Introduction
Global security after 11 September 2001

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I. Introduction

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States marked a watershed in the international security process. From the ruins of the World Trade Center in New York and the destroyed Pentagon building grew the catalyst for the shaping of a new security system.1 Unresolved issues, clashes of interests and conflicts began to be analysed from a different perspective, with new issues and priorities. The term ‘post-cold war period’ is no longer adequate.2

Although the unprecedented terrorist acts of 2001 were directed against the United States, they were the impulse for a reassessment and redefinition of the security policies by practically all states and major international security institutions. The attacks helped precipitate the shaping of a new global security system.

II. Global terrorism and global responsibility

In many parts of the world, the relationship between globalization and mass-scale terrorism is still ignored or underestimated, and globalization phenomena are seen there as ‘Americanization’.3 Two major forces are driving the evolution of the world today—modernization and globalization accompanied by fragmentation. The terrorist attacks of 11 September are perceived as the start of the first major war of the age of globalization.4 However, although globalization has changed the way in which war is waged, the attacks were not a war on globalization. They were not a war of the poor against the rich, although the blatant disproportion in development and income between a handful of high-income countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

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2 During the cold war, the term ‘bipolar’ security system denoted the division of the world into 2 antagonistic poles or blocs. The term ‘post-cold war era’, as put by the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, described our environment not for what was, but for what it was not. Grossman, M., ‘Global trends for the coming decade and the formulation of US foreign policy’, Speech delivered to the National Newspaper Association, 21 Mar. 2002, Washington File, 21 Mar. 2002, URL <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/nato/02032705.htm>.
Development (OECD) and the rest of the world is of great importance for understanding the essence of conflicts.\textsuperscript{5} The terrorist attacks were not a war of civilizations, although they were inspired, masterminded and executed under the banner of Islam. In this regard, the question arises how the experience of 11 September and the war on global terrorism\textsuperscript{6} will affect the shaping of a new global security system.

In the security field, the policies and mutual relations of the United States, Russia and many other states have changed. It is widely acknowledged that combating terrorism has become a matter of the highest priority.\textsuperscript{7} However, the transatlantic community is confronted with a disagreement on what should be the main aim: whether to focus on disrupting and defeating the al-Qaeda network (as urged by the USA) or eliminating the roots of terrorism with a broader range of policies, also stressing non-military measures (as preferred by the European states). As a result of the intervention against the al-Qaeda network and its allies in Afghanistan initiated later in 2001, the processes of the internal transformation and enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) have accelerated. The states of Central Asia have gained in significance, and the policies of, for example, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan are now more salient than those of many European states.

Meanwhile, the new US defence policy document reflects a change in the philosophy of US defence planning—from the ‘threat-based’ pattern that has dominated thinking in the past to a ‘capabilities-based’ model for the future.\textsuperscript{8} Indeed, the premises of defence planning today need to be rapidly and flexibly adapted to the new, volatile circumstances—‘adapting to surprise’, in the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{5} Illustrative here are the data presented in the \textit{Human Development Report 2001}: ‘The richest 1\% of the world’s people received as much income as the poorest 57\%. The richest 10\% of the US population (around 25 million people) has a combined income greater than that of the poorest 43\% of the world’s people (around 2 billion people). Around 25\% of the world population received 75\% of the world’s income (in PPP US dollars)’. UN Development Programme (UNDP), \textit{Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development} (Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford, 2001), p. 19. See also chapter 6 in this volume.

\textsuperscript{6} Although there is no agreed definition of terrorism, the UN Secretary-General has identified the common denominator as ‘the calculated use of deadly violence against civilians for political purposes’. UN document SG/SM/8021, 12 Nov. 2001, URL <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm8021.doc.htm>.

\textsuperscript{7} The UN Security Council, the General Assembly and Secretary-General Kofi Annan have condemned terrorism in all its forms in many statements and documents. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368, 12 Sep. 2001; UN document SG/SM/7948, 11 Sep. 2001; and UN document SG/SM/7951, 12 Sep. 2001. In an address to the UN General Assembly, Annan expressed his support for a global coalition against terrorism: ‘This Organization is the natural forum in which to build such a universal coalition. It alone can give global legitimacy to the long-term struggle against terrorism’. UN document SG/SM/7965, 24 Sep. 2001. Decisions were aimed chiefly at developing a long-term strategy to ensure global legitimacy for combating terrorism. Annan urged the UN member states to ratify the 12 conventions and protocols on international terrorism adopted under UN auspices. UN document SG/SM/7944, 1 Oct. 2001.

words of US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.9 The fundamental change of circumstances is seen by many as an enormous opportunity: ‘we have to build a new trans-Atlantic relationship that can be a central pillar in the war on terrorism and the constructive prospects for peace, which will follow. Unfortunately, this is an opportunity that, thus far, neither side of the Atlantic has enthusiastically welcomed’.10 The causes of this lost opportunity are manifold.

As a rule, the deliberations on globalization have an economic and financial bias and often lose sight of the fact that globalization processes embrace all aspects of life—political, cultural and civilizational.

