THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF PEACE OPERATIONS: A DIALOGUE WITH EMERGING POWERS

Europe and North America Regional Dialogue

XENIA AVEZOV*

On 7–9 April 2014 a regional dialogue meeting of the ‘New Geopolitics of Peace Operations: A Dialogue with Emerging Powers’ project took place in Brussels, Belgium. The meeting, which was jointly organized by SIPRI and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), brought together a range of leading experts, government officials and representatives of international organizations to discuss the challenges for peace operations and the roles that states from Europe and North America can play in future peace operations.

A CHANGING WORLD ORDER: PERSPECTIVES FROM EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

During the first session on the future security environment, participants from South and Central European states focused on threats and challenges—emanating from North Africa and Russia, respectively—while participants from North America and Western Europe focused on broader security interests and their current approach to peace operations.

A participant from the USA suggested that Iran and North Korea continue to be traditional security challenges for the USA. While Russia is a declining power, its military capacity remains a concern. Broader security challenges such as the persistent influence of terrorist organizations on fragile states, climate change and the resulting mass migration, as well as drug trafficking in North America and rising extreme right-wing groups in Western Europe—are also priorities for the USA. Given these complex global challenges, the USA is particularly concerned about the current lack of a clear international peace and security architecture, which is due to a lack of cooperation between rising and declining powers.

In Germany, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is still seen as a priority. Also, the western Balkans is an area of focus, as is the growing frustration of young people in that region. In terms of global issues, Germany prioritizes state fragility, weak governance and cross-border organized crime.

* This report summarizes the contents of each workshop session. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of SIPRI or of the majority of the participants.
One participant from Portugal noted that the main security threats for southern European states include terrorism, maritime piracy, cybersecurity and environmental disputes with neighbouring countries. Stability in the Maghreb region is also a strategic priority. Portugal, which has an Atlantic outlook, is also concerned about the pivot by the United States to Asia and the potential for decreased US engagement with European issues and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

A participant from Poland suggested that Central Europe faces very different security threats from those of Western Europe. Currently, Russia poses the most serious threat, primarily through its use of non-state actors to destabilize Ukraine. Participants from Eastern and Central Europe feared such strategies could be used against other countries in the region as well. It is not clear how traditional peace operations can address such destabilizing factors which were largely unforeseen by the international community until the events in Ukraine in early 2014.

Some argued that divergent threat perceptions in Europe are a growing challenge. One participant from Austria noted that, in the past, states were able to engage individually out of self interest, whereas the European Union (EU) must now act in unison. However, a participant from Poland asserted that EU voting on common security matters does not often reflect consensus, and that many states vote in favour of initiatives even when they do not have an interest in them with the expectation that other states will vote in favour of initiatives that might benefit them in the future. Consensus is also difficult to reach in controversial cases, such as that of the NATO operation in Libya. A participant from Portugal suggested that the lack of consensus within the EU on an operation in the Central African Republic (CAR) is due to the low direct threat the conflict poses to the majority of member states, whereas the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia was approved swiftly because of the palpable threat posed by Russia.

A participant from Germany noted that developments in peace operations are often driven by political circumstance and capacity. For example, the recent events in Ukraine will likely mean that Europe will not downsize its forces, and might even begin to increase its participation in UN missions,
albeit on a small scale. At the same time, the increasing isolation of Russia following the conflict in Ukraine may have an adverse affect on the United Nations Security Council’s ability to reach consensus on deployment.

NORMS AND CONCEPTS

In general, participants felt that enough norms and concepts are already used in peace operations and that there is little need to develop new ones. However, participants identified implementation, operationalization and interpretation as the main challenges to the current norms and concepts. Many of these norms and concepts were developed in the West and while they are seen as very positive they have been polluted by politics, as in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Some argued that, because the West has interests, the EU cannot really be a normative power and norms with a Western origin are limited in their reach.

Some participants felt that the relevance of norms and concepts often depends on recent experience. For example, responsibility while protecting (RWP), a concept which was brought forward by Brazil, was a response to the use of the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P) in the intervention Libya. RWP was perceived by some participants as an attempt to disable the use of military means under R2P which, if successful, would have brought the international community back to the pre-R2P era.

