Introduction
Trends and challenges in international security

ALYSON J. K. BAILES

I. Introduction

Over a year has passed since the cataclysmic, and catalytic, attacks of 11 September 2001, which provided the leitmotif for the Introduction to the SIPRI Yearbook 2002. As shown by the painful rifts over a US-led intervention in Iraq, however, the international community is still far away from developing a united and effective response. The new challenge has severely tested such global order as exists, for three main reasons.

First, the terrorist phenomenon itself is complex and intractable, difficult even to define in a way that all would agree with. Such questions as its unitary or manifold nature, its familiar or novel character, and whether one can and should wage ‘war’ against it are among today’s hottest debates.

Second, the new threat both feeds on and aggravates other security problems—deficits in national and global security management—which have prevailed at least since the epoch-making events of 1989–90 and often for longer.

Third, the early 21st century security environment is shaped by a specific set of factors, at least some of which are unprecedented. States are looking for security solutions in circumstances unlike any which have confronted them in the past.

Sections II and III of this chapter address these new circumstances and the generic challenges which they pose, both for the identification and prioritization of ‘threats’ and for the development of policy responses. Section IV deals briefly with other dimensions and challenges of global security today, and section V offers some final thoughts on global institutions.

II. The early 21st century environment

One of the several paradoxical aspects of the mass killings of 11 September 2001 has been that, while brutally demonstrating the reality of an interconnected world, they have bred policy perceptions and agendas which risk becoming increasingly West-centric.

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2 In this chapter the word ‘threat’ is used in a broad sense to cover all man-made and natural phenomena which are perceived as putting a given state or society in danger. It may be used in more restricted senses in other chapters.
The frustrations behind the attacks, the types of personalities involved and even the techniques used were not entirely novel. There was nothing new in the demonstration that a powerful international actor can affect other, even quite remote, players in the global arena in multiple ways, thus becoming a target of first choice for enemies as well as a rallying point for sympathy and support from friends. Rather, the ‘shock of the new’ came from the fact that the home territory of the world’s most powerful nation proved so vulnerable to an asymmetrical attack. It was compounded by the damage and distress caused in the following weeks by the delivery in the USA of letters containing anthrax spores and the impact of subsequent terrorist atrocities, even if aimed at other targets. The natural result was a painful sense of insecurity among those who had previously felt most secure. Involvement with the outside world and exposure to the all-invading processes of globalization could easily come to be seen not only as a burden or inconvenience but also as a potential source of deadly threat.

The disillusioning and disorienting effect of this revelation, following a decade of growing stability, may explain the sweeping force of the response strategies adopted by the US administration—if not always their specific direction. The resulting US agenda automatically becomes a defining part of the security policy environment, not only for the ‘West’ or the northern hemisphere but also for the greater part of the inhabited world.

Logically, a situation in which both strong and weak states are consciously vulnerable should lend itself to solution through a framework of universally applicable, universally protective regulation. In the real world, there is no single institution that can not only lay down the law in this context but also enforce it. The limitations of what can be expected from the United Nations have become clearer, even as post-cold war trends have generally enlarged the range of democratic states ready to support it, and enhanced the capacity and will of other institutions to cooperate. International law still has lacunae regarding the definition and criminalization of terrorist acts and, more broadly, the definition of circumstances in which the international community may take forceful action—overriding the normal safeguards of national sovereignty—against an offending state. The provision of military forces and other assets to carry out such enforcement tasks still depends overwhelmingly on the decisions of nation states on whether to provide them and how far to subordinate them to formal institutional control.

Another obvious problem is that the political will and borrowed resources of the UN are insufficient for tackling all the patent breaches of international security at any given time. The choice of cases for intervention is inevitably selective and liable to be biased both by the priorities of the UN Security Council’s five permanent, most powerful members and by their wish to hold back certain issues from international jurisdiction.

Finally, just at a time when even the most theory-averse observers are realizing that dimensions of security beyond traditional military conflict can criti-

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3 See essay 1 in this volume.
cally affect the survival and welfare of whole populations, the lack is keenly felt of a single global institution which can legislate and act across the whole range of human activities involved—from nuclear arms control to disease, and from money laundering to catastrophic climate change.

It would be tempting to contrast this shortfall in solutions with a constant growth in the challenge of international wrongdoing. A longer historical perspective does not, however, support the second point. The end of the East–West cold war removed the risk of escalation to global nuclear conflict and released a huge amount of human and material resources formerly tied up in sterile confrontation. It facilitated the resolution of several regional conflicts outside Europe, even while it removed the brake on others. There is no longer a coherent group of states within the international system that systematically opposes and offers an alternative to free-market democracy and the philosophy of cooperative security. (It would be a gross factual distortion to cast Islam in that role.)

State-to-state conflict, at least when both sides act on purely national initiative, has become a rarity.4 Dangers to human security, including those in such non-military dimensions as law and order, food and health, more often arise within dysfunctional states and, when they do, are usually quarantined or contained by other states before the overspill has spread beyond the immediate region. As a result of this and other causes, it remains the case that the rates of violent death (from all causes) are many times higher in the world’s weakest and poorest states than in its strongest.5 Indeed, a great deal of terrorist activity also takes place in conflict-torn developing countries, finding not only its safe havens and weapons but also some of its victims there.

The perception of sharpened challenge to the leaders of the international system and to the system as a whole must therefore be attributed to a combination of more specific factors. One is the identification of a new strain of terrorism that does not limit itself to targets connected with the promotion of change in the terrorists’ homeland or region or even to directly related players, such as colonial powers. Rather, it appears to assail the values, assets and self-belief of the international system as such. Such a philosophy of destruction is not unknown in history—vide the 19th century anarchists—but the modern version is more threatening because of the greater opportunities globalized societies give for infiltration and access to targets. It is more dangerous because of its access to weapons thousands of times more destructive than the typical 19th century bomb.

