2. Conflict prevention

RENATA DWAN*

I. Introduction
The prevention of violent conflict, as an issue of international concern, is a relatively new item on the agenda of multilateral forums. Discussion of the concept of conflict prevention since the mid-1990s has focused on the desirability and feasibility of international preventive action. In 2001, however, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) attempted to move conflict prevention from concept to practice by charting new directions. In somewhat similar processes both the UN and the EU set out frameworks for the principles of conflict prevention of their member states, reviewed existing preventive tools within their organizations, recommended institutional changes to improve and broaden the scope of these instruments, and proposed strategies for intra- and inter-organizational coordination to facilitate the effective implementation of prevention. The comprehensiveness of these reports, the high level at which they were considered and the policies they can potentially lead to mark a coming of age for conflict prevention as a norm in international politics.

Section II of this chapter traces the rise of conflict prevention as an international priority issue. Section III examines the UN and EU reports on prevention and the substance of their recommendations. In section IV two cases are examined—West Africa and Zimbabwe—in which the UN and the EU have attempted to adopt and implement some of the proposals for preventive action contained in their respective documents. Section V addresses the effect of the international response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the future development of conflict prevention.

Appendix 2A reviews the multilateral peace missions of 2001 and contains a comprehensive table of data on these missions.

II. The rise of conflict prevention
The release of major reports on conflict prevention by the UN and the EU in 2001 marked the culmination of efforts under way since the mid-1990s to establish conflict prevention as a priority issue within the international community of states and in multilateral and non-state organizations.¹ This has come about for a number of related reasons.


* Sharon Wiharta assisted in the research for this chapter.

SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
First, the end of the cold war changed perceptions about the incidence of conflict. The termination of superpower rivalry increased awareness of the prevalence of intra-state conflict around the world. Some such conflicts had been seen as consequences of East–West confrontation, while others had been ‘contained’ by a mixture of superpower sponsorship and coercion.

Second, the reduction of East–West tension has provided a more conducive climate for consideration of the causes of conflict. Within academic and policy-making circles there has been a shift away from the study of the dynamics of war to the wider cycle of conflict: the structural and short-term causes of conflict, the conditions in which disputes become violent, the effects of conflict on individuals and societies, the processes of conflict resolution and the substance of peace-building. This new discourse was reflected at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000 when, for the first time, the Security Council formally acknowledged economic, social, cultural and humanitarian grievances as root causes of armed conflict.2

Conflict prevention can be defined as political, economic or military actions taken by third parties to keep inter- or intra-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violence. This definition includes action taken in post-conflict situations to avoid a recurrence of violence, strengthen capabilities for peaceful resolution of disputes and alleviate the underlying problems producing them.3 The breadth of this definition makes it an issue of wide potential engagement: multilateral forums that previously had little engagement in peace and security issues, such as the Group of Eight (G8), have begun to address conflict prevention as a policy concern.4

Third, influential state and non-state actors have exerted concerted pressure to put the issue on the international agenda. A range of peace- and development-focused non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have lobbied governments in Europe and North America to adopt more comprehensive approaches to conflict and its prevention, the most influential of which was the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.5 Its study on the causes of conflict and the requirements of a functional system for prevention, led by an eminent international board, provided a widely quoted assessment of the costs of conflict. It estimated that the international community spent approximately $200 billion on seven major military interventions in the 1990s and calculated that preventive action in each case would have saved the inter-

---

4 G8 Roma initiatives on conflict prevention’, Conclusions of the meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers, Rome, 18–19 July 2001, Attachment 2. For the members of the G-8 see the glossary in this volume.
5 Other leading NGOs active in promoting conflict prevention as a policy include the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, the International Crisis Group, International Alert and Saferworld.
The commitment of the UN Secretariat to the cause of conflict prevention has helped raise the profile of such reports. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan assumed his position with a commitment to move the UN from a 'culture of reaction to a culture of prevention'. Under his leadership the UN Secretariat has reformed its internal structures to incorporate conflict prevention as an area of interdepartmental concern and taken external initiatives to develop partnerships with regional organizations, the private sector and civil society. This new approach has encouraged critical examination of the UN's own weaknesses, most notably in the publication of two reports on the consequences of the failure to adopt a preventive approach in the conflicts in Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Rwanda.

Annan's success in orienting the UN towards prevention has hinged, ultimately, on the support of the member states. States such as Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and, increasingly, Japan and the UK have undertaken a comprehensive review of the relationship between development, governance and conflict. As a result, they have revised their national development aid policies to give greater emphasis to the political context of aid delivery. At the multilateral level, these states have driven the preventive agenda in the forums in which they participate and have provided crucial back-up to the initiatives of NGOs and international organizations to establish conflict prevention as a norm in international relations. Sweden, for example, made conflict prevention a key priority of its presidency of the EU in the spring of 2001. Non-European regional organizations with a peace and security mandate, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have also taken steps to develop institutional capacity for conflict prevention, with the active encouragement of this international constituency. The EU, for example, has provided funds for the establishment in 1999 of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention.

8 Most national development policies had hitherto focused largely on economic development and poverty reduction. The British Government has gone furthest in reorienting a substantial degree of its development assistance activities around conflict prevention. For more information see the Foreign Office Internet site, URL <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/keytheme.asp?pageid=254>.
11 The OAU member states adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union on 11 July 2000; it entered into force on 26 May 2001, formally establishing the African Union (AU), with headquarters in Addis Ababa. The AU will replace the OAU after a transitional period.
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, which includes regional early-warning offices as well as intergovernmental bodies.\textsuperscript{12}

The combined effect of these efforts has been to encourage the detailing of the concept and practice of conflict prevention to facilitate a more concrete, forceful set of policies and activities. If prevention was in the past seen as an inoffensive concept to be used primarily as an interstate confidence-building measure, today’s concept heralds a comprehensive new way of engaging in international politics. In practice, this makes it a far more controversial idea than its definition would suggest.

III. The UN and EU reports on conflict prevention in 2001

The active efforts of the conflict prevention constituency described in section II help explain the fact that the UN Secretary-General’s report of 7 June 2001 was released just days before the European Council’s adoption of the Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts at its meeting in Gothenburg, Sweden, on 15–16 June. The UN Secretary-General’s report, the EU Programme and the EU Commission’s Communication of 11 April 2001 all differentiate between long-term (structural) prevention, which addresses the root causes of conflict, and short-term measures, which aim to prevent existing disputes from becoming violent. Moreover, all three embrace a comprehensive approach to the root causes of conflict and advocate that the bulk of international preventive effort be focused on long-term conflict prevention with an emphasis on sustainable development. They share a similar perspective: that a wide range of political, economic, social and military tools exist to address violent conflict and that both the UN and the EU are already engaged in a wide range of either indirect or deliberate preventive activities. The reports place emphasis on the need for greater coherence of current policies and better coordination between instruments and actors at both the intra- and the inter-institutional level. They represent, in essence, an attempt to create a new conflict prevention framework within which all current and future activities should take place.