One participant from Portugal noted that the use of R2P in Libya is also a divisive topic in the West, particularly when it comes to NATO’s implementation of the concept. A participant from Germany noted that France and the United Kingdom are more comfortable and experienced with the use of force and R2P than other countries (including Germany) that focus on the civilian and peacebuilding aspects of peace operations. It is possible that the ambiguity of R2P and its implementation is causing this division. In this context, a Dutch participant suggested that many Europeans also view R2P as a synonym for military intervention.

A number of other concerns were raised with regard to R2P, and particular its implementation in Libya. Participants from the Netherlands and Italy suggested that R2P in Libya was a short-sighted solution that did not take into account the long term implications for Libya, and caused a domino effect of instability in the region. A participant from Belgium expressed concern about the expectation that the use of R2P should always be neutral and never have the intention of regime change. R2P interventions require picking sides and if one is against regime change that simply means that, in some instances, one is against R2P. A participant from Italy disagreed, noting that R2P should freeze a conflict rather than seek to change a regime. According to a Norwegian participant, another problem with R2P is that it has led to a situation in which insurgents seek to ensnare the governments they fight against in order to evoke an R2P intervention.

A number of participants asked whether it was worth salvaging R2P, given that it was polluted in Libya and has been used by Russia to legitimatize its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Many felt that a further operationalization of the concept would create more clarity, and that R2P mandates should be as specific as possible. While a Norwegian participant suggested operationalizing R2P as a continuation of POC, another participant noted
that POC in itself has not been sufficiently operationalized. While there is some trepidation that R2P will continue to be misused, most participants supported the concept, with one noting that POC has gained ground partly because of R2P. One participant from the Netherlands argued that differentiating between POC and R2P is now crucial. A participant from the USA suggested that there is a need to focus more strongly on early stages of conflict and conflict prevention. She argued that, within this context, R2P and the International Criminal Court (ICC) should be seen as tools for deterrence, and as a way to back up preventive diplomacy with force, as both give initial primacy to the state and suggest external intervention as a secondary tool. However, deterrence does not always work, as was seen in the case of Syria.

In general, participants did not have problems with the concept of robust operations. However, a participant from the Netherlands noted that all peaceful means should be exhausted before embarking on a robust operation, and that robustness seems to have become an end, not a means. A participant from Romania agreed, arguing that increased attention should be paid to mediation. Another participant from the European Parliament concurred and added that that the EU missed crucial opportunities for dialogue in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and in Libya and Syria, and therefore also missed opportunities to pursue non-military solutions.

Participants also discussed the significance of ‘liberal peace’ as a norm, viewing it not as a Western agenda, but rather a belief that the West should support democracy and market economies. While the intervention in Afghanistan proved largely unsuccessful, the essence of democracy and market economy is still relevant, as long as it is not externally imposed. A participant from Belgium noted that there are many cases in which liberal peace has produced positive results and that Afghanistan is the exception rather than the rule. While there is less consensus in the West on nation-building and, to a certain degree, state-building, the notion and aspiration of peacebuilding remain uncontroversial.

A participant from the USA noted that host states often feel that local ownership is falling short. She argued that, on the basis of the concept of resilience, ownership can be handed over to the sources of resilience in fragile states. For this purpose, peace operations should apply the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States as presented in 2011 in Busan, South Korea. This approach should not replace liberal peace but instead complement it. Most participants saw a need to calibrate international norms and concepts with the local circumstances in order to prevent failure.

In the case of Afghanistan, the USA did not recognize the existing traditional court system and as a result the effect of initiatives related to the rule of law was limited. A Dutch participant felt that, in Europe, analysis at the start of an intervention often includes local expertise, allowing for some ownership, but that during implementation there is much less cooperation. However, it was noticed that local ownership is an unclear concept: ownership for who, when and why?

Some participants viewed civilian missions and soft-power diplomacy as examples of concepts that are strongly embraced in Europe. The comprehensive approach was also emphasized, but participants recognized the
challenge of balancing preparation and analysis with the need to act fast in order to save lives.