This is where the most logical linkage can be made to the increased focus on threats presented by so-called ‘rogue states’ (which is not an accepted term of art, but a shorthand for isolated regimes with a disregard for the broadly accepted norms of international behaviour). The dictatorial leaders of these states have shown that they are keenly interested in acquiring nuclear, radio-

4 See chapter 2 and appendix 2A in this volume.
logical, chemical and biological weapons and are able to obtain the necessary materials from a variety of sources. They are far from transparent in their activities, doctrines and intentions and are potentially reckless in the use of such weapons against both their own populations and others. In this light it is not unnatural to see transnational terrorism, ‘rogue states’ and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a single complex of threats to democratic societies. Such threats are existential in the depth of their impact; asymmetrical in coming from weaker or more elusive actors that cannot simply be balanced or deterred; and, for these and other reasons, peculiarly hard to tackle within the conventions of late 20th century security policy.

Parallelism of impact does not, however, always mean identity of source, and it would be well to avoid hasty conclusions about the material interconnectedness or shared ‘motivation’ of these three threat components. Terrorist networks typically arise and spread in non-dictatorial, relatively open societies. Moreover, ‘rogue’ dictators are not normally keen to surrender control of WMD to terrorists. Many of the documented leakages of mass-destruction technologies have come from states not regarded as ‘rogues’ but even, in some cases, as parts of the developed West.6

To these generic features of the current security environment can be added a number of observations on the role of particular states. The USA is now often described as having reached a ‘uni-polar moment’, with unchallengeable superiority in conventional and nuclear weapons and in military technology, backed by the world’s largest national economy and by worldwide influence in the field of culture and communications. The USA’s status as the sole superpower has arguably been a fact ever since 1989–90, but it has become a more salient and definitive feature of the world scene since 11 September 2001 for several reasons.

First, the current US administration more openly than its predecessors has declared US superiority as an assumption and a goal for its global policies and has pledged itself to repel any attempt to diminish it.7

Second, as noted above, this sole superpower feels that its territory and its citizens are at least temporarily under threat and is choosing to respond with an active, outgoing strategy designed to hit the various threats at their source. In the process, the USA has further demonstrated and used its truly global reach (both political and technological) to affect the actions and experiences of states of every kind in every possible region.

Third, the policy of Russia under President Vladimir Putin, and to a lesser extent that of China since 2001, no longer provide a general challenge or counterweight to US leadership, even in the political dimension. Russia now tends to seek common ground or to exert influence within the West–West debate on the most prominent strategic issues.8

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6 See also chapters 13 and 17 in this volume.
8 See also chapter 1 in this volume.
The resultant trends in US policy, including both specific actions such as the intervention in Iraq and the hot pursuit of terrorists (in Afghanistan and Yemen), and doctrinal formulations such as the new emphasis on circumstances requiring forceful pre-emption, inevitably have a major impact on other actors’ interests and perceptions in the security field. Not only does the USA have material resources to make major and lasting changes in the environment when it acts, but its predictions—or conclusions drawn by others from what it says and does—for the way it will behave in the future also strongly colour the debate about how the international security system as a whole is evolving. In the past year, many concerns expressed about stated US doctrines have been fed less by specific US actions than by the implications of how the USA has justified and pursued them as well as by the results of extrapolating this pattern of action into the future. The debate about whether the USA can be expected to act as an absolutist and unilateralist, or a lawful and cooperative, hegemon is one that agitates the USA’s friends much more than its potential foes. The former are concerned about the impact on global governance and their own role in it, while an isolated and aberrant superpower would not necessarily offer the worst of worlds for the latter.

The next piece of this early 21st century jigsaw is the ambivalent and incomplete development of Europe as a global actor. At this point in history, China’s security strategies are largely focused on its own region, and its eventual impact on the global system is moot. Russia’s power to actively direct events beyond its borders has been much curtailed. The European Union (EU) is thus commonly seen, in both theory and practice, as the main counterweight to or at least moderator of US influence. In economic life, it clearly and, indeed, often combatively plays that role. In the field of security, however, the picture is far less clear. This is not only because Europe has been and remains the USA’s partner in common defence, and co-dependent with the USA for tackling new threats, but also because the European common security personality is of recent creation, still dogged by national divisions and modest in both ambitions (envisaging military action only for limited scenarios of crisis management) and resources. Up to now, the EU’s defence dimension has not been taken seriously by US observers except as a possible irritation and distraction. Even when US intentions have been modified by European influence, this effect has been credited to individual European countries and their leaders rather than to the EU as such.

It is not surprising in this light that influential US analysts should see Europe as, at best, a source of only ‘soft’ power vis-à-vis the outside world (the merits of this issue are re-addressed below). Moreover, it would be unrealistic to expect either this judgement, or the EU performance on which it is based, to improve radically in the short term for a number of reasons. EU enlargement in 2004 and the likely attendant reforms in EU governance will draw European energies inwards for a couple of years at least. The US-defined security agenda set out above is a manifestly and seriously divisive one for Europe, given European states’ varying attitudes to terrorism and to out-of-
area use of force, let alone their different feelings about the USA itself. Finally, the EU’s own external policies are particularly underdeveloped and ill-adapted when it comes to dealing with the challenges posed by state or sub-state actors that flout international norms and fail to respond to the ‘softer’ kinds of pressure and persuasion.

III. Threat identification and threat hierarchies

It is one thing to identify salient novelties of the current world scene and another to agree on what, in truth, are the most serious challenges they pose for security. The debates in 2001–2002 have shown how difficult it is, even for a closely linked community of developed ‘Western’ states, to agree on issues as basic as the nature of terrorism and the basis for counter-terrorism strategy; how to assess and counter the threat of the proliferation of mass-destruction technologies; and how to include and rate these newly salient threats within the spectrum of threats to international and human security. This section offers further detail on these three examples of the difficulty of threat definition and prioritization. It also poses some more general questions about the difficulty of formulating an adequate security-policy concept to deal with present-day conditions.

