1. Major armed conflicts

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I. Introduction

In 2001 the security challenges faced by most countries of the world were similar to those that have prevailed since the end of the cold war. All of the 15 major armed conflicts reviewed in this chapter were intra-state conflicts. Although they developed according to their own dynamics, they were often influenced by outside events and actors. Most of the conflicts also had an impact on neighbouring states, as certain effects were felt across international borders in what is commonly called ‘spillover’. The potential for spillover from intra-state conflict to lead to interstate conflict was highlighted by the increased tensions between India and Pakistan caused by the violence emanating from the disputed territory of Kashmir.

The conflicts in 2001 pitted rebels using guerrilla tactics against regimes using repressive counter-insurgency strategies, in some cases combined with conventional military tactics. It was rarely the case that either side displayed much interest in winning the support of the population. Civilians were regularly the victims of violence perpetrated by both sides.

Most conflicts were sustained by revenue from the sale of natural resources, on the one hand, and the purchase of arms and ammunition, on the other hand.1 In general, the trade in resources and arms by governments was considered to be legitimate, while the same trade by rebel groups was considered to be illegal.2 Regardless of the legal status, the flow of money and arms enabled both sides to continue to pursue their objectives on the battlefield. While governments usually had considerably more wealth and military power than the rebel groups they opposed, the nature of guerrilla warfare meant that they could not take advantage of the disparity to end the conflicts through military means.

The conflict in Sierra Leone was the only one that appeared to end in 2001, mainly because the rebels lost the support of neighbouring Liberia. As a consequence, they abandoned their control of diamond-mining areas in accordance with a peace plan implemented by the United Nations. In the long-running conflict in Afghanistan, the overwhelming military power of the United States led to the rapid defeat of the Taliban regime. However, occa-

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1 In some cases, such as Sri Lanka, an important source of revenue for rebels was remittances from supporters living abroad.

2 Some countries were the subject of economic sanctions or arms embargoes or both. In those cases, some forms of trade by the government were also considered to be illegal.

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SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
sional intense battles continued, traditional rivalries re-emerged, and the ultimate outcome of the conflict has yet to be determined.

These two examples demonstrate the importance of external influence on internal conflicts. In most cases, the supply of military matériel by state and sub-state actors and overt military intervention by states served to prolong and intensify the conflicts. Other states and intergovernmental organizations attempted to counteract this type of external influence through mediation and promotion of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Negotiations in six of the conflicts reviewed in this chapter held out the possibility of peace. New agreements were signed or existing agreements were implemented in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Philippines and Sierra Leone. In Sri Lanka, the two sides engaged in informal negotiations at the end of the year. Three of the conflicts deteriorated considerably in 2001. In Colombia, Indonesia (Aceh) and the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, fighting intensified and peace talks collapsed or were non-existent. In the remaining six conflicts there was no marked increase in violence or in the likelihood of negotiated settlements.3

The intra-state conflicts not only were influenced by external actors but also affected their external environments. Of the 15 most deadly conflicts in 2001, 11 spilled over international borders.4 Most commonly, they threatened to destabilize neighbouring states through the burden of refugees, cross-border movement of rebels (and occasionally national military forces), and the undermining of legitimate economic and political structures through the illicit trade in resources and arms. The regional dimension of conflict was most clearly visible in the African Great Lakes region, where the conflicts in Angola, Burundi and the DRC are interlinked and have a destabilizing effect on Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Intra-state conflicts may also have a direct impact beyond their immediate region, as demonstrated by the 11 September attacks in the United States by the Afghanistan-based al-Qaeda network.

Although the general pattern of conflict worldwide in 2001 was consistent with that of previous years, the priorities and perceptions of many states changed as a result of the terrorist attacks in the United States. The campaign against terrorism by the United States and its allies in the latter part of the year directly influenced a small number of conflicts, as noted throughout the chapter in the appropriate places. Beyond its immediate ramifications, the campaign against terrorism has brought to the fore a number of conflict-related issues, the full scope of which remains to be seen. These include the militarization of responses to terrorism, the global role of violent sub-state actors, and the connection between intra- and interstate conflict.

Before 2001, terrorism was perceived largely as a type of violent political action waged on a limited scale in the location of a dispute. It was usually addressed using the tools of criminal investigation, policing and the criminal

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3 These 6 conflicts are Algeria, Angola, Kashmir, Russia (Chechnya), Somalia and Sudan.
4 There was minimal spillover of the conflicts in Algeria, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The last 3 are island states, which makes spillover to other countries less likely because of the natural barrier.
justice system. In 2001 terrorism came to be regarded as politically or religiously motivated violence that could be perpetrated with few limitations and that required the waging of a military campaign against terrorist groups throughout the world. The militarization of efforts to control terrorism holds the potential to intensify ongoing conflicts as governments use the rhetoric of counter-terrorism to overcome the international diplomatic constraints on the use of force. It may also increase the number of major armed conflicts, as seen in the apparent US interest in attacking Iraq in retaliation for its alleged sponsorship of terrorism.

The global role of sub-state actors was previously recognized in the context of their efforts to mitigate conflict. For example, Médecins sans Frontières, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs have all received the Nobel Peace Prize in recent years. The use of commercial aircraft by the al-Qaeda network to obliterate a global financial centre brought into shocking relief the destructive potential of sub-state groups. It also highlighted the effectiveness of the classic guerrilla tactic of surprise strikes against unprotected targets. Although 11 September was not the first time in which guerrilla tactics had been used on an international scale, the high profile of the attacks has caused some states to re-examine their national security needs and has drawn attention to sub-state groups as potential threats to international peace and stability.

The preoccupation with terrorism and the predominance of intra-state conflicts diverted attention from the danger of potential interstate conflict in 2001. The rapidity with which an interstate conflict can arise was demonstrated in October, when the USA attacked Afghanistan in retaliation for the September terrorist attacks. A reminder of the potential for catastrophic interstate conflict came in December, when India and Pakistan came close to a significant military escalation of their dispute over the territory of Kashmir in the wake of terrorist attacks in India by extremists based in Kashmir and Pakistan. Both countries possess nuclear weapons and neither has ruled out their use in the event of a war.

Sections II–VI of this chapter review major armed conflicts in the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and South America. For each conflict, information is provided on the parties, their objectives, the major events in 2001, the human costs and the regional impact. Section VII highlights the major findings of this review.

For the purposes of this chapter, a ‘major armed conflict’ is defined as the use of armed force between two or more organized armed groups, resulting in the battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people in any single calendar year and in which the incompatibility concerns control of government, territory or

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The conflicts reviewed below conform to this definition and, in addition, caused over 100 deaths in 2001. Major armed conflicts that were not intense enough to cause 100 deaths are not described in this chapter but do appear in table 1A.3 in appendix 1A.

II. Conflicts in Africa

The biggest changes in the conflicts in Africa in 2001 took place in Burundi, the DRC and Sierra Leone. A peace accord was signed by most parties to the conflict in Burundi; a new leader in the DRC helped to revive the stalled peace accord signed in 2000; and the Sierra Leonean Government and rebel groups implemented the peace accord signed in 2000. Two regions demonstrated the ways in which a conflict in one country can increase violence and sustain conflicts in neighbouring countries. In the Great Lakes region, progress towards peace in the DRC threatened to escalate the level of violence in Burundi as rebel forces moved across borders. The DRC conflict also served as a location for the Rwandan Government to fight its opponents, many of whom fled Rwanda for the DRC in 1994. In West Africa, the presence of Sierra Leonean rebels along the borders of Guinea and Liberia threatened to ignite a region-wide conflict, as Liberia supported Sierra Leonean and Guinean supported Liberian rebels. In spite of these developments, there were no new major armed conflicts in Africa in 2001.

Algeria

The conflict between the government and Islamic rebels that began in 1992 continued in 2001. An estimated 100 000–150 000 people, most of whom were civilians,7 have been killed in fighting between the Algerian Government and two rebel groups—the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front), the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA, Armed Islamic Group) and the Jamiyy’a Islamiyya Da’wa wal Jihad (variously translated as the Islamic Group for Mission and Holy War, the Islamic Group for Call and Combat, and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Salvation, usually referred to by the French acronym GSPC).8

Throughout 2001, attacks on civilian and military targets consisted of ambushes along mountain roads and hit-and-run operations in towns. The incidents occurred in all of the heavily populated northern regions.9 Most of

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6 This definition is based on the one developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project but differs from it in that it does not require a government to be one of the parties to the conflict and in that it takes into account conflicts that are motivated by communal identity and not clearly about government or territory. See appendix 1B for information on the definitions, sources and methods used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project to generate table 1A, appendix 1A.


8 In French, the group is known as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) or Group Salafiyyyste de Da’wa et Jihad (GSDJ).

the killing took place in the outskirts of major towns, allowing guerrillas an easy retreat to the mountains.\(^\text{10}\) While it is likely that the rebels are responsible for many of the attacks, a group of dissident soldiers and some activists in France have accused the Algerian military of massacring civilians for political reasons and then blaming the rebels.\(^\text{11}\)

Neither the GIA nor the GSPC is strong enough to hold territory. Their weakness was revealed during the summer, when they did not capitalize on the political upheaval created by violent protests among the Berber community, who make up about one-third of Algeria’s population of 30 million.\(^\text{12}\) Nevertheless, the rebels show no sign of stopping their violent activities and the government does not appear to be able to bring an end to the conflict through either political or military means.\(^\text{13}\) The government estimated that a total of 700–800 rebels were still active in 2001, a low figure compared to the 6000 who have surrendered since 1999. The number of killings has consequently dropped, but there were nonetheless about 2300 deaths in 2001.\(^\text{14}\)

**Angola**

Since 1975 the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) have fought for control of the country, with the MPLA holding governmental power since 1975.\(^\text{15}\) Throughout 2001, the conflict remained deadlocked. Although the government military is about 90 000 strong and has ample oil revenue to pay for weapons and operations, most observers consider it unlikely that the government can achieve a military victory over the approximately 8000 guerrilla fighters of UNITA.\(^\text{16}\)