The attacks on the main global power produced a powerful response of global solidarity. However, although almost all states of the world defined a common problem and signed up for the anti-terrorist campaign, the world is still in the initial stage of building a global security system. The strong sense of common responsibility and interdependence has not been translated into new norms, principles, procedures, forms and operating mechanisms.

The issue of the strengthening of global responsibility for the prevention of terrorism became topical after 11 September.11 However, in spite of the many declarations and UN Security Council resolutions, expectations fell flat—both globally, in the United Nations, and regionally, in NATO. There is a lack of internationally recognized legal instruments for effectively tackling situations in which states have traditionally exercised their discretionary power and/or justified their actions as self-defence. Although the issue concerns both domestic and external security, the need for common responses in the security field has not been accepted globally. The interventions in Kosovo (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and Afghanistan reflect the new aspiration to establish international rules for protecting and defending respect for the basic principles and norms of international order.

The methods for the prevention of international terrorism are not adequate to the scale of the threat. Rather than bringing an end to unilateralism, the reaction of the United States to this reality has been to increase its unilateral actions.12

The USA has a position that is unprecedented in history in terms of its military, economic and technological capabilities, including military superiority in

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11 This issue was raised by the UN Secretary-General on 12 Nov. 2001: ‘In addition to measures taken by individual Member States, we must now strengthen the global norms against the use of and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We must also strengthen controls over other types of weapons that pose grave dangers through terrorist use. This means doing more to ensure a ban on the sale of small arms to non-State groups; making progress in eliminating landmines; improving the physical protection of sensitive industrial facilities, including nuclear and chemical plants; and increased vigilance against cyber-terrorist threats’. UN document SG/SM/8021 (note 6).
conventional arms, nuclear weapons and missiles. In the economic sphere, the US national product accounts for 31 per cent of world product—equal to the next four countries combined (Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France). It also leads in science and technology. It is this preponderance that both tempts and permits the USA to act unilaterally. However, in the age of new information technologies, security is based on interdependence rather than independence or preponderance. While this understanding is reflected in official US statements, in practice the US tendency towards unilateralism in decision making prevails.

What are the reasons for this course of events? Why has the USA not moved from unilateralism to multilateralism after 11 September?

III. The change of perception

In his speech to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz explained the nature of the anti-terrorist campaign. First, ‘the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission’. Second, ‘there will not be a single coalition, but rather different coalitions for different missions, “flexible” coalitions’. Third, the USA will take the actions it deems appropriate, and states that wish to cooperate may join such actions.

There is a dichotomy in US policy regarding multilateral action. From a US perspective, those who do not join the struggle against terrorism are seen as anti-American. In its war on terrorism the USA received the political support it needed from its allies and most other states, but it neither expected or requested military support. Only a few states, principally the United Kingdom, played a significant role in the Enduring Freedom military campaign in Afghanistan. The aims of the multinational coalition were to root out the terrorist al-Qaeda network from Afghanistan, overthrow the Taliban regime which hosted it and deter other states from supporting or sheltering terrorist organizations. While the Taliban regime was overthrown sooner than


14 ‘This means that the coalition will not “unravel” if some country stops doing something or fails to join in some missions . . . Some will join us publicly; others will choose quiet and discrete forms of cooperation.’ Wolfowitz, P., Speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2 Feb. 2002, URL <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020202-depsecdef1.html>.

15 The International Security Assistance Force Operation (ISAF) was launched on a British initiative on the basis of the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1386, 20 Dec. 2001, URL <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/res1386e.pdf>. The operation was envisaged to last 6 months (until 13 July 2002). Some 4700 military from 17 European countries (more than 90% from NATO members) and New Zealand are taking part in the ISAF. The operation is under the command of the UK, which is to hand it over to Turkey in Apr. 2002. At various stages of the operation, more than 30 states have made military contributions. The following countries have been engaged in the military activities: 15 NATO member states (only 3 allied states did not participate—Iceland, Luxembourg and Hungary), 5 Partnership for Peace states (Finland, Russia, Romania, Sweden and Uzbekistan) and 12 non-Euro-Atlantic states (Australia, Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates).
expected, a much more difficult task facing the international community and calling for a qualitatively new approach is the eradication of terrorism globally.

It is therefore important to address a few basic questions. Did the terrorist attacks on the USA indeed provide a new catalyst in the process of international security and, if so, why? What are the short- and long-term implications of the tragic attacks? Can new instruments meet the new threats and risks?

IV. The new nature of the threat

Four features of the attacks of 11 September 2001 are qualitatively new.

*The scale of the attacks.* More people perished in the attacks of 2001 than in the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor or in all the other terrorist acts that have been directed at the United States.

*The nature of the attacks.* The attacks were sudden, unexpected and not predicted. Although planned and directed from abroad, they were launched from US territory. No weapons or complex technologies were used (acting as missiles, passenger planes with innocent civilians were targeted at buildings with thousands of innocent people), and no state claimed responsibility for the acts.

*The new type of adversary.* The attacks were carried out by a non-state criminal network. The USA was the victim of aggression, but the attacks were outside any of the definitions of aggression in international law.

*The target.* The target of the attacks was the mightiest world power, which had considered its territory the safest, even a kind of sanctuary in security terms.

