and peace operations have to be part of a broader integrated or comprehensive approach, as alone they will not be sufficient if entire regions fail.
**Monitoring and evaluation**

Only in the Europe and North America dialogue meeting was there a particular emphasis on the improvement of monitoring and evaluation. In this region it was argued that there is a need to develop better indicators, ways to measure baselines and, eventually, methods to gauge success and failure. Although the aim of such monitoring and evaluation is, of course, to a large extent to improve operations, this learning process was seen as very difficult. It was noted that a lot of lessons that have already been learned are still waiting to be applied.
7. Conclusions

The geopoliticization of peace operations?

On the basis of the desk research, the assumption at the start of the New Geopolitics of Peace Operations initiative was that the shift in the power balance away from the West would change the future of peace operations. It was thought that the emerging powers and big TCC/PCCs were likely to act as ‘norm revisionists’, adjusting through their influence the make-up, design and conduct of future peace operations. They might even want to put peace operations ‘back in the box’ and return to traditional peacekeeping operations.26 However, from the dialogue meetings and interviews it appears that, in the field of international security, the long-term positions of the emerging powers are neither very unified nor very revisionist. The two countries that clash most often with the West—China and Russia—are permanent members of the UN Security Council and have an interest in the current institutional framework. While most of the other emerging powers—Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa (but not Turkey)—are seeking seats in a reformed UN Security Council. Moreover, they view the UN Security Council, even without any reform, as the primary institution for international peace and security.

Most emerging powers also show a clear interest in peace operations and see them as relatively successful and a worthwhile investment. They view UN peace operations as an important tool in supporting stability, among other things, in regions that are of relevance to them. In fact, only Russia, South Africa and Turkey deploy troops to non-UN operations. Although the emerging powers articulate different emphases, they all support the current approaches, concepts and norms in operations. With few, if any, alternative concepts, approaches and norms being introduced from their side, an increasing convergence with the West can be noted. In short, none of the emerging powers wants to put peace operations back in the box. This does not, however, mean that there are no conflicts of interests. There clearly are and these are likely to play an increasing role, although primarily in the regions where interests actually clash.

The expectation (based on the desk study) that emerging powers would step up their contributions to peace operations as a way of demonstrating that they are responsible powers, or perhaps to justify their newfound influence, is also too simplistic.27 The dialogue meetings and interviews show that the emerging powers are also not a cohesive group when it comes to their engagement objectives, and their future outlooks for their own contributions vary as well. Despite their diplomatic activism, Russia and Turkey have only contributed in a limited way to peace operations and both are unlikely to contribute significantly in the future unless it directly benefits their national interests. China, which has increased its participation dramatically and continues to evolve when it comes to participation in robust operations, remains highly cautious. In Brazil, India and South Africa—all of which are major contributors—debates have begun about how to participate more strategically, in line with their national interests. It is


27 Wiharta, Melvin and Avezov (note 26).
unclear whether such strategic participation will lead to a decrease in participation, but it is not likely to lead to an increase either. In fact, Indonesia is the only country within this group that is openly committed to significantly increasing its contributions in the near future.

Conflict and consensus

In most recent analyses of great powers and peace operations there is a tendency to focus on existing differences and conflicts, ranging from Ukraine to the South China Sea, or the inability to agree on how to deal with Libya or Syria. However, from the dialogue meetings and interviews it appears that, in general, views on peace operations are actually more convergent than divergent.

Despite politicized and polarized debates at the UN in New York, in the dialogue meetings and interviews there was actually an increasing convergence on the international norms that underpin peace operations, such as POC and democratization. For the most part no regional alternatives were suggested. The main issues were with how certain norms and concepts are operationalized. China is concerned with a perceived increasing trend towards robust peace operations, a development also criticized by a number of stakeholders in Europe and North America, while in Africa a clear sense of urgency was expressed for the more flexible and pragmatic use of force in peace operations, when needed. Often the important issues such as how to deal with local ownership as part of the broader peacebuilding agenda were raised. The importance of democratization was never questioned—only sometimes the means towards that end. When discussing norms and concepts, a case-by-case approach, avoiding blueprints, was generally advocated.