Despite the international sanctions on ‘conflict diamonds’ coming from unlicensed sources in Angola, a thriving illicit market persists. The UN Moni-
The diamond and arms trades are two of the transmission belts by which the Angolan conflict spills over into neighbouring countries. The main reason why the Angolan military has been engaged in the war in the DRC on the side of the DRC Government is to try to shut down supply routes that UNITA has maintained there for decades. Relations between Angola and Zambia, to the east, were strained in 2001 by several incursions by Angolan troops into Zambian territory in pursuit of rebels. For years the Zambian Government has hosted a large population of Angolan refugees, some of whom trade diamonds, arms and fuel with UNITA and whose movement across the border the Zambian Government is unable to control. Zambia does not allow Angola to attack UNITA members on Zambian territory. The Zambian military killed Angolan army troops along the border soon after an alleged incursion by Angola that killed several Zambian civilians. In contrast, Namibia, Angola’s close ally to the south, allows cross-border attacks by the Forças Armadas de
Angola (FAA, Armed Forces of Angola) and occasionally sends its own troops into Angola in pursuit of UNITA fighters.23 The continued violence and lawlessness throughout much of Angola prolonged the suffering of civilians. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported in July that malnutrition and mortality rates in Bie province exceeded emergency levels.24 The situation was not unique. A lack of housing, food and medical assistance plagued the majority of the population of 12 million. The most common estimate is that over 500 000 people have been killed in the 26-year war and 3.6–3.8 million people have been displaced, including tens of thousands who were forced to flee in 2001.25 Revenue from rich diamond and oil deposits supports the war effort rather than basic social services, which are in a state of neglect.26

Burundi

The main development in Burundi in 2001 was the establishment on 1 November of a transitional government in accordance with the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in Arusha, Tanzania, on 28 August 2000. The achievement of former South African President Nelson Mandela, with strong support from the UN Security Council, the European Union and the Regional Peace Initiative,27 in bringing 19 parties together in a compromise agreement was welcomed as a significant step towards ending the civil war that began in 1993. To date, the conflict has killed over 200 000 people, about half of them during the first year. In a population of 6.7 million, it has caused the prolonged displacement of nearly 900 000 people, about one-third of whom are refugees, and the destruction of the social, economic and physical infrastructure. Thousands of people were killed and tens of thousands more were displaced by the fighting in 2001.28

In early February heavy clashes occurred in the south between the army and rebel groups.29 At the end of the month, the Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu–Forces Nationales de Libération (PALIPEHUTU–FNL, Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People–National Liberation Forces, known as the FNL) launched one of the biggest offensives of the war on the northern outskirts of Bujumbura and around Gitega, where fighting continued through the end of the month.30

26 Save the Children Fund (note 25); and ‘Oil, diamonds and danger in Angola’, The Economist, 13 Jan. 2001, p. 38.
27 The members of the Regional Peace Initiative are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The UN, the Organization of African Unity and the Implementation Monitoring Committee are represented in the initiative.
the capital Bujumbura. The battle lasted for nearly two weeks, killed hundreds and displaced as many as 50,000 civilians before the rebels retreated to the surrounding hills.\textsuperscript{30} There was also an upsurge in fighting in the central and southern provinces that caused massive destruction and displacement.\textsuperscript{31} The rebel groups involved were the FNL and the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD–FDD, National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for Defence of Democracy, known as the FDD).

The increase in violence in the first half of the year appeared to be related to early efforts to implement the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Accord in the DRC (see below). Many of the rebels engaged in the attacks had recently entered Burundi from the DRC.\textsuperscript{32} For several years the DRC Government allowed the FDD and the FNL to operate in the DRC in an attempt to disrupt the Congolese rebels who control the part of the DRC that borders Burundi.\textsuperscript{33} As the situation in the DRC became more stable and the possibility increased of disarming or expelling ‘negative forces’ in compliance with the Lusaka Accord, the Burundian rebels returned to Burundi by the thousands.\textsuperscript{34} Other rebels who left the DRC went to Tanzania, where the Tanzanian Government has either no means or no desire to prevent the recruitment and training of rebels or cross-border attacks into Burundi.\textsuperscript{35}

In this volatile environment, Peace Agreement Facilitator Mandela introduced the power-sharing proposal that would ultimately serve as the basis for an agreement, although most parties to the talks rejected the proposal at the time.\textsuperscript{36} An agreement on a transitional arrangement was reached among 19 political parties on 23 July 2001.

On 1 November a new, three-year government was put in place. Its primary task is to end the civil war. For the first 18 months, President Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, will serve as president. His vice-president is Domitien Ndayizeye, the Hutu head of the main opposition party, the Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu, Democratic Front of Burundi). During the second 18-month period, Ndayizeye will serve as president and the Tutsi parties will designate a vice-president. An Implementation Monitoring Commission was established under UN leadership to oversee the transition. A special protection unit was agreed by the parties and endorsed by the UN Security Council to


\textsuperscript{32} IRIN-CEA (note 29).


\textsuperscript{34} Turner, M., ‘Fears grow over the build up of rebel forces in Burundi’, Financial Times, 26 June 2001, p. 6; and ‘Rwanda/Burundi: negating the negatives’, Africa Confidential, 28 Sep. 2001, p. 8.


protect returning exiled politicians and possibly assist the reform of the military. South Africa was the main contributor of troops, with 1500 soldiers in Burundi by the end of the year.

In response to the transitional agreement, the FNL and the FDD declared that they would continue fighting. Battles with government forces persisted for the rest of the year, particularly in the north-east, where rebel soldiers had arrived from the DRC. The intensification of fighting made it impossible to carry out the provisions for the transitional phase, such as the return of displaced persons and reform of the security institutions.

The focus at the end of the year was to broker ceasefire agreements between the transitional government and the two rebel groups. The FNL and the FDD both gave conditional approval for negotiations with the government. Normally rivals, they announced a joint negotiating position for future talks, to be chaired by Gabon. The prospects for successful talks seemed poor. The FDD was estimated to have about 10 000 troops and the FLN about 5000 arrayed against the government’s 40 000 soldiers. The rebels also received support from the DRC, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. However, although they have the ability to be a potent fighting force, the rebels are politically fractured. This makes a consistent rebel negotiating position difficult, undermines the transitional government’s trust in the rebel negotiators and raises the possibility that some rebel factions will continue to fight even if others decide to make peace.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The assassination of President Laurent Kabila on 16 January 2001 and the succession of his son, Joseph Kabila, shifted the political ground in the DRC and gave new life to the effort to end the war that began in 1998. The elder Kabila had refused to cooperate with the United Nations or with the facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue—the primary diplomatic mechanism for implementing the Lusaka Peace Accord—former Botswanan President

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41 Interim report of the Secretary-General (note 37).
45 ‘Burundi/Congo-Kinshasa: piecemeal’ (note 44).
46 There is no agreement about who is responsible for killing the president. The DRC Government blames Rwanda, Uganda and their rebel allies, but there are also rumours of a plot by the DRC military, Angola or Zimbabwe. ‘Congo leader shot by guard: Belgium says Kabila died in an attempted coup’, International Herald Tribune, 17 Jan. 2001, pp. 1, 8; ‘Congolese enemies accused in slaying’, International Herald Tribune, 24 May 2001, p. 4; and ‘Kabila is dead, long live Kabila’, The Economist, 27 Jan. 2001, p. 41.
Ketumile Masire, who was appointed by the Organization for African Unity (OAU). The new president won the approval of foreign governments by reshuffling his cabinet and military leadership, recognizing the legitimate role of Masire and taking steps to reform government economic practices.

For the first time since the 1999 Lusaka Peace Accord was signed, there was substantial progress towards its implementation. The accord set out four steps: a ceasefire; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); a dialogue to set up new political arrangements; and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The multitude of armed groups and national militaries involved in the conflict makes each one of the Lusaka Accord steps difficult to achieve.

The two sides in the civil war consist of the DRC Government and its allies Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe versus a divided set of rebel groups and their foreign allies. The Mouvement de Libération Congolais (MLC, Congolese Liberation Movement), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML, Congolese Rally for Democracy–Liberation Movement) and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Goma (RCD-Goma, Congolese Rally for Democracy–Goma) each control a portion of the eastern half of the country. The MLC and the RCD-ML are in the north-east and are backed by Uganda. The RCD-Goma is in the central, eastern and south-eastern parts of the country and is backed by Rwanda.

The ceasefire between the government and the rebels was largely respected in 2001. There was no substantial fighting despite the distrust between them and the slow deployment of UN ceasefire monitors, the Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC, UN Observation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan blamed the countries of the region for the slow deployment of the mission, claiming that they had not demonstrated an interest in ending the war. The UN contingent had fewer than 200 personnel at the beginning of 2001 but was at almost full strength by the end of the year.

Almost all the parties implemented a disengagement and redeployment plan that was agreed in February 2001. It stipulated that all the signatories of the

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47 The OAU member states adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union on 12 June 2000; it entered into force on 26 May 2001, formally establishing the African Union (AU), with headquarters in Addis Ababa. The AU will replace the OAU after a transitional period.


Lusaka Accord withdraw 15 km from about 100 key positions along the 2400-km front line to create a 30-km buffer zone.\textsuperscript{54} The MLC complied in July.\textsuperscript{55} The RCD-Goma did not leave the city of Kisangani, strategically located on the Congo river, despite repeated demands from the UN.\textsuperscript{56} The disengagement provided the countries with troops in the DRC with an opportunity to repatriate their soldiers. By September, Namibia had completely withdrawn its troops, which had numbered about 2000 at their peak strength.\textsuperscript{57} Angola was expected to withdraw many of its estimated 2000–2500 troops by the end of the year.\textsuperscript{58} Zimbabwe made the withdrawal of most of its estimated 11 000 troops conditional on the outcome of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.\textsuperscript{59}

On the opposing side, Uganda withdrew an estimated 7000 troops from most of the DRC but maintained a presence in the region bordering on Uganda.\textsuperscript{60} Rwanda initially withdrew a substantial number of troops but maintained a presence in the DRC of possibly tens of thousands.\textsuperscript{61}

The parties to the Lusaka Accord are not the only armed groups in the DRC. Several tribal and rebel groups referred to in the accord as ‘negative forces’ are also active. Of these groups, only the Mayi-Mayi are Congolese. They are fighting primarily to expel Tutsis and their Rwandan backers. As noted above, the Burundian FDD and FNL rebels use the DRC as a rear base. They cooperate with the Armée pour la liberation du Rwanda (ALiR, Army for the Liberation of Rwanda),\textsuperscript{62} which wants to overthrow the Rwandan Government.