Some participants suggested that norms and implementation should be regionalized, with an emphasis on local solutions to local problems. Since individual states and regions interpret norms differently, it would be more beneficial to reinforce regional ownership and roles by allowing regions to specialize in specific areas. A participant from Poland questioned whether it is ethical for Europe to rely on regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the League of Arab States when civilians are being slaughtered. Some questioned whether neighbouring states are necessarily the most appropriate agents for intervention. However, if the trend towards multipolarity persists, the international community will likely favour solutions within regions.

**ENGAGEMENT OBJECTIVES**

Several Western European states’ negative experience of the UN in the early 1990s had a significant effect on their willingness to deploy troops under a UN command. The relatively modest contribution of Western European states to UN peace operations is often also based on a lack of national interest or public support, as well as states’ ability to maintain international prestige through other means. Outside the UN system, the West has been very active in peace operations within the context of NATO and the EU.

The European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is, generally speaking, more focused on human rights and peacebuilding. Unlike NATO, the EU still lacks the military capacity or political will for military intervention. Different countries have different preferences and agendas with regard to both organizations. France is fully behind the EU’s CSDP structure, while Germany is largely undecided, and the UK is far less interested.

In general, France and the UK are far more interventionist than Germany. France wants to have full spectrum capabilities for the CSDP, while Germany is more hesitant. Based on this strategic divergence within the EU, there is thus no clarity on what and how the CSDP should be doing and who should lead it.

**The United Kingdom**

The UK’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations waned considerably after its contribution to the UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) came to an end in 1995. Over the past two decades the UK has instead focused on engagement within NATO. In the case of Sierra Leone, the UK intervention in 2000 was outside UN command, but in support of the UN mission. In the early 2000’s, UK’s thinking about peace operations was boosted and there was a chance of the UK joining UN operations again. However, priorities shifted in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 2011, when the UK joined the ‘global war on terrorism’.

In terms of the UK’s current motivations, it views itself as a behind-the-scenes thinker, particularly in terms of shaping doctrine for UN peace operations. The UK also reinforces its influence on the UN Security Council through its financial contributions, by posting national high-level staff to
the UN headquarters, and by pushing for discussion of new issues such as gender-based violence, the comprehensive approach and conflict prevention. In some cases such as the conflict in Cyprus, where the UK still deploys 280 troops as part of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), national interests also drive participation.

While there is some discussion in the UK about increasing its participation in future UN peace operations, it is not high on the political agenda and will not involve large numbers of personnel. However, the UK may bring more niche and rapid reaction capabilities to the table. With regard to EU operations, the UK Government is currently sceptical of the EU in general and views the Battle Groups as a largely failed concept, and this is likely to have a knock-on effect on EU operations. Moreover, the UK doesn’t want to deploy in EU operations that it perceives as driven by French interests.

**France**

France’s contributions to peace operations, like those of the UK, were shaped by its negative experience of deploying under UN command in UNPROFOR. However, in areas where France has economic and political interests, it deploys its own UN Security Council-mandated, short-term military parallel operations in support of UN operations. France also contributes to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and has been active in NATO operations. Furthermore, France often initiates and leads EU operations that are at times seen as a continuation of French military operations deployed since decolonization for French interests.

In general, French interest in civilian operations is marginal. In terms of its motivations, France wishes to maintain its influence as a Security Council member and also views its activism in the area of international security as a part of its identity. Its economic and political interests in North Africa are also key motivations.

**Austria**

Austria has a quota of about 1100 troops which can be deployed to international missions at any given time. As a small country with a relatively limited capacity and a neutral tradition, Austria only contributes to missions with a UN Security Council mandate, deployed by existing organizations, and prefers low-risk engagement in post-war situations where military and civilian capacities are balanced. It also aims for a balance in terms of its engagement with the EU and the UN, and as a non-member to NATO missions. Currently, Austria deploys the majority of its troops in the western Balkans, with secondary preferences for the Middle East and West Africa, although it expects to continue prioritizing contributions in its immediate region.