Although unexpected—on the basis of the disagreement following the NATO armed intervention in Libya and, in particular, on how to handle the situation in Syria—the dialogue meetings and interviews show that there is also increasing international convergence on armed intervention. Rather than refuting the armed intervention pillar of the R2P concept, its operationalization is what the emerging powers struggle with, such as its uneven application. Emerging powers increasingly recognize the limitations of absolute sovereignty in specific cases. Brazil presented the concept of RWP as the necessary step to overcome issues regarding the use of R2P. China, on the other hand, introduced the concept of creative engagement, pointing to its evolving willingness to engage in international security matters in the future. At the same time, in Europe and North America the desire to intervene appeared to be declining, in particular if there is no UN Security Council mandate or if the support of the host government and regional organizations is absent—all criteria which are highly valued by China. In fact, recent French armed interventions in Mali and CAR demonstrate that there is a growing consensus on the need for armed interventions, particularly in cases where interests do not clash between the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Nevertheless, there was a fear in most regions that the absence of agreement in the UN Security Council might lead to non-intervention or increasing numbers of armed interventions without its
mandate, resulting both in more instability and less legitimacy for peace operations. In general, there was criticism about the way that the armed intervention in Libya had been conducted. In Europe and North America there was also an understanding that both Kosovo and Libya had opened up the argument for R2P without a UN Security Council mandate to other powers, such as Russia, which want to intervene for their own interests in their own backyards.

The tendency in the West to view the call by emerging powers and big TCC/PCCs for greater influence on peace operations as an attempt to gain greater power in the international system, and perhaps make more money from participation, is also a simplification. The dialogue meetings and interviews show that it is true that these actors look for more equitable representation at the UN and want to have more say in the direction of future operations. However, they are not looking for alternative strategies, concepts or norms, and they often have high stakes in continuing their contributions in the current system. Moreover, the call for such representation is not driven merely by national and political interests, but is often driven by a justified concern over how mandates are operationalized. During the dialogue meetings, TCC/PCCs repeatedly called for greater consultation when establishing rules of engagement and mandates, as that would help them to keep their personnel safe and to shape more achievable mandates. In addition, many TCC/PCCs called for higher personnel reimbursements. In Africa this often took place within the context of a perceived lack of respect for the work done by the African ‘boots on the ground’. At the same time, many of the FCCs in Europe and North America showed an increasing understanding of the need for a more balanced division of labour and that this might include the need to increase reimbursements—as also later agreed by the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly in July 2014.

The general tendency to focus on the divergences within peace operations also seems to overshadow current international progress in Africa and in the area of non-traditional security challenges, such as crime, international jihadism and piracy. In fact, in the dialogue meetings and interviews, peace operations that manage conflicts and address common security concerns in Africa, and to a certain extent in the Middle East, were commonly welcomed. In short, the future of peace operations needs to be looked at by region in order to see and understand the nuances.

Regional implications

On the basis of the dialogue meetings and interviews it can be concluded that in Central Asia, Europe and North America, North East Asia, South Asia and South East Asia, peace operations deployed by organizations not indigenous to the region—and often even the UN—seem to have become increasingly controversial. China and Russia appear to be the most determined to keep their neighbourhoods free from external peace operations. In addition, European and North American policies mean that inside this region the role of the UN is likely to be limited. However, this is certainly not a new development and has in fact, with the exception of the 1990s, been historically the case.
In most of the former Soviet space, Russia is willing—if it deems necessary—to deploy its own troops or those of the CSTO or CIS, and these missions can act towards the high end of the spectrum of violence if required. As such, Russia does not behave very differently from the EU (France and the UK) and the USA, which from their perspectives, in face of instability, take the lead in Europe and North America and much of the MENA region. Depending on the character of the mission, ranging from the low to the high end of the spectrum of violence, the extent to which a mission is comprehensive and intrusive, involved in state-building and democratization, and the phase of the intervention, they prefer EU, NATO, OSCE and ad hoc coalition action, or a combination of these, over external (UN) involvement.