In 2001 fighting occurred sporadically between the RCD-Goma rebels and ‘negative forces’.\textsuperscript{63} Most of the fighting appeared to be part of an effort by the RCD-Goma and the Rwandan Army to repress the Mayi-Mayi and the ALiR.\textsuperscript{64} The most sustained and deadly engagement occurred in September around the town of Fizi, on the eastern border of the DRC. Up to 4000 Mayi-Mayi and

\textsuperscript{60} IRIN-CEA, ‘DRC: Uganda to withdraw an additional 7,000 soldiers’, IRIN weekly round-up 77, 9–15 June 2001.
\textsuperscript{62} The ALiR is composed of the Rwandan Interahamwe militia and former Rwandan Army Forces (ex-FAR, Forces Armées Rwandaises), who have been in the DRC since they were driven out of Rwanda after they committed genocide in 1994.
\textsuperscript{63} IRIN-CEA, ‘DRC: heavy fighting in Shabunda’, IRIN weekly round-up 60, 10–16 Feb. 2001. Because the ‘negative forces’ are not parties to the Lusaka Accord, battles with them were not considered to be violations of the agreement.
Burundian and Rwandan rebels captured the town, only to be expelled again by the RCD-Goma a month later.\textsuperscript{65} The interlocking of the conflicts in the African Great Lakes region was revealed by the timing of the initial offensive by the militia, which occurred after Burundian government forces withdrew from the DRC in response to increased rebel activity in Burundi (see above).\textsuperscript{66}

A critical stumbling block came with the second step of the Lusaka Accord: the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the armed rebel groups. Successful DDR is necessary to convince the Rwandan Government that it is no longer threatened by the Hutu ALiR. If it is not convinced, it will not withdraw from the DRC. If the DRC Government does not believe that all Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan troops will leave its territory, then it will not consider sharing power with the anti-government rebels. A power-sharing arrangement is the ultimate objective of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.\textsuperscript{67}

Following the first successful preparatory meeting for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, held in August, the government of Joseph Kabila demonstrated its willingness to remove Rwandan ALiR fighters when it handed over 1600 of them to MONUC in September. It also pledged to disarm and hand over all of the about 6000 ALiR fighters in its area of control. Rwanda was not satisfied, claiming that there were 20 000–40 000 ALiR fighters in the DRC.\textsuperscript{68} However, as the government pointed out, the ‘negative forces’ had regrouped during the year along the borders of Burundi and Rwanda to avoid being disarmed. Those areas are under the control of the RCD-Goma and Rwanda, not the DRC Government. By mid-summer Rwandan troops had captured about 2000 ALiR fighters.\textsuperscript{69} The approach to the Mayi-Mayi was far more conciliatory. After the August preparatory meeting, the DRC Government and the rebel RCD-ML both supported the inclusion of the Mayi-Mayi in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, on the grounds that they are Congolese rather than foreign. The Rwandan Government appeared to be sympathetic to this position.\textsuperscript{70}

On 15 October 2001, two years after the Lusaka Accord was signed, facilitator Masire convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the first meeting of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in an effort to fulfil the third step of the Lusaka Accord. The talks broke down immediately, however, and were postponed until an


\textsuperscript{69} ICG (note 67); IRIN-CEA, ‘Great Lakes: Hutu rebels reportedly regrouping’, IRIN weekly round-up 78, 16–22 June 2001; and IRIN-CEA (note 68).

unspecified date because of the Kabila Government’s objections that the delegations were too small, that the Mayi-Mayi were not included and that funding for the planned 45-day meeting was uncertain.71

Although all the parties appear to be tired of fighting, each has something to lose if the peace process succeeds. The government will have to share power with the rebels in an as yet unspecified way. There is a chance that new political arrangements will recognize the de facto partition of the country and give the rebels federated control of half the territory. Under a different possible scenario, the rebel groups might have to give up control of the east in exchange for their participation in the national government. Angola, Rwanda and Uganda will lose access to the rear operating areas of their own rebels, thus possibly jeopardizing their own security.72

All of the countries with troops in the DRC will also lose control over the DRC’s lucrative natural resources. Military and political leaders from these countries have grown rich through the extraction of and trade in minerals, and the trade in timber and coffee. The government’s adversaries flatly deny plundering the DRC.73 A United Nations Panel of Experts submitted two reports in 2001 on the extraction of wealth from the DRC. The panel confirmed that continued resource exploitation provided all the parties with a disincentive to settle the DRC conflict. It also found that contests for control of wealth constituted a major source of the violence among all the armed groups and factions. Although security concerns initially drove foreign countries to become involved in the DRC conflict, the primary motive for remaining involved is the material benefits, according to the panel.74 In short, resolution of the political problems will have to address the economic interests of the parties.

Foreign plunder of wealth is not the only cost of conflict to the DRC. A report on the human cost of the conflict in the eastern part of the country estimated that from August 1998 to the end of March 2001 the war had caused 2.5 million deaths in excess of the number of people who would have died in peacetime. About 350,000 of those deaths were due to violence and the rest to disease and malnutrition.75 A separate investigation of the access to health services supported the assertion that the conflict has completely disrupted the minimal medical infrastructure that once existed and left many people with no

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72 Burundi would lose the same advantage, but it is not part of the Lusaka process.


medical care at all. In September 2001, an estimated 2.1 million people remained displaced, about 350,000 of whom had fled across an international border and gained the status of refugees. Looting and human rights abuses by all the armed elements made it impossible for most people to return home and caused several hundred thousand more to flee.

Sierra Leone

At the beginning of 2001 there was grave pessimism concerning the prospect of advancing the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement, which was intended to end the civil war. The rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the government-allied Civil Defence Forces (CDF) showed little sign of adhering to the DDR programme, which is an essential part of the peace process. The UN Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) lost much of its military strength in January, when the Indian and Jordanian contingents withdrew. UNAMSIL forces were only positioned around the capital Freetown. The Government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) controlled only the territory around the capital and needed the support of 600 British troops to do even that. Although a ceasefire signed in November 2000 was generally respected, there was fighting along the borders with Guinea and Liberia and clashes between the RUF and the CDF in northern districts.

By the end of the year, the picture was entirely different. A joint committee on disarmament had overseen the successful implementation of the programme in 10 of the 12 districts of the country, including diamond-producing districts and former RUF strongholds. The RUF had declared its intention to participate in the political process. UNAMSIL personnel, numbering 17,500, extended their presence throughout the country and the government was in the process of extending its authority. In January 2002 the disarmament programme was completed and a formal end to the war, which began in 1991, was declared. Elections were scheduled for May 2002.

The turning point came in May 2001 when the RUF, increasingly constrained and under pressure, began to abide by the terms of the Lomé Agree-
The RUF lacked direction since its founder, Foday Sankoh, remained imprisoned after being captured in 2000. Nor did the rebels have the support of a political constituency. Since 2000, the RUF’s only political demands were that the SLA disarm and that all British troops leave the country.82 In meetings in early May, they did not even make those demands.83 More importantly, the RUF lost the support of Liberian President Charles Taylor, who had provided financial and military assistance since 1991.84 Taylor faced international condemnation and increasingly tight economic sanctions for his role in sustaining the Sierra Leone conflict by trading ‘conflict diamonds’ that originated in RUF-controlled parts of Sierra Leone.85 In March 2001 the UN Security Council called on Liberia to end all support for the RUF and imposed an arms embargo on Liberia.86 Taylor also faced an insurgency in the north of Liberia that put demands on the meagre resources his government controlled and reportedly obliged him to ask RUF fighters for support.87

The final element in the RUF’s demise as a military force was its disastrous incursion into Guinea, at Taylor’s request, in support of Guinean rebels. It is unclear why the RUF acceded to the request. The Parrots Beak region, where Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone meet, had suffered increasingly violent battles for months in an escalation of the long-standing animosity between the leaders of Guinea and Liberia. Taylor supported the Guinean rebels, with the help of the RUF, and Guinean President Lansana Conté supported the Liberian rebels. The RUF lost hundreds of soldiers and suffered heavy attacks by the Guinean military on its bases in eastern Sierra Leone, which the Sierra Leone Government tacitly welcomed.88

On 15 May the pro-government CDF and the rebel RUF signed an additional ceasefire agreement that provided for simultaneous disarmament in accordance with the DDR programme. The implementation was to be monitored by a joint ad hoc committee consisting of government, UNAMSIL and RUF observers.89 The agreement was a breakthrough as thousands of fighters turned in their weapons and registered for reintegration programmes according to a plan that progressed methodically from district to district. The RUF even

83 ‘Sierra Leone: precarious calm’ (note 82).
84 On the role of Liberia and Charles Taylor in supplying arms to the rebels see chapter 8 in this volume.
89 IRIN-WA, ‘Sierra Leone: rivals agree to stop fighting’, IRIN-WA weekly round-up 72, 12–18 May 2001; and ‘Sierra Leone: precarious calm’ (note 82).
demobilized in the diamond districts, where access to the gems had provided an incentive and the means to continue the war in years past. By December, over 36 700 combatants had turned in their arms to UNAMSIL, about one-third of them members of the RUF and two-thirds members of the CDF. The number far exceeded the initial expectation of 28 000.90

The success of the voluntary disarmament programme surprised many observers, who recalled the history of the RUF making agreements only to break them. Four factors seem to have contributed to the success: the rebel group was leaderless after Sankoh was jailed; its patron was no longer able to provide material support; it had suffered military losses at the hands of Guinea; and there was a peace agreement in place that offered an alternative to continued fighting.

