Part I. Security and conflicts, 2002

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1. The Euro-Atlantic system and global security

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I. Introduction

This chapter sets the scene for the part of the Yearbook dealing with major developments in political and institutional security relationships, and with the incidence and handling of armed conflicts around the world in 2002. It puts flesh on the bones of the security policy trends and debates which are analysed in more conceptual terms in the Introduction. Section II analyses changes to the United States’ policies and doctrines during 2002. Section III describes the US agenda in action and its repercussions. Section IV covers institutional development within the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Section V analyses Russia’s reaction to and involvement in these processes and section VI provides some conclusions.¹

II. The USA’s policies and doctrines

The USA was traditionally considered to be vulnerable only to attacks by nuclear weapons delivered by identifiable systems launched by a clearly identified adversary. The motivations and actions of this adversary were believed to be both predictable and amenable to influence through dialogue. This dialogue was pursued both through discussions and through what Thomas Schelling referred to as the ‘diplomacy of violence’.² In September 2001 the perpetrator, direction and means by which it was attacked surprised the USA. During 2002 it became possible to see the first outline of how the shock of these attacks has affected the security policy of the world’s only remaining superpower.

Although US security policy was undergoing a transformation prior to September 2001, the shock of the attacks added a new dimension. The USA faced a new and changing threat but the government found itself with no comprehensive idea or functioning plan for the protection of the US homeland from future terrorist attacks.

¹ On major armed conflicts and multilateral peace missions in 2002 see chapters 2 and 3 in this volume, respectively.

* SIPRI Intern Martin Sjögren assisted with the preparation of section IV of this chapter.

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The USA’s response to the need for a new security policy was codified in three documents published in 2002—the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* and *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Together, these documents set out different aspects of a US response intended to incorporate political, military, diplomatic and legal (including domestic and international) instruments into an overall programme to enhance US security.

**The USA’s evolving approach to the use of force**

The issues that had dominated discussion of strategy and military reform during the first year of the Bush Administration—such as the need for and feasibility of defending against attacks by ballistic missiles—did not disappear from the debate. However, the completion of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which had been mandated by Congress, was rapidly overshadowed by the military response to the terrorist attacks on the USA in September 2001 and above all by the course and lessons of military operations in Afghanistan. The main focus became, first, how the USA might use force to defeat terrorists and the regimes that sponsor them and, second, how US forces might be better tailored to carry out those uses of force identified.

*Under what conditions should force be used?*

The war on terrorism, as President Bush made clear, was intended neither to be waged only against the perpetrators of the attacks on the USA nor confined in scope to Afghanistan: it was to be carried to terrorists and their sponsors worldwide. Under what Vice-President Dick Cheney has called ‘the Bush doctrine’, ‘a regime that harbours or supports terrorism will be regarded as hostile to the USA’. Senior officials underlined that the war on terrorism would involve overt and covert military operations and that the USA would be prepared to initiate operations before being attacked. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld observed that:

> the asymmetrical advantage of a terrorist is that he can attack at any time, at any place, using any conceivable technique and it’s not possible to defend at every time, in every place against every conceivable threat. . . . The only way to deal with those

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4 The US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force operations in Afghanistan are discussed in chapter 4.

threats is to go after them where they are. And that’s why the president’s global war on terrorism is based on that principle, that we have to find the global terrorists, anywhere in the world, and we have to stop nations from providing safe havens for them.6

Official pronouncements underlined that the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by regimes that sponsor terrorism could be considered a direct threat. In his State of the Union Address of January 2002, President Bush stated that ‘all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security. . . . The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons’.7 Vice-President Cheney subsequently observed that this threat was already discernible: ‘weapons of mass destruction are being sought by determined enemies who would not hesitate to use them against us’.8

In the eyes of the USA, the acquisition of certain military capabilities might justify an attack on their owners. Rumsfeld asked, ‘what obligations ought a country or a group of countries undertake if they know of certain knowledge that x number of countries that have hostile intention against their neighbors and others are moving rapidly down the road towards having weapons of mass destruction?’9 The answer in the new National Security Strategy is what the document calls ‘pre-emption’, that is, using force in anticipation of the danger that hostile states or terrorist groups will acquire WMD. It declares that ‘for centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. . . . We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries’.10 In effect, the new strategy involves broadening the traditional meaning of pre-emption to encompass preventive war, in which force may be used—even without evidence of an imminent attack—to ensure that a serious threat to the USA from WMD does not grow over time.

Once it is accepted that certain categories of threat cannot be deterred, deferring a response until the USA has been the victim of further attacks is politically unacceptable. Moreover, the USA is not prepared to rely exclusively on non-military approaches to threat reduction or elimination—although a role for such approaches is not excluded from US thinking.11

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8 Remarks by the Vice-President’ (note 5).
11 ‘The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (note 3) underlined US support for diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance and export controls that ‘dissuade or impede proliferant states or terrorist networks’. The document also stressed the need to
One of the hallmarks of the Bush Administration’s strategic thinking has been its explicit emphasis on maintaining US military pre-eminence. As described in the National Security Strategy, this task involves building and maintaining defences ‘beyond challenge’. The declared goal is for the US military to be ‘strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing or equalling the power of the USA’.12

What kinds of forces would be required?

During 2002, operations in Afghanistan and preparations for operations against Iraq were a catalyst for further discussion of a deeper transformation of the US military establishment. This transformation, which was already under way prior to September 2001, was needed to prepare for what US planners expected to be an increasingly uncertain and unpredictable security environment with new sources of threats. An important step in this direction was taken in the 2001 QDR. A central objective of the review had been to shift the basis of US defence planning from a ‘threat-based’ model to a ‘capabilities-based’ model. The latter model focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than specifically who the adversary might be. It places particular emphasis on the portfolio of capabilities that are needed to deter and defeat adversaries who rely on surprise, deception and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives.

As noted above, leaders have lost faith in the utility of deterrence with regard to some of the threats now considered to be the most significant—although deterrence remains central to thinking about other possible threat scenarios.13 Operations in Afghanistan strengthened the conviction of political leaders and senior defence officials in the USA that there was a need for a fundamental transformation to provide a different range of options. Moreover, the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense was itself convinced that transformation could not be delayed until after the immediate operations in Afghanistan were completed.

While US forces were able to improvise a plan to carry out operations in Afghanistan, they were equipped and trained to conduct a theatre operation against the armed forces of a state rather than counter-insurgency and mountain warfare. While the US-led coalition had no choice but to wage the war on terrorism with the forces at its disposal, military leaders underlined that existing forces were not developed or trained with this kind of operation in mind.14 The operation succeeded in spite of its improvised character, but some of the

13 Deterrence is discussed in essay 4 in this volume.
14 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz pointed out that: ‘General Franks was starting from scratch on Sep. 20th when he received the order from the president to begin planning a campaign, but less than three weeks later, on Oct. 7th, we commenced military operations’. ‘Testimony as delivered to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: the situation in Afghanistan’, 26 June 2002, available at URL <http://www.dod.gov/speeches/2002/s20020626-depsecedf2.html>.
capabilities and much of the training that would have made it possible to use force in an even more effective and discriminate manner did not exist.

The USA faced political, operational and legal obstacles to fighting a major regional war with existing forces. Although the USA has developed and will increasingly rely on long-range force projection capacities supported from the sea or from the USA itself, political support is needed to carry out operations that require access to the facilities of other countries or that proceed through their land, territorial waters or airspace. This factor is having an impact on the reshaping of US foreign relations, particularly where countries have not traditionally been close allies or friends of the USA.

Domestic political support for operations has depended on confidence about the prospects of success being gained at an acceptable human and financial cost. Moreover, the human cost to the adversary and the need to discriminate between targets in specific military actions has played an increasingly important role in thinking about operations. Field commanders have had to complete missions within the framework of rules of engagement requiring real-time confirmation that striking a target runs no risk of civilian casualties while lacking the surveillance and monitoring capacities capable of providing such assurances. Regardless of whether the USA participates in any international legal tribunal, legal advisers to the US military have increasingly insisted on doctrines and tactics that are compatible with contemporary interpretations of the laws of war. These concerns have begun to be recognized in the rules of engagement issued to field commanders.

**Future force planning**

In August 2002 the Secretary of Defense presented the Annual Report to the President and the Congress. The report was based on a reassessment of the strategic environment, incorporating responses to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA.

A number of trends were identified that could challenge the effectiveness of US armed forces. First, the continuing proliferation of long-range cruise and ballistic missiles, coupled with the effects of globalization, were said to have demonstrated that the USA could not in future rely on geography to provide immunity from attack. Second, some states were developing military capabilities that could threaten stability in regions critical to US interests. Third, increasing challenges and threats were said to be emanating from the territories of weak states and ungoverned areas. Fourth, and related, non-state actors were said to be acquiring the capabilities to conduct devastating attacks on the USA or its critical interests.