Austria’s participation is driven by its will to contribute to international peace and security and gain international credibility and visibility. Security interests—such as strengthening stability in the region and supporting regional security institutions that small states like Austria depend on for their security—are also priorities. Austria’s contribution to peace operations in the Balkans is also a tool to maintain its influence in the region.
Finally, Austria views its contribution to peace operations as a way to keep its military trained and increase interoperability. Economic considerations do not really play a role. In the future, Austria hopes to further develop its comprehensive, whole-of-government approach.

**Germany**

Germany currently deploys approximately 6000 troops in missions, including more than 5000 with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and some smaller contingents with the EU and UN. Due to historical considerations, Germany prefers restraint in the use of force. While the German public does not oppose international engagement, including in peace operations, it is generally against missions that are perceived as war. For example, Germany’s participation in Afghanistan was unpopular due to German and civilian casualties. Given that the Bundestag has to decide on each contribution, the German Government is often reluctant to push for participation in missions that are difficult to justify.

At the same time, Germany makes significant financial contributions, as well as logistical and medical support, to peace operations and has a long-standing multilateral tradition with the EU, NATO and the UN. Germany views its participation as a way to contribute to international peace and security, and to justify its ambition for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. While solidarity with NATO has been very strong in the past, it has become less important. The deployment of troops to protect economic interests is controversial.

Although the current administration appears open to deploying forces elsewhere after its drawdown from Afghanistan, Germany will most likely focus on diplomatic and civilian contributions due to negative public perceptions of military contributions. Finally, Germany does not view contributing to EU operations as a serious option.

**The United States**

Since September 2001, in addition to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the USA has increasingly focused on development assistance in fragile states as well as whole-of-government and society approaches as a way to safeguard its own national security. In some cases, humanitarian reasons and public opinion have been secondary drivers of its engagement. While the USA deployed a very large number of troops in Afghanistan, it views itself mainly as a major funder of UN operations with political influence and active diplomatic role as a UN Security Council member.

However, the USA’s decreased financial capacity is likely to result in a further decline in political will to finance UN peacekeeping operations, particularly if the Republican Party wins the forthcoming US Congressional elections. In 2009 the US Department of State launched the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, which outlines a vision of global leadership through conflict prevention rather than military intervention. Therefore, US engagement in counterinsurgency or large-scale military operations is unlikely in the near future.
Romania and Poland

Romania, Poland and other Central and Eastern European states hope that committing to NATO and EU operations will ensure that their allies come to their assistance in case of an escalation with Russia. Romania contributes about 1100 troops to both NATO and UN missions as a way to maintain its strategic alliances with the USA, Moldova and others. Romania’s foreign policy is to follow the lead of its partners, which explains its contribution to ISAF and to the EU’s anti-piracy mission, Operation Atalanta. Normative considerations are a secondary driver for Romania, as it has no real economic interest in contributing to such operations. Although Poland foresees a military build-up after its withdrawal from ISAF, the country might not increase deployment elsewhere until tensions in its immediate region have subsided.

Finland and the Netherlands

Finland is traditionally a strong supporter of UN peace operations, which enjoy high public popularity. It looks to strengthen its contribution to UN operations but is not likely to return to its earlier peak levels of 2500 deployed personnel. It focuses on critical enablers such as intelligence, planning and engineering, as well as on political and mediation missions. Finland is committed to contributing to international peace and security but its engagement in peace operations is also meant to showcase its defence capacity. While it would like to increase its engagement in Africa, Finnish troops’ lack of French language skills is currently a challenge.

Having been a primary troop contributor to ISAF in Afghanistan, the Netherlands now aims to focus on niche capacities when engaging in peace operations. This explains why it recently deployed troops to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), largely focusing on information- and intelligence-gathering activities. Departing from its previously ideal-driven engagement, the Netherlands has grown to accept a mixture of pragmatism, ethical and interest-based engagement.