During 11 years of war, approximately 43 000 people were killed and about 2 million displaced, out of a population of some 4.5 million.91 The RUF was infamous for using child soldiers and for mutilating people. The hope for successful elections in 2002 and a lasting peace was tempered by a desperate need for international funding to support the training and reintegration of demobilized fighters, many of whom only knew how to make a living through violence and plunder. There was also grave concern that the peace process in Sierra Leone was too compartmentalized and did not take into account the overlapping conflicts in the West African region.92 Weak governments, the prevalence of rebel movements and the propensity of rival governments to undermine each other, combined with the abundance of small arms and easily mined gems, remained a recipe for continued insecurity in the region.93

**Somalia**

In 2001 the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia was able to exert control over only part of the capital Mogadishu and a strip of territory along the coast. The northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland maintained their self-declared independent status, although no other state has recognized them.94 In the central and southern regions of Somalia, there were occasional violent clashes between clan-based armed groups that sought to maintain dominance over local areas, including the capital. Some groups supported the TNG, but most did not.95 The fighting caused thousands of refugees to flee to

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90 United Nations (note 81).
92 See chapter 2 in this volume.
Kenya and may have led Ethiopia to assist militia groups in Puntland and around the Somali town of Baidoa. The year closed with talks in Nairobi, Kenya, between the TNG and factions opposed to it, but there was little reason to expect a positive outcome.

Sudan

The war in Sudan escalated in 2001 and the prospects for peace appeared to be more remote than ever. Since 1983, the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum has fought several groups in the south of the country, the largest of which is the Sudanese People’s Democratic Front (SPDF). The complex of objectives that drive the war include disputes over religion, governance, autonomy and resources. The government is opposed to giving African animist and Christian groups autonomy, either as a separate state or within a federated union. It is estimated that over 2 million people have died during the war as a result of violence, famine and disease. Approximately 4 million people have been displaced within Sudan and an additional 420 000 are refugees. Over 150 000 people were displaced in 2001.

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sub-regional organization has tried since 1994 to initiate peace talks, but without success. The IGAD initiative accepts the concept of self-determination for the south, which the government flatly rejects. The Sudanese Government favours an alternative peace proposal made in 1999, known as the Libyan–Egyptian Initiative. The initiative reportedly calls for a transitional government of all the political parties, revision of the constitution, general elections, recognition of diversity, guarantee of basic rights, a cessation of violence and a single unified Sudanese state. A tentative third peace initiative began in November 2001 when the US Special Envoy to Sudan, John Danforth, held talks with the government, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). All three efforts failed to seriously address the

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two central issues of the relationship between the north and the south and the relationship between religion and the state.\textsuperscript{103}

The extraction of oil begun by several international corporations in 1999 caused a tremendous increase in violence in the south-central provinces. In 2001 the government stepped up its scorched-earth campaign in an effort to clear all residents from the areas of the oilfields. The result was hundreds of deaths and tens of thousands of displaced people, adding to the population of IDPs that was already the largest in the world.\textsuperscript{104} Airstrips and roads built by the oil companies gave the military better access to remote areas to continue its campaign. In addition, in recent years the Sudanese Government has increased its military spending. These factors transformed the military’s strategy from holding garrison towns and launching dry-season attacks to systematically taking territory and destroying everything in its path.\textsuperscript{105} The government and oil companies deny that there is any increase in deaths or human rights abuses, but numerous humanitarian aid and human rights organizations claim that the devastation is overwhelming.\textsuperscript{106}

There was occasional heavy fighting in the Nuba mountains of central Sudan as government and SPLA forces battled for control of the region that lies just north of the oilfields. The rebels hope to be able to attack the oil companies’ assets in an attempt to shut them down.\textsuperscript{107} In May, the government launched its largest offensive since 1992, committing some 7500 troops. The SPLA repulsed them and despite continued fighting the situation had not significantly changed by the end of the year.\textsuperscript{108} The humanitarian crisis in the area worsened and famine loomed on the horizon.\textsuperscript{109}

The SPLA concentrated its war effort to the west of the oilfields, in Bar el-Ghazal province, where it attacked garrison towns held by the military and pro-government militia. In February the SPLA began an attack that paved the way for a major push in May.\textsuperscript{110} By early June the rebels claimed to control all of Bar al-Ghazal for the first time. Independent sources reported that the fighting was not heavy, as local forces that were supposed to defend the government’s position switched sides.\textsuperscript{111} Nevertheless, the fighting caused tens of

\textsuperscript{103} ‘Sudan: delusions of peace’ (note 100).
\textsuperscript{104} US Committee for Refugees (note 99); and IRIN-HOA, ‘Sudan: largest internally displaced population in the world’, IRIN-HOA weekly round-up 42, 16–22 June 2001.
\textsuperscript{109} ‘War, famine and oil in Sudan’ (note 106); and Flint (note 108).
thousands of people to flee at a time when they would normally have been planting seeds in a region that has usually supplied food to much of the country. In October, the government regained control of the provincial capital Raga. An intensified bombing and ground offensive in October and November triggered calls of alarm from humanitarian organizations.

III. Conflicts in Asia

The most dramatic event in Asia in 2001 was the entry of the USA into the conflict in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks in the USA. The US action changed the conflict from a deadlock that favoured the Taliban regime to a dynamic war in which the Taliban were defeated. It also shifted political relationships throughout Central and South-East Asia. The conflicts in India (Kashmir) and Indonesia remained intractable, while conflicts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka showed signs of moving towards negotiated settlements.

**Afghanistan**

The reaction of the United States to the terror attacks of 11 September completely transformed the conflict in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA), also called the Northern Alliance. The Taliban, under Supreme Leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, and the Northern Alliance, led by military chief Ahmad Shah Massoud and political head Burhanuddin Rabbani, had fought over control of the state since 1994. That conflict was a continuation of the war that began in 1978, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in an attempt to ensure a pro-Soviet government. For most of 2001 the Taliban controlled the capital Kabul and 90–95 per cent of the country. Although the Northern Alliance only held territory in the north-east, it was recognized by the United Nations as the legitimate government. By the end of the year the Taliban had been militarily and politically defeated by the USA and the Northern Alliance. A new, temporary government was set up in Kabul, headed by Hamid Karzai and composed of a spectrum of political leaders but dominated by members of the Alliance.

In January 2001 UN diplomatic and economic sanctions and an arms embargo on the Taliban (but not the UIFSA) came into effect because of their support for and training of international terrorists and their role in drug trafficking. The impact of the economic sanctions was minimal since 80 per cent of the Afghan economy was dependent on the production of and trade in


illegal drugs, according to the UN. The arms embargo helped the Northern Alliance on the battlefield, since the Taliban had trouble resupplying their troops and the Northern Alliance was able to buy arms and helicopters from India, Iran and Russia. The Northern Alliance was thought to pay for the aid by selling gems, as well as profiting from the production of opium.

The Northern Alliance’s new matériel probably helped it avoid further losses to the Taliban, but it did not significantly change the balance between the sides. The Northern Alliance was estimated to have 12,000–15,000 fighters under the command of Massoud. Additional anti-Taliban groups which were not part of the Northern Alliance numbered in the thousands and operated in pockets of northern, central and western Afghanistan. These fighters were under the command of local leaders who have traditionally fought each other for influence. The Taliban were thought to have a fighting strength of 40,000–45,000, of whom an estimated 4,000–12,000 came from Chechnya, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and various Arab countries.

There was considerable fighting during the first eight months of 2001, but the conflict remained in the stagnant state that had characterized it for several years. In particular there was frequent fighting in the middle of the country and in the north-eastern province of Takhar, near the border with Tajikistan, where the Taliban were trying to crush the Northern Alliance’s stronghold.

On 9 September UIFSA military leader Massoud was mortally wounded by suicide bombers posing as journalists. The loss of their strongest general might have turned the tide against the Northern Alliance, had it not been for the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United

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115 Interfax, 11 July 2001, in ‘Afghanistan still a major narcotics threat according to CIS border chiefs’, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report–Central Eurasia (FBIS-SOV), FBIS-SOV-201-0711, 12 July 2001. The 3 countries that had diplomatic relations with the Taliban prior to Sep. 2001 were Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.


119 Davis (note 117).


States two days later. The USA immediately blamed the al-Qaeda network and its leader Osama bin Laden, who was known to live in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban. The Taliban leadership refused to hand over bin Laden in the face of US threats to use force, just as it had refused to comply with UN Security Council resolutions demanding that it do so. In response, the USA began building up its naval forces in the Indian Ocean and negotiating limited access rights to airbases in Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Emboldened by the prospect of US military strikes on the Taliban, the Northern Alliance intensified its fighting and made small advances.

The UN Security Council condemned the terrorist attacks, interpreted them as a threat to international peace and security, and interpreted member states’ right of self-defence to include retaliatory action against the perpetrators. This opened the legal avenue for the US war in Afghanistan.

The Pakistani Government, under President General Pervez Musharraf, made a decision to end its support for the Taliban and cooperate with the US effort to topple the regime of its former ally. The decision eliminated any hope the Taliban had of receiving outside assistance in their impending war against the USA, as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates cut off their diplomatic relations with the Taliban. Musharraf’s decision also enabled US air operations by allowing flights over Pakistani territory. Without that permission, US aircraft would not have been able to reach Afghanistan from the Indian Ocean, since Iran would not allow overflights. Aircraft based on aircraft carriers, in Kuwait and on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia provided most of the firepower used by the USA.

The UK and the USA began military operations against the Taliban and the al-Qaeda on 7 October, when they struck targets in Afghanistan with submarine- and air-launched cruise missiles and other munitions. For about the first two weeks the attacks focused on gaining uncontested control of the air, destroying terrorist training camps, and destroying the Taliban’s command, control and communications capacity. By mid-October US special forces were in Afghanistan. They coordinated Northern Alliance forces and gave US aircraft more accurate target information so that they could strike troop formations rather than just fixed targets. A number of other countries

eventually contributed ground, air and naval forces, most of them in support rather than combat roles.  

Two changes at the end of October opened the way for a sudden breakthrough on the ground. First, the number of daily air attacks increased considerably, many of which focused on the Taliban front lines. Second, Russia provided the Northern Alliance with tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, ammunition and other equipment. The Taliban collapsed. On 9 November Northern Alliance forces took control of the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. On 12 November the Northern Alliance captured the northern city of Taloqan in Takhar province, where there had been so much indeterminate fighting earlier in the year. They also captured the crossroads city of Herat in the west near the border with Iran.

