

**RUSSIA:
ARMS CONTROL,
DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY**

**MEMO SUPPLEMENT
TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION
OF THE SIPRI YEARBOOK 2014**

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INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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(IMEMO RAN)

**RUSSIA:
ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

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The volume provides IMEMO contributions to *the Russian edition of the 2014 SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. The contributors address issues involving the future of nuclear arms control, UN Security Council and regional arms control, OSCE and the Ukrainian crisis, Russia and NATO in the new geopolitical context, the Ukrainian factor in the US defence policy, the strategic relations between Russia and China. This year's edition also highlights issues of resolving the crisis around Iran's nuclear program, the dynamics of the Russian armed forces modernization, military political cooperation between Russia and the CIS states, India's military technical cooperation with Russia and the US, Islamic State as a threat to regional and international security.

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CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| PREFACE | 7 |
| <i>Alexander DYNKIN</i> | |
| ACRONYMS | 9 |
| PART I. ANALYSES, FORECASTS, DISCUSSIONS | |
| 1. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: WAYS TO OVERCOME A COMPREHENSIVE CRISIS | |
| <i>Alexei ARBATOV</i> | 15 |
| Symptoms of the crisis | 15 |
| Controversial world order | 17 |
| Weapons and geostrategy | 23 |
| Proliferation strategies..... | 26 |
| 2. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL | |
| <i>Alexander KALYADIN</i> | 31 |
| Powerful enforcement mandate..... | 31 |
| The role of the UN Security Council in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons | 34 |
| The challenge to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program | 39 |
| The UN Security Council against nuclear militarization of the Korean Peninsula..... | 42 |
| The prospects for improving the management of international security | 45 |
| 3. THE OSCE AND THE UKRAINE CRISIS | |
| <i>Andrei ZAGORSKI</i> | 49 |
| OSCE activities | 51 |
| Special Monitoring Mission | 55 |
| OSCE observers at the Russian–Ukrainian border..... | 59 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| Trilateral Contact Group and the ‘Minsk process’ | 61 |
| 4. RUSSIA AND NATO IN THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT | 65 |
| <i>Sergei OZNOBISHCHEV</i> | |
| NATO transformation after the Cold War and challenges of Russia–NATO relations | 65 |
| NATO military-political decisions regarding events in Ukraine ... | 69 |
| NATO policy of ‘restrained escalation’ | 75 |
| 5. THE UKRAINIAN FACTOR IN THE US DEFENCE POLICY..... | 84 |
| <i>Natalia BUBNOVA</i> | |
| US weapons programmes and the Ukrainian crisis..... | 85 |
| Changes to the US and NATO strategies | 89 |
| Military assistance to Kiev | 92 |
| The US dilemma over arms supplies to Ukraine..... | 94 |
| 6. STRATEGIC RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS..... | 104 |
| <i>Vasily MIKHEEV, Sergey LUKONIN</i> | |
| The new role of China’s foreign policy..... | 104 |
| The Ukrainian factor | 108 |
| Beijing’s leadership ambitions | 109 |
| Russia and China: problems and shortcomings of cooperation ... | 111 |
| Prospects for a ‘turn to China’ in the context of ‘Russia–West– China’ relations | 116 |
| PART II. EXPERT INSIGHTS | |
| 7. ISSUES OF RESOLVING THE CRISIS AROUND IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME (2013–2015) | 123 |
| <i>Vladimir SAZHIN</i> | |
| Stages of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear problem | 123 |
| Iran’s nuclear infrastructure | 128 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| The results and implications of Geneva and Lausanne agreements..... | 132 |
| 8. THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES..... | 141 |
| <i>Lyudmila PANKOVA</i> | |
| Results of GPV–2020 | 143 |
| ‘External failure’ in the implementation of GPV | 146 |
| The role of R&D in the modernization process | 152 |
| 9. RUSSIA’S MILITARY-POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH THE CIS: THE ROLE OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS | 157 |
| <i>Vadim VLADIMIROV</i> | |
| The Western region | 157 |
| The South Caucasus | 163 |
| The Central Asia..... | 168 |
| The CSTO and the events in Ukraine..... | 174 |
| 10. INDIA’S MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AND THE US..... | 178 |
| <i>Petr TOPYCHKANOV</i> | |
| Do Russia and the US compete in India? | 178 |
| Indian armed forces’ needs and defence industry | 180 |
| Indo–Russian military-technical cooperation..... | 182 |
| Indo–US military-technical cooperation | 189 |
| 11. ISLAMIC STATE AS A THREAT TO REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY | 194 |
| <i>Stanislav IVANOV</i> | |
| Islamic State’s activity in Iraq, Syria, and other countries..... | 195 |
| Future of the Islamic State: possible scenarios | 197 |
| Ways to counter Islamist terrorist organizations | 200 |
| Russia’s policy: key aspects | 202 |

PART III. DOCUMENTS AND REFERENCE MATERIALS

12. KEY DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE, AND ARMS CONTROL (JANUARY–DECEMBER 2014)..... 207

Tamara FARNASOVA

 Legislative acts 207

 Normative acts..... 209

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS..... 217

PREFACE

It is with great pleasure that I am introducing the Special Supplement – *Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security* for the Russian edition of 2014 SIPRI Yearbook. This Supplement contains analytical articles written by the leading scholars of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

The volume reflects the developments in arms control and security in the year 2014. Hence, it is logical that quite a number of inputs of the Russian experts are devoted to different aspect of the Ukrainian crisis which, as we predicted a year ago, appeared to be unmatched by its severity since the end of Cold War. After the beginning of the crisis Russia and the West started to move towards confrontation which is unpredictable in its consequences.

Under these circumstances for the first time in the history of building the nuclear arms control and non-proliferation system the world appears to be facing a perspective of losing the legal control upon the most destructive military mean in the whole mankind history. The way out from this threatening situation, as it is emphasized in the Supplement, lies through political decisions – settlement of the Ukrainian crisis first of all.

It is emphasized that a number of efforts in this direction have already been undertaken – the OSCE appeared to be the principle international institution introducing and implementing the applicable solutions. Another European institute – NATO, in its turn, has chosen alternative route – to undertake military measures to counter newly ‘emerging threat’ on the part of Russia.

The role of the USA in the Ukrainian conflict is perceived in Moscow very negatively. It is believed that Washington was one of the ‘sponsors’ of the crisis aimed at threatening the interests of Russia. To support the peaceful process in Ukraine the US should explicitly refuse weapon shipments to Ukraine and undertake a consistent course aimed at the solution of the conflict by peaceful means, along with the Minsk accord (February 2015).

The deepening strategic relationship between Russia and China being the principle vector of Russia's 'turn to the East' policy is still considered by a number of experts as a rather complicated in its consequences process. In their analyses two well-known experts come to the conclusion that though China is interested in the economic and military technical partnership with Russia but in its relations with the US Beijing will exploit the 'Russian card' for the sake of strengthening its negotiating positions.

There are a number of other important issues viewed upon in the Supplement. Among them – analysis of the issues of resolving the crisis around Iran's nuclear program, which is definitely of extreme importance for the future of the non-proliferation process. Commenting on the issues of regional security contributors to the volume emphasize the importance of the proper implementation of the rich UN experience in this regard.

Traditionally the volume contains a brief summary of the key Russian documents on national security and arms control passed in 2014, which may be of particular benefit to the expert community.

This work represents a collective effort. I would like to express my special thanks to Academician Alexei Arbatov and Sergey Oznobishchev for contributing, compiling and editing this volume and to Tatiana Anichkina – for important input in this process. Appreciation is also due to the authors – Natalia Bubnova, Vladimir Evseev, Tamara Farnasova, Stanislav Ivanov, Alexander Kalyadin, Sergey Lukonin, Vasily Mikheev, Lyudmila Pankova, Vladimir Sazhin, Petr Topychkanov, Vadim Vladimirov, and Andrei Zagorski.

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Academician Alexander Dynkin, Director,
Institute of World Economy and International Relations,
Russian Academy of Sciences
July 2015

ACRONYMS

| | |
|------------|---|
| ABM Treaty | – Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty |
| AF | – armed forces |
| AME | – armaments and military equipment |
| ASEAN | – Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| ASP | – Additional Safeguards Protocol |
| BJP | – Bharatiya Janata Party of India |
| BMD | – ballistic missile defence |
| BTWC | – Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention |
| CBM | – confidence- and security-building measure |
| CD | – Conference on Disarmament |
| CFE | – 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe |
| CIA | – Central Intelligence Agency of the USA |
| CiO | – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office |
| CIS | – Commonwealth of Independent States |
| CSTO | – Collective Security Treaty Organization |
| CTBT | – Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty |
| CW | – chemical weapons |
| CWA | – chemical warfare agents |
| CWC | – Chemical Weapons Convention |
| CWP | – chemical weapon production facility |
| DIC | – defence-industrial complex |
| DIME | – diplomacy, information, military and economy |
| DPR | – Donetsk People’s Republic |
| DRDO | – Defence Research and Development Organisation of India |
| EEU | – Eurasian Economic Union |
| FC | – Federation Council of the Russian Federation |
| FSB | – Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation |
| FTP | – federal target program |
| G2 | – Group of Two (the US and China) |
| GDP | – gross domestic product |
| GICNT | – Global Initiative to Combat Acts of Nuclear Terrorism |

| | |
|------------|---|
| GPV | – Gosudarstvennaya programma vooruzheniy (state armament program) |
| HCNM | – OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities |
| IAEA | – International Atomic Energy Agency |
| ICBM | – intercontinental ballistic missile |
| IISS | – International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) |
| INF Treaty | – 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles |
| IRI | – Islamic Republic of Iran |
| IRNA | – Islamic Republic News Agency |
| IS | – Islamic State |
| ISIL | – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |
| JCCC | – Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination |
| LAS | – League of Arab States |
| LPR | – Luhansk People’s Republic |
| MFA | – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation |
| MIRV | – multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle |
| MNNA | – major non-NATO ally |
| MSC | – Military Staff Committee |
| MTC | – military-technical (technological) cooperation |
| NATO | – North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| New START | – 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms |
| NGO | – non-governmental organization |
| NNWS | – non-nuclear weapon state |
| NPT | – 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| NRC | – NATO–Russia Council |
| NRF | – NATO Response Force |
| NSG | – Nuclear Suppliers Group |
| NW | – nuclear weapons |
| ODIHR | – OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights |
| OPCW | – Organization for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons |
| OSCE | – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |

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| PGS | – Prompt Global Strike |
| PSI | – Proliferation Security Initiative |
| SD | – State Duma of the Russian Federation |
| SDO | – state defence order |
| SLBM | – submarine-launched ballistic missile |
| SMM | – OSCE Special Monitoring Mission |
| SOF | – Special Operations Forces |
| START | – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty |
| SZRF | – Sobranie zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoy Federatsii (Statute Book of the Russian Federation) |
| TLE | – treaty-limited equipment |
| TNC | – transnational corporation |
| TPP | – Trans-Pacific Partnership |
| UAV | – unmanned aerial vehicle |
| UNSC | – United Nations Security Council |
| VJTF | – Very High Readiness Joint Task Force |
| WMD | – weapons of mass destruction |

PART I. ANALYSES, FORECASTS, DISCUSSIONS

1. Nuclear arms control: ways to overcome a comprehensive crisis
2. The UN Security Council and regional arms control
3. The OSCE and the Ukraine crisis
4. Russia and NATO in the new geopolitical context
5. The Ukrainian factor in the US defence policy
6. Strategic relations between Russia and China: opportunities and prospects

1. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: WAYS TO OVERCOME A COMPREHENSIVE CRISIS

Alexey ARBATOV

Half a century after the international nuclear arms limitation and non-proliferation system was established (with the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty) for the first time the world faces a real prospect of losing international treaty-based control of this most destructive weapon in human history. This security domain has seen halts and even rollbacks, yet at no point in the past a crisis was so broad-based with no light to be seen at the end of the tunnel in the near future. Negotiation process in almost every sphere related to nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation has been deadlocked and the existing system of international treaties has been eroding from political and military and technical perspective, and can be destroyed as soon as in the near future.

Symptoms of the crisis

To maintain strategic stability, Russia and the United States still observe the two cornerstone treaties on offensive nuclear weapons: the new Prague Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) of 2010 and the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) of 1987. Yet this is no reason to relax, as their

future is at risk due to deteriorating political and military and strategic environment. The United States is still reluctant to engage in any limitations of ballistic missile defense (BMD) and has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for almost two decades. In addition, it accuses Russia of breaching the INF Treaty. Based on this, the Republican majority in Congress has proposed to denounce this agreement and to withdraw from the New START¹.

Russian officials, for their part, have openly questioned the value of the INF Treaty². The non-governmental expert community openly calls to denounce it, as well as the New START and the CTBT. The most outspoken opponents of arms control have gone as far as insisting that Russia should withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in order to sell nuclear weapons abroad and provide its maintenance³. It seems that both great powers, especially their parliaments, militant organizations and movements have embarked on a course of destruction of everything that national leaders, diplomats, and militaries have so painstakingly built in this realm over decades.

Apart from the two nuclear superpowers, the other seven states possessing nuclear weapons are as reluctant as ever to join the disarmament process and limit their arsenals.

The non-proliferation process and regime too are in disarray. After the P5+1 states concluded an interim agreement⁴ with Iran to limit its nuclear programme in November 2013, contrary to the initial plan negotiations on a long-term arrangement brought no success a year

¹ Ivanov, V., 'America does not need a thick 'nuclear wall'', *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, 19 Dec. 2014, No 46(835), <http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2014-12-19/10_nuclear.html?auth_service_error=1&id_user=Y>.

² See: Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, 19 Sep. 2013, <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243>>; 'INF Treaty can't last forever, Ivanov said', *RIA Novosti*, 21 June 2013, <http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130621/945019919.html>.

³ Brezkun, S., 'Pacta sunt servanda, but with responsible partners only', *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, 22 Aug. 2014, No 29(818), <http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2014-08-22/4_dogovor.html>.

⁴ The group comprises Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Germany.

later and in April 2015 produced another political framework document putting off the comprehensive legally binding arrangement till summer. Some countries' increasing nuclear ambitions, as well as the developing nuclear programme of North Korea (the country withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and has since conducted three nuclear tests), further jeopardize this cornerstone treaty. Basically, after the successful NPT Review Conferences of 2000 and 2010 none of the planned practically significant steps to strengthen the treaty has been made (except for the ratification of the New START). As a result, a creeping erosion of the whole non-proliferation regime continues.

The reasons of the current crisis of nuclear arms control can be divided into three categories: the transformation of the international political environment, the influence of the advances in military technologies, and economic and technological factors of the proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies.

Controversial world order

Paradoxical as it may seem, nuclear arms limitations and reductions fitted organically into the Cold War world order and were its direct result. However, this interrelation did not emerge at once by itself. Humanity had to go through a series of dangerous crises (with the Caribbean crisis of 1962 being the narrowest escape of all) and a few cycles of accelerated and highly expensive nuclear arms race before the leading powers realized that this course was destructive and that practical efforts were necessary to prevent global catastrophe.

At the same time, all international politics were determined by global competition and arms race of the two super-powers, and the possibility of deliberate or accidental nuclear war was the main threat to common security. Hence, since the late 1960s, nuclear arms limitation and reduction based on the principles of parity and strategic stability became the main track of strengthening of international security. The concept of stability formalized the relations of mutual nuclear deterrence based on retaining both sides' ability to mount a destructive nuclear strike while gradually reducing arms. Nuclear arms

non-proliferation played a subordinate role, as it was generally acknowledged that successive nuclear disarmament was impossible if the number of states possessing nuclear weapons expanded.

The end of severe bipolar confrontation and large-scale arms race just before the 1990s unexpectedly brought about two-fold consequences that no one could have predicted at the concluding stages of the Cold War. First and foremost, the relations between the US and Russia ceased to dominate global politics and security. Second, nuclear arms control was no longer the main issue in security realm.

The first was due to the fact that after the Soviet Union collapsed (both as an empire and a social and ideological system) the world gradually became polycentric. Besides the US and Russia, other global centers of power (China, the European Union) and regional leaders (India, Japan, ASEAN countries, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, South Africa and Brazil) started playing increasingly active roles. In their foreign policy interests and security concepts nuclear arms reduction mattered little or did not matter at all.

The second consequence was due to the fact that the transition from the superpowers' confrontation to their cooperation minimized, from political perspective, the threat of nuclear war between them, despite the huge destructive arsenals remaining after the Cold War. In the policy the states pursue today, financial and economic, climate-related, resource, migration and other globalization issues have come to the fore. In security matters, priority is attached to local conflicts on ethnic and religious grounds, international terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, illicit drug trafficking and other types of trans-border crime.

The effect of the two mentioned factors was offset by an unprecedented improvement in the relations between the USSR/Russia and the West, which enabled the sides to make major steps in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Those steps became a token of political and military rapprochement between former adversaries and made reality unprecedented transparency and predictability of strategic nuclear forces, the main component of their defences. Hugely excessive nuclear arsenals of the Cold War were reduced and the risk of losing control over nuclear weapons was diminished. The latter was first and

foremost due to the elimination and relocation of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons that remained in the territory of the neighbouring Soviet states.

Major breakthroughs in the disarmament and at the same time in the strengthening of the non-proliferation regimes took place in the decade of 1987–1998. These years saw the conclusion of the INF, START I, START II, START III, CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) treaties, and the parallel adoption of measures aimed at deeper reductions of tactical nuclear weapons. (Besides, major steps were made in the related fields: The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in 1990, and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1992).

Alongside with that, over 40 states joined the NPT, including two nuclear-weapon states (France and China). Seven states voluntarily forewent or were forced to forego their nuclear weapons (those were Iraq, South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Brazil, Argentina). In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely and the Additional Protocol of 1997 and modified Code 3.1 of the Supplementary Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA were adopted that drastically expanded possibilities of control over nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon states. The NPT became the most universal international instrument, except for the Charter of the United Nations, with only three countries remaining outside its framework (India, Pakistan and Israel).

Nevertheless, after the positive breakthroughs of the first decade of 1987–1998 that put an end to the Cold War and opened a new era in the global politics, the process of nuclear arms reduction has moved down the international security agenda losing its clear aims and stages. Even in the US–Russia relations nuclear arms reduction started playing significantly lesser role than before. The concepts of parity and strategic stability that used to be a cornerstone of strategic arms reduction process were challenged as a remnant of the Cold War with nothing offered to replace them, except for sonorous yet empty declarations.

This trend was seen most clearly in the policy pursued by US President George W. Bush in 2001–2008. At that time Washington's officials of all levels constantly argued that arms control in the relations

between the US and Russia is a legacy of the Cold War. In 2002 the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty that had been a cornerstone of strategic arms limitations for 30 years before that. Another treaty on strategic offensive reductions (the Moscow Treaty) of 2002 failed to become a full-fledged agreement, as the parties could not agree on counting rules and verification measures. The United States called for as liberal authorizations and restrictions as possible.

The neglect of nuclear arms control and prolonged stagnation of the negotiations in the decade of 1998–2008 had destructive consequences. When START I Treaty was about to expire (in 2009), it turned out that there was no treaty to replace it, with the START II and the START III treaties, and the Moscow Treaty not duly finalized or ratified. Therefore, the administrations of Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev had to promptly agree upon a new (Prague) START that established the levels of strategic nuclear forces set forth in the Moscow Treaty eight years before (about 2000–2200 deployed warheads). Yet no further progress was possible.

Contradiction between polycentric world order and nuclear disarmament manifested itself equally clearly in the fact that the treaty process has never become multilateral. It is true that the third countries have taken part, within their powers, in the treaty on qualitative and area disarmament for a long time (nuclear tests limitation and ban, non-placement of nuclear weapons in outer space and on the seabed and ocean floor, the NPT and the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, etc.). However, it turned out to be impossible to involve other states possessing such weapons in a legally binding process of limiting and reducing such arms, although the United States and Russia reduced their nuclear arsenals many times.

Despite all the calls from Moscow (which Washington occasionally joined) to multilateralize the process, seven other states possessing nuclear weapons showed neither political will, nor conceptual basis for that. At no time and in no place reasoned suggestions were made as to in what succession and composition they should be involved and based on what principle (parity, stability, aggregate levels, proportionality, national quotas), what types of nuclear weapons should become the subject of agreements, and what

verification methods would be sufficient and acceptable for them. As for the third countries themselves, they refer to the fact that over 90% of the global arsenals of nuclear weapons still belong to Russia and the United States and demand that the leading powers engage in deeper reductions as a prerequisite for multilateralizing the disarmament process.

Unlike nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation has moved to the top of the security agenda of the new world order. After the end of the Cold War the two main tracks of the nuclear arms control changed places, and now nuclear arms reduction has started playing a subordinate role as a condition for strengthening the NPT regime and institutions (according to its Article VI). However the relation between further disarmament steps and further nuclear non-proliferation measures has caused increasing disagreements among states, policy-makers and experts.

There is no unity among the 189 states parties to the NPT, as non-nuclear-weapon states deem unacceptable the privileged situation of the P5, and all states criticize the nuclear policy pursued by the United States and Russia. The world is no longer divided into two hostile camps headed by the two great powers, and the latter are growing more and more reluctant to bear responsibility for their allies' and partners' security. In this context more and more non-aligned states are striving to self-sufficiency in defence and security matters, and to strengthening their prestige. From this perspective, nuclear energy and the related technical capability for producing nuclear weapons is perceived as an attractive option.

By the end of the first decade of the new millennium, the two macro-political factors undermining nuclear arms control, coincided. The world remains polycentric, and nuclear arms control failed to return to the top of the international security agenda. At the same time, the scale-down of the great powers' cooperation eliminated the political incentive that facilitated the negotiations and agreements of the 1990s and the brief period of reset in 2009–2011.

The Ukrainian drama brought the tension to the level that no one could imagine until recently. For the first time in many decades, scenarios of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO once again

become political reality, the parties started strengthening military capabilities along the NATO-Russia confrontation lines and engaged in regular demonstration of strength (including the flights of strategic bombers and missile launches). Even references to possible use of nuclear weapons returned to public statements of national leaders. In August 2014, in the heat of Ukrainian crisis, the President of Russia stated in an interview: ‘Our partners, irrespective of the situation in their countries or their foreign policy, should always bear in mind that Russia is not to be tampered with. Let me remind you that Russia is a major nuclear-weapon state. Those are not just words, it is a reality. What is more, we are strengthening our nuclear deterrent’⁵.

In summer 2013, the president of the United States discarded the idea of nuclear disarmament and removed the issue of further START treaties from the agenda, and after the developments in Ukraine this decision became final. High officials of the US administration made serious statements on the need to prepare to an armed conflict with the modern and capable Army of Russia⁶.

The confrontation has inevitably affected the multilateral efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The division and mutual sanctions of the P5+1 states and the Far East five (Russia, the United States, China, Japan and South Korea) have repeatedly put off the conclusion of a comprehensive deal with Iran and brought negotiations on the DPRK’s nuclear programme further into a deadlock.

The peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis could create a more favourable political climate for nuclear arms control in the future. However that would not in itself resolve other objective and long-term issues that are currently exacerbating the crisis in this international security sphere.

⁵ ‘Foreign Media: Putin threatens the West with nuclear weapons’, *The Russian Times*, 29 Aug. 2014, <<http://therussiantimes.com/news/12416.html>>.

⁶ Marshall Jr., T.C., ‘Hagel Praises Army’s Strength, Resilience’, 15 Oct. 2014, <<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123425>>.

Weapons and geostrategy

As the excessive nuclear arms capabilities of the Cold War were reduced, the strategic relations between the parties were increasingly influenced by the factors not related to the balance of strategic nuclear forces, which had to be taken into account in order to facilitate the reduction of longer range offensive nuclear arms.

Initially, in the early 1970s, it was decided that negotiations on this issue should rely on a set of explicitly and implicitly agreed terms and reservations. Those included not taking into account the nuclear forces of the third countries and non-strategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons of the parties, rigid limitation of ballistic missile defence, leaving conventional long-range systems (that merely did not exist at that time) outside the scope of negotiations. Neither Moscow nor Washington accepts either of these conditions any more.

The United States suggested that non-strategic nuclear weapons should be limited under the following START Treaty. This is justified by concerns voiced by their European and Far Eastern allies' situated within the range of Russian nuclear weapons of this class. Moscow demands that as a prerequisite the United States should withdraw such weapons (about 200 air bombs) from Europe.

The non-strategic nuclear arms have a number of specific features that do not allow to consider them together with strategic nuclear arms, as Washington suggests. Tactical nuclear arms are oriented along different geostrategic azimuths, are mounted on dual-use delivery means and at peacetime are stored in special storage places rather than deployed on the delivery means. In terms of arms control, they represent a separate complex issue⁷, and the work on this subject is also deadlocked at the moment.

Russia, in its turn, demands the engagement of the third nuclear-weapon states as a condition for further progress of the reduction of nuclear weapons of the two leading powers. Other aspects of military technical progress put additional obstacles to disarmament.

⁷ Arbatov, A., Dvorkin, V., Bubnova, N. (eds), *Nuclear Reset: Arms Reduction and Nonproliferation* (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2012), pp. 204-218.

The United States are deploying global ballistic missile defence with regional segments in Euro-Atlantic region and in the Pacific. Despite all Russian proposals, it refused to limit it either by creating a joint missile defence or by accepting legally binding conditions of not targeting their missile defences against each other. Since 2011, Russia has been developing its own Aerospace Defence consisting of ballistic missile, air and space defences⁸.

There is one more crucial military and technical trend where the United States play the leading role, the development of high-precision conventional attack missiles relying on the state-of-the-art guidance and information systems, including the space-based ones. In the foreseeable future, fractional orbital missiles and hypersonic gliders carrying conventional warheads can be developed.

The new revision of the Military Doctrine of Russia adopted at the end of 2014 listed ‘the creation and deployment of global strategic antiballistic missile systems that undermines global stability and balance of power in nuclear missile capabilities, the implementation of the ‘prompt strike’ concept, intent to deploy weapons in space and deployment of strategic conventional high-precision weapons’⁹ as the fourth major military threat for Russia (after the expansion of NATO, global and regional destabilization, and the build-up of foreign military groups around Russia).

Russia has engaged in R&D in this sphere following the United States’ example. The 2014 Military Doctrine was the first one to list ‘strategic (nuclear and *conventional*) [highlight added] deterrence, including the prevention of armed conflicts’¹⁰ among the main tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at peacetime.

As the studies by many Russian experts demonstrate, the threat that can be posed by the US high-precision long-range attack missiles

⁸ Expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board, 20 Mar. 2012, <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/14808>>; Expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board, 19 Dec. 2014, <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47257>>.

⁹ The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 26 Dec. 2014, <<http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf>>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

and ballistic missile defence in the foreseeable future, are vastly exaggerated, especially as regards their capability to mount a disarming strike against Russia's strategic forces and to counter Russia's retaliatory strike¹¹.

At the same time, one has to acknowledge that high-precision conventional systems are a major issue. Russia has the most significant backlog in this sphere and the diminishing role of nuclear deterrence so relied on by the country's leadership is naturally perceived with great anxiety. What is more, the new advanced systems would introduce considerable uncertainty in the assessments of strategic balance and estimations of the deterrent adequacy. They would complicate even more the negotiations on arms control and even the preservation of the treaties that have already been concluded (including the INF Treaty, and the New START).

Even if the two powers could find a way to adjust the stability concept to a wider deployment of ballistic missile defences and regulate the high-precision offensive weapons through treaty-based restrictions and confidence building measures as political environment improved, the proliferation of such technologies among the third countries would still seriously complicate the matter.

While in the past the development of ballistic missile defence system was monopolized by the United States and the USSR/Russia, today national and international ballistic missile systems are developed in the framework of NATO, in Israel, China, India, Japan, and South Korea. No doubt that this is a major long-term trend in global military technological progress, as offensive missiles and missile technologies causing demand for missile, air and space defence, are spreading fast, with the traditional borders between such systems eroding. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea are actively developing or already possess medium-range and intercontinental

¹¹ Arbatov, A., 'Changing priorities to overcome strategic deadlock', *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, No 6, 2014, pp. 3-17; Arbatov, A., Dvorkin, V. (eds), *Nuclear Proliferation: New Technologies, Weapons, Treaties* (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2009), pp. 85-103; Arbatov, A., Dvorkin, V., Bubnova, N. (eds), *Missile Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation* (Moscow, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2013), pp. 183-225. !

ballistic and cruise missiles, with the latter five countries also having nuclear weapons.

This is also true of high-precision long-range conventional weapons that are developed, in addition to the United States and Russia, by the PRC (who took the lead), Israel, India who are most likely to be followed by other countries. Therefore, limiting such systems by the United States and Russia bilaterally would most probably face serious opposition in both countries.

Proliferation strategies

It is evident that the proliferation of missile technologies seems the more dangerous as it goes hand in hand with the proliferation of nuclear materials and production. In the foreseeable future, taking in consideration the climate change and the increasing political ambitions of a number of countries in Asia, Africa and South America, one can forecast a considerable absolute growth of nuclear energy¹². Notably, this growth will be most active in the Asia Pacific and many unstable regions of the world. Alongside with that the line between the military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy will be blurred, first and foremost through the nuclear fuel cycle technologies. The current fall of world prices for hydrocarbons can, to a certain extent, slow down the forecasted growth of nuclear energy, yet it will not reverse the trend. This poses a threat to nuclear non-proliferation regime and institutions, especially as many of its norms need to be, yet are not, adjusted to the new realities.

Initially, the non-proliferation regime and the NPT as its cornerstone were based on two main principles: non-nuclear-weapon states' foregoing nuclear weapons in exchange for, first, assistance in enjoying the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, second, nuclear disarmament of the nuclear-weapon states. As for the first

¹² As of January 2013, a total of 435 nuclear power reactors were operated around the world, 65 more were under construction, 167 more were planned and for 317 more designs were proposed.

condition, today it is eroding increasingly as countries striving to obtain nuclear weapons or technological capability for promptly developing such weapons use benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a channel or a pretext. It was DPRK who provided an example. It was followed by Iran, and in the future is likely to be followed by other countries of whom many are characterized by internal instability and are involved in regional conflicts.

The NPT norms and mechanisms (IAEA, Nuclear Suppliers Group, 1997 Additional Protocol) have proven inadequate to this challenge, as the treaty does not prohibit the development of dual-use technologies and the accumulation of critical materials for peaceful use. It is absolutely evident, for example, that the NPT cannot encourage a country's obtaining peaceful technologies and materials in the framework of international cooperation provided for by its provisions (Article IV.2) in order to use them for military purposes after withdrawing from the Treaty, as DPRK did in 2003. Article X.1 provides for withdrawal from the Treaty. In theory, this Article may be made more rigorous (as well as other norms of the Treaty and the regime), yet this may only be done by consensual decision of states parties, including countries possibly intending to develop nuclear weapons.

There is also another way: an obligatory clause may be included in the contracts for the supply of nuclear technologies and materials providing for the return of all goods acquired under the Treaty in case the recipient withdraws from the NPT. Yet this would require consent of all 45 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that compete on the nuclear market. Furthermore, such contracts are often classified in order to protect commercial secret. What is more, states remaining outside the NPT and NSG have also become nuclear suppliers (Pakistan and DPRK).

There are many other provisions in the NPT that require adjusting to the new realities. Even such fundamental notions as 'nuclear weapons', 'to deny any transfer of nuclear weapons', 'not to acquire nuclear weapons' still have no agreed definitions. For instance, can one regard large quantities of highly enriched uranium as nuclear weapons, if it is justified by possible civilian uses (such as use in

marine nuclear reactors)? Can one suspect a state of military intentions if it has little nuclear power plants yet builds up its uranium enrichment capabilities and the stockpiles of nuclear materials sufficient for the rapid production of nuclear weapon-grade materials? The Treaty bans neither of these.

As for the second provision of the NPT, it has also been a bone of contention. The Treaty says, 'Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament' (Article VI). For the time when the NPT was concluded (1968), this language was quite adequate. The United States had just completed the cycle of accelerated buildup of their land-based and sea-based strategic missiles, and the USSR tried to catch up with them until 1972. Hence, the logic of this Article, to put an end to the arms race and engage in arms reductions.

However, military and technical reality has proven much more complex. After 1972, the number of the two powers' missiles has not increased but the number of nuclear warheads has been building up intensively as missiles with multiple-warhead re-entry vehicles were deployed. This buildup continued until late 1980s. In the beginning of 1990s, the parties engaged in deep reductions of both delivery vehicles and warheads, while continuing with qualitative modernization of their strategic forces. Today, quarter of a century later, the two powers have 5 or 6 times less strategic nuclear weapons in terms of the number of nuclear warheads (and 7 or 8 times less nuclear weapons taking in consideration the reductions of tactical nuclear weapons). Nevertheless, Russia has engaged in extensive nuclear forces modernization by introducing new weapons. As for the United States, it is to start modernization after 2020.

Five NPT nuclear-weapon states are not in nuclear arms race against each other, and they have drastically reduced their arsenals (except, probably, for the PRC). It seems that Article VI of the NPT has been successfully implemented. At the same time, today it seems that the aim of nuclear disarmament stipulated in it remains as distant as ever. The strategic reality requires this article to be adjusted, yet the

state parties to the Treaty are deeply divided in terms of their vision of this issue.

To regulate these and many other issues, a consensus of all 189 states parties is required, which one can hardly expect today. Obviously, the confrontation between Russia and the West undermines further the possibility of efficient measures to strengthen the Treaty, as they are the leading actors of the non-proliferation.

On top of the above, nuclear weapons are losing their significance as a token of a privileged status and instead of an attribute of a great power are turning into the 'weapon of the poor' against the superior conventional strength of the enemy. That means that the risk of its combat or accidental use in local wars will increase, and the great powers may get involved in it. Finally, it is through the proliferation of critical materials in unstable or radical countries that the risk of nuclear explosive devices' falling into the hands of terrorist organizations may become reality.

* * *

Nuclear arms control has obviously entered a most acute and comprehensive crisis in its five decades' history. This crisis can quite possibly bring about the collapse of the existing systems of treaties and regimes. In this case, new cycles of arms race will be inevitable, and both accidental and military use of nuclear weapons, as well as their use for terrorist attacks in the near future will become much more probable, leading to catastrophic humanitarian, material and moral consequences for our civilization.

'The end of history' of nuclear arms control can be avoided only if political unity among the leading powers and alliances of the world is restored, and their leaders realize their responsibility. Solutions can be found to all the above technical and military issues, if politicians have sufficient political will and experts show enough creativity.

In case of de-escalation of the current crisis in the relations between Russia and the West, the parties should begin with untying the tight knot of military and technical issues that have blocked any

positive progress. As the experience of early 1980s showed, the negotiations on nuclear and space-based weapons remained in a deadlock until the medium-range missiles, strategic weapons and space-based missile defence were discussed as separate subjects of negotiations. After that, the INF Treaty and START I were agreed. The idea of space-based missile defence was rejected by the United States themselves: it has never been created, and is highly unlikely to ever be.

Following this example, the issues of further reductions of the United States and Russia, the regulation of both countries' new missile defences could be discussed separately, as well as the measures regarding the existing and future long-range high-precision conventional weapons. Alongside with that, negotiations could commence on non-strategic nuclear weapons, and proposals for adequate fora and methods for involving the third countries possessing nuclear weapons in this process could be put forward. Naturally, politically these subjects would be interlinked, and the progress in one area would contribute to the resolution of other issues. All these issues require special research, and some studies have already been prepared and await attention of the great powers' leaders.

It would be much more difficult to influence the emerging world order, especially the aspects that undermine international security and hamper arms control. Discussing ways of positively changing the world order remains outside the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is evident that the peaceful settlement of Ukrainian crisis taking in consideration the interests of all the parties in conflict and relying on the resources offered by the UN and the OSCE is the main prerequisite for that. At the same time, objective analysis of the causes of the crisis by all its parties is necessary, as well as the introduction of the necessary changes in the European security system, restoring economic, security and humanitarian cooperation between Russia and the NATO countries and the members of the European Union. The new global world order should be built on this basis, with preserving of nuclear arms control and adjusting it to new political and technical realities being the crucial elements of this world order.

2. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Alexander KALYADIN

Powerful enforcement mandate

The seventieth anniversary of the Organization of the United Nations (UN), commemorated in 2015, is a fitting occasion for public opinion to show heightened interest in the potential of the UN Security Council (UNSC) for good governance in the spheres of global and regional strategic stability, collective security and arms control.

The UN Security Council is a unique legal mechanism for managing international security through the coordination of the positions of world powers, having defining influence on strategic stability.

This key UN body is authorized to regulate global processes affecting international peace and security. Thus, enforcement measures (sanctions and the use of force) in order to maintain or restore international peace and security fall within the exclusive competence of the Security Council. The UNSC is authorized by the UN Charter to make decisions binding on all UN member states.

It has 15 members: five permanent with veto powers (Great Britain, China, Russia, the US and France) and 10 non-permanent elected by the UN General Assembly for a two year term. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters are made by an affirmative

vote of nine members. For all other issues decisions are made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members (the veto of the permanent members of the UN Security Council). The UN Charter does not provide for the possibility of taking decisions disregarding the opinion of any permanent member of the Security Council.

Security Council resolutions are binding for all member states. All UN member states agree to abide by the decisions of the Council, implement them and therefore take action in accordance with their obligations under the UN Charter (Article 25 of the UN Charter). The Security Council may request members of the UN to resort to sanctions, coercive economic and political measures (Article 41), as well as to the use of armed forces (Article 42).

The promotion of the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security *with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armament* is one of the UNSC objectives under the UN Charter. The course of the world events has prompted a thorough involvement of the UNSC in arms control processes at regional and global levels. Its powers have been used to encourage states to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD.

The latter circumstance is of especial significance due to the increased risk of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly nuclear weapons (NW), among problematic regimes suffering from internal instability and involvement in regional conflicts. The threat of problematic regimes and terrorist entities gaining access to WMD has become a considerable destabilizing factor in international relations in 21 century exacerbated by grave regional risks.

A shared concern about the destructive effect of the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the strategic stability have brought world powers – permanent members of the UNSC – closer. Although this challenge occupies different places in the list of military threats in their respective doctrines¹³.

¹³ In the new edition of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin on 26 December 2014 the

International developments in the 21st century confirmed that productive cooperation in this field between the permanent members of the UNSC is not only possible but crucial. An informal counter-proliferation coalition has been de facto formed on the basis of these common concerns.

As early as in 1992, the UNSC unanimously qualified the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction as a ‘threat to international peace and security’ (Doc. UN.S/PV.3046 from 31 January 1992). In subsequent years the Council recurrently adopted resolutions in connection with serious challenges to the WMD non-proliferation regimes.

As history has shown, when states were able to develop common approaches and interact smoothly and purposefully within the UNSC framework, then enforcement action coupled with political and diplomatic measures yielded positive results, and, in particular, prompted the resolution of complex regional disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

Here are some examples: the elimination of the chemical weapons (CW) arsenal of the Syrian Arab Republic carried out in 2013–2014 under the guidance of the UN Security Council; significant progress in resolving a number of issues related to ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear activities; concerted action by members of the UN Security Council aimed at resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula which has been under the UNSC control for over 10 years.

There are also positive results of the states’ collaboration on the counter-terrorism: the adoption of a series of the so-called sectorial UNSC resolutions related to the issues of combating terrorist militants. One should mention in this connection Resolution 2199 adopted at Russia’s initiative by consensus on 12 February 2015. The resolution is aimed at disrupting the funding of terrorist groups by the proceeds from illicit oil trade. The UNSC raised the question of using its mandate to

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile technology ranked the sixth in the list of the major external military threats’.

conduct military operations under the Security Council auspices against specific terrorist groups.

The positive record of interaction of the UNSC format is instructive and relevant in the modern world. The solutions referred to could be useful in the search to resolve other conflict situations on a solid international legal basis.

The role of the UN Security Council in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons

On 31 August 2013, in a suburb of Damascus, Huta, toxic substances were used. On 16 September 2013, the UN mission presented a report on the incident in Huta confirming the information on the use of sarin and death of several hundred people. However, the perpetrators of the attack were not identified¹⁴.

The SAR authorities declared their innocence in the incident. Nevertheless, the US administration accused the Syrian government of the use of CW and threatened to resort to coercive actions. The situation was fraught with a military scenario disastrous for the region and for international relations in general.

In this acute phase of the crisis Moscow made an unusual diplomatic move by proposing to put the Syrian CW arsenal under the control of the international community for its subsequent disposal¹⁵.

In a conversation between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama on 5 September 2013 on the margins of the

¹⁴ UN Doc. A.67.997 – S/2013/553, 16 Sep. 2013.

¹⁵ Prior to this move, Moscow succeeded in obtaining the consent of Damascus to join the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC). The Syrian government agreed to start fulfilling its obligations under the Convention prior to its formal (after 30 days) entry into force for Syria. On 14 September 2013 the Syrian authorities handed over the instrument of the accession of the country to the CWC to the depositary – UN Secretary-General. At the same time Damascus declared its intention to start to apply the Convention immediately – before its formal entry into force for Syria (14 October). Practical destruction of chemical weapons in Syria began in October 2013.