In North East Asia, South Asia and South East Asia the number of peace operations is likely to remain limited, whatever the demand. These regions commonly reject robust or intrusive external interventions, and they have no commonly accepted hegemon or strong regional security organization that could deploy regional operations of that kind. However, in South East Asia, while Indonesia and other ASEAN members hope to keep the ASEAN region free from external intervention in order to prevent great power tensions from destabilizing it again, there is some space for traditional, non-intrusive peacekeeping operations at the low end of the spectrum of violence—at the invitation of the host nation. In such a case, ASEAN is not very likely to deploy a mission itself, but if a UN operation were to be deployed in South East Asia, it would require a large ASEAN role within it.

In South America there is more room for manoeuvre if instability requires, as Brazil and the rest of the region are open to the deployment of a UN operation with a large South American role within it. Operations in this region are also more likely to be at the low end of the spectrum of violence, due to regional actors’ dislike of violence, and are likely to have a comprehensive character, focusing on development and state-building when seen as needed.

In Africa the picture is quite different. This is the region where emerging and established powers have the most common security challenges and the least conflicting interests. It is also the region that is most open to having robust, intrusive and comprehensive peace operations and armed interventions on its soil. For this reason, more than ever before, peace operations are likely to become an African affair in future. This is the region where most new developments with regard to concepts and norms in peace operations are likely to take place. Although South Africa and the rest of the region advocate ‘African solutions to African problems’, meaning that they prefer operations deployed by the AU or RECs, and they are unhappy with the dominance of armed Western armed interventions in the region, they are generally open to external involvement and assistance from EU and UN operations. There is also a common understanding that it is unlikely that in the short and medium terms APSA alone will be able to deal with regional instability in a sustainable and comprehensive manner.

In the MENA region, as in Africa, peace operations were seen as an important tool for restoring and maintaining stability in the region. Although governments in power are
likely to claim their national sovereignty to prevent unwanted interference, the message was strong that the international community, and in particular the West, should not think in terms of ‘Middle Eastern solutions to Middle Eastern problems’, because it was argued that the problems in the MENA region are in fact global problems, which also need global solutions. Turkey, together with its allies in Europe and North America, is also likely to support peace operations and armed interventions in the MENA region if instability is regarded a serious threat. The quantity, intrusiveness and robustness of operations in the MENA region might, however, be more limited than in Africa, because the great powers, particularly China, Russia and the USA, have more conflicts of interest in the region.

Lastly, particularly in areas where great power interests clash, in what can be described as the borders of ‘spheres of influence’, the tools of the international community for dealing with instability and conflict, particularly in a robust and comprehensive manner, appear to be decreasing. A number of these areas have historically seen less international activity, and they are primarily located in North East Asia and South East Asia, where China and the USA have conflicting interests. In other areas—in Central Asia (where Chinese, Russian and Western interests conflict), in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (where Russian and Western interests conflict), and in a number of countries in the MENA region—multilateral peace operations deployed by the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the UN have benefitted from increased cooperation after the end of the cold war. In these areas the quantity of operations is likely to decrease and become more limited to traditional UN peacekeeping operations, although in the former Soviet space the OSCE might also play a role with monitoring missions. Nonetheless, although international opportunities appear to be decreasing in these areas, international cooperation and possibilities for conflict management and peace operations still seem to be far greater than during cold war times.

As such, this analysis refines the desk study findings that concluded that, although most emerging powers continue to see the UN as the most legitimate body to lead peace operations and conflict management, they would also explore new potential roles for existing regional organizations. From the dialogue meetings and interviews it can be concluded that the possibility of regionalization of peace operations is in most cases much more limited than generally assumed.28

Food for thought

The outcomes of this research raise many questions about the future of peace operations.

1. How can the international system deal with conflicts in which UN Security Council agreement is absent?
2. How can peace operations deal with the non-traditional challenges that were often mentioned in the dialogue meetings, such as international jihadism, international organized crime and piracy, but to which participants did not have real solutions?
3. How can the international community integrate all the different comprehensive approaches of the various peace operations deployed in single mission areas (e.g. Mali or CAR)?