The adaptation of US forces proposed in response to these changes is presented as ‘a major departure in our approach for managing strategic issues’ that evolves out of the findings of the 2001 NPR. In particular, the Annual

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15 See essay 1 in this volume.
Report points to the need to replace the triad of strategic forces (land-based, sea-based and air-based offensive nuclear weapons) with a ‘New Triad’ that integrates conventional and nuclear offensive strategic strike capabilities, active and passive defences, and a responsive infrastructure. The military potential of these capacities would be further enhanced by improvements in the speed of gathering and distributing information necessary for intelligence assessments and command and control.17

To achieve the necessary transformation a major investment would be required in advanced non-nuclear strike forces, missile defences of different kinds, and command, control and intelligence capabilities, many of which would be space-based. As noted above, these investments were intended to produce forces that could be applied in a more discriminate manner than forces developed for large-scale attrition warfare. Moreover, such forces would be able to operate with a range of partners without being dependent on any foreign state for their effectiveness and would free the USA, to the extent possible, from the need for foreign bases and infrastructure when carrying out operations.

III. The US agenda in action and the repercussions

During 2002 the Bush Administration acted consistently with its declared doctrine in giving highest priority to the ‘asymmetric’ threats posed to its homeland by international terrorism, the potential use of mass destruction technologies, and ‘rogue states’ which might inspire or connive at both. The main practical reflections of this policy were the development of generic counter-terrorist measures; the military operations carried out by the USA and certain allies against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, followed by the installation of a new national government with a protective international security force; and, from March onwards, the USA’s drive to neutralize the threat from Saddam Hussein—by military intervention if necessary. At the end of 2002 North Korea became another serious nuclear proliferation challenge, forcing a rapid development of US policy towards the region—but this time without the threat of military action. The USA stepped up its military support to other governments, for instance, in the Philippines, that faced threats from al-Qaeda-related terrorism and sought military facilities (including the right to station troops) in various Central Asian countries to back up the operations in Afghanistan.18 The dominant counter-terrorist perspective, however, had the effect of limiting US activism in the handling of certain other crises and, in particular, made President Bush more reluctant to expend diplomatic capital in support of the Middle East peace process.19

17 Annual Report (note 16), chapter 7, pp. 84–86.
18 For a useful summary of US overseas military involvement in 2002 see Spiegel, P., ‘US expands its military presence around globe’, Financial Times, 27 Feb. 2003, p. 3. Events in Afghanistan are discussed in chapter 4 and cases of US material assistance to governments fighting terrorism are analysed in chapter 14 in this volume.
19 An account of developments in the Middle East is given in chapter 2 in this volume.
Counter-terrorism

Any account of counter-terrorist efforts in 2002 must begin with the limitations on their success: al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was neither caught nor proved to have been killed, although some of his important lieutenants were. (On 12 November 2002, a new video tape was released purporting to show bin Laden alive and making new threats.) Nor could any official determination be made of the source of the letters containing anthrax spores that had been mailed to addresses in the USA the previous autumn. A continued sense of vulnerability to new mass-impact terrorist attacks was part of the year’s experience for people in the USA and elsewhere. Popular fears of terrorism had a measurable impact on tourism and air travel, especially in the first half of 2002.

At least 12 gun and bomb attacks in six different Arab countries, apparently linked to al-Qaeda, took place against individuals or premises with links to the USA during 2002. Anti-US motives were also blamed for the attack on the French tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen on 6 October 2002 and the bomb which killed nearly 200 people at a night club in Bali on 12 October.

The most solid progress demonstrated by the international community in terms of global action against these threats came through the work of the new Counter-Terrorism Committee, established by the UN in September 2001. In 2002 it received initial progress reports from 178 countries in all parts of the world, with 134 still outstanding. The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism entered into force on 10 April 2002. The USA kept up strong pressure on other states to freeze funds linked specifically to al-Qaeda and 33 further terrorist groups which it had listed. However, results were somewhat disappointing, with only $113 million frozen by December 2002. Cases in which the police authorities of other nations worked successfully with the USA to track down, arrest and try suspected terrorists developed side by side with disputes about the status of some individuals concerned and the handling of judicial proceedings against them. There was also widespread concern about the detention of alleged al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters captured in Afghanistan at a US military camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where they received neither prisoner of war status

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nor the normal access of civilians to the judicial process.\textsuperscript{27} (The USA planned to bring them before national military tribunals.)

**Homeland Security**

The Bush Administration also moved rapidly to review the means by which the USA might reduce its vulnerability to surprise attack. The president appointed Tom Ridge to an new position as Homeland Security Advisor, within the Executive Office, and shortly afterwards established the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council at the White House to support Ridge in his tasks.\textsuperscript{28} The task of the office was to develop a comprehensive strategy to secure the USA from terrorist attacks or threats, while coordinating all relevant activities of the executive. The White House also began to prepare a more fundamental reform to restructure and strengthen the executive branch. On 25 November 2002 President Bush signed into law the Homeland Security Act, establishing the Department of Homeland Security, with primary responsibility for counter-terrorism tasks on US territory.\textsuperscript{29}

The Department of Homeland Security was given six missions: intelligence and warning; border and transport security; domestic counter-terrorism; protection of critical infrastructure; defence against catastrophic threats; and emergency preparedness and response. As these missions cut across tasks performed by other parts of government, creating the department—initially expected to employ around 170 000 people—required a major reassignment and reorganization of personnel and resources. For example, the new Directorate for Border and Transportation Security was created by merging the US Customs Service (previously part of the Department of the Treasury), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (previously part of the Department of Justice), and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (previously part of the Department of Agriculture).\textsuperscript{30}

During 2002, in this and other contexts, the USA introduced numerous measures to tighten up security in public life and to introduce new investigatory powers. Most had a principally inward-looking effect, such as raising security standards for domestic air traffic, but others had extraterritorial implications, which became a matter for debate with partners. For example, the US Customs Service announced a four-part programme to prevent dangerous individuals, goods and materials (e.g., terrorists, and chemical and biological

\textsuperscript{27} See chapter 4 in this volume.

\textsuperscript{28} ‘Full text: President Bush’s speech on US security, remarks by the president in an address to the nation at the Cross Hall’, Guardian Unlimited, 7 June 2002, URL <http://www.guardian.co.uk/bush/story/0,7369,728973,00.html>.


warfare agents) from being smuggled into the country, which includes pre-screening of cargo by US customs officials at non-US ports.31

The USA and Iraq

The USA’s campaign for action against Iraq developed in parallel to these broader policy emphases, starting with a speech by President Bush as early as 13 March,32 but gathering steam after the regime change in Afghanistan was completed formally in June. The prime charges against Saddam Hussein in 200233 rested not on direct links to al-Qaeda—which have remained difficult to substantiate—but rather on the claim that he had not stopped trying to develop nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and the means of their delivery, in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 687, adopted after the 1991 Persian Gulf War (and many other decisions).34 Such action not only would breach general non-proliferation rules and an explicit UN prohibition, but also had to be regarded as a serious risk for regional and global security given Saddam’s past history of support for terrorism, his territorial aggression against Iran and Kuwait, and the generally dictatorial and inhumane character of his regime. The UN inspectors sent to find and destroy Saddam’s NBC capabilities had been withdrawn in 1998 with some suspect stocks and capacities still unaccounted for.35 The USA claimed that it had conclusive evidence of further weapons development and that this, among other things, proved that the policy of ‘containment’ applied to Iraq in the past five years was not working.36 Nor, according to the USA, could the methods of deterrence traditionally used against potential nuclear adversaries be relied on in Iraq’s case.37 Consistent with the USA’s declared new priorities and policy documents, Bush sought and obtained approval from the House and the


36 For a detailed discussion of the issues at stake see chapters 15 and 16 in this volume, on nuclear and chemical and biological weapons aspects, respectively.

Senate (on 2 and 10 October 2002, respectively) to use US military force if necessary to destroy and prevent the recreation of these Iraqi capabilities.