St. Petersburg G20 summit, the Russian president advanced this proposal. The leaders of the two countries agreed to develop a collective solution.

An agreed scheme was presented to the international community in Geneva on 14 September at a joint press conference of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Secretary of State John Kerry after the talks on the issue of the Syrian chemical weapons¹⁶.

In particular, Russia and the United States agreed to take joint steps within the framework of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)¹⁷ to assist this specialized international body to quickly resolve problems of the destruction of the Syrian CW arsenal (to determine the amounts, timelines and procedures).

At the end of September 2013 the UN Security Council reached consensus on these matters and worked out a coherent approach to the elimination of the SAR chemical weapons arsenal. This was reflected in UNSC Resolution 2118 adopted on 27 September 2013 on bringing under international control and ensuring the elimination of the Syrian CW capability. The document defines a general framework to facilitate the UNSC support for OPCW efforts including ensuring the safety of international inspectors. Under the resolution regular reports to the UN Security Council should be submitted describing the status of the implementation of Resolution 2118 and of the relevant OPCW decisions.

Resolution 2118 provided that the Security Council should investigate non-compliance with the procedures for disposal of chemical weapons committed by the Syrian government or opposition and take measures in proportion to the violation on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus an international legal foundation was

¹⁶ Joint National Paper by the Russian Federation and the United States of America. Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons, 14 Sep. 2013, <https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-33/ecm33nat01_e_.pdf>.

¹⁷ The OPCW serves to ensure the complete elimination of chemical weapons worldwide. The OPCW developed a plan of liquidation of the Syrian CW arsenal, supported by the UN Security Council (including the plan of removal of components and precursors of chemical weapons from Syria and their future planned destruction).

created to fulfill the objective to bring under international control the Syrian SW arsenal and its elimination.

Following the adoption of Resolution 2118 concrete steps for its implementation were taken. On 16 October 2013, a joint mission of the United Nations and the OPCW in Syria was established to ensure timely and safely disposal of the Syrian chemical weapons. The mission was engaged in practical work to facilitate the removal and elimination of chemical weapons.

The CW stockpiles, accumulated by Syria, included about 1,300 tonnes of CW components and precursors (nerve agents, blister agents, mustard gas and other toxic substances) and 1,230 of unfilled munitions¹⁸. The joint mission was assigned a significant role in their disposal¹⁹.

While the OPCW was entrusted with specific, technical work, the UN assumed such functions as provision of support to the OPCW in several areas: security, logistics, information, administration, interaction with the Syrian government and rebel groups, as well as with international and regional interested parties.

The UN Secretariat carried out reviews of the implementation of Resolution 2118 on a regular basis (monthly) and submitted reports to the UNSC. By 25 July 2014 the UNSC received 10 reports on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons, the decommissioning of chemical weapon production facilities (CWPFs) and activities of the joint OPCW-UN mission in this area²⁰.

As early as in October 2013, Syria launched a process of decommissioning of facilities used in the CW production. OPCW

¹⁸ Syria Submits Its Initial Declaration and a General Plan of Destruction of its Chemical Weapons Programme, 27 Oct. 2013, <<http://www.opcw.org/news/article/syria-submits-its-initial-declaration-and-a-general-plan-of-destruction-of-its-chemical-weapons-pro/>>.

¹⁹ About OPCW-UN Joint Mission. Mandate and Timelines, <<http://www.opcw.unmissions.org>>.

²⁰ Tenth Monthly Report to the United Nations Security Council. S/2014/533, 25 July 2014, <<http://opcw.unmissions.org/AboutOPCWUNJointMission/OPCWUNReports.aspx>>.

inspectors sealed all the CW warehouses containing CW and its components.

The original Syrian Declaration submitted to the OPCW on 24 October 2013 contained data about 12 former chemical weapons production facilities. These facilities were decommissioned according to the terms agreed with the OPCW (by early November 2013).

At the beginning of October 2014, Syria submitted to the OPCW data on four additional CWPFs that were not mentioned in the original declaration (three research laboratories and one production facility)²¹.

Major stocks of toxic substances, components and precursors of chemical weapons were removed from the coastal region of Syria (Latakia) outside the country for destruction under the control of the OPCW²².

The UNSC was able to secure sufficiently broad political support from the international community: a number of states from various regional groups assisted in chemical demilitarization of Syria²³.

Severe problems emerged in the security area. The OPCW specialists had to work in a combat zone for the first time since the founding of the organization in 1997. The extremists posed a real threat to the transport convoys. Nevertheless, by 4 April 2014, 59% of all toxic substances were destroyed or removed. On 23 June 2014, the last batch of CW components and precursors were removed from the port of Latakia²⁴.

²¹ The completion of the operation to eliminate the facilities under the OPCW on-site supervision was scheduled for the summer of 2015.

²² Neutralization of the removed toxic substances occurred in the Mediterranean Sea on the US ship 'Cape Ray' equipped with two special neutralization facilities. The elimination of toxic chemicals also occurred at facilities in several countries, including the UK, Finland and Germany. The OPCW concluded corresponding contracts with the companies of these countries.

²³ Russia, USA, UK, China, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Germany, Cyprus, Lebanon and other countries assisted in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons.

²⁴ 100% of declared chemical weapons materials were destroyed or removed from Syria, 23 June 2014, <<http://opcw.unmissions.org/AboutOPCWUNJointMission/tabid/54/ctl/Details/mid/651/ItemID/325/Default.aspx>>.

Thus, 100% of the declared Syrian toxic chemicals were either destroyed on the site or taken out of the country for destruction. About 1.200 tonnes of toxic substances (CW components and precursors) were removed from the Syrian territory. (Over 100 tonnes were previously neutralized in the storage areas under the OPCW supervision).

According to the UN data, by 3 February 2015, 98% of the declared Syrian toxic chemicals were destroyed²⁵.

The unique large-scale international chemical disarmament operation was successfully completed under the UNSC guidance in an unprecedentedly short time and under very difficult conditions of the civil war. The successful completion was achieved thanks to the coordinated work of the UN and the OPCW, as well as of many states, especially the Syrian authorities, in full accordance with international legal norms and principles of the UN Charter. It became a significant contribution to strengthening the coordinating role of the UNSC.

It should be emphasized that in relation to Syria the UNSC for the first time assumed very specific disarmament functions, including organizing and conducting large-scale international maritime operation for the removal of CW components and precursors out of the country, ensuring the safety of international inspectors and a variety of other measures in support of the OPCW.

An important precedent was set – the disposal of WMD with the deep involvement of the UN Security Council in this process. This experience can be helpful in case of the need for a similar international operation.

²⁵ The operation to destroy the remaining less toxic Syrian chemicals (29 tonnes of hydrogen fluoride) continued at the sites in the US and UK. The mandate of the joint UN and OPCW mission on Syria was completed by 30 September 2014. From October 2014 the work on the Syrian chemical weapon dossier was conducted under the auspices of the OPCW with the support of the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Thus, the Syrian chemical weapon dossier lost an extraordinary character.

The challenge to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program

This is a key issue on the international security agenda. According to 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and 1974 Agreement of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) with the IAEA on Safeguards, Iran assumed international legal obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons and place all its nuclear activities under the international control.

However, Iran used to carry out undeclared nuclear activities, secretly purchased dual-use technologies and nuclear facilities (for example, natural uranium conversion and enrichment facilities) through illicit networks.

The NPT does not prohibit non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) – parties to the Treaty to buy or build such facilities. It only requires states to declare such facilities in advance to the IAEA and place them under the IAEA safeguards. The Iranian authorities did not comply with these requirements and thus casted doubts on the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program in the international community.

In February 2006, IAEA Director General submitted a report on Iran's nuclear program to the UN Security Council. The report contained information on the requirements of the Governing Board (GB) of the IAEA to Iran to implement a number of specific measures in order to restore confidence in its nuclear activities. The Board of Governors, in particular, wanted Iran to reinstate a complete and sustained suspension of all nuclear enrichment activities, including research and development activities; reconsider the decision to construct a research heavy water reactor; to promptly ratify and fully implement the Additional Safeguards Protocol (ASP).

The UNSC supported these demands and called upon Iran to comply with them. Tehran ignored all the requirements which prompted the Security Council to move to enforcement measures in the late 2006.

On 23 December 2006, the UNSC members unanimously passed Resolution 1737 that using Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN

Charter impose sanctions on all the Iranian activities on uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing as well as on the projects related to heavy water reactor or production of means of delivery for nuclear weapons²⁶. The Security Council also established a subsidiary body – the Sanctions Committee (‘Committee 1737’). Three subsequent resolutions on Iran²⁷ expanded the UNSC’s policy as Tehran refused to follow the previous resolutions.

In order to improve the implementation of the measures imposed by Resolution 1929 ‘Non-proliferation (Iran)’ the Security Council established an Expert Group to collect, examine and analyze information from states and relevant international organizations to assist the Sanctions Committee in carrying out its mandate and achieving its objectives.

Resolution 2159 adopted by the UN Security Council on 9 June 2014 extended the Expert Group’s mandate until 9 July 2015.

The dual-track approach adopted by the UN Security Council combines sanctions (in order to prevent Iran from building up the capabilities for creating nuclear weapons) and ‘positive incentives’ (designed to increase Tehran’s interest in cooperation with the IAEA and in complying with the obligations arising from its membership in the NPT, IAEA and the UN)²⁸.

Addressing the Iranian nuclear program in the UNSC format prompted the establishment of an informal negotiation mechanism comprising five permanent members of the UNSC (Britain, China, Russia, the US and France) and Germany known as ‘P5+1’ group. Thus the situation was turned into political negotiations and search for diplomatic solution. The resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council on the INP strengthened the bargaining position of the international mediators.

²⁶ UN Doc. S/RES 1737, 23 Dec. 2006. The sanctions would be lifted after the IAEA Board of Governors confirmed the Iranian compliance with requirements of the UN Security Council and the IAEA.

²⁷ The Committee’s mandate extends to the implementation of the resolutions 1737(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010).

²⁸ *SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009).

It should be emphasized that the substantive consideration of the Iranian nuclear program and the action taken by the Security Council played an important role in deterring those Iranian politicians who pushed for acquiring nuclear weapons. As a result of coordinated strategy of the international community based on the two track approach the IAEA reached progress on solving a number of issues of Iran's past nuclear activities.

On 24 November 2013, during the negotiations held in Geneva Iran and the six international mediators reached an important interim agreement. Tehran pledged within six months to suspend uranium enrichment to 20% and not to enrich uranium above 5% level. Teheran also agreed to dispose of stocks of uranium enriched to 20%, suspend construction of a heavy water reactor at Arak, not to deploy new centrifuges and to broaden access of international inspectors to its nuclear facilities.

The November agreements opened the prospect of a long-term and reliable solution of the INP problem which would allow to fully restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program and exercise the rights of Iran as a party to the NPT including the right to enrich uranium as well as to lose the sanctions imposed on the IRI.

During further negotiations a substantial progress was made in developing a system of guarantees of the exclusively peaceful nature of the INP in exchange for a lifting all the sanctions on Iran.

The talks at the ministerial level held in Lausanne at the beginning of April 2015 led to a political framework agreement for the settlement of the situation around the Iranian nuclear program.

The agreement provides for IAEA control and measures of verification of peaceful nuclear activities in Iran, withdrawal of the sanctions imposed on Iran (as the implementation of the agreements proceeds) both by the UNSC and the US and EU unilaterally. In particular, the framework agreement provides that two-thirds of the

Iranian uranium enrichment capacity (centrifuges) be suspended within ten years²⁹.

The parties agreed to continue consultations on the expert level to document the implementation of each of the specific decisions before the end of June 2015.

‘The nuclear threshold’ approached by Iran constitutes an important feature of the situation around the INP. If the Iranian government makes a political decision to build nuclear weapons then such weapons, according to experts, can be developed within a year. There are cleric and secular circles among Iranian elites who promote hard line on INP and reject President Rouhani attempts to alleviate international concerns.

With this in mind, the nuclear activities of Iran in the coming years will require the collective attention and efforts of the UN Security Council.

The UN Security Council against nuclear militarization of the Korean Peninsula

In 2003, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced its withdrawal from the NPT and the termination of cooperation with the IAEA. In early 2005, North Korea announced that it possessed nuclear weapons³⁰.

In 2003, a special negotiation mechanism to address this issue was established – the Six-Party Talks involving North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, the US and Japan. The talks started in late 2003

²⁹ There are 6104 centrifuges remained out of 19,000. The facility at Natanz will produce uranium enriched to 3.67% (used only for civilian purposes); another facility (at Fordo) will be used solely for research purposes; the reactor in Arak will not produce weapons-grade plutonium.

³⁰ Back in 1993, the UNSC was informed by the IAEA Board of Governors about the fact that North Korea did not comply with its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the DPRK, and that the Agency was unable to verify whether there had been a diversion of nuclear materials. However, at that time the UN Security Council failed to resort to enforcement measures in relation to North Korea in order encourage it to comply with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.

failed to meet their objective³¹. On 12 April 2009 North Korea withdrew from the Six Party Talks.

On 5 July 2006, Pyongyang carried out group tests of missiles of various ranges and on 9 October 2006 it tested a nuclear explosive device. These actions caused a sharp reaction from the UNSC.

On 25 July 2006, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1695 demanding from North Korea to suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, strongly urging North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons development programs and return to the Six-Party Talks, the NPT, and the IAEA safeguards. All state members of the United Nations were requested to refrain from trading with North Korea in missile technologies.

UNSC Resolution 1718 adopted on 14 October 2006 stated that under the NPT 'DPRK cannot have a status of a nuclear weapon state'. The UN Security Council urged the DPRK to refrain from any further nuclear tests and renounces completely all nuclear weapons and existing WMD and ballistic missile development programs.

The UNSC established the Sanctions Committee consisting of all members of the Council to keep the DPRK's actions under continuous scrutiny (UN Doc. S/RES/1718 of 14 October 2006)³².

On 25 May 2009, the DPRK carried out a second test of nuclear weapons. On 12 June, the UNSC responded to this challenge by unanimously adopting 2009 Resolution 1874 based upon Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter ('Non-proliferation. DPRK', UN Doc. S/Res/1874 of 12 June 2009). The provisions of this resolution amplified the sanctions regime substantially.

In accordance with Resolution 1874, a Panel of Experts was established to gather information on the implementation of the UNSC

³¹ On 12 April 2009, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks. Pyongyang said that North Korea did not consider itself bound by any agreements reached earlier in the course of the negotiations and intended to develop nuclear deterrent. Numerous attempts in 2011-2015 to revive the six-party talks failed.

³² In fact, the full sanctions regime established according to Resolution 1718 in 2006, entered into force only in April 2009, after the start of the testing of North Korea's long-range missiles.

measures in relation to DPRK's nuclear activities and to make recommendations for follow-up UNSC actions.

On 12 February 2013 North Korea carried out a third nuclear test. In response, on 7 March 2013, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2094³³.

On 5 March 2014, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2141 which extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts till 5 April 2015. The UNSC urged all States, relevant UN bodies and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Sanctions Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by UNSC resolutions on North Korea³⁴.

The UNSC approach, as reflected in its resolutions, combines targeted restrictive measures against the military nuclear activities of the DPRK with the effort to promote 'peaceful dialogue' in order to resolve the denuclearization issues of the Korean Peninsula through diplomatic means. The goal of the approach is to eliminate the DPRK's nuclear and missile potential. As a whole the UNSC actions on solving North Korean nuclear crisis can be estimated as a significant factor increasing the chances for slowing down and eventually closing the DPRK's nuclear and missile programmes.

Though these efforts have so far failed to resolve the North Korea's nuclear crisis, they hampered further development of its nuclear and missile projects.

North Korea's nuclear issue is a challenge for the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation. It can be resolved only through the political and diplomatic mechanisms.

The UNSC actions steer Pyongyang towards returning to the Six Party Talks and serve as not only a major instrument in the process of resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula but also an important contribution to the international enforcement efforts in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

³³ UN Doc. S/RES/2094, 7 Mar. 2013.

³⁴ UNSC Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013).

The prospects for improving the management of international security

The enormity and diversity of challenges to world strategic stability in the foreseeable future are such that the states can cope with them only by acting together and taking advantage of the UN resources for managing issues of international security.

Today, unfortunately, the UN Security Council is split with Russia and China on the one side and the Western states on the other, and in between there are non-permanent members joining one or the other group of permanent members. The UNSC mechanism does not always work effectively. Not all of its resolutions are implemented properly. Its resources as a guarantor of international stability are underutilized. Moreover, attempts are made to prevent the UNSC from exercising its prerogatives in the main area of its competence – maintaining international peace and security and to exclude the UNSC from the process of solving key issues of strategic stability.

Meanwhile, history shows that illegitimate use of force outside the legal UN mandate does not bring, as a rule, the expected results and often exacerbates the situation by exposing the futility of betting on the use of force without the Security Council's authorization.

The deterioration of Russia–US/West relations occurred in recent years as a result of the events in Ukraine as well as a rift in strategic partnership have jeopardized international cooperation on matters of common security. A number of practical cooperation projects have been frozen at the initiative of the US and its allies.

The UN solidarity is under serious test and global risk management is deteriorating. The constructive interaction of the states within the UNSC framework and the UN ability to respond to strategic challenges of the 21st century may be also negatively affected.

The prospects for radical strategic destabilization in a number of regions, possibly including Russia, are more than real. The situation is exacerbated by the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism, and infectious diseases, as well as by escalating regional conflicts, large-scale natural and technogenic catastrophes and other disasters (overburdening biological resources, shortages of drinking water, etc.).

But, on the other hand, such negative developments expand the zone of common interests of nations. The restoration of international cooperation on the matters of the safety of the humankind and the planet appears as the only rational alternative to the current accumulation of a critical mass of world disorder.

The improvement of the UNSC practices, the increased focus on fully utilizing its legal and organizational powers of enforcement on the basis of unanimity to address the crises of global and regional security meet this objective. And the urgency of a breakthrough in this area of world politics is increasing.

Overcoming stagnation in arms control and facilitating the restoration of multilateral partnership on the issues of common security are in the interest of regional and global security. For that it is necessary to comply with the uniformly understood principles of world order and international rules of conduct in a polycentric world as presented in the UN Charter, as well as to impart priority to common security matters over other interests and motives.

The UN Security Council will be likely in demand not only as an institution for solving problems of international stability through political and diplomatic means, but also as a reputable legitimate instrument of coercion to peace, disarmament and non-proliferation, including prevention of terrorists' access to WMD.

To eliminate the increasing threats to international stability it is necessary to actively develop appropriate UNSC tools and mechanisms, better use tremendous opportunities of its mandate to implement concerted approaches and strategies. For example, the idea of engaging the UN Security Council mandate to conduct military operations – including establishing special units (troops) – to suppress terrorism groups such as the Islamic state is becoming more relevant.

The UN Security Council should also increase the willingness to intervene at the early stages of military-political crises including those concerning violation of international obligations of states on disarmament and non-proliferation. It is important to have common approaches, procedures, patterns of action, forces and means ready in order to promptly use mechanisms and scenarios of response to emerging crises, for example in the field of nuclear non-proliferation.

The relevance of such measures has increased due to the fact that the Ninth NPT Review Conference failed to adopt a final document

Given the above-mentioned trends and the need for better incorporation of the 21st century realities it is necessary to consider ways to improve global governance of international security and to strengthen the UN enforcement potential.

Among such measures is the revitalization of the UNSC Military Staff Committee (MSC) in order to make a full use of its expertise and enable this UN subsidiary body to play a prominent role in handling challenges to global and regional strategic stability.

Such measures can be implemented even before the ongoing discussion on the UNSC reform – in order to enhance its representation while maintaining proper flexibility – comes to an end

The reform should be based on the concept of refining the existing UNSC instruments in terms of resources, at the organizational and operational levels to give the Security Council effective leverages against global conflicts and enable it to cope successfully with global and regional security crises.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that the ‘radical reform’ proposals involving dramatic increase in the number of the UNSC members, abolition of the veto right, etc. do not serve the declared goals of the reform namely enhancing the efficiency of the Security Council. This objective can only be achieved with a slight increase in the number of seats in the UNSC while maintaining its compact composition and the veto power of the current five permanent members. The patient pursuit for a common denominator in this area should be continued without forcing events.

If common security becomes a priority and Russia and the US succeed in restoring and developing their strategic partnership there will be a real promise for qualitative improvement of the global governance in the area of global security. The international community could take advantage of the UNSC instruments and rapidly move forward in managing international risks in such critical security areas as the implementation of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy (through the establishment of UN counter-terrorism contingents); stabilization of the WMD non-proliferation regimes (through ensuring strict compliance

with the relevant UNSC resolutions); reinforcement of UN agencies involved in conflict prevention and peacekeeping (through augmenting the UN enforcement capacity).

Progress along the suggested lines would strengthen the UN ability to respond adequately to existing and anticipated challenges in a polycentric world.

The important factor in this regard is the experience accumulated by the UN in the areas of regional arms control and influence on states' actions through the combination of restrictive measures and encouraging efforts aimed at finding compromise solutions.

3. THE OSCE AND THE UKRAINE CRISIS

Andrei ZAGORSKI

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) became the *main multilateral platform*, on which cooperative measures aimed at de-escalation of the Ukraine crisis were adopted in 2014-2015. The Organization deployed a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and an Observer Mission at two Russian checkpoints at the border with Ukraine. A Trilateral Contact Group was established for the purpose of discussing political solutions to overcome the crisis. It became the single format in which representatives of Donbas are engaged in talks. Measures adopted by the Contact Group in 2014 and 2015 are endorsed by all parties to the conflict, the European Union, the US, Russia and other OSCE participating states.

OSCE activities are part of *wider international activities* in Ukraine, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine. The European Union finances the provision of humanitarian assistance to the country including those regions in Donbas which have suffered from the armed conflict. The Council of Europe oversees investigations of violent

incidents that took place on Kyiv's Maidan in 2013-2014 as well as in the city of Odessa on 2 May 2014³⁵.

Decisions taken within the OSCE were largely driven by *agreements* reached at the political level. Issues pertinent to the Ukraine crisis regulation are subject of discussions at bilateral and multilateral meetings and in telephone conversations by Heads of State or Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In 2014, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, President and Foreign Minister of Switzerland Didier Burkhalter played a remarkable role in these efforts. Switzerland initiated the deployment of an OSCE monitoring mission and the establishment of the Contact Group³⁶. After a ministerial meeting held in Geneva on 17 April 2014 (attended by Russia, the US, Ukraine and the EU)³⁷, Burkhalter offered a 'road map' charting steps toward de-escalation of the crisis³⁸.

From Summer 2014, the 'Normandy' group of four countries (Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine) became the main format for the generation of agreements toward the regulation of the crisis. In 2015, four countries agreed to institutionalize this format by establishing an oversight mechanism in form of regular senior officials meetings³⁹.

³⁵ The International Advisory Panel on Ukraine, <<http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/international-advisory-panel>>.

³⁶ Greminger, Th., *The 2014 Ukraine Crisis: Curse and Opportunity for the Swiss Chairmanship, Perspectives on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis*, ed. by Ch. Nünlistand, D. Svarin (Zurich: CSS ETH Zurich; foraus, 2014), p. 11.

³⁷ Geneva Statement of 17 April 2014 agreed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Russia, USA, Ukraine and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, <http://www.mid.ru/bdomb/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b4325699005bcbb3/b3b3396b891fb8df44257cbd00600264>.

³⁸ Swiss Chairperson-in-Office receives positive responses to OSCE Roadmap, says implementation is well underway, 12 May 2014, <<http://www.osce.org/cio/118479>>.

³⁹ Declaration by the President of the Russian Federation, the President of the Ukraine, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the 'Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements' adopted on 12 February 2015 in Minsk, The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 12 Feb. 2015, No 59, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2015/2015-02-12-ukraine-erklaerung_en.html>.

As a result, a *multi-layered mechanism* of decision-making pertinent to the regulation of Ukraine crisis took shape. Measures drafted by the Trilateral Contact Group are usually adopted after they have been endorsed by the ‘Normandy’ group. Decisions by the OSCE Permanent Council and the UN Security Council ensure wide political support of the agreements reached. It is the parties to the conflict which bear responsibility for the implementation of those accords. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) is entitled to monitor the implementation process. Coordination of military aspects of the implementation of the relevant agreements is handled by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) established in September 2014 by Russian and Ukrainian military. Representatives from Donbas take part in JCCC activities.

OSCE activities

OSCE crisis management activities were conducted either by various OSCE institutions or upon the initiative by participating states which triggered different cooperative mechanism not requiring consensus.

Confidence- and security-building measures

At various phases of the unfolding crisis, a number of procedures for observation and evaluation of military activities under the Vienna Document 2011 on confidence- and security-building measures (CBMs), as well as under the Open Skies Treaty have been activated.

Ukraine made use of Chapter III of the Vienna Document (risk reduction) which provides, inter alia, for the possibility of voluntary hosting of visits do dispel concerns about military activities. Such visits were conducted upon invitation of Kyiv between 5 and 20 March 2014, including in southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, by thirty participating states which sent to Ukraine a total of 56 military and civil observers. However, these groups were not admitted to the Crimea. After 20 March 2014, smaller groups of military experts from

participating states continued operating in Ukraine. One of them was kept hostage by Donetsk forces from 25 April through 3 May.

In 2014, 26 participating States activated provisions of Chapter IX (compliance and verification) and X (regional measures) of the Vienna Document and conducted 21 evaluation visits, including the evaluation of temporary deployed paramilitary formations and combat units in Ukraine. 12 participating states conducted evaluation visits on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Canada, Estonia, Ukraine and the US transmitted to Russia 18 requests for explanation within the mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities (Chapter III of the Vienna Document). Russia also transmitted such requests to Ukraine. The results of the activation of this mechanism were discussed at joint meetings of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation and the Permanent Council on 7, 17 and 30 April 2014. A total of 37 inspections and visits were conducted on the territory of the Russian Federation in 2014 under the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty.

The effectiveness of applying CSBMs for the purpose of de-escalation of the crisis became subject of critical assessments⁴⁰. Several disputes were triggered as a result of their application. Subjects to controversy included, inter alia, whether Russian military activities along the border with Ukraine should have been subject to provisions under the Vienna Document or not. The decision of Russia not to participate in either bilateral or multilateral meetings under the mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities became subject of controversy, too. Criticism was expressed with regard to alleged deviations from the rules of conducting inspection. The objectivity of assessment reports was contested. Complaints were expressed that the Vienna Document

⁴⁰ Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Forum for Security Co-operation, FSC Journal No 777, 19 Nov. 2014, Annex 1.

provisions were instrumentalized or abused for purposes other than confidence-building⁴¹.

The effectiveness of CSBMs in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine is widely contested. Some participating states which took part in activities under the Vienna Document in 2014, decided to no longer invest in these activities but, instead, redirected their resources to support SMM considering the latter a more effective crisis management instrument. This experience inspired the proposal to systematically review the effectiveness of applying CSBMs in crisis situations.

Human rights and minority rights, rule of law

All OSCE institutions, including those dealing with human and minority rights and the rule of law activated their work in Ukraine against the background of the crisis.

The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Astrid Thors visited Ukraine six times during 2014⁴², including visits to Donetsk, Luhansk, Odessa and the Crimea before the incorporation of the latter into Russia. The HCNM concentrates on two issues. Firstly, legislation and policy of Ukraine pertaining to the use of minorities language. Astrid Thors expressed concerns, as did her predecessors, as regards the relevant policy of Ukrainian authorities. Secondly, she follows the situation of Tatars community in the Crimea.

From 19 March through 1 April 2014, a Human Rights Assessment Mission was deployed in Ukraine by the OSCE Office for

⁴¹ See, inter alia, documents FSC-PC.DEL/9/14, 8 Apr. 2014; FSC-PC.DEL/8/14/Rev.1, 8 Apr. 2014; FSC-PC.DEL/16/14, 22 Apr. 2014; FSC-PC.DEL/15/14, 17 Apr. 2014; FSC-PC.DEL/17/14, 25 Apr. 2014; FSC-PC.DEL/20/14, 2 May 2014; FSC-PC.DEL/19/14, 30 Apr. 2014; FSC Journal No 777, 19 Nov. 2014. Annex 1; FSC.DEL/32/15, 18 Feb. 2015; Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation to Vienna military security and arms control, Vienna, 28 Apr. 2014, <<http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-dvbr.nsf/6786f16f9aa1fc72432569ea0036120e/44257b100055dde344257cc80040cdd2!OpenDocument>>; Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO A.V. Grushko at the meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna, 18 Mar. 2015, <<http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-dos.nsf/4b8edd3adb064e9f432569e70041fc52/44257b100055eea843257e0e004cc656!OpenDocument>>.

⁴² See, inter alia: HCNM.GAL/2/14/Rev.2, 10 July 2014; HCNM.GAL/5/14/Corr.1.

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the HCNM Office. The mission established a number of serious human rights violations but came to the conclusion that ‘these violations did not precede but rather accompanied and followed’ armed confrontation. It also found that the situation concerning national minorities rights in Ukraine ‘has not changed significantly’ at the beginning of 2014 and could not be the cause of the crisis⁴³.

ODIHR continuously reviews Ukrainian draft laws submitted to the parliament and prepares legal opinions on the compliance of submitted draft legislation with international human rights standards and rule of law principles⁴⁴. One thousand ODIHR and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly observers observed presidential elections in Ukraine on 25 May and 700 observed parliamentary elections on 26 October 2014. The Minsk accords of February 2015 call upon ODIHR to observe municipal elections in Donbas which should comply with the relevant OSCE commitments.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatović visited Ukraine several times and established multiple cases of attacks on journalists in her reports.

National and inter-parliamentary dialogues

The OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine has a permanent presence in the country. He is mandated to plan, implement and monitor projects implemented by Ukrainian authorities in cooperation with the OSCE. After a series of National Dialogue round tables had been organized in May 2014 in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Mikolayiv, facilitation of continuous dialogues in different regions of the country

⁴³ Human Rights Assessment Mission in Ukraine. Human Rights and Minority Rights Situation. ODIHRHRAM: 6 Mar.-1 Apr. 2014; HCNMHRAM: 8 Mar.-17 Apr. 2014. The Hague/Warsaw, 12 May 2014, <<http://www.osce.org/odihr/118476?download=true>>.

⁴⁴ OSCE ODIHR. Opinion on the draft law of Ukraine on combating cybercrime based on unofficial English translation of the Draft Law. Warsaw, 22 Aug. 2014; Opinion on draft amendments to some legislative acts of Ukraine concerning transparency of financing of political parties and election campaigns. Warsaw, 11 Sep. 2014; Opinion on the draft law of Ukraine on police and police activities based on an English translation of the draft law provided by the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights. Warsaw, 1 Dec. 2014.

(in particular, in Lviv, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk and Odessa) was an important part of its activities.

During the crisis, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has turned out to remain the sole inter-parliamentary platform on which all parties concerned continue de-escalation dialogue. At the Assembly's summer session in Baku on 2 July 2014, a decision was adopted to establish an Inter-Parliamentary Liaison Group on Ukraine⁴⁵.

Special Monitoring Mission

SMM was established on 21 March 2014 with the aim to contribute to reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability and security; and to monitoring and supporting the implementation of all OSCE principles and commitments throughout the country⁴⁶. Its mandate was defined in broad terms. The mission was supposed to:

- gather information and report on the security situation in the area of operation;
- establish and report facts in response to specific incidents and reports of incidents, including those concerning alleged violations of fundamental OSCE principles and commitments;
- monitor and support respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;
- establish contact with local, regional and national authorities, civil society, ethnic and religious groups, and members of the local population in order to fulfill its tasks;
- facilitate the dialogue on the ground in order to reduce tensions and promote normalization of the situation;

⁴⁵ Baku Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Twenty-Third Annual Session. Baku, 28 June to 2 July 2014, <<http://www.oscepa.org/publications/all-documents/annual-sessions/2014-baku/declaration-2/2540-2014-baku-declaration-eng/file>>.

⁴⁶ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Permanent Council. Decision No. 1117. Deployment of an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 21 Mar. 2014.

- report on any restrictions of the monitoring mission’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfillment of its mandate;
- co-ordinate with and support the work of the OSCE executive structures, as well as co-operate with the United Nations, the Council of Europe and other actors of the international community.

Despite financial austerity practiced by the majority of participating states, the OSCE did not face any serious difficulties in either funding or staffing the mission. The most controversial issue in the process of negotiating its mandate was the definition of the area of its operation. Russia was excluding the Crimea from this area while the majority of participating states insisted that the Crimea should be included on the mandate while regarding the peninsula as part of Ukraine. The compromise allowing all parties to maintain their legal positions was offered by Germany. The SMM mandate stresses that the mission operates ‘throughout the country’. At the same time, it identifies particular areas of its initial deployments to Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Luhansk. It does not list the Crimea and explicitly provides that any change in deployment shall be subject to a decision of the Permanent Council⁴⁷. In their interpretative statements, participating states repeatedly reconfirmed their diverging positions concerning the status of the Crimea⁴⁸.

Initially, the mission consisted of 100 international civilian monitors. The mandate allowed to increase its strength to 500, and subsequent decisions – to 1000 monitors. The Minsk protocol of 5 September 2014⁴⁹ and subsequent agreements on measures to

⁴⁷ Decision No. 1117.

⁴⁸ See attachments to OSCE Permanent Council’s decisions No. 1117, 1129 and 1126. South Eastern European countries (with the exception of Serbia), Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, San Marino, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia usually align themselves with the relevant EU statements. See document FSC.DEL/31/15/Rev.1, 18 Feb. 2015.

⁴⁹ Protocol of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group concerning joint measures aimed at the implementation of the Peace plan by the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and the initiatives by the President of Russia V. Putin, <<http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true>>.

implement it of 19 September 2014 and 12 February 2015⁵⁰ entitled SMM to monitor their implementation. In this context, the strength of the mission continuously increased from autumn 2014. In March 2015, it consisted of 460 international monitors. More than two thirds of them were deployed in the east of the country – in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as in Kharkiv and Dnepropetrovsk. However, SMM saw the prospects of increasing the effectiveness of its monitoring not in the redeployment of its personnel but, rather, in benefitting from modern means of surveillance. This brought it to the conclusion that it needed to recruit additional staff with particular expertise in IT and remote surveillance technologies⁵¹.

The mission serves the important purpose of informing participating states about developments in Ukraine. However, its capability to establish facts in the area of conflict and to verify the implementation by all parties of provisions of the Minsk agreements is more limited than it is usually believed. In its reports, SMM records facts established by its personnel, information received from military structures, local authorities and population, NGOs and the JCCC staff. However, the factual baseline provided by those reports does not provide unequivocal evidence of developments in the area of conflict.

While conducting its activities, the mission depends on cooperation of belligerent parties, which cannot always be taken for granted⁵². The movement of SMM personnel in the area of hostilities is

⁵⁰ Memorandum on the implementation of the Protocol of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group concerning joint measures aimed at the implementation of the Peace plan by the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and the initiatives by the President of Russia V. Putin, <<http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123807?download=true>>; Complex of measures to implement the Minsk agreements, 12 Feb. 2015, <http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/4804>.

⁵¹ Interview with Alexander Hug, Deputy Chief Monitor: Political will has to be translated into operational instructions on the ground, 24 Feb. 2015, <http://www.shrblog.org/blog/INTERVIEW_with_Alexander_Hug_Deputy_Chief_Monitor_Political_will_has_to_be_translated_into_operational_instructions_on_the_ground.html?id=520>.

⁵² Liechtenstein, S., The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission has become the eyes and ears of the international community on the ground in Ukraine, *Security & Human*

restricted by security considerations as well as by both parties to the conflict. Observing movements of military equipment, the mission often cannot establish the ownership of it. The mission does not have either the authority or the means to investigate cases of shelling at local settlements. As a result, discussions within the OSCE are not based on an undisputed common factual baseline, and representatives of participating states continuously present opposing narratives of developments.

SMM capabilities to verify the agreed withdrawal of weapons by parties are even more limited. Without having the baseline information on where respective weapons were deployed before the withdrawal and where their locations would be thereafter, the mission was only able to observe the movement of weapons but was not able to establish and particularly to verify whether parties fully implemented their commitments to withdraw from the established zone⁵³. However, it was able to establish violations of their commitments by both parties.

In March 2015, the Permanent Council decided to extend the SMM mandate until the end of March 2016, to double its strength and to substantially increase funding of the mission⁵⁴. SMM receives modern surveillance equipment, including drones and satellite images. Other measures are considered, inter alia, the option of equipping SMM with some peacekeeping functions and including military observers on its staff⁵⁵. Another option under consideration is to deploy an additional UN sponsored stabilization mission in the area of conflict⁵⁶.

Rights, Vol. 25 (2014), No 1, p. 9; Interview with Alexander Hug, Deputy Chief Monitor: Political will has to be translated into operational instructions on the ground.

⁵³ OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Status Report as of 24 February 2015.

⁵⁴ Decision No. 1162, 12 Mar. 2015.

⁵⁵ Sengupta, S., Monitors of Ukraine Conflict Seek Help, *The New York Times*, 25 Feb. 2015, p. 7, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/25/world/europe/monitors-of-ukraine-conflict-seek-help.html>>.

⁵⁶ OSZE-Beobachter sollen dauerhaft an „heiße“ Orte, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 März 2015, s. 5.

OSCE observers at the Russian–Ukrainian border

In response to the invitation of the Russian Federation supported by Foreign Ministers of the ‘Normandy’ group⁵⁷, on 24 July 2014 the Permanent Council decided to deploy 16 OSCE observers to two Russian border checkpoints Donetsk and Gukovo mandating them to monitor and report on the movements across the Russian–Ukrainian border⁵⁸. This mandate of OSCE observers extends to a small, approximately one kilometer in length, portion of Russian–Ukrainian border.

This decision was taken at a time when Donbas was in control of a small part of the border. The July 2014 decision was seen by a majority of participating states as a first step towards a more effective monitoring of the Russian–Ukrainian border⁵⁹. Concerns as regards a very limited effect of the deployment of this small mission further strengthened after, as a result of the August 2014 offensive, Donbas forces took control over more than 400 kilometers of the Russian–Ukrainian border.

Then issue of extending monitoring to all checkpoints along the entire Russian–Ukrainian border, or at least along its part which was not effectively controlled by Ukrainian authorities, as well as to granting observers access to areas between checkpoints was repeatedly raised within the OSCE. For this purpose, it was proposed to increase the number of observers operating on the Russian side of the border, and to observe the border from its Ukrainian side by means of SMM until Ukrainian authorities would restore full control over that border⁶⁰.

⁵⁷ Joint Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany, 2 July 2014, <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/2fd69f0269f1e51b44257d0900659a61!OpenDocument>.

⁵⁸ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Permanent Council. Decision No 1130. Deployment of OSCE Observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, 24 July 2014.

⁵⁹ PC.DEC/1130, 24 July 2014, attachments 1-4; PC.DEC/1133, 22 Oct. 2014, attachments 1-3; PC.DEC/1135, 20 Nov. 2014, attachments 1, 2,4; PC.DEC/1155, 18 Dec. 2014, attachments 1-3; PC.DEC/1160, 12 Mar. 2015, attachments 1-3.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Those supporting such a decision referred to the provision of the September 5 2014 Minsk protocol stipulating that an OSCE operated permanent monitoring of Russian-Ukrainian border should be ensured alongside with the establishment of a security zone in border areas of Ukraine and Russia that was also supposed to be verified by the OSCE⁶¹.

Russia continuously rejected these demands referring to the impermissibility of singling out one element of Minsk agreements at the expense of other (political) commitments, as well as to the lack of any rationale to observe the Russian side of the border. Moscow suggested that the solution should be sought in direct dialogue ‘with those who these days exercise control over the respective checkpoints’⁶², i.e. with Donbas authorities. Furthermore, Moscow pointed out that measures to implement Minsk agreements adopted in February 2015 had clearly mapped the road to restoring control over the border by Ukrainian authorities by the end of 2015, provided the entire package of political commitments is implemented⁶³.

In the absence of consensus on this issue within the OSCE, an increase of the number of observers at border checkpoints of Donetsk and Gukovo was suggested as a compromising solution, though of limited effect. A decision to expand the mission to consist of 22 civilian monitors and a small logistic and administrative support team was approved in November 2014⁶⁴. However, this more than modest decision did not help to alleviate concerns as regards the ineffectiveness of the monitoring exercised along the Russian-Ukrainian border.

⁶¹ Protocol of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group concerning joint measures aimed at the implementation of the Peace plan by the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and the initiatives by the President of Russia V. Putin. Paragraph 4.

⁶² Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation A.V. Kelin in the meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council on 22 January 2015, Document PC.DEL/64/15, 23 Jan. 2015.

⁶³ Complex of measures to implement the Minsk agreements, 12 Feb. 2015. Paragraph 9.

⁶⁴ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Permanent Council. Decision No 1135. Extension of the deployment of OSCE Observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border, 20 Nov. 2014.