From the strategic perspective, the attacks can be seen as a part of a *sui generis* civil war in the Islamic world. The terrorists sought to compel the USA to pull back from the Muslim world by inciting a neo-isolationist mood and thus attempting to get the American people to put pressure on its government. Were this to have happened, it would have opened the way to the fall of existing regimes in the Islamic countries and the seizing of power by aggressive, extreme fundamentalist groups in most of the states where Islam is the ruling religion, including Pakistan. It would have affected the entire Arab world, whose autocratic regimes do not have popular support and have not come to power through free elections.

Islamic fundamentalists also attempted to diminish the impact of modernization by posing a serious threat to the very foundation of open, democratic society. Faced with the choice between security and democratic freedoms, societies, as a rule, tend to opt for the former. In this regard, the attacks have already adversely affected such values as privacy, freedom of movement and other civil liberties. However, the main aim of the terrorists was not so much to undermine the democratic system in the Western countries as to prevent the
spread of democracy to the Islamic countries and to create the conditions for seizing power there.

V. New security building blocks

The attacks on the USA have shown that the norms, procedures, mechanisms and institutions of the current security system are not sufficient for dealing with this kind of threat effectively. The international community—states, the United Nations and regional structures, including NATO—was caught off guard, in spite of the fact that there had been some warnings of an impending attack.

In seeking the correct responses to this new challenge, it is important to avoid solutions based on a belief that the sources of threats stem from specific arrangements within states (e.g., lax airline safety) or fundamental problems such as low living standards and inequitable distribution of wealth between the rich North and the poor South. The logical conclusion of the former analysis is that the attacks could have been prevented by enhancing controls at airports. The latter approach accepts the argument that a gang of desperate idealists sacrificed their lives and those of several thousand victims in order to defend the rights of the poor and underprivileged. It does not explain why the great mass of those suffering in the world neither become nor support terrorists.

Four premises are of key importance in shaping a new global security system. The first is that the development and spread of the technologies of ‘the network age’, particularly information technology, are a part of the process of globalization. The second is that a growing number of states are too weak to control developments on their territory; consequently, they have become a base and an asylum for international crime and terrorist networks. The phenomenon of failed states is due to various factors: the emergence of new states after the collapse of multinational federations, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; the exposure of poor states to the globalization and modernization processes; and the higher standards of governance called for by the international community. Paradoxically, at the beginning of the 21st century, threats to international security are generated less by strong and rich powers than by poor and powerless states and non-state actors. The third is the blurring of the distinction between domestic and external security. The fourth is the growing importance of non-military aspects of state security. The stability and efficacy of the state and respect for the norms and rules of law are more important for the maintenance of international order than a state’s military potential.16

16 This is illustrated by a statement by President George W. Bush regarding the second phase of the war on terrorism: ‘America encourages and expects governments everywhere to help remove the terrorist parasites that threaten their own countries and peace of the world’. ‘No neutrality, warns Bush’, 11 Mar. 2002, URL <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1867000/1867101.stm>. With this objective, the USA has initiated programmes of assistance for the training of anti-terrorist units (in Georgia, the Philippines and Yemen) and monitoring of capital transfers.
These premises offer a starting point for governments’ operational decisions. The consequences of globalization in decision-making processes have to be taken into account in practically all the spheres of activity of states, both in their external relations and in ensuring internal stability.\footnote{Marc Grossman has rightly observed: ‘Globalization’s challenges extend beyond international terrorism. The current failure of the Argentine economy, the self-enforced isolation of some countries such as North Korea and the deepening digital divide all tell us we have to do a better job integrating the world into a contemporary economic and political system’. Grossman (note 2). See also the speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, ‘NATO and the future of global security’, delivered at the inauguration of the Potsdam Center for Transatlantic Security and Military Affairs, Potsdam, 4 Mar. 2002.} The international system can only function if it is organized around the principles of democratization, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and the rights of minorities.\footnote{See also Rotfeld, A. D., ‘The organizing principles of global security’, \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security} (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001), pp. 1–12.} The emerging new system is predicated in equal measure on the harmonization of interests, common values, and the norms and tenets of law.

**A new agenda for NATO**

The close interrelationship between security and freedom is the basis of the North Atlantic Alliance. President George W. Bush referred to this in an address on the further enlargement of the Alliance.\footnote{‘All of Europe’s democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom—and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe—as Europe’s old democracies have.’ President George W. Bush, Remarks by the president in address to faculty and students of Warsaw, Warsaw University, 15 June 2001, URL <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html>.} In 2001 four issues were in focus: NATO defence capabilities; transatlantic relations; NATO enlargement eastward; and new principles of cooperation with Russia within the ‘20’ format.\footnote{Following the decisions adopted at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels on 6–8 Dec. 2001, in the course of talks conducted with Russia in the spring of 2002 a document on a qualitatively new format for Russia–NATO cooperation ‘at 20’ was elaborated. Matser, W., ‘Towards a new strategic partnership’, \textit{NATO Review}, Dec. 2001–Jan./Feb. 2002 (winter 2001/2002), p. 21. It will replace the existing ‘19 + 1’ forum for cooperation (the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council), established by the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act.} In 2002 decisions will be taken with regard to NATO’s new capabilities, new members and new relationships. It will be a period of external enlargement and internal transformation.