The UN Secretary-General’s report

The UN Secretary-General’s report of 7 June 2001 was the result of the second Security Council discussion of conflict prevention, in July 2000, and of the decision to invite Kofi Annan to submit an analysis of and recommendations on the role of the UN system in prevention.\textsuperscript{13} The length of time taken to


\textsuperscript{13} United Nations (note 1). Conflict prevention was formally addressed in a Security Council meeting for the first time in a 2-day debate on 29–30 Nov. 1999.
prepare the report and the fact that it was addressed to both the Security Council and the General Assembly illustrated the UN Secretariat’s desire to avoid the negative reaction provoked in the General Assembly by the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known as the Brahimi Report after Lakhdar Brahimi, chair of the high-level panel established by the Secretary-General in March 2000. Many states felt that the Assembly had not been adequately consulted in the preparation of the Secretary-General’s report and that the finished product reflected primarily the views of Western states. The report went out of its way not to offend states that, in some cases, may be the most obvious candidates for international preventive action. The cautious tone demonstrates that consensus on conflict prevention remains far from universal. The document, in its essence, is a claim for the legitimacy of conflict prevention as a focus of international concern.

The Secretary-General’s report builds its case on the premise that the primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national governments and that preventive action assists, rather than undermines, the national sovereignty of member states. The report argues that the UN Charter (Chapter 1, Article 2, paragraph 3) makes prevention an obligation for member states and that placing it at the centre of the international system is to bring the UN back to its core mandate. It is the potential threat of conflict prevention to the principle of non-interference in national affairs that makes the implementation of the idea so controversial for many states and the greatest obstacle to overcome among UN member states.

A key theme of the report is the link between conflict prevention and development. It stresses that an investment in national and international efforts for conflict prevention must be seen as a simultaneous investment in sustainable development since the latter can best take place in an environment of sustainable peace. This emphasis is intended to meet the concerns of some developing states that fear that a Western-led focus on prevention may result in diminished and/or more conditional development assistance. It is also an argument to convince sceptical donor countries that conflict prevention is a core component of sustainable development assistance, even if the benefits of investing in conflict prevention may not be immediately evident.

The key word in the Secretary-General’s review of the preventive role of the principal bodies in the UN system is ‘coordination’. This not only is a consequence of the multidimensional nature of conflict but also reflects the wide range of existing preventive efforts already under way. The challenge is one of mobilization of collective potential rather than of introducing new instruments

---

17 See the comments made during the General Assembly review of the Secretary-General’s report, UN Press Release GA/9890, 12 July 2001.
and resources. This perspective underscores the reality facing the Secretary-General: that UN member states are unwilling to make a substantial financial outlay in support of reinforced prevention.\footnote{See the comments made during the Security Council’s consideration of the Secretary-General’s report, UN Press Release SC/7081, 21 June 2001.}

Despite these broad approaches, the report does make a number of specific recommendations to improve UN preventive capacity. The Secretary-General commits himself to submitting periodic regional and sub-regional reports on conflict prevention to the Security Council and suggests that it establish an informal working group to discuss prevention cases on a continuing basis. The report also advocates increased dialogue on prevention between the Security Council and the General Assembly and recommends the creation of an open-ended group of states within the Assembly to facilitate this dialogue. It lauds the increase in the number of Security Council fact-finding missions and recommends their use for short-term preventive purposes. The UN Secretariat commits itself to more inter-agency technical assessment and confidence-building missions as well as to the creation of prevention task forces for specific regions. Another undertaking is the establishment of an informal group of eminent persons to advise the Secretary-General on prevention.

Internal institutional changes have been under way since 1998 to incorporate a preventive focus into decision making and to increase coordination within the UN system.\footnote{For more on conflict prevention mainstreaming see Björkdahl (note 9) and Dwan (note 9).} The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has been designated the focal point for UN prevention and has established an internal conflict prevention team. It convenes the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, which addresses system-wide preventive action. The Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination was reoriented towards early-warning and preventive action in 1998. Its 14 members (which include UN agencies and the World Bank) meet monthly to exchange information and assess potential conflict and complex emergencies. The UN staff also participate in training workshops on early warning and prevention in a course administered by the International Labour Organization (ILO) International Training Centre in Turin, Italy. Measures which have been recommended include the establishment of a UN-wide unit for policy and analysis to improve the DPA’s capacity to analyse and follow up on information received from desk officers as well as a staff dedicated to conflict prevention within the Secretariat.\footnote{The creation of this unit was first proposed in the Brahimi Report but this proposal has so far not received General Assembly support.} The Secretary-General’s report also recommends that conflict prevention activities be funded from the regular UN budget rather than from the Trust Fund for Preventive Action, which suffers from perennial financial shortfalls. This proposal reinforces the Secretary-General’s argument that, although the Secretariat and agencies can do much to improve the UN’s preventive capacity, the UN will fall far short of effective preventive action without the political will and active commitment of the member states.
The Security Council held a one-day open debate on 21 June 2001 to discuss the Secretary-General’s report.\textsuperscript{21} Although the report was broadly welcomed, the lack of discussion of its substantive proposals illustrated the continued ambivalence of many member states towards conflict prevention. In such contexts, the breadth of the concept becomes a weakness, as the unfocused discussion demonstrated. It was not until 30 August that the Security Council adopted a resolution on conflict prevention, cast in the most general of terms.\textsuperscript{22} Although the Security Council recognized the 10 principles proposed by the Secretary-General to place prevention at the core of the UN system, it did not adopt the substantive suggestions for an informal working group on prevention or for increased cooperation with the General Assembly. Rather, the Council expressed its willingness to give ‘prompt consideration’ to cases brought to its attention by the Secretary-General or a member state and its commitment to take ‘early and effective action’. To the extent that the tone and content of the resolution almost mirrored the July 2000 statement of the President of the Security Council,\textsuperscript{23} it must be seen as a disappointing outcome.

The General Assembly’s reaction was even more limited and testified to the persistently controversial nature of active conflict prevention. Although member states were mollified by the emphasis on the Assembly’s role in creating a culture of prevention, the final resolution, adopted on 13 August 2001, did nothing more than draw the attention of states, regional organizations and civil society to the report and request them to consider its recommendations. It also called on UN bodies to undertake a similar process and report their views to the Assembly during its next (56th) session.\textsuperscript{24} The General Assembly’s handling of the report on conflict prevention demonstrated that, for all its expressed desire to play a more significant role, the Assembly is unable to provide the coherence required for it to serve as a forum for substantive discussion or for collective action. This was amply illustrated in the debate on the report on 12–13 July 2001, which degenerated into a spat between Israel, Lebanon and Syria.\textsuperscript{25}

The EU documents

The UN Secretary-General’s view that regional organizations can contribute to conflict prevention in a number of specific ways would seem to be borne out by the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts.\textsuperscript{26} When considered along with the European Commission Communication on Conflict

\textsuperscript{21} United Nations Press Release (note 17).
Prevention, the EU programme represents a ground-breaking step in the collective implementation of preventive action at the regional level and contrasts markedly with the general, basic level of the UN debate.