Trilateral Contact Group and ‘Minsk process’

The establishment of the Trilateral Contact Group served the purpose of institutionalizing political dialogue involving all opposing sides in the conflict on all matters pertaining to de-escalation and peaceful settlement. This dialogue is assisted through good offices by a representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office (CiO). The implementation of the initial Swiss proposal became possible after it received support from the ‘Normandy’ group in June 2014.

The Trilateral (Russia, Ukraine and the CiO representative) Contact Group commenced its work in Kyiv on 8 June 2014. Since 23 June, it has also conducted consultations with representatives of Donetsk and Luhansk through video-conferences arranged with assistance of SMM or through face-to-face meetings held in Minsk⁶⁵. The Contact Group is the only platform for negotiations in which representatives of Donbas participate. All decisions, recommendations and agreements within the Contact Group are adopted by consensus.

Three documents signed by participants to the Contact Group in Minsk provide the basis for the ‘Minsk process’ and constitute, in their entirety, a road map for peaceful settlement: the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014,⁶⁶ a Memorandum of 19 September 2014 spelling out measures to implement the Protocol’s provisions⁶⁷, and a package of further implementation measures signed on 12 February 2015⁶⁸ and

⁶⁵ Address by the Special Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini to the OSCE Permanent Council. Vienna, 20 November 2014. Document CIO.GAL/221/14, 20 Nov. 2014, p. 4.

⁶⁶ Protocol of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group concerning joint measures aimed at the implementation of the Peace plan by the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and the initiatives by the President of Russia V. Putin.

⁶⁷ Memorandum on the implementation of the Protocol of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group concerning joint measures aimed at the implementation of the Peace plan by the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko and the initiatives by the President of Russia V. Putin.

⁶⁸ Complex of measures to implement the Minsk agreements, 12 Feb. 2015.

endorsed by the Heads of State and Government of the four countries of the 'Normandy' group in a declaration⁶⁹ adopted the same day.

Media news sometimes distinguishes between 'Minsk-I' (September 2014 agreements) and 'Minsk-II' (February 2015 agreements). This may produce the impression that the 2015 agreements at least overwrote the 2014 accords. However, both the September 2015 Memorandum, and the February 2015 'package of measures' were adopted in order to give effect to the provisions of the initial Minsk Protocol through agreed and more detailed practical steps of their implementation. All three documents should be interpreted in their entirety by resolving continuous disputes pertaining to their implementation.

Minsk agreements anticipate several developments, which have yet to be synchronized and which are expected to promote a peaceful solution. Military aspects of the agreements provide for cease-fire, withdrawal of heavy weapons in order to establish a security zone, withdrawal of foreign armed units, combatants and mercenaries, creation of a security zone on both sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border. All military measures are subject to observation and verification by the OSCE.

'Minsk process' documents also include a wide range of political aspects of the peaceful solution, including implementing a constitutional reform in Ukraine by the end of 2015, political decentralization, conduct of a broad national dialogue, adoption of a Ukrainian law 'On a tentative local self-governance in select areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions' under Donbas control, adoption of an inventory of Donbas areas (within the separation line established on 19 September 2014), to which a special political and economic status would apply, holding local elections in Donbas in compliance with OSCE standards and observed by ODIHR, full amnesty of combatants, exchange of detained persons etc.

⁶⁹ Declaration by the President of the Russian Federation, the President of the Ukraine, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the 'Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements' adopted on 12 February 2015 in Minsk.

Minsk agreements proceed on the basis that Donbas is part of Ukraine. Territorial integrity of the latter was re-confirmed in February 2015 by the leaders of the ‘Normandy’ group. Respectively, peaceful settlement is supposed to proceed within the legal space of Ukraine. In order to co-ordinate practical steps within the overall political process, Minsk agreements anticipate direct dialogue between Kyiv and Donbas, in particular, to take place within special working groups under the auspices of the Contact Group.

Finally, agreements reached anticipate an economic and social re-integration of Donbas within the Ukrainian state, as well as resolving humanitarian issues, including the establishment of an international mechanism to provide humanitarian assistance to affected regions.

* * *

Despite some progress in implementing military provisions of the Minsk agreements, although accompanied by repeated setbacks, the focus is now shifting toward the implementation of political and socio-economic commitments which is lagging behind.⁷⁰

The JCCC played a crucial role in planning for withdrawal of heavy weapons from the line of separation and controlling that process. It keeps account of continuous violations of the cease-fire regime.

However, both opposing sides accuse each other of violating Minsk agreements – their military and particularly political and economic provisions.

The OSCE and the ‘Normandy’ group continue discussing the implementation of the implementation of the Minsk agreements. The issue of providing for effective monitoring of the movements across the Russian-Ukrainian border remains the most controversial part of this debate.

⁷⁰ Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation A.V. Kelin in the meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 12 Mar. 2015, <http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newslines/E740E202FE8F829543257E070026CC88>.

All this reveals the extremely fragile balance of the ‘Minsk process’ at the beginning of 2015. It can be easily torpedoed by either opposing side or by both of them, should they conclude that, on the balance, this process turns out to be detrimental to their interest.

4. RUSSIA AND NATO IN THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV

The Ukrainian crisis became a starting point for revision of the whole system of relations between Russia and the West. It also introduced serious adjustments to NATO–Russia relationship having frozen bilateral cooperation in every field. Acute and multilateral Ukrainian crisis which is far from being over has provided reasoning for the increased level of military-political activity of NATO allies that is, obviously, an undesirable ‘by-product’ of the crisis for Moscow.

NATO transformation after the Cold War and challenges of Russia–NATO relations

After the end of the Cold War the military component of NATO has been significantly reduced. Thus, during the period of a little more than ten years following the signing of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) the number of the treaty-limited equipment (TLE) has been dramatically decreased despite the increase of the number of the NATO member states from 16 to 19. The number of tanks which at Alliance’s disposal was reduced by 1.8 times,

armored combat vehicles and artillery systems – by 1.4 times each, combat aircraft – by 1.5 times, helicopters – by 1.1 times⁷¹.

Further dynamics of this process only amplified: the number of NATO member states was growing, and the number of armaments decreased. As a result, at the beginning of the 2010s Alliance's national ceilings for tanks and armored combat vehicles in Europe (excluding Turkey which has increased its number of armored equipment due to regional security concerns) were slightly more than 50% of permitted national levels. The ceilings on tanks were met, however, to less than 30%⁷². In post Cold War period 'the American presence' within NATO on the European continent was sharply reduced. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union about 450 thousand US military personnel were deployed in Europe, and by now the number of the US personnel has dropped more than by 80% to 64 thousand⁷³.

There is a quite unambiguous explanation to it: NATO European allies no longer seriously consider scenarios of offensive operations for which the heavy armored equipment would be necessary. Thus, though the claims of overwhelming superiority of NATO over Russia in treaty-limited armaments and equipment which are constantly voiced by the Russian side formally have solid foundation they represent comparisons of treaty's ceilings rather than actual armaments.

For a long time there was a serious discussion in European political and expert circles on keeping 200 US free-fall nuclear bombs on the territory of Europe. After the Ukrainian crisis the United States initiated the long-term program of modernization of this nuclear arsenal in Europe.

From the Russian side, the polemic among politicians and experts that Russia is surrounded with a network of NATO bases is still going on. However, if the 'base' in this case means a facility used by

⁷¹ Calculated by the author based on Khranchikhin, A., 'What we after all should do with NATO', *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, 15 Oct. 2010, No 39(636), <http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-10-15/1_nato.html>.

⁷² Calculated by the author based on *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, 2011).

⁷³ Stavridis: Europe Remains Strategically Vital to US, 15 Mar. 2013, <<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119541>>.

several NATO states, such bases exist only in Afghanistan and will be, closed after the withdrawal of NATO troops from the country.

There are military facilities in the territory of European countries where the contingents of alliance' states are deployed. Thus, the US military units are placed at 21 bases and several smaller supporting platforms. The British unit of 15,500 military personnel which has been deployed in Germany is going to gradually withdraw by 2019.

Plans to deploy a European missile defence became the element of the US and NATO military policy in Europe that seriously complicated relations with Russia. After its announcement the vast majority of Russian military, politicians and experts declared that this system was directed against Russia. NATO claims that Russia was officially invited to cooperate on this issue⁷⁴ did not convince the Russian side. The latter did not believe either in official declarations that 'NATO missile defence is intended to defend from potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area' and that the system 'is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence capabilities'⁷⁵.

The general mood in Russia did not change even after parameters of the European missile defence had been corrected twice – and the last time quite significantly – in order to decrease its capabilities. It happened in March 2013 when the Pentagon gave up the fourth stage of the system that was the deployment of the modified SM-3 Block IIB interceptors in Europe and offshore which due to their characteristics were considered by Russian experts as potentially capable of weakening the retaliating power of the Russian ICBMs.

Despite it and in many respects due to the position of the West the 'substantive' dialogue on this issue did not take place. The unwillingness of NATO and the USA to address Russian concerns, i.e.

⁷⁴ Lisbon Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, 20 Nov. 2010, <http://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm>.

⁷⁵ Chicago Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago, 20 May 2012, <http://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm>.

technically, organizationally or legally guarantee that the system did not direct against Russia, deeply affected the relations between Moscow and Brussels and Washington.

Russia's sharp reaction to the prospects of Ukraine changing its policy (on conclusion of Association Agreement with the European Union) was in many respects a consequence of the general nature of relations between Russia and the West after the end of the Cold War when negative factors and unresolved contradictions accumulated. The NATO enlargement policy which was perceived by most of the political and military community in Russia as relentlessly approaching direct threat to national security was the major factor that became, in our opinion, the central and constant destructive element of these relations. The alliance' leadership did not want to enter into a dialogue with Moscow on this issue (as well as in due course to discuss the prospect of Russia's membership in NATO) hiding behind such clichés as NATO enlargement 'doesn't threaten Russia'.

Such position of Brussels made compromises impossible and played to suspicions of those Russian analysts who considered NATO at least a potential enemy. Army general Yu. Baluyevsky, the former deputy chief of the General Staff and deputy secretary of the Security Council of Russian Federation, who enjoys high authority in military and political circles, accurately expressed nuances of the attitude widespread in Russia that in the near future external and military threats 'will be defined by the policy of our partners (the word 'opponents' is more suitable here) – the USA and NATO – whose goal, in my opinion, has never changed. And this purpose is to prevent Russia's revival as an economic and military power capable to defend its interests independently',⁷⁶.

The situation further aggravated by the issue of Ukraine's joining NATO. The Alliance' leaders kept this topic alive since 1997 when NATO and Ukraine signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership to a high level meeting in Bucharest in 2008 when NATO

⁷⁶ Baluyevsky, Yu., 'From whom Russia should defend itself in XXI century', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23 Apr. 2013, <http://www.ng.ru/stsenarii/2013-04-23/9_defend.html>.

member countries agreed that Ukraine ‘will become member of NATO’⁷⁷. Though later, in 2010, Ukraine declared that it would pursue a ‘non-block policy’ and adopted the relevant legislation, certain Ukrainian politicians and parties has been constantly raising the matter.

All these factors led to further proliferation of anti-NATO and anti-West attitudes among the Russian elite. And the time came when the prevailing vision of NATO as a direct threat in combination with the feeling that NATO could ‘absorb Ukraine’ pushed Moscow to specific actions in the Crimea as well as to support of the anti-Kiev actions in the east and southeast Ukraine. As the president Vladimir Putin emphasized, there was a feeling that ‘if we do not do anything, Ukraine will be drawn into NATO sometime in the future... and NATO ships will dock in Sevastopol, the city of Russia’s naval glory... But if NATO troops walk in... such a move would be geopolitically sensitive for us’⁷⁸.

NATO military-political decisions regarding events in Ukraine

Rapid development of events in Ukraine took the NATO leadership unawares and revealed unpreparedness of the Alliance to react quickly in similar emergency situations. An attempt to take drastic decisions in this respect and to coordinate further actions was undertaken during the NATO summit in Wales that took place on 4-5 September 2014. Many experts and politicians foretold that this meeting will mark a ‘turn to a new course’ – or to put it more precisely ‘return to an old course’ – to elements of the Cold War.

Nevertheless, decisions of the summit, as well as reaction of NATO as an organization on the Ukrainian crisis, can be characterized as a ‘soft scenario’. Especially serious concerns of the NATO members have being so far resolved within the organization and the proposed

⁷⁷ NATO-Russia relations: the facts, May 2015, <http://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natolive/topics_111767.htm>.

⁷⁸ ‘Direct line’ with Vladimir Putin, 17 Apr. 2014, <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796>>.

solutions which could lead to aggravating relations with Russia have not been adopted or formalized in official documents.

The NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in an interview after the summit emphasized that he did not want ‘a new Cold War’. In his opinion, ‘NATO made a lot’ to establish a ‘real’ strategic partnership with Russia. Moreover, speaking about the future, Rasmussen expressed confidence that ‘the constructive partnership between Russia and NATO’ was indispensable⁷⁹.

The documents of the summit outlined conditions for transition to such partnership rather distinctly. The statement on results of the meeting stressed that ‘the nature of the Alliance’s relations with Russia and our aspiration for partnership will be contingent on our seeing a clear, constructive change in Russian actions which demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities’. Besides it repeated that NATO ‘does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia’⁸⁰. At the same time the leaders of the Alliance had to note that ‘Russia, apparently, considers NATO not as the partner, but as the opponent’⁸¹. However nobody in the NATO headquarters wanted to analyze the reasons for such mood in Russia. The summit declared its activity successful and its intention to continue the policy of enlargement.

Unfortunately, even twenty years after the beginning of this destructive for the NATO-Russia relations policy Brussels could not understand that it was the factor that constantly undermined NATO–Russia relations, strengthened and broadened the Russian opposition to policy of Alliance changing thereby the internal political situation in Russia. Without understanding of this fact the effective restoring of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Brussels seems impossible.

⁷⁹‘The constructive partnership between Russia and the NATO is necessary – the NATO Secretary General A. Fogh Rasmussen told ‘Kommersant’ about the crisis in relations with Russia’, *Kommersant*, 10 Sep. 2014, <<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2563623>>.

⁸⁰ Wales Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 5 Sep. 2014, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=ru>.

⁸¹ The constructive partnership between Russia and the NATO is necessary...

The documents of the Wales summit once again confirmed NATO's commitment to the earlier decisions on full admission of Georgia. Though 'the substantial package for Georgia' approved in Wales did not contain direct obligations to help it by providing weapons, it opened opportunities in 'defence capacity building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison, and enhanced interoperability opportunities'⁸². The accepted formula left rather broad interpretation of real restrictions on military assistance for Georgia. And the remaining prospect of this country's joining NATO comprises potential for new serious strain of relations of Russia with Georgia and NATO.

In January 2015, in elaboration of the military-political decisions of the summit Brussels meeting of the NATO Military Committee at the level of Chiefs of Staff adopted a Readiness Action Plan. According to it the Alliance plans to carry out a complex of military activities in two areas – providing security guarantees for the member countries and implementing 'measures for adaptation' to the new circumstances.

The first area includes such measures as increasing the number of aircraft on patrol over the Baltic states; increasing the number of ships on patrol in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean seas; deploying ground troops on a rotational basis in the eastern members of the Alliance for training and exercises, etc. The second direction – 'measures for adaptation' – provides for the strengthening of the growing and improving high readiness task forces⁸³. The same meeting made a decision on the first time deployment of six multinational command centers – the so-called 'small headquarters'.

According to the Action Plan, NATO adopted a number of organizational decisions to increase the defence capability and mobility of its forces. The 173rd meeting (May 2015) of the Military Committee at the level of the Allied Chiefs of Defence discussed a complex of

⁸² Wales Summit Declaration...

⁸³ NATO's Readiness Action Plan. Fact Sheet, February 2015, <http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_02/20150205_1502-Factsheet-RAP-en.pdf>.

activities that NATO needed ‘to continue to adapt and ensure all Allies were secure against any threat’⁸⁴.

At a June meeting of the NATO Defence Ministers the allies finalized the details of establishing the ‘small headquarters’ in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Estonia. As the NATO Secretary General explained, ‘they will each consist of around 40 people and will play a key role in planning, exercises, and assisting potential reinforcement’. In addition, ministers decided to establish a new Joint Logistics Headquarters to facilitate the rapid movement of forces when necessary. The allies also approved a new concept of advance planning.

NATO Defence Ministers decided on air, maritime, and special forces components of the enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF would consist of up to 40,000 personnel – a major increase from the previous level of 13,000⁸⁵.

The NRF is technologically advanced high readiness force made up of land, air, maritime and special operations forces (SOF) components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed. The NRF consists of three organizational units: headquarters command and control; Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that comprises around 13,000 troops from NATO member states; joint response force reserve that can enhance the NRF whenever needed. The NATO Response Force is to be fully operational in 2016⁸⁶.

According to the plan, the military personnel of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Norway, Great Britain and the Netherlands will be part of the NRF. Canada has also expressed an

⁸⁴ NATO Chiefs of Defence discuss the Readiness Action Plan, Ukraine and the way ahead for missions and operations, 21 May 2015, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_120073.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

⁸⁵ Defence Ministers decide to bolster the NATO Response Force, reinforce collective defence, 24 June 2015, <http://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/news_120993.htm>.

⁸⁶ Ibid. See also: NATO Response Force, 11 May 2015, <http://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/topics_49755.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

interest in the project. Such forces will include ground as well as air and naval units⁸⁷.

The leadership of the Alliance also planned additional measures to increase readiness that are considered to be an important task because of ambiguity of the current crisis which is still far from an end. At the June meeting, NATO defence ministers took measures to speed up political and military decision-making including determining the powers of the NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe to prepare troops for action as soon as a political decision was made.

Just before the meeting the US Defense Secretary Ash Carter told at a press conference in Tallinn that the USA 'will temporarily deploy one armored brigade combat team's vehicles and associated equipment in countries in Central and Eastern Europe'⁸⁸. According to the media, seven countries – Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Germany and three Baltic States – could host about 250 tanks, infantry armoured vehicles and other military equipment⁸⁹.

The arguments accompanied the announcement of these steps were indicative. The Alliance's secretary general stated that the situation in the East 'is heating up'. It was declared at the same time that NATO's decision was balanced and 'purely defensive' in nature. The measures taken by NATO were presented as a 'careful response' to 'Russia's behavior, its nuclear activity and rhetoric'. In addition to the 'careful' definition it was also stated that NATO would act 'cautiously, predictably, and very transparently'. One of the important features of NATO's policy in present-day critical circumstances was stated by the head of the Alliance: NATO 'does not seek confrontation and does not

⁸⁷'New rapid reaction force will be created in Europe with the participation of the Baltic states', *Interfax*, 30 Aug. 2014, <<http://www.interfax.ru/world/394090>>.

⁸⁸ See: <<http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5643>>, 23 June 2015.

⁸⁹'US ready to position 250 infantry fighting vehicles in seven European countries', *RIA Novosti*, 23 June 2015; 'US to Position Tanks, Arms in 7 European Nations', *VOA News*, 23 June 2015, <<http://www.voanews.com/content/carter-us-will-not-rely-on-cold-war-playbook-with-russia/2833572.html>>.

want a new arms race'. It was stressed that the Alliance continues to adhere to all disarmament and arms control agreements⁹⁰.

The US enhances its participation in the military activities which are becoming more intensive in the territory of the countries neighboring with Russia. This fact confirms the increasing attention of the US as the most powerful member of the Alliance from the military point of view to European security issues in the new security environment. There are direct indications that in the forthcoming years Washington will shift its strong focus on NATO as the central element of accomplishing this objective. The US and the NATO leadership can also be expected to exercise the growing pressure on the Alliance member countries in order to increase their defence spending. The top NATO officials have already made such calls repeatedly and unequivocally demanding the Alliance's members to raise the military expenditures up to 2% of the GDP. However it will be difficult to translate these requirements into reality.

So the conditions arise for certain build-up of previously significantly reduced American presence in Europe. The US nuclear arsenal in Europe is likely to be further modernized and enhanced. There are plans for modernization of fighting aircraft of some NATO countries in order to equip them with B-61 bombs and modify. It appears, however, that if the Ukrainian crisis and military operations do not escalate, such modernization can be insignificant and temporary.

It should be noted that despite powerful pressure from the US Congress, President Obama so far has rejected many measures that would lead to further escalation of the situation, for example, supplying so-called 'lethal weapons' to Kiev. Both Washington and Brussels refused to satisfy the Ukrainian request for deployment of missile defence elements on its territory. The Obama administration tries not to give in to pressure from legislators and opposition and find some middle ground, especially in comparison with the scale of the political crisis in Ukraine.

⁹⁰ 'The NATO decided to increase the Response Force up to 40,000 personnel', *RBK*, 24 June 2015, <<http://top.rbc.ru/politics/24/06/2015/558ae5779a7947364fe3ad49>>.

NATO policy of ‘restrained escalation’

The Ukrainian crisis planted doubts among the leading Western politicians concerning the viability of Ukraine’s access to NATO. For example, such European leaders as the French president F. Hollande and German foreign minister F.V. Steinmeier spoke against the idea of Ukraine’s joining the Alliance. In short term non-alignment of Ukraine as one of the Russian foreign policy objectives is rather realistic given the events in Donbas. However the costs of achieving this objective are large and sensitive for Moscow.

However Brussels cannot drastically change its earlier proclaimed course. Therefore at the Wales summit NATO confirmed its commitment to cooperate with Kiev within the special program of ‘distinctive partnership’. The ‘additional efforts to support the reform and transformation of the security and defence sectors and promote greater interoperability between Ukraine’s and NATO forces’ were launched⁹¹ but they all fell below expectations of Ukrainian leadership. The Ukrainian president P. Poroshenko who attended the Wales summit obviously sought to secure not only declarative and political but also military support from the Alliance. During the subsequent visit of P. Poroshenko to the US he also fail to make any progress on this issue and to receive the desired status of major non-NATO ally which were granted, for instance, to Israel, South Korea and Japan.

At the summit in Wales and other meetings a number of countries (Canada, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia) called for the dissolution of the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act but could not rally enough support. Such step would allow, in particular, to remove the restrictions on the so-called additional permanent stationing of ‘substantial combat forces’ on the territory of NATO member states. This document prevents the plans of opening five constant NATO military bases in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania and Poland which are under discussion⁹².

⁹¹ Wales Summit Declaration...

⁹² ‘Public media: NATO plans to deploy five bases in Eastern Europe’, *ITAR-TASS*, 31 Aug. 2014, <<http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1411311>>.

Technically dubious ideas of targeting the European missile defence system against Russia suggested by Poland and the Baltic states failed to get support either⁹³. The leaders of the Alliance did not give way to the request of the Polish minister of foreign affairs R. Sikorski on deploying ‘two heavy brigades of NATO troops’ in Poland. The idea of a permanent dislocation of large NATO divisions in the Baltic states was also rejected. NATO high-rank officials announced a ‘soft option’ which showed the Alliance restraint but declared that all its members individually had the right to interact both with new NATO members and with Ukraine in the security sphere.

Further moves of the alliance will go in line with the initiative put forward at the Wales summit – launch of ‘Defence and Related Security Capacity Building’ which implies enhancing capabilities to project force without deploying large combat forces⁹⁴. It is obvious that specific parameters of this initiative to be elaborated will depend on a number of external and internal factors, but first and foremost – on the progress of peace process in Ukraine.

Brussels’ muted reaction at political level is however accompanied by the demonstration of both declared determination to provide defence to all NATO members and stepping up efforts in the military sphere. Answering the question on a possibility of applying Article 5 of the Washington treaty the NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg said that ‘the NATO will respond proportionally in case of attack on the member countries’⁹⁵.

The Ukrainian crisis prompted a wide complex of initiatives aimed at the largest build-up of NATO collective defence capabilities since the end of the Cold War. Military leaders from NATO countries whose interests are directly connected with maintaining a high level of defence spending advance an idea that the new situation in security area has become, as the chairman of NATO Military Committee General

⁹³ ‘Poland and the Baltic states requested to target the European missile defence system on Russia’, 1 July 2015, <<http://mskfabr.com/?IDE=128194>>.

⁹⁴ Wales Summit Declaration...

⁹⁵ ‘Secretary General: NATO ‘will respond proportionally’ on attack on the member countries’, *RIA Novosti*, 27 May 2015, <<http://ria.ru/world/20150527/1066824192.html>>.

K. Bartels put it, the ‘new norm’⁹⁶, so it will require large-scale and long-term adjustments of military policy.

Overcoming the new security challenges and resolving issues in defence sector facing the Alliance require above all the strengthening of close cooperation through joint exercises intended to demonstrate the determination of the Alliance to guarantee security of the ‘new allies’ – the new NATO members that border with Russia and Ukraine. It is no coincidence that NATO military exercises have considerably intensified mostly in the territory of such states (Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states) that serves as an unambiguous signal. It also answers the requests of these countries to demonstrate NATO security guarantees as vividly as possible.

In 2014 NATO exercises gradually intensified. In the western Ukraine NATO held Rapid Trident-2014 large peacekeeping exercises. In September 2014, the Ukrainian armed forces together with NATO units conducted Sea Breeze-2014 three-day military exercises in the Black Sea with up to 12 ships from the both sides. Their goal formulated as providing ‘security of a navigational zone in a crisis region’ was directly linked to the Ukrainian crisis.

Since March 2014, several naval ships of the US and other NATO countries have been rotated almost constantly in the Black Sea. Thus the Montreux convention which limits the total tonnage and duration of permitted stay of ships in the Black Sea has not been violated.

In 2015 Ukraine will take part in 12 joint military exercises with NATO countries, including three US-Ukrainian drills (Fearless Guardian, Sea Breeze and Saber Guardian/Rapid Trident) and two Polish-Ukrainian drills (Safe Skies and Law and Order). Totally more than 7000 servicemen will take part in the exercises, more than half of them will be sent to Ukraine by NATO member countries (predominantly by the US)⁹⁷.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ See: ‘Ukraine in 2015 will take part in 12 joint military exercises in the NATO countries’, *Liga.net*, 20 Mar. 2015, <http://news.liga.net/news/politics/5346132-ukraina_v_2015_m_uchastvuet_v_12_voennykh_uchenyakh_so_stranami_nato.htm>.

Due to the Ukrainian crisis military activity in Poland and in the Baltics has seriously intensified – they hold not only the national but also the large-scale joint exercise. In the opinion of the Polish defence minister, ‘NATO has to be prepared for a new situation, and it requires structural changes’. The adjustment to new conditions should be aimed at ‘enhancing the integrity of the Alliance as a whole, not only of the high readiness forces. Changes are necessary which will allow us to react not only at the level of sending brigades (3–6 thousand soldiers), but also at the division (5–15 thousand soldiers) and corps (15–45 thousand soldiers) levels’⁹⁸.

In spring 2014, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia hosted an exercise with participation of the US 173rd airborne brigade redeployed from Italy. From 24 September to 3 October 2014, the large-scale NATO Anaconda maneuvers were held in northern Poland which had over 12 thousand personnel from 9 countries of the Alliance. In June 2015, Poland and three Baltic states held another large-scale Saber Strike exercise. A Polish motorized brigade, German artillery, Danish and US tanks – up to two thousand military personnel – took part in the exercises. They were a part of a series of NATO maneuvers in Eastern Europe under the joint name of Allied Shield⁹⁹.

Before the Ukrainian crisis the only routine presence of the NATO forces in the territory of the Baltic states was four NATO fighters whose mission was to patrol the air space. Soon after the beginning of the crisis their number raised to twelve. Now on the agenda is the deployment of heavy military equipment in Europe promised by the US Defense Secretary. Though limited in number it will be rather sensitive for Russia.

In March 2015, Latvia hosted annual international Operation Summer Shield XII military exercises. US Army’s 1st brigade of 3rd infantry division participated in the maneuvers; US brought over 120 units of military equipment including M1A2 Abrams tanks and M2A3

⁹⁸ ‘Poland: the NATO may violate agreements with Russia’, *BFM.ru*, 20 May 2015, <<http://www.bfm.ru/news/293392>>.

⁹⁹ The series includes four independent components: BALTOPS, ‘Saber Strike’, ‘Noble Jump’, and ‘Trident Joust’ exercises.

Bradley armored cars Latvia within the Atlantic Resolve mission in order to strengthen Baltic states' security.

Lithuania, according to the Lithuanian ministry of defence, is the country which coordinates and officially hosts the Saber Strike exercise. To participate in these maneuvers the NATO allies have delivered heavy armored machinery to Lithuania – Abrams tanks, Stryker, Boxer and Piranha infantry fighting vehicles, Fuchs armored reconnaissance vehicles and other weaponry¹⁰⁰.

In May 2015, Estonia held the largest Steadfast Javelin mobilization exercises. They involved 13,000 servicemen (including 7000 Estonian reservists) as well as American M1A2 Abrams tanks, Polish SU-22 fighter bombers, British Typhoons fighters, American Hawks and A-10 fighters¹⁰¹.

NATO military activity and its leadership's organizational decisions are intended to demonstrate to the East European member states Brussels' determination to protect them and at the same time to send an unambiguous signal to Russia for the latter to show restraint in supporting the anti-Kiev forces. Such activity teetering on the brink of breaking the existing arrangements between Russian and NATO will apparently continue – at least, until steady peace process starts in Ukraine.

It seems that in the present crisis situation with no end in sight, NATO avoids sharp escalation and tough large-scale response to a threat perceived by its members, and instead follows rather slow pace of coordinated demonstration of its readiness for actions in case of further aggravation of the situation. At the same time NATO shows certain restriction and marks possible ways of gradual return to constructive relations with Russia. It is no coincidence that Alliance's officials constantly stress unwillingness to be involved in an arms race or come back to a Cold War, and emphasize commitment to international treaties and bilateral agreements with Russia and praise the value of restoration of partnership.

¹⁰⁰ 'Lithuania will host the 'Saber Strike' exercise', *Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier*, 1 June 2015, <<http://vpk-news.ru/news/25454>>.

¹⁰¹ Siil/Steadfast Javelin kicks off in Estonia, NATO official web-site, 4-15 May, 2015, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_119257.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

At the same time NATO member countries are free to take measures to support Ukraine on a bilateral basis. But so far these measures have been rather limited.

The Russian side constantly expresses its concern about NATO stepping up its military activities and perceives them as a challenge to Russian national security. Officially Moscow interprets NATO activity as another evidence of Alliance's aggressive intentions and plans to use Ukraine as the foothold against Russia.

The Russian Foreign Ministry assumes that 'an essence and tone of statements on the situation around Ukraine coupled with the announced plans of holding joint exercises by NATO member states and Ukraine on the territory of the latter' will inevitably lead 'to the aggravation of tension'¹⁰². The Secretary of the Russian Security Council N. Patrushev further details this prospect noting that escalating aggression 'on the part of the US and in relation to Russia' and accumulating offensive potential directly at the Russian borders create a threat not only for Russia but also for its allies¹⁰³.

In spite of the fact that in early April 2014 the Alliance took a collective decision to suspend 'all practical cooperation with Russia, military and civil, in the NATO Council, the Council of the Euroatlantic partnership and in the Partnership for Peace'¹⁰⁴, NATO leaders continued to count on interaction with Moscow on some crucial topics. One of them certainly was Afghanistan; as the NATO Secretary General noted, the projects of cooperation connected with Afghanistan had to be continued¹⁰⁵.

However Moscow apparently decided not to follow Brussels' lead and to participate only in the projects it is interested in. According

¹⁰² 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: the exercises of the NATO in Ukraine will lead to aggravation of tension', *TASS*, 5 Sep. 2014, <<http://tass.ru/politika/1423580>>.

¹⁰³ 'Ministry of Defence of Latvia: the NATO jets will carry out flights over the republic at a low altitude', *TASS*, 29 May 2015, <<http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2005416>>.

¹⁰⁴ 'Rasmussen looks forward to continue cooperation with Russian Federation on Afghanistan', *RIA NOVOSTI*, 1 Apr. 2014, <<http://ria.ru/world/20140401/1002141870.html>>.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

to the decree of the prime minister D. Medvedev from May 2015 the transit of military equipment and weaponry to Afghanistan through the territory of the Russian Federation was closed¹⁰⁶.

Meanwhile so far among Russian officials negative moods concerning prospects of renewal of cooperation with NATO prevail. As the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to NATO A. Grushko pointed out, from NATO side there was no desire to look for practical cooperation, and without it 'the political motivation for a dialogue will disappear'¹⁰⁷.

* * *

NATO continues to emphasize the possibility to reverse the undertaken political steps and military actions. It is not a coincidence that Alliance's official documents speak about cooperation and constructive relations with Russia and also stress 'that the partnership between NATO and Russia based on respect of international law would be of strategic value'. Besides, they contain assurances that 'the North Atlantic Treaty Organization does not seek confrontation and pose no threat to Russia'¹⁰⁸.

One cannot but agree with the opinion of the respected US politician and expert, senator Sam Nunn who believes that 'NATO must leave the door open to working with Russia on areas of shared vital interest ... It will take time to rebuild trust, but NATO should be clear that it will do its part'¹⁰⁹.

Such an approach is the most suitable for finding a solution to a present acute crisis in relations between Russia and NATO. There is no doubt that not only Moscow should do everything to carry out the existing arrangements on the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis and to

¹⁰⁶ Vladykin, O., 'The transit for the NATO is closed', *NVO*, No 18, 22-28 May 2015.

¹⁰⁷ Ministry of Defence of Latvia: the NATO jets...

¹⁰⁸ Wales Summit Declaration...

¹⁰⁹ Commentary: Nunn on the NATO Summit, Russia & Ukraine, 4 Sept. 2014, <<http://www.nti.org/analysis/opinions/former-senator-sam-nunns-perspective-nato-summit-russia-ukraine>>.

manage its neighbors' concerns about their security, but also Brussels should try to comprehend the essence and the nature of Moscow's concerns and make efforts to alleviate them instead of hiding behind a fence of formal bureaucratic decisions that do not seem to fit the reality.

It seems that the Russian side has to immediately raise the question of filling the NATO–Russia Founding Act with specific content concerning the deployment of combat troops. How many forces a party is allowed to additionally deploy? As NATO makes a commitment not to deploy permanent forces, what are the time frames limiting temporary placement of the forces?

In present dramatic situation it is extremely important that the political-expert community show restraint, not heat up tension, and promote ways of peaceful regulation of the conflict. That also applies to official representatives of Russia that has repeatedly declared its interest in the early settlement of the conflict.

In August 2014 the US-Russian 'Boysto' working group that consisted of most prominent Russian and American scholars and experts made a number of interesting relevant recommendations¹¹⁰. Most of them were eventually realized.

One should not ignore the fact that Ukraine is not only the Russia's geographical neighbor, but also the nation closest to Russia culturally and historically and Ukrainians are connected to Russians through numerous personal and family ties. As V. Putin rightly repeatedly noted, 'our common cultural values which make us one people' are certainly the cornerstone of the bilateral relations¹¹¹.

The possibility of return to cooperation may occur along the way to stabilization of situation in Ukraine and steady development of peace process. Of course, a return to the partnership existed between Moscow and Brussels before is hardly possible in the near future. Anyway there is no alternative to establishing constructive relations with NATO even after a serious crisis. More precisely, such an

¹¹⁰ 'The way to diplomatic settlement of the Ukrainian crisis', *Kommersant*, 26 Aug. 2014, <<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2553169>>.

¹¹¹ Conference 'Orthodox-Slavic values as the basis of the civilizational choice of the Ukraine', 27 July 2013, <<http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18961>>.

alternative consists in an arms race and return to the Cold War, and that is not in the long-term interests either of the West or Russia.

5. THE UKRAINIAN FACTOR IN THE US DEFENCE POLICY

Natalia BUBNOVA

At the start of his first presidential term in 2009, Barack Obama declared quite an ambitious foreign policy programme that called for a more equitable world order in which military force would play a much lesser role to non-military instruments and political settlement. A consolidated position developed in Washington at that time favoured cuts in defence spending. The new administration declared a 'reset' in relations with Russia and emphasised the importance of US–Russian cooperation in resolving global problems. Obama made nuclear disarmament cooperation with Russia one of his policy priorities. The reset policy in the military field brought concrete results in the form of the New Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (New START), signed in 2010, cooperation in Afghanistan and progress in resolving the situation with Iran's nuclear programme.

Beginning from 2009, the Democratic administration under Obama almost annually trimmed the defence budget and suspended arms development and procurement programmes. It embarked on this course partly out of general policy considerations described above and partly in response to the risk of financial crisis. At the same time, the Arab Spring – which failed to bring the democratic transformations and stabilisation in the Arab world that many Western analysts hoped for, – the growing strength of radical Islamist organisations and particularly the Islamic State, and then the Ukraine crisis, were all grist to the mill

of supporters of increased defence spending. It is only recently though, that the US defence budget has once again started to swell.

US weapons programmes and the Ukrainian crisis

The reset in Russian–American relations had come to a halt long before the start of the confrontation over Ukraine in February–March 2014. Growing foreign policy and military-political differences between the United States and Russia were to blame (including US missile defence plans and differences over the political path of several other post-Soviet countries). US domestic policy issues also played their part (Washington’s policy towards Moscow took shape under considerable pressure from Obama’s opponents among the Republicans). The start of the Ukraine crisis brought to a standstill practically all defence cooperation between the United States and Russia. Talks on a new strategic offensive arms reduction treaty were also taken off the agenda.

In a turnaround on Obama’s earlier declared nuclear disarmament objectives, the draft US budget for the 2016 financial year increases spending on nuclear arms and foresees the acceleration of several projects in this area. Overall, the United States will spend \$8.8 billion on its nuclear weapons programmes, which represents an increase of 10.5 per cent on approved spending for these purposes in the 2015 financial year. Moreover, the United States plans to continue increasing spending on the nuclear programme, as it modernises all three components of the strategic nuclear triad.

The influence of the Ukraine crisis on the US nuclear policy and on increases and decreases to budget spending in the nuclear field is not at all so evident, but it shows up clearly in other areas. The clearest example in this respect is the Ukraine crisis’ impact on US policy in Europe and on the policy course taken by NATO, where discussion on the ‘security threats’ posed by Russia has intensified. At the Wales Summit on 4–5 September 2014, the NATO members decided to bolster the organisation’s military capability in Europe. This includes increasing the size of the NATO Response Force (NRF), made up of

ground troops, air force, navy and special operations units, from 13,000 to 30,000 people¹¹². The idea is that in the event of possible military activities, the joint troops making up the NRF could be brought together in full complement and deployed at the theatre of operations within a matter of weeks. In order to facilitate the NRF's rapid deployment and prompt response to new challenges arising, the NATO members – though without much US involvement – are establishing a new corps, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF, also called Spearhead Force), with around 5,000 military personnel and a permanent headquarters in western Poland. Poland, Romania and the Baltic states are developing new military centres, where NATO forces are stationed on a rotation basis. These centres could eventually become permanent military bases. The US secretary of defense and the British defence minister have made announcements about the need for a permanent US military presence in Eastern Europe.

NATO has conducted military exercises, with the participation of ships and aircraft, in the Baltic states, western Ukraine, Poland, and in the waters of the Black and Baltic seas. US units in Eastern Europe have been receiving tanks, armoured personnel carriers and self-propelled howitzers. US B-2 and B-52 strategic bombers were deployed to Europe in 2014 and 2015. The planes patrolling over Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have tripled in number, and US warships have made more than 15 entries into the Baltic and Black seas. Plans are under examination to deploy multipurpose fifth generation F-22 fighter planes in Europe. Georgia holds joint exercises with NATO on its territory in the summer of 2015. An upsurge in attention to the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions following the Ukraine crisis has also led to the emergence of a defence cooperation programme between the United States and Romania intended to strengthen this country's airspace monitoring capabilities and modernise its air force, and the rotation-basis deployment of US marines at the Mihail Kogalniceanu military base not far from the Black Sea port of Constanta. Additionally, starting in September 2015, 150 US marines and three

¹¹² The NATO Response Force could subsequently be increased to 40,000 people.

Osprey tiltrotor aircraft are to be deployed on NATO ships in the Mediterranean.

In 2013, the US planned to withdraw the last of its F-15C fighter squadrons based in Britain, and retrieved the last of its tank brigades in Europe, but the start of the Ukraine crisis changed these plans. US tanks, albeit fewer in number, have been returning to Europe¹¹³. Discussions have resumed on the possibility of deploying elements of the European missile defence system in the Czech Republic and Poland, and work stepped up on developing operational components of the system in Turkey (mobile radar stations) and Romania (ground-based launchers for interceptor missiles)¹¹⁴.

Over recent years, the US Prompt Global Strike (PGS) concept has been shifting the main focus from the nuclear deterrent to precision-guided conventional long-range strategic weapons: new cruise missiles, hypersonic boost-glide systems, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) armed with conventional warheads able to destroy enemy command centres, strategic weapons and infrastructure sites¹¹⁵. Officially, the PGS systems are intended for striking terrorist targets, yet experts do not rule out the possibility of the existence of scenarios for their use against Russia and China. The biggest funding allocations for the PGS programme were in 2010–2011, however, and with real

¹¹³ It is worth noting in this connection that of the three main branches of the US armed forces, only spending on the ground forces is set to grow in 2016 financial year, exceeding by an estimated \$7 billion the figure for 2015 (up to a total of \$126.5 billion).