The definition of terrorism has been probably the most discussed case. It is a legal and conceptual challenge but also a political bone of contention. The adage ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ is true in both a subjective and an objective sense. People carrying out terrorist acts against country A may be seen as benefactors by people in country A who oppose the regime and by country B if it is an enemy of A. On the other hand, it may also happen, notably in a colonial scenario, that groups which gain power by means that include terrorist violence are subsequently viewed as liberators of their country (or population group). They may then be recognized as legitimate leaders by the world community. The whole issue of how people ‘move into and out of’ terrorism needs further elucidation. Another hotly debated question is whether terror is always the weapon of the weaker side in an asymmetrical relationship or whether ‘state terror’ needs to be equally reprehended.9

For purposes of practical policy making, however, questions of definition are less critical than questions of perception and assessment. There is a wide intergovernmental consensus, reflected inter alia in UN votes, that something called terrorism exists and that it constitutes a threat to national and international law, to human rights and to security. However, many states, including active and responsible ones, would question whether terrorism constitutes a single coherent threat. Many of the situations in which one or more sides resort to terror tactics have grown from specific historical–political roots and have stayed within certain geographic, or at least ethnic, limits. On top of these separate, often long-standing ‘hot spots’ are superimposed links between terrorist groups for purposes of practical cooperation and the truly ‘trans-

9 See essay 1 in this volume.
national’ groupings, such as al-Qaeda, which defy geographical limits in both their methods of organization and their targets. Within this already complex picture, further distinctions—descriptive, not normative—can be made. Many people see a difference between terrorists who have specific and ‘attainable’ goals, such as taking over power in or changing the structure of a state, and those whose culture is dominated by protest and by punishment of the chosen enemy without clear gain for themselves. (Terrorism even of the first kind can of course degenerate into a way of life and lose sight of its own exit strategy.) Construction of a rational and effective counter-terrorism policy must start from careful analysis of the balance and interrelationship between these different brands of terrorism, with special attention to their origins, their motivation, and the distinction between the environments which they exploit for their activities and the targets they actually mean to strike.

The other much advertised global threat—from nuclear, chemical and biological—would seem at first sight an easier one to define. These weapons are properly the object of special fears and abhorrence because of their huge, indiscriminate and insidious destructive power and because of the way their use threatens to contaminate or disrupt the whole human environment. No responsible member of the international community ought to condone the further acquisition of such weapons by itself or any other state or group, or the breaking of taboos on those types of weapon which are (in principle) universally outlawed.

If governments and institutions often fail to translate these concerns into real-life policy and resource priorities, it is not only because of the temptation to turn a blind eye to unpalatable facts. Real complications and difficulties lie in the way, not limited to the notorious problem of establishing what the facts are. To the extent that many worries concern the development of capacities, the dual-use nature of many relevant technologies creates challenges of both detection and interpretation. Even where it is clear that weapons or assets capable of use as weapons do exist, questions of motivation and targeting must be addressed to establish the nature of the threat to international security—as distinct from the possible breach of international commitments. Observers may disagree over how far such arms are aimed at, and designed to balance, particular local rivals; in what circumstances they might be used against the international community and its leaders; or how likely they are to fall into the hands of terrorists.

Even when a clear view can be taken on these aspects of diagnosis, the range of possible cures may be equally hard to define and agree upon because of other variables in the local and international context. Unfortunately, the clearer the existence of mass-destruction capacities becomes and the more irresponsible their possessor is known to be, the harder it becomes to take resolute action to get rid of the capabilities without intolerable risk. This simple argument underlines the importance of tackling suspected cases of WMD proliferation before they can cross the fatal threshold.

10 See essay 5 in this volume.
It is fair to add that, in the case of nuclear weapons, another set of issues complicates global consensus. Many UN member states still believe that the threat to peace comes from the very existence of such weapons, so that the five nations recognized as nuclear weapon states under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty are also part of the problem. For those who believe that ‘recognized’ nuclear possession cannot or should not be reversed, and that the problem is limited to further spreading, it is not always easy to explain on what grounds the categories of ‘accepted’ and ‘unacceptable’, ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegal’ possessors are delineated. A differentiated and localized approach to these issues cannot be defended in pure logic or morality. In real life, however, the challenges posed by, say, Iraqi, Israeli, Indian, Pakistani and North Korean nuclear capabilities not only are handled but also need to be handled in substantially different ways. One conclusion to draw from all this would be that the world community will make its task much more difficult again if it slips into a ‘non-proliferation’ approach, requiring ad hoc judgements on what capacities are to be stigmatized and destroyed, to any further categories of WMD.

These two examples of the difficulty of defining even the most obvious and generally recognized threats are part of a much larger problem with threat prioritization. Just as peace is more than the absence of war, security is generally understood today to be more than the absence of immediate military threat or coercion. A shift of emphasis from military and defence relationships to broader threat spectrums, whether defined in relation to ‘human’, ‘existential’ or ‘soft’ security, was forecast after the end of the cold war. Now, more than a decade later, it is starting to make sense for a wide range of regimes around the world.

Threats such as the collapse of law and order, internal conflict or oppression flowing from ethnic and religious intolerance, interruption of vital supplies, water, food and fuel shortages, human and animal epidemics, accidents and natural disasters, and the results of environmental damage and climate change loom increasingly large in the concerns of ordinary voters. A truly comprehensive security strategy would need to take account of this full range of direct or indirect threats to the given nation and society, assess their relative importance also in terms of their interconnectedness—which ‘hits’ can a society bounce back from relatively easily, and which are the ones that risk undermining its whole viability?—and make an overall apportionment of resources accordingly. The corresponding shift of perspective at the international level would lead us to classify the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development as one of the most important security events of 2002.

The difficulties of articulating such a comprehensive approach to security in the real world are, however, on a par with its theoretical attractiveness. They are far from being limited to the aggravated problem of prioritization. The

11 See essay 2 in this volume, which reports on a specific national (Swiss) attempt to produce such a comprehensive analysis. Another interesting discussion of European and US ‘comprehensive’ threat perceptions is Kirchner, E. and Sperling, J., ‘The new security threats in Europe: theory and evidence’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 7, no. 4 (winter 2002).
headaches start with the definition of what it is that one is trying to protect. The boundaries of a given nation and the assets amassed inside them are merely a starting point. The wide definition of security combined with the multiplication of transnational processes and actors makes it necessary to start the process of defence from inside the state, with the protection of the individual citizen and of the assets and values of society as a whole. The traditional distinction between the concepts and means of internal and external security quickly becomes blurred here, and policy formulation is complicated by the fact that no country can in practice be self-sufficient in either respect.