*The Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*

The elaboration of an EU agenda for conflict prevention was an innovation of the Swedish Government when it held the EU presidency from January to June 2001. Sweden’s declaration of this goal well before assuming the presidency and its commitment to steering the draft through the European Council were important elements in the successful conclusion of an EU agreement at the summit meeting in Gothenburg in June. The political ground had been set by the European Council’s decision at its meeting in Cologne, Germany, in 1999 to develop the EU’s capacity to take decisions ‘on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union’ (the Petersberg tasks). Member states claimed that the international community has a political and moral responsibility to act to avoid violent conflicts, which the EU, itself a successful example of conflict prevention, cannot ignore.

The Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts represents a commitment by the EU heads of state to establish conflict prevention as a priority for EU external action. The specific elements include a broad consideration of potential conflict issues at the outset of every presidency (i.e., every six months) to identify priority areas and regions for EU preventive action. This is intended to help set coherent preventive objectives and strategies for the EU, the implementation of which is to be monitored by the Council of the European Union. The EU heads of state, in marked contrast to the UN, emphasized early warning and analysis, and assigned specific EU bodies responsibility for the provision of regular information on potential conflict situations through standardized formats and reporting methods. The programme also commits the EU member states and the European Commission to enhancing the EU’s short- and long-term conflict prevention tools and stresses the need for ‘partnerships for prevention’ with the UN, regional organizations and civil society. In this light it declares its intent to intensify information exchange with other institutions and suggests that joint training programmes in conflict prevention be developed for field and headquarters personnel of the EU, the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Funding for training support would come from the Commission: the programme makes no commitment to increase funding for prevention policies. Member states are encouraged to develop national action plans to increase their conflict prevention capacity and to assist in bringing prevention into all the relevant EU institutions. The 15 EU member

---


states agreed that the first progress report on the implementation of the programme should be submitted to the European Council in June 2002.

Although the programme is not a detailed document, it does provide a road map for a comprehensive EU preventive approach. This was immediately evident when the subsequent Belgian presidency fulfilled the new commitment to hold a broad discussion of priorities at the outset of each presidency. At the meeting on 16 July 2001 the Council noted the intention of both the Commission and the Council Secretariat, specifically the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy Unit), to present more detailed regional/sub-regional reports on ongoing or emerging conflict issues to the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC).\(^{29}\) The fact that the PSC meets on a weekly basis makes it a more suitable forum for monitoring prevention policies than the monthly meetings of foreign ministers in the General Affairs Council (GAC).

The Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention

The most comprehensive review of European Community policies and tools related to prevention, together with substantive recommendations for future EU conflict prevention policy, is contained in the Commission’s Communication on Conflict Prevention, presented in April 2001.\(^{30}\) This was a follow-up to the joint paper on conflict prevention presented by the Commission and Javier Solana, the Secretary General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to the Nice meeting of the European Council in December 2000 and represented the Commission’s contribution to the EU Programme.\(^{31}\) The Commission addressed the wide range of external policies that fall under Community competency, arguing that the main target of EU efforts should be long-term prevention (defined as ‘projecting stability’).

As the world’s largest aid donor, the EU uses its development policy and cooperation programmes as its most powerful preventive tools. The incorporation of preventive perspectives and the systematic coordination of Community instruments to implement them are to be achieved through the elaboration of Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) for each recipient of European Community aid. These papers will use agreed indicators to analyse potential conflict situations and, where conflict risk factors are identified, prevention measures will be integrated into Community programmes. The Commission also noted its intention to address more comprehensively in its support programmes democratic governance issues such as electoral processes, parliamentary activities, the rule of law and security sector reform.\(^{32}\) The increased use of political dialogue, in which the EU engages with all partner countries, should also be considered for more short-term preventive action. This, the Commis-


\(^{30}\) Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention (note 26).


\(^{32}\) For a discussion of security sector reform see chapter 4 in this volume.
tion underscored, requires that member states take a common political line on
the situation in question. A procedure for political dialogue with partner states
on contentious issues of concern to the EU, established in the 2000 Cotonou
Agreement, has already been put in place within the EU framework for
development assistance and trade relations with African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) countries.33

Coordination among actors was a second key theme of the Commission
Communication, a sensitive issue within the complex governance structure of
the EU. At the intra-EU level, the Commission emphasized the need for
increased coordination with member states and its intention to exchange CSPs
with corresponding national documents (e.g., on bilateral development aid
programmes). A pilot system for information exchange has also been set up
between the Commission, the Council Policy Unit and member state desk offi-
cers for two areas—the Balkans and the African Great Lakes Region.
Increased cooperation on short-term preventive action between the Com-
mission and the CFSP structures in the Council Secretariat, especially the
High Representative, was also stressed. These include measures such as
regular reviews of potential conflict zones, including the establishment of
early-warning mechanisms, a coordinated approach to the use of political
dialogue and more use of EU Special Representatives. Coordination with other
international actors included proposals for integrating discussion on early-
warning and monitoring systems into the political dialogue with partner coun-
tries, structured dialogue with the UN on conflict prevention, the exchange of
documents, common staff training programmes in prevention with the OSCE
and the Council of Europe, and co-financing of the funding instruments of the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Within the Commission, structures have been established to help implement
the new approach. The Directorate-General for External Relations created a
unit for conflict prevention, crisis management and African, Caribbean and
Pacific issues in late 2000; it is responsible for coordinating the Commission’s
prevention activities and liaising with the Council Secretariat on early-warning
and crisis prevention strategies. An Inter-service Quality Support Group has
also been established to review CSPs in order to ensure that cross-cutting
issues, such as prevention, are incorporated in them. Guides are also being
developed (e.g., a Conflict Prevention Handbook) to help desk officers in
identifying and developing projects with preventive measures. A Rapid Reac-
tion Mechanism has been set up to enable the release of funds for short-term
crisis reaction activities.34

The EU Programme for Prevention and the Commission’s Communication
point to the role a regional organization can play in activating conflict preven-
tion. The smaller membership size and common cultural/political perspectives

33 The Cotonou Agreement is a partnership agreement between the members of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part and the European Community and its member
states of the other part, signed in Cotonou, Benin, on 23 June 2000. The Cotonou Agreement is also
called the ACP–EC Partnership Agreement. EU document ACP/CE/EN, available at URL <http://
europa.eu.int/comm/development/cotonou/agreement_en.htm>.
of regional organizations facilitate consensus, which in turn can help states take a common position on issues of preventive action. A regional organization’s capacity for early warning and monitoring may be enriched by greater knowledge of and contacts in its own neighbourhood. The high degree of integration in the EU may further facilitate information exchange and intelligence sharing between member states on vulnerable situations. However, the EU is an atypical regional organization in its wealth and other resources, degree of integration and extra-regional reach. EU conflict prevention, therefore, is unlikely to provide an easily adaptable model for other regional actors.