While the administration held back from formally defining the overthrow of Saddam’s regime as a goal in itself, it was hard to see how any forceful solution to the proliferation threat could be achieved without this consequence. Indeed, many in Washington saw ousting Saddam as more than just the elimination of a present threat (or the completion of unfinished business from 1992). It could open the way for the managed increase of Iraq’s oil exports, to ease Western reliance on other producers and, incidentally, help pay for internal reconstruction. On the most optimistic view it might also have a political ‘domino effect’, not only conveying salutary lessons to wrongdoers, but also stimulating reform processes and increased conformity with Western values throughout the Arab world.38

The picture of Saddam Hussein as a bad ruler and a dangerous man who had repeatedly flouted international opinion and international obligations was largely uncontested in 2002. The USA’s insistence that the time had come to stop his wrongdoing by force, however, was consistently supported by only a few countries (notably the UK) and opposed by Iraq’s neighbours, China, Russia and many European countries. Their reservations and objections could with some simplification be divided into four categories. First, there were divergent judgements on the scale and immediacy of the danger from Iraqi WMD. Those who placed the threat lowest (although generally with less access to intelligence than the USA and the UK) were disposed to argue that a combination of traditional sanctions, embargoes, inspections and territorial ‘containment’ would suffice at least to stop matters getting worse. The general argument was also made that few problems of proliferation had ever been, or could be, solved by military means. The USA itself appeared to favour more ‘political’ approaches to the even clearer danger from North Korea, and for containment of India–Pakistan tensions,39 not to mention the (usually left unspoken) case of Israel.40

A second set of arguments concerned the likely risks and costs of military action, especially if it aimed at or led to complete regime change. It focused


39 See chapter 5 in this volume.

on such issues as the possible unleashing of Kurdish and Turcoman separatism (a special worry for Turkey) and revenge by the Shi’ā majority; possible humanitarian and refugee calamities; the need for extensive rebuilding by the USA or international authorities, coupled with doubt over whether the intervening forces would be willing to remain in Iraq for as long as necessary afterwards; and fears that the ‘domino effect’ could be negative rather than positive, destabilizing other regional powers and exacerbating anti-Western sentiment. There were also concerns over the impact of a short- or long-term rise in world oil prices or of their falling too low, which would be catastrophic *inter alia* for the Russian economy.

The third argument was essentially about priorities. It took the form of questioning whether Iraq really deserved precedence over the ongoing direct struggle with international terrorism, the need to stabilize a still fragile Afghanistan and the search for a way to stop new violence on both sides in the Middle East.

The fourth set of arguments was about principles—notably the question of whether a single state, even one as powerful as the USA, could arrogate to itself the right to act unilaterally as judge, jury and executioner against another sovereign entity which had not directly attacked it. The real depth of this concern arose not so much from the circumstances of the Iraq case as from uncertainty over how far and in which directions the USA might intend to press its doctrines of unilateral and/or pre-emptive intervention in the future.41 Even some who largely shared the Bush Administration’s threat analysis argued that a counter-strategy of military coercion, although it might succeed in the short term, would risk both discrediting the liberal–democratic values it was meant to protect and stirring up stronger resentment and resistance to the USA’s leadership in the longer run.

Serious and sometimes profound although these disagreements were, powerful diplomatic forces were also mobilized—especially from mid-year onwards—to seek an operational compromise. Statements as blunt as that made by the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, during a hard-fought national election campaign in September 2002, when he swore never to support an attack on Iraq, were the exception—and caused corresponding alarm.42 Other European countries, in parallel with certain sectors of opinion in the USA, sought rather to use their influence to steer the administration back on to a path of multilateral action and to give traditional arms control methods one further chance in the process.

These efforts led to the drafting of a new UN Security Council Resolution designed to achieve the return of international inspectors to Iraq—with a toughened mandate and explicit timescale—to establish the facts on Iraq’s past compliance and future willingness to comply with its international obli-

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41 See the Introduction in this volume.
Finally adopted on 8 November 2002 by a unanimous vote of the UN Security Council (including Syria), UN Security Council Resolution 1441 called on Iraq to cooperate ‘immediately, unconditionally and actively’ with the UNMOVIC and International Atomic Energy Agency inspection teams led by Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, respectively. By 8 December Iraq was to have made a declaration of all its WMD, by 23 December inspections were to have resumed and by 21 February 2003 the inspectors were to make an initial report to the UN Security Council. On 13 November Iraq stated that it accepted the resolution ‘without conditions’ and the inspection teams were able to start their work on 27 November.

UN Security Council Resolution 1441 represented a greater success than many predicted some months earlier in holding the global community together and deferring irreparable US–European or intra-European splits over the Iraq issue. It was also an interesting experiment in developing the UN’s spectrum of means of enforcing its previously disregarded edicts, short of authorizing forceful intervention. Already before the end of 2002, however, some of the ambiguities and uncertainties inherent in this line of action were evident.

The statement in paragraph 12 of the resolution that the Security Council ‘Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 . . . [Iraqi falsehood, failure of cooperation, interference, or default on obligations], in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security’ masked a serious, and still unresolved, difference of view between the Security Council’s members. Some, including France and Russia, believed that the Security Council would have to adopt a second resolution in such circumstances to authorize military intervention in Iraq, while the USA saw this as unnecessary in the event of a further material breach. The steady build-up of US military assets in the Gulf region, and active US diplomacy to seek transit and other facilities from countries such as Kuwait and Turkey, conveyed a message that the option of a nationally authorized attack remained open. The inspection process for its part unearthed no significant new evidence in its first weeks, while the 12 000-page dossier duly delivered by Iraq to the UN Security Council on 7 December was judged by Blix to have blurred and evaded important issues. Iraq continued to claim that it did not possess any WMD.

44 In retrospect the difference of intention seems to have been even more profound. The USA and the UK saw the inspections as a means to accumulate enough evidence of Saddam’s guilt and obstruction to justify forceful action for his overthrow, even without—as events proved in 2003—the cover of a further UN decision. Other members of the UN Security Council, to the extent that they wanted to disarm Iraq, seemed to treat the inspection process as a means to pressure, cajole and guide Saddam into gradual surrender.
US-European debates

Iraq was the issue which most clearly focused US-European disagreements on the handling of security challenges in 2002, but it was not the only evidence of a potentially serious and widening gulf in security values across what used to be thought of as a close-knit Atlantic community. Continuing differences of view over how to define and handle the general challenge of terrorism also contributed, especially when questions of respect for domestic and international legality and human rights, and of the best strategy to spread true respect for democratic values, were at stake.

The topic which raised these particular issues most sharply was the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, which received the required number of ratifications for it to enter into force on 1 July 2002. The atmosphere was further damaged by continuing US-European differences on issues of global management, such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and by specific disputes in the trade field, such as US subsidies to steel producers, resulting in a case before the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the impact on foreign companies of US corporate ethics legislation.

The Bush Administration by no means remained on the defensive in these controversies. Misgivings in Europe were sometimes met with assurances that the USA could go it alone, sometimes with tactics to seek common ground with other powers such as Russia and even China. (It was a fact that the attitude of Russian President Vladimir Putin to the defence of homeland security often came closer to that of the USA than to the European norm.) Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld framed a principle that in future, for the USA, ‘the mission must determine the coalition and not the coalition the mission’.

At the analytical level, US observers questioned how far reservations in Europe reflected a genuine difference of judgement and how far they were a rationalization of outdated prejudices and/or of Europe’s practical incapacity to keep pace. It is impossible not to cite here Robert Kagan’s much-quoted article, ‘Power and weakness’, which argued that historical processes culminating in post-war European integration had carried the European nations in some sense ‘beyond power’. On the most balanced formulation of this view, Europe has found the right form of civilization for building peace and for taking increasing responsibility for its own continent’s security. In the process, however, it has opened its frontierless societies to terrorist and criminal infiltration and become incapable of recognizing the cruder challenges of power

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46 See appendix 3A in this volume.
49 Counter-terrorism in Russia is covered in more detail in section V of this chapter.
play beyond its own borders—let alone of responding to them with the necessary force and resolve.

Naturally, this view inspired attempts at refutation in both Europe and the USA but there were structural problems in defending the European case. A number of European nations, notably the UK and France, could show that they had the capacity for forceful action anywhere in the world and were not afraid to use it. Germany and the Netherlands took over joint responsibility for leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan at the end of 2002. The problem was that these contributions were not collective or associated with the European integration movement as such, and the EU's own progress towards its goal of a military intervention capability remained slow and tortuous. Moreover, European governments were reluctant even to launch discussions aimed at a common justification of their positions on 'new' security issues because of their consciousness of the divisions that might be exposed between them in the process. It is noteworthy that no substantial discussion of the Iraq issue took place at the joint ministerial level either in the EU or in NATO during 2002. In framing EU positions and interventions, European leaders focused on the limited range of common denominators where shared interests could reliably be defined, such as the continuation of measures to tighten the EU's internal security regimes and the extension of EU roles and responsibilities in the western Balkans region.