Underlying NATO’s transformation agenda is a search for answers to the question ‘what is the essence of collective defence?’. Some see it as the need for NATO to develop its capacities for counter-terrorism. They also call for a reform of the Alliance command structures to make it ‘leaner, more streamlined and more cost efficient, and, above all, more flexible’.\footnote{Wolfowitz (note 14).} Others see the problems in a broader perspective, not confined to military aspects. They demand ‘an unrestricted, comprehensive and transnational strategy that focuses attention beyond the immediate and towards the future new horizon’.\footnote{Hall, R. and Fox, C., ‘Rethinking security’, \textit{NATO Review}, Dec. 2001–Jan./Feb. 2002, p. 11.}
crisis management and European defence. In transatlantic relations, collaboration between the USA and its European allies should continue to pursue the following goals: (a) ensuring the close interrelationship between US and European security; (b) maintaining US leadership in the Alliance; and (c) taking into account security interests and guaranteeing the sovereign equality of all NATO members. Considering the new situation and new needs for the future of the Alliance, the build-up of mobile rapid reaction forces, adjustment of the European states’ military capabilities to new tasks, collaboration in identifying new threats through the cooperation of the intelligence branches and preventing new non-military threats are all of key importance. The emphasis is not on increasing military spending, but on restructuring the existing capabilities in Europe. The capabilities of the new NATO allies are contingent on the rational use of existing resources to enable the effective fulfilment of defence-related and security tasks.

NATO’s new political philosophy incorporates the concept of inclusive security that was adopted in the late 1990s and is addressed to those states that are not members and do not intend to join the alliance in the coming years. This political concept was reinforced in the face of a universal terrorist threat and helped align NATO both with Russia and other post-Soviet states as well as the European non-NATO countries.

The NATO–Russia relationship

An essential change has taken place in NATO and US relations with Russia. Although Russia was considered a source of potential tension and rivalry even after the end of the cold war, since 11 September 2001 there has been a profound transformation of their relations. Confrontation and distrust are being replaced by a spirit of collaboration and the gradual engagement of Russia in the Western security structures and arrangements. The new common priorities are cooperation in combating terrorism, crisis management, arms control and confidence-building measures, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation and civil emergencies.23

In 2001 Russia’s incipient new policy was visible at the US–Russian summit meeting in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on 16 June and at the meeting of the Group of Eight (G8) in Genoa, Italy, on 22 July. The opinions and recommendations offered by prominent Russian analysts and researchers were also indicative.24 While the changes in Russian policy were prompted by the 11 September events, they had much deeper motives and there are strong indications that the reorientation of policy is of a strategic and durable character. As the USA and other Western states do not harbour any ill intentions, and in particular have

23 See note 20.
no aggressive schemes vis-à-vis Russia, there is no reason to retain the political instruments that determined the cold war confrontation. However, many Russian diplomatic and military officials, including some of President Vladimir Putin’s close advisers, neither share the new philosophy nor support the new premises for Russian–Western relations which it requires. The Russian president will have to overcome the conservative stereotypes prevailing within the Russian establishment.  

The change in US–Russian relations enabled Russia to stop seeing NATO enlargement as an insurmountable obstacle to closer cooperation with the Alliance. Lord Robertson quoted President Putin: ‘If NATO and Russia can develop a true partnership, our past differences over NATO enlargement will cease to be a relevant issue’. The NATO Secretary General pointed out the permanent qualitative change in the relationship between NATO and Russia.

The implementation of an ‘open door’ political philosophy will promote the evolution and transformation of the Alliance. The membership of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia would expand the zone of political stability in Europe. Such a decision would better serve the goals of political than purely military security. Although none of the newcomers would bring militarily significant assets, the entry of some candidates (such as Bulgaria and Romania) would carry NATO infrastructure and access closer to several areas of current concern. The decision about the scale and time frame of further enlargement will be taken at the Prague NATO summit meeting in November 2002. A significant extension of NATO should be seen as an important element in the process of changing and reforming the Alliance.

Other new elements in the building of a global cooperative security system include the closure of Russian bases in Cuba and Viet Nam and Russian consent to the presence of the USA and other Western states in Central Asia—where time-limited US engagement is regarded by Russia as in its security interests.

### A new agenda for the European Union

Ten days after the terrorist attacks on the USA, the European Council and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),

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25 Unable to hamper the process of improvement of NATO–Russia relations, opponents seek to slow it down by suggesting new bases on which it might rest. Illustrative in this context is the position of Dmitri Rogozin, Chairman of the State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee: ‘We should not allow any rush towards accommodating the talks on creating new cooperation mechanisms in order to meet the artificially set political terms’. Rogozin, D., ‘Rossiya i NATO: Sleduyet-li speshit s “dvadtsatki”’? [Russia and NATO: should we rush for the ‘20’?], Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 12 Apr. 2001.