The EU’s new conflict prevention goals pose significant challenges to the organization, whose external profile has often been less than the sum of its parts. Its complex structure and multiple components provide serious obstacles to either swift or effective action on a cross-cutting issue such as prevention. Successful implementation depends on political leadership from the Council and follow-up from successive EU presidencies, as well as the development of active information and coordination frameworks between member states, the Commission and the Council, to develop real policy coherence.\textsuperscript{35} It also requires the commitment of financial resources. This latter issue was noted by the European Parliament in its review of the Commission Communication, which called for a wider political debate in Europe and an increase in the budget for external actions.\textsuperscript{36}

IV. Prevention in practice: West Africa and Zimbabwe

The UN and EU documents were intended as guidance to move conflict prevention from a rhetorical expression to a practical policy. In 2001 both organizations made concrete efforts to implement some of the commitments outlined in their respective reports. This section explores UN and EU preventive efforts with regard to two areas of identified vulnerability: the threat of all-out regional conflict in West Africa and the reality of domestic conflict in Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{37} In so doing, it illustrates some of the potential as well as the limitations of international preventive action.

Regional conflict in West Africa

West Africa has experienced some of the most severe and sustained conflicts in the post-cold war period, with devastating effects on national states and populations. The current regional instability began in 1989 with civil war in Liberia, a seven-year conflict that displaced 80 per cent of the 2.5 million population.\textsuperscript{38} The conflict had spread to Sierra Leone by 1991, when rebels of


\textsuperscript{37} For a discussion of these conflicts see chapter 1 in this volume.

the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began making incursions across the Liberian border into Sierra Leone. The catastrophic consequences of the war in Sierra Leone included the displacement of at least 70 per cent of the 4.5 million population. This war was declared ended only in January 2002. The influx of refugees into bordering Guinea led to serious political instability, violence against refugees and rebel attacks in Guinea. Tensions between the three countries of the Mano River Union (MRU)—Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone—increased dramatically in the second half of 2000 with fighting along the Guinean–Liberian and Guinean–Sierra Leonian borders. By early 2001 Guinean and Liberian troops had been deployed to their joint border and fighting had spread across the border into Guinea. Liberia also faces growing conflict within its borders as attacks by anti-government forces in northern Lofa County mount. Economic growth in the MRU states has been non-existent: Liberia and Sierra Leone lie, respectively, in 174th and 175th place on the UN Human Development Index for 2000, and Guinea is ranked the 8th least developed country in the world.

Neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, currently the most stable and economically developed country in the West African region, has undergone a period of domestic turbulence and increasing economic woes. Political tensions are also high in Guinea-Bissau, while fighting between separatist rebels and the government in the Casamance Province of nearby Senegal threatens a peace agreement signed in March 2001. With the possibility of complete regional implosion looking increasingly likely, the UN and the EU put new emphasis on prevention in West Africa in 2001. The sub-region (as it is described by the UN) presents a real challenge for preventive efforts.

First, it has multiple, interconnected conflicts at a variety of different stages, none of which can be addressed independently. Second, a wide variety of international strategies are required simultaneously—pre- and post-conflict prevention as well as conflict mediation, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building. Third, there are many different regional and extra-regional actors already involved in West Africa, making coordination a real challenge. Fourth, the UN and the EU have both been engaged in West Africa for some

---


time, but adopting a new preventive approach requires changes in established policies and bureaucratic processes.

**UN efforts**

The need for an interlocking approach to the cycle of instability in West Africa was clear to UN peacekeepers deployed in Sierra Leone and to humanitarian aid officials working in the region long before tensions among Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone had reached a critical point.\(^{44}\) The UN Security Council acknowledged the regional nature of the crisis following its mission to Sierra Leone in October 2000.\(^{45}\) In December 2000 the Secretary-General established an Inter-Agency Task Force on West Africa under the coordination of the DPA. This task force, heralding the approach emphasized in the Secretary-General’s report, was instructed to undertake a mission to take stock of sub-regional priority needs in security, humanitarian affairs and development, to consult with governments and ECOWAS on enhancing cooperation with the UN, to make recommendations for a sub-regional strategy to help address identified challenges and to propose how international support for such a strategy could be mobilized. The mission included representatives from the main UN agencies as well as a representative of ECOWAS. By the time the task force undertook its mission to the region, on 7–27 March 2001, the situation had deteriorated sufficiently to prompt it to warn of a possible ‘domino effect’ in the entire West African sub-region unless urgent political, economic and social progress was made.\(^{46}\)

Concern for regional stability was the basis of the imposition of Security Council sanctions on Liberia on 7 March, effective from May 2001. Resolution 1343 bans the export of diamonds from Liberia and imposes an arms embargo on the country as well as travel restrictions on senior officials of the Liberian Government until Liberia ceases financial and military support to the RUF and expels the RUF from its territory.\(^{47}\) The decision to impose sanctions on the regime of President Charles Taylor was, in turn, the result of a report on the violation of the ban on diamond exports from Sierra Leone, an inquiry that convincingly demonstrated how Liberian involvement had prolonged and intensified Sierra Leone’s war.\(^{48}\) A panel of experts was appointed by the Secretary-General on 29 March to monitor violations of the sanctions as well as Liberia’s compliance with Resolution 1343. Its first report recommended the expansion of the arms embargo to state and non-state actors in all three

---

\(^{44}\) The Mano River Union was established among the 3 countries in 1973 with the aim of increasing sub-regional economic integration.


countries of the MRU.\textsuperscript{49} ECOWAS, which had objected to the imposition of immediate sanctions and won the reprieve of two months for Liberia, also established a monitoring mechanism to assess Liberia’s compliance with UN sanctions. In April 2001 the mission travelled to Liberia with delegates of the UN Sanctions Committee.\textsuperscript{50}

West Africa came under Security Council consideration again on 14 May, when the report of the March Inter-Agency Task Force mission to West Africa was discussed.\textsuperscript{51} The mission proposed a number of concrete steps to implement a regional strategy for peace and security issues, the most controversial of which was the expansion of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to cover all three MRU countries. Such a step would require a new mandate for UNAMSIL and was immediately rejected by the Security Council. The report made additional recommendations that mirrored the strategy marked out in the Secretary-General’s report. These include the establishment of a UN Office for West Africa, to be headed by a Special Represen-


tative of the Secretary-General, the strengthening of the presence of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the region, proposals for integrated UN agency programmes that address all aspects of the conflict as well as international donor conferences to mobilize financial support for two vulnerable West African countries, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. On 26 November 2001 the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intention to establish the proposed regional office in Dakar, Senegal, from January 2002. Its mandate is to enhance the coherence of UN activities in the region, to liaise with ECOWAS and other international actors, and to carry out good-offices roles on behalf of the Secretary-General, especially in the area of conflict prevention and peace-building.

