

NEW COMPACT, RENEWED IMPETUS: ENHANCING THE EU'S ABILITY TO ACT THROUGH ITS CIVILIAN CSDP

TIMO SMIT*

I. Introduction

European Union (EU) member states adopted a new Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Compact on 22 May 2023.¹ The compact consists of 14 strategic guidelines and 20 political commitments—and an annex full of deliverables—to strengthen the EU's civilian crisis management missions and make them more effective. This is in line with the EU's Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, released in March 2022, in particular its objective to increase the EU's ability to act whenever crises emerge.² According to the new compact, civilian CSDP remains politically relevant and is more important than ever, given the current state of global security and the geopolitical shifts that are underway.³

When EU member states adopted the new compact—twenty years after the deployment of the EU's first crisis management mission—they called for a renewed impetus towards civilian CSDP.⁴ It is not the first time that member states have attempted to revive this instrument, which is often said to be an essential part of the EU's Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises.⁵ The new compact succeeds the old compact, which was established in 2018 to make civilian CSDP more 'capable, effective, and joined up'.⁶ Most agree that this was a worthwhile initiative, which produced positive results at the EU, national and mission level. However, EU member states under-delivered on what were arguably the most fundamental commitments of the first compact: to increase their contributions to civilian CSDP and raise the number and share of seconded personnel in missions. Capability shortfalls and uneven burden sharing have continued to undermine the credibility and

¹ Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, 9588/23, 22 May 2023.

² Council of the EU, 'A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence: For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security', 7371/22, 21 Mar. 2022.

³ Council of the EU, 9588/23 (note 1).

⁴ Council of the EU, 9588/23 (note 1), p. 2.

⁵ Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises, 5413/18, 22 Jan. 2018.

⁶ Council of the EU, Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, 14305/18, 19 Nov. 2018.

*The author would like to thank the German Federal Foreign Office for funding the research presented in this paper.

SUMMARY

● In May 2023, European Union (EU) member states adopted a new compact to further strengthen the EU's civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The new Civilian CSDP Compact succeeds the compact established in 2018 and is in line with the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, in particular its objective to increase the EU's ability to act whenever crises emerge.

While most stakeholders agree that the old compact was a worthwhile initiative, EU member states under-delivered on the commitments to increase national contributions and raise the number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions. The new compact doubles down on these commitments—not only by renewing them but also by refining them, and by raising the level of ambition when it comes to capability development and increasing women's representation.

Among other things, this has implications for the review process of the new compact, which this paper recommends that the European External Action Service and EU member states consider before setting the process in motion.



effectiveness of many civilian CSDP missions. The new compact therefore doubles down on these commitments—not only by renewing them but also by refining them, and by raising the level of ambition when it comes to capability development and increasing women’s representation, among other things. The success of the new compact will depend in no small part on whether member states can translate these commitments into tangible results this time.

This SIPRI Research Policy Paper covers three main areas. First, it reviews the outcomes of the old compact in terms of the commitments by EU member states to: (a) increase national contributions to civilian CSDP (commitment 1); (b) raise the share of seconded personnel to 70 per cent of the international mission personnel (commitment 3); and (c) promote a better representation of women in missions at all levels (commitment 16).⁷ Second, it assesses how these commitments are renewed in the new compact and which refinements have been made. Third, it identifies issues related to the review process of the new compact, especially concerning its commitments and deliverables on personnel contributions, which the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU member states should consider before this process is set in motion. The paper concludes with a set of policy recommendations. Much of the research presented builds on previous research by SIPRI and data from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database.⁸ Unless otherwise stated, all analysis of mission personnel is based on data from the database.

II. The EU’s evolving role as a civilian crisis management actor

The EU is determined to become a more credible and effective security provider, which can protect itself and contribute to international peace and security.⁹ In recent years, the EU has taken significant decisions to strengthen its CSDP, in particular the military dimension. Much of this momentum can be attributed to the worsening security environment in and around Europe, combined with growing concerns about the predictability of the United States’ commitment to European security and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were major turning points in this regard. These events heavily influenced the EU’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy and its Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, released in 2016 and 2022, respectively.¹⁰

The Strategic Compass lays out a comprehensive vision and action plan for EU security and defence policy until 2030. It emphasizes that the EU must be willing and able to respond to crises ‘rapidly and robustly’ whenever and wherever they emerge, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood. The Strategic Compass thus contains a strong commitment to reinforce civilian and

⁷ Council of the EU, 14305/18 (note 6), p. 5.

⁸ See e.g. Smit, T., ‘Delivering the compact: Towards a more capable and gender-balanced EU civilian CSDP’, SIPRI Research Policy Paper, Nov. 2022; and SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database.

⁹ Council of the EU, 7371/22 (note 2).