¹¹⁴ For an account of the missile defence issue, see Arbatov, A., Dvorkin, V., Bubnova, N. (eds), *Ballistic Missile Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation* (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2013); and also Acton, J., *Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013).

¹¹⁵ Arbatov, A., 'Non-Strategic Weapons' in Arbatov, A., Dvorkin, V., Bubnova, N. (eds), *Nuclear Reset: Arms Reduction and Nonproliferation* (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2012).

spending 5–7 times less than what was originally planned, budget cuts could lead to postponement of the new systems' commissioning¹¹⁶.

As the Ukrainian crisis unfolded, Western sanctions were imposed in several stages on Russia, starting in March 2014. The sanctions targeted individual Russian state officials and also leading Russian companies of the military-industrial complex and other key economic sectors. Space cooperation was unaffected by the sanctions at first, but consultations with Russia on missile defence and space cooperation were suspended on 3 April 2014, with the exception of matters concerning the International Space Station. US officials decided to develop a new rocket of their own by 2023 which is to will replace the currently used RD-180 engines produced by Russia's Energia Corporation, with which the contract expires in 2018. This rocket, the Volcano, will be equipped with multi-use large engines that make it possible to put military and intelligence satellites into orbit.

There is no denying in the United States of Russia's growing impact on its foreign and military policy. Barack Obama admitted that 'Russia obviously has an extraordinarily powerful military'¹¹⁷, and the 'Aviation Week and Space Technology' magazine named Vladimir Putin 'Person of the Year' for his 'notorious impact' on defence, space programmes, civil aviation and the aerospace sector¹¹⁸. Following a US Congress decision of 2013, the US Department of Defense is to report every year until 2017 to the relevant Congress committees on Russia's military capabilities. These reports are to cover 16 areas, from development of cyber-weapons to strategic systems. The few remaining areas of Russian-American cooperation include combating terrorism and cyber threats (although there is little visible progress in these areas), and joint work on resolving the situation with Iran's nuclear

¹¹⁶ Even if the new flight tests planned for 2017–2020 are successful, these new systems would not be ready before 2025 at the earliest.

¹¹⁷ Koring, P., 'Obama weighs sending weapons to Ukraine as divide over Russia deepens', *The Globe and Mail*, 9 Feb. 2015, <<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/obama-weighs-sending-weapons-to-ukraine-as-divide-over-russia-deepens/article22886681/>>.

¹¹⁸ *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 15 Jan.-1 Feb. 2015.

programme, with the involved parties managing to reach a common agreement in 2015.

The East Asia pivot that Barack Obama declared in 2011 was aimed to counter threats to US interests in the Asia-Pacific region, with China on the rise, but as US political circles have shifted their attention to the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, the Asian pivot in some aspects has been overshadowed by policy priorities related to Europe and the Arab world¹¹⁹. Although the United States has continued its course of building up US naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region, experts doubt that it will manage to increase the number of its navy in the region from 97 to 120 ships by 2020, as was originally planned.

Changes to the US and NATO strategies

Official statements from the US Department of Defense indicate that the Ukraine crisis is not on the list of the agency's priority issues, yet the US National Security Strategy, approved in February 2015, mentions Russia 17 times, including in the context of 'Russian aggression,' 'Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty,' 'Russian pressure on neighbouring countries' and use of energy deliveries as an 'energy weapon'.

The United States developed its military and political position on the Ukraine crisis and on Moscow's role in related events in close coordination with its NATO allies. At the NATO summit in Wales, for the first time since the Cold War ended, Russia was officially recognised as a threat to NATO and a 'threat to Euro-Atlantic security.' The NATO summit in Antalya on 13–14 May 2015 named two main challenges as creating 'an arc of instability' for NATO: to the east, it faces 'a more assertive Russia, responsible for aggressive actions in

¹¹⁹ Bubnova, N., 'Russian factor in Barack Obama's military-political strategy', *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, No 6, 2015.

Ukraine,’ and to the south – ‘turmoil, violence spreading across the Middle East and North Africa’¹²⁰.

Speaking in June 2015, US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter called for a ‘two-pronged approach’ to Russia, somewhat reminiscent of the ‘cooperation and competition’ formula advanced by Zbigniew Brzezinski with regard to the Soviet Union in the years of the Cold War in mid-1970s. In Carter’s view, the United States should work with Russia in some areas, such as nuclear talks with Iran, combating terrorists from the Islamic State and achieving peaceful political transformation in Syria, but efforts should be made at the same time to restrain and counter Russia’s ‘aggression’ by defending US allies and the rule-based world order, and standing up ‘to Russia’s actions and their attempts to re-establish a Soviet-era sphere of influence’¹²¹.

The Wales summit shifted the main emphasis in NATO’s deterrent strategy to its eastern flank – the Eastern European countries’ borders with Russia. Speaking at a security forum in Aspen in July 2014, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey said, ‘We’re looking inside our own readiness models to look at things that we haven’t had to look at for 20 years, frankly, about basing and lines of communication and sea lanes’¹²². NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe Philip Breedlove noted that the main problem creating a new security risk for the NATO countries is that of ‘hybrid war’, which, in his words, covers diplomacy, information, military and economy (DIME). As the experts see it, measures to counter a hybrid war could include deploying special units to beef up local security forces, bringing down to two days the time it would take to deploy Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, establishing components of a

¹²⁰ From the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s opening remarks quoted in Erimtan, C., ‘Spelling out Zbig’s legacy on Turkish Riviera: NATO’s Antalya summit’, *RT*, 15 May 2015, <<http://on.rt.com/97e8ol/>>.

¹²¹ ‘Carter: NATO Must Stand Together against Russia Aggression’, *Associated Press*, 17 June 2015, *Military.com*, <<http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/06/22/carter-nato-must-stand-together-against-russia-aggression.html>>.

¹²² Kitfield, J., ‘How to Prevent War with Russia?’, *Politico Magazine*, 31 July 2014, <<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/how-to-prevent-war-with-russia-109596.html>>.

command centre network in the Baltic states, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, developing infrastructure that would make it possible to bring in reinforcement forces in the quickest possible time and preventing the destructive consequences of cyber operations.

NATO's nuclear strategy, according to official statements, will also be undergoing changes. Before the Ukraine crisis, Obama expressed satisfaction with security provisions in Europe based on NATO and US nuclear guarantees (the so-called 'nuclear umbrella'). But now, however, Western experts are discussing whether the time has come to strengthen NATO's nuclear dimension and put more emphasis on the nuclear deterrence strategy¹²³. In February 2015, NATO defence ministers held a nuclear planning meeting to discuss 'potential nuclear threats from Russia'. The need for this meeting was explained by increasingly frequent flights by Russian military aircraft over the Baltic and the northern coasts of countries in Western and Eastern Europe. NATO stepped up its 'joint nuclear missions' in Western Europe, with US strategic bombers taking part. The NATO member countries use these missions to run through coordination of joint nuclear planning and capabilities for using nuclear weapons. Many members of the Western expert community oppose deployment of any new American nuclear weapons in Europe however, fearing that if the US missiles or aircraft capable of carrying not just conventional but also nuclear weapons were deployed, for instance, in Poland, Russia would see this as an act of provocation and the respective countries would become targets for the Iskander missiles deployed on Russian territory.

Statements by President Obama and other representatives of the US administration and NATO commanders make it clear that the red line is non-violation of NATO countries' borders. General Breedlove stressed that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, under which armed forces are to be sent in in the event of aggression against a member country, would also apply to possible penetration of a member

¹²³ See the discussion in the issues of *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, February-March 2015 and April-May 2015.

country's borders by scattered armed forces¹²⁴. Article 5 stipulates mutual assistance from the other member countries if one member country is attacked, and many American politicians and analysts are inclined to see this article as the grounds for deciding what role the United States could play in the Ukraine conflict. They therefore ask why the United States should help a country with which it has no treaty obligations. Along these lines, President Obama stated that US armed forces' actions in Ukraine are limited, in particular, by the fact that Ukraine is not a NATO member¹²⁵.

Western experts believe however, that the measures taken have made only small adjustments 'to the existing US strategy' with its 'underlying trend ... to a lighter and more geographically dispersed posture around the European periphery'¹²⁶. US policy regarding the events in Ukraine has been for the most part one of response rather than initiative, following the circumstances as events unfold in eastern Ukraine.

Military assistance to Kiev

During more than a year-and-a-half since the Maidan events in Kiev, the United States supplied the Ukrainian army military equipment worth over one hundred million dollars, but did not yield to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's repeated requests for weapons supplies. Neither did Ukraine obtain the status of 'major ally outside NATO' (this status is held by countries such as Israel, Japan, South Korea and Australia). US representatives repeatedly stressed in their official statements that the US government is interested in a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Ukraine and that there can be no military

¹²⁴ 'Die Nato muss auf grüne Männchen vorbereitet sein', *Die Welt*, 17 Aug. 2014, <<http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article131296429/Die-Nato-muss-auf-gruene-Maennchen-vorbereitet-sein.html>>.

¹²⁵ Pres. Obama on Fareed Zakaria GPS, *CNN*, 1 Feb. 2015, <<http://cnnpressroom.blogspot.com/2015/02/01/pres-obama-on-fareed-zakaria-gps-cnn-exclusive>>.

¹²⁶ Simon, L., 'Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, April-May 2015.

solution to the problem. During his visit to Sochi in May 2015, US Secretary of State John Kerry warned President Poroshenko against undertaking military action, in particular, fresh attempts to take the Donetsk Airport by force. However, every upsurge in activity from the forces of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics stirred up more debate in the United States on potentially revising Washington's position on sending lethal weapons to Ukraine. This was the case in August 2014, and, particularly, after the separatist offensive in January 2015.

Among the lethal weapons systems discussed for possible supply to Ukraine were Humvee armoured vehicles, Javelin light anti-tank missiles and drones. According to information contained in Ukrainian documents posted online in November 2014 by the hacker group CyberBerkut, Poroshenko's government also asked the United States to provide 400 sniper rifles, 2,000 assault rifles, 720 hand grenades, some 200 mortars and more than 70,000 shells for them, 150 portable Stinger surface-to-air missiles and 420 anti-tank missiles¹²⁷. Certain American experts have additionally called for supplying 'strategic air defence systems' to Ukraine. Some in Washington have also voiced the opinion that Moscow fears that US cruise missiles might be deployed in Ukraine¹²⁸.

The United States began delivering Humvee armoured vehicles in March 2015 (the first batch included 30 vehicles) and also 200 regular off-road vehicles. In the above-mentioned debates on whether or not to provide US weapons to Ukraine, Humvees came under the category of 'lethal weapons,' but neither American nor Russian officials seemed keen to politicise the situation and did not make any statements qualifying their shipment as having crossed the 'lethal threshold'. The Humvee armoured vehicles did not carry arms, though

¹²⁷ According to the information published at <<http://kiberberkut.ru/>>.

¹²⁸ Parry, R., 'Nuclear War and Clashing Ukraine Narratives', *Consortium News*, 6 Feb. 2015, <<https://consortiumnews.com/2015/02/06/nuclear-war-and-clashing-ukraine-narratives/>>.

they came equipped with a turret, which can be used to mount lethal weapons systems¹²⁹.

The United States is also supplying Ukraine various non-lethal systems, equipment and material such as radar systems for detecting mortars, surveillance equipment for coast guard vessels, robotic systems for deactivation of explosives, armoured vests, helmets, night vision instruments, thermal vision systems, communications systems including radio sets, engineering equipment and computers for the National Defence University of Ukraine.

In the spring of 2015, the British and Lithuanian instructors already working in Ukraine were joined by a battalion of US marines (from 300 to 600 people, according to various estimates), who arrived in Lviv to train three battalions of the Ukrainian National Guard. American troops are also to train Ukrainian armed forces and border guards units over the course of 2015. The Executive Director of the Ron Paul Institute Daniel McAdams noted that this kind of activity runs counter to point 9 of the Minsk Agreements, which calls for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Ukrainian soil. McAdams additionally emphasised that this requirement should apply not only to the 600 marines, but also to CIA and special forces units reported to be assisting the Kiev government¹³⁰.

The US dilemma over arms supplies to Ukraine

NATO members are divided over the issue of whether to provide weapons to Ukraine. Britain, Poland, Croatia and the Baltic countries support the idea, but Germany, France, Greece, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic firmly oppose it. Speaking on 2 February 2015, President Obama said that the US objective in Ukraine should be 'peaceful de-escalation.' Critics of the current US administration

¹²⁹ Some media reports suggested that Ukrainian troops are equipping the Humvees they receive with grenade launchers and high precision weapons which, however, raises the issue of adaptability.

¹³⁰ 'McAdams: the arrival of US marines to Lviv will violate the Minsk agreements', *RIA Novosti*, 13 Feb. 2015.

accuse Obama of indecision and procrastination over arms supplies to Ukraine. Media reports on a number of occasions suggested that Obama had already made up his mind or was inclined to make a decision in favour of arms supplies, but these reports were no more than incorrect interpretations of Obama's statements¹³¹.

According to the American Pew public opinion research centre, 53% of Americans oppose providing lethal weapons to Ukraine¹³². In his wait-and-see policy on the issue, Obama was following not just his own moderate views but for a long time was going on the support of this majority and also part of the US expert community and, to some degree, the positions of France and Germany, key US allies in Western Europe.

On the opposing side, the supporters of arming Ukraine unsurprisingly have included prominent members of the US military-industrial complex: Ashton Carter, who was appointed defense secretary in February 2015, his predecessor in this post Chuck Hagel, General Philip Breedlove, the Defense Intelligence Agency Director Vincent Stewart and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey.

Supporters of arming Ukraine dominate not just in the US armed forces, as was usually the case in the past with regard to military programmes, but also in government bodies responsible for shaping US

¹³¹ During a joint news conference with Angela Merkel on 9 February 2015, Barack Obama said: 'The criterion I will use in making this decision [on supplies of lethal arms to Ukraine] is whether it is likely to be effective or not. This is what we will reflect on'. Some media outlets translated this as follows: 'The position I take with regard to this issue is that [arms supplies] are more likely to be effective than not'. See: Remarks by President Obama and Chancellor Merkel in Joint Press Conference, 9 Feb. 2015, <<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/09/remarks-president-obama-and-chancellor-merkel-joint-press-conference>>; 'Obama: weapons supplies to Ukraine are more likely to be more effective than not', *RIA Novosti*, 2 Feb. 2015.

¹³² Over the first year since the conflict in eastern Ukraine began the number of those in the United States opposing arms supplies to Kiev dropped by 9%, but the majority of Americans while opposing Putin's policies in general (and Obama's rating goes up every time he makes strong statements in Russia's address) are still not prepared to pay for arming Ukraine out of their own pockets.

foreign policy. They include Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry (the latter also said, however, that neither Europe nor the United States wanted conflict with Russia, and that the latter was ready to act as guarantor of peace in southeast Ukraine¹³³).

The upcoming presidential election is also influencing the situation. Hillary Clinton, who has announced she will run for the White House and has Obama's support, has spoken in favour of sending weapons to Ukraine. Several American experts have suggested that some prominent members of the Democratic Party have abstained from publicly objecting to arming Ukraine in order to distance themselves from Obama and be able to bid for posts in the next administration if Hillary Clinton wins the election.

Neither can Obama disregard the mood in the Congress, the support of which is crucial for going ahead with his key projects, including health reform, the trans-border oil pipeline from the United States to Canada, the settlement with Iran and the clean power plan. Republicans in the Congress (where they now control the Senate and the House of Representatives) actively support arms supplies for Ukraine, with a few exceptions, such as Rand Paul, senator from Kentucky who is campaigning to run for the Republicans in the presidential race (in the summer of 2014, he actually once mentioned the possibility of supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine, but has since refrained from speaking on the issue and positions himself as an opponent of an increased US military involvement). Republican leaders in the campaign to arm Ukraine include the chairmen of both the Senate's and the House of Representatives' Armed Services Committees, respectively John McCain and Mac Thornberry, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, influential senator for South Carolina Lindsey Graham and senator from Texas Ted Cruz, who is also campaigning to run for president for the Republicans.

This issue, however, is not the standard Republicans vs. Democrats confrontation, as there is quite a broad sentiment in favour of arming Ukraine on both sides of the US political divide. There was

¹³³ 'Putin, Merkel and Hollande will discuss at the Kremlin urgent resolution of the situation in Ukraine', *TASS*, 9 Feb. 2015.

support from both Republicans and Democrats for the anti-Russian bills and resolutions on Ukraine passed in 2014–2015, including the Russian Aggression Prevention Act (May 2014), the Menendez–Corker bill coined the Ukrainian Freedom Support Act (September 2014, signed by Obama in December 2014) and the Congress Resolution 758 (December 2014). These acts propose giving Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova the status of major allies outside NATO, providing military assistance to Ukraine, exchanging intelligence data with Ukraine, and expanding military training for armed forces of countries that are not NATO members. The resolutions passed by Congress also imply suspending of the withdrawal of US forces from Europe, activating the work on NATO, expanding military support for Poland and the Baltic states and speeding up the deployment of the missile defence system in Europe. But the main refrain that has sounded in Congress's legislative initiatives since autumn 2014 is the call to supply lethal arms to Kiev. The bills passed in May 2015 by the armed services committees of both the House of Representatives and Senate foresaw the allocation of \$300 million on military assistance to Ukraine including weapons (earlier much larger sums, up to two or even \$3 billion, had been under discussion). There have also been voices raised in favour of a possible resolution that would make it mandatory for the White House to actually take the decision to supply arms to Ukraine.

Many members of the American expert community have also expressed support for arming Ukraine. The Brookings Institute, which holds the number one spot in the authoritative global think tank ranking compiled by the University of Pennsylvania¹³⁴ and usually takes an independent and liberal line, together with two other influential US think tanks, the Atlantic Council and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, issued a report calling for immediate supplies of \$1 billion worth of arms to Ukraine in 2015, followed by further installments of

¹³⁴ For the 2014 global think tank ranking, see 'The Global Go To Think Tank Report', *University of Pennsylvania Almanac. Journal of record, opinion and news*, 27 Jan. 2015, Volume 61, No 20, <<http://www.upenn.edu/almanac/volumes/v61/n20/think-tanks.html>>.

\$1 billion each in 2016 and 2017¹³⁵. Among those who signed this joint report were several prominent Democratic Party members, including former Deputy Secretary of Defense Michelle Flournoy, who is seen as a likely candidate for the post of secretary of defense if Hillary Clinton wins the presidential election, former US Permanent Representative to NATO Ivo Daalder, and former US Ambassador in Ukraine Steven Peifer who is currently the director of the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative. It is no surprise to find that Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the leading ideologues of US foreign policy, former national security adviser to President Carter and consultant to Obama, has also spoken up in favour of providing weapons to Ukraine.

The American opponents of a tougher line on the Ukraine conflict include for the most part scholars, academics and journalists. Not everyone at the Brookings Institute shares the view presented in the above-mentioned joint report. In material published in his blog,¹³⁶ Jeremy Shapiro, one of the Institute's scholars, criticised the report's positions, though among its authors was his boss, Director of the Brookings Institute Strobe Talbott.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which ranks second on Pennsylvania University's list of the world's leading think tanks, published a report setting about arguments against supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine. Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago John Mearsheimer, Professor at New York University and author of many best-selling books on Soviet history Stephen Cohen, Vice President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Andrew Weiss, Director of the Carnegie Endowment's Russia and Eurasia Programme Eugene Rumer, Director of the Arneson Institute for Practical Politics Sean Kay and Professor of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government Martin Walt have all published articles in magazines and media criticising arms supplies to Ukraine.

¹³⁵ *Preserving Ukraine's Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do*, Atlantic Council, Brookings, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, February 2015, pp. 1, 4.

¹³⁶ Shapiro, J., 'Why Arming the Ukrainians is a Bad Idea', 3 Feb. 2015, <<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/02/03-why-arming-ukrainians-is-a-bad-idea-shapiro>>.

Many White House and Congress veterans are also critical about the wisdom of sending weapons to Ukraine, probably as a result of their extensive international experience and knowledge gained during the Cold War years. They include former US Secretary of State James Baker, former US Ambassador to Russia Jack Matlock, former Senator Sam Nunn and Thomas Graham, managing director at Kissinger Associates, who was senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during George W. Bush's administration. Speaking at a Congress hearing, Henry Kissinger said, 'I am uneasy about beginning a process of military engagement without knowing where it will lead us and what we will do to sustain it'¹³⁷.

Advocates of a more active American role in the Ukraine conflict, in particular, arms supplies to the troops under Kiev's control, call Russia's actions the 'the gravest security threat to the transatlantic community and Eurasia since the end of the Cold War'¹³⁸. They maintain that Russia has violated the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act on non-violability of European borders and the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in accordance with which Russia, the United States and Great Britain undertook to guarantee Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time though, the demand that Crimea be returned to Ukraine has gradually dropped from the list of demands put forward by Russia's American critics, giving way instead to demands to 'end Russian aggression' in eastern Ukraine. The main arguments supporters of arming Ukraine advance are the following:

- The Ukrainian army must receive new arms in order to be able to respond to the Russian forces in such a way as to convince Russia that it would not make sense to engage in further military activities.
- If the conflict ends in defeat for Poroshenko's government, this would drastically undermine whatever stability remains in Ukraine

¹³⁷ 'Henry Kissinger, Mikhail Gorbachev separately warn about Ukraine crisis blowing out of control', *National Post*, 30 Jan. 2015, <<http://news.nationalpost.com/2015/01/30/henry-kissinger-mikhail-gorbachev-separately-warn-about-ukraine-crisis-blowing-out-of-control/>>.

¹³⁸ *Preserving Ukraine's Independence...*, p. 4.

and could encourage Russia to follow the same tactic in other former Soviet republics.

- The Russian government should be sent a clear message that Western states will hold to their principles and support other countries' democratic choice, the right to self-determination, territorial integrity and independence.

Some of those who favour supplying American arms to Ukraine make a distinction between 'lethal defensive arms' and 'lethal offensive arms', but many experts see no real difference between these two categories. Yet a certain part of the proponents of shipping weapons to Kiev maintain that this help should not extend to 'lethal offensive arms'. Others insist that what Ukraine needs are not 'defensive lethal arms', which would 'lead Putin to double-down to achieve his goals as quickly as possible, before the weapons are fully integrated into the Ukrainian military'. They maintain that 'changing the equation would require heavier anti-tank weapons, air defence systems, and possibly tanks and armoured vehicles from former Warsaw Pact states such as Poland'¹³⁹. Yet both the former and the latter agree that military assistance for Ukraine should come not just from the United States, but also from its NATO allies, including the organisation's new members, who have at their disposal weapons and equipment remaining from the Soviet period which are compatible with Ukrainian arms.

All supporters of providing arms to Ukraine set the condition, however, that weapons should be supplied only to troops under the control of the government in Kiev (this includes the National Guard), and must not end up in the hands of private armed groups and independent military detachments, get seized by the separatist forces or find themselves on the black market.

At the same time, over the period of more than a year and a half from the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, the debate on American arms supplies has also brought to light a large number of people opposed to anything that might escalate the conflict. Many American

¹³⁹ Gorenburg, D., 'West Must Either Commit to Ukraine or Back Off', *CAN Corporation official site*, 11 Feb. 2015, <<http://www.cna.org/news/commentary/2015-2-11-west-must-either-commit-ukraine-or-back>>.

experts disagree with Russia's annexation of Crimea and Russia's support for the separatists in eastern Ukraine, but they also point out that one cannot place all the blame on Russia for the chaos in Ukraine and that Russia's policy rather than being calculatedly aggressive, is motivated by fears. They say that Western attempts to tear Ukraine from Russia's embrace and draw it into NATO have been counterproductive in their effect on Western countries' relations with Russia and have spread division in Ukraine. Their arguments against supplying arms to Kiev can be summed up as follows:

- Supplying arms to Ukraine would spread the conflict further, prod Russia into a counter response and set off an action-reaction cycle that would escalate the violence with an eventual possibility of a full-scale war.

- Ukrainian forces would hardly be able to make effective use of the US weapons. Ukraine's senior armed forces commandment is 'catastrophic' and 'hopeless',¹⁴⁰ corruption is rampant in the armed forces, training is at a very low level, and neither the soldiers nor the officers have the desire to fight.

- A policy of militarisation of Ukraine would drive a wedge between the United States and its NATO allies that oppose weapons supplies to Ukraine. The respective European countries might drop their support for the United States, preferring to let Washington take alone the risks and cover all the costs.

It is worth noting that neither advocates nor opponents of weapons supplies to Ukraine raise the possibility of using American military power against Russia itself. Even as the confrontation between Russia and the West kept heating up, NATO representatives repeated that the organisation would not enter into armed conflict with Russia. Some NATO members, particularly the new ones (Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) and also Canada, have called for complete renunciation of the NATO–Russia Founding Act, but NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has stated that the organisation has no plans to break out of this agreement, and that any action the Alliance

¹⁴⁰ 'The Ukraine Crisis: Risks of Renewed Military Conflict after Minsk II', *Europe Briefing N 73*, International Crisis Group, 1 Apr. 2015.

takes to strengthen collective defence will be in full compliance with the Founding Act's provisions¹⁴¹.

* * *

The build-up of American arms in some areas is taking place at the same time as the United States decreases its overall arms volumes, re-profiles them to counter new threats, and carries out some moderate modernisation. New systems are being developed, however, in the areas of strategic nuclear arms, strategic conventional precision-guided weapons and space weapons. The US military presence in Europe is also on the increase. American heavy weapons are returning to Eastern Europe for the first time since the Cold War.

NATO has obviously gained a second wind by reviving its original mission of deterring Russia as its *raison d'être*. The principle that the Alliance had followed until the start of the Ukraine crisis, under which NATO refrained from stationing on a permanent basis large troop contingents in the organisation's new member states, will in all probability be revised. The Ukrainian and Georgian involvement in NATO activities is also growing.

The United States has so far consistently rejected the possibility of armed intervention in the Ukraine conflict, but provides military assistance to Ukraine through supplies of non-lethal systems and training for Ukrainian forces, and is helping Russia's East European neighbours to bolster their defence capabilities. At the same time, US politicians maintain that they do not want to see either the United States or European countries get drawn into an armed conflict. As the Russian President Vladimir Putin has said in a televised interview, 'No one needs a conflict, all the more an armed conflict, on Europe's periphery'¹⁴².

¹⁴¹ Quoted by *RIA Novosti*, 1 Sep. 2014.

¹⁴² 'Putin: No one needs a conflict on the periphery of Europe', *Gazeta.ru*, 24 Feb. 2015, <http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/video/2015/02/24/putin__nikomu_ne_nuzhen_konflikt_na_periferii_evropy.shtml>.

Barack Obama's wait-and-see position probably explains above all that the decision on supplies of lethal arms to Ukraine has not been forthcoming for more than a year and a half. But the possibility of such a decision remains, especially given that it has the support of a large part of the US political establishment and that American instructors have been training Ukrainian military service personnel since April 2015. Opposition to arms supplies for Ukraine, aside from Obama himself, comes from a certain part of the US expert community and from a slight majority of the American public. This is a very fragile balance that could be easily shaken if any of its components slips out of place. The demand that Russia return Crimea to Ukraine has gradually dropped from the list of prerequisites the United States places on Russia. Yet real progress in finding a settlement to the Ukraine crisis would require the United States to unambiguously reject the possibility of arms supplies to Ukraine, a clear course of pursuing settlement through diplomatic, not military, means, and compliance with the Minsk II agreements, with guarantees for Ukraine's territorial integrity (leaving Crimea aside) and also for its non-aligned status.

Russia, mostly as a result of the Ukraine crisis, has become an increasingly important factor in Washington's foreign and defence policy, but is seen these days as a problem, rather than as a partner and potential ally. The most promising path towards overcoming the confrontation would be for the United States to develop a strategic approach that takes into account the interests and positions of both sides to the conflict in Ukraine – western and eastern Ukrainians alike, – and also with consideration taken of the importance for the international community of having Russia's participation in tackling major issues on the global agenda, such as combating terrorism, overcoming extremism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ensuring cyber and information security. The importance of issues such as these will not fade, but on the contrary will increase in the future, and for many years after the Ukrainian crisis has finally been settled.

6. STRATEGIC RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS

Vasily MIKHEEV, Sergey LUKONIN

The relations between Russia and China constitute the major vector of Moscow's new 'turn to the East' policy. The situation is complicated by the fact that the shift on Russia's part occurs at the time of strategic changes in China where the country's new leadership headed by Xi Jinping is aimed at a new breakthrough in reforms and foreign policy.

This complexity makes it necessary to analyze the extent to which the Russian new initiatives can be adjusted to the changes in the Chinese foreign policy towards Russia.

The new role of China's foreign policy

In recent years China's foreign policy has been transforming into one of the major factors of the national economic growth.

Internal growth factors allow China to solve a strategically important unemployment problem and maintain economic growth at 7.4% (in 2014) but do not provide breakthrough solutions. Exports amid the current, relatively sluggish global demand no longer plays its role in ensuring high growth rates.

In these circumstances, China tries to compensate for the low growth rates with capital export.

The mega-strategies of Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in Eurasia, South East and South Asia, as well as entry into distant investment markets of Africa and Latin America require foreign policy innovations to establish favorable conditions for the expansion of the Chinese capital.

By the early 2015, China finalized its new foreign policy. The previous goal of creating conducive external conditions for economic reforms was replaced by new ones related to ‘increasing China’s role in solving global problems up to the US level’ and ‘using active foreign policy’ as a factor of economic development¹⁴³.

According to Chinese experts, the following factors will back up the new policy:

- *The build-up of China’s military power.* Among the latest developments in this respect, China has tested multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) ICBM Dunfen-41 with a range of 15 thousand km¹⁴⁴.

- *‘Investment attack’ on emerging markets.* Xi Jinping’s visits in less developed countries are as a rule accompanied by technological assistance and large investments into development of railroad and automobile infrastructure as well as some other infrastructure projects.

- *Securing regional ‘zones of China’s new influence’.* The primary issue in question here is the South China Sea problem: Xi Jinping’s message that ‘Asian problems should be solved by Asians’ was reinforced by a sharp reaction to the US proposals for solving the conflict in the South China Sea with American engagement.

- *The development of ‘new type’ of relations with the United States.*

Some aspects of Sino–US relations at this point require further explanation. The first year of implementing ‘Xi’s foreign policy doctrine’ has revealed the following new elements in interaction with the United States.

¹⁴³ See: Mikheev, V., Shvydko, V., Lukonin, S., China-Russia: when emotions are appropriate? *Mirovaya ekonomika i mejdunarodnye otnosheniya*, No 2, 2015, pp. 5-13.

¹⁴⁴ <<http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-12/5260996.html>>, 19 Dec. 2014.

The first is the *increased level of intergovernmental relations between China and the US*. The first state visit of Xi Jinping to the US was announced in February 2015 to be held in September 2015. At the same time, in March 2015, Chinese premier Li Keqiang announced the final phase of the Sino–US negotiations on the bilateral investment agreement which would even – except for specified exemptions of strategically important industries – investment conditions in China and the United States. In essence, this is a step towards potential Chinese accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), or if it fails, to a new US–China economic bloc.

In February, the landmark 9th round of China–US dialogue on strategic nuclear stability took place in a ‘track 1.5’ format¹⁴⁵. Against the background discussions on ‘whether Russia will stay a negotiating partner on the nuclear issues in the context of the Ukrainian crisis,’ the Chinese and American experts identified a desire to gradually bring the bilateral nuclear dialogue up to the official intergovernmental level. They decided against creating an analogue of the US–Soviet Cold War agreements on nuclear deterrence or focusing the number of missiles and warheads, but rather to develop confidence-building measures in the nuclear field and mechanisms of bilateral notification of military activities and prevention of WMD incidents.

However China would like to enter the formal nuclear talks with Washington from a stronger position by reducing the military gap. In order to modernize its military, particularly nuclear, missile and space, capabilities China has been increasing its military spending at a higher rate than the GDP growth (for example, in 2014 military expenditures increased by 12% compared to 2013, and in 2015 by 10,1% compared to 2014)¹⁴⁶.

Second, Beijing is planning to move to *move to a new, active phase of the Silk Road strategy*. In February–March 2015 China starts

¹⁴⁵ ‘Track 1.5’ is a formal event where high-ranking officials among others express a private opinion. See Voda, K.R., The development of Sino-US nuclear dialogue at an informal level, 3 Apr. 2015, <http://www.imemo.ru/index.php?page_id=502&id=1599&ret=640>.

¹⁴⁶ According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics (<http://www.stats.gov.cn/>) and IA Xinhua (<http://www.xinhuanet.com/>).

financing the first projects of the Silk Road in Kazakhstan and Pakistan from the Silk Road fund of \$40 billion. The founders of the fund are the Central Bank of China, Chinese sovereign fund, and two so called ‘economic policy banks’ handling public investments.

Another China’s success is that, despite the opposition of the US and Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, South Korea and other countries agreed to become founders of another Chinese financial innovation – the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the prospective credit resources of \$800 billion.

Third, China is betting *on increased use of ‘soft and smart power’*. In January 2015, the CPC Central Committee and State Council adopted a special decision on the establishment of 50–100 new Chinese world-class think tanks with budgets comparable to those of the US leading think tanks¹⁴⁷.

Another important element of the new strategy is the desire to *enhance China’s historic role* by adjusting the traditional interpretation of World War II.

China is developing its own program of celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. In this context, the Chinese propaganda distinguishes between the ‘two wars’ and ‘two wins’. One is the war against fascism, the other is the anti-Japanese war in which ‘China contributed the most to the victory’, which according to the Chinese ‘contributed to the victory over fascism’. The Chinese propaganda purposefully gives increased attention to the narrative that ‘China was a major front in the East’ which however ‘has not yet got a proper international recognition’.

¹⁴⁷ CCP General Office and State Council General Office Opinions concerning Strengthening the Construction of New Types of Think Tanks with Chinese Characteristics, 20 Jan. 2015, <<https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2015/01/20/ccp-general-office-and-state-council-general-office-opinions-concerning-strengthening-the-construction-of-new-types-of-think-tanks-with-chinese-characteristics/>>.

The Ukrainian factor

With regard to the situation in Ukraine which today to a large extent is ‘an issue number one’ for Russia, Beijing’s position has recently showed new nuances. Continuing to speak out against anti-Russian sanctions China distinguishes between two aspects of the problem. On the one hand, on the issue of ‘Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty’ Beijing announced through Li Keqiang its unequivocal support for Kiev. On the other hand, on the issue of Crimea China made it clear that it could recognize its new status in case of an appropriate international political solution of the problem, thus indicating the differences with the position of Moscow that believed that the issue had already been definitively resolved¹⁴⁸.

Such an approach can hardly be regarded as ‘support’ for Russia. But most likely, it is not deliberate ‘tripping’ either. In Beijing’s understanding this approach on Ukraine reflects its ‘principled position’.

From the beginning China has not approved the sanctions but for obvious reasons it has not supported Russia on Crimea either. China cannot afford acting in favor of the violation of the territorial integrity of other countries as it has similar risks in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.

It is a different matter that for the first time China expressed its position so clearly and firmly. Previously, it was about the inadmissibility of violation of territorial integrity as a matter of principle. Probably old grievances namely related to the 2008 events in South Ossetia were also involved. Beijing keeps believing that Russia as a ‘strategic partner’ could have first informed China about its plans before asking for political support. The timing China chose for the clear designation of its positions was not random either. In fact, on the eve of the two upcoming Russian–Chinese summits dedicated to the end of war China sent a signal through its prime minister (but not through Xi)

¹⁴⁸ See: Mikheev, V., Lukonin, S., China: follow-up to the March session of the National People’s Congress), 27 Mar. 2015, <http://www.imemo.ru/index.php?page_id=502&id=1591&ret=640>.

to Russia that the latter ‘should not ask Beijing for the impossible’ including the support on Crimea.

On the other hand, Beijing believes that it acts in the interests of Moscow when it admits the possibility of international recognition of Crimea as a result of international negotiations. Thus China shows the world that it does not always protect Russian interests therefore guarding itself against US critique on the Crimea issue (in addition to US critique for Beijing’s aggressive – in the American interpretation – actions towards Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea).

Analyzing the economic impact of the Ukrainian crisis Chinese media openly expressed Chinese companies’ dissatisfaction, especially on the part of small and medium-sized businesses, with a twofold devaluation of the ruble which led to the inhibition of Russian–Chinese trade in 2014 and its almost 1.5 times reduction in the first quarter of 2015.

There also recent speculations on Russia’s inability to overcome its ‘fundamental economic problems’ which – rather than Western sanctions – are the true cause of the ongoing crisis¹⁴⁹.

Beijing’s leadership ambitions

In relations with Russia and the United States China pursues a dual-track policy of hedging its political risks.

On the one hand, Chinese top leaders continue to talk about the ‘special relations with Russia’. On the other hand, Beijing aims to use the worsening of US–Russian relations in order to obtain dividends from the Russian ‘turn to the East’ and US efforts to prevent Russia and China from getting too close in the context of a new Cold War.

Beijing has already passed the stage of development when Moscow and Washington could use it as a trump card in the bilateral competition for leadership and now it more openly claims its right to

¹⁴⁹ Solovyova, O., ‘Russian crisis and ruble devaluation concern Beijing’, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 21 Oct. 2014, <http://www.ng.ru/economics/2014-10-21/1_china.html>.

the leadership in the 21st century. In this respect China's strategy is significantly different from the Russian one.

The essence of *China's strategy of global leadership* can be summarized as follows.

First. China realistically evaluates its strength and does not consider itself equal to the United States. Hence its current strategic objective is not a leadership superiority over the United States but an attempt to take an important place in the world economy and politics: as a minimum – straight after the US, surpassing Japan, as a maximum – on par or near par with the US, though Beijing realizes that in military terms it is not quite possible in the foreseeable future.

Second. As the most significant conceptual aspect, China cannot and does not set a goal to offer the world a different model of development in addition to the market economy amid deepening involvement of countries in the globalization process. In this regard, one can argue that the Chinese leaders have left the Soviet-style communist goals and social model in the past.

Third. As to democratic reforms, China does not deny the importance of democracy as such but it promotes the right to pursue democracy at its own pace and in its own way. At the same time Beijing claims that no country is obliged to copy the Western model which appeals to developing countries.

Fourth. Based on these fundamental assumptions, China creates global infrastructure for its future leadership in two areas. The one is that China, in contrast to the United States, consistently avoids the topic of political order of other countries. The other one is related to China's economic expansion in the following forms: (1) investments in the world economic infrastructure (the Silk Road), (2) absorption and merger with the global corporate business, and (3) Chinese government and private companies accelerating entering into overseas markets.

Investment in foreign infrastructure is one of the most attractive Chinese strategies for developing and even some developed countries. Using Chinese money to finance most expensive infrastructure projects many countries turn the blind eye to the generally negative attitude to the Chinese leadership in the world.

Chinese capital's hunt for liquid assets in developed countries continues to be a source of additional suspicion against China. However, the emerging trend is that Western capital is increasingly focusing on the profitability of such transactions rather than on the corresponding threat.

Entering of Chinese enterprises into foreign markets is still at an early stage. The reaction to it mostly remains neutral. However, in the areas of conflict of interests between China and its main competitors the problem can be politicized. For instance, during the early 2015 conflict between China and Sri Lanka a new government in Colombo imposed restrictions on the Chinese construction of ports and other facilities in the country. There is a probability of India's hand in play there as New Delhi sees in Chinese projects in Sri Lanka a threat of creating Chinese military infrastructure in the area of the Indian traditional influence.

Time will show how effective and efficient is the Chinese strategy of world leadership. However, it appears that the main Beijing's advantage is strengthening its global position by investing in the global infrastructure.

The soft spot of the leadership strategy is the absence of a political component. In 2015, China has started to change the situation. However, so far Beijing's efforts come down to the statements by senior Chinese leaders that 'China will play a greater role in the United Nations' and 'will act as a mediator in regional conflicts'. It is not clear yet what this will mean in practice.

Russia and China: problems and shortcomings of cooperation

Chinese expert discussions of Beijing's relations with individual countries as a rule use the following model: 'problems and limitations' and 'prospects'.

Chinese experts identify the following main problems of the Russian-Chinese relations which affect their strategic future:

- Russia's erroneous perception of China;
- inconsistent development of bilateral relations;

- lack of mutual trust;
- unwillingness to provide each other with full political and politico-military support;
- insufficient consideration of the American factor in Russian-Chinese relations;
- strategic imbalances in Russian-Chinese relations.

The above problems and arguments are considered in the respective context in more details below.

The Russian policy, according to Chinese experts, – and one can agree with them – does not keep pace with the rapid changes in the domestic situation in China and its foreign policy. This leads to *an erroneous perception* on Moscow part of what can and cannot be expected in relations with Beijing. It resulted inter alia in an expectation of China's fully support in the Ukrainian conflict.

Inconsistent development of bilateral relations, in Chinese understanding, is caused by recent 'unpredictable policy of Russia'. According to Chinese experts, the unpredictability of Russian foreign policy decisions creates risks for China with the most sensitive ones possibly leading to deterioration of Beijing's relations with Western partners.