The UN Security Council’s lack of enthusiasm for extending UNAMSIL’s duties to monitoring the Sierra Leonean–Liberian–Guinean borders may be comprehensible in the light of UNAMSIL’s past problems and ongoing difficulties. However, it illustrates the general absence of will in the UN to undertake preventive deployment and, more specifically, new peace operations in Africa. It also reinforces the significance of ECOWAS as the UN’s main interlocutor for peace and security issues in West Africa. The UN takeover of the former ECOWAS-led peace operation in Sierra Leone brought the two organizations into close, if sometimes difficult, contact, although their cooperation in Sierra Leone improved with the creation of the Coordinating Mechanism for Sierra Leone in 2000 between ECOWAS, UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Government. In the case of border tensions among the MRU countries, ECOWAS continues to play the dominant mediating role. As early as November 2000 the organization dispatched a technical mission to investigate the border crises and, at its Bamako summit meeting one month later, approved the deployment of a 1700-strong ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force along the common Guinean, Sierra Leonean and Liberian borders. A mediation committee comprising the presidents of Mali, Nigeria and Togo was subsequently set up to facilitate conflict resolution. Although the three parties to the conflict approved the creation of the ECOMOG force and although Niger, Nigeria, Mali and Senegal pledged troops, by the end of 2001 the peace operation had not yet been deployed. This is in part because Guinea and Liberia refuse to sign the Status of Forces Agreement enabling ECOMOG forces to be deployed on their territory, preferring to deal unilaterally with what they describe as insurgencies. Another factor, emphasized by ECOWAS, is UN Security Council authorization and assistance for

53 Dwan, SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (note 2), pp. 82, 102–103; and Reno (note 39).
ECOMOG’s deployment. The UN Inter-Agency Task Force mission to West Africa concluded its report with a recommendation for a West African integration framework, with ECOWAS at its centre. If ECOWAS is to play the central role that the UN would like to see it play, especially in mediation, preventive deployment and peacekeeping, then it will require substantial new resources from and active partnership with the UN.

EU efforts

Since 1997 the EU has adopted a series of Common Positions on the conflicts in Africa, including the 1998 Common Position on human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa and, most recently, the 14 May 2001 Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. These policy documents emphasize the role of the EU as a supporter of African regional organizations’ peace efforts. However, the 2001 Common Position also commits the EU to develop a proactive, integrated approach to conflict prevention and crisis management and to take new steps to promote coordination with other actors in this field. The implication of this Common Position would be to give the EU an enhanced political profile in the African continent beyond that of Primarily a provider of substantial humanitarian and development aid.

In West Africa, where the EU is the region’s leading development cooperation and trade partner, a regional aid approach has been in place alongside bilateral support programmes. This was given a new political framework in June 2001, when the EU foreign ministers, in line with their new prevention programme, identified West Africa as one of the regions where the EU would increase its attention and seek priority cooperation with the UN in conflict prevention, management and resolution issues. The outgoing Swedish presidency offered to assist its Belgian successor in developing an EU policy on the political and humanitarian crises in West Africa. In a step reflecting a recommendation of the European Commission’s Communication, a Swedish diplomat, Hans Dahlgren, was appointed the Special Representative of the Presidency of the European Union to the countries of the MRU. His mandate is to follow developments in the three countries with a view to proposing appropriate EU action, pursuing dialogue with the UN and ECOWAS to identify coordinated measures to deal with the crises, encouraging dialogue between the three MRU states, supporting the disarmament and demobilization process in Sierra Leone, and maintaining contact with Liberia regarding its conformity with UN sanctions.

Dahlgren travelled to the MRU countries in October and
December 2001 to pursue these tasks and will report to the EU Council in June 2002.

In his discussions with UN and ECOWAS officials in the region, the Special Representative of the Presidency of the European Union noted the EU’s willingness to provide more financial support for prevention and peace-building initiatives. This has so far been borne out. In July 2001 the EU agreed a new aid package to Liberia that included a €25 million programme for the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). This was supplemented in October 2001 by a €5.1 million programme for refugees and IDPs in Sierra Leone and Guinea. In line with the new commitment to political dialogue with partner countries, the EU began consultations with Liberia in November 2001 to discuss human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, making its position clear that the Liberian Government would have to take concrete initiatives to comply with the terms of the Cotonou Agreement. These negotiations are to continue and will shape the EU’s decisions on its future aid to Liberia. During the year similar negotiations took place with Côte d’Ivoire authorities, following the suspension of EU cooperation in response to the government’s handling of the national elections held in 2000. After three months of discussions the EU agreed to the gradual resumption of aid to the country, with full cooperation dependent on a six-monthly review of the situation. These actions illustrate that, although development aid will remain the EU’s main tool for external relations, the Commission is determined to give it a new political–security dimension and make it more effective in achieving EU policy goals.

Although the EU emphasizes coordination with the UN in conflict prevention, it has made efforts to deepen relations with African regional organizations, particularly the OAU, its main interlocutor for issues relating to peace and security. ECOWAS has become increasingly important to the EU, however, since relations between the two organizations were established in 1998. The EU–ECOWAS ministerial meetings in October 2000 and 2001 symbolized this new recognition. During these meetings, the EU foreign ministers reiterated their commitment to continue providing assistance for the development of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. However, the 2001 ministerial meeting was somewhat strained by the suspension of EU aid to Togo as a result of government efforts to amend constitutional electoral procedures and to clamp down on political opposition in that country. This illustrates one of the barriers

64 EU Press Release, 13789/01 (Presse 412), 9 Nov. 2001.
to the development of an active partnership between ECOWAS and the EU in long- and short-term prevention.