Most nations’ welfare now depends on mutual interpenetration and on opening up to multinational processes, while transnational threats cannot effectively be fought within a single state’s boundaries. Beyond their frontiers, nations can have different kinds of ‘mental maps’ about how much farther their zone of interest, of protection and of responsibility extends—to their citizens abroad, their investments, their remaining and former colonies, their allies and their partners in integration. A responsibility to the whole international community is now part of the calculation, inasmuch as all states that can develop an exportable ‘surplus’ of security are encouraged to do so and to put it at others’ disposal in the form of peacekeeping, aid, mediation and so forth. The more active and powerful a given state, the more complex its security maps are likely to be and the worse the problems of prioritization and coherence will become.

The other major set of difficulties arises, as ever, from internal contradictions between the desiderata of security policy, including above all the relation between means of protection and what is being protected. The most familiar form of this conundrum is the ‘defence versus development’ debate. Spending too much on protection risks overstraining a nation’s (or alliance’s) financial and human-asset base and stunting the very growth that the policy was designed to support. This issue is far from out-of-date in current circumstances: it applies just as much to large states overreaching their powers as to small states misusing their scarce resources (being a ‘rogue state’ is one extreme way of doing so).

There are also more subtle dilemmas involved, however, once the concept of defence has been extended inwards into a society and out into further ‘soft’ dimensions. There is more than just a moral contradiction involved when, for example, terrorism is combated by methods which violate political rights and freedoms within the society being defended and/or which place too many new burdens and obstacles in the way of normal economic life. This also risks sapping the civic and economic vitality on which the self-confidence of the free world, and its outward authority and its appeal, are built. The same damage could be done within a country by stepping up the level of awareness and fear vis-à-vis certain threats without providing citizens with assurance that they will be mastered or that they can help in mastering them themselves. A government which sets out to defend its citizens from the grass roots upwards

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12 See also chapter 9 in this volume.
needs the citizens to help in their own defence—and a whole population is much harder to persuade and to mobilize than an army. A multicultural society that adopts a defence strategy based on defining enemies in ethnic or religious terms is clearly laying up problems for itself.

Last but not least, the ‘defence and development’ contradiction also applies at the level of global governance. If the available international security ‘surplus’ is directed towards the wrong problems (or even provokes new ones), the resilience of the world order for meeting larger and longer-term challenges—such as climate and population change—could be weakened. The consequences would be dire for rich and poor alike.

Policy responses: trends and challenges

All these considerations call for a policy-making approach which not only adjusts its range and substance to the new conditions but also mobilizes a different set of players and partners. Good civil–military, or military–police, coordination is just the beginning. A strategy for the defence of society must be capable of coordinating resources for civil protection, control or facilitation of transport and movement, communication and information, among other things. It must mobilize many kinds of environmental, medical, scientific and social-service as well as internal and external security expertise. It must also address in a much more serious way than modern societies have done hitherto the linkage in the security field between the activities of the public and the private sector.

On the one hand, the private sector is an asset to be protected against new threats such as cyber-terrorism as well as the familiar problems of energy or raw material supply; against interference with transport or communications; and against the fragility of those crisis-management instruments most relevant to this sector’s survival, such as the international insurance system. On the other hand, the private economy needs to be recruited to the service of international systems of threat control, such as measures against dangerous exports, smuggling and money laundering. Private business is critically interwoven with both the sources of and the solutions to environmental and other global resource problems, and it may itself be an actor both for good and ill in pre-conflict and post-conflict situations. There are large gaps both in policy formulation and in the building of institutions and networks to implement policy in this field, at both the national and the international level. (Many of the same issues have of course been explored in the debate over the nature and consequences of ‘globalization’, but in the main not by security experts nor with the methods of security-policy analysis.)

In the rest of this section, the formulation of security-policy responses is examined in three overlapping perspectives: (a) the choice between methods of positive action and of restraint (including the place of arms control); (b) the broad demands and dilemmas of counter-terrorism policy; and (c) the evaluation of the ‘integrative’ approach to security associated with the European
Union and with European states in general. The selection of these issues defers to the prevailing trends of debate in the ‘Western’ (or northern hemisphere) policy community. It does not do justice to many questions raised by—more or less autonomous—developments in other regions, but it is relevant to the way in which states in all regions will be acted upon and how they may be judged.

Action and restraint

In its current security policy, the USA shows a clear preference for ad hoc, active, nationally led responses to regions of threat and uncertainty—and is often blamed for it. In reality, the whole community of developed states since the mid-1990s has been putting more energy into positive and active ways of using defence resources than into ways of limiting them. The story of crisis control and regime change in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, the EU’s target for a military intervention capability, national and institutional programmes of defence reform assistance in Europe and elsewhere, and regional communities being built outside Europe with a direct or indirect security dimension are all part of the same picture. They implicitly reinforce the assumption that military power is a good and, indeed, that certain good purposes can only be achieved by its use.

This shift in perception and preference is not difficult to explain in historical terms. It has been made possible in large part by the end of the cold war, which not only allowed old adversaries to integrate and cooperate across former frontiers, but also removed worries about global escalation which had deterred or limited the direct use of force by strategic powers. Regime changes and solutions to local crises have widened the range of democratic, internationally open governments to collaborate with. The defence industry, for its part, has been looking for new markets and partnerships. All these factors tend to increase the ‘supply’ of externally deployable military capacity and to widen the pool for building coalitions. Meanwhile, the ‘demand’ has been stimulated by pressure for international solutions to both regional crises and generic (e.g., terrorist) problems, which appear intractable by any means short of the use of force. It is fair to note that, over the post-cold war decade, calls for such intervention have come as often from left-wing and liberal quarters, in the name of humanity, as they have from right-wing and nationally assertive ones.

Since 1989–90 the climate has, in fact, twice shifted against the restrictive and abstentionist approaches connected with traditional arms control. The first shift came in the immediate post-cold war period. In Eurasia at least, greater arms reductions were achieved by unilateral action in pursuit of a peace dividend than by any multilateral treaty. The fear of nuclear war largely subsided across this region, and stability was sought by reaching out to cooperate with past enemies rather than by sitting tight behind dividing lines so as not to provoke them. The second shift followed when the post-cold-war honeymoon
ended with the emergence of new regional and generic threats. This gave new reason to equate the defence of positive values with military superiority and sometimes left the impression that arms control was something to be done to the ‘bad guys’ (such as former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic under the provisions of the 1995 General Framework Agreement reached at Dayton).