At the same time China is willing to admit that in Russian view the unevenness of the relations may be associated with the uncertainty of the Chinese approach to global development and regional conflicts. Today broad statements of 'a harmonious world' and solving problems 'through dialogue and political means are not enough to clarify China's position.

On the other hand, *lack of mutual trust* also plays its role. Beijing witnesses weakening of anti-Chinese sentiment and suspicion against China in Russia in the context of deteriorating relations between Russia and the West and the so-called 'turn to the East'. Russia is ready to deepen military cooperation, open more Russian industries to the Chinese capital including oil and gas sectors, develop cooperation in space, etc.

However the mistrust has not disappeared and will continue to have a dampening effect on the bilateral relations. Chinese analysts believe that in case Russia's relations with the West recover, its

traditional distrust of China will hinder the bilateral cooperation to more extent than it does now at the low point in Russian-Western relations.

China's economic, military, and innovation build-up and increasing economic gap between Moscow and Beijing, in its turn, may also increase Russia's distrust.

Another important point is that, according to a number of Chinese experts, the recent conflicts involving Russia and China have revealed *unwillingness of the parties to provide full support to each other*.

China did not politically supported Russia joining Crimea. Moscow was not ready to sacrifice its interests in relations with Vietnam and Japan for China. Thus the 'Russian-Chinese strategic partnership' turns into a mere declaration when it comes to real regional conflicts.

At the same time Beijing believes that Russia will not act on its side when it comes to confrontation with China's regional neighbors. Russia can get closer to China if the framework is not one of the conflict but of cooperation on territorial and historical disputes in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. However, there are no constructive ideas to implement this framework the Asia Pacific yet.

In the medium term, Beijing hopes to offset this lack of a bilateral 'strategic partnership' by developing cooperation with Moscow in the areas where Chinese and Russian positions are closer, namely in Afghanistan, on fight with terrorism and drug trafficking in Central Asia, on North Korea.

Russia and China's relations with the United States also have strategic impact on the Russian-Chinese relations. China has become the world's second economy and through strengthening its international position will become the second to the US in world politics. Such trends will change the entire configuration of relations in the Russia-China-United States triangle.

At the same time, the subject of US relations with Russia and China is not included in the agenda of Russian-Chinese discussions. China believes that it is not just Beijing's problem – Russia is also not ready to hold a comprehensive dialogue with China on the US issue.

This situation adds uncertainty to the understanding of the US role in Russian–Chinese relations. Beijing observes a wide spread of opinions in Russia on the prospects of Sino–US relations.

At one extreme, a number of experts say that China is the main enemy of the United States today and in the long term, and that the current Chinese–US relations deteriorate. Hence the conclusion that Russia, in the face of the declining relations with the US because of Ukraine, can count on China as a trump card in the game against the West and as a partner in providing ‘dual containment’ of the United States.

At the other extreme, there are claims that China and the US are going to create a political union (G2) in opposition to Russia. In the context of Ukrainian crisis, the concerns are growing that to avoid dangerous rapprochement between Russia and China the US will force the military-political and economic cooperation with China. Thus, Russia may again find itself in a position of the ‘enemy number one’ for the United States.

Russia’s disappointment if it does not receive the expected support from China – in line with the first set of views – can lead to unnecessary degradation of relations between Russia and China. The predominance of the other set of views in Moscow’s real politics can cause new escalation of distrust toward Beijing.

Finally, the last key problem of the Russian–Chinese relations. Beijing admits that in the long term the main challenges for the Russian–Chinese relations are related to the *growing imbalances in economic development* between the two countries. China has strengthened its second place in the world economy, Chinese TNCs are increasingly active in accessing global markets, acquiring foreign companies, and competing directly with American, European, and Japanese companies. Russian economy successes clearly look more modest against this background.

In the military sphere, China has been gradually reducing the gap on conventional and, according to some Russian experts, nuclear weapons.

In foreign policy, China intends to more actively promote its own version of global and regional (especially Asia–Pacific) order and more aggressively defend its interests.

Since the Soviet era, the trump card of *Russian global leadership* has been its nuclear missile potential which allows Moscow to maintain its status of a global military and political power alongside Washington. The second advantage of Russia is its oil and gas reserves.

In political context, Russia has limited its leadership claims to the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Therefore one cannot say that China is already ahead of Russia in the competition for the world leadership in all areas of development.

In the military-political sphere, Russia continues to maintain the superiority of the world's nuclear power. China's military build-up may help it to catch up with the nuclear potential of Russia and the United States, but so far not to a great extent.

In economy the balance of power rapidly changes in favor of China: the global impact of Chinese infrastructure expansion (in addition to the fact that Beijing has already become the world's second economy) exceeds Russia's influence as a global energy power.

In foreign policy, one can call it 'a draw'. Russia restrains itself to the former Soviet Union, while China claiming for the future global leadership status does not offer much to the world today. Attempts to promote its ideas of 'harmonious development' or 'Chinese dream' fail in reality.

Most disturbing is Russia's looming backlog in terms of 'smart power'. As mentioned above, in 2014–2015 Beijing began to invest in Chinese intellectual expansion – albeit without clear theoretical and political innovations – funds comparable to those of the US.

It should be noted that the general trend of changing the balance of strategic power between Russia and China in favor of the latter can change the whole 'physical basis' of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the near future.

Today, Russia in many ways still considers China a 'junior partner'. Therefore, Moscow takes disagreement with Beijing more painfully than, say, the differences in Russian–American relations.

In China, there are views that deepening strategic imbalances in favor of China will not alleviate but strengthen the negative aspects of Russian–Chinese relations, and above all, will not reduce but increase mutual distrust in future.

Prospects for a ‘turn to China’ in the context of ‘Russia–West–China’ relations

The aggravation of relations between Russia and the United States leads to a crisis of the existing world order and reduces strategic resources to solve global and acute regional security issues. The possibilities of joint response to the military and technology related challenges are minimal since the end of the Cold War.

The ‘turn to China’ strategy may allow Russia to soften the internal losses from the war of sanctions with West but it cannot replace the US–Russian cooperation on strategic stability, nuclear non-proliferation, space exploration, counterterrorism, and climate change.

For Russia the impendent transformation of the global political hierarchy is fraught with descending to a ‘third role’ after the US and China.

China can become a more important partner for Russia than Russia for China not only economically and financially, but also politically. This imbalance will cause Russia to tolerate Chinese expansion not only in Central Asia and in the short term in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, but also in Russia which is the focus of the Pacific–Atlantic part of the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt mega-strategy. The ‘Eastern hegemon’ will replace the Western one and as a young global player it will be more aggressive and tough in defending its interests.

China will use the Russian ‘turn to the East’ for its own strategic purposes. Thus, Beijing refused to support Western sanctions not because of ‘political solidarity with Russia but to protect Chinese business interests. It is also developing plans for entering those sectors and niches of the Russian economy which the Western capital has abandoned or never been interested in the first place.

Beijing strives to use the crisis of the existing world order to establish new mechanisms for solving major global and regional security issues on the basis of Sino–US relations of a ‘new type’. Beijing understands that to prevent ‘undue rapprochement’ between Beijing and Moscow Washington cannot put pressure on China the way it does with Japan and South Korea demanding them to support sanctions against Russia. And secondly, the United States will not play up its traditional criticism of China’s domestic political process.

The US, for its part, is changing its approach to China indicating the prospect of not only economic, but also strategic and military-political cooperation. The focus in the conflict between the two options on ‘rebalancing in Asia’ begins to shift from strengthening relations with US military allies (Japan and South Korea, as well as the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia) towards making relations with China the key factor of the US policy

With that in mind China will not go for the economic and military-political cooperation with Russia which could threaten the Sino–US relations.

The Chinese leaders see the way out of the current international relations crisis, first, in turning China’s into a de facto leader of the developing countries – through the active and multidirectional (loans, direct investments, new international banks, etc.) funding of the most problematic sectors of the ‘peripheral economy’, namely infrastructure and social services; and, second, in occupying those niches in Russian relations with the West which is left disengaged due to the crisis in the US–Russian relations.

Thus ‘turn to China’ involves *certain strategic risks for Russia*.

China is a young global player who is still getting accustomed to the role of a world leader acting with natural freshman’s assertiveness. And Russia will have to adapt to it making concessions for the sake of maintaining the preferential nature of the relations.

As the transformation of Russia into a new ‘enemy number one’ for the United States proceeds, China will be strengthening its position in the regional niches of Russian influence (Central Asia, Silk Road area, Africa, Latin America, etc.).

In the context of the sanctions war with the West, Russia in order to participate in the lucrative Chinese Silk Road economic zone project aimed at creating *integration infrastructure* between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans will have to adapt to the new role of a 'junior' partner.

With increasing of its global political significance and building up of China–US relations of a 'new type', China may behave aggressively in regional disputes insisting on the emphatic support on the part of Russia, possibly against the Russian interests.

In case Sino–US relations deteriorate Beijing may require Moscow to take actions against Washington that could lead to a further escalation of the Russia–West conflict.

At the same time, 'turn to China' strategy cannot devalue traditional mutual interests shared by Russia and the US in such areas as strategic stability, missile defence, WMD non-proliferation, space, anti-terrorism efforts, etc. There is also a joint concern that the nuclear missile build-up in China is not transparent enough. Internal mechanisms of developing and implementing foreign policy decisions in the United States are more transparent and predictable than the ones in China.

Washington holds a view that despite the rapprochement with Beijing the level of mutual understanding between them is 'significantly lower' than between Moscow and Washington during the Cold War. In addition, some experts express an opinion that the conflict over Ukraine which poses no immediate security challenge to the US should not interfere with negotiations on strategic stability and other issues of direct threat to US security¹⁵⁰.

To overcome the crisis in international relations requires continuing international cooperation with Russia sustaining its role of an independent and relevant participant of the global processes. The latter is possible through maintaining 'mutually balancing' cooperation

¹⁵⁰ See, for instance: 'It is not possible to normalize situation in Ukraine by worsening relations with Russia (interview with F. Voytolovskiy)', *Lenta.ru*, 16 May 2014, <<http://lenta.ru/articles/2014/05/16/usacrisis/>>.

between Russia and China and the United States. For this end Russia may face the following prerequisites:

– It needs not so much to make a ‘turn to the East’ i.e. to China, as to complement relations with the West with a ‘balanced’ cooperation with China which does not required concessions for the sake of the speed of its development.

– It is necessary to preserve the United States as a strategic counterbalance to Chinese influence, as well as the US, Japan and South Korea as a financial, innovation and economic counterbalance as relations between Moscow and Tokyo and Seoul were less affected by the sanctions war in comparison to the EU–Russian relations.

– Russia needs to create new counterbalances to the Chinese leadership through the mechanisms of trilateral cooperation between Russia, China and the United States (initially on the topics where ‘traditional interests’ dominate even in the context of the unsolved Ukrainian issue).

– It is important to use the factor of the forthcoming new US administration for building a ‘mutually balancing’ cooperation between Russia and China and the United States.

Overall the prospects for the new configuration of the power balance in the West–China–Russia triangle in five to ten years appear to be not in Russia’s favor

China is going to continue pursuing global leadership and ‘partnership-rivalry’ relations with the United States.

At the same time, the overall trend of declining Russia–West relations will intensify negative for Moscow consequences of the general trend of improving China–West relations. Despite existing differences, cooperative rather than confrontational element will determine the nature of relations between China and the West.

It should also be taken into account that the development of cooperation between Russia and China has its limits. Those limits are due to the strategic interests of China as a country aspiring to become a new global leader and therefore considering relations with other powers by their potential contribution to the rise of Beijing.

China will remain interested in Russia as an economic and military-technological (import of military technology) partner.

However, politically Beijing is more likely to use the ‘Russian card’ to strengthen its bargaining position with Washington than to sacrifice its relations with the US in Russia’s interests.

PART II. EXPERT INSIGHTS

7. Issues of resolving the crisis around Iran's nuclear programme (2013-2015)
8. The dynamics of modernization of the Russian armed forces
9. Russia's military-political cooperation with the CIS: the role of the Ukraine crisis
10. India's military-technical cooperation with Russia and the US
11. Islamic State as a threat to regional and international security

7. ISSUES OF RESOLVING THE CRISIS AROUND IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME (2013–2015)

Vladimir SAZHIN

Stages of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear problem

The negotiating process on resolving the Iranian nuclear issue (INI) between the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and its opponents has a long history of more than 12 years. This period can be divided into three stages.

The first stage began in late 2002 and early 2003 when the Iranian opposition found an undeclared nuclear facility in the Iranian territory and the Western intelligence focused its attention on it¹⁵¹. It turned out that Iran being a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been having secret nuclear activities for 18 years. This violation of NPT provoked a lot of questions and complaints from the UN and IAEA¹⁵².

¹⁵¹ US discovered nuclear facilities in Iran, *Pravda.ru*, 13 Dec. 2002, <<http://www.pravda.ru/world/northamerica/usacanada/13-12-2002/8518-iran-0/>>; The opposition named the location of a secret nuclear facility in Iran, *Nuclearno.ru*, 16 Oct. 2003, <<http://nuclearno.ru/text.asp?6982>>.

¹⁵² Goldschmidt, P., Decision time on Iran, *Voltaire Network*, 30 Sep. 2005, <<http://www.voltairenet.org/article128981.html>>; *Forceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue: scenarios and implications*, ed. by V. Dvorkin and A. Arbatov (Moscow: International Luxembourg Forum, 2008), p. 4.

In October 2003, Tehran had to enter the negotiations with the so-called 'troika' – three countries – Britain, Germany and France – with the current president Hassan Rouhani headed the Iranian delegation. The negotiations achieved some success: Iran signed an additional protocol to the agreement with the IAEA which the Iranian parliament Majlis failed to ratify but the Iranian government nevertheless had been implementing up to 2006. Thus, the negotiations opened real prospects for solving the Iranian nuclear issue.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a radical politician who became the president of Iran in 2005, reversed all the progress and began to pursue a fairly aggressive policy in the nuclear field.

In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution stating that Iran had violated the Agency's requirements and had been conducting secret nuclear activities which resulted in suspicions in the peaceful nature of its programme. Tehran reacted by intensifying its nuclear activities. In February 2006, the IAEA authorized the transfer of the Iranian nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council. Iran pursued the build up of uranium enrichment facilities and rejected voluntary measures of transparency¹⁵³.

In 2006, *the second stage* of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program began. From 2006 to 2010, the UN Security Council adopted six resolutions on Iran four of which involved sanctions. In turn, the IAEA produced not only resolutions but also reports on the state of Iran's nuclear activities for certain periods.

Negotiations with Iran at this stage were held within two frameworks: the P5+1 group representing five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, and the IAEA format. P5+1 dealt with the political and strategic issues while the IAEA – with practical, technical problems. Overall, however, it was only a semblance of dialogue as Tehran did not agree to any compromises.

The situation escalated to a very serious point in 2011–2012 when speculations run wild about a possibility of a military strike by the US and Israel against Iran's nuclear facilities. It did not happen but

¹⁵³ See: Sazhin, V.I., *Nuclear and missile potential of Islamic Republic of Iran: state and perspectives* (Moscow: LENAND, 2011), pp. 52-75.

in 2012 the US and EU who were later joined by some other countries introduced unilateral sanctions against Iran in three basic packages: oil sanctions, i.e. a ban or restriction on Iranian oil import; financial sanctions that turned out to be the most serious ones since they excluded the country from SWIFT system depriving Iran from conducting international banking transactions; as well as a ban on insuring oil vessels. As a result, Iran found itself on the verge of a serious economic crisis fraught with social upheavals.

Despite the fact that the Ahmadinejad administration earned \$1,200 billion over eight years half of which came from oil revenues¹⁵⁴, it did not save the country from a crisis.

According to the International Monetary Fund, because of the unilateral financial and economic sanctions imposed on Tehran the growth rate of the national economy fell to 0.4% in 2012, turned into an economic downturn of 3.5% in 2013¹⁵⁵, the Iranian currency rial fell by 40%, while the index of consumer prices was 32%.

From March 2012 to March 2013, inflation in the country amounted to 30.5% (according to other sources to 41%)¹⁵⁶, although in March 2012 it was only 21.5%. According to the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, during the same period, more than 6 thousand manufacturing enterprises (about 67% of the total number) were on the verge of bankruptcy¹⁵⁷.

The situation worsened due to the fact that since January 2012 to March 2013 oil production in Iran decreased from 3.8 to 2.7 million barrels per day while the oil exports reduced from 2.4 to 1.3 million barrels¹⁵⁸ (in the worst period of April 2013 this figure was around

¹⁵⁴ Khatynoglu, D., Economic slogans of Iran's presidential candidates, 11 June 2013, <<http://news.day.az/world/407826.html>>.

¹⁵⁵ Cordesman, A.H., Coughlin-Schult, Ch., Gold, B., *The US and Iran: Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), p. xiii.

¹⁵⁶ Sazhin, V., Iran: Rouhani received challenging inheritance, *Rambler*, 16 July 2013, <<http://news.rambler.ru/20110904/>>.

¹⁵⁷ Kozhanov, N.A., The socio-economic situation in Iran: May 2013, 8 July 2013, <<http://www.iimes.ru/?p=17884>>.

¹⁵⁸ *The foreign trade guide for the Russian participants of foreign economic activity: Iran* (Moscow: Ministry of Economic Development, 2013), p. 5.

700 thousand barrels)¹⁵⁹. In 2013 Iran's oil revenues were confined to a total of 30–35 billion dollars (similar to the level of a decade ago)¹⁶⁰ which caused a serious national budget deficit. The oil sanctions annually left the Iranian budget short of 35 to 50 billion dollars¹⁶¹. Some sources put the figure at \$5 billion per month, which corresponds to 60 billion per year¹⁶².

In January 2015, Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council Mohsen Rezaei stated that the damage to the Iranian oil industry from the economic sanctions over the past three years had amounted to 100 billion dollars¹⁶³.

All this confirms that the efficiency of the unilateral financial and economic sanctions imposed on Iran was quite high. Iran was virtually cut off from the international banking system (SWIFT)¹⁶⁴ and insurance services primarily in the field of transportation and logistics. Tehran's access to foreign investment, foreign technology and international maritime transportation system was also hindered.

In 2013, up to 60% of the Iranian population lived below the poverty line, and there was significant social differentiation: the income of the three richest deciles was 15–16 times greater than the income of the three poorest deciles¹⁶⁵. According to the Central Bank of Iran, the unemployment rate was 12.2% (according to unofficial sources 19–20%, and among young people – up to 40%)¹⁶⁶.

¹⁵⁹ Nikitina, A., Iran' 2014. Oil and gas vertical, <<http://www.ngv.ru/upload/medialibrary/dcb/dcb480091f1843a5f5dc296eb467ec16.pdf>>.

¹⁶⁰ Clawson, P., Talk Is Cheap, *Foreign Affairs*, 24 Sep. 2013, <<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2013-09-24/talk-cheap>>.

¹⁶¹ Based on price of \$95–105 per barrel of oil in recent years.

¹⁶² Cordesman, A.H., Coughlin-Schult, Ch., Gold, B.,... p. xiii.

¹⁶³ Rezaie: Sanctions caused \$100 bn damage to Iran's oil revenues, *IRNA*, 11 Jan. 2015, <<http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81460498/>>.

¹⁶⁴ SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) is an international interbank system of information and payment transfers.

¹⁶⁵ Kozhanov, N.A., The socio-economic situation in Iran: March 2013, 8 May 2013, <<http://www.iimes.ru/?p=17405>>. A decile is used in mathematical statistics to divide the population into 10 equal groups according to income.

¹⁶⁶ Kasaev, E.O., Iran: the economic situation and trade relations with Russia, 24 June 2013, <<http://www.iimes.ru/?p=17765>>.

The difficult socio-economic situation of a large part of the population triggered mass emigration primarily among skilled labor leading to 'rain drain'¹⁶⁷.

The country's leadership including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei clearly understood the difficult situation. It is the supreme leader who is the head of state, supreme commander and spiritual leader of Iran¹⁶⁸. The presidential post is the second most important office in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, the Iranian president is a popularly elected prime minister; he forms the government and conducts daily operations. In that situation, in 2013 presidential elections Ayatollah Khamenei had to give the green light to Hassan Rouhani who in Iranian political culture was considered a relatively liberal politician and reformer. Rouhani won the presidential election with a wide margin in the first round, however without the approval of the supreme leader he could not have even got on the lists of candidates. The head of state knew that at that moment Iran needed a politician who was known in the West and who knew Western 'political kitchen' including such a 'dish' as the Iranian nuclear issue. Thus Rouhani got the presidential powers with the key task of negotiating Iran out of the sanctions regime.

Ayatollah Khamenei supported the efforts of President Rouhani in resolving the nuclear issue and defended his new team of nuclear negotiators from criticism by Iranian radicals opposing to any negotiations with the West on the Iranian nuclear issue¹⁶⁹.

In 2013, with Rouhani taking up the presidential office *the third stage* of negotiation process on the Iranian nuclear program began. On 24 November 2013, just three months after Rouhani's inauguration the six countries and Iran reached an agreement called 'Joint Action Plan'

¹⁶⁷ About 200 thousand Iranians try to leave the country yearly. See: Iran's Brain Drain: 200,000 Graduates Trying to Go Abroad, *Payvand Iran News*, 24 Apr. 2006, <<http://www.payvand.com/news/06/apr/1188.html>>.

¹⁶⁸ See: Sazhin, V.I., Bondar, Yu.M., *The military might of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Moscow: Moscow State University Publishing House, 2014), 544 p.

¹⁶⁹ The meeting of students with the great leader of the Islamic Revolution, 4 Nov. 2013, <http://russian.khamenei.ir/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1069>.

in Geneva¹⁷⁰. The document specified the steps to create conditions for working out a comprehensive agreement which would remove all the concerns about Iran's nuclear program and ensure that Iran did not develop nuclear weapons.

Iran's nuclear infrastructure

What was the level of development of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure and its potential in 2013? According to the IAEA data for November 2013¹⁷¹, Iran acquired 10,357 kg of uranium enriched by 3 to 5% of which 7,154.3 kg were stockpiled and the rest was further processed. Iran also produced 410.4 kg of 20% enriched uranium from which 196 kg were stockpiled and the rest further processed. On average Iranian nuclear facilities produced more than 200 kg of 3–5% and 15 kg of 20% enriched uranium per month.

It is worth noting that the Iranian November stocks of enriched uranium with further enrichment could lay the foundation for the production of five nuclear warheads¹⁷². There are four stages of uranium enrichment: first – up to 3–5%, second – to 20%, third – to 60%, fourth – to over 90% (weapon grade uranium). Each stage of enrichment significantly reduces the amount of uranium. According to Mark Fitzpatrick, the director of the program on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), enrichment of 3,917 kg of 'yellow cake' produces only 37 kg of 93% enriched uranium¹⁷³. Using this method

¹⁷⁰ The Joint Action Plan, Geneva, 24 Nov. 2013, <http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/A40C0E9478030EFD44257C2D003913CE>.

¹⁷¹ Report of the IAEA on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, S/2013/668, 14 Nov. 2013, <<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/565/85/PDF/N1356585.pdf?OpenElement>>.

¹⁷² Iran has enough uranium for 5 Bombs – expert, *Reuters*, 26 May 2012, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/26/us-nuclear-iran-uranium-idUSBRE8400SN20120526>>.

¹⁷³ Iran's Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities. A net assessment, IISS Strategic Dossier, 3 Feb. 2011, p. 73.

one can calculate that all the enriched uranium held by Iran in 2013 would produce about 120–130 kg of 93% enriched uranium which is enough to make five nuclear warheads.

The head of US National Intelligence James Clapper said that the amount of enriched uranium produced in Iran in 2012 was more than three times the amount estimated before the attack of Stuxnet virus which in 2010 hit the Iranian nuclear facilities and other businesses. According to the representative of the US Bipartisan Policy Center Stephen Rademaker, the IAEA data clearly pointed out that Iran could develop nuclear weapons in a very short period of time if it wanted to¹⁷⁴.

So far Iranian physics (to their regret) cannot obtain a high-purity uranium hexafluoride¹⁷⁵ which is the compound subjected to enrichment in centrifuges. Moreover each subsequent stage of enrichment requires a higher level of purity. This circumstance clearly hinders the production of highly enriched uranium in Iran.

However, even 90% enriched uranium is not an explosive device. It is gas that is not suitable to make an atomic bomb. To produce one, the gaseous uranium undergoes complex technological manipulations through the process consisting of no less than 4–5 stages. As a result, gas is converted into metal which is used to create a nuclear warhead. Experts doubt that today Iran has high technology and chemically pure substances to implement the process of converting gaseous uranium into the metal.

In 2012 prominent Israeli politician Avigdor Lieberman said: 'If you sum up all the opinions of independent experts and institutions, the

¹⁷⁴ In just 4 months Iran can accumulate enough material to make nuclear weapons – experts, *IA Finmarket*, 21 June 2012, <<http://www.finmarket.ru/z/nws/news.asp?id=2965697>>.

¹⁷⁵ Uranium hexafluoride is a chemical compound of uranium and fluorine (UF₆). It is the only highly volatile uranium compound (when heated to 53°C it transits directly from the solid to the gas phase), and it is used as a raw material for separating isotopes of uranium-238 and uranium-235 through gas centrifugation and uranium enrichment.

real assessment is that Iran will require 10 to 14 months to acquire all the necessary components¹⁷⁶.

However, ‘all the components’ are not a bomb either, and certainly not a warhead for a delivery system. Iran has no aircraft carriers of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it develops missile program with the aim to combine it with the nuclear program. It presents a complex technical and technological problem which successful solution depends on an array of intervening factors largely independent of the will of Iranian missile and nuclear weapon developers. Based on the above, the deadlines of 84 weeks (M. Fitzpatrick)¹⁷⁷ or one year (A. Lieberman) are the result of purely mathematical calculations that do not take into account all the external and internal factors. It took Pakistan about 10 years to move from the first test of a nuclear device to the production of a missile nuclear warhead.

However, many areas of weapon development can advance in parallel and often secretly speeding up the whole process. According to Gary Samore, an American expert in the field of weapons of mass destruction, the deadlines imposed on Iran by Israel and the United States are essentially dictated ‘by politics and not physics’. That is the actual state of the Iranian nuclear program is the last to be taken into account. In fact, ‘physics’ still gives enough time for a dialogue as long as Tehran has not made a political decision on this matter¹⁷⁸.

However, the adoption of such a decision is unlikely to be publicly announced – the world would learn about it retrospectively, only after the first nuclear test. In any case, Iran’s nuclear program causes a fair concern. The nuclear policy of the radical Iranian ex-president Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), his confrontation with the

¹⁷⁶ Iran can get all the components for a nuclear bomb next year, insists Israel, *IA Iran News*, 21 June 2012, <http://www.iran.ru/news/politics/81397/Iran_mozhet_poluchit_vse_komponenty_dlya_yadernoy_bomby_uzhe_v_sleduyushchem_godu_nastaivayut_v_Izraile>.

¹⁷⁷ Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities. A net assessment, IISS Strategic Dossier, 3 Feb. 2011, p. 72.

¹⁷⁸ West should more actively work with Russia on Syrian and Iranian crises – Western experts, *IA Regnum*, 2 Apr. 2013, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1643734.html>>.

international community, his reluctance to implement resolutions of the highest international authority – the UN Security Council represented a real threat to global and regional security. It is not even about Iran itself. It is clear that in purely military terms Iran's military might (though significant within the region), especially in high-tech terms, is incomparable with the military power of the world's leading powers. And Tehran realizes it. The danger of a nuclear Iran lies in another area¹⁷⁹.

Firstly, the Iranian example of creating nuclear infrastructure capable of producing not only fuel for nuclear power plants but weapons-grade uranium or plutonium can be contagious for more than a dozen so-called 'threshold' countries many of which are or may become parties to regional conflicts and, because of this, do not rule out adoption of a political decision to create its own nuclear weapons. It entails a possibility of virtually uncontrolled use of nuclear weapons by medium and small countries – the 'third world' in the old terminology. In this scenario, one can expect that if not the whole world then some regions, particularly the Middle East, will plunge into nuclear chaos.

Secondly, the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Middle East, does not rule out the possibility of terrorist groups capturing weapons or their components which can lead to catastrophic consequences. After all, terrorists have no values (country, industry, people) the threat of which can serve as a deterrence, such as in a nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, Pakistan and India, and India and China¹⁸⁰.

Thirdly, the presence of nuclear weapons in Iran or even the real possibility of its creation in a fairly short period of time will make the country's leadership even less cooperative and more assertive towards its neighbors in the region. As a result, Tehran can use the atomic bomb as a blackmailing tool for the Iran policy to implement

¹⁷⁹ Yevseyev, V.V., Sazhin, V.I., *Iran, uranium, and missiles* (Moscow: Institute of Middle East Studies, 2009), p. 272.

¹⁸⁰ Ganiev, T.A., Bondar', Yu.M., Tolmachev, S.G., *Analysis and forecasting of military-political developments in foreign countries. Islamic Republic of Iran* (Moscow: Military University of the Russian Defence Ministry, 2011), p. 272.

doctrinal principles of Ayatollah Khomeini. Iran's Arab neighbors in the Persian Gulf are extremely concerned about it.

The results and implications of Geneva and Lausanne agreements

In view of the above, one can correctly state that the Joint Action Plan adopted by Iran and the international mediators in Geneva was a major milestone on the way to minimize the nuclear threat posed by Iran.

According to the Plan, Iran committed for the duration of the agreement not to enrich uranium above 5%, to get rid of all the accumulated reserves of 20% enriched uranium, to suspend construction of a heavy water reactor in Arak and redesign it, not to deploy new centrifuges for uranium enrichment, and to expand access of IAEA inspectors to the nuclear facilities.

In response, Iran's opponents expressed their willingness to unfreeze \$4.2 billion and alleviate sanctions against Tehran.

Due to the success of the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program the United States since spring 2014 have virtually turned blind eye to violations of sanctions against Iran by other countries, and in August officially suspended some of the sanctions until the final conclusion of a comprehensive agreement (if it happens). US temporarily lifted the ban on the purchase of petrochemical products from Iran. The government once again allowed American companies to supply Iran with spare parts for repair and maintenance of civil aircraft, in particular, to conduct transactions with Iran Air national airline as well as to export some other industrial products. The ban still applies only to individual companies from the US Treasury Department special list¹⁸¹.

In 2014, sanctions were also eased on oil. Until mid-2012, when oil embargo was established Iran had supplied oil to 21 countries. After

¹⁸¹ Sazhin, V., Not so black a devil: the rapprochement between Iran and the West amid lifting of sanctions teaches Kremlin a lesson, *Mir i politika*, No 9 (96), 2014, p. 29.

alleviating sanctions, six countries got the right to buy Iranian oil: China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey and Taiwan¹⁸². The ban on insuring oil tankers was also lifted¹⁸³ and as a result Iran increased oil production and export¹⁸⁴ which in turn brought the inflow of petrodollars to the national budget.

In accordance with the Geneva Joint Action Plan the parties set 20 July 2014 as a deadline to work out a comprehensive final agreement ensuring totally peaceful character of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for lifting international sanctions against Iran. However, the deadline was extended to 24 November 2014 and then to 30 June 2015.

During the period of extension Iran will receive \$700 million every month from the frozen assets¹⁸⁵.

In January 2014, the parties began to implement the Joint Action Plan and it proved to be rather productive. Delegations of the P5+1 and Iran met almost every month at various levels and in different formats. Although sometimes such meetings were not entirely successful, the negotiation process continued.

Within the last round of negotiations in Lausanne, Switzerland, held from 26 March to 2 April 2015, representatives of P5+1 and Iran worked literally for eight days and nights without leaving the negotiating table and achieved notable results.

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry statement on 2 April 2015¹⁸⁶, 'as a result of the recently concluded talks Britain, Germany, China, Russia, the US, and France as parts of the 'Group of Six' international mediators and the Iranian delegation agreed on a political

¹⁸² IAP Neft' Rossii, 4 Apr. 2015, <<http://www.oilru.com/news/455739/>>.

¹⁸³ IAP Neft' Rossii, 12 Dec. 2013, <<http://www.oilru.com/news/390288>>.

¹⁸⁴ Nikitina, A., Iran' 2014...

¹⁸⁵ Iran nuclear talks conclusive approach deadline, *The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)*, 26 Feb. 2015, <<https://www.iiiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2015-1f4d/iran-nuclear-talks-approach-conclusive-deadline-0b80>>.

¹⁸⁶ Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry after the talks of Group of Six foreign ministers and Iran, in Lausanne, on the issue of settling the issue of the Iranian nuclear program, 2 Apr. 2015, <http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/1172F6446B05FF5C43257E1B0068E88B>.

framework agreement for the final settlement of the situation around the Iranian nuclear program (INP). The parties reached a fundamental understanding on the key parameters of all the elements of a future peaceful nuclear activities in Iran, measures on their verification and monitoring by the relevant international organization – the IAEA, the duration of imposed restrictions against Iran in the nuclear field, as well as the order, sequence and scale of removal of anti-Iranian sanctions imposed both through the UN Security Council and unilaterally by the US and EU’.

The political framework agreement includes a number of specific items that should lay the foundation for the forthcoming comprehensive final agreement. The parties agreed on the following parameters¹⁸⁷:

- IAEA sets a strict control over the Iranian nuclear program for 25 years. The following facilities fall within the agreement: uranium deposits, processing plants for uranium ore and production of ‘yellow cake’ (uranium oxide) which can serve as raw material for the production of enriched uranium.

- Duration of the forthcoming agreement is 10 years.

- Over this period (10 years) Iran will reduce the number of centrifuges Iran from 19,000 to 6,104.

- ‘Extra’ centrifuge and enrichment equipment will be stored and transferred under the control of the IAEA.

- Iran will redesign its nuclear facilities although none of them will be dismantled.

- The uranium enrichment plant at Fordow will become a scientific and technological center with 1,000 centrifuges which will be used for scientific and medical purposes (this facility was designed to hold 3,000 centrifuges).

- Natanz nuclear center will be the only facility for uranium enrichment with 5,060 IR-1 old type centrifuges. Production capacity of the plant allows for installation of 54,000 centrifuges.

- For 10 years Iran is prohibited to use new models of centrifuges (IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8) for uranium enrichment.

¹⁸⁷ According to Iranian, Russian, US, and British media.

Thousands of such centrifuges of a new IR-2M generation installed at the facility in Natanz will be sent to a warehouse under the supervision of the IAEA.

- For 15 years Iran will not build new facilities for uranium enrichment.

- For 15 years Iran will not enrich uranium above the level of 3.67%.

- For 15 years Iran will not conduct research on the use of spent nuclear fuel.

- The parties plan to create an international joint venture to reconstruct a renovated heavy water reactor in Arak which will not produce large amounts of weapons-grade plutonium. According to its specifications, currently the reactor is capable of producing 9 kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year which is enough to make one nuclear device. Under the agreement, the reactor's capacity will be limited to 1.5 kg of plutonium per year. It will be used for research purposes including isotope production.

- Iran will sell the surplus of heavy water at the international market. The country will not build facilities for its production.

- Iran will destroy warehouses used to store fissile materials. Most of the Iranian uranium reserves will be removed outside the country. The amount of low-enriched uranium (LEU) will be reduced from almost 10 tons to 300 kg. This will stay the Iranian limit for 15 years.

- All of these large-scale events will be held under the strict and rigorous control of the IAEA. Inspectors will use in their work the most advanced technologies in order to prevent any secret operations within Iran's nuclear program. The requirements of the Additional Protocol to the agreement with the IAEA are to serve as the basis of the Agency's activities. This will allow the Agency's inspectors greater access to the Iranian nuclear program including the 'declared and undeclared facilities'. In addition, IRI is required to allow experts to conduct investigation of the reports of suspicious activity at all nuclear facilities in the country. Iran will have to pre-notify the IAEA of its plans to build any new nuclear facility and report on the issues of concern on the Agency's part.

– The parties to the negotiations agreed not to introduce new restrictions against Iran.

– The parties agreed on the order, sequence and scale of removal of anti-Iranian sanctions imposed both through the UN Security Council and unilaterally by the US and EU in 2012. In this regard, the head of the European diplomacy Federica Mogherini said: ‘The EU will suspend implementation of all the economic and financial sanctions associated with the atom, and the US to stop implementation of all bonded to other economic and financial sanctions in conjunction with IAEA verification of Iran its key nuclear obligations’¹⁸⁸.

– The UN Security Council will lift the international sanctions imposed by this international body¹⁸⁹ and adopt a resolution which provides guarantees for the implementation of a comprehensive Treaty on the Iranian nuclear program by all the parties. This international document will be binding for all the parties.

It should be noted that, as of April 2015 a lot has been done in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. Like never before in the 12 years of negotiations the parties are close to the adoption of an agreement eliminating the Iranian nuclear issue from the global agenda. But the deal has not yet been concluded and no one can give a 100% guarantee that it will succeed. Although negotiators are optimistic, many politicians and political analysts remain doubtful.

The political agreements adopted in Lausanne on 2 April by P5+1 and Iran on the nuclear issue have caused controversy in the world. In addition to the long standing opponents to the agreement with Iran, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, US Republicans representing the opposition to President Obama and many US experts are skeptical about the possibility to come to a final comprehensive agreement with Tehran based on the Lausanne Framework.

The main argument of the opposition is that Iran can keep its nuclear infrastructure which gives it an opportunity, under the

¹⁸⁸ West lifts Iran sanctions – but not all of them, *Vzglyad*, 2 Apr. 2015, <<http://vz.ru/world/2015/4/2/600184.html>>.

¹⁸⁹ See: UN Security Council Resolution 1737, 23 Dec. 2006; UN Security Council Resolution 1747, 24 Mar. 2007; UN Security Council Resolution 1803, 03 Mar. 2008; UN Security Council Resolution 1929, 09 June 2010.

respective political decision by the country's leadership, to develop nuclear weapons.

However, if all the parties (both P5+1 and Iran) meet the conditions of the Lausanne framework, the probability and possibility of Iran creating a nuclear weapon would be extremely meager.

And here's why. The reduction in the number of centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,000; obligation not to replace the remaining, mostly inefficient centrifuges of the first IR-1 generation with more modern ones; moving main stockpiles of enriched uranium abroad; conversion of heavy water reactor in Arak and removal of the reprocessed plutonium from the country dramatically increase the time required for building nuclear weapons. According to the US State Department spokesman Marie Harf, it will take Iran more than two years just to restore 13,000 dismantled centrifuges¹⁹⁰.

The well-known American expert in the field of nuclear energy, Siegfried Hecker, a long time director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory which developed the first American atomic bomb, endorsed the Lausanne framework and said that the timescales stipulated in the agreement would enable the international community to take retaliatory steps, if Iran violated the terms¹⁹¹.

Clearly, a sharp extension of the time limits to build nuclear weapons provides the IAEA with a better chance to identify any minor deviations from the terms of the agreement to be signed by the end of June. The Agency will implement the strictest control over Iran's nuclear activities for the following 25 years.

There are an additional number of important arguments against skeptics' position.

First, on 7 April the Iranian Majlis endorsed the efforts of the country's delegation at the negotiations on Iran's nuclear program in Lausanne and thus Iran's commitment to the strict compliance with the

¹⁹⁰ It will take Iran more than two years to reinstall centrifuges for uranium enrichment - the State Department, *IAP Neft' Rossii*, 7 Apr. 2015, <<http://www.oilru.com/news/456092/>>.

¹⁹¹ Hecker: trust between the US and Iran is an important element of the agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, *RIA Novosti*, 7 Apr. 2015, <<http://ria.ru/world/20150407/1057021846.html>>.

requirements of both the current political framework and the future comprehensive agreement¹⁹².

Second, and perhaps most significant, is that speaking at the Majlis Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif confirmed that the Additional Protocol to the NPT had to be approved by the parliament to become mandatory for the country¹⁹³. This Additional Protocol enhances the IAEA absolute control of all Iran's nuclear activities.

And third, new policy of the Iranian leadership has received broad support from the Iranian citizens. For instance, a survey conducted by the IRNA showed that 96.3% of Tehran's residents support the agreement reached in Lausanne¹⁹⁴.

* * *

Leading American experts on Iran's nuclear program have supported the parameters of the interim agreement between the six international mediators and Iran. In particular, a group of 30 specialists in nuclear security issued a statement which called the Lausanne framework 'a vital step'. The document was signed among others by the former State Department negotiator on the Iranian nuclear issue Robert Einhorn and former US ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering¹⁹⁵.

In Iran the opponents of the nuclear agreement – radical anti-Westerners, adversaries of the Iranian President Rouhani – on the contrary, believe that Iran has agreed to unfavorable compromises that

¹⁹² The majority of Mejlis deputies are satisfied with nuclear talks progress, *Russian service of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)*, 7 Apr. 2015, <<http://russian.irib.ir/news/iran1/item/248930-достижения-ядерных-переговоров-устраивают-большинство-депутатов-меджлиса>>

¹⁹³ The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 3 Apr. 2015, <<http://IRNA.ir/ru/News/2848896/>>; IA TASS, 7 Apr. 2015, <<http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1885211>>.

¹⁹⁴ 96% of Tehranis support Nuclear Negotiating team: poll, *IRNA*, 7 Apr. 2015, <<http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81562919/>>.