¹⁰ EU, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe—A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy* (EU: Brussels, June 2016).



military CSDP missions and enhance the EU's capacity to carry out the full range of crisis management tasks, including through a new Civilian CSDP Compact.¹¹ The Strategic Compass also reiterates the EU's commitment to gender equality and includes an objective to increase women's representation in CSDP missions at all levels, including in leadership positions, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women and peace and security (WPS) and the wider WPS agenda.¹²

Civilian CSDP missions: Managing crises since 2003

CSDP missions and operations are a central component of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises, and they are some of the most visible EU contributions to international peace and security. Pursuant to the 2007 Treaty on European Union (TEU), the CSDP provides the EU with an 'operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets', which it can deploy on missions outside the EU for 'peacekeeping, conflict prevention, or strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the United Nations charter'.¹³ The ability to use both civilian and military capabilities for these purposes, within an integrated approach that also includes diplomatic and economic instruments, is seen as a unique strength of the EU.

The EU has been conducting crisis management missions for twenty years. The first missions were deployed to the Western Balkans in 2003. At that time the EU had 15 member states and, according to the European Security Strategy released the same year, Europe had never been more peaceful and secure.¹⁴ Since then the EU has deployed 41 civilian and military CSDP missions, of which 23 (13 civilian, 9 military and 1 civilian–military mission) remain active (see table 1). Today, the EU has 27 member states and, according to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Europe is experiencing its most dangerous moment since World War II.¹⁵ Three civilian CSDP missions were established in 2023: the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA); the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); and the EU Security and Defence Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea (EUSDI Gulf of Guinea), which has a civilian and a military pillar.

The changed geopolitical context has affected the EU's role as a civilian crisis management actor. Whereas it previously deployed large missions with ambitious mandates to contribute to peacebuilding and stabilization in places such as Aceh and Afghanistan, more recently the EU has been using civilian CSDP closer to home to support host governments in partner countries and promote its own security and geopolitical interests.¹⁶ The

¹¹ Council of the EU, 7371/22 (note 2).

¹² UN Security Council Resolution 1325, 31 Oct. 2000.

¹³ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, *Official Journal of the European Union*, C326/13, 26 Oct. 2012, articles 42 and 43.

¹⁴ European Council, 'A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy', 12 Dec. 2003, p. 1.

¹⁵ Gronholt-Pedersen, J., and Adomaitis, N., 'NATO chief: Ukraine war is Europe's most dangerous time since WW2', Reuters, 4 Aug. 2022.

¹⁶ Mustasilta, K., 'The EU's external conflict responses: Drivers and emerging trends in the era of strategic competition', FIIA Working Paper no. 135, Sep. 2023; and Pietz, T., 'Zeitenwende or standstill in EU crisis management operations?', *Internationale Politik Quarterly*, 7 Nov. 2022.

**Table 1.** Active EU civilian CSDP missions as of Oct. 2023, by region

Europe	Middle East and North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine, launched 2014)	EU Advisory Mission in Iraq (EUAM Iraq, launched 2017)	EU Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA, launched 2020)
EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA, launched 2023)	EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah, launched 2005)	EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali, launched 2015)
EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo, launched 2008)	EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya, launched 2013)	EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger, launched 2012)
EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia, launched 2008)	EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS, launched 2006)	EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia, launched 2012)
EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova, launched 2023)		EU Security and Defence Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea (EUSDI Gulf of Guinea, launched 2023)

CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; EU = European Union.

Notes: Bold marks missions that were launched after the first Civilian CSDP Compact was established in Nov. 2018. EUSDI Gulf of Guinea is a civilian–military CSDP mission that operates in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.

recent establishment of EUMA and EUPM Moldova are good examples of this trend. It can be argued that most of the civilian CSDP missions that the EU has deployed in recent years were established to counter Russian threats or counterbalance Russian influence in their host countries, either directly or indirectly.

Member states decide, member states provide

The CSDP is an intergovernmental policy domain of the EU, meaning the political ownership of CSDP missions lies primarily with the member states. The Council of the EU—the EU institution in which all member states are represented at ministerial level—authorizes missions and decides their mandates; the political control and strategic direction of missions is delegated to the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC). All decisions are taken on the basis of unanimity, thus requiring consensus among all 27 member states (although constructive abstentions are possible). In other words, EU member states together decide the mandates of CSDP missions, from which their capability requirements are then derived.

The TEU emphasizes that EU member states are responsible for providing CSDP missions with the capabilities they need to implement their mandates.¹⁷ In the case of civilian CSDP missions, this implies that member states are expected to provide the personnel of these missions by seconding individual experts and sometimes entire teams to them. Most of the costs involved with these deployments are borne by the seconding countries themselves. Certain common costs of the civilian and military missions are covered by the CFSP budget, administered by the European Commission and the European Peace

¹⁷ Treaty on European Union (note 13), articles 42 and 43.



Facility, respectively. EU member states pay into these financial instruments based on their gross national income, which ensures that burden sharing is equitable. There is no similar arrangement for in-kind contributions such as personnel secondments to missions.

Effective mandate implementation requires that missions have enough capabilities and capacities in terms of quantity and quality. Yet EU member states' contributions to missions are regularly insufficient. On the one hand, there is the narrative that civilian CSDP is a unique crisis management instrument, which contributes significantly to international peace and security and the EU's wider response to non-traditional security challenges, and whose political relevance and importance is only increasing.¹⁸ On the other hand, there is the reality that capability shortfalls and resource constraints persist and remain a serious challenge. This apparent contradiction not only affects the ability of missions to achieve their objectives, it reduces the options of the Council to use civilian CSDP strategically, because it limits the type, number and size of missions that the EU can realistically deploy and sustain.