Theoretically, the second phase might not have had to follow if arms control approaches had been able in the meantime to eliminate the sources and means of bad behaviour worldwide. Objective gaps and weaknesses in arms control, export controls and non-proliferation regimes did exist, and this helps to explain why the weakening regard for them has been a phenomenon not limited to US policy or to ‘rogue states’. The current US administration has, indeed, gone uniquely and disturbingly far in rejecting new universally applicable restrictions which bite upon itself and in renouncing, or severely stretching the limits of, past arms control commitments. In many other developed countries, however, the subject of arms control has been shunted into a specialized niche. Continued lip service cannot hide its supporters’ failure in recent years to reconcile and balance its philosophies with the new active defence trends, to remedy the weaknesses of old approaches, or to build new (e.g., European and other regional) initiatives in the face of deficient US policies.13

In the real world, the balance between the measures of active security building and restraint will not be redressed by denying legitimacy to either of them. What is needed is a better awareness of their respective strengths and weaknesses. Positive action has real values of speed, flexibility, open-endedness and often of inclusiveness. Action in an alliance or coalition creates confidence and maintains peace within that grouping, for a start. The downside lies in an absence of predictability and consistency; ambiguity of the results (there is always a losing party and not always the one intended, in addition to risks of retaliation and spiralling violence); and a potential lack of transparency, accountability and equality (the strongest party usually determines what will happen and who can join in). There is invariably some cost in terms of defence and other material resources and most probably in human life. Excess as well as failure in action can dent the credibility of the ‘good guys’ and encourage the less well-intentioned to follow suit.

There are ways of limiting these negative effects, some of which are obvious from recent experience. The action may be set within a multilateral framework where checks and balances are inherent in the decision-making process and responsibilities and burdens can be fairly shared. Care may be taken to work within the limits of international law, including its precepts on the minimum use of force and proportionality of response. Action should be aimed wherever possible at ‘everybody wins’ security building and at other preventive measures. The use of military resources and security-policy measures may be combined with instruments from other policy dimensions—political, economic

13 See also chapters 14, 15 and 18 in this volume.
and functional—so that force is only used in the limited context and for the limited time that it is really necessary. The main challenge for those who believe in this prescription is to show that multilateral, normative frameworks are actually available for the range of necessary actions—and that restraint need not mean delayed reactions, weakness or ineffectiveness in the field.

The weaknesses of arms control, especially in its universal regulatory version, are usually identified as failure to enrol or deter the most dangerous players (including the problem of catching sub-state and trans-state actors), weakness in detection and enforcement, and excessive cumbersomeness and cost. To this could be added inflexibility—because of the legalistic nature of the instruments, the long time taken to negotiate them and the number of participants with a veto; a general lack of ‘process benefits’ other than transparency—arms control communities do not generally widen and deepen their cooperation into other spheres; and the difficulty of integration into multivalent strategies. The short-term costs of carrying out reductions also loom large for some nations on the debit side, while others object to the perceived overlap and interference with civilian industrial activity and research and development.

In the past few years, creative attempts to escape these problems have sometimes taken the form of doing arms control jobs with the instruments of positive cooperation—for instance, the US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme and the Group of Eight (G8) Global Partnership programme—or ‘packages’ may be constructed in which arms cuts are traded for other security benefits, as in the 2002 US–Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Both these approaches exploit the potential of a kind of crossover zone between the spheres of action and restraint. It is a potential certainly worth exploring further, including the reverse case in which an arms control agreement or other restraint measures would be used to help launch a positive military relationship. However, these hybrid methods can mean jettisoning some of the most characteristic values of traditional arms control, namely, transparency, verifiability, enforceability and universality (or at least, reproducibility). If these latter values still have merit, their supporters also need to consider how the classical arms control approach which preserves them might be re-invented and re-sold. Its credibility can be bolstered not only by securing greater effectiveness but also by borrowing some of the merits of positive cooperation such as greater flexibility, productiveness and community-building effect.

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14 On the CTR see chapters 15 and 16, and on the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction see chapter 14 in this volume.


16 See also chapter 14 in this volume.
Counter-terrorism policy

Counter-terrorism policy offers a special illustration of the importance, and the difficulty, of correctly balancing measures of action and restraint. Whether arising within or between nations, terrorism has never been suppressed without some degree of forceful containment, coercion and punishment. Indeed, it can be argued that, because the essence of terrorism is to try to rob the authorities of their monopoly of violence, the authorities can only end it by reasserting their superior force.17 On the other hand, it has also been a recurring pattern in history for terrorists to try to provoke their targets into excessive use of force in the hope that this will create martyrs, further alienate whatever disaffected constituencies the terrorists are drawing their support from, prolong tension and insecurity within the society under attack, and even undermine the target regime’s own base of legality and legitimacy.

In modern conditions, where developed states are typically members of one or more integrated security communities, terrorists may also gamble on the hope that an exaggerated reaction will split their target away from its natural allies and sympathizers. Even if these more insidious risks are avoided, there is still a danger that crushing terrorists by force alone will convey the lesson that future terrorists can only win by being more violent. Moreover, in cases where terrorism is a symptom of some underlying grievance or other misalignment in the national and international structure, it is self-evident that force alone will not make the problem go away.

The types of positive international action that have flourished since the end of the cold war tend to break down when applied to terrorist targets. Terrorists cannot be defeated and subjected to a peace settlement in the same way as erring states. Nor can they be recruited through schemes of positive security partnership and integration. Somewhat paradoxically, measures of restraint and denial do retain more of their relevance in this field: good export control and non-proliferation policies can block dangerous materials from reaching terrorists and criminals, wherever they may be. Some of the most fruitful new attempts to get an international grip on the terrorist challenge since September 2001 have in fact involved applying approaches that are very similar to arms control. UN- or EU-backed regulations with universal application, using the means of the law, have been applied to such areas as immigration control, extradition, trial and sentencing of terrorists, and the blocking of terrorist-backed money transfers and deposits.18 Such approaches are logically, as well as practically, robust because they use the new mechanisms of integration and transnational jurisdiction to counter a transnational enemy trying to exploit the openness of integrated societies.