28 Wiharta, Melvin and Avezov (note 26).
Does the increasing trend of having complex constellations of operations mean that integrated or comprehensive approaches are coming to an end?

4. If, on a case-by-case basis, peace operations might develop further in Africa, what are the concepts and norms going to look like? What is useful and acceptable under what circumstances?

5. If the use of force is going to be more common in peace operations in Africa, how can repetition of the troubled operations of the early and mid-1990s, which struggled with the middle ground between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, such as the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia and the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), be prevented? What have we learned from that period?

6. If the West contributes less, in terms of both uniformed personnel and finances, but the MENA region and Africa look primarily to the West for assistance, how can the gaps be filled?

7. How can terms, norms and concepts become clearer and misunderstandings in the discussion about the future of peace operations be avoided if, in order to reach agreement, constructive ambiguity is required?

8. How can the polarized and politicized discussion at the UN in New York be brought more in line with the less polarized and politicized discourses in the different regions, as reflected in the dialogue meetings?
8. Policy implications

The following strategic and operational policy implications can be distilled from the findings of the dialogue meetings and interviews.

Strategic issues

Rebalance the relationship between FCCs and TCC/PCCs

In order to rebalance the relationship between FCCs and TCC/PCCs, and in order to create the necessary increased universality to make peace operations a joint endeavour again, the following approaches were mentioned in the dialogue meetings and interviews.

1. Further increase consultation with TCC/PCCs in the mandate-shaping process in order to more clearly define and increase the realism of mandates, the comprehensive rules of engagement and the delegation of responsibility.
2. Further increase the uniformed personnel contributions of FCCs, while finding creative ways to further increase the financial contributions of TCC/PCCs.
3. Further increase personnel reimbursements to compensate for the increased complexity of missions and demands, while continuing to focus on quality, accountability, training and equipment.
4. Further improve the flexibility of the reimbursement system by rewarding TCC/PCCs for their risk taking, quality of work and provision of key-enablers.
5. Show more respect for TCC/PCCs, particularly from Africa, by reducing criticism and being careful not to overlook their efforts, while continuing to assist in improving quality, accountability, training and equipment.
6. Further increase the role of large TCC/PCCs in the command and control structures of operations.
7. Increase the number of senior positions in the UN Secretariat given to key TCC/PCCs.
8. Increase the number of civilian mission staff from TCC/PCCs and support TCC/PCCs in overcoming their lack of civilian peacebuilding capacities.
9. Use training as an incentive for participation in peace operations, rather than a punishment.
10. Increase regional integration among TCC/PCCs in order to facilitate the building of civilian capacities and create leverage to negotiate a more equitable share of civilian positions.

Increase regional cooperation

Potential approaches for increasing regional cooperation in the area of peace operations are to (a) increase dialogue and the exchange of ideas at both track 1 and track 2 levels; (b) increase cooperation between national peacekeeping training centres in the regions, including joint training operations for military personnel; (c) encourage cooperation or joint policy initiatives at the UN in New York; and (d) encourage bilateral cooperation and coordination efforts, particularly when countries are participating in the same mission.

Improve inter-organizational cooperation

When peace operations involve complex constellations of separate missions in single-mission areas, efforts for coordination need to be redoubled to maintain unity of effort and a comprehensive approach.
A more clear division of tasks between the UN, regional and sub-regional organizations is needed to address the complexity of modern conflicts and to guarantee regional ownership. In Africa, for example, this would require increased recognition of the AU and RECs as stakeholders. In order to reduce organizational competition for the same TCC/PCCs, a joint assessment that clarifies which organization is best able to do what would show TCC/PCCs where they get the most value for money, while allowing organizations to focus on their strengths.

Although creative solutions for AU, EU and UN cooperation, such as modular approaches, early-entry bridging operations, parallel missions and the re-hatting of forces will be necessary, such hybrid solutions require improved cooperation in the fields of analysis, intelligence and information sharing, and mission and transition planning, as well as with regard to developing a single integrated mission plan.