Javier Solana, elaborated a programme and agreed on specific measures of action.28 It included combating terrorism within the European Union and cooperation with the USA in its anti-terrorism programme. Judicial cooperation, cooperation between police and intelligence services, preventing the financing of terrorism and enhanced border controls were among the specific measures. The decisions became an important constituent part of the Union’s common security policy and accelerated the development of international legal instruments. The European Union supported the Indian proposal for framing within the United Nations a general convention against international terrorism. The convention should enhance the impact of the measures taken over the past 25 years under UN auspices. The new, decisive aspects of EU activities are focused on: (a) stopping the funding of terrorism, including money laundering, and freezing assets; (b) strengthening air security, including quality control of security measures applied by member states, classification of weapons, technical training for crews; checking and monitoring of hold luggage; and protection of cockpit access.29

In the Union’s efforts to combat terrorism, two elements deserve attention. First, the implementation of the task has accelerated the development of the CFSP and facilitates making the European Security and Defence Policy more operational. Second, it brought home to the EU states that the fight against the scourge of terrorism will be the more effective if it is based on an in-depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism comes into being.

The West and the Islamic world

The overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the response of states in Central Asia call for a redefinition of the policy of the West as a whole vis-à-vis the Islamic world.30 A new strategy should also address the significance of Asian states, particularly Pakistan, India and China.

The states of Central Asia joined the global anti-terrorist coalition and helped produce an agreed position within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) by declaring their unconditional condemnation of the attacks and by pledging to make all efforts to combat terrorism. Their political declarations were supported by concrete commitments concerning military cooperation, including allowing the stationing on their territory of troops of the coalition of states participating in the armed intervention in Afghanistan. More

30 A Turkish security analyst has recalled that, on 8 Sep. 2000, a year before the 11 Sep. attacks, Uzbek President Islam Karimov warned the UN General Assembly that ‘Afghanistan has turned into a training ground and a hotbed of international terrorism’ and is posing ‘a threat to the security of not only the states of the Central Asian region, but to the whole world.’ Yavuzalp, O., ‘On the front line’, NATO Review, vol. 49 (Dec. 2001/Jan./Feb. 2002), p. 24.
important than military contributions is their understanding of the essence of the threat and non-military ways of preventing terrorism within states.\textsuperscript{31}

The threat has been described as a conflict of values within a civilization, not between civilizations.\textsuperscript{32} It stems not from the incompatibility of values between religions in general, and Islam and the West in particular, but from the modern challenges to traditional autocratic structures in many Muslim countries, especially in the Arab world. There are no evil religions, but in many conflicts great religions have been misused for evil purposes.\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, the clash that is taking place has little to do with religion \textit{per se}. It is about the conflict between values such as individualism and collectivism, conservatism and liberalism, modernism and traditionalism.

It is important to distinguish between Islam as a religion and the attempts to forge it into an instrument for aggressive and extremist groups to seize power in Islamic countries. In the Middle East conflict, it is not ideology or religion that is at stake but the existential interests and the right of Israelis to live within secure boundaries and of Palestinians to obtain statehood.

VI. SIPRI findings

The main findings of the studies presented in this volume, based on original data, facts and analyses of the developments in 2001, particularly against the background of the tragic events of 11 September and the ongoing change in the international security process, are the following.

\textit{Armed conflicts.}\textsuperscript{34} In 2001 there were 24 major armed conflicts in 22 locations throughout the world. The only interstate conflict that was active in 2001 occurred between India and Pakistan. All of the 15 most deadly conflicts in 2001—those that caused 100 or more deaths during the year—were intra-state conflicts. Most commonly, they threatened to destabilize neighbouring states through the burden of refugees, cross-border movement of rebels (and occasionally national military forces), and the undermining of legitimate economic and political structures through the illicit trade in resources and arms. Eleven

\textsuperscript{31} At the Munich Conference on Security Policy, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance of Singapore made an interesting comment: ‘Terrorism, especially by extremists invoking the name of Islam, or what Francis Fukuyama called “Islamo-Fascism”, is a long-term problem. . . . In countries with large Muslim populations, there are small minorities at the fringes who are inclined toward extremist views and terrorist methods. Globalisation and easy foreign travel enabled them to come into contact with the extremist teachings of militants abroad, and to become part of an international terrorist network. . . . Terrorism, therefore, is not indigenous to South East Asia. It is a problem imported from abroad, but the danger is that it may become endemic to the region’. Lee Hsien Loong, ‘Global war on terrorism’, 2 Feb. 2002, URL <http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/default.asp?jahr=2002&topic=reden>. Similar views were offered by other Asian representatives at the conference. The US representative noted that ‘to win the war against terrorism we have to reach out to the hundreds of millions of moderate and tolerant people in the Muslim world, including the Arab world’. Wolfowitz (note 14).


\textsuperscript{34} See chapter 1 and appendix 1A in this volume.
of the 15 conflicts have lasted for eight or more years, leading to extensive destruction of economic and social infrastructure. One of the reasons for their endurance is the inability of either side to prevail by force. In the vast majority of the conflicts, rebels used a guerrilla military strategy but failed to win wide popular support. Governments were unable to use their full strength against small and mobile opponents.