17 It is consistent with this argument that ‘failed states’, where a central authority is unable to enforce its writ—leaving room for others to compete over control of population and resources—seem to lend themselves particularly to the use of terror methods internally and to exploitation by terrorists from outside.

18 See also essay 1 in this volume.
Just as in the case of military security, it may be tempting for those with most at stake to try to use a ‘cocktail’ of positive collaboration and coercion against terrorism, rejecting the restraint approach, especially where it seems to limit the exercise of their own strengths. The trouble is that the necessary elements of universal regulation have to be really universal, shaped by and binding on all parties, if they are going to work. The international rule of law cannot be turned on and off like a tap. Even a sole superpower needs partners to make a success of the most direct and active uses of force, and certainly to contain and control their consequences. It is an understandable paradox that the most advanced and closely integrated partners are likely to be most scrupulous about establishing a consensual, morally and legally defensible basis for joint actions—not just in cases of the use of force but also for such constitutionally sensitive matters as the exchange of intelligence, extradition of suspects or seizure of assets.

Conversely, states that want to join in hunting down terrorists without concern for legal restraint (or that welcome the excuse to strike at their own opponents with impunity) are not likely to be the most reliable allies, or props of international security, in the longer run. Last but not least, conflating might and right is a safe strategy only for a state that can be sure of its current supremacy in all dimensions and of keeping that supremacy indefinitely. If the first factor is lacking, a military success could, for instance, be undercut by an economic backlash. If the second is uncertain, there is a risk that other, future superpowers will profit from the lack of restraint to assert or revenge themselves in a way that more than cancels out any short-term advantages. Working within respectable international coalitions, within institutional frameworks and within the limits of international law is not an idealistic but rather a realpolitik prescription when viewed in these various lights.

While SIPRI does not study terrorism as such, part III of this Yearbook, dealing with arms control, has a lot to say about the challenge of making traditional restraint measures bite upon the terrorist threat. It should be added here that there is still much work to be done on the impact of terrorism in the context of armed conflict, which is another traditional SIPRI field of analysis. Under the impact of 11 September 2001 there has been a revival of concern about the risk that any conflict, anywhere, could generate a terrorist diaspora—as well as refugee flows, crime, arms smuggling and economic disruption—threatening even remote and non-engaged states on their own territory. Self-interest has thus usefully reinforced the existing motives for third parties to try to halt emerging or existing conflicts, and there is progress to report in consequence, even in some cases on which the world had for a time appeared to turn its back. Growing attention has also been devoted to the terrorism dimension of conflict prevention—terrorism as a warning symptom, and strategies to spot and arrest the deterioration of conditions that can give rise to both terrorism and more general armed conflict.

19 See chapters 14, 16 and 18 in this volume.
20 See also chapter 2 and appendix 2A in this volume; and Stepanova, E., SIPRI, Anti-terrorism and Peace-building During and After Conflict, SIPRI Policy Paper (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2003).
The theme can and should be continued through the different stages of active conflict management. How does the presence of terrorist activity, perhaps aimed at the intervening forces themselves, affect international peace operations, and what combination of military and other inputs can best bring it under control? When the time comes for post-conflict reconstruction, how can the structure of law and order be rebuilt in a way that is robust enough to stifle any remaining terrorism—while avoiding errors of oppression and exclusion that might drive new candidates along the terrorist path, both at home and in exile? How can there be assurance that power is being left in the hands of people who will not themselves one day start sponsoring and harbouring terrorists, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan?

**The European way?**

The literature on the unique exercise in security building represented by the integrated community of the European Union has expanded in the past couple of years, thanks almost exclusively to its critics. Both the new trends in strategic thinking under the Administration of President George W. Bush, and the effort to understand the tensions these have provoked between the USA and Europe, have led US observers to identify the collective European approach as a ‘soft’ one. It is capable—they argue—of creating security by political, economic and other consensual methods, but falls down when confronted with problems requiring clear ‘side taking’ and force.21

If there has been no equally famous European rebuttal (as yet) of this thesis, that may be because at least part of the analysis is true. After World War II, a unique historical opportunity existed in Europe which was seized in a unique way. The integrated community designed by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman was endowed with a degree of common jurisdiction, pooled resources, domestic interpenetration and supranational governance never paralleled between free nations before or since. In security terms, the EU succeeded—powerfully assisted of course by NATO’s own integrative effects—in making war among its members inconceivable, sublimating remaining conflicts to the political level, and relegating to history a whole series of previously explosive cross-border minority problems.

Later in its evolution, the EU acquired the competence and tools to protect its members’ security in a number of non-military dimensions, including some very relevant to the latest threats, such as Justice and Home Affairs cooperation against terrorism and export controls against proliferation. From the 1960s onwards it developed external policies with a number of explicit security-building elements. Most recently, it has decided to establish its own pool of capabilities for possible joint military actions in the service of its citizens’ safety and international crisis management.22

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22 See chapter 6 in this volume.
At this point of time, an objective audit of the productiveness of this ‘integrative’ approach to building peace and security could start with several positive elements. Recent history has disproved any idea that the model only makes sense for a limited set of World War II antagonists and/or within a narrow cultural continuum. Four European neutral states are now in the EU and 10 Central European and Mediterranean states with widely differing histories are set to join in 2004. Turkey is inching closer to membership and would offer the first test case of applying the model to a state with an Islamic cultural heritage. With the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the EU has begun to use the prospect of eventual integration quite openly as the spur for reform and reconciliation among the post-Yugoslavian states. If, as it is now starting to do, it gradually takes over residual military functions in the post-conflict Balkan states, it will be on the way to building a self-sustaining peace order in that tragic region for the first time in history.

Russia, for its part, has welcomed EU enlargement and joined in solutions for tricky aspects such as the problem of Kaliningrad, and not just because it looks forward to compensating or overspilling economic benefits. At least some parts of Russian society respond to the appeal of rule-based integration based on common values and aspire one day to share in it more fully themselves. If this audit were extended to other non-security dimensions of the EU (including its rise as an economic bloc, its success in launching a common currency and its standing as a supporter of global development), the positive side of the scale would be even heavier and the challenge to the USA correspondingly sharper.