The best judgement that can be made on the US–European 'values' debate is to say that—even after the more open and wounding splits of the spring of 2003—a judgement would be premature. The thesis of underlying differences in US and European security philosophy can be supported by some practical observations, notably the USA's unique status as a potentially hegemonic sole superpower and the impact of 50 years of integration processes on European lifestyles and perceptions. The difficulty of reconciling these standpoints at the day-to-day operational level may, however, have been exaggerated in 2002–2003 as a result of the language and tactics used by individuals in the Bush Administration and the intemperance of some European responses, while the record of US and European actions does not, on examination, sustain some of the more pessimistic theses. During 2002, even on the Iraq issue, the key players seem to have been guided at critical moments by instincts of caution, convergence and compromise—and a reflex of escalation control over US–European and intra-European disputes in the economic sphere seems to have continued to operate well into 2003.

This may be interpreted in at least three different ways. European nations felt some of the same pressure to avoid confrontation, and to seek influence

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53 See chapter 6 in this volume.
over US policies through ‘band-wagoning’, as was clearly felt by President Putin and other non-European actors in the light of the unassailability of US power. The habits of 50 years of transatlantic solidarity and the consciousness of continuing shared interests, in the face of new as well as old threats, may also have counted for something—notably with those generations who could remember the cold war and the recent fall of other tyrannies. Finally, any objective assessment of US interests would reveal practical reasons for seeking multilateral support and operating, wherever possible, within the framework and in the name of internationally recognized principles. The point would not only be to share the burdens of action and reduce risks of a ‘stab in the back’ while US forces are engaged. Realpolitik logic also indicates that transnational threats should be met wherever possible with transnational measures, and that the task of disciplining and rehabilitating offenders, once subdued, should be an international rather than a national one. The question still remains whether this potential ‘new multilateralism’ is best encouraged and served by the present stock of multilateral institutions.

IV. Institutional developments: NATO and the EU

During 2002 the pattern of institutional activity in NATO and the EU reflected an uneasy blend of two agendas: the working-through of post-cold war dynamics, notably in the guise of enlargement, and the ongoing adaptation of each institution to new security challenges. Broadly speaking, the former process went more smoothly than forecast, largely because of the more compliant attitude of Russia. The latter process threw up problems of a political and philosophical as well as an operational nature, which remained fundamentally unresolved and, if anything, were growing sharper in 2003.

The two agendas were also interlinked, for good and ill. Growing acceptance of an early and broad enlargement, in both institutions, owed something to the logic of bringing the widest possible area of Europe under the disciplines of collective defence and supranational integration and enlisting its full resources in the context of the counter-terrorism struggle. Enlargement also offered the prospect that Europe would become more self-reliant in containing its own residual security challenges while the USA turned its attention to newer threats. On the other hand—rightly or wrongly—the new Central European members were widely expected to under-contribute to the institutions’ capacity and over-contribute to their diversity, potentially increasing the problems of overstretch and technology gap in NATO, and the challenge of building a united security vision in the EU.

54 See section V of this chapter for a discussion of Russian relations with the EU and NATO in 2002.
55 A calculation was made before the NATO Prague Summit that the 7 new members would add 35% more territory but only 2.5% to the NATO budget. Deighton, A., ‘The European Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 4 (Nov. 2002), pp.719–741.
NATO in 2002: enlargement and adaptation

NATO’s enlargement decision was taken at the Prague Summit of 21–22 November 2002. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin NATO accession talks, with the aim of signing accession protocols by 16 April 2003 and joining NATO formally, after ratification procedures, at the May 2004 Summit. This would bring the number of new Central European NATO members to 10—after the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999—and the total number of NATO members to 26. The inclusion of the Baltic states had particular historical significance in view of their former place within the Soviet Union.

NATO did not give any indication at Prague of plans for a further enlargement. However, the seven successful candidates had previously met at Riga in July 2002 together with representatives of Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and exchanged pledges of mutual support for the eventual accession of this entire group. In the spring of 2002 the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council announced Ukraine’s intention to join NATO, which was confirmed in a decree signed by President Leonid Kuchma in July. In November 2002 Georgia made an official request to join NATO. Russia, for its part, had already upgraded its sui generis relationship with NATO in advance of the Prague Summit by the inception of the new NATO–Russia Council ‘at 20’ in Brussels on 27 May 2002.

The efforts to adapt NATO to a new security environment dominated by extra-European and non-traditional threats—and to the USA’s related policy agenda—were pursued at both the strategic and operational levels during 2002. The political environment remained somewhat tense, principally because of fears that the USA might no longer value NATO as an operational framework, nor accept the disciplines of multilateral security making in general. The fact that no practical follow-up was ever given to NATO’s invocation of Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty in support of the USA on 12 September 2001 fuelled such perceptions, as did the lack of formal NATO involvement in the Afghanistan operations. (At the end of 2002, however, Germany and the Netherlands applied for NATO's assistance with force generation, logistics and communications for ISAF, and this was agreed in principle by the time of the Prague Summit.) There were also questions of a more general nature over whether capacities and organizational structures of

60 Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty) states that an armed attack against 1 or more of its members shall be considered an attack against them all.
61 ‘Prague Summit Declaration’ (note 56).
the NATO type were actually best suited to meet the challenges of terrorism, WMD proliferation and ‘rogue state’ behaviour.

Finally, US–EU relations were not eased by the fact that the obstacle to full NATO–EU cooperation in defence planning and operational planning, created essentially by problems involving Greece and Turkey, remained in place for most of 2002. Only in response to the EU’s enlargement decisions at the 12–13 December European Council meeting did Turkey make moves that led to the removal of the block.62

Nevertheless, an important doctrinal step was taken at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Reykjavik in May 2002, when ministers agreed on the need for NATO to ‘field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives’.63 The significant point was not just the possibility that such forces might be used for operations of a counter-terrorist nature, but also the implied dropping of the geographical limits that previously defined the ‘NATO area’. At the Prague summit meeting, NATO went further in adopting an agreed military concept for defence against terrorism, which envisaged the use of military forces to help ‘deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks directed from abroad’.64 It adopted five practical initiatives to enhance defences against the use of NBC weapons65 and it authorized a new NATO Missle Defence Feasibility Study.66

Regarding NATO’s operational development, the most important package of decisions were those of the Prague Summit. Taken together, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) and the establishment of a new NATO Response Force (NRF) represented an attempt to kick-start—not for the first time—NATO’s adaptation to a new-age military environment.67

The PCC aimed both to enforce capability targets more effectively and to tailor them better to the demands of coalition deployments outside the territory of NATO members.68 The NRF was designed to spearhead such deployments for counter-terrorism as well as other purposes and to find practical ways for

65 ‘Prague Summit Declaration’ (note 56), para. 4e.
66 ‘Prague Summit Declaration’ (note 56), para. 4g. See also chapter 15 in this volume.
67 ‘Prague Summit Declaration’ (note 56), paras. 4a and 4c.
68 The Prague Capabilities Commitment entails what the Summit Declaration called ‘firm and specific political commitments’ from all member states to improve their performance in areas regarded as essential for new-style collective deployments: defending against NBC and radiological weapons attacks; ensuring superiority in the field of command, control and intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; improving forces’ interoperability and combat effectiveness; improving the capacity for rapid initial deployment; and sustainability of expeditionary forces. Nations are encouraged to collaborate in technology transfer, procurement and operational planning in order to share the cost of necessary assets and build interoperability from the bottom up.
the USA to operate with other allies, large and small, despite the apparently irremediable technology gap between them.\(^{69}\) Interestingly, both initiatives showed some signs of a conceptual debt to features already developed in the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP).\(^{70}\) They were complemented by a sweeping reform of NATO’s military command structure, creating two strategic commands with responsibilities now divided on a functional rather than a geographical basis. The Operations Command will be based in Belgium—supported by two Joint Force Commands able \textit{inter alia} to generate Combined Joint Task Force headquarters—and the Transformation Command will be based in the USA.\(^{71}\) Further cuts in the number and size of headquarters with a collective NATO character are involved at all levels. Apart from fitting better with the new military doctrines of the USA and other major contributors to NATO, this change will obviate the need for a further expensive elaboration of the headquarters network in connection with enlargement.

The new NRF, in particular, stood as a symbol both of the up side and the down side of NATO achievements in 2002. The concept of the force was logical and its arrival, arguably, overdue. The USA promoted it, however, by arguing that only by launching such a force could NATO make itself relevant to the new environment—thus stirring up concern that the administration might already be discounting NATO’s value in all other fields. Some Europeans, notably in Belgium and France, worried that the NRF was designed to compete with and undercut the EU’s plans for an intervention capability and/or that the USA would use it to ‘cherry-pick’ European assets for use in ad hoc operations without NATO consent or a proper mandate.\(^{72}\)

These specific objections did not survive examination, mainly because the purposes of the NRF and the EU force capability—and thus also their technological demands—could be clearly differentiated.\(^{73}\) However, NATO’s success, by the end of 2002, in reaching agreement on the NRF and other parts of the Prague package did not completely clear the air. Doubts continued to be expressed that the European NATO members might disregard their capability pledges as they had done earlier ones, or that the USA might not choose to use the NRF in its institutional incarnation because of the implied restraints on its

\(^{69}\) Originally proposed by Rumsfeld at the NATO Defence Planning Committee meeting in Warsaw on 24 Sep. 2002 the NRF should consist of 20 000 troops capable of deploying anywhere in the world within 7–30 days. It would bring together elite elements of US and other forces capable of spearheading action in a tough environment, but could also incorporate ‘niche’ contributions from allies (such as the central European nations) lacking an all-round global operational capacity. The NRF should achieve initial operational capability by Oct. 2004 and full capability by Oct. 2006.