Conflict prevention, management and resolution.\(^{35}\) The war against terrorism has led to the forging of new relationships between states that were formerly at odds with each other. The global effort against international terrorism marks the appearance of a new paradigm in international politics. It is important that it does not undermine the norms that have so recently been established. There were no new United Nations peace missions in 2001, for the first time since 1996. However, five new multilateral missions were initiated—one of them, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, on the authority of the UN Security Council. There were 51 multilateral peace missions under way in 2001. The shock generated by the attacks and the responses that have followed them carry serious repercussions for the international adoption and practice of conflict prevention. Prevention of terrorism, as currently practised, consists of measures taken to stop international terrorism, cut off the financial, political and military sources of terrorist support and, where possible, apprehend terrorists before they commit acts of terror. The attacks on Afghanistan have inevitably focused attention on the military elements and given vent to the idea of a global military engagement against terrorism.

The military dimension of the European Union.\(^{36}\) Almost a decade passed after the end of the cold war before the EU developed the concept of a ‘second pillar’ European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Efforts have been made to meet security risks and challenges in Europe and elsewhere by carrying out the full range of military crisis management tasks. Events in 2001 served as a mid-course test for the success of these efforts.

Democratic control of the security sector.\(^{37}\) Although security sector reform has become established as part of the international security agenda, there is still not a shared understanding at the international level of what this term means. The response of states to the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 2001 may slow down the development of a security sector reform agenda—that is, demobilization and demilitarization, spending cuts and the promotion of transparency. Increased importance is being placed on developing cooperation with the armed forces, intelligence services and law enforcement services of other states to identify and eliminate groups and individuals engaged in terrorist acts.

Sanctions applied by the European Union and the United Nations.\(^{38}\) Sanctions, recognized as a necessary and important instrument for conflict resolution, have not been effective in bringing about a change in the behaviour of

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\(^{35}\) See chapter 2 and appendix 2A in this volume.

\(^{36}\) See chapter 3 in this volume.

\(^{37}\) See chapter 4 in this volume.

\(^{38}\) See chapter 5 in this volume.
their targets when applied as a ‘stand-alone’ measure. Efforts have been directed to improving sanctions design and implementation as well as considering how they might be used as part of a wider strategy. In the light of experience the United Nations has modified its approach away from the use of comprehensive sanctions towards the use of measures targeted only at those held responsible for wrong or illegal behaviour. The European Union has also elaborated its approach to the use of sanctions as part of its common foreign and security policy. In addition to giving effective expression to decisions of the United Nations, the EU has also developed a distinctive approach to the use of sanctions in foreign policy areas where the UN has not provided direction, notably to support the parts of the CFSP aimed at improving human rights.

Military expenditure. World military expenditure in 2001 is estimated at $839 billion in current prices, an increase of 2 per cent in real terms over 2000. This corresponds to an average of 2.6 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP) and $137 per capita. The post-cold war decline in military expenditure lasted 11 years (1988–98). Since 1998 world military expenditure has been increasing again. The combined increase in world military expenditure since 1998 is 7 per cent in real terms. More than half of the world total is spent by five high-income countries in the West: in 2001 the USA accounted for 36 per cent of the world total, followed by Japan with 6 per cent and France, Russia and the UK, with 4 per cent each. Most of the countries with the heaviest economic burden in terms of military expenditure as a share of GDP are located in the Middle East, where official military expenditure accounts for more than 5 per cent in several countries. Countries involved in armed conflict in Africa also have a high defence burden, even according to their official figures, although these are likely to understate actual expenditure by a significant amount.

Arms production. The restructuring of arms production that has taken place during the post cold war period has resulted in an increased level of concentration, in particular among the major arms-producing companies in the USA. In Europe, efforts continue to achieve increased concentration into larger companies on the European level. During 2001 several new European joint ventures were created for this purpose. While internationalization at the transatlantic level has been subject to even more political challenges than within Europe, the participation of the UK and British companies in the US-led JSF programme marked an important step in transatlantic military industrial relations. The approval in June 2001 by the French and US governments of a major joint venture may also serve as a test case for future transatlantic military industrial links. The Russian arms industry is still characterized by an extreme degree of over capacity and dependence on arms exports.

Arms transfers. In 2001 the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons and military technology for foreign licensed production of such weapons was $16.2 billion, in constant 1990 prices, slightly higher than

39 See chapter 6 and appendices 6A–6E in this volume.
40 See chapter 7 and appendices 7A and 7B in this volume.
41 See chapter 8 and appendices 8A–8E in this volume.
in 2000. Calculated as a five-year moving average, however, the level continued to decline in 2001 (the total volume in 1997–2001 was $100.7 billion). The USA, accounting for 44.5 per cent of global arms transfers, remained the largest supplier in the period 1997–2001 despite a 65 per cent reduction in its arms deliveries since 1998. Russia was the second largest supplier in the period 1997–2001, accounting for 17 per cent of total arms transfers. As the result of a 24 per cent increase in arms transfers between 2000 and 2001 it became the largest supplier in 2001, with 30.7 per cent of the total. The five major recipients in the period 1997–2001 were China, India, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and Turkey. China was by far the largest recipient in 2001, with 19 per cent of the total, after an increase of 44 per cent from 2000. Imports by India increased by 50 per cent, making it the third largest recipient in 2001 after the UK.

Arms control after 11 September. While restoring the traditional linkage between arms control and military security, the Bush Administration underlined that agreements and arrangements need to be adapted to the contemporary strategic environment. This is not an abandonment of arms control. However, at present arms control can be seen as primarily a framework in which structured dialogue can be organized around armaments policy.