¹⁹⁵ Experts in the United States supported the Iranian nuclear deal, *RIA Novosti*, 7 Apr. 2015, <<http://ria.ru/world/20150407/1057026197.html>>.

threaten the very existence of the Iranian national pride – its nuclear program.

After the conclusion of the Lausanne framework both in the US and Iran internal political struggle for and against the final agreement continue. The two presidents – Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, supporters of a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear program – have found themselves in a difficult situation, under the pressure of criticism. Each has to interpret the agreement made in Lausanne as a unilateral victory of his country's diplomacy. This leads to the different interpretation of the contents of the Lausanne framework in Washington and Tehran¹⁹⁶.

This clearly affects the context of the negotiations between P5+1 and Iran at its final stage. According to the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, the negotiations in Lausanne have failed to agree on two points: the guarantees that 'Iran gives up definitively the nuclear weapon', as well as the mechanism of lifting the sanctions imposed against Tehran¹⁹⁷.

The Iranians insist on the 'package' lifting of sanctions as soon as the agreement is signed, the Americans try first to verify that Tehran adheres to its commitments and then lift sanctions, possibly in a phased manner. (By the way, a step by step approach to the problem of sanctions was proposed by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov a few years ago).

It is important that in the preparation of a final comprehensive agreement under the pressure of the opponents and skeptics the parties do not change the parameters of the agreement negotiated in Switzerland. The difficulty lies in the fact that every word of the agreement in all the official languages of the UN, and most importantly in Persian, is interpreted unambiguously. The final document should contain no double meaning.

¹⁹⁶ Iran's nuclear program: the time has come to understand what they agreed on in Lausanne, *Inosmi.info*, 8 Apr. 2015, <<http://inosmi.info/yadernaya-programma-irana-nastalo-vremya-ponyat-cto-tam-v-lozanne-nareshali.html>>.

¹⁹⁷ Fabius: two issues remain to be solved for an agreement with Iran, *Vestnik Kavkaza*, 12 Apr. 2015, <<http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/material/126063>>.

The political and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue is an international victory for the administration of the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his political supporters who belong to the liberal-reformist wing of the Iranian politics. It gives hope for some liberalization of the Iranian regime and its policy at home and abroad.

Iran as one of the largest countries in the Middle East is connected in many ways to all other parts of the region. It has undisputable impact to various extent on the key regional processes. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, the fight against Islamic State extremist group, Israeli–Palestinian problem – Tehran is involved in all of the issues.

The solution of the Iranian nuclear issue followed by the removal of sanctions will return Iran into the global economic and financial systems. The expansion and strengthening of Iran's business ties with the outside world will help to soften and improve the predictability of its foreign policy which ultimately will contribute to the security of the region.

8. THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES

Lyudmila PANKOVA

The process of active modernization of the Armed Forces (AF) of the Russian Federation started in 2008 under Defence Minister A. Serdyukov. The development of the State Armament Program (GPV) for 2011–2020 (hereinafter – the GPV–2020) which provides an almost twofold increase of the state defence order, in fact, put an end to the dispute about the major focus of the Russian army rearmament program (either on selective use of Western weapons or on domestic production of armaments and military equipment). The GPV–2020, the fourth in the history of modern Russia¹⁹⁸, was approved on 31 December 2010. Its absolute priority was to supply the army with weapons and military equipment of domestic production.

Over the last 15 years, appropriations for the state armament program steadily grew. While 2.5 trillion rubles were allocated for the GPV 2001–2010, the state armament program of 2007–2015 had 5 trillion rubles and the GPV–2020 – 20 trillion rubles with extra 3 trillion rubles allocated for the Federal Target Program (FTP) for the development of enterprises of the defence-industrial complex (DIC).

¹⁹⁸ State armament programs are developed, as a rule, for a 10-year period divided into two five-year periods. The first GPV 1995–2005 (was discontinued in 1997), the second – GPV 2001–2010, and the third – GPV 2007–2015 and, finally, the fourth – GPV 2011–2020.

However, force majeure circumstances in 2014 – unprecedentedly tough sanctions pressure¹⁹⁹, restricted access to the global technology markets, the need for import substitution program – significantly complicated the process of implementing GPV–2020 program, altered the course and the pace of its implementation, prompted certain adjustments in terms of financing and timing of a number of projects. The adoption of the perspective GPV–2016–2025 program (hereinafter – GPV–2025) – which would include the second half of the GPV–2020 program – was postponed (the initial deadline was December 2015). In the context of economic uncertainty and the lack of detailed macroeconomic forecast the adoption of GPV–2025 program would be postponed for two or three years (according to some estimates, till 2018). At the same time, although with some adjustments, the intensive implementation of GPV–2020 is underway.

As to the modernization of the Russian army, in the current decade it is not just modernization of the army and navy but their escape from ‘the severe conditions which they found themselves due to chronic underfunding and lack of new of military equipment’²⁰⁰. It is known that from 1990s and to almost 2007 the weaponry in the Russian army, in fact, was barely updated. As (former) Deputy Defence Minister Vladimir Popovkin noted in this regard, ‘weapon systems stayed combat-ready due to maintenance, ... only samples of strategic weapons and supporting means were procured’²⁰¹.

¹⁹⁹ By the definition of the Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. See: Zamahina, T., ‘The Prime Minister urged to prepare for a new economic reality’, *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 21 Apr. 2015.

²⁰⁰ Such an opinion was expressed by Deputy Defence Minister T. Shevtsova. Shevtsova, T., ‘Save in defence spending – a necessary condition for the stability today and economic growth in the future’, *Voorujemye sily*, January-February 2015, p. 61.

²⁰¹ ‘The new state armament program gives priority to high-tech designs (interview of First Deputy Defence Minister Vladimir Popovkin)’, *Natsionalnaya oborona*, No 3, 2011, <<http://www.oborona.ru/includes/periodics/maintheme/2011/0314/21345724/detail.shtml>>.

Results of GPV–2020

Ten year long state armament program GPV–2020 – the fourth in new Russia – planned for implementation in 2011–2020 was supposed to be the most successful.

The first evidence was the objectives of the program²⁰². For example, one of its goals was to increase the share of modern weapons in the Russian army up to 70% by 2020²⁰³ (i.e. it is a several-fold growth with an average of 10–20% at the start of the program depending on the type of weapons)²⁰⁴. Secondly, the parameters of the program (Table 1) did not exceed the generally accepted standard parameters of state military power in peaceful time (the share of military expenditures in GDP is no more than 4.5%, in the state budget – no more than 15–18%).

Table 1. National defence spending in the Russian federal budget.

| | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| National defence spending, bln rubles | 1516.0 | 1812.3 | 2103.6 | 2479.1 |
| % of GDP | 2.70 | 2.90 | 3.20 | 3.80 |
| % of total budget expenditures | 13.90 | 14.10 | 15.80 | 16.60 |

Source: data of the Russian Federal Treasury, <www.info.minfin.ru/fbrash.php/>, <<http://www.roskazna.ru/federalnogo-byudzheta-rf/yi/>>.

²⁰² See more: Pankova, L., Russia: defence spending in 2012-2014 and GPV-2020, *SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Moscow: IMEMO, 2012), pp. 681-694.

²⁰³ In the United States this level was reached at the beginning of the 2000s.

²⁰⁴ Note that the level of security of the Russian Armed Forces with weapons and military equipment is ‘one of the highest in the world in general – 98-100%’ (according to the head of the Department of armaments of the Russian Ministry of Defence A. Gulyaev – see TSAMTO materials from 28 Nov. 2014) although most of them are out of date (according to the statement of Vladimir Popovkin, deputy defence minister of the Russian Federation in 2011).

Defense spending in 2011–2014 did not exceed the spending for economy (except for 2013). According to the Federal Treasury of Russia, the actual implementation of the budget under the ‘National Economy’ chapter (as of 1 January of the following year) was in 2011–2014 1,790.2, 1,968.5, 1,849.3, and 3,062.9 billion rubles respectively²⁰⁵.

Third, the pace of the GPV–2020 implementation during the first half of the program led to the results in some cases surpassing the planned ones. For instance, by the end of 2014, the share of primary modern military hardware in the Russian Armed Forces, according to the head of the Department of weaponry of the Defence Ministry A. Gulyaev, exceeded 40%²⁰⁶ while the plan was 30% by the end of 2016. The objective of 30% of modern type weapons was ‘almost accomplished’ by the early 2015 in the Air Force and Navy, while in the Aerospace Defence forces the share of new weapons reached 48%. Though the Land forces was lagging behind but planned to achieve the level of about 33–35% by 2016²⁰⁷.

Many experts note the significant progress in the quality and capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces today comparing to 2008, i.e. the time of the Five-Day War with Georgia. This is mentioned, in particular, in a recently published reference book on the armed forces of the world by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – ‘The Military Balance 2015’²⁰⁸, which emphasizes the significant improvements in equipment, logistics, electronic warfare, and others. In the words of Philip Breedlove, Commander of the US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO Allied Command Operations, ‘Russians have learned hard lessons’ from the conflict with Georgia and ‘have taken them into account in developing its conventional forces’. In his opinion, investing in increased mobility

²⁰⁵ Structure and dynamics of expenditures of the federal budget for the years 2011–2014, *Russian Ministry of Finance*, <<http://info.minfin.ru/fbrash.php>>.

²⁰⁶ ‘Russian Defence Ministry: the share of modern technology among weapons systems exceeded 40%’, *RIA Novosti*, 27 Nov. 2014, <http://m.ria.ru/defense_safety/20141127/1035497274.html>.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ *The Military Balance 2015* (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), p.159.

and combat capability, training and equipping of Russian troops should be regarded as ‘smart investments’²⁰⁹.

2011–2014 can be characterized as a period of sustained and dynamic modernization of the Russian army while also productive enough for the Russian defence industry. At the beginning of the new decade, the production of armaments and military equipment in Russia increased by an average of 6% a year²¹⁰ while labor productivity increased by 1.2 times. A further increase in the quality and productivity is associated, inter alia, with creating a single integrated engineering software platform for the defence industry commissioned by the Foundation for Perspective Studies (FPS)²¹¹. It aims to simplify and unify the software processes at the enterprises of the defence-industrial complex.

Another indicative factor is the increase in the overall number of transactions with Russian participation at the global weapon market in 2009–2014 which amounted to 16% compared with the previous period of 2005–2009²¹².

In general, the full implementation of targets set at beginning of this decade by GPV–2020 would provide the necessary level of military security for Russia in the third decade of the 21st century, maintain an optimal balance between the defence needs and economic capabilities of the country, and contribute to the creation of modern and effective armed forces.

²⁰⁹ ‘The Pentagon has acknowledged the military power of Russia and the ineffectiveness of sanctions’, *NTV*, 25 Feb. 2015, <<http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1335576/>>.

²¹⁰ Fedorov, Yu., ‘The State armament program 2020: power and industry’, *Indeks bezopasnosti*, No 4 (107), 2013, <<http://www.pircenter.org/articles/1627-gosudarstvennaya-programma-vooruzhenij-2020-vlast-i-promyshlennost>>.

²¹¹ ‘OPK creates software platform for import independent ‘software’’, *VPK News*, 8 Apr. 2015, <http://vpk.name/news/129694_opk_sozdast_programmnuyu_platformu_dlya_importnezavisimogo_softa.html>.

²¹² Litovkin, V., ‘‘Panzir’ is not afraid of sanctions’, *NVO*, 27 Mar. 2015, <http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2015-03-27/1_panzir.html>.

‘External failure’ in the implementation of GPV

As mentioned above, the implementation of GPV–2025 is postponed until 2018 and the implementation of GPV–2020 is continuing. The total amount of 7,941 billion rubles was already allocated for the latter for 2011–2014 (see Table 1), i.e. about 36.5% of the sum planned for the period till 2020. Most of the funds for the GPV–2020 should be allocated in the second half of the decade.

However, under the external circumstances the implementation of GPV–2020 program faced serious financial problems. The main elements of this exogenous failure are the introduction of anti-Russia sanctions (2014) and the decline in oil prices. As the Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Medvedev reported at the meeting of the State Duma of 21 April 2015, Russia in 2014 bore a total of about 25 billion euros in losses from sanctions, and in 2015 this damage may increase several times (totaling at least 75 billion euros)²¹³.

According to the report of the Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu at the extended board meeting of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation of 19 December 2014²¹⁴, the expenses for previously planned GPV–2025 state armament program, which had been estimated at 55 trillion rubles, could be reduced to 30 trillion rubles through the use of modular platforms and formation of types of perspective weapons and equipment with similar features and specifications²¹⁵. At the same time the necessary amount of equipment

²¹³ ‘Government report on the results of work in 2014’, The State Duma of the Russian Federation, Report of D. Medvedev, 21 Apr. 2015, <www.government.ru/news/17768>.

²¹⁴ ‘The state armament program of the Russian Federation ‘fell in price’ almost doubled due to the unification’, *RIA Novosti*, 19 Dec. 2014, <http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20141219/1039228752.html>. For more information on the meeting, see: ‘Shoigu: Equipment of the Russian army with modern weapons and equipment for the year increased by 7%’, *IA TASS*, 19 Dec. 2014, <<http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1660936>>.

²¹⁵ For example, it is assumed that K-52 ‘Alligator’ helicopter originally intended for the land forces with the expansion of its fighting capabilities will be also deployed on ships. See: Ptichkin, S., ‘‘Alligator’ will turn into a shark’, *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 3 Apr. 2015, <<http://www.rg.ru/2015/04/03/vertolet.html>>.

supply would be maintained. Later, there appeared calculations that even 20 trillion rubles might be sufficient. In general, according to experts of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), the armament program had to be cut by about a third²¹⁶.

As the first Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the defence sector D. Rogozin noted, 'we will further determine the macroeconomic forecast for the coming years and the parameters of the perspective state armament program because the forecast is floating, the situation is changing rapidly'²¹⁷. In addition, he said that the implementation of some orders 'has to be postponed'. The state order for 2016–2017 is expected to be cut by 22–23%²¹⁸.

The program of import substitution needs special attention and assessment. In many strategic sectors of the Russian economy the share of imported equipment and goods was 80% or more (in the machine, electronics and heavy engineering industries) which under sanctions pressure created a real challenge not only for the competitiveness of domestic industries but also for the national security in general.

Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation developed 18 industrial import substitution plans²¹⁹ which implementation would allow to reduce import dependence even in the most sensitive sectors to 50–60% by 2020, and in some cases even lower. For example, in machine industry import dependence would be reduced from the current 88% to 40% by 2020, in the electronic industry the projections for reductions were from 82% to 44%.

²¹⁶ 'Experts: 'State armament program will have to adjust'', *Izvestia*, 21 Apr. 2015, <<http://izvestia.ru/news/585684#ixzz3Y2GINdog>>.

²¹⁷ 'Rogozin: costs for armament are not reduced, but the terms may change', *IA Rosbalt*, 20 Jan. 2015, <<http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2015/01/20/1359095.html>>.

²¹⁸ Falichev, O., 'Without a monopoly on the truth. The new system of analytical support to become an effective means of achieving the intellectual superiority of Russia (an interview with the chairman of the NTS 'Rostekhnologii' Yuri Koptev)', *Voenna-promyshlennyi kurier*, No 42 (560), 12 Nov. 2014, <vpk-news.ru/articles/22620>.

²¹⁹ 'Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation developed 18 import substitution sectoral plans', *IA Regnum*, 18 Feb. 2015, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/economy/1896598.html>>.

It should be noted that the implementation of import substitution programs does not mean the reduction of cooperation with foreign partners to zero but its contraction in view of possible risks.

Huge difficulties in the implementation of GPV–2020 result from *curtailing ties with Ukraine's defence industry* and – to a lesser extent – with Western partners. Although these difficulties are not insurmountable, the problem of substitution of production of Ukrainian defence industry as well as of individual NATO countries is so large-scaled and multi-dimensional that the program of import substitution becomes the most important component of radical transformation of the Russian DIC and alterations in GPV–2020 implementation.

According to various estimates, 100 to 160 Ukrainian enterprises have until recently participated in the cooperative supply of components. The total number of substitutable positions is from 3,000 to 10,000 units. Ukrainian companies are involved in the production of more than 200 samples of Russian military equipment of various types of complexity. In particular, 80% of Russian helicopters were equipped with engines from 'Motor Sich', 60% of the ships under construction – with gas turbines from Nikolaev enterprise 'Zorya'²²⁰. According to Russian Industry and Trade Ministry, the program of import substitution of Ukrainian products would require about 50 billion rubles.

According to most experts, virtually none of the modern AME ('Topol-M' and Yars' ICBMs, S-300 and S-400 Sarmat anti-aircraft missile systems which should become operational in 2018–2020 and to replace R-36 'Voevoda' ICBM in the Strategic Missile Forces) use of Ukrainian components.

In general, according to experts of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, the proposed set of measures aimed at ensuring import substitution through the localization of competitive import products will require 159 billion rubles of budgetary funds and in 20 years will attract budget revenues amounted to 2.156 trillion rubles

²²⁰ Falichev, O., Op. cit.

(increase of 13.5 times)²²¹. According to the Minister of Industry D. Manturov of 26 June 2014, the program of import substitution will allow Russian companies to generate additional output worth more than 30 billion rubles annually starting from 2015²²². Along with the new realities, in early April the Russian budget expenditures for 2015 were adjusted and new objectives for 2016 and 2017 were set²²³. The defence spending in 2015 will be reduced by 157,217.5 million rubles with 3,116,774 million rubles for the chapter of 'National defence' will (Table 2)²²⁴. Military spending in 2015 will increase by 24% (comparing with the previous year).

Table 2. Estimate national defence expenditures of the Russian federal budget.

| | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| National defence spending, bln rubles | 2479.1 | 3116.8 | 3113.0 | 3237.0 |
| % of GDP | 3.8 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 3.6 |
| % of total budget expenditures | 16.6 | 20.5 | 19.7 | 20.0 |

Source: *Finmarket*, 07 Apr. 2015, <www.finmarket.ru/news/3986959>; *Vesti Finance*, 16 Oct. 2014, <www.vestifinance.ru/articles/48298>.

²²¹ According to the press service of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. See: 'Ministry of Industry and Trade: import substitution costs 1.5 trillion rubles', *Vesti*, 23 May 2015, <www.vestifinance.ru/articles/55466>.


²²² 'The program of import substitution for Russian companies', *Voenno-promyshlennyi kurier*, 26 June 2014, <www.vpk-news.ru/news/20843>.

²²³ Amendments to the budget developed by the Ministry of Finance on the basis of the adjusted macroeconomic forecast of the Ministry of Economic Development for 2015 assumes a reduction in GDP by 3% at an oil price of \$50 per barrel and inflation at 12%. The budget deficit, according to the project, in 2015 will amount to 3.8% of GDP (2.76 trillion rubles).

²²⁴ 'Defence spending is proposed to reduce in 2015 to 157 billion rubles', *IA Finmarket*, 7 Apr. 2015, <www.finmarket.ru/news/3986959>.

Moreover, if the share of defence spending in 2015 (Table 2, Figure 1) is approximately 4.2% of GDP (which, as stated previously, is within reasonable limits for peace time), the share of national defence spending of 20.5% in the federal budget (Table 2)²²⁵ is rather high. According to representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry, this is due to rearmament cycle of the Russian army. Over 2011–2015, the share of spending on national defence in the federal budget will grow by 1.5 times, from 14% in 2011 to 21% in 2015.

Figure 1. Military expenditures as % of GDP.



Source: *Finmarket*, 07 Apr. 2015, <www.finmarket.ru/news/3986959>.

In general, the Russian Defence Ministry budget sequestration was not 10%, as proposed by the Ministry of Finance, but only 3.8%. There was a compromise between the social interests and objectives of military security. In addition, the spending on defence order and GPV were not sequestered (only about 3% of positions were rescheduled for a later implementation date).

The share of spending on GPV–2020 will increase from 38% in 2013 to 62% in 2015 and is expected to reach 70% in 2017 (Table 3, Figure 2), which indicates the priority of equipping the army over its material substantive content.


²²⁵ Ibid.

Table 3. Russian Ministry of Defence expenditure structure (2013–2015).

| | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
|---|------|------|------|
| State Armament Program | 38 | 44 | 62 |
| Public and equated obligations | 36 | 37 | 18 |
| Infrastructure development and supporting of troops' daily activities | 26 | 19 | 20 |

Source: according to the data of the press service of the Russian Ministry of Defence: Vladykin, O., ‘Untouchable chapters of the budget’, *NVO*, No 12, 3 Apr. 2015.

Figure 2. State Armament Program as % of Ministry of Defence military spending.



Source: according to the data of the press service of the Russian Ministry of Defence: Vladykin, O., ‘Untouchable chapters of the budget’, *NVO*, No 12, 3 Apr. 2015.

Today there is no single answer to the question of whether defence spending constitute a loss for the economy or a multiplier effect takes place. Thus, according to the director of the Institute for Public Finance Reform V. Klimanov, political considerations aside, from a purely economic point of view, the reallocation of resources in

favor of the defense industry does not bring any benefit for the economy²²⁶.

However, we have no doubt – and the relevant data supports it – that the increase in production and its regularity in the aviation, aerospace, shipbuilding, electronic industries lead to the growth of national industrial production and the corresponding multiplier effect (creating added value). At the same time, experts of the Higher School of Economics believe that in other sectors stagnation may take place.

The share of the defence industry in the total industrial capacity of Russia is about 4–5%. At the same time, it accounts for about 30% of gross production in the engineering industry and about 45% of the machinery and technical export. According to the middle of this decade data, defence enterprises produce 60% of the medical equipment and fuel and energy complex depends for 30% on them. For certain types of the high-tech sectors, such as aerospace, electronics and optics, defence enterprises provide for 100% of production²²⁷.

The role of R&D in the modernization process

One of the important of the declared (and objectively indispensable) tasks of GPV–2020 is the build-up of scientific and technological potential, suggesting the development of fundamental and applied research which forms the basis for developing new systems and types of weapons. To solve this problem will require intensive measures to create an effective mechanism of innovative economic development with the active cooperation of the military and civilian industrial sectors.

Analysis of GPV–2020 and the perspective GPV–2025 programs suggests that an innovative modernization breakthrough

²²⁶ Bulin, D., ‘New Russian budget: more military, less social’, *BBC Russian Service*, 25 Oct. 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2013/10/131025_russia_budget_2014>.

²²⁷ Pankova, L., ‘The role of innovation in the economic system of national and military security’, *Military and economic foundation for Russia’s national security in the multipolar world* (Moscow: IMEMO, 2009), p. 56.

should be expected at the turn of the second and third decades of this century. During this period, fifth-generation aircrafts, S-500 anti-aircraft missile systems to intercept high-altitude goals will appear, the supply of Iskander operative-tactical missile systems will expand (up to 10 brigades), the development and deployment of a new heavy Sarmat ICBM will be completed, satellite fleet (to replace the vehicles developed in the Soviet period) of an early warning system will be built²²⁸. Under discussion is the deployment of a system which significantly expands the range of controlled orbits and reduces the minimum size of detectable space objects by 2–3 times; development of the fifth generation of Armata main battle tank; establishment of radically new, innovative flight control systems of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), etc.

High-precision conventional weapons were considered to have a priority in GPV–2025 state armament program. This category ‘includes means to ensure hitting a designated target with a first shot, high probability and least possible collateral damage. As a rule, these are guided missile systems, guided aerial bombs and artillery shells’²²⁹.

The transition of armaments and military equipment from a laboratory to a battlefield is known to take decades. A detailed regression analysis held in the last few years²³⁰ showed a close correlation between five year old investments in research and development and the efficiency of current R&D, and 20–25 year old investments in research and development and creation of new weapons systems.

The development of military R&D has remained a high priority for decades and is a focus of attention in a number of key industrialized countries. Russia spends on military R&D much less than the US and a number of other countries (about \$8 billion per year, and as a part of

²²⁸ The new spacecraft, as well as modernized command centers capable of processing information in the automatic mode, allows the detection of ballistic missile launches from any place on Earth.

²²⁹ ‘Precision weapons will be a priority in the new state armament program’, *Lenta.ru*, 5 Dec. 2014, <<http://lenta.ru/news/2014/12/05/precisionguided/>>.

²³⁰ Bowns, S., Gebicke, S., *From R&D Investment to Fighting Power, 25 Years Later*, McKinsey on Government, No 5, 2010, pp.75-79.

GPV–2020 was supposed to receive about 20% of total funding)²³¹. It should be noted that after the Cold War global military R&D spending has reduced but only by 18%, and ranged between 30 and 37% of total R&D expenditures of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member states in the late 1990s²³², when these expenditures again began to rise. Currently military R&D spending remains at quite a high level: about \$80 billion in the United States, almost \$40 billion in the UK.

During the first decade of the new century, spending on military R&D in the United States increased from \$40 billion to more than \$63 billion in constant prices of year 2000, i.e. more than to 50%. During the same period, these costs at current prices about doubled – from \$41 to almost \$80 billion²³³.

It is obvious that without the expansion of national R&D it is hard to expect the growth of innovation activity of defence enterprises which is planned to be from a little more than 11% in 2011 to a 17–20% by 2020. For comparison, in the former Soviet Union this figure exceeded 50%, and in the United States, according to various estimates, it reaches 70–80%.

The hopes for increasing efficiency of military-oriented R&D are pinned on a reviving class of chief designers who will work in 20 research areas to create complex armaments systems. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the corresponding decree ‘On the chief designer of armaments, military and special equipment’ at the meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission at Novo-Ogaryovo on 20 January 2015²³⁴. Chief designers will not only spearhead the development of strategic weapons systems, but will also have broad powers to secure resource provision for their projects.

²³¹ See: <<http://rusaviacluster.ru/aviatsiya/aerokosmicheskij-kompleks/149-v-ramkakh-gpv-2020-resheno-vydelit-na-niokr-okolo-600-mlrd-rublej>>.

²³² Military Spending on R&D, March 2005, <http://www.youthxchange.net/main/ff4b265_military-spending-d.asp>.

²³³ *Aerospace Facts and Figures*, 57th edition (Washington, D.C., 2009).

²³⁴ ‘Putin signed a decree on the general designers of weapons’, *Mir-24*, 20 Jan. 2015, <<http://mir24.tv/news/politics/11941624>>.

It is indicative that chief designers will at the same time serve as commissioners for the most advanced research of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Such an arrangement is aimed at reviving the interaction between various elements of the Russian R&D sector.

Prospective domestic R&D projects require special attention and conceptualization within the framework of import substitution policy. Successful rearmament of the Russian army by 2020 will allow to take the attention to the renewal of military-oriented research and development to a qualitatively new level.

New prospects are opening up due to the opportunities arising from employing dual-use technologies; achieving an optimal balance of military, civil and commercial projects; solving the issue of production diversification; as well as transitioning to modern technology and integrating industrial enterprises, leading research institutes and universities. The foundation for such changes lies in the traditional strengths of the Russian R&D: accumulated experience of fundamental sciences, implementation of system integrator functions, implementation of large-scale projects, major share in the global exports of arms and military equipment, Russia's maintaining its positions in several important sectors of the world market (space delivery vehicles and rocket engines, combat and transport aircraft, helicopters).

According to some Western experts, European and US restrictions on the sale of military equipment to Russia will not deeply affect the modernization plan for the Russian armed forces²³⁵, as the top priority of rearming the Russian Army under the current Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu is to focus on the domestic production of armaments and military equipment.

However, the greatest challenge to the modernization of the Armed Forces, as noted by Professor Julian Cooper of the British Center for Russian and East European Studies²³⁶, is the limited access to dual-use technologies in particular to electronic components. Cooper

²³⁵ Cooper, J., 'Sanctions will hurt Russia's rearmament plans', *Moscow Times*, 12 Aug. 2014, <<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/505006.html>>.

²³⁶ Ibid.

stressed the fact that ‘the Russian defence industry will be particularly strongly affected when it comes to foreign component base’. At the same time, Western experts emphasize that the Russian defence industry will be able to satisfy its needs for radiation-protected components for rockets and key space systems, while some electronic components may be purchased in Asia or anywhere else²³⁷. However, Western experts believe that Russian experts’ claim that these challenges will be solved within five to six years to be too optimistic.

According to Russian experts, the development of domestic, mainly electronic, elements is a quite problematic issue of the state armaments programme. As Vladimir Popovkin, current first deputy defence minister, already pointed out in 2011 (i.e. before the sanctions), Russian Defence Ministry would no longer deal with this problem on its own. Within the framework of the Federal Target Program ‘Development of the defence-industrial complex of the Russian Federation in 2011–2020’ the corresponding subprogram is under formation. The Ministry of Defence together with the Russian Space Agency and the Ministry of Industry and Trade will jointly work to achieve the goal.

In the situation when there is no alternative to the development of an import substitution program in the military sphere, the next big issue is finding an optimal balance of import substitution and international cooperation in the military field, since it is obvious that the full import substitution is necessary and appropriate only in the most critical areas.

²³⁷ Ibid.

9. RUSSIA'S MILITARY-POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH THE CIS: THE ROLE OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS

Vadim VLADIMIROV

The ongoing events in Ukraine (no matter how they will end) have become a serious challenge not only for Ukraine itself but for all the CIS countries. The split of Ukraine as a state and nation has, in fact, turned into a 'moment of truth' for the entire post-Soviet space. The rise of anti-Russian nationalism in Ukraine and Russia's response in the form of support of the 'Russian world' and Crimea, from the point of view of many post-Soviet states, has led to serious geopolitical complications throughout the region.

The Ukrainian crisis has seriously affected the functioning of the CIS formed in 1991 as a tool for the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union and disengagement of the post-Soviet states based on the principle of inviolability of borders. Since the beginning of the current crisis, the military-political situation in the former Soviet states has undergone changes related, inter alia, to concerns of the CIS countries about a possible repetition of the 'Kiev scenario'. In this regard many countries in the CIS have tried to develop new strategies to enhance security.

The Western region

This region includes Belarus and Moldova which share a

common border with Ukraine and not only consider the Ukrainian crisis a direct threat to their security but try, each in their own way, to gain political and military advantages depending on its outcomes.

Ukraine

One of the most serious consequences of 2014 events in Ukraine was Kiev's complete abortion of military and political ties with Russia. In June 2014 President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko decided to terminate the cooperation with Russia in the military-political sphere²³⁸. After almost a year the restrictions on military cooperation were expanded: on 8 June 2015 Ukrainian president signed the laws on denunciation of the agreements between the governments of Ukraine and Russia on cooperation on military and intelligence issues, on the mutual protection of classified information, on the military interstate transportation and relevant payments, and on transit through the Ukraine territory of the Russian military units temporarily stationed in Republic of Moldova²³⁹.

The Ukrainian leadership does not hide the fact that all those decisions were adopted under the influence of certain Western countries that consider the termination and/or obstruction of the military-political relations between Ukraine and Russia to be one of their key tasks in Ukraine.

On 19 March 2014, after Crimea joined Russia – the fact that Ukraine and most Western countries refused to accept – the official Kiev raised the question of withdrawing from the CIS. On 20 March,

²³⁸ According to the Ukrainian government, P. Poroshenko signed a decree on the termination of cooperation on production and supply of arms and weapons to Russia. At the same time no ban was imposed on cooperation with Russia on manufacturing dual-purpose goods, for instance, engines for helicopters that could be used both for military and civilian purposes, etc. See: 'Poroshenko banned military-industrial cooperation with Russia', *Vzglyad*, 17 June 2014, <<http://www.vz.ru/news/2014/6/17/691439.html>>.

²³⁹ 'Poroshenko signed laws on terminating agreements on military cooperation with the RF', *IA Interfax*, 8 June 2015, <<http://www.interfax.ru/world/446411>>. Before entering into force these laws passed the expertise on feasibility of application at the Verkhovna Rada. See: 'Rada will review the legislation on breaking Ukraine's cooperation with Russia', *RIA Novosti*, 10 June 2015, <<http://ria.ru/world/20150610/1069253446.html>>.

the plenipotentiary permanent representative of Ukraine to the CIS coordinating institutes resigned, and the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry announced that in 2014 the country terminated the chairmanship in the CIS²⁴⁰.

Apparently, Ukraine (following Georgia who left the CIS in 2009 for similar reasons) may terminate activities within all CIS structures in the near future. Since Kiev never ratified the Charter of the Commonwealth, from a legal point of view for Ukraine such termination would essentially mean leaving the organization. To date, Kiev has finished almost all procedures to end Ukraine's participation in the CIS²⁴¹. However, in April 2015, Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin took part in the meeting of the CIS foreign ministers which shows that the 'break away from the Commonwealth' has not yet been finalized. The reason is that Kiev may continue to analyze potential political and economic ramifications of such a step²⁴².

For its part, Moscow strongly reacted to the changing situation and the termination of military-technical cooperation with Ukraine. According to the Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, on 10 June 2014, on behalf of the Russian government the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade introduced to the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) a plan for full substitution of Ukrainian military production for

²⁴⁰ 'Rada was recommended to end its membership in CIS bodies', 17 Dec. 2014, <<http://glavcom.ua/news/256730.html>>. According to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, in March, Ukraine tried to initiate an extraordinary meeting of the CIS Foreign Ministers' Council regarding Russian actions with respect to the Ukrainian territory, but the members of the Commonwealth did not support this initiative. See: 'Why Ukraine leaves the CIS, and what it portends for the country?', *AiF na Ukraine*, 20 Mar. 2014, <<http://www.aif.ua/politic/ukraine/1128656>>.

²⁴¹ Poroshenko did not participate in the CIS summit, and in November 2014 he recalled the representative of Ukraine A. Dron from the CIS Executive Committee.

²⁴² In the current difficult economic situation (active debts to Russia and Western countries, including those for Russian gas), it is very important for the Ukrainian leadership to collect convincing evidence that the pro-Western course that focuses on close cooperation with the United States and the implementation of the EU Association Agreement promises more benefits for Ukraine than the 'pro-Eastern' (Russia oriented) one or even multi-vector policy which Kiev pursued in recent years.

the needs of the Russian military-industrial complex²⁴³. By the end of 2014 the government prepared a general program of import substitution in the defense area. All these measures became the result of painstaking efforts of experts who determined the deadlines and cost of the work²⁴⁴. However, amid tighter Western sanctions these estimates could hardly be considered final.

In the following discussion several experts expressed doubts as to whether it was possible in such a short period of time to execute the program. They believed that it would take much more time. According to R. Puhov, the head of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, the full substitution of Ukrainian goods might take 12 to 13 years²⁴⁵.

Belarus

Sharing a border and maintaining broad economic ties with Ukraine, Belarus reacted vehemently to the Ukrainian crisis. President Alexander Lukashenka quite unequivocally spoke for the country's territorial integrity and refused to recognize the breakaway Luhansk

²⁴³ Prior to the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian side maintained close ties with major enterprises of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex such as Zorya-Mashproekt research and production complex (Russia planned to set up joint manufacture of gas turbines for warships), Yuzhnoye design bureau and Yuzhmash industrial group (performed maintenance for Russian strategic ICBMs including SS-18 Satan, Russia and Ukraine discussed developing a new heavy ICBM), Antonov state-run enterprise (cooperation in the field of military transport aviation), Progress design bureau (produced a number of helicopters and aircraft and equipment) and some others. However, since the early 2010s Russia started the process of creating its own production cycles of certain military equipment.

²⁴⁴ Speaking on 28 April 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia was able to complete the import substitution of military equipment within 2.5 years given certain deadline and funding alterations of the state defence order. See: 'V.V. Putin: Russia can complete import substitution of the Ukrainian military equipment, it will take up to 2.5 years', *Interfax*, 28 Apr. 2014, <<http://www.interfax.by/news/world/1154928>>.

²⁴⁵ 'Import substitution of the Ukrainian military products will cost Russia \$15 billion', 20 June 2014, <<http://www.eer.ru/a/article/u155/06.20.2014/22255>>.

and Donetsk People's Republics (LPR and DPR)²⁴⁶. From the very start of the crisis Minsk kept constant contact with Kiev: Lukashenka maintained close relations with Ukraine's acting president A. Turchinov and attended the inauguration of the new president P. Poroshenko.

Such policy was associated both with Minsk's attempts to improve its image in the West and with its desire to position Belarus as an 'independent arbiter' and mediator in the conflict²⁴⁷. The latter was evident from the active role Belarus undertook in facilitating the Minsk negotiation process (Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 agreements), as well as, Lukashenka's proposals to send Belarus troops to Ukraine as peacekeepers.

At the same time, focusing on the maintaining close economic and political cooperation with Moscow Minsk was quite cautious expressing its opinion on the Russian actions in the Ukrainian crisis including the accession of Crimea. While acknowledging the accession, the Belarus president noted that in the absence of a legal solution the Ukrainian leadership should negotiate the Crimean issue in the future.

At the same time Lukashenka offered Moscow an additional site on the territory of Belarus to deploy 15 bombers against NATO and endorsed the Russian proposal to start a production line in Belarus for several thousands components for the Russian defense industry²⁴⁸.

Thus, Belarus has been successfully using the Ukrainian crisis playing a mediating role in its settlement and trying to present its policy as a balanced course between Russia and the West. According to experts, this kind of policy is mainly propaganda and mostly focused on the presidential elections to be held in Belarus in 2015.

²⁴⁶ 'Belarus does not recognize LPR and DPR – Lukashenka', 3 Oct. 2014, <<http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/849967-Belarus-ne-priznaet-DNR-i-LNR-Lukashenko>>.

²⁴⁷ For details, see Radov, N., 'Belarus: domestic politics is a prisoner of foreign policy', *IA Regnum*, 19 Feb. 2015, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1897337.html>>.

²⁴⁸ 'The Russian-Belarusian military fist', 12 Mar. 2014, <<http://rosgeroika.ru/geroi-nashego-vremeni/2014/march/rossijsko-belorusskij-voennyij-kulak>>; 'Russia suggested that Belarus should replace Ukraine in MIC', *Vzglyad*, 24 July 2014, <<http://vz.ru/news/2014/7/24/697061.html>>.

Moldova

Despite the claims of Chisinau that Moldova adheres to neutrality it continues to ‘drift’ towards NATO. Chisinau refuses to discuss military and political affairs in the CIS framework, especially the Transnistria issue. The crisis in Ukraine presented Moldova with an opportunity to enforce a blockade of the territory. This approach fits in American politics of hampering Russia in the region, stretching its powers, attention and resources, depriving it of the possibility to pursue active policy in the post-Soviet space.

Transnistria borders only with Moldova and Ukraine that is why Russia can provide assistance to the republic, including supplying peacekeepers, only through the Ukrainian territory. The alternative is to transit supplies by military transport aircraft but it is inconvenient and expensive. With the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis the border between Ukraine and Transnistria was closed. Moreover, in April 2014 Kiev moved some armed forces to the border with Transnistria.

Formed in February 2015 the new government of Moldova headed by Cyril Gaburici from the Liberal Democratic Party stepped up its support for Kiev, above all continued to develop a ‘common line’ towards Transnistria. Ukraine took some effort to assist Moldova in resolving the Transnistrian problem in Chisinau’s favor. With the approval of Romania Moldova together with Ukraine virtually declared the beginning of the so-called policy of ‘unfreezing’ of the Transnistrian conflict which does not rule out recurrent attempts to solve the problem by military means²⁴⁹. As part of this course in early June 2015 the Ukrainian president announced the dissolution of agreements with Russia on transit through the Ukrainian territory those Russian military units which were temporarily located on the territory

²⁴⁹ It should be noted that most experts from Moldova and Ukraine find approaches involving potential use of force counterproductive. This is due to the fact that the situation in Transnistria where Russian peacekeeping units are deployed is, in fact, very similar to the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008. The mandate of the peacekeepers deployed at the border of Moldova and Transnistria provides for prevention of a military conflict. Thus, an attack on Transnistria would be an attack on the Russian peacekeepers, that is an aggression not only against the breakaway republic, but also against Russia with all due consequences.

of Moldova, and on the arrangement of military interstate transportation and payments which could create certain problems for the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Transnistria.

It is possible that Chisinau and Kiev consider other scenarios that can promote the ‘Transnistrian settlement’ (the way as it is seen by Ukraine and Moldova). According to one of scenarios, both capitals will actively work to ensure that the new Transnistrian president E. Shevchuk (Moscow was not quite satisfied with his candidacy) initiates agreements on unification of Moldova and Transnistria while maintaining limited political and economic preferences for the latter.

In turn, the Russian leadership makes efforts to reduce the level of Chisinau’s involvement in the resolution of the Transnistrian issue. For this end Moscow allots an important role to the active support of Moldova’s Gagauz autonomy, which in 2014–2015 signed several agreements on cooperation with Russian regions. In February 2014, Russia facilitated a referendum in Gagauzia which raised questions about external self-determination of the autonomy and the approval/disapproval of Moldova’s accession to the Customs Union and the European Union. The referendum resulted in about 90% of citizens voted in favor of integration with the Customs Union. In March 2015, Irina Vlakh, a pro-Russian candidate and a supporter of the Eurasian vector of integration, won the elections in the Gagauz autonomy²⁵⁰.