**Align aims with means in peace operations**

The resources provided to missions are not always in line with their mandates. Either more adequate resources are required or mission mandates need to be focused on, for example, prevention, POC or exit strategies.

**Increase attention to conflict prevention and peacebuilding**

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding are more cost-effective than (military) solutions once conflicts have escalated, they prevent a lot of suffering and they are more sustainable.

**Increase attention to gender and misconduct issues**

In spite of the need to place gender and misconduct issues higher on the agenda, these topics are generally given relatively low priority—often just seen as a box-ticking exercise. However, the following factors must be considered: (a) gender awareness of all personnel is required; (b) women are needed in leadership positions and senior recruitment should be streamlined for that purpose; and (c) mechanisms to prevent misconduct and to deal with it should it occur need to be strengthened.

**Operationalize POC, R2P and robustness**

Further agreement needs to be reached on the operationalization of POC, R2P and robust operations.

Mandates that contain POC elements need to reflect the realities on the ground, set achievable goals and provide adequate resources. In the absence of the required resources to implement POC completely, mandates
need to provide explicit limits to the scope of POC, providing a clear
definition and clarity on what a mission does and does not do.

The operationalization of R2P can be further improved by being more concrete and clear in mandates about what specific tasks are expected from coalitions that undertake an R2P operation.

In robust operations, particularly those that are strategically robust, further operationalization of the concept would need (a) to be based on the principle of the minimal use of force; (b) to develop systems to deal with collateral damage; (c) to ensure flexible budgets and more capacity; (d) to create greater clarity in mandates and rules of engagement about what robust missions should and should not do in their mandates; and (e) to link operations to a political framework and long-term transition planning.

Operational issues

Broaden the discussion on force generation

The discussion on force generation between potential TCC/PCCs and the organizations deploying operations is still too focused on uniformed personnel numbers. By building more on the country niches and added value capabilities that can be provided by TCC/PCCs, more contributions and new contributors could potentially be found. The UN already provides capability gap lists to focus attention on their needs, and this is seen as a step towards further tailoring the discussion to the capabilities of countries.

Nonetheless, troop numbers remain important as well, as more robust operations with a stronger focus on POC often require redundancy, escalation dominance and a big footprint.

New uniformed personnel contributors could be found in the category of middle-income countries that: (a) are relatively stable; (b) have significant military capacity; (c) are looking to increase their influence in the international theatre; (d) want to preserve their military capacity; or (e) hope to indirectly maintain national security by increasing their visibility or upholding good relationships with their allies.

They could also be found among low-income countries that: (a) are directly affected by regional conflict; (b) have some military capacity; (c) have relative internal stability; and (d) stand to benefit from personnel reimbursements.

The first steps to increasing numerical engagement for newcomers might include joint training exercises, and partnering with established TCCs and deploying as part of their contingents.

International involvement in stimulating countries to contribute to peace operations is particularly effective when national political leadership starts to consider it (otherwise countries are less likely to start) or when countries actively consider withdrawing due to political considerations (as regular contributors have sufficient institutional motivations to stay involved).

Do not overemphasize force protection

Force protection (e.g. the safety and security protocols placed on mission personnel) can, and often does, unwittingly hamper the work of missions. Troop security cannot be the main priority as that would render missions irrelevant. By selecting the
right TCCs for the right tasks, even more risk-averse countries would still have an important contribution to make.

**Accept the need for intelligence**

In spite of all the sensitivities surrounding the issue of intelligence, missions that face non-traditional challenges (e.g. terrorist attacks) and operations with strategically defensive or offensive robust mandates require better access to intelligence for situational awareness, in order to protect themselves, the population and their mandates.

**Further improve integrated and comprehensive approaches**

Common processes for strategy development, analysis and planning within organizations and between organizations are still underdeveloped, particularly with regard to including local perspectives, as well as to their ability to remain suitable when emergency situations require swift action. A single integrated mission plan for all operations deployed in a mission area focusing on cooperation and transition is required.

**Develop better monitoring and evaluation methods**

Indicators, ways to measure baselines and, eventually, methods to gauge success and failure in order to further improve and apply lessons learned are still underdeveloped.