Nuclear arms control and missile defence. On 13 December President Bush gave formal notice that the USA would withdraw from the ABM Treaty. There was disagreement between the USA and Russia over the form and substance of the reductions in their countries’ strategic nuclear force levels. Specifically, there was a dispute over whether they would be made within the framework of a ‘traditional’ arms control treaty or as parallel, non-legally binding instruments. There was also a disagreement over whether the nuclear warheads scheduled to be removed from delivery vehicles should be dismantled, as insisted upon by Russia, or could be placed in storage, as advocated by the USA.

The military uses of outer space. At the end of 2001 the USA, as the only superpower, had nearly 110 operational military spacecraft—well over two-thirds of all the military spacecraft orbiting the earth. Russia was a distant second, with about 40, and the rest of the world had only about 20 satellites in orbit. The issue of the military uses of space has resurfaced on the arms control agenda. China, France and Russia, supported by Canada, Sri Lanka and other states, have called for the negotiation of a new multilateral treaty to prohibit the deployment of weapons in space.

Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control. The attacks of 11 September increased the sense of vulnerability to indiscriminate mass-casualty terrorism. This sense of vulnerability was further augmented by a series of letters containing very high-grade anthrax spores sent to representatives of the US media and politicians. Although the mailed anthrax spores

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42 See chapter 9 in this volume.
43 See chapter 10 in this volume.
44 See chapter 11 in this volume.
45 See chapter 12 in this volume.
did not result in the mass casualties predicted by some analysts, the letter attacks nevertheless demonstrated the potential for widespread social and economic disruption. The major events in biological weapon arms control were the US rejection of a draft protocol to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and to reject the negotiating mandate of the body that had drafted the protocol. The main US objections were that the protocol would be an ineffective verification tool, that it would allow ‘proliferators’ political cover by allowing them to claim to be in compliance with the protocol and that confidential business information belonging to biotechnology firms and information relating to national biodefence facilities could be unnecessarily compromised.

**Conventional arms control.** In 2001 the international community focused its attention on regional and domestic sources of conflict and relevant arms control measures, particularly those of an operational character. In Europe the focus was on the implementation of agreed measures and the search for new approaches to the politico-military dialogue. The 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty) is being implemented, but Russia’s non-compliance has hindered its entry into force. A second review conference was held in 2001. Russia has made insufficient progress towards complying with its obligations with regard to agreed flank levels, although it has met its commitments regarding troop withdrawals from Moldova. In Georgia the future of one Russian military base and the continued presence of Russian forces remain to be resolved. The Balkan arms control regimes worked well, and the agreement on regional stabilization ‘in and around Yugoslavia’ was successfully concluded. Regional and bilateral confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) continued to work smoothly, and new bilateral CSBMs were introduced in Europe. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) military doctrine seminar evaluated new threats and challenges and identified possible additional directions for the work of the OSCE in the zone of application. After years of deadlock the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies entered into force on 1 January 2002, after Russia and Belarus ratified it in 2001.

**Multilateral export control.** After the terrorist attacks on the USA, certain decisions that were difficult to take in the framework of the export control regimes may have become possible because of a heightened awareness of the need to reduce the risk that entities planning terrorist acts will acquire non-conventional weapons. Particular attention is being paid to the following questions: the development of procedures for sharing information related to licensing and enforcement; the development of a more harmonized approach to risk assessment and the identification of programmes of concern; the development of common approaches to end-user controls in countries where pro-

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46 See chapter 13 in this volume.
47 See chapter 14 in this volume.
grammes of concern are located; and to the question of how to apply controls to new types of commercial practices in a changing market.

VII. Concluding remarks

In 2001—in the age of globalization—terrorism was transformed from a local into a global problem and the entire structure of the international security system was called into question.

One paradox of the globalization era is that, although the threat of external aggression is non-existent in many parts of the world, national security cannot be taken for granted in any state, including the United States. National security is dependent in greater measure on the developments within states and an effective international security system. Because of its position in the world, the USA plays the most crucial role in shaping this new system. In the search for a new ‘grand strategy’ for the USA, various concepts have emerged after 11 September 2001. Arguments based on a balance of power are anachronistic and are not reflected in the recent decisions of the US Government. A new and serious threat to international security is the revival of nationalism, quite often in extreme forms, including the risk of possible re-nationalization of security policies. The process of modernization is often perceived as Westernization or Americanization—an attempt to impose the values of the Western world, in particular the United States, on other regions, cultures and civilizations. This misunderstanding has to do with the fact that values such as democracy, accountability, human rights, the rule of law, and social systems based on tolerance of diversity, individual freedoms and gender equality are identified with Western liberal, secular ideas. These are then pitted against traditionalist cultures that put the laws of closed communities above the rights of individuals and the tenets and norms of religious beliefs as well as customs and traditions above the law.