The South Caucasus

The crisis in Ukraine has had a great influence on the political, economic and military situation in the South Caucasus. In general, the Ukrainian crisis and the process of Crimea’s self-determination has deepened ‘dividing lines’ between the Caucasus republics increasing the degree of controversy about the future of the region. While Georgia

²⁵⁰ Sholar, E., ‘We want a referendum!’, *IA Regnum*, 31 Jan. 2014, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1760981.html>>; ‘Gagauzia has become even closer to Russia’, *Kommersant*, 23 Mar. 2015, <<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2692716>>.

tries to use the Ukrainian factor to strengthen its engagement with the US and EU, Azerbaijan, on the contrary, makes efforts to improve relations with Russia and Iran.

For the Transcaucasian countries the scenario of a deepening crisis in Ukraine is connected with a lot of practical and strategic risks. For example, large-scale destabilization in the Black Sea can have a negative impact on the supply of the region through the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi. Since Kiev broke off diplomatic relations with Yerevan, Armenia who uses the Ukrainian port of Ilichevsk bears especially great risks.

According to experts, special relationship between Russia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with the accession of Crimea may create so-called 'Black Sea chord' in the Black Sea – a line of defence for the Russian Black Sea coast as well as for the entire North-Eastern Black Sea region. Georgia and Ukraine then will find themselves to a different degree in the area of this influence²⁵¹.

Armenia

Armenia, a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), is Russia's key strategic ally in the South Caucasus: the Russian 102nd military base is located in the territory of Armenia, and Yerevan cooperates closely with Moscow in economic and military sphere. However, recently Armenia has felt quite uncomfortable in security related issues partly due to the policy Russia pursues in the region which excludes concessions in solving important for Armenia economic problems. Moscow, inter alia, has blocked Yerevan's attempts to establish relations with Iran on gas, prevented a deal with the US on Vorotan hydroelectric power plant, and impeded signing of a free trade agreement between Armenia and the EU.

Another reason Yerevan feels quite uncomfortable within the CSTO is because the key members of the organization – Russia and Belarus – sell weapons to Azerbaijan that is in a conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian officials emphasize that due to the arms trade with Azerbaijan Armenia receives weapons at discounted

²⁵¹ Akopian, V., 'Post-Crimea: Transcaucasus', *IA Regnum*, 10 Apr. 2014, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1789461.html>>.

prices. At the same time, the Armenian military experts point out that much of the arms go not to Armenia but to the 102nd military base which is not subject to Yerevan and ensures Russian interests in the region²⁵².

According to a number of Armenian experts, the statement of Nikolai Bordyuzha, CSTO Secretary General, is quite indicative in this respect. Bordyuzha said that the organization was not going to interfere in active combat as it would violate the principle of a peaceful settlement. According to the experts, it means that CSTO's priority is not defense and security of its members²⁵³ but peaceful settlement which in this case is maintaining parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan²⁵⁴. Yerevan is not satisfied with such approach. However, given that Western countries cannot provide Yerevan with the comparable security guarantees both on Karabakh issues and relations with Turkey, Armenia continues to affirm its commitment to relations with Russia and other post-Soviet states.

In 2014, Armenia announced its accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and signed the Treaty of Accession on 10 October 2014. The Kyrgyz Republic followed Armenia's steps shortly in December that year²⁵⁵.

During the events in Ukraine Armenia has unequivocally supported Russia's position, in particular, on the accession of Crimea²⁵⁶. As a result, Kiev filed a note of protest and the Ukrainian ambassador was recalled. Ukraine also accused Russia in using Armenia as a means to realize its aggressive intentions. However, according to observers, Armenia has seen in the Ukrainian crisis a

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Armenia is a CSTO member, while Azerbaijan is not.

²⁵⁴ Akopian, V., 'Post-Crimea: Transcaucasus'...

²⁵⁵ The information is from the official web site of the Eurasian Economic Union, <<http://eaeunion.org/#about-history>>; Falyakhov, R., 'Russia will pay for the allies', *Gazeta.ru*, 23 Dec. 2014, <<http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2014/12/23/6356133.shtml>>.

²⁵⁶ However, at that Yerevan made a reservation that it supported not Russia but the right of nations to self-determination. See: 'Armenia approved the annexation of Crimea to Russia', *IA Forum*, 20 Mar. 2014, <for-ua.com/world/2014/03/20/095305.html>.

chance to stepping up its policy on Nagorno–Karabakh. It is no coincidence that Yerevan resumed contacts with Baku (negotiations at the level of foreign ministers in Moscow, as well as the meeting of the presidents at the Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague in late March), during which it tried to put pressure on Azerbaijan to hold a referendum in Nagorno–Karabakh following the Crimean example (which was strongly opposed by Azerbaijan). These demands, to Yerevan’s dismay, found no support in Moscow.

Moscow’s losing interests to Karabakh problem because of the Ukrainian crisis, along with its refusal to support the idea of Karabakh referendum provoked a debate in Armenia about the priorities of Russian policy in the South Caucasus. Some experts (mostly those in opposition to government policy) expressed the view that Armenia is increasingly seen in Russia, on the one hand, as a channel to maintain presence of Russian peacekeepers in the region²⁵⁷ and, on the other hand, as a ‘bargaining chip’ in negotiations with Turkey and Azerbaijan.

In general, despite domestic criticism the Russian–Armenian relations remain at a high level. The evidence of it includes a visit of the Russian president Vladimir Putin to Yerevan for the centennial anniversary of the Armenian genocide in Turkey, as well as Armenia’s resolute refusal, along with Belarus, at the Riga summit of the ‘Eastern Partnership’ to sign a declaration containing a phrase about Russian ‘annexation’ of Crimea²⁵⁸.

Azerbaijan

Until recently Azerbaijan managed to successfully implement a policy of equidistance from Russia and NATO. However, the situation has begun to change in a sense that the attention of the US and European countries to Azerbaijan and resolution of the Karabakh

²⁵⁷ If none of the parties to the Karabakh conflict were members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, it would be difficult to push the deployment of CSTO peacekeepers in the conflict zone. See: ‘Why Russia needs Azerbaijan in khaki’, *IA Rosbalt*, 11 Nov. 2014, <<http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2014/11/11/1336325.html>>.

²⁵⁸ ‘Armenia and Belarus refused to sign the final statement of the Eastern Partnership summit because of the statement on Crimea’, *NewsRu*, 21 May 2015, <<http://www.newsru.com/world/21may2015/sammit.html>>.

conflict has considerably eased recently. Azerbaijan reacted very sensitively to the active Western support to the opposition movements in the post-Soviet states. From Baku's point of view, such support poses a threat of a possible 'color revolution' in Azerbaijan. Therefore, Baku has lost its confidence in the EU and the US as guarantors of the country's security.

At the same time, its relations with Russia despite some difficulties (the Caspian Sea problem, etc.) are fairly stable. Russia remains the key guarantor of a possible solution for the Karabakh conflict, one of the main Baku's weapon suppliers, and, most importantly, much to Azerbaijan's delight it has never interfered in its internal affairs.

The events in Ukraine, particularly Crimea's accession to Russia were perceived by Azerbaijan as a serious security threat and at first led to some confusion among the country's leadership. The pro-government media cited daunting assessment of Azerbaijani experts that Russia could create 'artificial problems in the north of Azerbaijan' and then occupy (or annex) a part of the country. In late March 2014, the country's leadership made a statement that 'the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine is as important for Baku as the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan'. During the UN discussion of the Crimean referendum in March 2014 Azerbaijan (together with Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine) made a stand against Russia²⁵⁹.

For its part, Russia made every effort to change Azerbaijan's position. Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov, Deputy Prime Minister D. Rogozin, Russia's special representative for CIS affairs S. Kosachev, Russian Chief of Staff V. Gerasimov – all visited Baku in the very midst of the Ukrainian crisis. In April 2014, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov visited Moscow to participate in the summit of the CIS foreign ministers.

As a result Azerbaijan's position began to change. Azerbaijani media advanced an opinion that accession of Crimea did not mean

²⁵⁹ 'At the UN General Assembly session Azerbaijan and Georgia voted for Crimea remaining a part of Ukraine, while Armenia – against', *Kavkazskiy uzel*, 28 Mar. 2014, <www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/240136/>.

Moscow's final say on the 'principle of self-determination' in the international law. In late January 2015, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in his speech at Davos drew attention to the fact that generally the conflict in the southeast of Ukraine did not pose a direct threat to Azerbaijan²⁶⁰.

Thus, Azerbaijan's relations with Russia have improved though not without some leftover friction. In general, Moscow is quite satisfied that while not seeking membership in the CSTO or Customs Union, Azerbaijan at the same time does not consider joining either the EU or NATO. In expert opinion, Azerbaijani cooperation with the West will in the foreseeable future be largely confined to the areas of energy and economy. At the same time, Azerbaijan will not join anti-Russian alliances and support measures to isolate Russia. Moreover some analysts believe that Baku may even abandon the construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline in exchange for Moscow pressuring Yerevan in the Karabakh issue.

The Central Asia

Events in Ukraine generated quite restrained reaction from the Central Asian countries that called for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. That was due both to the remoteness of the region from Ukraine and the countries' confidence that the so-called 'color revolutions' did not yet present a threat to the region. At the same time Crimea's accession to Russia provoked a negative response due to the mutual territorial claims among the Central Asian states, as well as concerns for their territorial integrity. In general the countries showed no desire to openly oppose Russia and continued to maintain with it close military ties which largely served as a guarantee of their internal stability and external security.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is Russia's major strategic and economic partner of

²⁶⁰ Azerbaijan in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, 30 Jan. 2015, <<http://1news.az/authors/oped/20150130015157976.html>>.

in Central Asia. Both countries are members of economic and military integrated associations, particularly the Customs Union and Collective Security Treaty Organization.

The military doctrine of Kazakhstan does not mention a single enemy and designates Russia as its main military ally. Despite the fact that Kazakhstan's army is considered the best army in Central Asia and has fairly sophisticated weapons and mobility, in the view of some military experts, it is more like an Ukrainian army eighteen months ago and is still in a strong technical and financial dependence on Russia including the unified air defence. Events in Ukraine and Crimea caused in Kazakhstan a very negative reaction. Primarily this was due to the growing opinion that Russia 'would not stop' on Crimea and southeast Ukraine and may attempt to annex northern regions of Kazakhstan with the predominant Russian population²⁶¹. As a result, new trends in the perception of a policy of strengthening cooperation with Russia emerged: one part of the Kazakh population was still in favor of continuing military cooperation with Russia and integration into the Eurasian Union, and the other, on the contrary, was for reducing economic and military ties with Russia.

At the official level Astana articulated a quite soft stance on the Ukraine crisis. In particular, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry issued a statement that Kazakhstan sees the referendum in Crimea as 'a free expression of will of the population'. All other statements by the Kazakh leadership during 2014 were general in nature and contained neither criticism nor support for Russian actions. However, judging by

²⁶¹ Controversial statements by E. Limonov and V. Zhirinovskiy that the northern regions of Kazakhstan should join Russia added to the concerns. Zhirinovskiy also said that Russia should create a Central Asian Federal District to include Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. When the Foreign Ministry of Kazakhstan requested explanation for such statements Russia did not provide a clear answer. As a result, Kazakh public came to the conclusion that Moscow had no opinion on the matter. See: 'Kazakh senators want to ban Zhirinovskiy from entering the country', *IA Rosbalt*, 27 Feb. 2014, <<http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2014/02/27/1238248.html>>; 'Kazakh MFA is preparing a note to Russia after Limonov's proposal to seize northern Kazakhstan', *Tengrinews.kz*, 20 Feb. 2014; '2014: Scandals about Kazakh sovereignty', *Radio Azattyk*, 14 June 2015, <<http://rus.azattyq.org/content/spory-vokrug-gosudarstvennosti-kazakhstan/26774962.html>>.

circumstantial evidence, Astana did not approve Crimea joining Russia and did not recognize DPR and LPR. From the very beginning of the conflict in Ukraine Kazakh general prosecutor's office warned the citizens against participation (on either side) in the armed hostilities in Ukraine. In turn, the president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev gave a secret order to enhance the combat capability of national armed forces in the north of the country.

While signing the treaty establishing the EEU in May 2014 Kazakhstan took steps to exclude some of its political provisions related to, inter alia, issues of common citizenship, migration policy, visa policy, security issues and common border security. According to some Kazakh experts, thus Astana prevented the creation of a 'strong supranational political union' under Moscow's control. Some Russian analysts, however, believe that the exclusion of the political part of the agreement 'makes EEU meaningless and essentially reduces it to the Customs Union which already exists'²⁶².

As for Ukrainian conflict, Kazakhstan, similar to Belarus, advocates for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and has repeatedly offered its mediation services. In an important move defining Astana's position on the Ukrainian conflict Kazakhstan resumed military and technical cooperation with Ukraine. The relevant decisions which, according to the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko, should allow 'Kazakhstan to fully utilize the experience and potential of Ukraine to strengthen its military capacity' were taken during Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to Kiev on 22 December 2014²⁶³. Along with Astana's approach to the agreement on EEU such move clearly demonstrated that Kazakhstan was keen on pursuing an independent political course.

In general, the Kazakh authorities continue to pay close

²⁶² 'Kazakhstan succeeded in excluding issues of common citizenship from the EEU agreement', *IA Rosbalt*, 26 May 2014, <<http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2014/05/26/1272766.html>>; Yaduha, B., 'EEU: Russia is left with nothing', *IA Rosbalt*, 27 May 2014, <<http://www.rosbalt.ru/blogs/2014/05/27/1273257.html>>.

²⁶³ 'Ukraine and Kazakhstan resume military cooperation', *Liga business inform*, 22 Dec. 2014, <http://news.liga.net/news/politics/4500680-ukraina_i_kazakhstan_vosstanavlivayut_voennoe_sotrudnichestvo.htm>.

attention to maintaining stability in the country and strengthening the legitimacy of the regime. This was the reason for moving the presidential elections in Kazakhstan from 2016 to April 2015 when Nazarbayev won a landslide victory.

Uzbekistan

The Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan expressed its position on the events in Ukraine in two key statements. Tashkent urged the parties 'to refrain from solving problems by force' and 'to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country in the framework of international law and UN standards'²⁶⁴. Experts believe that these statements indicate that the Uzbek leaders do not approve the accession of Crimea and beginning of civil war in Ukraine. Similarly, back in the day Tashkent did not recognize the independence of Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. In general, however, Uzbekistan seems to assume 'let's wait and see' position on the Ukrainian conflict, being afraid of upsetting the balance in relations with Moscow as well as its internal stability (millions of Uzbeks work in Russia).

Kyrgyzstan

Official Bishkek was one of the first to comment on the Ukrainian events. But if the initial statements expressed support of Kiev, later they assumed a pro-Russian attitude. This change can be attributed to the close military and political cooperation between the Kyrgyzstan and Russia: in 2013 Bishkek received \$1 billion in military-technical assistance from Moscow²⁶⁵ and in 2014 it signed the agreement on joining the EEU. Eventually Kyrgyzstan supported the referendum in Crimea held in March 2014 referring to it as an

²⁶⁴ 'Crisis in Ukraine: the reaction of Central Asian countries', *BBC Russian service*, 6 Aug. 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2014/08/140806_ukraine_crisis_central_asia_reaction>.

²⁶⁵ According to the agreements, Russia will provide Kyrgyzstan with helicopters, armoured personnel carriers, armoured vehicles, Hurricane 9K57 multiple launch rocket systems, artillery systems, small arms, communications and intelligence equipment. See: 'Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will receive 1.5 billion for military expenditures from Russia', *Lenta.ru*, 6 Nov. 2012, <<http://lenta.ru/news/2012/11/06/money/>>; 'Russia reached an agreement with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on weapons supplies', *Voennoe obozrenie*, 3 Oct. 2013, <<http://topwar.ru/34111-rossiya-dogovorilas-s-kirgizyey-i-tadzhikistanom-o-postavkah-vooruzheniy.html>>.

expression of will of the absolute majority of the population. Occasionally Kyrgyz politicians voice their support of Kiev and criticism towards Moscow. However such views are not widespread due to a quite high level of interdependence with Russia, including in economic and security spheres. One of the major factors is that the majority of country's migrant workers have to seek work in Russia and not in the West.

Tajikistan

Despite close military and political cooperation with Russia (a Russian military base providing security for the country, military cooperation agreement till 2042, and recent \$200 million in military aid)²⁶⁶. Tajikistan commented very cautiously on events in Ukraine. Dushanbe mainly confined itself to recommendations to resolve the conflict through the efforts of the two countries' leaders. Such a position is due to a rather complicated situation of the country. On the one hand, Tajikistan has close ties with Russia primarily in the military-political area, on the other hand, Tajikistan develops multidimensional relations with the West and China including through various grants and other forms of support which gives it a certain freedom of maneuver. From Dushanbe's point of view, in recent years the credibility of Russia as the main sponsor of the integration processes in the post-Soviet space has been reducing. In addition, development of Crimea, participation in a protracted crisis in Ukraine, and Western sanctions are likely to divert substantial Moscow's resources including in terms of its capacity to provide military assistance to Dushanbe. So perhaps in the near future Tajikistan will not actively seek to integrate with Russia including joining the EEU. At the same time it has a good chance of developing military and political cooperation with the United States, as well as with China which uses every opportunity to gain a foothold in the region. It should raise a red flag for Moscow which has long believed that Dushanbe will long remain in its orbit of influence.

Turkmenistan

Despite the virtual absence of an official response to the crisis

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

in Ukraine, according to many experts, Turkmenistan closely monitors the situation and makes it clear that it is ready to diversify its foreign policy. In particular, Ashgabat considered it appropriate in the midst of the Ukrainian conflict to ask Washington for help in fighting the Islamic State. According to some observers, the United States will not fail to seize the emerging opportunities in this regard.

It should be noted that while the assessment of the Russian actions in Ukraine given by the Central Asian leaders was relatively lenient due to their reluctance to confront Moscow, the attitude of the general public to the Ukrainian crisis in the region was not so unambiguous.

According to many experts and media, the Ukrainian crisis has exposed existing conflicts between countries of the region and Russia. It has once again confirmed that Moscow's policy in the region actually undermines the efforts by international organizations (including the CSTO), which could make a real contribution to crisis management in the CIS. For Central Asia it is especially dangerous due to the persistent economic and social tensions, ethnic conflicts, and lack of trust in relations among states.

Since the likelihood of Russian unilateral action that could further destabilize the situation in the region cannot be excluded, according to some experts, it is necessary to undertake at least two key tasks in the near future.

First, Central Asia countries should focus on their regional problems including the revival of regional integration structures instead of hoping for Russia's mediation.

According to some experts, in such circumstances Tashkent could take the initiative given its long-standing idea of regional integration in Central Asia.

Second, Central Asian states need to develop the multidimensional aspect of their foreign policy pursuing partnerships with other centers of power. This, in particular, implies enhancing cooperation with the US and NATO despite the fact that Russia considers undermining such cooperation one of the key tasks of its global policy and its policy towards Ukraine in particular.

The CSTO and the events in Ukraine

The crisis in Ukraine has become a serious stress test for such integrated military structure as the Collective Security Treaty Organization. As recent events have shown, despite some progress in the areas of collective security of the Commonwealth countries and protection of their territorial and economic space it is premature to consider the CSTO a fully functional military and political union.

The CSTO member countries are certainly interested in Russia's military and political support to ensure their security and, above all, to prevent 'color revolutions' on their territory. However, they are generally disaffected by the fact that Russia does not always consult with its allies in dealing with important political issues.

Therefore it is not surprising that the events in Ukraine and above all Russia reclaiming Crimea have caused mixed reactions among CSTO members. During the UN voting on a resolution condemning Russian actions in Crimea in March 2014, only Belarus and Armenia supported Moscow. Kazakhstan abstained, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan did not participate in the vote.

Later the allies expressed serious concerns that Russia would demand from the CSTO member states to intervene in the conflict. When Russia made it clear that such intervention was not required, the allies for a long time could not formulate their common attitude to the ongoing crisis.

The CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha spoke on a consolidated position of the organization regarding the Ukrainian crisis for the first time only on 13 March 2014 in response to the call of the Russian State Duma 'to reflect on the role that the organization should play in the national security structure' in the context of the disturbing events in Ukraine. Bordyuzha stated unequivocally that 'the organization does not prepare any measures of collective response to what is happening in Ukraine and does not see Ukraine as a party to the conflict. Ukraine is not a member of the Collective Security Treaty

Organization, so CSTO do not make any plans concerning Ukraine²⁶⁷. Bordyuzha confirmed this position in late April 2014. Speaking at the round table on security issues in Minsk he reiterated that ‘Ukraine is not a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, so we do not consider organization’s involvement in the country including in the matters of collective security’²⁶⁸. Such statements clearly show that the conflict between an SCTO member state and a non-member state does not concern the organization’s leadership.

As for Russia, at 2014 CSTO summit it attempted to change the approach of allied countries to the Ukrainian crisis and get at least a formal approval of its actions in this regard. Also Moscow repeatedly demonstrated in a number of military exercises its military power and put forward proposals to improve the operational and combat training of the CSTO countries.

An informal meeting of the leaders of the CSTO in April 2014 (the only president missing was Nursultan Nazarbayev who was meeting in Astana with William Burns, US deputy secretary of state) was emblematic in this respect. The heads of the CSTO member states attended a large-scale military exercise designed to demonstrate Russia’s military might and its readiness to use force. The guests were also invited to the Kremlin for a meeting which focused on the discussion of the Ukrainian crisis.

Another means to influence the CSTO position was Frontier-2014 command and staff exercise conducted by the Russian Central Military District units together with the national collective rapid deployment forces. The exercise was aimed at modernization of the general command and control strategy in preparation of joint operations and development of common methods of crisis and security management. Military forces from all the CSTO member states participated in the maneuvers that all together involved 3,000 troops,

²⁶⁷ ‘CSTO does not prepare collective response to the crisis’, *IA Interfax*, 13 Mar. 2014, <<http://www.interfax.ru/world/364416>>; ‘CSTO takes the situation in Ukraine indifferently’, *Voенно-politicheskoe obozrenie*, 13 Mar. 2014, <<http://www.belvpo.com/ru/35670.html>>.

²⁶⁸ ‘Bordyuzha: neither NATO, nor CSTO should interfere in the situation in Ukraine’, *IA Regnum*, 10 Apr. 2014, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/1789593.html>>.

300 military vehicles, 30 aircraft and helicopters. According to the scenario, participating units conducted a special operation to localize a conflict in a notional CSTO member state.

However, despite its calls for further modernization of the military structure of the CSTO countries Russia failed to achieve unanimity of opinion on this issue.

On 23 October, the Bordyuzha once again stated in an interview that ‘the position of the CSTO in Ukraine is very cautious. Ukraine is not a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and we have no right or capacity to intervene’²⁶⁹.

In his next interview on 30 January 2015 Bordyuzha said that the CSTO member states had ‘various views and approaches’ to the Ukrainian crisis. He again explained that the Collective Security Treaty Organization ‘focuses primarily on the prevention of any attempt to influence our countries from outside, protection of our sovereignty from outer influence. And only if a national security system is unable to cope with the specific direct external challenges, the CSTO will employ its resources’²⁷⁰.

Another negative consequence of the Ukrainian events was revitalization of the policy to protect the ‘Russian world’ which become a Russian policy brand. According to some experts, Russian leadership and elites failed to explain the meaning and means to implement this idea to their allies. At the same time Russian patriotism being on the rise caused concern among other post-Soviet states.

* * *

Over a year long Ukraine crisis has not been settled yet though there is some hope for its peaceful resolution as a result of the Minsk Agreements. However it is already obvious that it has created a new political situation which has drawn the line not only under the post-

²⁶⁹ See: *RIA.ru*, 23 Oct. 2014, <<http://ria.ru/world/20141023/1029770983.html>>.

²⁷⁰ Press conference of the CSTO Secretary General N. Bordyuzha, 30 Jan. 2015, <<http://pressmia.ru/pressclub/20150130/949908971.html>>.

Soviet history of the last decades, but also, perhaps, under the whole post Cold War global politics. The Ukrainian crisis caught all post-Soviet states unawares forcing them to once again revise their foreign policy models. The ability of these countries to respond adequately to new political challenges will depend on how stable and long-term Russia's military-political and economic influence will be in the post-Soviet space.

10. INDIA'S MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AND THE US

Petr TOPYCHKANOV

The 2014 general elections drastically changed the political landscape of India. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured simple majority in the Parliament (282 of 545 seats²⁷¹) and formed a one-party government²⁷². The previous one-party government was formed in India thirty years ago. After the victory of the BJP and its leader Narendra Modi there were questions on probable changes of India's foreign policy generically, and Indian relations with Russia and the United States specifically.

Do Russia and the US compete in India?

Some Russian observers look at these questions in the context of a US–Russia rivalry for India. Dmitry Kosyrev wrote, ‘The main question many Russians are asking is with whom does India stand? The United States or Russia?’²⁷³.

²⁷¹ Comparing to 116 seats which BJP received at 2009 elections.

²⁷² BJP's political allies added 54 seats to this number. At the same time, Indian National Congress suffered a crushing defeat in 2014 elections retaining only 44 seats instead of 206 won in 2009. Its allies were able to get only 15 seats

²⁷³ Kosyrev, D., ‘Nice and kind Kerry bring together the US and India’, *IA RIA*, 1 Aug. 2014, <<http://ria.ru/analytics/20140801/1018435819.html>>.

This view on the supposed US–Russia rivalry was the reason for a fervent response of the Russian press to the news that Russia ceded its place to the US as the main arms supplier to India²⁷⁴. In response to the development of Indo–US military cooperation, some hotheads suggested ‘compensating for their losses in India through the traditional American weapons market’, including Pakistan²⁷⁵.

Although such assumptions about India seem to have a certain undeniable logic to them, they are hardly likely to reflect the real picture. India cannot turn its back from one state to the other because such a policy would hamper its national interests. The main principle of India’s foreign policy as expressed in 1985 by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reads: ‘We take into account what it is beneficial for India and other developing countries, we do not take a turn to any side. Decisions are taken – even though they are difficult to take – in accordance with the principles of our independence, freedom of actions and the right to self-reliance’²⁷⁶.

Although there are some voices in India that support closer ties either with the US or with Russia, this country will avoid any turn to one or the other side. India demonstrated many times that it is not ready to change its stance due to the relationship with any state. For example, India didn’t support Russia’s policy towards Syria and Ukraine, as Moscow was hoping. And India did not endorse anti-Russian sanctions, imposed by a number of countries after the annexation of Crimea²⁷⁷.

If India decides to develop relations with one partner to the prejudice of another, this partner would not be able to satisfy India’s increased demands. In the field of military-technological cooperation (MTC) Russia cannot meet demands of Indian clients. That is why very

²⁷⁴ Kostarev, G., ‘Russia yielded to the US in the competition for arms supplies to India’, *RBC Daily*, 28 Feb. 2014, <<http://rbcdaily.ru/world/562949990689920>>.

²⁷⁵ Arms markets. News, *Natsionalnaya Oborona*, June 2014, <<http://www.oborona.ru/includes/periodics/armstrade/2014/0630/182913484/detail.shtml>>.

²⁷⁶ Lunev, S., *Diplomacy in South Asia* (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1993), p. 134.

²⁷⁷ ‘India will not back sanctions against Russia’, *The Times of India*, 7 Dec. 2014, <<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-will-not-back-sanctions-against-Russia/articleshow/45399933.cms>>.

often Russia has to implement contracts with the help of companies from other countries.

In the field of military-technological cooperation India cannot rely on solely the United States which has restrictions on transfer of certain technologies to India and make India's other partners like Israel to follow these restrictions. It is clear for Delhi that Washington may deny obligations because of political reasons.

Defence companies from Russia and the United States cannot feel unchallenged in the Indian market. Now they have to compete not only with third countries companies but also with Indian state-run and private producers.

Indian armed forces' needs and defence industry

Military equipment developed and produced by the defence industries of India not always satisfy the end user. It concerns many systems – from strategic to operational and tactical, from space to land.

The former CEO of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Avinash Chander called the key directions of development of strategic systems of India for the next years. According to Chander, the priority areas are creation of MIRV ballistic missiles, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, land-, air- and sea-based cruise missiles of medium and long range. On this directions India cooperates only with two states – Russia (Brahmos project) and Israel (surface-to-air missiles of long range and medium range).

It is obvious that in the field of missile warheads India is interested in cooperation on MIRV, missile and air defence systems, and high-precision systems. Data on the Indian development of warheads for these systems are classified. However, according to the Indian observers, a common problem which Indian developers work on is substantial increase of accuracy of warheads. In fact, only BrahMos can be considered as high-precision Indian weapons.

At the same time, India intends to develop high-precision short-range ballistic missile warheads (Prithvi-2 and Prahar), medium and

long-range cruise missiles (Nirbhay) and air-to-air missiles (Astra)²⁷⁸. When delivered to the armed forces these systems will be equipped mainly with conventional weapons. The military missions of the units where such systems will be deployed will include attacking not only military targets in Pakistan and China, but also camps and hideouts of militants in the territory of other states. It follows from India's increased efforts in the field of high-precision weapons after the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in November 2008 which was planned in Pakistan.

Another priority for India is to develop missile defence and modernize air defence²⁷⁹. Another important area of Indian R&D is Pinaka multiple launch rocket system.

The above projects have some common features – delays in supply, the Indian armed forces' unwillingness to adopt them and dissatisfaction with their quality and capabilities. All these demonstrate the technological challenges that Indian developers can not handle within the set deadlines.

In general the current state of defence industries and arms market of India is characterized by the following features:

- the size of the arms market which will increase in the next years;
- consecutive and large-scale diversification of sources of the imported arms;
- preference for weapons with the equipment from different producers;
- complexity and low efficiency of tender process in military-technical sphere;
- establishing licensed production of imported arms;
- aspiration to use military-technical cooperation for

²⁷⁸ Topychkanov, P.V., 'Nuclear standoff in South Asia'. Carnegie Moscow Center Report, 26 Feb. 2013, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2013_02_26_South_Asia.ppt>.

²⁷⁹ For further details on missile defence systems see: Topychkanov, P.V., Romashkina, N.P., 'Regional missile defence programs', *Protivoraketnaya oborona: protivostoyanie ili sotrudnichestvo?*, ed. by A. Arbatov, V. Dvorkin (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2012), pp. 301-309.

development of the national military industrial complex.

Indo–Russian military-technical cooperation

Russia and India have a well-developed system of military-technical relations. In recent years, there have been a number of great successes in their cooperation in this sphere.

The creation of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile however, remains the sole example of Russian–Indian cooperation in military technology which resulted in the creation of a product which is greatly superior to similar products produced in developed countries. On 12 February 1998, Russia and India signed an agreement between the two governments on the ‘Joint Development and Production of Missile Complexes with the Anti-Ship Missile (BrahMos),’

Based on this document, a joint enterprise BrahMos Airspace Ltd. with a registered capital of \$250 million dollars was established. The share in the joint venture was divided as: 49.5% to Russia and 50.5% to India. The first flight tests for the BrahMos (named after the rivers Brahmaputra and Moskva) took place in 2001. In 2004, the Indian government proposed that the country’s armed forces adopt the missiles into service. The Indian Navy initiated the process of adopting the missiles in 2005, the Army – in 2007²⁸⁰.

According to this year’s data, the Indian Army has two regiments armed with BrahMos missiles, while a third regiment is being equipped. The decision about a fourth regiment has been made, and missiles for the fifth and sixth regiments may be ordered by the end of this year (each regiment armed with 4 launchers and 90 missiles costs an estimated \$300 million dollars)²⁸¹.

According to official data from 2013, the Indian Navy has eight

²⁸⁰ Based on the information from the official Indian web sites <<http://pib.nic.in/>> and <<http://www.brahmos.com/>>.

²⁸¹ Belli, A., ‘More, faster and smaller Brahmos missiles for India’s armed forces’, *Russia & India Report*, 15 Jun. 2015, <http://in.rbth.com/economics/2015/06/15/more_faster_and_smaller_brahmos_missiles_for_indias_armed_forces_43679.html>.

ships equipped with launchers for BrahMos missiles²⁸². In fact, however, India only has six ships with the BrahMos: Rajput, Ranveer, and Ranvijay destroyers (according to domestic classification, these are the Project 61ME anti-submarine ships) and Teg, Tarkash, and Trikanth frigates (Project 11356 patrol ships).

New versions of the BrahMos missiles are being developed for submarine and aircraft carriers. On 20 March 2013, the first test launch of the missile from an underwater platform took place. In 2015, preparations for the test launch of the BrahMos from the Su-30MKI fighter jet were announced²⁸³. But despite being half a tonne lighter and half a meter shorter the BrahMos rocket was too heavy for the aircraft: 'the fighter could take off, but landing was difficult if the missile was not launched'²⁸⁴. It forced the Indian Air Force to abandon plans to equip the Su-30MKIs with three missiles. The two airplanes prepared for test launches of the BrahMos can only carry one missile each.

In line with the plans to equip submarines and fighters with the missile, a decision was taken in 2014 to build a mini-BrahMos. A smaller missile will make it possible to launch it on submarine torpedoes and equip not only Su-30MKI but also MiG-29K and MiG-29KUB based on the Vikramaditya aircraft carriers.

In 1996, Russia and India concluded a \$3.5 billion contract for the design and manufacture of the two-seat twin-engine Su-30MKI fighter. By this contract, India got 18 Su-30K fighters between 1997 and 1999, and 32 Su-30MKI fighters between 2002 and 2004. In 2007-2008 India received 18 Su-30MKI fighters for \$700 million. Beginning with 2008, India has been receiving 40 Su-30MKIs for the sum of \$1.6 billion.

In 2000, an agreement for the licensed production of Su-30MKIs in Nasik was signed. Components for assembly are delivered from Irkutsk. A total of 140 fighters were to have been assembled.

²⁸² 'Induction of BrahMos Missile', Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 29 Apr. 2013, <<http://pib.nic.in/newsite/AdvSearch.aspx>>.

²⁸³ 'Ready To Fly: Su-30MKI With BrahMos', 17 Feb. 2015, <<http://www.livefistdefence.com/2015/02/ready-to-fly-su-30mki-with-brahmos-at.html>>.

²⁸⁴ 'Smaller is better: why Russia needs a supersonic mini-missile', Zvezda, 24 Feb. 2015, <<http://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201502240838-dhl4.htm>>.

During the course of the project, the parties decided against full localization of production limiting it to the assembly of parts supplied from Russia. In the words of V.P. Isaikin, ‘the Su-30MKI fighter is the foundation of the Indian Air Force. They know it well. These aircraft have the possibility of being upgraded at Indian production sites after a few years’²⁸⁵. According to 2015 data, there are 350 Su-30MKI fighters in the Indian Air Force²⁸⁶.

Contrasted with this successful project, joint development of the fifth military transport plane and the fifth generation fighter has yet to make progress.

Russia and India signed an Agreement for Joint Implementation of a Programme for the Creation of a Multipurpose Transport Aircraft on 12 November 2007. Defence ministers of both countries gave instructions that an inter-governmental agreement be readied within a period of two months back in January 2005. However, according to O.F. Demchenko, General Designer at A.S. Yakovlev Design Bureau, ‘the bureaucratic apparatus worked in such a way that we have not been able to issue an inter-governmental accord in two years’²⁸⁷.

After the document was signed, the project continued to proceed at a similar slow pace. The direct contract for the design of the aircraft was signed in May 2012 instead of the projected 2008.

In November 2012, an office was opened for the joint enterprise MTA Ltd (MTAL) in Bangalore (state of Karnataka); its founders were the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) (25%), Rosoboronexport (25%) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) (50%). Instead of launching the first flight tests in 2013 as expected, MTA developed a preliminary design only by autumn that year. According to that design, the length of the aircraft was to have been 33 m; wingspan – 30 m; maximum takeoff weight – 55-60 tons; load carrying capacity – 18.5 tons; flight range – 2,000 km; and cruising speed – 800 km. However, this draft design has still to be approved. This made Y. Slusar, President of the UAC, call on

²⁸⁵ Rosoboroneksport, 13 Apr. 2015, <http://www.roe.ru/rus_pr/rus_pr_15_04_13_a.html>.

²⁸⁶ ‘Smaller is better: why Russia needs a supersonic mini-missile’...

²⁸⁷ Nikolski, A., ‘Bureaucrats hit MTA’, *Vedomosti*, 27 Aug. 2007, <<http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2007/08/27/byurokraty-sbili-mta>>.

the Indian side in June 2015 to ‘maximally speed up all procedures for the approval and acceptance of the results of the preliminary stage (design)’²⁸⁸.

The agreement between the Russian and Indian governments on joint development of a prospective multifunction fighter was signed on 18 October 2007. A year earlier, the Indian side sent the requirements and characteristics of the future aircraft to the Russian side, but these requirements were generally ignored since Russia decided to focus on the ‘joint modification’ of the Russian PAK FA (T-50) plane instead of on joint development of the prospective fighter²⁸⁹.

In December 2008, a general contract was signed for the development of the fighter and in December 2010 the contract for \$295 million for the development of the preliminary draft was signed. This project was completed by June 2013 instead of the planned 2012, after which both sides were to have approved it and transitioned to the building, testing, and production stages for the fighter. This did not happen due to unresolved issues.

In early 2014, it became known that the Indian Air Force’s major complaints were about the Russians’ reluctance to allow them full access to technology (even though from a financial standpoint this project was evenly split), the fact that the fighter did not conform to New Delhi’s requirements (particularly in relation to the engine and radar), and its price²⁹⁰.

As early as the 1970s, India initiated a project to build strategic nuclear submarines. It was divided into three parts: reactor

²⁸⁸ ‘OAK calls India for speeding up the development of a transport aircraft’, *Gazeta.ru*, 15 June 2015, <http://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2015/06/15/n_7288285.shtml>.

²⁸⁹ ‘Farce Generation Fighter Aircraft’, 20 Oct. 2007, <<http://www.livefistdefence.com/2007/10/farce-generation-fighter-aircraft.html>>.

²⁹⁰ Shukla, A., ‘Russia can’t deliver on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft: IAF’, *Business Standard*, 21 Jan. 2014, <http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/russia-can-t-deliver-on-fifth-generation-fighter-aircraft-iaf-114012100059_1.html>; Pandit, R., ‘Despite Putin’s visit, two pacts on military aircraft still in doldrums’, *The Times of India*, 13 Dec. 2014, <<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Despite-Putins-visit-two-pacts-on-military-aircraft-still-in-doldrums/articleshow/45500969.cms>>.

development, body design, and building nuclear warheads to place on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) fitted on nuclear submarines²⁹¹. The official launch of the Indian project to build nuclear submarines, also known as Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), however, happened only in 2009 when the dry dock in which the submarine had been built was filled with water; the submarine was called Arihant. Starting in 2012 and continuing through the present, this submarine has been undergoing a number of sea-trials. It may enter into service of the Indian Navy in 2016.

According to some experts, Soviet engineers were able to participate in the R&D for building the Indian nuclear-powered submarine from its start as they were engaged in the construction of the dockyard in Visakhapatnam (Vizag)²⁹².

The Arihant was, to all appearances, among the first projects within the framework of which cooperation between Russia and India began in development and production of weapons for India's Navy.

Russia and India are continuing to cooperate in the construction of this project's next submarines. The laying of the second submarine, called Aridhaman, happened in 2011. The new sub may be launched into the water in 2015. The construction of two more submarines is underway (six are planned in all).

The knowledge that India gained by leasing the Russian multi-purpose K-152 Nerpa (Chakra) submarine which entered into service in the Indian Navy in 2012, plays a key role in obtaining experience for the nuclear submarine fleet. Personnel who are trained on it will serve on submarines produced in India in the future. This is the second submarine that India has leased from Russia. The first was the K-322 Kashalot (project 971) submarine, which was in the Pacific Fleet in 1989-2003. After an upgrade at the Amur Shipyard, it may be transferred to India in 2018²⁹³.

²⁹¹ Frolov, A.L., 'India's road to the atomic submarine fleet', *Yaderny kontrol*, No 2(68), 2003, pp. 101-102.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ 'Kashalot' may be leased out to India', LiveJournal blog of the Centre of Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 20 Jan. 2015, <<http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1143627.html>>.

In the 1990s and 2000s, Russia and India also collaborated on other major projects for the Indian Navy. In 1997, Russia and India signed a construction contract for the supply of three project 11356 frigates (patrol ships according to the Russian classification). These vessels are equipped with 100 mm artillery systems, Club-N attack anti-ship missile systems, Shtil medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems, torpedo launching tubes and rocket launchers.

The Talwar, Trishul and Tabar frigates entered the Indian Navy in 2003-2004. In 2006, Russia and India signed an agreement for the supply of three project 11356 ships. The Teg, Tarkash and Trikanth frigates entered the Navy in 2012-2013. The major difference is that the second set is equipped with launchers for Brahmos missiles.

Russian-Indian collaboration culminated in significant success with an aircraft carrier fleet. Russia and India signed a contract in 2004 on the transfer of the last aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, after extensive modernization. The ship got a new name, Vikramaditya, and began first sea-trials in December 2012 and the second – in June 2013. The aircraft carrier arrived in India in June 2014 when the official ceremony was held to introduce it to the Indian Navy.