On 13 November the Taliban fled Kabul. Despite requests by many countries that the Northern Alliance not enter the city and re-establish themselves as the government, about 2000 military and police from the Northern Alliance took control. International misgivings were overcome by the establishment of calm and order in an environment that had threatened to become anarchic. The next day the Taliban surrendered Jalalabad, east of Kabul, near the border with Pakistan. Two Taliban strongholds remained. Many non-Afghan fighters held out in the northern city of Kunduz but surrendered under intense military pressure on 26 November. The seat of Taliban leader Mullah Omar was in the southern city of Kandahar, in a part of the country dominated by Pashtun tribes, from which the Taliban drew most of their support. The focus of the air war shifted south, US Marines established a base at an airfield south of Kandahar on 26 November, and the Northern Alliance captured the city on 6 December.

Although the fight against the Taliban was successful, another US objective was not achieved. Neither Mullah Omar nor Osama bin Laden were captured and it did not appear that either had been killed. In December the USA focused its operations on a network of caves in the region of Tora Bora on the Pakistani border, where it believed bin Laden was hiding. However, a military

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132 Australia and the UK supplied combat forces. Ground and air support forces were provided or promised by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia and Turkey. ‘Operation Enduring Freedom: a day-by-day account of the war in Afghanistan’, Air Forces Monthly, Nov. 2001, pp. 35–50; and Willis, D., ‘Afghanistan: the second month’, Air Forces Monthly, Dec. 2001, pp. 74–82.
139 Willis (note 132).
assault on the cave complex did not result in the capture or death of al-Qaeda leaders, and US officials admitted that they had lost all trace of bin Laden.\textsuperscript{141}

When the US attack on Afghanistan began in October, there was a widespread expectation that the fight would be long and difficult. Analogies were drawn with the experiences of the UK in the 19th century and the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in which both countries expended great effort but were unable to dominate the Afghan people. The swiftness of the US-led military campaign can be attributed to several factors.\textsuperscript{142} First, the US forces utterly dominated the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters with overwhelming firepower and a near monopoly on battlefield information. Second, the Northern Alliance proved to be willing and able allies who pressed the ground campaign forward as the USA operated from the sky. Third, the USA used special operations forces to great advantage by attaching them to Northern Alliance units so that they could coordinate ground and air attacks, pinpoint targets for aircraft, and coordinate logistics and supply help for the Afghan forces. Fourth, the Taliban were weak. Their lack of popularity and a tradition of switching allegiance in Afghanistan meant that many local commanders joined the Northern Alliance or fled without fighting. In addition, the number of Taliban troops was small compared to the size of the territory they protected, so when a defensive line gave way the advancing Alliance could rapidly capture territory before meeting further resistance. Finally, many commentators forgot that, while Soviet troops also captured Kabul relatively quickly, it was when they tried to stay and impose a government that they encountered difficult problems.

On 27 November–5 December 2001, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, brought together delegates from four Afghan factions in Bonn, Germany, to discuss arrangements for the replacement of the Taliban regime. The delegates agreed to establish an Interim Authority—a power-sharing council to govern for six months, starting from 22 December, under the leadership of Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai.\textsuperscript{143} Some Northern Alliance leaders threatened not to recognize the interim government, but in the end they agreed to respect the decision.\textsuperscript{144} The interim government is intended to give way to a two-year transitional government established by a traditional council of elders at the end of the six-month transitional period, in mid-June 2002.

As requested in the Bonn Agreement, the UN Security Council approved the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) on 20 December. A force of up to 3000 troops was authorized for six months to operate in and around Kabul. It was to provide stability in the area, assist the Afghan Interim Authority in developing future security structures and help administer reconstruction assistance.

Reconstruction was desperately needed after 23 years of war. There was an even more urgent need for emergency humanitarian assistance. Before the escalation of violence in October, war and a three-year drought had driven 2.2 million refugees into Pakistan and 1.5 million into Iran. About 1 million were internally displaced at the end of September. The UN aid agencies estimated in September that 5 million people needed humanitarian assistance to survive. The increase in violence exacerbated the situation. During the US attacks, large proportions of the population of cities and towns fled.

The number of civilians killed by US actions was difficult to determine. The Taliban alleged that the casualty rates were high, but few people regarded this claim as credible. The US Government acknowledged that the operations had killed civilians but insisted that the number of casualties was low and offered no total figure. Independent estimates of the number of Afghan civilians killed by early December range from a conservative 1000–1300 to 3767–5000.

India: Kashmir

India and Pakistan fought wars over the territory of Kashmir in 1965 and 1971, as well as clashing in the Kargil region in 1999. An intra-state conflict arose in 1989, when several groups in the Indian province of Jammu and Kashmir began to use violence in their effort to gain independence for the Muslim-dominated province from Hindu-dominated India. Some groups wanted the province to become part of Pakistan, while others wanted to establish an independent state. Since then, most of the militant groups, composed of indigenous Kashmiris who fought for locally defined objectives, have turned away from violence. They have been replaced by militant groups composed largely of Afghans, Pakistanis and other foreigners motivated by a desire to

establish Islamic rule across the entire region.\(^{154}\) The Indian Government has long insisted that the status of Kashmir is an internal issue and has refused to seek a negotiated solution with Pakistan.

Pakistan is widely believed to support the rebel groups, although it denies doing so. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, which had ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan, provides assistance that includes training and logistical, financial and doctrinal support. In addition, fighters attend religious schools in Pakistan that preach a violent interpretation of jihad.\(^{155}\) The five main groups in Kashmir that benefit from Pakistani support are Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toyeba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, al Babr and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Only Hizbul Mujahideen is composed mainly of Kashmiris.\(^{156}\) In mid-2001 there were an estimated 3500–4000 rebel fighters and 350 000–400 000 Indian military and paramilitary in Kashmir.\(^{157}\) The number of Islamic fighters in Kashmir probably increased at the end of the year, as they fled from Afghanistan across Pakistan to Kashmir.

In the first half of 2001 there was movement towards the establishment of peace talks, but it led nowhere. An Indian unilateral ceasefire declared in November 2000 was extended twice by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, ending in May 2001.\(^{158}\) The militant groups claimed that the ceasefire was a ploy to attract international support and did not reciprocate. The All Parties Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference—a collection of 20 parties, most of which disavow violence—expressed its interest in talks but required consultation with Pakistan first. The Indian Government refused to issue passports to several people in the Hurriyat’s delegation, so the negotiations never opened.\(^{159}\) An expression of interest by the Democratic Freedom Party in early April also came to nothing.\(^{160}\)

Surprisingly, when the ceasefire expired in May, Vajpayee invited Pakistani President Musharraf to India for talks in July about several aspects of their countries’ relations, including Kashmir.\(^{161}\) The talks, held in Agra, India, were the first between the countries since they fought at Kargil in 1999.\(^{162}\) The summit meeting ended without a joint statement because the two sides could not agree on how to refer to the sensitive issue of Kashmir.\(^{163}\)


\(^{155}\) Chalk (note 154).

\(^{156}\) Chalk (note 154).


\(^{161}\) Gardner (note 157).


Throughout 2001, small attacks and suicide bombings by militant groups occurred weekly.¹⁶⁴ The Indian security forces responded aggressively to the rebel actions, particularly after May. The violence caused more than 2000 deaths in 2001.¹⁶⁵ About 35 000 people have been killed since 1989.¹⁶⁶ The largest attack since 1999 took place in October 2001 when militants drove a car bomb into the legislature building in Jammu and Kashmir’s summer capital Srinagar, killing 38 people.¹⁶⁷ The attack generated pressure by Indian hard-liners to strike at Pakistan, a country they believe harbours terrorists. Despite a visit by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the two countries in October, they exchanged artillery fire across the Line of Control in October and November, as they had done earlier in the year.¹⁶⁸ In November, India accused Pakistan of provocative troop movements, to which Pakistan replied that India had been massing troops near the Line of Control.¹⁶⁹

The political stakes escalated dramatically in December, when suicide bombers and gunmen attacked the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi. No group claimed responsibility but Indian authorities were certain that one of the Kashmiri groups was to blame, most likely Lashkar-e-Toyeba or Jaish-e-Mohammed.¹⁷⁰ India demanded that Pakistan disband the militant groups. Under intense pressure, President Musharraf took steps to control the militants, whom he called ‘freedom fighters’, including the arrest of many of their leaders. Not satisfied with Musharraf’s actions, India built up its military forces along the Line of Control in a game of brinkmanship designed to induce Pakistan to fully disband the militant groups. The year ended with Pakistan matching Indian moves in a tit-for-tat military escalation. Both leaders said that they were prepared to go to war.¹⁷¹

Indonesia

In a country consisting of 17 000 islands and over 210 million people, the Indonesian Government faces separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya and violent communal conflicts in West Kalimantan, the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi. Aceh was the only location that experienced sustained, politically motivated violence in 2001. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement) has sought an independent state on the northern tip of Sumatra since 1976. Violence between the GAM and government security forces has


¹⁶⁶ Gardner (note 157).


caused 5000–6000 deaths, most of them civilians, in 25 years of conflict.\textsuperscript{172} In 2001 the situation deteriorated considerably, with a complete breakdown in talks between the government and the rebels. The Indonesian Red Cross reported at least 1500 deaths in 2001.\textsuperscript{173}

The year began with a one-month extension of the May 2000 ceasefire. The stated intention was to create conditions conducive to discussion. However, as in 2000, both sides tried to strengthen their positions, resulting in an increase in violence rather than a decrease.\textsuperscript{174} In February the two sides met in Switzerland for peace talks mediated by the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. On the day the talks opened the Indonesian Government announced that it was sending an additional 3000 troops to the province, bringing the total number of military, paramilitary and police forces to over 30 000.\textsuperscript{175} The talks were fruitless and broke down completely in July when the government arrested members of the GAM negotiating team.\textsuperscript{176}

Small-scale attacks by the GAM and counter-insurgency operations by government forces were nearly daily events in 2001. With an estimated strength of about 3000 fighters and even fewer military-type weapons, the GAM planted bombs and launched surprise attacks on police, military and industrial targets, and civilians of Javanese background.\textsuperscript{177} (The central government’s practice of settling people from the island of Java on other, less densely populated, islands is a source of tension throughout Indonesia.) With popular support apparently growing in the countryside, the separatists managed to prevent the government from exercising effective administrative control of about 80 per cent of the province.\textsuperscript{178} Government forces, oblivious to the concept of winning the support of the population, frequently burned entire villages to the ground and killed suspected rebels and their sympathizers.\textsuperscript{179}

One of the GAM’s grievances is that Jakarta siphons off Aceh’s resources and returns little benefit to the province. In March GAM attacks on natural gas-producing facilities run by ExxonMobil caused the company to shut down production until it resumed on a limited basis in July. The government, which exports an estimated $1.3 billion worth of oil and gas from Aceh each year, caused 5000–6000 deaths, most of them civilians, in 25 years of conflict.\textsuperscript{172} In 2001 the situation deteriorated considerably, with a complete breakdown in talks between the government and the rebels. The Indonesian Red Cross reported at least 1500 deaths in 2001.\textsuperscript{173}

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secured the installation with thousands of troops. In response to the continued violence, closure of the gas fields and failed talks, President Abdurrahman Wahid issued Presidential Instruction (Inpres) no. 4 in April. The decree authorized increased military and police operations in Aceh and allowed military reinforcements to be sent to the province. The largest clashes of the year occurred in June, when a GAM attack on Javanese settlers brought a strong counter-attack by the military and local militia, causing hundreds of deaths, hundreds of houses to be burned and thousands of people to flee.