The impact of EU and UN preventive activity

It is impossible to draw causal connections between the activities of the UN and the EU in West Africa and events on the ground during the course of 2001. Nevertheless, if conflict prevention is to become a policy reality for international and regional organizations, then some assessment of the impact of UN and EU activities in the region is desirable. By the end of 2001 West Africa was still a region in turmoil, with one of the world’s most serious humanitarian crises (in the MRU). Fighting between Liberian government forces and armed dissidents in the north-west of the country surged in December 2001, causing further flights of refugees and more strain on relations with Guinea and Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, war has not broken out between the three MRU countries and the parties have been persuaded to back down from some more inflammatory actions (e.g., Liberia’s expulsion of the Guinean and Sierra Leonean ambassadors). The situation in Sierra Leone, on the other hand, has stabilized, in large part because Liberia terminated its active support to the RUF, as demanded by the UN Security Council. This has permitted UNAMSIL to gradually expand its presence to almost all parts of the country, including diamond-producing centres formerly under RUF control. UNAMSIL completed the disarmament of over 37 000 former combatants by the end of 2001 and is providing assistance for the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled to take place in May 2002.

UN and EU preventive actions in West Africa in 2001 were short-term and reactive, coming late in the day to prevent a complete conflagration of the region. The difficulty of swift reaction was particularly marked in the UN: three months passed between the establishment of an Inter-Agency Task Force and its dispatch to the region, and it took a further six weeks after the return of the task force for its report to be considered in the Security Council. Subsequently, seven months passed before a UN Office for West Africa was established. Moreover, UN Security Council discussions demonstrated how reluctant the UN member states are to consider preventive deployment or further peacekeeping commitments—at least as regards Africa. Nonetheless, the fact that the UN and the EU maintained and intensified their focus on the region was a significant development. UN sanctions against Liberia and Secretary-General updates on UNAMSIL brought West Africa to the Security Council’s attention on a regular basis.

---

67 ‘UNHCR get figures wrong in Guinea’, BBC News Online, 4 June 2001, available at URL
70 See appendix 2A.
In contrast, the formal structure of the EU’s relations with external actors provides for regular policy reviews at the ministerial and working levels. At the same time, the way in which the EU took up West Africa in the second half of 2001 demonstrates the significance of the EU presidency in setting priorities for the Council’s agenda. Whether the Special Representative of the Presidency to the region will play an active role in shaping EU policy on West Africa depends on successive presidencies—and the EU Representative’s own government—giving him the wherewithal to do so. Without some form of political leadership from the Council, the substance of EU external relations in Africa will remain development aid administered by the European Commission.

Despite their last-minute nature, the UN and EU actions demonstrated the organizations’ appreciation of the need to address the structural causes of West Africa’s crises. The UN Inter-Agency Task Force mission provided a comprehensive road map of the wide range of social, economic, humanitarian and security problems that need to be tackled and demonstrated that its specialized agencies, already on the ground, are the best placed actors to deal with massive humanitarian emergencies. The design and provision of EU aid illustrate that its comparative advantage lies in its regularity and its focus on long-term capacity development. Another strength of EU development assistance is its inclusion of mechanisms for political dialogue with the states concerned. It enables the EU to traverse sovereignty-sensitive issues of internal governance while keeping channels open with the particular government. The UN’s coercive instruments—primarily sanctions—may be stronger, but the EU has a wider and more scaled range of tools from which to choose.

Ultimately, however, coordination has been the key to efforts to stem the rising tide of conflict in West Africa. In 2001 the UN and the EU prioritized relations with the region’s primary institutional actor, ECOWAS, and as a result established a more coherent international voice than has previously been heard in West Africa. Regular communication, formalized meetings, joint missions in the region and financial support were important elements of this approach and helped secure coordination with regard to the peace process in Sierra Leone, sanctions on Liberia and mediation in the MRU crisis. The renewed focus on ECOWAS as a partner is, undoubtedly, a reflection of the lack of alternative partners in the region as well as of the Western reluctance to become embroiled in its conflicts. However, it also reflects a heightened awareness that regional strategies for prevention and crisis management are needed and that sustainable peace is, ultimately, dependent on local actors. ECOWAS remains a troubled regional organization, not just because of its lack of an institutional capacity but also because the conflicts it is called on to manage are those between and within its own members. All these countries face significant social, political and economic domestic problems, not least Nigeria, the leading power in the organization. Therefore, if ECOWAS is to play the ambitious role envisaged for it, it will need a sustained, active

72 For a comprehensive discussion of sanctions see chapter 5 in this volume.
partnership with, and assistance from, the UN and the EU. Regional preventive strategies must be international in substance.

**Civil conflict in Zimbabwe**

Zimbabwe represents a contrasting, although no less challenging, case of international conflict prevention—an intra-state crisis that has not yet become a violent conflict, in a country formerly seen as an African ‘success story’. Zimbabwe has had a relatively good rate of development (117th on the UN Human Development Index for 2000) and is acknowledged as a powerful actor in sub-regional and African politics. Its current demise illustrates how development is not exclusively progressive and points to the significance of bad governance as a cause of conflict.

Zimbabwe has been in a political crisis since February 2000, when the government was defeated in a referendum on changing the constitution so as to permit President Robert Mugabe to remain in office for an additional 10 years with increased powers. This opened the possibility that Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) Party might lose power in the 2002 parliamentary elections for the first time since 1980, when Zimbabwe gained independence. Mugabe seized on the long-standing grievance of land reform to secure voter support. His regime, through inflammatory speeches, the overriding of Zimbabwean High Court rulings and the passivity of the police authorities, facilitated the violent invasion of white-owned farms by ZANU–PF supporters and war veterans. The fact that a new political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), garnered enough votes in the June 2001 elections to become the first serious opposition to Mugabe’s regime, with power to block constitutional amendments, has continued to keep the redistribution of land ownership a central issue. Although there is an agreed basis for resolving the issue between Zimbabwe and international donors, the most important of which is the UK, the former colonial power in the country, Mugabe’s government has continued to champion rapid land seizures and resettlement. The effect of this violence on the agriculturally based economy has been catastrophic: Zimbabwe has been described as one of the world’s fastest shrinking economies. By late 2001 this former food exporter was importing grain from neighbouring South Africa, while a World Food Programme (WFP) emergency intervention was under way to provide food for an estimated 550,000 people in need. Over 70,000 people were internally displaced during 2001 and an estimated 500 Zimbabwean refugees crossed the South African border daily.

---

73 UN Development Programme (note 42).
As the March 2002 presidential election approached, the government’s disregard for the rule of law turned into overt oppression. Zimbabwe’s only independent daily newspaper was regularly charged for spurious criminal offences and was twice bombed, and foreign news organizations faced increasing restrictions. Mounting laws curbing freedom of speech and association accompanied violence and political intimidation against lawyers, journalists, trade unionists and political opposition figures. Zimbabwe displays every classic sign of a country disintegrating into violence.