If the defects and limits of the European model are attracting more attention just now, this is because the historic achievements of EU enlargement—and of carrying it through with Russia in a positive mode—have been overshadowed by the US-defined new security agenda outlined above. If the test of security contributions becomes the readiness to help eliminate threats from international terrorists, ‘rogue states’, proliferation and other agents of conflict, a number of points can be scored up against the EU. Its integrative, interpenetrative, rule-compliant model does not work with those who are deaf to its attractions and has yet to show any relevance even to a crisis as close at hand as that in the Middle East. The EU as a whole has not found any alternative policy, other than occasional sanctions, for dealing with international recalcitrants. It is patently divided over some of the most basic issues involved, such as the rationale for use of force outside its own territory. It is true that practically all the European nations have taken part in ‘peace enforcement’ actions, from those in the former Yugoslavia through to Afghanistan, and countries such as France and the UK have used force in non-European crises under their own initiative as well. Yet these contributions are rarely credited to ‘Europe’

23 See chapter 1 in this volume.
24 For the participants of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe see the glossary in this volume.
25 For Russia–EU relations, including the problem of transit between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia in the context of EU enlargement, see section IV of chapter 1 in this volume.
and certainly not to the EU. Indeed, they are just as likely to be interpreted as evidence of national propensities standing in the way of a common approach.

These sources of frustration for the USA are also frustrating for many European states, which is why, *inter alia*, the present European Convention (scheduled to end in mid-2003 and be followed by an Inter-Governmental Conference) is addressing the case for change in relevant aspects of EU policy and governance.\(^{26}\) There are, however, other contexts in which the European states consciously and deliberately take a different view from the USA, frustrating Americans by their degree of harmonization rather than the lack of it. These include European stands in favour of legal and multilateral avenues for international intervention; insistence on equal application of international codes; a higher priority to combating non-military (e.g., environmental) global threats; and a preference for gradualist, transformational approaches to regional crises rather than the adoption of proxies and creation of international outlaws. All these attitudes are organically linked with Europe’s own history, internal security culture and experience. It is difficult to imagine the EU—as a collectivity—adopting policies fundamentally at odds with them, even were it to grow greatly in military power and in confidence about wielding it.

Perhaps because they are conscious of this, US critics do not usually go on to explain what Europe ought to do differently. The more radical of them appear content with the idea that Europe should look after its own area in its own ‘soft’ way, leaving the USA (and opportunistic US–Russian coalitions) a free hand in the rest of the world. Others show awareness that for Europe to ‘re-nationalize’, letting some but not all of its members move fully into the US camp, or for Europe as a whole suddenly to become a tough and interventionist military power, would not necessarily suit US national interests any better than the status quo. A laissez-faire attitude to current differences cannot, however, be sustained so long as both sides of the Atlantic want to keep NATO as a common security framework. Mutual support is needed also for the minimum set of universal measures needed to combat terrorism and, indeed, for global economic governance.

In the real world of politics, European states seem to be adopting a mix of strategies for coping with these dilemmas. These include ‘bandwagoning’—working closely with the USA in hopes of being able to influence it, explicit or implicit role division and burden sharing—for example, a tough US intervention followed by a reconstructive European one; the pursuit of independent ventures to widen and deepen European strength—for example, EU enlargement and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); and the encouragement of lobbies or tendencies within the USA which appear more amenable to European views and values.

Expert opinion in both the USA and Europe is divided over whether to see this situation of uneasy compromise as leading towards a greater and longer-lasting Atlantic rift, which would drive part or all of Europe to form a more explicit (if inadequate) counter-pole to the US hegemon. Some would prefer to

\(^{26}\) For developments in the European Convention see URL <http://european-convention.eu.int/>. 
read it as keeping the way open for eventual re-convergence, with Russia and other powers ideally joining the new ‘wider West’ consensus.

One relevant issue which has been somewhat under-studied is which processes are guiding autonomous security development in the rest of the world. A European case could be made that very few democratic states other than the USA are trying to resile from arms control, climate control and other international legal commitments. Strong military actors in other regions seem hesitant to use their power unilaterally or pre-emptively—sometimes because the USA discourages them. Attempts at regional cooperation and integration are proliferating in all the world’s continents, often with an explicit security rationale. Some of the best-known groups—the Association of South-East Asian Nations, the Southern Common Market and the Southern African Development Community\(^\text{27}\)—have indeed been created in regions of recent military conflict and have already gone a long way to control the impulses that might lead to conflict again.

European states should be cautious about trying to claim any direct credit for these advances. They are most solid when based on local dynamics—necessarily different from those of post-war or present-day Europe—and may be motivated in part by the wish to escape post-colonial manipulation. Nevertheless, the creation and survival of such groups lend support to the thesis that integrative security is not an aberration or anachronism. Developing as well as developed nations may find in it a logical recourse against the ‘atomizing’ and disenfranchising tendencies of globalization. In this case, it becomes hard to imagine any substantial number of the world’s nations becoming either miniature copies or old-fashioned clients of the USA. Future scenarios involving qualified and mitigated versions of US leadership may then start to look more viable—as well as representing a more than purely European preference.

IV. Other dimensions of global security

For millions of people around the globe in 2002, security meant not the prospects of suppressing military and terrorist threat but the struggle to secure the most basic necessities of human existence—food, fuel, medicine and shelter. In these broader terms of human security and global governance, it was at best a year of mixed performance. A study published in *Foreign Policy* showed that the overall pace of globalization (as measured by indicators from the economic, social and information fields) had not slowed down despite the economic and psychological damage done by the September 2001 strikes.\(^\text{28}\) A UN report found that living standards in the world’s 49 poorest countries were actually lower than they had been 30 years ago.\(^\text{29}\) At the International Conference on Financing for Development, held at Monterrey, Mexico, in March

\(^{27}\) For the members of these organizations see the glossary in this volume.


2002, and at the Group of Eight meeting at Kananaskis, Canada, in June, the leaders of the chief Western economies—impelled partly by new awareness of the links between under-privilege, conflict and terrorism—agreed inter alia to raise their levels of aid to Africa, where 25 million people were estimated to be at risk from the latest famines. In August, the World Summit on Sustainable Development at Johannesburg, South Africa, adopted new goals, for example, for the provision of drinking water and sanitation.