The qualitatively novel phenomena and changes in the world call for a new, unconventional approach. Since the risks are global, the responses should be global as well. This, in turn, requires a system that fosters and generates cooperation rather than balancing influence and threats resulting from competition and rivalry among powers and other actors. The world is interdependent. Positive and negative processes and phenomena are of a global character.48

The greatest challenge of the contemporary world is not so much the rivalry over power or territorial expansion—motives that dominated in the colonial era—as it is dealing with the new threats of global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime, on the one hand, and local and regional conflicts, on the other. The inconsistent reactions to the 11 September events which will affect future arms control are reflected both in

48 NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated: ‘This is a networked world. . . . The dark side to globalization is that security threats, too, are networking. They are going global. . . . And, as a result, they pose a qualitatively new menace to the international community’. ‘A new security network for the 21st century’, Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, at the Economist Conference, Athens, 17 Apr. 2002, URL <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020417a.htm>.
the re-prioritization of arms export controls and in the sui generis ‘de-prioritization’ of nuclear concerns among the states combating terrorism (e.g., with respect to India and Pakistan).

There is a close relationship between global and local or regional threats. The main regions of conflict—Africa, Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East—have become a fertile ground for organized crime, terrorists and arms smugglers. The task ahead for the international community is to dismantle these networks. ‘To accomplish this, we need an international security network.’49 This is one of the new global tasks which face the North Atlantic community.

The current situation can be characterized not only by the diversity of threats, but also by the diversity of opportunities. A new NATO must play a central role in addressing the central security challenge. A US–European strategic partnership is essential for winning a global war on terrorism.50

The very notion of cooperative or inclusive security is more about political philosophy than a concrete programme of action. Depending on specific needs, cooperative security has different contents and includes different forms of operational collaboration. It is reflected in the transatlantic debate between the United States, which is inclined towards a ‘pro-active’ approach based on a ‘single truth’, and the European states, which emphasize the existential aspects of security—mutual restraint and respect for universal regulation.

There is nothing deterministic about the shaping of a new security system. Nothing is prejudged; institutions and procedures should be transformed. Nothing is shaped forever, and even joint decisions are often interpreted differently.51

In the search for a new security system, two common institutional norms of behaviour are dominant in the present circumstances: (a) democratic institutions, human rights and the protection of minorities; and (b) the bringing to justice under international criminal law of political leaders who have committed massive crimes against humanity. These two elements constitute a new, inalienable part of the evolving international security system. A security

49 Robertson (note 48).
50 The same idea was put forward by US Secretary of State Colin Powell, who observed that the ‘process of participating in this great global campaign against terrorism may well open the door for us to strengthen or reshape international relationships and expand or establish areas of cooperation’. Powell, C. L., ‘Seizing the moment’, US Foreign Policy Agenda (US Department of State), Nov. 2001.
51 In Aug. 1993, in Warsaw, Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed with Polish President Lech Walesa that each country should determine for itself and choose the optimal road towards ensuring its own security. This was interpreted to mean that Russia would not oppose the enlargement of NATO eastward, but it was the wrong interpretation. After his return to Moscow, Yeltsin wrote to US President Clinton, and 3 other Western leaders, to try to persuade him to abandon NATO enlargement. Yeltsin’s main motive was the domestic situation in Russia. ‘We do not see NATO as a bloc opposing us. But it is important to take into account how our public opinion may react to such a step. Not only the opposition, but the moderates, too, would no doubt see this as a sort of neo-isolation of the country as opposed to its natural introduction into the Euro-Atlantic space.’ ‘And generally’, he went on, ‘we favor a situation where the relations between our country and NATO would be by several degrees warmer than those between the Alliance and Eastern Europe’. Russian President Boris Yeltin’s letter to US President Bill Clinton, 15 Sep. 1993, reproduced in SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994), pp. 249–50.
regime based on shared values should in equal measure take into account the specific features of states and regions and the needs of the global community.

The adaptation of the cooperative security system to new tasks calls for the elaboration of new principles and norms adequate to the requirements of the contemporary world. International structures, institutions and organizations are also being reassessed, since they have so far not been able to address effectively the needs and challenges of global processes and the accelerated modernization in the world today.

The USA can play or is playing a decisive role. Enlightened and engaged US leadership is crucial. This leadership should be recognized by the coalition of democratic states within a common framework, not by imposition but by their willing acceptance based on moral consensus and common values.52

It is less important to debate the merits of unilateralism against those of multilateralism in US policy than to provide the means to overcome the ‘democratic deficit’ in international relations. Joseph Nye has suggested that governments can do several things to respond to the concerns about this phenomenon. They can try to design international institutions that preserve as much space as possible for domestic political processes to operate. There is no single and simple answer to the question of how to reconcile the necessary global institutions with democratic accountability. There is a need to think more about the norms and procedures for the governance of globalization.53

The fact that in the era of globalization and information technology the USA cannot act independently in pursuing its international security goals meets with a growing understanding among various groups in the US establishment. As Nye rightly noted, ‘the paradox of American power in the 21st century is that the largest power since Rome cannot achieve its objectives unilaterally in a global information age’.54 The world needs the United States as never before, but the United States needs the rest of the world, too. Neither domination and hegemony nor neo-isolationism offer an adequate response to the new challenges.

54 Joseph Nye follows Henry Kissinger in his argument that the test of history for this generation of American leaders will be whether they can turn the current predominant power into an international consensus and widely-accepted norms. ‘And that cannot be done unilaterally.’ Nye (note 13), p. 25.