PEACEKEEPING 2.0

Participants began the session by discussing the main challenges to and potential reforms of UN peace operations, including the future roles of European states. A participant from the Netherlands noted that the UN system has made strides since Srebrenica, and these changes should be appreciated. However, challenges that require attention include (a) the need to coordinate different policy instruments (e.g. impartiality and robust POC in mandates); (b) the need for more analysis and planning as well as cooperation on common strategy; (c) the need for increased civilian police capacities and enablers such as airlift and intelligence; (d) improved monitoring and evaluation; (e) the possibility of greater compensation for troop-contributing countries; (f) improved police leadership; (g) increased accountability; and (h) improved relations with regional organizations, particularly the EU. However, on this last point, given that the EU’s traditional focus is on diplomacy and conflict prevention, as opposed to large-scale military operations, the Dutch participant believed that the UN will likely remain the primary
organization in the field of peace operations, with the EU potentially acting as a niche subcontractor.

A participant from Finland identified several additional areas for improvement from a Finnish perspective, including (a) promoting universality in training, equipment and accountability, as well as reimbursement and command structures, in order to bridge the gap between finance-contributing countries and troop-contributing countries; (b) clarifying exit strategies to limit costs, increase success and free capacities that are currently tied to missions that have become institutionalized; (c) increasing the speed of deployments; (d) prioritizing POC and fulfilling mission mandates over the security of peacekeepers; and (e) increasing female contributions, both in the field and in leadership positions. A participant from the UK agreed that training is very important, and should be used as an incentive for participation in peace operations, rather than as a punishment.

A participant from the UN said that the current thinking within the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is in line with the Dutch and Finnish analyses, and that there has already been some progress on the challenges mentioned. The UN views peace operations as very cost effective. At the same time, it is trying to reduce costs and increase efficiency. It also aims to provide higher remunerations for troop-contributing countries that are willing to take greater risks, provide higher quality and bring key enablers. The UN has sent the EU a list of gaps in capabilities, but also still needs more troops. It hopes that, following the Dutch contribution to MINUSMA, more EU member states will return to UN operations after the Afghanistan drawdown, especially since there have been significant improvements to command and control structures. In addition, peace operation mandates have become much more focused, with a relative decrease in state-building and more emphasis on POC. Echoing the Dutch participant, he argued that, while robust peace operations have shown progress in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN must not lose sight of the importance of political processes and long-term transition planning.

A participant from the UK warned that a focus on POC may also have unintended consequences. For example, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is currently protecting civilians under difficult circumstances and this may possibly lead to new Srebrenica-like situations. A participant from Finland said that although she thought robust mandates are a good thing, systems should be in place to deal with collateral damage, such as causality tracking and compensation. A participant from the Netherlands asserted that the UN Security Council needs to take into account that robust peace operations require a more flexible budget, more capacity, and greater clarity on what such operations will entail, including clearer rules of engagement. He also argued that, if the UN wants to encourage European countries to contribute to peace operations, it might be more realistic to build on country niches.

A participant with a NATO background commented that the post-Afghanistan fatigue is political, not military. The military itself would always look for new tasks but would also need a sound command and control system to operate. In cases where such a structure is in place Western countries are also more willing to take casualties, like many did in ISAF. While the UN has improved its command and control structures, Western militaries
will require NATO standards. Moreover, interoperability is needed and only exists in NATO, not in the EU or the UN. Referring to the perceived threat from Russia he argued that, contrary to the currently default political preference for more efficient and light-footprint mission types, Europe needs to improve its capacities to deploy large conventional military forces not only for protection against Russia, but also for POC and crowd control. He argued that Europe currently has a significant shortage of basic military capacities such as strategic airlift, transport and intelligence and is currently too dependent on the USA. Europe would need to increase its cooperation to offset the budget cuts in order to maintain the current capabilities and capacities. However, there is currently no such trend.

A participant from the European External Action Service argued that no single instrument can address all challenges. The main question would be how to get the ‘wiring’ between the different combinations of instruments right. This would be not only relevant for the EU, but also for member states. She said that, in theory, everything from analysis to implementation is in place within the EU. However, in practice, analysis and implementation occur at the same time and during crises analysis is often skipped. The EU would be too focused on its own instruments and approaches and would consequently be less open to external cooperation. Competition between organizations forces these organizations to show where member states get most value for money. A joint assessment that would clarify which organization is best able to do what would reduce organizational competition, and allow organizations to focus on their strengths. The EU could then also operate as a subcontractor.