Along with extensive financial and organizational issues arising during the Vikramaditya's modernization, the main problem related to meeting all the Indian requests. State and private companies from both countries participated in the outfitting of the ship.

The experience of Russian-Indian cooperation in the process of building the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier helped India initiate work on building the Vikrant aircraft carrier which began in 2009 (Nevskoe Design Bureau participated in designing it). Vikrant was finally launched in the water on 10 June 2015. Its sea-trials may begin in 2017²⁹⁴.

According to V. Komardin, Deputy General Director of Rosoboronexport, Russia cooperated with India in the construction of

²⁹⁴ 'Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant has been moved from the construction dock', LiveJournal blog of the Centre of Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 11 June 2015, <<http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1336199.html?thread=109022343>>.

the Vikrant in every area related to aviation equipment²⁹⁵.

For the Indian Navy's marine aviation, Russia is supplying the ship-based multipurpose MiG-29K and MiG-29KUB fighters. The first contract for the supply of 16 jets of both modifications was signed in 2004, the second – in 2010. The Russian Aviation Corporation MiG will supply the second batch in 2016²⁹⁶.

Despite the large number of bilateral agreements signed as a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Delhi in 2014, the military-technical cooperation was not high on the agenda.

There are several reasons why Russian–Indian military-technical cooperation has recently slowed down.

First, Russia and India have drawn up a portfolio of orders in the field of military-technical cooperation to 2020 that are worth \$20 billion, according to Indian sources²⁹⁷. This portfolio covers a wide range of military products, the most vivid examples of which are mentioned above.

Second, there is a technical or rather management issue. After the 2014 general election the Indian Ministry of Defence under the new government could not operate to its full potential. Only after Manohar Panikkar took up a position of defence minister on 9 November 2014, the Russian–Indian dialogue on military-technical cooperation intensified.

Third, ahead of Vladimir Putin's trip to Delhi the parties did not address all the outstanding issues related to ongoing projects, primarily the new fifth-generation multipurpose fighter and military transport aircraft. However, there is no reason to suppose that they cannot be resolved in the coming months.

The development of new strategic projects would be not only significant expansion of the practice already existing in the Indian–

²⁹⁵ 'Russia will help India to finish Vikrant aircraft carrier', *IA RIA*, 25 Sep. 2013, <http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130925/965630683.html>.

²⁹⁶ 'The delivery of MiG-29K/KUB fighter jets will be finalized in 2016', LiveJournal blog of the Centre of Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 13 Mar. 2015, <<http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1217949.html>>.

²⁹⁷ 'The US is ahead of Russia on direct arms supplies to India', *Vzglyad*, 12 Aug. 2014, <<http://vz.ru/news/2014/8/12/700014.html>>.

Russian military-technical cooperation, but also transition to a new level. According to K. Makiyenko, Deputy Director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, ‘the growth of international competition for the Indian defence market will push Russia to expand cooperation with India to the new areas where it will not have any competitors. Strategic weapons and technology are among them’²⁹⁸. The joint efforts of Moscow and India could produce components or whole systems for strategic weapons. In modern conditions, such cooperation would undoubtedly serve Russia’s interests.

After the deterioration of relations with several countries because of the Ukraine crisis, obstacles have arisen for Russia to obtain several components used in manufacturing Russian military products²⁹⁹. The foreign companies that refused to continue to supply parts for Russian-made military hardware are being replaced by BRICS countries including India.

Indo–US military-technical cooperation

The US–India dialogue on defence and military-technical cooperation has gained in intensity since the mid-2000s.

In the coming years prospects of the MTC will apparently become one of the key topics affected by the progress (or its absence) in Indo–US relations in all other areas of cooperation. New Delhi and Washington face the task of extending the New Framework for the India–US Defence Relationship agreement signed in 2005 by the Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee (now the President of India) and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The 2005 agreement, in turn, replaced the Agreed Minute on Defence Relations between the US and India signed by the parties in 1995.

The Modi government is trying to use the new agreement to

²⁹⁸ Radyukhin, V., Russia may offer strategic technologies, *The Hindu*, 6 Oct. 2010, <<http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article814932.ece>>.

²⁹⁹ Rosoboronekspert, 13 Apr. 2015, <http://www.roe.ru/roe/rus_gd.html>.

gain access to US defence technologies. If the parties sign such a document in the near future (it has to happen as the previous one expires in 2015), it would help India and the US to move from simple arms trade to military-technical cooperation accompanied by exchange and development of modern technologies.

However, to move to a new level, in addition to this document, India has to sign Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA) and Logistics Support Agreement (LSA). The US law requires the first two documents for full-fledged military-technical cooperation with other countries, the last one is desired but not required by Washington. India has so far refused to sign these documents which would allow the United States to access to the electronics installed on the Indian weapons and military equipment received or produced with US participation (such as in CISMOA), get deeply engage in geospatial intelligence (BECA), and to use Indian military infrastructure to transfer US troops and military cargo (LSA)³⁰⁰.

The parties have been able to agree only on the monitoring of defence production end-users. The agreement was signed in 2009 by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna. This document allows the United States to monitor India's use of arms and military equipment, as well as ensures that the arms and military technology purchased from the US will not be handed over to third countries³⁰¹.

As for CISMOA, BECA and LSA, the discussion of these agreements was stalled in 2010 when the Indian Defence Minister A.K. Anthony called the documents 'intrusive' and announced his decision not to sign them. After several years of trying to make progress in this area the United States gave up pressuring India which was confirmed in 2012 by US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta who

³⁰⁰ Shukla, A., 'US high-tech arms to India stumble on safeguards', 25 May 2010, <<http://ajashukla.blogspot.ru/2010/05/us-high-tech-arms-to-india-stumble-on.html>>.

³⁰¹ Qingchuan, Y., 'New pact puts US-India military ties under spotlight', *Xinhua*, 24 July 2009.

said that ‘It is no longer a problem’³⁰². However, in 2015, Washington returned to this issue in the context of negotiations on the new agreement on defence relations.

These agreements are important not only for signing future contracts between India and the US, but also for implementing the ongoing ones. The largest contracts already under implementation are the following. In 2008, India ordered six Lockheed Martin C-130J medium transport aircraft worth about \$1 billion; in 2009, it signed an agreement with the United States to purchase eight new Boeing P-8I patrol base aircraft worth \$2.1 billion; and in January 2010, it agreed to purchase ten Boeing C-17A heavy military transport aircraft worth \$2.4 billion³⁰³.

The special terms of the Indian market with its growing demand for arms and military equipment make the largest US companies establish joint ventures in India. For example, in 2009, the Boeing Company entered into an agreement with the Indian corporation Tata Group on the production of military aviation products in India (the starting value of the project is estimated at \$500 million). In the same year, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation followed the suit signing an agreement with a division of the Tata Group to establish a joint venture to produce military and civilian helicopters (the starting value of the project is estimated at \$200 million)³⁰⁴. The US companies Boeing and Bell participated in the Indian Armed Forces’ tender for purchasing 197 light helicopters most of which were supposed to be assembled in India. In 2012, Bell Helicopter won the tender and the initial contract was signed in 2013. In late May 2015, the Ministry of Defence of India allocated \$2.5 billion for the purchase of 22 AH-64E Apache and 15 CH-47F Chinook helicopters³⁰⁵.

³⁰² Banerjee, A., ‘US again rakes up issue of defence pacts’, *The Tribune*, 2 Mar. 2015, <<http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/us-again-rakes-up-issue-of-defence-pacts/48644.html>>.

³⁰³ Bhatt, Sh., ‘India will depend on US for military hardware’, *Rediff*, 6 Feb. 2010.

³⁰⁴ ‘Second helicopter producer entered the Indian market’, *Lenta.ru*, 2 June 2009.

³⁰⁵ Bedi, R., ‘India moves to sign off on Apache, Chinook deals’, *IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 28 May 2015, <<http://www.janes.com/article/51758/india-moves-to-sign-off-on-apache-chinookdeals>>.

However, despite these contracts and the US–India agreement on monitoring the use of arms and military equipment, since its signing by Hillary Clinton and S.M. Krishna the sale of military technology to India has not reached a new level³⁰⁶. As the former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted during his visit to India in January 2010, there are a number of US laws restricting the transfer of military hardware to India. Defence Minister A.K. Anthony confirmed this statement by pointing out several cases when the US supervisory authority banned the export of arms and military equipment to India (all of them occurred after the signing of the agreement between India and the US)³⁰⁷.

According to Robert Gates, Washington intends to share military information and technology with India to a much larger scale than it does today, as well as to develop security cooperation in particular in cyber and maritime spheres and in open space. The former defense secretary mentioned the agreements which are essential for the development of US–Indian military-technical cooperation: on geospatial intelligence data exchange, interoperability of telecommunications, and mutual logistical support³⁰⁸.

* * *

Russia and the United States have long had a considerable

³⁰⁶ The high performance level of military-technical cooperation between India and the US is misleading, as it is a result of signing a number of ‘expensive’ contracts for supplying military hardware to India. So far the technological cooperation between the two countries remains tentative.

³⁰⁷ He mentioned, inter alia, a number of DRDO laboratories and private defence sector enterprises (Defence Public Sector Undertaking, PSU) making the list of export forbidden companies. See: ‘Antony conveys India’s concern over listing of defence firms by US’, *Asian News International*, 20 Jan. 2010.

³⁰⁸ ‘Secretary Gates Emphasizes U.S.-India Opportunities During Visit’, American news & views. A Daily Newsletter from Public Affairs, American Embassy, 21 Jan. 2010, p. 3, <<http://photos.state.gov/libraries/burma/895/pdf/ANV20100121.pdf>>. On the eve of Robert Gates’ visit to India, Times of India newspaper published his featured article: Gates, R.M., ‘Forward, together’, *Times of India*, 9 Jan. 2010.

presence on the Indian arms market. In some areas of a position of Russia in India is much stronger, for example, in the field of nuclear power. Also a key feature of the Russian–Indian military and technical cooperation is joint development of technologies (such as the BrahMos). Positions of Russia in India are strong, but they are strong in certain niches. At the same time even in those spheres of the Indian arms market where Russia feels quite confident today, tomorrow it can start losing contracts. And the main reason for it will be not more lucrative offers from the third countries but India’s policy.

The start of the global ‘Make in India’ initiative declared on 25 September 2014 by Narendra Modi should not be regarded only as another loud PR campaign³⁰⁹. This initiative, in fact, is a key element of the Indian national strategy which will define the development of India’s trade and economic relations with other countries for many years.

Within this strategy India will use military-technical cooperation for developing technologies and shifting away from imports. Moreover, India aspires to become a competitive exporter at the global level. So in order to maintain or increase the level of cooperation with India, Russia cannot limit itself to those niches where it currently enjoys strong positions and the technologies which constitute a basis of the Russian–Indian cooperation in civil and military spheres.

The United States faces different problems. Washington and New Delhi need to resolve legal problems of their military and technical cooperation in order to transform trade in arms and military equipment into joint development and production. The protracted dispute between the parties on these issues does not yet promise an early solution.

³⁰⁹ ‘PM launches ‘Made in India’ global initiative’, 25 Sep. 2014, <<http://www.narendramodi.in/pm-launches-make-in-india-global-initiative>>.

11. ISLAMIC STATE AS A THREAT TO REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Stanislav IVANOV

Mobilization of Islamists to fight Afghan and Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s by external political forces led to the creation of Al-Qaeda, a well-ramified international terrorist network, and the Taliban movement. Later these Islamist groups went out of control of their creators and sponsors from the West and Gulf countries and even succeeded in carrying out a large-scale terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 in the United States. Nonetheless, radical factions of Islam are still used by some regimes and their secret services as a 'vanguard' and striking force to achieve their ends.

It was not by accident that the tragic events of the Arab Spring in the Middle East were followed by Islamists stepping up everywhere. They led to the overthrow of regimes in Egypt (twice), Yemen (twice), Libya, and Tunisia, and provoked a civil war in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. By that time former leaders of the Arab world (Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq) had been considerably weakened, concepts of Arab socialism and pan-Arabism had been decayed and receded into background being increasingly replaced by ideas of radical Islam and pan-Islamism.

Saudi Arabia took advantage of this fact. Riyadh for at least last two decades has been making efforts to ensure its status as the new leader of the Arab and Islamic world. Referring to the Saudi king as the guardian of two of Islam's holy sanctuaries, Riyadh is trying to unite not only Arabs but all Sunni Muslims. Their activity is directed against

Shiite Muslims led by the Islamic Republic of Iran. In general, the radical (or politicized) Islam is confidently filling the power vacuum in some Middle Eastern countries becoming one of the most powerful military and political forces in the region.

Islamic State's activity in Iraq, Syria, and other countries

Today, Islamic State (IS) plays the leading role among numerous Islamist groups. The world's media cover extensively the actions of the terrorist group, circulate videos depicting jihadists parading with black banners, ballistic missiles, heavy weapons and military equipment, as well as massacres of prisoners and hostages, destruction of museum treasures of world significance. The international community wonders where did this Islamist terrorist group come from, the group that 'outshined' Al-Qaeda and Taliban in the scale and scope of its criminal activities? What is behind its brutality and medieval obscurantism, what else should one expect from the Islamic State? As it has been centuries since religious wars stopped and people no longer died because of theological disputes and controversies.

IS previously known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was created from an Al Qaeda cell in the so-called Iraq's 'Sunni triangle' during country's occupation by the United States in 2004-2006 by radical Wahhabi-Salafi Muslim organizations³¹⁰ apparently with the support of security services of the Persian Gulf monarchies. The objectives of IS's sponsors were to form a military-political counterweight to the new Arab Shiite regime in Baghdad and to prevent possible strengthening of Tehran's position in Iraq and the region as a whole. More than a dozen clandestine military-political groups of former Baath Party members, Iraqi soldiers, and members of other security forces who fought the occupation forces and the central government in Baghdad by mostly terrorist means.

³¹⁰ Pechurov, S.L., *Arab East: from spring to chaos?* (Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013), p. 115.

Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, IS with the help of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey extended its activities to the Syrian territory and, first in alliance with other Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and then on its own, was able to establish control over a large territory and important strategic objects (state borders, cities, oil fields, etc.). Smaller Islamist groups and even units of the opposition Free Syrian Army joined IS. Washington and its Western partners for some time tried to ignore the growing military potential of IS expecting it to actively participate in the fight against Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.

In the summer of 2014, taking advantage of the uprising of Iraq's eight Sunni provinces IS insurgents triumphantly marched through the north-west of the country facing virtually no resistance, seized the second largest Iraqi city of Mosul, and established control over one third of Iraq. Trained by US instructors regular Iraqi forces could not provide any serious resistance to the IS militants and fled in panic leaving behind arsenals of heavy weaponry. In July 2014, IS declared the establishment of a new Sunni state – the Islamic caliphate on the occupied territories of Syria and Iraq. The IS leaders using sharia laws as a basis for the legal system began to form new legislative and executive bodies, law enforcement and other government departments (education, health, infrastructure). Financial injections from Wahhabi funds, trade in arms, oil and oil products, museum artifacts, and hostages, extortion at borders, looting of banks, and other sources allowed Islamists to have an annual budget of tens of billions dollars and not only to cover their direct costs but also to start paying wages and pensions to civilians. Today, according to rough estimates, 8 to 10 million people live at IS controlled areas of Iraq and Syria³¹¹.

It seems that the world does not fully realize the gravity of the threat posing by IS and other radical Islamist groups. Not enough attention is paid to the analysis of ideological basis and IS appeal for millions of people in Iraq, Syria, and other countries. It is important, in particular, that today the holy war against infidels not only attracts hundreds of thousands of Muslims from Arab Middle East, but

³¹¹ Islamic State terrorist organization. Dossier, *ITAR-TASS*, 10 Mar. 2015, <<http://tass.ru/info/1264570>>.

hundreds of young Muslim men and women from quite prosperous European countries constantly join the ranks of jihadists. Partly their attraction to IS can be explained by disillusionment with moral values of the Western civilization and desire to fulfill the revolutionary spirit of the young through ideas of militant Islamism. Besides there is growing dissatisfaction of young people with their position in family and society, lack of prospects to realize their potential, and, no less important, active influence of Islamists through the media and Internet including social networks. All of this significantly expands the geography and demographics of the jihadist movement allowing young people regardless of nationality, gender or financial status virtually communicate with recruiters resulting in thousands of new volunteers going to Syria and Iraq.

As the FBI acknowledged it, the Islamic State recruiters operated in all 50 US states³¹²; it is roughly the same picture in Europe and CIS countries. According to the director of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), about 1,700 Russians serve in the Islamist ranks³¹³. Apparently IS is also active in African and Latin American countries, besides expanding its activities and recruiting in many Asian countries. One of the reasons population of occupied countries and areas, namely Iraq and Syria, support IS is that the central powers in Baghdad and Damascus have long ignored rights and freedoms of Sunnis and in fact prompted the latter to support the Islamists.

Future of the Islamic State: possible scenarios

Following the natural spread of Islam across the globe as a result of demographic and migration processes one can witness some 'side effects' as fairly wide proliferation of radical, or politicized, Islam. One should not underestimate religious and intellectual appeal of

³¹² 'The head of the FBI admitted the fact that IS 'was recruiting in all US states', *Russia Today*, 26 Feb. 2015, <<http://russian.rt.com/article/76578>>.

³¹³ 'The head of the Federal Security Service told about thousands of Russians fighting for extremists in Iraq', *RBC*, 20 Feb. 2015, <<http://top.rbc.ru/politics/20/02/2015/54e668559a794765c2ce6705>>.

Islamic State despite all its external unjustified brutality as well as aggressive and dogmatic views of its adherents. What happens today in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen and other Arab and African countries can be called a real ‘relapse’ of early Islam when civil wars, murder of ‘infidels’, execution of apostates, taking hostages, destruction of cultural and historical monuments become the norm for hundreds of thousands of religious fanatics waging jihad.

Jihadists believe that any denial of the sanctity of the Quran and Muhammad’s prophecy is a blatant apostasy, and there are many other actions which lead to a Muslim’s excommunication from Islam (alcohol or drugs consumption or sale, wearing Western clothes, shaving beard, violating Islamic dress code for women, participating in elections of secular authorities, reluctance to call other people apostates, etc.). The list also includes belonging to Shiism (the second largest denomination of Islam), because the Islamic State considers it an innovation, and according to the Quran it is a negation of the original perfection. Following takfir tradition (accusation in apostasy) IS declares its intention to clear the world of all infidels which, according to IS leaders, include not only atheists, pagans, members of other religions, Shiites, but also moderate Sunni Muslims who do not share the extreme views. According to the ninth sura of the Quran (‘Sūrat al-Tawbah’ or ‘Repentance’), IS grants life and the right to remain on caliphate territory only for Yazidis, Christians, and believers of other faiths if they pay a special tax, known as the ‘jizya’, as well as recognize their subordinate status³¹⁴.

What will be the further developments surrounding IS and ‘Islamic caliphate’? There are three possible scenarios.

First. The international community will be able to join the efforts fighting against IS, discredit its ideology, deny its support from the local population and citizens of foreign countries, isolate it, and then smash its most capable forces and disarm the rest. According to Western experts, such outcome can only be achieved through a large-scale multi-year ground operation by a coalition of states.

³¹⁴ ‘What IS really wants’, *Inosmi.ru*, 22 Feb. 2015, <<http://inosmi.ru/world/20150222/226404539.html>>.

Second. The caliphate can give up its aggressive intentions, stop mass executions and violence, and transform into a moderate Sunni Arab state which will establish formal relations with Ankara, Riyadh, Doha and other countries of the League of Arab States (LAS). In this case it can be tacitly regarded by the West as an outpost against further strengthening of Iran's influence in the region.

Third. Inconsistency and indecision in dealing with IS on the part of concerned states and the reluctance of the caliphate leaders to abandon their radical views and criminal acts can lead to 'somaliaization' of the region. In other words, chaos, terror and violence will reign on the territory of Iraq, Syria and other Arab countries for many years. Iraq and Syria may eventually lose their statehood and split into various ethnic and confessional enclaves.

So far, despite missile and bomb strikes of the US Air Force and its allies, the Islamic caliphate is committed to further expansion and fights on several fronts. In Iraq it faces Peshmerga Kurdish brigade militia and Shiite militias. In Syria, government forces can defend against IS attacks only Damascus and its surroundings while in the north of the country Islamic militants meet fierce resistance from Kurds self-defence forces. Smaller Islamist groups in Syria keep joining IS.

Many militant Islamist leaders outside Iraq and Syria – in Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries in Africa and Central Asia, and even in the North Caucasus – have pledged allegiance to the new caliph. The scale and effectiveness of the fight against IS today obviously does not correspond to the level of the threat that the group poses to the region and the global community. By early 2015, this group became a strike force of radical Islam and a large terrorist organization so that its leader could claim to be the new Osama bin Laden. Besides IS leaders publicly announced their plans to fight for the world supremacy³¹⁵.

³¹⁵ *Warspot.ru*, 13 Nov. 2014, <<http://warspot.ru/2208-igil-novyy-islamskiy-halifat>>.

Ways to counter Islamist terrorist organizations

To successfully fight and resist such an influential organization as the Islamic State that currently has millions of supporters, the entire international community and especially all the major Middle Eastern players should join forces and work together. But the reality is that the world today – as seventy-five years ago on the eve of the World War II – is politically and ideologically divided.

The United States and its allies in the fight against IS flatly refuse to cooperate with the legitimate Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. In Syria, there are many supporters of strengthening the efforts aimed at a rapprochement between the Syrian authorities and Syrian opposition within the framework of the Geneva talks which would ultimately help to create a united front against radical Islamist groups. But external forces (Riyadh, Doha, Ankara, Washington, Brussels) still do not recognize the legitimacy of President Assad.

The situation in Iraq is also complicated³¹⁶. The coalition's air strikes cause little damage to the IS manpower but destroy infrastructure and incur casualties among civilian population. In the Sunni provinces of Iraq the number of opponents to the central government in Baghdad and foreign allies is only multiplying.

Washington's apparently is not ready yet to initiate a peacekeeping operation under the mandate of the United Nations with a broader involvement of regional countries including, for example, Iran. The US links the issue of cooperation with Iran with Teheran's implementation of Western countries' requirements regarding its nuclear program³¹⁷. The dialogue between Russia and NATO countries on the anti-terrorism track does not improve either, not least because of the deterioration of relations due to the Ukrainian crisis and sanctions

³¹⁶ Ivanov, S., 'New Iraqi Prime Minister 'falls into the same trap'', *Kurdistan.ru*, 20 Apr. 2015, <http://kurdistan.ru/2015/04/20/articles-23892_Novyy_irakskiy_preme.html>.

³¹⁷ 'Kerry: US will not cooperate with Iran in the fight against IS', *IA Rosbalt*, 10 Sep. 2014, <<http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2014/09/10/1313817.html>>.

policy³¹⁸.

The 'double game' played by Gulf monarchies also complicates the fight against IS. Officially they have joined the international coalition and even participate in the air raids on Islamists' positions but, according to some information, non-governmental organizations, intelligence agencies and various Wahhabi funds continue to finance IS and recruit new fighters³¹⁹.

Since early 2015, the world's attention has been focused on the events in Yemen where the confrontation between Houthis (Shiites) supporting federalization and the Sunni government escalated. On 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia with the assistance of its regional allies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) initiated a military operation against Houthis. So far the coalition's actions are limited to air missile and bomb strikes on Sana'a, Aden and other Yemeni cities and towns which resulted in the destruction of infrastructure and killing of not only Houthi rebels but also local citizens and foreigners. The situation in Yemen is exacerbated by the fact that there is a third party to the conflict – militants from notorious terrorist groups of al Qaeda and Islamic state.

It is unlikely that the military intervention of Saudi Arabia in Yemen's internal affairs on any side will contribute to the settlement of the conflict³²⁰. It is no accident that Russia calls for so-called humanitarian pauses to continue the evacuation of foreigners and to give the parties of the conflict an opportunity to negotiate.

³¹⁸ 'NATO General Secretary rejected cooperation with Russia in the fight against the IS', *NTV*, 14 May 2015, <<http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1408096/>>.

³¹⁹ Braterskiy, A., Matveeva, P., 'Terrorist millions (who finances Islamic State group)', *Gazeta.ru*, 29 Oct. 2014, <http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/10/29_a_6281277.shtml>.

³²⁰ A bombing-missile air attack or even ground operation conducted by the coalition in a densely populated areas will inevitably lead to heavy casualties among the population.

Russia's policy: key aspects

The mobilization of the radical Islamist groups worldwide has forced the Russian leadership to take a wide range of measures to counter the threat to national and international security. In particular, in early February 2015, Russia initiated the UN Security Council Resolution 2199 condemning 'any engagement in direct or indirect trade, in particular of oil and oil products, and modular refineries and related material, with ISIL, ANF and any other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities designated as associated with Al-Qaida'³²¹.

Russia has been providing humanitarian assistance to the Syrian and Iraqi refugees in the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan while maintaining close ties with the Iraqi government in the military-technical area³²². At the same time, Moscow continues its efforts to arrange contacts between representatives of Bashar al-Assad's government of and opposition up to a next round of Geneva-3 negotiations. According to the Russian side, the joint efforts of Damascus, opposition and Kurdish militia against IS militants in Syria could facilitate a breakthrough and create conditions for ending the fratricidal civil war. Russia also advocates for a more active involvement of Iran against IS, implementation of 'financial monitoring' of IS sponsors, tightening control over the Turkish and Persian Gulf countries' borders with Syria and Iraq. According to Russian experts, external isolation (blockade) would help to significantly limit IS's recruiting and combating capabilities.

Today it is becoming increasingly clear that it is not possible to defeat IS with air strikes and uncoordinated actions of Kurdish and Shiite militia alone. It requires concerted efforts of all states and international organizations concerned about global stability. Russia calls for international cooperation, including within the UN, in the fight

³²¹ Resolution 2199 (2015) adopted by the UN Security Council at its 7379th meeting, 12 Feb. 2015, <http://www.cbr.ru/today/anti_legalisation/un/2199.pdf>.

³²² 'Moscow considers development of military-technical cooperation with Iraq to be successful', *IA Orujje Rossii*, 9 Oct. 2014, <http://www.arms-expo.ru/news/cooperation/moskva_schitaet_ushpeshnym_razvitiye_voenno_tekhnicheskogo_sotrudni_chestva_s_irakom/>.

against IS and makes efforts to strengthen such cooperation. For instance, on 19–21 February 2015, the head of FSB A.V. Bortnikov took part in the summit against violent extremism hosted by the US State Department in Washington, DC³²³.

Russia realistically estimates the threat of proliferation of radical Islamic ideas studying inter alia the possibility of IS expansion reorienting from Afghanistan to Central Asia countries and the Caucasus. Such studies take into account that the Islamist propaganda skillfully uses such factors as the local population losing confidence in authorities, high level of corruption, ideological vacuum, social and economic problems (unemployment, etc.). Through integration within the structures of Eurasian cooperation, Russia seeks to establish closer cooperation with the Central Asian states in various areas including regional security.

As preventive measures, Russia puts IS and Jabhat al-Nusra on the list of banned terrorist organizations³²⁴, tightens passport and immigration control, identifies recruiters and potential jihadists, pays close attention to returnees from Syria and Iraq, works with their families and friends. Moscow amends the Russian legislation with necessary provisions related to countering terrorist organizations. The Russian authorities also seek support of traditional religions, above all by the orthodox Muslims, in exposing the Islamist extremist ideology.

In April 2015, Dushanbe hosted a meeting of the CSTO foreign ministers. One of the key issues on the agenda was the goal of ensuring security in the region under the threat of escalation of violence in Afghanistan. Speaking at the meeting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed concern about the ‘degradation’ of the situation in Afghanistan due to the growing activity of Islamic State³²⁵. Mentioning the active recruitment of Afghans into the group he said that IS gradually penetrated into Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and that the group

³²³ ‘Summit on ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ opened in Washington’, *TV Pervyi kanal*, 19 Feb. 2015, <<https://www.1tv.ru/news/social/278142>>.

³²⁴ ‘The Russian Foreign Ministry called on all countries to include IS in the terrorist list’, *TV Mir-24*, 29 Dec. 2014, <<http://mir24.tv/news/society/11861308>>.

³²⁵ Savodyan, B., ‘Afghanistan becomes a transit country of radical Islam’, *IA Regnum*, 10 Apr. 2015, <<http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1914117.html>>.

that found new allies among the radical Taliban, became a danger to the whole Central Asia.

PART III. DOCUMENTS AND REFERENCE MATERIALS

12. Key documents of the Russian Federation on national security, defence, and arms control (January–December 2014)

12. KEY DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE, AND ARMS CONTROL (JANUARY–DECEMBER 2014)

Tamara FARNASOVA

Legislative acts

Federal Law no. FZ 36 of 21 April 2014 ‘On the ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the accession the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and on forming new constituent entities within the Russian Federation’.

Passed by the State Duma (SD) on 20 March 2014, approved by the Federation Council (FC) on 21 March 2014, signed by the President of the Russian Federation (President) on 21 March 2014.

Federal Law hereby ratifies the above mentioned treaty³²⁶ signed in Moscow on 18 March 2014.

Federal Law no. FZ 138 of 4 June 2014 ‘On ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on cooperation in the exploration and use of the outer space for peaceful purposes’.

³²⁶ For the full text of the treaty see: *Sobranie zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoy Federatsii* (SZRF [Statute Book of the Russian Federation]) 2014, Vol. 14, Article 1571.

Passed by the SD on 23 May 2014, approved by the FC on 28 May 2014, signed by the President of the Russian Federation on 4 June 2014.

Federal Law hereby ratifies the above mentioned agreement signed in the city of Astana on 28 May 2008.

Federal Law no. FZ 207 of 21 July 2014 ‘On ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on cooperation in the exploration and use of the outer space for peaceful purposes’.

Passed by the SD on 4 July 2014, approved by the FC on 9 July 2014, signed by the President on 21 July 2014.

Federal Law hereby ratifies the above mentioned agreement signed in Hanoi on 7 November 2012.

Federal Law no. FZ 215 of 21 July 2014 ‘On ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua on cooperation in the exploration and use of the outer space for peaceful purposes’.

Passed by the SD on 4 July 2014, approved by the FC on 9 July 2014, signed by the President on 21 July 2014.

Federal Law hereby ratifies the above mentioned agreement signed in Moscow on 26 January 2012.

Federal Law no. FZ 384 of 1 December 2014 ‘On the federal budget for 2015 and for the planning period of 2016 and 2017’.

Passed by the SD on 21 November 2014, approved by the FC on 26 November 2014, signed by the President on 1 December 2014.

Federal Law³²⁷ indicated the basic features of the federal budget for the mentioned periods, the rules of revenue sharing between the budgets of the budgetary system of the Russian Federation for 2015 and the planning period of 2016 and 2017.

³²⁷ For the full text of the law see: SZRF 2014, No 49 (parts I-VIII), Article 6893. !

Federal Law no. FZ 390 of 1 December 2014 ‘On the ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on military-technical cooperation’.

Passed by the SD on 21 November 2014, approved by the FC on 26 November 2014, signed by the President on 1 December 2014.

Federal Law hereby ratifies the above mentioned agreement signed in Moscow on 24 December 2013.

Federal Law no. FZ 391 of 1 December 2014 ‘On ratification of the Agreement on the main principles for creation of a system of hidden control over forces and equipment of the collective security system of the Collective Security Treaty Organization’.

Passed by the SD on 21 November 2014, approved by the FC on 26 November 2014, signed by the President on 1 December 2014.

Federal Law hereby ratifies the above mentioned agreement signed in Moscow on 14 June 2009.

Normative acts

Decree no. 79 of the President of the Russian Federation of 13 February 2014 ‘On the organization of the federal state supervision in the field of nuclear and radiation safety of nuclear weapons and nuclear power reactors for military purposes and in the field of physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear reactors and storages for nuclear materials at nuclear facilities’.

In order to ensure safety of activities related to the development, manufacturing, testing, maintenance, storage and disposal of nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities for military purposes the Decree approves the Regulation on State Supervision (see above) which establishes the procedure for the organization and implementation of the federal state supervision aimed at prevention, detection and suppression of violations of the requirements related to ensuring nuclear and radiation safety established by federal laws and decrees of the President of the Russian Federation.

Decree no. 58-rp of the President of the Russian Federation of 12 March 2014 ‘On signing the Agreement on the formation of joint groups of specialists (experts) of border agencies for the prompt response to border security threats at the external borders of the CIS member states’.

This document approves the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation to sign the above Agreement. The Russian FSB which participates in the negotiations on the signing of the Agreement is authorized to introduce changes in the draft approved by the Government of the Russian Federation, unless they are of fundamental nature. The Agreement is to be signed at the highest level.

Ordinance no. 339 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 15 April 2014 ‘On cooperation on the development of national regulating systems of nuclear and radiation safety when using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the states with nuclear facilities designed by Russia’.

The Ordinance establishes that the Federal Service for the Supervision of Environment, Technology and Nuclear Management is the body authorized in accordance with the established procedures to carry out cooperation with the state bodies of the countries with nuclear facilities designed by Russia on the development of national regulating systems of nuclear and radiation safety when using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes including the development of regulatory and legal framework, as well as on issues of the training of personnel of state bodies in charge of nuclear and radiation safety of these states’.

Presidential Decree no. 259 of 20 April 2014 ‘On approval of the Concept of the state policy in the area of international development assistance’.

The document approves the above-mentioned concept.

It sets out the goals, objectives, principles and main directions of the Russian state policy in the area of international development assistance, as well as priorities and ways of providing technical, financial, humanitarian and other assistance to foreign countries aimed at sustainable socio-economic development of the countries—

beneficiaries, as well as settlement of crisis situations arising from natural and technogenic disasters and other emergencies, internal and/or international conflicts.

Order no. 139-rp of the President of the Russian Federation of 6 May 2014 ‘On the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia’.

This document approves the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation to sign the above-mentioned Protocol. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) which participates in the negotiations on the signing of the Protocol is authorized to introduce changes in the draft approved by the Government of the Russian Federation, unless they are of fundamental nature. The MFA is charged with signing the Protocol on behalf of the Russian Federation with the following reservations:

a) The Russian Federation will not consider itself bound by the obligations under Article 1 of Protocol in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation, the Russian Armed Forces or other troops, its allies or a state which it is bound to with security commitments, carried out or supported by a non-nuclear-weapon state together with a nuclear-weapon state, or given alliance obligations to that state; Russian Federation reserves the right not to be bound by the obligations under the Protocol in case any state party to the Treaty in accordance with the Article 4 of the Treaty allows foreign military ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices entering its ports and landing on its airfields, as well as any form of transit through its territory of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

b) Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that the obligations of state parties to the Protocol referred to in Article 1 of the Protocol are only limited to the nuclear weapons free zone in Central Asia as defined in paragraph ‘a’ of Article 2 of the Treaty.

Presidential Decree no. 519 of 21 July 2014 ‘On Amendments to the List of dual-use goods and technologies that can be used for creating weapons and military equipment covered

by export controls, approved by the Presidential Decree no. 1661 of 17 December 2011’.

This document approves the changes to the above-mentioned List according to the annex to the Decree.

Presidential Decree no. 613 of 8 September 2014 ‘On some issues of monitoring and control of the state defence order for armaments, military and special equipment and materiel’.

In order to improve monitoring and control of the state defence order (SDO) in accordance with the Decree:

– The Federal Agency for Supplies of Weaponry, Military and Special Equipment and Materiel and Federal Service for Defence Order are abolished.

– The functions of the abolished Federal Agency for Supplies of Weaponry, Military and Special Equipment and Materiel regarding placing orders, awarding, paying, monitoring and controlling implementation of SDO contracts on the entire range of weaponry, military and special equipment and materiel are transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Civil Defence Affairs, Emergencies, and Liquidation of Consequences of Natural Disasters, Ministry of Defence, Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal Security Service, Federal Drug Control Service, Federal Protective Service, and Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation.

– *The above federal executive agencies* are to ensure the continuous exercise of the functions transferred from the abolished Federal Agency for Supplies of Weaponry, Military and Special Equipment and Materiel.

– *The Government of the Russian Federation* is to transfer the functions of the abolished Federal Service for Defence Order to federal executive bodies managed by the Government of the Russian Federation to ensure their implementation starting from 1 January 2015; and to ensure continuous exercise of the functions of the abolished Federal Service for Defence Order as well as retaining its human resources.

– Establish that the federal executive bodies assuming in accordance with the present Decree the function of the abolished

Federal Agency for Supplies of Weaponry, Military and Special Equipment and Materiel and Federal Service for Defence Order are also responsible for their liabilities including those resulting from court rulings.

– Make the appropriate changes to the structure of federal executive bodies as approved by the Decree.

Executive order no. 2008-r of the Government of the Russian Federation of 9 September 2014.

In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 11 of the Federal Law ‘On international treaties of the Russian Federation’, the Order adopts a proposal by the Federal Service for Environment, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor) coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other concerned federal executive bodies and the State Atomic Energy Corporation ‘Rosatom’ about the negotiations on an agreement between the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (Russian Federation) and the State Office for Nuclear Safety (China) on cooperation in the area of nuclear and radiation safety when using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Executive order no. 2081-r of the Government of the Russian Federation of 9 September 2014 ‘On signing the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on conditions of transfer and procedures for further use of Kazakhstan’s Balkhash station in Russian missile attack early-warning system’.

In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 11 of the Federal Law ‘On international treaties of the Russian Federation’, the Decree approves the draft of the above Agreement prepared by the Russian Defence Ministry, agreed with concerned federal executive bodies and pre-approved by the Kazakh side. The Russian Ministry of Defence is mandated in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hold talks with the Kazakh side and sign on behalf of the Russian Federation the Agreement and is authorized to introduce changes in the draft unless they are of fundamental nature.

Executive order no. 1775-r of the Government of the Russian Federation of 10 September 2014.

In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 11 of the Federal Law ‘On international treaties of the Russian Federation’, the Order adopts the proposal of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation agreed with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conduct negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement between the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on military cooperation.

Decree no. 626 of the President of the Russian Federation of 10 September 2014 ‘On measures to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 2127 of 5 December 2013 and 2134 of 28 January 2014’.

In accordance with the above UN resolutions imposing a number of restrictions on the Central African Republic (CAR), the Decree demands all state institutions, industrial, financial, transport and other organizations, credit and non-credit financial institutions, individuals and businesses under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, inter alia, to act until further notice according to the following:

a) Starting from 5 December 2013 the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to CAR (from or through the territory of the Russian Federation, or by Russian citizens, or using vessels or aircraft under the flag of the Russian Federation) arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts, as well as provision of training or technical, financial or other assistance including provision of armed personnel related to military activities or provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel regardless of their country of origin, are prohibited.

b) Starting from 28 January 2014 the entry to or transit through the territory of the Russian Federation for individuals identified by the Committee of the UN Security Council established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2127 of 5 December 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) are prohibited. At that nothing in the paragraph commits

the Russian Federation to refusing the entry of the Russian citizens to its territory.

c) In the manner adopted by the Russian legislation, the financial transactions of the funds or other financial assets or resources located on the territory of the Russian Federation and directly or indirectly owned or controlled by entities identified by the Committee, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or in their name, or entities owned or controlled by them including the provision of funds and other financial assets or resources to individuals or entities identified by the Committee or in their favor, are prohibited.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with other concerned federal executive bodies are mandated with carrying out the implementation of the Decree in accordance with their competence.

Decree no. 627 of the President of the Russian Federation of 10 September 2014 ‘On the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation’.

In order to implement the state policy in relation to defence-industrial complex, military-technical provision of national defence, national security and law enforcement in accordance with the Decree:

– the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation is abolished;

– the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation is established;

– the Regulations on the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation are adopted;

– as a permanent body under the Government of the Russian Federation the board of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation is formed to deal with the day-to-day matters of Commission’s activities;

– the board of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation is authorized with coordinating activities of federal executive bodies on: implementation of the state policy on military-industrial complex; development of science and technology for military logistics, national security and law enforcement; controlling the export

of military and dual-use production; mobilization preparing of the Russian economy and shaping of the state defence order; implementing decisions of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation.

Executive order no. 370-rp of the President of the Russian Federation of 24 November 2014 ‘On signing the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia on alliance and strategic partnership’.

The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation approves the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation to sign the above Agreement. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs which participates in the negotiations with the Abkhaz side is authorized to introduce changes in the draft treaty approved by the Government of the Russian Federation, unless they are of fundamental nature.

Executive order no. 2511-r of the Government of the Russian Federation of 10 December 2014 ‘On signing the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the prevention of dangerous military activities’.

In accordance with the paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Federal Law ‘On international treaties of the Russian Federation’, the Decree approves the above draft agreement prepared by the Russian Defence Ministry in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other federal executive bodies. The Russian Defence Ministry is mandated with the participation of concerned federal executive bodies to hold talks with North Korea and sign on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation the above Agreement with the right to make changes in the draft unless they are of fundamental nature.

Presidential Decree no. 773 of 12 December 2014 ‘On adoption of the Regulation on the implementation of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia on development of military-technical cooperation of 25 June 2013’.

This document approves the above Regulation.

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