\(^{71}\) ‘Prague Summit Declaration’ (note 56), para. 4b.


\(^{73}\) The NRF would be used for short, sharp actions designed for a breakthrough effect in difficult environments, presumably under US leadership. EU forces would be used without the USA for the Petersberg tasks defined in the European Union’s 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, which mainly fall at the low and moderate end of the peace operations spectrum.
freedom of action and choice of partners. Meanwhile, the USA’s chief security preoccupation, Iraq, had not even been formally addressed in the NATO framework. When a related point concerning contingency planning for aid to Turkey came up early in 2003, it plunged NATO into a painful and damaging deadlock with Belgium, France and Germany, on one side, and the USA and other NATO members, on the other. The basic question thus remained, if NATO was not ready to tackle the USA’s most urgent security concerns, and the USA was not interested in using what NATO could offer, what basis could be found for NATO’s longer-term survival?

The EU: widening and deepening

The decision to enlarge the EU was taken just weeks after the NATO Prague Summit. At the Copenhagen European Council meeting of 12–13 December 2002, agreement was reached on the largest ever expansion of the EU. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to join, and will do so in 2004 if the Accession Treaty is ratified by the applicant states and existing member states. Bulgaria and Romania were given 2007 as a new target date.

Unlike NATO’s, the EU enlargement decision turned out to be something of a cliffhanger. Several blockages had to be overcome. On 21 October, the second Irish referendum on the 2001 Treaty of Nice produced a vote in favour of ratifying the treaty. Tough negotiations on the actual terms of accession went on right up until the Copenhagen European Council meeting, especially on issues such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), where existing net beneficiaries from CAP subsidies were unwilling either to extend its full benefits to new members or to commit themselves to wholesale reforms. Perhaps the greatest difficulties arose, however, from the applications to join the EU from Cyprus and Turkey.

Regarding Cyprus, the question was whether the island’s Greek and Turkish communities would be able to agree on a mechanism to reunify the island before it was to join the EU. In November the UN presented a plan by which the two sides would reunify under a loose federal government. However, even under intense pressure from the EU, the UN and the USA, they failed to agree and the Turkish Cypriot authorities refused to accept the UN plan. Since the EU is committed to admit Cyprus even if an agreement is not reached, this could mean that only the Greek part of the island will be admitted in 2004. The Copenhagen European Council dealt with the dilemma by setting a new deadline of 28 February 2003 for the parties in Cyprus to reach agreement, in

which case popular referendums could be held in March.\textsuperscript{77} This objective was also strongly endorsed by the new Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey, elected on 3 November 2002. However, despite deadline extensions and personal intervention by the UN Secretary-General, it did not prove possible to reach agreement and talks ended in failure on 11 March 2003.\textsuperscript{78}

At Copenhagen, the existing member states were divided over the issue of giving Turkey itself a firm date to begin negotiations to join the EU. The UK backed by Greece, Italy and Spain, argued for talks to begin in January 2004. France and Germany proposed that talks begin in 2005, and then only on condition that Turkey makes further progress on human rights reforms and economic changes.\textsuperscript{79} Against a background of strong pressure from the USA to admit Turkey, the agreement reached at Copenhagen was that a date for Turkey’s accession negotiations would be set at the end of 2004, at the earliest, and that this would be conditional on Turkey fully satisfying the 1993 Copenhagen political criteria.\textsuperscript{80} During 2002, Turkey did in fact initiate several internal reforms in order to strengthen its case for EU membership. Most noticeable was the reform package adopted in early August that abolished the death penalty in peacetime and eased restrictions on Kurdish rights and the Kurdish language.\textsuperscript{81} The new AKP Government, despite some observers’ misgivings on the grounds of its historical origins within the Islamist movement, came to power on an explicitly pro-European and reformist mandate.

The EU’s attempts to adjust to a changing security environment, both in its own interests and in the context of managing European–US relations, covered a wider range of dimensions than in NATO’s case. Aside from developments in external and internal security policies and in relations with Russia,\textsuperscript{82} the principal adaptation debate was conducted in the framework of the European Convention, set up by the decisions of the Laeken European Council in December 2001 to consider the future structures and governance of the EU.\textsuperscript{83} It began its work on 28 February 2002 under the chairmanship of a former President of France, Valéry Giscard-d’Estaing, and is scheduled to present its recommendations in mid-2003, to be followed—after an interval still to be determined—by an Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) which will prepare the necessary decisions for adoption in treaty form.


\textsuperscript{78} ‘Cyprus reunification talks end in failure’, Guardian Unlimited, 11 Mar. 2003, URL <http://www.guardian.co.uk/cyprus/story/0,11551,911959,00.html>.


\textsuperscript{80} The Copenhagen criteria are available at URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm>.


\textsuperscript{82} EU efforts in the field of external and internal security are addressed in chapter 6, and in chapter 7 in the context of implications for new member states. Russia is covered in section V of this chapter.

The European Convention consists of a mix of governmental, parliamentary and other civil representatives from existing and future member states, without formal legislative authority, and was at first regarded by most EU members as an essentially consultative body. It was designed to give a sense of involvement in institutional change to a wider range of EU citizens than ever before, while leaving the IGC a free hand over which, if any, of its conclusions to adopt. During 2002, however, the earnestness of governments’ efforts to sway opinion and the somewhat surprising speed of consensus forming on certain key issues made it seem increasingly doubtful whether, as a matter of practical politics, the IGC could afford to ignore or overturn the Convention’s major findings. The raising of stakes was reflected in the fact that, by the end of 2002, France, Germany and the UK were all represented at the Convention by ministers of cabinet rank.

During work in the 11 thematic working groups established by the Convention from May 2002 onwards, it soon became clear that there was majority support for the drafting of an EU ‘constitution’—either incorporating or combined with a delineation of competences—and for further simplification of decision-making procedures, including greater use of majority voting, ‘flexibility’ and ‘subsidiarity’. A more serious division appeared, roughly following the line between larger and smaller member states, over whether it was more urgent to strengthen the EU’s political leadership (e.g., by instituting a long-term President of the European Council and a ‘Foreign Minister’) or to strengthen the competence and political authority of the European Commission (e.g., by electing its president directly). By the end of 2002 a possible compromise could be discerned which would involve doing both.

Wider issues in European security

During 2002 an additional theme of debate in all European security forums was how to deal with the enlarged institutions’ ‘new neighbours’ to the east. Part of the challenge was familiar from the 1999 NATO enlargement, that is, how to avoid strategically counterproductive dividing lines without permitting any dilution of new members’ commitments. The new EU members’ entry into the Schengen regime and the enhanced emphasis on border security after 11 September 2001 threatened to recreate the dividing line in a very concrete way. At the same time, practical experience on the Finnish–Russian border (and the NATO border between Norway and Russia) suggested that new-style

84 The general aim of the principle of subsidiarity is to guarantee a degree of independence for a lower authority in relation to a higher body or for a local authority in respect of a central authority. When applied in a Community context, the principle means that the member states remain responsible for areas which they are capable of managing more effectively themselves, while the Community is given those powers which the member states cannot discharge satisfactorily. European Parliament, Subsidiarity, Fact sheet 1.2.2., URL <http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/1_2_2_en.htm>. The principle of flexibility is discussed in chapter 6 in this volume.


86 See chapter 6 in this volume for discussion of the Schengen Treaty.
transnational threats could best be controlled by cooperation from both sides of the frontier. Even if the integrated institutions could make their outer limits truly impermeable, the effect might be to ‘bottle up’ illegal immigrants, criminal elements and smuggling in the zones just behind the frontier, which would merely increase the risks of local destabilization.

While the main features of the challenge, and its geographical focus, are similar for both NATO and the EU, the framework for each institution’s response is somewhat different. In NATO’s case, the absorption of 10 new members will leave the Partnership for Peace (PFP) scheme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) with a somewhat lopsided mix of ‘new neighbour’ members and non-allied Western states (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland). NATO’s emerging new agenda—counter-terrorism, peace operations in general and the WMD threat—is, however, of equal _prima facie_ interest to all these remaining partners, and the non-legalistic character of NATO commitments makes it relatively easy to pursue cooperation in regional groups across membership dividing lines. As early as March 2002 Finland and Sweden put forward proposals for developing the focus of future PFP–EAPC cooperation accordingly. The Prague Summit duly approved a package of measures to upgrade cooperation in these forums, including stronger political dialogue, the option for non-applicants to develop Individual Partnership Action Plans, and implementation of a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. It also signalled the adoption of a new national Action Plan with Ukraine.