While not exactly a failure, the Johannesburg Summit did not bring the conceptual or political breakthroughs many had hoped for either. The real progress lay perhaps more in the summit’s relative lack of accompanying violence and extremism from anti-globalization protesters. Sincere activists were understandably reluctant to become assimilated to the ‘terrorist’ danger, while at the policy level there was growing interest from both sides in the ideas of ‘corporate responsibility’ and ‘accountability’ for the private sector. As one set of issues moved towards compromise, however, another set opened up. For example, the confrontation between the USA, which wants freedom to supply genetically modified products as food aid, and recipient countries, which decline to accept such food even when starving, was not resolved by the end of the year and has the capacity to reverberate well into the future.

In the dimensions most directly related to human security, the verdict on 2002 would have to be that the pace of advancing threats grew well ahead of the solutions. It was the second-hottest year ever on record—and 2003 is forecast to be the hottest ever—yet the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change could still not be brought into force and did not bind the world’s largest energy user (the USA). Estimates were published that the ‘brown haze’ of pollution over Asia was reducing the yield of India’s crops by 10 per cent and that Indonesian forests would be completely gone within a decade. Even within Europe, violent floods did great economic (and cultural) damage and cost many lives. Another great human scourge, HIV/AIDS, claimed 3.1 million lives in 2002 and infected a further 5 million. Experts warned that China and the former Soviet Union were on the verge of an explosive growth in HIV infection—and nothing like the necessary resources were being mobilized against it. Partly as a result of AIDS but also because of the demographic impact of economic development, world population forecasts were revised downward. It was suggested that the world population might be as low as 8.9 billion in 2050 (only one-third higher than at present), with the population of developed regions falling to less than half its present level.

33 The Kyoto Protocol is available at URL <http://unfccc.int/>.
Although at first sight this might seem a relief from earlier worries of over-crowding and exhaustion of global resources, the concern that the world might have too few people is not entirely absurd in terms of current agendas. Falling birth rates and a shift of population structure towards the aged are a characteristic of economically developed societies and are progressing especially fast in Europe. Although the issue is still delicate at the EU level, many national authorities have concluded that positive efforts will be needed to import younger labour forces to fill the gap and to sustain their taxation and social welfare systems.

The difficulties of executing such policies are, however, obvious, starting with the problem of attracting suitably qualified people at the right place and time. Natural pressures (conflict, oppression, exhaustion of economic resources and environmental degradation) are more likely to impel the ‘wrong’ people to migrate in the ‘wrong’ directions. Even where the ‘import’ is successfully calculated for the needs of countries with a declining population, the ‘export’ side of the equation could mean a brain drain or other structural handicaps for the supplying nations. On the other side lies the difficulty of integrating such immigrant workers, possibly of increasingly unfamiliar origins, into the receiving nation’s social and political structures while preserving the proper standards of democracy and human rights.

The issue links up with those discussed above in this chapter. There is a tension between defence policies requiring increasingly forceful action against national and transnational adversaries of Arab/Islamic/developing country origin, and the maintenance of internal peace in multi-ethnic societies where many immigrants share the same origins and may be affected by the same resentments. Few would contest that further progress towards (appropriate forms of) pluralist democracy, in all countries, is the ultimate answer for all such contradictions. In the short term, however, the implementation of counter-terrorist measures can and does also cut across the lines of local democratization strategy.36

V. Envoi: back to the United Nations

In a proposal presented to the UN General Assembly in September 2002, the Government of Poland suggested that a group of eminent personalities might be asked to draft a new ‘political charter’ for the Organization.37 The initiative paid tribute to the UN’s Millennium Declaration38 but argued that thinking needed to be pushed further regarding the UN’s capacity to achieve the goals set out there. Experience in the post-cold war era had underlined not just the problems of capacity, as mentioned above, but the lack of clarity and consensus on certain principles crucial for effective action in the new security envi-

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36 See also chapter 7 in this volume.
The legal and moral basis for intervention in sovereign states was an obvious example, as was the whole question of how and by whom rulings made in the name of the international community should be enforced. Seeking answers to such conundrums in the UN framework, through an open and public process, would have the advantage that the interests of all member states and their varying cultures could be taken into account. It would also allow the roles of the various UN agencies relevant to non-military dimensions of human security to be brought into the review and thereby clarified and strengthened. A conceptual blueprint might emerge for the reform of the UN’s own structure.

Whether or not this particular proposal bears fruit, it points to a remarkable reality of the early 21st century environment—and one that confounds many black-and-white analyses. While NATO initially seemed marginal to the operational demands of counter-terrorism and the Iraq campaign, and while the EU’s related measures might be dismissed as inward-looking, the UN has found itself playing a central role in and offering the primary arena for both issues. A Republican US administration has used the UN more actively and inventively in the process than any of its predecessors for some time. With this operationalization goes, of course, the evident danger of instrumentalization—the UN becoming a tool or cover for what its most powerful members intended to do anyway—and of overreach followed by corrosive failure. These are, however, hardly new phenomena in the Organization’s history. On the other side, it may be argued that the normative, legitimizing and coalition-building value of UN authorization for the use of force has rarely been more clearly proclaimed and concretely illustrated as a subject of real-time politics.

In simpler terms, the co-dependence of might and right has come back to the centre of world debate. If the UN aspires to be the place for combining both, it will need to seek its own answers to all the quandaries of modern security policy making set out above: from threat identification to prioritization, the balance of active and restraint-based instruments, and the choice between integrative and non-integrative methods. The more it is forced to ‘get its hands dirty’ in enforcement exercises, the more important it becomes that the guiding intelligence should be clear. Adoption of the Polish proposal or something like it would mean confronting the issues involved while they are still inchoate and divisive. The results could still be better in the end—especially for the smaller players, which have little voice outside the UN—than the effects of muddling through.

For NATO developments in 2002 see chapter 1 in this volume. During the year NATO had no involvement in the operations in Afghanistan or in preparation for the action in Iraq, although both issues were to be reopened in 2003.