A Norwegian participant argued that the future of peace operations involves complex constellation of missions in single-mission areas—as in the case of Mali. The EU may be able to deploy a niche mission, while its members could also deploy inside a UN mission, because they will have French forces and the US Africa Command to protect them. A participant from the UN stressed that if parallel missions, bridging operations and rehatting of forces become more common, improved cooperation between the AU, EU and UN will be required in the fields of analysis, intelligence and information sharing, and mission planning. Although EU–UN cooperation is currently on the agenda again, there is a fear within the EU that countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden will retreat from EU operations in order to deploy with the UN.

**COOPERATION WITH EMERGING POWERS ON PEACE OPERATIONS**

During this session participants from India, China, South Africa and Europe shared views on potential cooperation in future peace operations.

**China**

In response to the growing pressure on emerging powers to participate in peace operations, China will likely continue or even increase its troop and financial contributions, but expects a review of the strategies applied in peace operations. As for cooperation, China prefers to move beyond traditional
alliances and forge new partnerships. However, the perceived lack of trust in China’s intentions causes China to proceed with caution when it comes to new engagement, as it is often seen as a potential threat. Moreover, China felt betrayed by NATO over the intervention in Libya. For China, development assistance, joint training or funding would be preferably to peace operations in terms of areas in which trust and cooperation can be established.

**India**

Overall, there is an understanding in India that increased cooperation in the field of peace operations is necessary in order to address the challenging and often asymmetrical threats of modern conflicts. Beyond cooperation between states and organizations there is also a need to consider non-governmental bodies (e.g. private military companies and non-governmental organizations) working alongside operations. While India would like to cooperate more intensively with the EU and NATO, differences in military standards and planning procedures, and the lack of common interests and political will, remain a challenge. However, by initially working together on improving specific areas that are currently weak—including strategic airlift capabilities, formalizing doctrines and intelligence practices—cooperation could become more feasible. Improving interoperability and command and control procedures are also important and India would not oppose NATO standards. If the trend towards more robust operations continues, an exchange on POC would also be a good field of cooperation. Common military exercises also help implement standard operating procedures over time. In general, the more effective, clear and goal-oriented peace operations become, the easier it will be for countries and regional organizations to cooperate.

**South Africa**

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS countries) want to reform global governance and increase their influence on global peace and security but follow a relatively conservative approach because serious disruptions would negatively influence their economic development. At the same time, it might be interesting to observe how their internal relationships will be affected by the events in Ukraine. BRICS countries felt betrayed by NATO after its operation in Libya, and partnerships with Europe and North America suffered as a consequence. The AU, and South Africa in particular, were working on mediation efforts between the Libyan Government and the opposition but were blocked from the country once the NATO operation began. African leaders have responded to the call for regional responsibility over African problems through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). However, African regional organizations and troop-contributing countries still need assistance in better managing conflicts, improving early warning, and enhancing professionalism and training standards.

**A European Union perspective**

Given the ongoing decline of its military capacities, the EU recognizes the need for increasing cooperation with new partners. At the same time, the
demand on European states is increasing as the USA reduces its military presence in Europe and its wider neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the EU and NATO are sceptical about significant cooperation with the BRICS countries. For example, in the case of India, European actors have traditionally focused only on the issue of terrorism. China is an obvious partner but since the country shies away from robust operations and casualties it can hardly replace the USA. In South America, only Chile is interested in cooperation.

The EU has provided funding to the APSA and has close ties with South Africa, but still expects Nigeria to step up its engagement and contribution. It is evident that EU member states will decrease their future involvement and this will increase the burden on the emerging powers. However, it is not yet clear whether emerging powers will do more in the area of peace operations. Both the EU and the BRICS countries are divided on what they want, making direct dialogue on interests, values and potential partnerships difficult.

A participant from France noted that, ultimately, cooperation is rather limited because both the EU and NATO have their own planning and command and control structures, which exclude third parties. However, a participant from the Netherlands argued that the example of Mali, where China provides the Dutch with force protection, Dutch intelligence is shared throughout the mission, and the Netherlands learns from African experiences, proves that cooperation is both possible and necessary. He argued that training in particular is an area where cooperation is possible and called for establishing a forum in which demand and supply could be matched.