Because of its law-based culture the EU is not as free as NATO to reinvent its external architecture (where partners are clearly demarcated into holders of Europe Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, etc., according to their potential for accession or not) or to offer its new neighbours a deal involving partial integration. At the same time, certain of the next-tier states have indicated that for their part they would like to enter the potential accession zone. Ukraine declared its wish to join the EU as long ago as 1996 and adopted a national strategy to that effect in 1998. Moldova has expressed a similar interest. Ups and downs in their national politics have, however, influenced Western views of the credibility of these aims and, up to the end of 2000, the EU had gone no further than ‘acknowledging’ Ukraine’s aspirations. With Russia the issue has not even moved this far towards being clari-

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88 As distinct from declared applicants for membership which have Membership Action Plans (currently Albania and FYROM, and Croatia prospectively in 2003).
89 Prague Summit Declaration (note 56), para. 7.
90 Prague Summit Declaration (note 56), para. 8.
91 The constitutional impossibility of giving a non-member state equal rights with a member, even in the context of a potentially shared military operation, was at the root of the problems regarding Turkey’s status in the CESDP which obstructed EU–NATO cooperation for so long.
fied, but the EU–Russia Summit statement of May 2002 does establish the shared goal of a Common European Economic Space (CEES), which would further integrate Russia into the world economy as well as deepen ties between Russia and the EU.93

The EU’s General Affairs Council (GAC) decided in April 2002 to ask for policy recommendations from the Commission and the Secretary-General/High Representative, Javier Solana, on how to handle a particular set of ‘new neighbour’ countries—Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine—against the background of enlargement. On 18 November 2002 the GAC added some general guidelines for the way ahead, including differentiation (reflecting the individuality of each country), conditionality (linkage with progress in international commitments, democracy, rule of law and human rights), and the fact that actions towards new neighbours would be combined with a ‘strong’ EU commitment to deepen relations with Russia.94 The Copenhagen European Council called for specific proposals to be drawn up by the Commission and Solana, with a view to foreign ministers taking decisions in April 2003. Speaking in the context also of Mediterranean policy, it underlined its general support for using cross-border and sub-regional cooperation as an instrument of outreach objectives, ‘in order to develop the regions’ potential to the full’.95

While this initiative may reflect the most advanced policy making on outreach strategies for a larger EU, other issues of a practical kind remain on the table, such as the re-apportioning of assistance to non-members after the accession of all but two Phare recipients.96 There will be natural differences of outlook and priority in this respect between the EU members that face to the north-east, the east, the Black Sea region and the Mediterranean. The new members have ideas and interests of their own to add to the mix, reflected in Poland’s support for the concept of an EU ‘Eastern Dimension’ along the lines of the Finnish Presidency’s ‘Northern Dimension’ scheme targeted at Russia in 2000.97

An attempt to conceptualize the EU’s outreach strategy as a single sweep, giving the appropriate attention to all neighbours ‘from Minsk to Morocco’, would mean confronting these sometimes stubborn differences. It would,

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93 In this context, recognizing the progress Russia has made towards the establishment of market relations in its economy, the EU has promised to modify its legislation to grant Russia full market economy status. Joint Statement, 9th EU–Russia Summit, Moscow, 29 May 2002, URL <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/gac.htm>.
96 The Phare programme is 1 of the 3 pre-accession instruments financed by the EU to assist the applicant countries of Central Europe in their preparations for joining the EU. Originally created to assist Poland and Hungary, it currently encompasses the 10 candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
97 See the Polish Foreign Ministry non-paper ‘The EU enlargement and neighbourhood policy’, distributed at the Stefan Batory Foundation Conference, Warsaw, 20–21 Feb. 2003; and ‘The EU’s “Eastern dimension”—an opportunity for or idée fixe of Poland’s policy’? (Centre for International Relations: Warsaw, 2002).
however, appear to offer the best chance not only of rational resource distribution but also of doing justice to the transnational and cross-regional nature of many of the security challenges involved.

V. Russian policy in a Euro-Atlantic and regional setting

After nearly a decade of erratic Russian foreign and security policy under President Boris Yeltsin, it was clear by 2002 that the Putin Administration had embarked on a different path. The change in direction had a number of causes, ranging from the progressive weakening of the state, linked to Russia’s social and economic problems, to Russia’s decline in status relative to other major international actors. The new direction moved away from the political obstruction of Western policies and arms control approaches, from the attempts to play European allies off against the USA, and from ostentatious ‘strategic’ partnerships with other actors such as China. Instead, Russian policy has become more firmly anchored to Western and US policies, and particularly to the EU. Russia’s pursuit of renewed superpower status and the search for new spheres of influence, witnessed in the 1990s, appears to have receded and a more realistic accommodation to global politics is at work, with the main aim of consolidating Russia’s position as a decisive regional power in its immediate Eurasian environment.

Russia’s change of direction pre-dated the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 but events in the USA were a catalyst for its formalization. President Putin, aware that the existing passive foreign policy was damaging Russia, saw 11 September as an opportunity to make a strategic choice. Pragmatism and a ‘pro-Western’ outlook in international policy became two sides of the same coin. Russia cannot cope alone with the major threats coming from its southern and eastern borders and requires the cooperation of the USA and other Western nations to counter terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. In this sense, the new policy could be described as a ‘pro-Russia policy’. Putin’s pro-Western attitude is unpopular among the Russian foreign policy and military establishment, including those in the Kremlin, and with public opinion. However, Putin’s strong authority and consistently high approval ratings in domestic opinion polls give him a relatively free hand in pursuing the new course and overcoming resistance from the political elite. It is therefore also legitimate to refer to Russian policy as ‘Putin’s policy’.

The question remains whether the change in Russia is sustainable or merely an expedient tactic to gain some breathing-space (peredyshka) before a return

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98 Russia frequently assures its major Asian partners, China and India, of the importance of their respective strategic partnerships with Moscow, albeit China and Russia each enjoy better relations with the USA than they do with each other.

99 ‘To Russia for love’, The Economist, 18 May 2002, p. 11. The pro-Western line is likely to continue for the following reasons: shared vulnerability to Islamic extremism and terrorism; Russian weakness and US strength; Russian economic need for Western investment; the interests of Russia’s economic elites; and Russia’s desire to be accepted as a ‘European’ country. Lieven, A., ‘The secret policemen’s ball: the United States, Russia and the international order after 11 September’, International Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2 (Apr. 2002), pp. 245–59.
to traditional ways. There remain a sense that Russia’s new policy is not irreversible and a fear that, if the pro-Western policy does not pay dividends, the Russian President may feel compelled to reverse it. As a Russian analyst observed, ‘[t]o a large extent [the] situation can be explained by the fact that President Putin has not created a solid political foundation for his foreign policy course’. Another cautionary factor is that the ‘Westernization’ of Russian foreign policy is not accompanied by similar progress with domestic efforts to build a ‘strong state with controlled democracy’.

In the first decade of this century, Russia is no longer the primary consideration of Western policy. At the same time the West still wonders where Russia is heading and how it should be treated. The new direction has allowed progress in areas where, until recently, Russia had drawn ‘red lines’, procrastinated or even voiced outright opposition. These areas include missile defence systems, the new Russian–US nuclear arms control agreement (the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, SORT) signed in May 2002, and the admission of the Baltic states to NATO.

Russia’s policy shift has yielded some concrete rewards involving new and privileged relationships with NATO and the EU, a more equal status within the Group of Eight and significant progress towards WTO membership. Relations with the USA have been normalized and stabilized, albeit not to the extent that Russia would have wished. While Russia aims for partnership with the USA, it has so far failed to become a fully-fledged strategic partner. This stems from the increasingly asymmetrical relationship that exists between the two countries, as well as a lack of strategic vision on both sides regarding how the relationship should develop. At the same time, there were also a number of issues in 2002 that continued to divide Russia and the USA, especially those concerning the definition and treatment of ‘states of concern’, growing arms sales to China, India and some Middle East ‘rogue states’, and reaction to new and existing threats close to Russia’s borders. However, Russia’s attitude to the countries of the so-called axis of evil is determined by the need to pursue positive and businesslike relations, including diplomatic, economic and trade ties, and to keep a low profile to avoid provoking possible US reprisals, rather than by any strategic aim.