The parliament elected Megawati Sukarnoputri as president on 23 July after it impeached former President Abdurrahman Wahid for corruption. In her first state of the nation address, President Sukarnoputri apologized for past abuses by security forces in Aceh and Irian Jaya. However, she is a strong nationalist who is opposed to Wahid’s moves towards decentralization and has flatly stated her opposition to independence for restive provinces. In August she sent additional national police trained in counter-insurgency techniques. She also signed a law giving Aceh a measure of autonomy. The action, which she made the centrepiece of her Aceh policy, did not seem to impress the people of Aceh, who were not consulted about it, and did not meet the GAM’s demand for complete independence. The year ended with continued and frequent clashes.

The Philippines

In January 2001 Gloria Macapagal Arroyo replaced Joseph Estrada as president of the Philippines. She turned away from the bellicose stance adopted by the government in 2000 towards the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the New People’s Army (NPA). Her strategy was to engage these two groups in dialogue, maintain a peaceful relationship with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and try to eradicate the smallest and most violent group, the Abu Sayyaf.

The NPA has fought for a Marxist government since 1968. In 2001 it launched occasional assaults on government forces and installations.
government has estimated that the NPA has about 6000 fighters, operating mostly in the northern regions although they are present throughout the country. Previous talks between the NPA and the government had broken down in 1999. In February President Arroyo appointed a panel to reopen talks with the rebels and their political arm, the National Democratic Front (NDF). In March she ordered a ceasefire that was reciprocated by the NPA. Peace talks between the government and the NDF began in Norway on 27 April. After minor progress, the government suspended the talks in June when the NPA killed a member of parliament. An offensive by the military in November resulted in a month of clashes that were the worst battles between the government and the NPA in a decade. The government and rebels called reciprocal truces in December.

The MILF has fought for an independent Muslim state on the southern island of Mindanao since 1984, when it broke off from the MNLF. It maintains a military presence and has popular support in a sizeable portion of the island. On 20 February 2001 President Arroyo ordered a suspension of the military operations against the MILF that had begun the previous year, allowing about two-thirds of the displaced population to return home. With the mediation of Malaysian officials, the government and rebels reached an agreement in March on plans for a joint ceasefire and arrangements to hold peace talks. The two sides made progress during talks held in Libya in June and signed a joint ceasefire agreement on 7 August in Malaysia. The agreement outlined plans for the deployment of monitoring teams involving observers from the government, the MILF, Indonesia, Libya and Malaysia. A follow-up agreement was signed in October. The question at the end of the year was whether the peace talks will be accompanied by economic development in one of the poorest parts of the country. Economic development is one of the MILF’s demands.

189 ‘Philippine president seeks peace talks’ (note 188).
In November a small element of the MNLF took up arms again, under the direction of former MNLF leader Nur Misuari. About 200 MNLF members attacked army positions on the southern island of Jolo. More than a week of fighting on Jolo and Mindanao left about 200 people dead, most of them rebels.\textsuperscript{199} The attack was a surprise because the MNLF had agreed to stop fighting the government in 1996. It is thought that Misuari, who had recently been ousted as the MNLF leader, turned to violence in an attempt to stop the November 2001 gubernatorial election. The political settlement between the government and the main body of the MNLF remained in place. The election proceeded but with very low participation. Misuari was arrested in Malaysia and extradited to the Philippines.\textsuperscript{200}

The government intensified its effort to eradicate the Abu Sayyaf, which it sees as a criminal organization rather than a political group.\textsuperscript{201} The Abu Sayyaf claims to be fighting for an independent Muslim state, but its actions reveal a far greater interest in capturing hostages for ransom. It appears to number in the hundreds and have no ability to capture and hold territory.\textsuperscript{202} Nevertheless, the Abu Sayyaf attracted the attention of the United States for its alleged connections to the al-Qaeda terrorist network. Before the 11 September terrorist attacks, the USA had suggested the holding of joint military exercises with Philippine forces, and at the end of the year the Philippine Government accepted the proposal. The USA sent several hundred military advisers to the Philippines and promised additional military and economic assistance.\textsuperscript{203}

**Sri Lanka**

The level of violence in Sri Lanka was considerably lower in 2001 than in 2000. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have waged a struggle for a separate Tamil state in the northern part of Sri Lanka since 1983, in a conflict that has claimed over 62,000 lives.\textsuperscript{204} LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran declared a one-month unilateral ceasefire from 24 December 2000 and then extended it several times until 24 April 2001. He indicated his readiness to engage in peace talks on the conditions that the government reciprocate the ceasefire, lift the ban on the LTTE as a legal political organization, and lift the economic embargo on the Jaffna peninsula, held by the rebels.\textsuperscript{205} The

\textsuperscript{204} Dugger, C. W., ‘Sri Lankan President turns up the pressure’, *International Herald Tribune*, 6 Dec. 2001, p. 2.  
rebels seemed to be trying to take advantage of the territorial gains they had made in fierce military engagements during the past two years as well as the good offices of Norwegian envoy Erik Solheim, who began talks with both sides in 1999.

President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga expressed scepticism that the LTTE were interested in peace and found their conditions unacceptable. Despite pressure from international economic donors, in January the government launched a military offensive to recapture important transport links on the Jaffna peninsula. The government forces, using tanks, artillery and aircraft, gained control of the road connecting the two main towns on the peninsula, but they were not able to advance towards the Elephant Pass, which connects the peninsula with the rest of the country. The battle ended after several days of strong resistance from the LTTE.\footnote{\textit{\textsuperscript{206}} ‘Poker game’, \textit{The Economist}, 13 Jan. 2001, p. 54; ‘Sri Lanka Army in major push’, BBC News Online, 16 Jan. 2001, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>; and ‘Jaffna battle rages on’, BBC News Online, 17 Jan. 2001, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>.}

After January, fighting remained at a low level for the duration of the LTTE ceasefire, with only occasional government air attacks and clashes at sea.\footnote{\textit{\textsuperscript{207}} AFP (Hong Kong), 22 Mar. 2001, in ‘Sri Lankan jets bomb LTTE targets as 20 killed in 21 March sea battle’, FBIS-NES-2001-0322, 23 Mar. 2001; and ‘Upsurge of fighting in Sri Lanka’, BBC News Online, 28 Mar. 2001, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>.} On 25 April government forces tried to capture the town of Pallai as a prelude to advancing on the Elephant Pass. Several days of fighting left hundreds of soldiers dead and did not change the front-line positions. The offensive was launched by the government’s best troops with new equipment, and its failure raised concerns in the government about its ability to maintain a presence on the peninsula.\footnote{\textit{\textsuperscript{208}} ‘Tiger teeth’, \textit{The Economist}, 5 May 2001, p. 5.}

Solheim’s efforts to bring the two sides together foundered in May on the rebels’ conditions and the government’s insistence on unconditional talks. Beyond the procedural problems, President Kumaratunga has argued in favour of a new constitution that would give the Tamils autonomy, but the LTTE insists on independence.

The main action shifted from the northern peninsula to the capital Colombo in the summer. In July LTTE suicide commandos attacked the country’s only international airport and an adjacent military airbase outside Colombo. The attack was significant because of the highly visible target and because it was the first attack by the LTTE on a military target so far away from the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE destroyed three passenger aircraft, amounting to half the national airline fleet, as well as six fighter planes and two helicopters. In addition to its direct military and economic costs, the raid undermined Sri Lanka’s tourism industry. The military immediately resumed its bombing of LTTE positions.\footnote{\textit{\textsuperscript{209}} Dugger, C. W., ‘Tamil suicide bombers strike Colombo airport’, \textit{International Herald Tribune}, 25 July 2001, pp. 1, 5; and ‘The Tigers pounce’, \textit{The Economist}, 28 July 2001, p. 54.} For the remainder of the year, fighting consisted of sporadic raids.
by the LTTE on army bases, police stations and ships in the waters around Jaffna and similarly sporadic government responses.\textsuperscript{210}

President Kumaratunga’s October call for parliamentary elections to be held in December ignited a divisive political campaign. The president led the People’s Alliance Party campaign and was stridently intransigent towards the LTTE.\textsuperscript{211} While she accused the main opposition party of secretly planning to grant the LTTE control over the north and east of the country, her opponent, Ranil Wickremesinghe of the United National Party (UNP), advocated a return to the peace talks under Norwegian auspices.\textsuperscript{212} The campaign was marred by numerous election-related acts of violence and murder, but it appeared as though the perpetrators were supporters of various political parties rather than the LTTE.\textsuperscript{213} The UNP won the election and Wickremesinghe became the new prime minister.\textsuperscript{214} Kumaratunga remained the president.

By the end of the year the peace process had slowly resumed. In November, LTTE leader Prabhakaran said for the first time that the group would consider settling for something less than total independence. In December the new prime minister agreed to a truce and lifted an economic embargo on rebel-held areas, thus meeting two of the LTTE’s three conditions for talks. The legal ban on the LTTE remained in place and the government would only communicate through the Norwegian intermediary. After elections in Norway brought a new government into office, Deputy Foreign Minister Vidor Helgeson was appointed as the new mediator.