**UN activities**

The fact that the UN has remained almost mute on Zimbabwe’s political crisis cogently demonstrates its limitations as an early-warning or preventive actor. The sanctity of the sovereignty principle among member states rules out UN engagement in domestic political affairs until a conflict has or is about to spread beyond national borders. The only likely exception, as the intervention in Kosovo partly illustrated, occurs in cases in which UN Security Council members are sufficiently interested and united to take up a particular conflict. UN aid agencies, including the WFP and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), undertook missions to Zimbabwe in late 2001 to assess the food and land reform situation in the country. In January 2002, for the first time in over a year, Secretary-General Annan addressed the situation in the country, noting his concern at the imposition of restrictive laws and supporting the efforts of the sub-regional organization, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), to facilitate free and fair elections in Zimbabwe.

**EU activities**

The EU, by contrast, has been engaged to an unprecedented degree in an attempt to halt Zimbabwe’s international and domestic demise. This has been influenced by its role as an aid donor—the EU provides €11.9 million annually to Zimbabwe—and the UK’s efforts to put Zimbabwe on the Council agenda, particularly as bilateral relations between the two countries deteriorated. In February 2001 the EU warned Zimbabwe that its human rights record threatened the continued provision of EU aid and one month later, during a visit to Europe by President Mugabe, it initiated the political dialogue procedure of the Cotonou Agreement. This effort to effect change in Mugabe’s policies through negotiation yielded little result, forcing the Council to issue a warning in May 2001 that it would review its approach to the crisis. On 25 June 2001 the EU foreign ministers spelled out the progress the EU

---


---
expected to take place in the next 60 days, including an end to the official encouragement of political violence, an invitation to the EU to observe the 2002 elections, concrete action to protect media freedom, compliance with judiciary decisions and an end to illegal farm occupations. If Zimbabwe failed to comply, the Council warned, ‘appropriate measures’ would be taken.81

Despite the absence of any sign of progress over the summer, the EU did not impose any punitive policies against Zimbabwe after its 60-day deadline had expired. Although there was speculation that economic sanctions would be imposed, political dialogue consultations dragged on until the end of October 2001, when the EU warned Mugabe that he had one last chance to take steps towards the restoration of the rule of law and free and fair elections. The threat was explicit this time: failure would result in the imposition of sanctions at the end of January 2002.82 On 11 January 2002 a meeting was held in Brussels between a high-level Zimbabwean delegation and the EU at which another stiff warning of EU action was given and another round of assurances provided by the Zimbabwean representatives.83 Although the EU acknowledged the futility of pursuing the political dialogue procedure further, the EU foreign ministers pulled back from imposing any kind of sanction at their meeting on 28 January 2002. Instead, they pressed Mugabe to permit EU observers into the country ahead of the March elections and noted their concern at the 9 January 2002 threat by the head of the Zimbabwean armed forces that the military would not accept the outcome of the presidential election if it did not agree with the result.84 Meanwhile, according to the influential NGO Human Rights Watch, ‘the atmosphere of intimidation has been so intense that the presidential elections . . . cannot be free and fair’,85 while Amnesty International reported that, between late December 2001 and early January 2002, 10 people were killed by ‘state-sponsored militia’.86

The evident lack of impact of EU actions on the Zimbabwean Government’s activities throughout 2001 is a consequence of a number of factors central to conflict prevention policies. First and foremost, the EU has been internally divided on how to approach Zimbabwe’s political crisis and what combination of policies should be applied. Some EU states, notably the UK, have cut bilateral aid substantially and others, such as Denmark and Sweden, have frozen all assistance to the country. France, in contrast, significantly increased its aid to Zimbabwe in 2001.87 As a result, repeated EU threats have had little coercive power because the likelihood of actual punitive action has been weak.

85 HRW (note 78).
One of the main reasons behind this lack of unity among the 15 EU member states is the link between Zimbabwe and the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).\(^8\) Since its intervention on the side of the DRC Government in 1998, Zimbabwe has been a key actor in international negotiations to end that conflict. The interest of Belgium and France in securing peace in the African Great Lakes Region has made them keen to forge a cooperative, rather than a combative, relationship with Mugabe. The Zimbabwean President’s visit to both countries in March 2001, in parallel with the start of the EU’s tough line in the political dialogue, demonstrated how much the credibility of an international threat depends on the unity with which it is delivered. Such unity is much harder to achieve when the target of the threat is a significant international actor.

Another main reason behind the EU’s wavering line lies in the problematic nature of sanctions.\(^9\) Almost all EU member states agree that a halt to development aid and the imposition of economic sanctions would adversely affect Zimbabwe’s citizens rather than the political elite responsible for the crisis. Zimbabwe’s opposition party, the MDC, as well as the country’s neighbours signalled that economic sanctions would be dangerous for the situation in the country.\(^9\) However, Mugabe’s domestic opponents, along with human rights groups, have called for targeted sanctions against the regime in the form of travel bans and a freeze of the assets of senior officials.\(^9\) The EU foreign ministers concluded that even the imposition of limited sanctions could prompt Mugabe to prevent foreign observation of the March 2002 presidential election and exploit the sanctions for his own political gain.

The lack of unity and coordination between the international and regional organizations involved with Zimbabwe—the EU, the Commonwealth of Nations, the OAU and the SADC—is the third main reason for the failure of EU action to prevent the deepening crisis. One element of this is the general sensitivity of African–European relations. President Mugabe has proved adept at manoeuvring European warnings to his own advantage by playing on colonial legacies and making the most of Zimbabwe’s standing in African politics. At the July 2001 OAU summit meeting,\(^9\) he sought and gained the support of other African leaders for his land resettlement programme. The OAU Council of Ministers stressed the UK’s responsibility, as the former colonial power, and rebuked it for allegedly trying to mobilize the countries of Europe and North America against Zimbabwe.\(^9\) The sensitivity of land issues among


\(^{9}\) For a more comprehensive discussion of sanctions see chapter 5 in this volume.


\(^{9}\) This was the last summit meeting of the OAU. See note 11.

many African states, along with the OAU’s emphasis on the sovereignty principle, rules out the OAU as a partner for EU preventive action in Zimbabwe. Belatedly, the EU turned to the Commonwealth of Nations and the SADC in an attempt to coordinate international efforts.94

The Commonwealth of Nations,95 under British pressure, has attempted to engage in the crisis and coordinate its actions with those of the EU. It is within this forum that negotiations between the UK and Zimbabwe over the funding and administration of land reform have taken place. Its mixed geographical membership has helped avoid a north–south cleavage on the issue. On 7 September 2001 a special Commonwealth meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, adopted the Abuja Agreement, by which the UK would provide financial assistance (£36 million) in exchange for Zimbabwe’s implementation of land reform. In return, Zimbabwe agreed to end illegal occupations of land, to restore the rule of law and to work with the UNDP in the implementation of land reform.96 However, even before questions could be raised as to how the Abuja Agreement would be implemented, there were reports of new farm seizures.