During 2002, over and above its qualified support for the anti-terrorism coalition, Russia made several major concessions and gestures, including the reluctant acceptance of the unilateral withdrawal by the USA from the 1972

102 Having discussed various options for Putin’s future course (a ‘Chinese model’, ‘reformism’, antiterrorism and ‘dual Westernization’), a French observer concludes that ‘all the options remain open’. Vernet, D., ‘La Russie de Vladimir Putin: l’héritier du despotisme oriental se tourne vers l’Occident’ [Putin’s Russia: the heir to eastern despotism turns west], Les notes de l’ifri (Institut français des relations internationales), no. 45 (Oct. 2002).
103 See chapter 15 in this volume.
104 See Menkiszak, M., The Pro-Western Turn in Russia’s Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects (Centre for Eastern Studies: Warsaw, Sep. 2002).
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), which took effect on 13 May 2002, and the related commencement of work on US missile defences; the muted reaction to the increases in the US defence budget; and consent to the location of new US bases in Central Asia and the US military presence in Georgia. Earlier, Russia had decided to close its intelligence centre in Cuba and the Cam Ranh naval base in Viet Nam.105

Russia and the war on terrorism

Russia expressed almost immediate support for US-led anti-terrorism efforts in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks. This decision was the result of both genuine security interests and expediency. Russia feels threatened by the growing wave of discontent and chaos, leading to acts of terrorism, on its southern borders in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It has also sought unsuccessfully to have the ongoing hostilities in Chechnya recognized by the West as part of the global war on terrorism. Nevertheless, its support for the war on terrorism resulted in muted US and West European criticism of human rights abuses perpetrated in the region.

Russia has reduced its military presence in Chechnya several times and has also made a long-term commitment to station only police and special units in the area and hand over civilian power to local authorities.106 However, these local authorities have failed to gain acceptance among the population, being seen largely as a puppet regime.

In spite of Russia’s insistence that Chechen fighters have links to Islamic terrorists outside Chechnya, no evidence has been found to substantiate this claim.107 Terrorist acts committed by the Chechen fighters stem from the vicious logic of the bloody conflict—including ‘cleansing’ operations against civilians and acts of revenge against Russians in return—rather than ideological or religious motives. The hostage taking in a Moscow theatre in October 2002 was a shock for Putin,108 who had come to power promising to quickly subdue the breakaway republic. However, instead of leading to a reassessment of his policy, it strengthened the Russian Government’s determination to stamp out terrorism with all means available.109 Consequently, by the end of 2002, Russia was not pursuing any realistic plan for a political resolution in Chechnya. Instead, it further curtailed access for independent observers to the region and announced that it would not extend the mandate of the The OSCE

105 The agreement on the closure of the Cam Ranh base, once the largest Soviet military base outside the Warsaw Treaty Organization, was signed on 2 May 2002.
106 See chapter 17 in this volume and chapter 2 for an account of the conflict during 2002.
107 There were, however, some radical Islamic fighters who joined the Chechen units in their struggle.
108 The incident is discussed further in chapter 2 and the use of a chemical riot control agent to end the hostage taking is addressed in chapter 16 in this volume.
109 In the wake of the Moscow incident, Putin lashed out at Western correspondents who were critical of the level of civilian casualties in Chechnya and charged the Chechens with a plan to create a caliphate in Russia, while calling them an Islamic threat to global civilization. On 27 Dec. a related attack by suicide bombers destroyed the Chechen government building in Grozny, leaving several people dead or injured.
Assistance Group, the OSCE mission in Chechnya, in 2003. At the same time it started a forced repatriation of Chechen refugees from Ingushetia and insisted on holding a constitutional referendum in Chechnya on 21 March 2003. The referendum was intended to provide proof that the war in the republic was almost over, despite the fact that separatist rebels and federal forces continue to clash there on a regular basis. Given the dissatisfaction of the separatist Chechen leaders with Western interventions, there is a risk that the region may become even more radicalized and susceptible to religious extremism.

Another dramatic aspect of Russia’s war on terrorism in 2002 was the increasing tension between Russia and its southern neighbour, Georgia. President Eduard Shevardnadze’s efforts to gain Georgia more independence from its powerful neighbour have been repeatedly thwarted by Russia’s ambiguous policy, which apparently seeks to keep the Caucasian state in its sphere of influence and force it into a more compliant policy, in particular on Chechnya. Russian allegations that the Georgian Government is harbouring Chechen terrorists have repeatedly tested Shevardnadze’s policy. In September, after a series of threats of military action against Georgia, Putin threatened, but did not carry out, a pre-emptive air strike against armed Chechen and other Islamic extremist fighters on Georgian territory, in the Pankisi Gorge, which borders Chechnya. Russia’s policy vis-à-vis Georgia is evolving as Georgia has declared its intention to join NATO after 2005 and the USA has offered the Georgian Army training and assistance.

Enhanced cooperation with NATO

Enlargement of the two major European organizations and the change in Russia’s policy vis-à-vis the West also gave a stimulus to the setting up of new institutional frameworks for practical cooperation between the West and Russia. Following the initiative of British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the autumn of 2001, NATO eventually agreed to further institutionalize its cooperation and confidence-building dialogue with Russia. This resulted in the creation, on 27 May, of a new NATO–Russia Council (NRC, ‘at 20’), replacing the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC, ‘19+1’). The new forum initially faced strong scepticism from a Russian political elite still mindful of the unfortunate experience of the PJC in the late 1990s. Hedging its bets, Russia insisted on retaining the former framework, while NATO insisted on scrapping it once the NRC was in place. To avoid the failure of the new body, NATO sought to reassure its Russian partner about its willingness to

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110 The separatist President Aslan Maskhadov and his chief emissary Ahmed Zakayev have repeatedly criticized both the OSCE and the Council of Europe for the poor record of their human rights work in the region.
111 E.g., in 2002 Russia offered passports to the people of Abkhazia, a breakaway autonomous republic within Georgia.
112 Georgia had repeatedly denied the charge until Shevardnadze admitted to the possible presence in the region of armed Chechen fighters and promised to handle the problem in cooperation with Russia. See also chapter 2 and 17 in this volume.
strengthen this form of cooperation, including the use of a ‘retrieval clause’ in extreme situations.\textsuperscript{113}

While NATO tends to place emphasis on military cooperation, Russia insists on supplementing it with political interaction. In 2002 both partners were still trying to identify new areas for cooperation.\textsuperscript{114} Since its establishment the NRC has launched several initiatives and activities, including a joint civil emergency exercise in Noginsk (a response to a mock terrorist attack using chemical weapons); the completion of a joint assessment by military authorities of the threat posed to troops in the Balkan states and to civil aviation by al-Qaeda; a submarine rescue agreement;\textsuperscript{115} and an outline for a more thorough assessment of the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD.

Russia was, and still is, opposed to NATO enlargement—claiming that it is irrelevant to the new political and security landscape, in Eastern Europe in particular. The watershed of 11 September 2001 allowed a psychological breakthrough and helped modify Russia’s position, despite the inclusion of the Baltic states in the next round planned for 2004. This stemmed from the cold calculation that resisting the inevitable would be a lost cause.\textsuperscript{116} Consequently, instead of familiar grim tones, the Russian pronouncements were calm and devoid of confrontational undertones. The critical point was reached when Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov stated in July 2002 that Russia ‘feels no fear’ of NATO in the Baltic Sea region.\textsuperscript{117} In symbolic opposition to the enlargement, President Putin did not take part in the NATO Prague summit meeting, but he met President Bush in St Petersburg the following day, 22 November, to reaffirm his willingness to intensify Russia’s cooperation with NATO.

The Kaliningrad issue

Because of its resentment and distrust of NATO, and still cherishing expectations of ‘less militarized’ European cooperation, Russia has pursued enhanced relations with the EU.\textsuperscript{118} The EU–Russia security dialogue notwithstanding,\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{113} The North Atlantic Council is able to ‘retrieve’ topics from the NRC if agreement with Russia is impossible or if a NATO country believes that the Alliance would be militarily compromised. Blitz, J. and Dempsey, J., ‘NATO and Russia seeking closer links’, \textit{Financial Times}, 13–14 Apr. 2002, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{114} US Ambassador to Moscow Alexander Vershbow urged the partners to explore new questions such as whether NATO and Russia should develop military capabilities to work together against terrorism; whether NATO should develop a common missile defence system with Russia; and whether there is a role for Russia in conjunction with the new NATO Response Force, which in turn would provide a stimulus for reform of Russian defence forces. US Department of State, International Information Programs, ‘Build common security, US envoy urges Russia, NATO’, 6 Dec. 2002, \textit{Washington File}.


\textsuperscript{118} However, 1 of the main barriers to deeper cooperation with Russia is the EU’s belief that Russia is trying to play it off against NATO.