The new anti-terrorism climate abroad led Australia, Canada and the UK to declare the LTTE a terrorist group, as India, Sri Lanka and the USA had done in previous years. Since many Tamils who support the LTTE live in those countries, the designation was bound to put financial and political pressure on the LTTE to resume peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{215}

IV. Conflicts in Europe

The only active major armed conflict in Europe in 2001 was in the Russian republic of Chechnya. The conflict had transnational aspects in that non-Chechen Islamists fought in Chechnya, Chechens fought in Afghanistan, and the presence of Chechen refugees and rebels in the neighbouring state of Georgia threatened to exacerbate separatist conflicts there. Russia has consistently referred to the Chechen rebels as terrorists. After September, the interest of other states in stopping terrorism turned their criticism of Russian human


\textsuperscript{212} Jayasinghe, A., ‘Sri Lankan opposition claims election victory’, \textit{Financial Times}, 7 Dec. 2001, p. 3; and Dugger (note 204).


\textsuperscript{214} Jayasinghe (note 212).

rights violations in Chechnya into support for the struggle against extremists. Other militarized disputes in the Caucasus remained at a low level of violence. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia faced armed attack by ethnic Albanian rebel forces, but the fighting did not reach the level of a major armed conflict.

Russia: Chechnya

The conflict between the Russian Government and separatist rebels in the republic of Chechnya that began in 1999 continued to grind on with little change over the year. Although the government claimed to control the entire country, it controlled only the major population centres. The security situation was tenuous, even in the Chechen capital Grozny, as rebels infiltrated and attacked military posts at night and Russian forces occasionally tried to completely seal off the city. According to official figures, there were 80,000 troops from the Russian defence and interior ministries in Chechnya at the beginning of the year.

A plan to transform the Russian operation from a military to a police operation led to the transfer of responsibility from the army to the Federal Security Service (Federal’nya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, FSB). Reflecting its confidence that the rebels were almost defeated, the General Staff announced that it would reduce its forces in Chechnya to 50,000. Although the withdrawal of troops started in March, it was halted in May and an independent estimate of the total number of Russian forces in Chechnya in September was 90,000.

The rebels were strongest in the southern mountains, especially in the Argun and Vedeno gorges, where there were sporadic clashes with federal forces. In the rest of the country the rebels employed guerrilla tactics, such as ambushing Russian troops, detonating bombs and assassinating military leaders and Chechens who worked for the Russian district administration. The

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only figures for the number of rebels come from the Russian Government, which estimated in March that there were 3000–5000 rebels.\(^{225}\) By November its estimate had declined to 1500–2000 rebels.\(^{226}\)

The reduction in the government’s estimated number of rebels is probably due to battle casualties. Russia claimed to kill 80–90 rebels each month, although there was no independent verification.\(^{227}\) Casualties on the Russian side were a politically sensitive issue. There were claims that 40–45 soldiers had been killed each month in 2001.\(^{228}\) In December the interior ministry said that 800 of its troops had died since the start of the conflict, including 168 in 2001.\(^{229}\) The defence ministry said that 2355 of its soldiers had been killed and 6000 wounded.\(^{230}\) In September 2001 the Association of Soldiers’ Mothers protest group claimed that the total number of government forces killed was 10 500.\(^{231}\)

The conflict is not only costly for the fighters; it is also devastating for civilians. Grozny has been destroyed, as has the economy of the republic and much of its infrastructure. Chechens in the Russian-sanctioned administration complain that Moscow has done little to rebuild the republic.\(^{232}\) The number of civilians who have been killed is not known, but according to Russian authorities there were 225 000 IDPs in Chechnya and 180 000 in Ingushetia.\(^{233}\) Human rights organizations accused the Russian troops and Chechen rebels of torture, summary executions, ‘disappearances’ and other abuses, but laid most blame on the Russian side.\(^{234}\) The head of the district administration in Chechnya also criticized federal troops for abusing civilians, and a Russian general admitted that his forces had tortured and abused civilians on at least one occasion.\(^{235}\) Moscow appointed a special presidential human rights commissioner, but officials from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe were sceptical about whether the appointment had led to any change.\(^{236}\)
The conflict spilled over into neighbouring Georgia in the form of refugees, 7000–8000 of whom remained there at the end of 2001. Moscow frequently accused Georgia of harbouring Chechen fighters, a charge the Georgian Government has denied. In 2001 Georgian officials accused Russia of launching air strikes into Georgia in October and November but Russia denied the charge. At the end of the year Chechens in the breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia were reported to be assisting Georgian irregulars against the Abkhaz Government. In another example of external influence on an intrastate conflict, a Taliban official said that the Taliban and other Muslim governments had supplied the Chechen rebels with money and arms. There were also reports of non-Chechens fighting for the rebels. The presence of Chechen fighters in Afghanistan was confirmed by Northern Alliance officials. These reports corroborated long-standing Russian claims that Chechen rebels had ties with radical Islamists outside Chechnya.

V. Conflicts in the Middle East

The worsening conflict between the Israeli Government and various Palestinian groups dominated Middle Eastern politics in 2001. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden declared that the September terrorist attacks in the USA were meant inter alia to induce the US Government to withdraw its military presence in the Middle East and end its support for Israel. There was no indication of a US intention to withdraw from the Middle East.

Israel–Palestinians

The Intifada conflict between Israel and Palestinians that began in September 2000 became more violent and intractable during 2001. On 6 February Ariel Sharon of the right-wing Likud Party defeated incumbent Ehud Barak of the moderate Labour Party to become prime minister of Israel. Barak’s defeat was widely interpreted as a rejection of his attempts to negotiate a peace agreement with Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Sharon came into office having denounced as no longer relevant the 1995 Israeli–
Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which ended the first Intifada (1987–93) and led to the establishment of PA control over the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank.\textsuperscript{245} The Palestinians responded to the election result with intensified attacks, to which the Israeli military responded even more strongly.\textsuperscript{246}

Although the level of violence increased, the pattern of attacks and counter-attacks remained unchanged throughout the year. Palestinians detonated car bombs and launched suicide attacks in Israeli towns using bombs strapped to their bodies.\textsuperscript{247} They also attacked Israeli troops and settlers living in the West Bank. These attacks escalated in 2001 from primarily stone throwing to the use of assault rifles, mortars and grenade launchers, which they received in several small shipments during the year.\textsuperscript{248} Israeli troops retaliated, armed with assault rifles, armoured personnel carriers, tanks and helicopter gunships. Many observers, including UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, characterized the Israeli responses as disproportionate and called for restraint, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{249}

There were nearly constant attempts to broker peace talks by diplomats from Egypt, Jordan, the UK and the USA with the support of the United Nations and the European Union. Although some of the efforts led to ceasefire agreements, none resulted in stopping the violence for more than a day and none led to substantive talks between the two sides.\textsuperscript{250}

In May 2001 the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee released its report, known as the Mitchell Report, on the outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians.\textsuperscript{251} The report called for an immediate and unconditional cessation of violence, recommended a number of steps towards the rebuilding of confidence between the two sides, and called for a resumption of negotiations to solve the underlying causes of the conflict. Among the confidence-building steps were a full effort by the PA to stop terrorist acts and punish the perpetrators and an Israeli freeze on the building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Although the report was accepted in principle by the PA and the Israeli Government, it did not lead to any pragmatic measures.\textsuperscript{252}

By July an upsurge in violence that coincided with a diplomatic impasse led to a tit-for-tat cycle of violence that continued for the rest of the year. The Israeli military used ground and air assaults to attack the PA and to destroy homes and farmland.\textsuperscript{253} Israel also assassinated individuals in a practice that began in November 2000 and led to about 60 murders by the end of 2001.\textsuperscript{254} After one such attack in October, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) assassinated the Israeli tourism minister, who was an extreme nationalist. The action marked an escalation of the conflict as it was the first time a cabinet minister had been murdered in this conflict. In response Prime Minister Sharon pledged ‘an all-out war’ on terrorists and their collaborators.\textsuperscript{255} Israeli forces occupied six towns in the West Bank for a month.\textsuperscript{256}

The current Intifada is more violent than the first one and became more violent as it entered its second year. During the first 12 months of the 1987–93 Intifada, over 300 Palestinians and 11 Israelis were killed. Between September 2000 and September 2001, 560 Palestinians and 177 Israelis were killed, according to the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group and the Israeli Government, respectively.\textsuperscript{257} By the end of November 2001, the violence had killed 725 Palestinians and 192 Israelis and had devastated the economy in the Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.\textsuperscript{258}

Initially, the new US Administration of President George W. Bush put pressure on the Israeli Government to take a less militaristic approach, calling Israeli actions provocative and agreeing on the desirability of international observers in the region, which the PA had frequently requested and Israel had opposed.\textsuperscript{259} For several months after the September terrorist attacks in the USA, the US Government put pressure on the Israeli Government to agree to a ceasefire, as part of its strategy to convince Arab governments to join its global effort against terrorists. The Bush Administration also endorsed the idea of a Palestinian state and began to refer to ‘Palestine’, marking the first time a US administration had used the term the Palestinians use to designate their homeland.\textsuperscript{260} Israel strongly resisted US pressure and by the end of the year the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{256} ‘Israeli pulls back in “goodwill gesture”’, BBC Online Network, 27 Nov. 2001, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>.
\item \textsuperscript{257} Bennet, J., ‘After a year of Intifada, hearts have hardened’, \textit{International Herald Tribune}, 29–30 Sep. 2001, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{258} ‘The Palestinians and Hamas: Hamas has the people’s heart’, \textit{The Economist}, 1 Dec. 2001, p. 41.
\end{itemize}
USA once again put full responsibility on Arafat for taking the first steps towards a ceasefire.²⁶¹

It was impossible for Arafat to completely end the violence, even if he had wanted to.²⁶² He was prevented from leaving the town of Ramallah by Israeli tanks, the PA’s infrastructure had been destroyed and the PA had effectively lost control of the Palestinian side. The far more radical Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups were ascendant.²⁶³ Prime Minister Sharon’s cabinet formally pronounced Chairman Arafat as ‘irrelevant’, although Foreign Minister Shimon Peres believed that he was still a possible negotiating partner.²⁶⁴ The year ended with Israelis and Palestinians radicalized by fear and desperation.

VI. Conflicts in South America

Colombia was the location of the only major armed conflict in South America in 2001. The conflict took on a regional aspect as neighbouring countries became concerned that the violence would spill over their borders in the wake of a large US infusion of military funding and equipment to the government. The peace process was internationalized with the appointment of a UN envoy.