The Commonwealth’s weakness as a preventive actor lies in its lack of political and economic tools. For example, the deal it brokered between the UK and Zimbabwe did not include any provisions as to actions to be taken if Mugabe failed to abide by the agreement. The postponement of the Commonwealth summit meeting in October 2001 merely cemented this lack of follow-up power.97 A Commonwealth Committee delegation visited Zimbabwe in October 2001 to review progress on the agreement but was itself divided on whether the fundamental issue was land reform or the rule of law.98 Mugabe continued to prevaricate over the Commonwealth Secretary-General’s request to send a mission to the country. He was comfortable in the knowledge that the next summit meeting, scheduled for March 2002, would take place too late to put insurmountable pressure on him before the election. Zimbabwe’s suspension from the organization, the Commonwealth’s most powerful coercive weapon, had no consensus among the member states.99

The SADC,100 the EU’s potentially most valuable partner in the region, has been the most reluctant of all organizations to become involved in the problems of one of its members. Despite international exhortations that it should play an active regional role, South Africa, the organization’s leading power,
maintained a low-key diplomatic approach towards neighbouring Zimbabwe until August 2001, when the SADC summit meeting agreed to establish a ministerial task force to address Zimbabwe’s land crisis. SADC heads of state travelled to Harare, Zimbabwe, in early September and held an extraordinary summit meeting there to underscore their support for the Abuja Agreement. A committee was set up to monitor developments and is scheduled to meet every few weeks to assess progress. Concern over regional and domestic stability has shaped the SADC states’ actions towards Zimbabwe. South Africa, in particular, was reluctant to become involved in the debate about Zimbabwean land reform precisely because it faces its own land resettlement problems. Nor were southern African states keen to provoke active opposition movements that could influence their own domestic politics. Finally, the countries neighbouring on Zimbabwe, such as Mozambique, are heavily dependent on it for food exports, markets and even aid. The fact that continued repression and instability in Zimbabwe now threaten the economic and political climate of the entire region is the motivation for SADC action since September 2001. Although the tone of the states neighbouring on Zimbabwe has become considerably more critical, by the start of 2002 regional and international actors were still some distance from each other in terms of coordinating a united approach to the country. In the absence of international coordination and regional political leadership, external preventive efforts have little effect.

V. Prevention after 11 September 2001

The international environment in which the UN and EU conflict prevention reports were presented in June 2001 was fundamentally changed by the terrorist attacks on the USA three months later. The shock generated by the attacks and the responses that have followed them carry serious repercussions for the international adoption and practice of conflict prevention.

The most immediate consequence is distraction. By virtue of their broad nature, the UN and EU Council programmes were intended to start, rather than to conclude, greater consideration of conflict prevention at the international, regional and national levels. Their release just prior to the start of the summer vacation period in Europe and North America gave little opportunity for this process to get under way before September. The attacks of 11 September catapulted international attention onto the threat of global terrorism and this attention has been glued fast by the subsequent US-led intervention in Afghanistan. Every UN-recognized international and regional organization issued a declaration against terrorism in the wake of the attacks, and the subject has been on every multilateral agenda, for example, the agendas of subsequent EU–
Conflict prevention, as a new subject on the international agenda and one that is non-time-specific and broad in scope, has little chance of maintaining significant political attention. This is particularly true in cases in which it has not yet been institutionalized in the structures and systems of an international organization or national government. Political leadership, in such situations, is central to successful follow-up. By the end of 2001 the prospect of such leadership looked doubtful in both the UN and, to a lesser extent, the EU.

Approaches to the threat of terrorism have the potential to incorporate much of the central tenets of conflict prevention. Issues such as the root causes of terrorism, structural and short-term approaches to its prevention, the broad range of state and non-state actors involved, and the multiple tools required to address terrorist threats are precisely the issues with which conflict prevention research and policy making have grappled over the past decade. Initially, it seemed that international organizations and states might incorporate the preventive framework into their approach to terrorism. For instance, the European Council, at its extraordinary meeting on 21 September 2001, declared that the fight against terrorism required the EU to ‘play a greater part in the efforts of the international community to prevent and stabilize regional conflicts’. Efforts to address the threat would be ‘all the more effective’ if they were based on ‘an in-depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism comes into being’. The UN Security Council’s third resolution in the aftermath of the attacks similarly acknowledged that the fight against international terrorism required a sustained, comprehensive approach that addressed regional conflicts and ‘the full range of global issues, including development issues’. US Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking in support of this resolution, promised that the war against terrorism would be fought ‘with increased support for democracy programmes, judicial reform, conflict resolution, poverty alleviation, economic reform and health and education programmes’.

However, the subsequent global effort against terrorism has moved away from a preventive focus and is now characterized as a ‘war against terrorism’. In this narrower approach, the preventive concept is severely circumscribed. Prevention of terrorism, as currently practised, consists of measures taken to stop international terrorism, cut off the financial, political and military sources of terrorist support and, where possible, apprehend terrorists before

---


they commit acts of terror. Although this approach employs a broad range of instruments, it is coercive and short-term in character. It is in origin and practice distinct from the concept of conflict prevention that was elaborated over the past decade and reflected in the UN and EU documents of 2001. Indeed, the current approach to the prevention of terrorism risks undermining the entire notion of conflict prevention.

It does this in a number of direct and indirect ways. First, although international cooperation against terrorism embraces a wide range of military and non-military instruments, the attacks on Afghanistan have inevitably focused attention on the military elements and given vent to the idea of a global military engagement against terrorism. Important as this may be, there is some risk that the prioritization of military relations between states will undermine the important progress forged in the post-cold war world in broadening international affairs so as to take greater account of non-military issues and the legitimate engagement of non-state actors. Second, the war against terrorism has led to the forging of new relationships between states that were formerly at odds with each other. In many cases, these differences centred on the domestic policies of a state. Improved regional and international cooperation on shared threats may indeed contribute to stability and peace. However, the extent to which states such as Pakistan, Sudan or Tajikistan are called upon to assist in the fight against terrorism may constrain the international community’s willingness to engage with these countries on such sensitive questions as governance and human rights. Indeed, for a number of states, the discourse on the war against terrorism is providing a means for legitimating a more aggressive approach to domestic and regional dissent. The global effort against international terrorism marks the appearance of a new paradigm in international politics. It is important that it does not undermine the norms that have so recently been established.

110 The renewal of US–Pakistani relations and the resumption of US aid blocked since Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon, in 1998, constitute the most obvious examples.
111 Examples are Israel’s depiction of its conflict with Palestine after the assassination of Tourism Minister Rehavam Zeevi on 17 Oct. (e.g., Morris, H., ‘Sharon’s call’, Financial Times, 18 Oct. 2001, p. 14) and India’s characterization of its actions towards Pakistan after the 13 Dec. suicide attack on the Indian Parliament (e.g., Chandrasekaran, R., ‘Pakistan and India spar with sanctions’, International Herald Tribune, 28 Dec. 2001, p. 1).