\textsuperscript{119} See chapter 6 in this volume.
the most controversial issue in 2002 was the problem of transit between the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and the rest of the Russian Federation in the context of EU enlargement (which would leave the territory flanked by the EU members Poland and Lithuania). EU enlargement was welcomed by Russia apparently as a countervailing act to NATO’s. Its consequences for the status of the oblast, however, had evidently been overlooked or played down by Russia for a long time. Nor did the EU seem to realize the potential gravity of the Kaliningrad situation.

During 2002 the problem of transit was at the centre of EU–Russian relations. Attempts, sometimes heavy-handed, to resolve the issue of movement between the enclave and the rest of Russia had been made by the Russian side in the past decade, for example, through talk of ‘corridors’ linking Kaliningrad with Belarus via Poland. A more subtle version of these ideas, such as ‘visa-free railways’ and sealed trains travelling through Polish and/or Lithuanian territory, appeared in 2002. In a nutshell, Russia’s demand was to lift visa requirements for Russian citizens travelling between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia immediately after EU enlargement. In turn, the EU was only willing to offer measures to make border crossing by Kaliningrad inhabitants ‘smooth, secure and efficient’. However, its time frame for the removal of border controls and the introduction of visa-free transit was much more distant—a decade or more, and then conditional on Russian progress with internal reforms, including combating crime.

President Putin and his special envoy on the Kaliningrad issue, Dmitri Rogozin, warned of grave consequences if EU members did not meet Russia’s demands, including a boycott by Putin of the EU Copenhagen Council meeting. Russia insisted that requiring Kaliningrad residents to obtain a visa simply to visit another part of Russia was both humiliating and unacceptable. The reasons for Russia’s anxiety can be summarized as follows: (a) only one-third of the population have passports; (b) the possible development, among Kaliningrad inhabitants, of an ‘island psychology’ and feelings of being neglected by Moscow; (c) concerns about Russia’s territorial integrity—secessionist trends and even separatism seem to be on the increase; (d) Russians being deprived of their rights to leave and return to their own country; and (e) Putin’s alleged fear that conceding too much to the West would result in a loss of face and weaken his position domestically. On closer inspection, these arguments are not particularly convincing. The EU was offering to expand border and consular facilities to help ensure that borders could be crossed quickly and efficiently. The challenge is to make the procedure as non-discriminatory as possible for Russian citizens, and the application of EU rules as simple and flexible as possible.

On 18 September, in an attempt to address Russian concerns, the European Commission proposed a set of measures regarding transit after enlargement. The package comprised the introduction of special ‘facilitated transit docu-

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ments’ (FTD) for issue to Russian citizens; a promise to assess the feasibility of non-stop, high-speed trains between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia; consideration of a long-term goal of visa-free travel between the EU and Russia; and simplified procedures for the movement of goods by road and rail.121

After a final tough round of bargaining and some adjustment to the September proposals,122 agreement was reached on 11 November between Russia and the EU.123 From 1 July 2003 Russians will be required to have a multiple-entry FTD or a single-return ‘facilitated rail transit document’ (FRTD) to travel through Lithuania. Lithuania agreed to be flexible in its border control and to accept Russian internal passports until the end of 2004. Russia agreed to conclude a readmission agreement with Lithuania by mid-2003 and approve the expansion of the Lithuanian Consulate General in Kaliningrad and the opening of a new one elsewhere in the oblast by the end of 2002. Moreover, it will ‘favourably consider’ requests to open consulates in the oblast from other EU and EU candidate countries.

Russia and Central Asia

As the perceived threats from the east decrease, Russian attention has shifted to its southern borders. Unable to shoulder the burden of dominating its former Central Asian territory alone, Russia has sought various multilateral means of retaining its control over the region. The upgraded political status of Central Asia in the wake of 11 September 2001 created considerable unease in Russia, which was initially resistant to an international force in the region. However, Putin soon signalled Russia’s consent to enhanced military cooperation between the Central Asian countries (with Turkmenistan’s opt out) and the anti-terrorism coalition.124

Russia also attempted in 2002 to breathe new life into the largely symbolic 1992 Collective Security Treaty (Tashkent Treaty) regime, with the apparent aim of regaining lost ground. At the summit meeting in May to mark the treaty’s 10th anniversary, President Putin urged his partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to strengthen the framework and adapt it ‘to tackle the new, non traditional challenges and threats’. He met a cautious

124 Accompanying these developments, the militarization of Central Asia poses a risk of destabilization. The influx of arms and military equipment for the fight against terrorism may, in the longer run, have an adverse effect if used as the only tool to resolve the problems of extremism in the region. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘Central Asia: militarization could come at cost of regional stability’, RFE/RL Newsline, 3 Sep. 2002, available at URL <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/09/03092002142110.asp>.
response from the other five partners. Advised by their foreign and defence ministers to set up a joint military body, the presidents of the CIS states failed to agree on a proposal by Putin to establish a rapid reaction force under Russia’s command, postponing a decision until a later date. At the same meeting the CIS Collective Security Organization was upgraded to a formal organization—the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This was seen mainly as a move by Russia to reassert its position in Central Asia, especially in the light of the impending establishment of a NATO–Russia body.

In 2002 Russia made other moves to reassert its presence in Central Asia. In July a sophisticated Russian-built optical tracking facility was inaugurated in Tajikistan to monitor objects in space. In the wake of Russian–Kyrgyz discussions, initiated in June, President Putin and his Kyrgyz counterpart, Askar Akayev, signed an agreement in early December to establish a Russian airbase as part of a CIS rapid deployment force. At the same time President Akayev confirmed that the US bases will remain in Kyrgyzstan until the end of the ISAF and UN operations in Afghanistan.

Other areas of regional cooperation in Central Asia are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). The SCO became a formal organization in June 2002 with the aims of fighting terrorism, preventing conflicts and ensuring security in Central Asia. Although seen as a Chinese–Russian ‘counterbalance’ to US/Western influence in the region, the organization has suffered from its inadequate response to the terrorist threat from Afghanistan. The CICA members signed the Almaty Act on 4 June 2002. The large scope and structure of the forum, however, makes it unlikely that the CICA will quickly become an ‘Asian OSCE’. The heterogeneous character of this loosely knit body, which has existed since 1992, makes it difficult to predict its future.

125 The CSTO now comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Tashkent Treaty in 1999.
128 For a detailed discussion of Russian–CIS relations see Adomeit, H. and Reisinger, H., Russia’s role in post-soviet space; decline of military power and political influence (Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies: Oslo, 2002), pp. 4-16.
129 For membership of the SCO and the CICA see the glossary in this volume.
131 For the text of the Almaty Act see Strategic Digest (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: New Delhi), vol. 32, no. 6 (June 2002), pp. 881–86.
VI. Conclusions

The trends reported above, which have continued into 2003, may be summed up as changes in the nature of the Euro-Atlantic security community combined with challenges to the unity and coherence of Euro-Atlantic (or ‘Western’) values. There are at least three, partly conflicting, processes at work. The first is the continued spreading of Atlantic and European institutions and methods of security making—most obviously to include the new members invited to join NATO and the EU in 2004, but also affecting a large number of countries along the new EU and NATO borders (including Russia) that are adopting similar practices with or without the specific goal of membership. The growing US influence in Central Asia may be seen as a further geographical extension of the process, albeit so far without the same institutional framework or normative effect.

The second tendency is the exposure of diversity, sharpening into open rifts, within this extended ‘Western’ family—between the USA and Europe on the one hand, and among European states on the other (where the responsibility clearly lies with the conflicting visions of ‘old’ European states rather than ‘new’ ones). Although the Euro-Atlantic family has survived many, arguably equally serious, divisions over strategy and over individual operations in the past, the current disputes have some more fundamental and ideological traits which may be put down to the conceptualization of new US national defence strategies on the one side and the ‘Europeanizing’ effects of 50 years of EU integration on the other.

The third feature is a shifting strategic relationship between the Western heartland and the rest of the world, itself with several strands: greater exposure (or consciousness of exposure) in the West to threats of distant origin; greater emphasis by the USA in particular on the need to contemplate security-driven interventions anywhere around the globe; a tendency by the USA to seek allies in remote regions with which it can reach a more uncritical agreement on combating new threats than with most European states; and the autonomous growth in many regions of integrative regional security experiments on a quasi-EU model.132 The most optimistic overall interpretation would be that the world is witnessing the turbulence involved in movement towards a multipolar system, cushioned by the globalization process which increasingly pushes towards a single world security and economic agenda. The most pessimistic would be that a corner is being turned towards deinstitutionalization and towards a world governed by power play, the nature of which is as unstable in the longer term as it seems unipolar in the short term.

132 See the Introduction in this volume, and the example of the African Union in appendix 1A.