Colombia

The Colombian Government faces two leftist rebel groups and a right-wing paramilitary group. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), motivated by Marxist ideology, has been fighting since the late 1960s in an effort to overthrow the Colombian Government. Composed of small farmers and day labourers, FARC has about 18,000 fighters, of whom 6,000 are lightly armed urban militia. It operates throughout the country, but its main strength is in the south. It claims to have a broad base of public support.²⁶⁵

The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, National Liberation Army) is smaller, with about 3,500 fighters and about the same number of urban militia. Its main strength is in the central region of the country, but it has been seriously weakened by paramilitary attacks on its civilian base.²⁶⁶ It is motivated by a Marxist-inspired concept of governance and economic reform. The ELN and the FARC see each other as rivals, although pressure by the paramilitary and government forces has led them to launch occasional joint operations.

The fastest growing armed group is the right-wing paramilitary umbrella organization Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia), led by Carlos Castaño. The AUC began as self-defence forces for large landowners and continues to state that its purpose is to fight the guerrillas. However, the paramilitaries are increasingly motivated by the desire for profit from the drug trade, extortion and kidnappings. They use terror to win territory from the guerrillas and are responsible for the worst atrocities against civilians committed in the country. The government says that it is taking action against the paramilitaries, but human rights groups have accused the Colombian military of complicity in the AUC atrocities. They have also criticized the US Government for ignoring or playing down evidence of the ties between the military and paramilitaries.\footnote{Human Rights Watch, *The ‘Sixth Division’: Military–Paramilitary Ties and US Policy in Colombia* (HRW: New York, 2001), p. 89.} Castaño appears to be interested in political influence and has built the AUC into a national organization. In 2001 the AUC’s fighting strength stood at over 8000, up from about 1200 in 1993 and 4500 in 1998.\footnote{Reid (note 266).} In 2001 the US State Department classified the AUC as a terrorist organization.\footnote{‘AUC is formally a “terrorist” organization’, *Latin American Weekly Report*, 18 Sep. 2001, p. 435.} It classified FARC and the ELN as terrorist organizations in 1997.

The Colombian military benefited tremendously in 2000 and 2001 from becoming the third largest recipient of US military aid, behind Israel and Egypt, as part of Plan Colombia. Out of a total US aid package of $1.3 billion, the Colombian military and police were to receive $952.3 million.\footnote{Centre for International Policy, *US aid to Colombia*, URL <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/aid0001.htm>.} Most of the money went to the military to pay for three mobile attack battalions, armed with combat helicopters. By May 2001 all three battalions had been formed.\footnote{Human Rights Watch (note 267).} At the end of 2001 the Bush Administration contemplated providing the means to train a fourth mobile battalion.\footnote{Sipress, A., ‘US contemplates anti-drug options as Powell heads to Colombia’, *International Herald Tribune*, 11 Sep. 2001, p. 3.} The Plan Colombia aid is supposed to be spent on the ‘war on drugs’ by contributing to the eradication of coca cultivation.\footnote{Reid, M., ‘Spraying misery’, *The Economist* (note 265), p. 7; and Reid, M., ‘Colombia: drugs, war and democracy’, *The Economist* (note 265), p. 4.} In practice, much of the coca is planted in regions that are controlled by FARC or the AUC, who earn hundreds of millions of dollars per year from the drug trade. Therefore, sending military units into coca-growing areas to aerial-spray pesticides and to seize and control territory makes the anti-drug programme hard to distinguish from a counter-insurgency strategy.\footnote{LeoGrande, W. M. and Sharpe, K. E., ‘Two wars or one? drugs, guerrillas and Colombia’s new Violencia’, *World Policy Journal*, fall 2000, pp. 1–11; and Reid (note 266).} Despite the infusion of military aid, the government is not strong enough to overcome the rebels or the paramilitary by force. The army, air force and navy together number about 140 000 and the police about 100 000.\footnote{Reid (note 265).} Conscript soldiers who have received a secondary
education are prohibited by law from being sent into battle, which keeps the country’s elite somewhat insulated from the conflict.276

Fighting took place throughout the country in 2001 but was most frequent in the north and south. The armed groups and government forces rarely engaged each other directly, preferring to try to weaken each other’s support base by attacking civilians thought to be sympathetic to one group or another.277 However, there were direct clashes at times, the most intense of which took place in March and April in Antioquia province in the north. Government, AUC and FARC forces were all involved in ambushes, attacks on villages and counter-attacks.278 In a departure from the past, fighting between the AUC and rebels also took place in cities on several occasions.279 The frequent battles and massacres made 2001 one of the deadliest years of the conflict. Over the past decade, the conflict is estimated to have caused over 35 000 deaths.280

Violence also began to spread into Ecuador. Ecuadorian forces discovered coca plantations and cocaine-processing laboratories controlled by the AUC. In February AUC members fired on Ecuadorian villagers who allegedly gave Ecuadorian troops information that led to the destruction of a cocaine plant and the death of Colombians.281 The Ecuadorian military has also discovered camps belonging to FARC in an area close to the Colombian province of Putumayo, where FARC and AUC forces are fighting each other.282

Colombian President Andrés Pastrana was elected in 1998 on a platform centred around peace talks with the rebels. In a highly controversial move, he removed all government forces from a 42 000-square kilometre zone in southern Colombia and turned it over to FARC for a limited period of time. The rebels had demanded such a safe zone as a precondition for their participation in negotiations. President Pastrana has repeatedly extended the time period for the FARC zone, even though the rebels have not always been willing to negotiate. Talks were formally restarted in February 2001, having been suspended by FARC in November 2000. President Pastrana and FARC leader Manuel Marulanda Vélez agreed on a 13-point plan for further talks, including the involvement of foreign third parties.283 After little progress, the talks almost

276 Reid (note 265).
collapsed in October 2001, when FARC killed a former government minister and the government stepped up military patrols around the zone.\footnote{Columbia peace talks rescued’, BBC News Online, 6 Oct. 2001, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/>; and ‘Fresh talks with guerrillas on the cards’, Latin American Andean Group Report, RA-01-10, 11 Dec. 2001, p. 2.} Although Pastrana stated that FARC were terrorists and drug traffickers, he again extended the period for the FARC zone, until January 2002, and the talks carried on under growing pressure from conservatives to end them.\footnote{‘Fresh talks with the guerrillas on the cards’ (note 284); and Agence France-Presse, ‘Chronology of the strained Colombia–FARC peace process’, 10 Jan. 2002, available from ReliefWeb at URL <http://www.reliefweb.int/>.}

The ELN has sought a similar zone free of government control as a place to hold its own negotiations with the Pastrana Administration. A zone was agreed in 2000, but the AUC has blocked its establishment because it would be located in a region where the AUC controls the towns and coca industry.\footnote{Reid (note 265).}

VII. Conclusions

The central contention in all of the conflicts described above is control over either government or territory. However, the diverse state and non-state actors reveal multiple and overlapping objectives related to political power, economic gain and ideological belief. In 2001, economic incentives and ideological belief sustained many of the conflicts to the point that it was difficult in some cases to distinguish where politics left off and other considerations became primary. The role of mineral wealth in West Africa and the African Great Lakes region provided clear examples of the importance of economic gain in sustaining conflicts once they have started.

The spillover of intra-state conflicts into neighbouring states was common, but its impact was varied. In some cases, the cross-border movement of rebels and arms caused conflicts in neighbouring states to intensify, as in Burundi when rebels entered from the DRC. In other cases, conflicts were not significantly affected by spillover from neighbouring states. For example, the Ugandan Government’s fight against several rebel groups was not noticeably affected by changes in the conflicts in Sudan and the DRC. Spillover threatened to turn the minor conflicts in Guinea and Liberia into a larger, regional conflict. Fortunately, the region has not yet suffered the fate of the Great Lakes region in the 1990s. Some countries at peace were threatened by spillover, for instance, when rebels and right-wing paramilitaries from Colombia entered Ecuador. Other countries did not appear to be destabilized, for instance, when refugees and armed elements crossed into Kenya from Somalia. Research into the reasons for the wide variation in the impact of conflict spillover could have significant implications for policy.

Eleven of the 15 conflicts reviewed have lasted for at least eight years. One of the reasons for their endurance is the inability of either side to prevail by force. In the vast majority of the conflicts reviewed in this chapter, rebels used a guerrilla military strategy. They supported their military effort through the
sale of minerals, timber and narcotics and through remittances from supporters abroad. However, very few groups tried to win the loyalty of the population through political, economic or social programmes. Historically, such programmes have been important elements of successful insurgencies. From the perspective of governments, it is very difficult to win a guerrilla war militarily. It is difficult to use the military’s full strength against small and mobile opponents, and even a military victory does not solve the problem that led to the insurgency. The longer a conflict lasts, the more it creates the economic and social conditions in which rebel organizations can recruit disaffected people into their forces. This combination of factors means that both sides can fight for a long time without one defeating the other or debilitating it through attrition. Long conflicts, where weak antagonists often attack even weaker targets, cause a large number of civilian casualties and destroy economic and social infrastructure.

Events in several countries in 2001 demonstrate that the duration of a conflict alone is not an indication of whether it is ‘ripe for resolution’ or ready for escalation. Long-running conflicts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka showed signs of resolution. In contrast, the protracted conflicts in Colombia and between Israel and the Palestinians intensified during the year. Analysts and policy makers often conceive of conflicts progressing through a series of phases, from a low level of violence to more intense violence and back to a low level before they are resolved. The concept of conflict phases is a useful one, but it is important to bear in mind that violent conflicts rarely progress in a linear fashion. More often they are cyclical, passing several times through phases of more and less violence.

The full impact of the United States’ response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 will take several years to develop. It is likely that changes in political alliances and flows of military aid brought about by the new US security agenda will have an effect on many conflicts in the future, particularly in those states where the government successfully makes the case that its opponents are terrorists. In addition, the USA has indicated its increased willingness to engage in direct military confrontation now that it perceives its national security to be in danger. Its ability to dominate battlefields will have an immediate and dramatic effect on any conflict in which it becomes involved. However, the extent of future US military engagement throughout the world and whether a military campaign can lead to victory in the ‘war on terrorism’ are open questions.