III. The 'old' compact: Mixed results and messages

EU member states established the compact in 2018 to demonstrate that they remained committed to civilian CSDP and were serious about strengthening it. The compact consisted of 10 strategic guidelines and 22 political commitments to make civilian CSDP 'more capable, more effective, and more joined up'.¹⁹ One expected outcome was that member states would increase their contributions to civilian CSDP, especially by seconding more personnel to missions. At the time, the number of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions had fallen to approximately 700—the lowest level in 10 years. Another expected outcome was that by increasing member state contributions, missions would become less dependent on contracted personnel, who are employed directly by missions and whose costs are fully covered by the CFSP budget. By 2018, the share of seconded personnel among the international personnel across all missions had decreased to 66 per cent, with 34 per cent being contracted.

As part of the compact, EU member states committed to increasing the number and share of seconded personnel in missions, aiming for at least 70 per cent (see box 1).²⁰ There appeared to be no specific reason for choosing this target, except that it seemed achievable and would be useful for measuring progress.²¹ According to the commitment, seconded personnel were to be prioritized in operational positions in particular. Operational personnel execute the substantive tasks of missions (such as advising or monitoring) and usually require specific professional skills and expertise. Member states also agreed to 'promote actively' the better representation of women in civilian CSDP missions 'at all levels'.²² Women's representation

¹⁸ Council of the EU, 9588/23 (note 1), pp. 2–3.

¹⁹ Council of the EU, 14305/18 (note 6).

²⁰ Council of the EU, 14305/18 (note 6), p. 5.

²¹ Smit, T., 'Towards a more capable European Union civilian CSDP', SIPRI Policy Brief, Nov. 2019.

²² Council of the EU, 14305/18 (note 6), p. 9.

**Box 1. Selected commitments under the 2018 Civilian CSDP Compact**

Under the 2018 Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Compact, the Council of the European Union (EU) and EU member states committed to:

‘Provide an increased contribution to civilian CSDP—which can take the form of personnel, equipment, training, exercise support, financial contributions or otherwise—on an individual or joint basis and based on individual national implementation plans.’ (Commitment 1)

‘Increase jointly the number of seconded experts in the missions, aiming to raise the total share of seconded experts to at least 70 percent of the international mission staff, prioritizing seconded staff on operational positions . . .’ (Commitment 3)

‘Actively promoting an increase in the representation of women among international experts at all levels of the mission, based on increased national contributions and in line with agreed EU and international policies and guidelines.’ (Commitment 16)

Source: Council of the EU, Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, 14305/18, 19 Nov. 2018.

had increased in the years leading up to the first compact but it remained relatively low.²³

Member state contributions to civilian CSDP

Most stakeholders agree that the compact has been a worthwhile initiative, not least because it has engaged many relevant EU and national actors in an inclusive and structured process, and incentivized member states to review and develop their policies and capabilities for supporting civilian CSDP.²⁴ However, it appears that member states have not delivered on the commitment to increase their personnel contributions, despite ample opportunities to do so. The demand for such contributions—that is, the number of occupied and vacant positions in all missions—grew by 24 per cent between December 2018 and June 2023, from 1254 to 1555 (see figure 1). Yet the number of seconded personnel in missions increased a mere 11 per cent in this period, from 710 to 788. Without the launch of EUMA and EUPM Moldova in early 2023, there would not have been a substantial net increase at all. Meanwhile, the number of contracted personnel across all missions increased 32 per cent during the first compact, from 370 in December 2018 to 489 in June 2023. Most of this growth occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic. Whereas the number of seconded personnel increased towards the end of the compact, the number of contracted personnel has remained stable since 2022.

Contrary to the objective of the compact, civilian CSDP missions became more dependent on contracted personnel instead of less. Rather than reaching 70 per cent, the overall share of seconded personnel decreased from 66 per cent in December 2018 to 62 per cent in June 2023 (see figure 2). Before the launch of EUMA and EUPM Moldova, this share had been as low as 60 per cent. Halfway through the implementation period of the compact it was evident that the 70 per cent target had already become unattainable, especially due to the substantial net increase in contracted

²³ Smit, T., ‘Towards a more gender-balanced European Union civilian CSDP’, SIPRI Policy Brief, Nov. 2019.

²⁴ Council of the EU, 14305/18 (note 6), p. 2; and Faleg, G. et al. (eds), *The New Civilian CSDP Compact* (EUISS/European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management: Paris, 2023).



Figure 1. Number of personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by employment type, Dec. 2018–June 2023

CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy.

Note: These numbers do not include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office personnel.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.

mission personnel.²⁵ The share of seconded personnel declined in nearly all individual missions and reached particularly low levels in the missions in sub-Saharan Africa (see tables A.1–3). Meanwhile, the share of seconded personnel in operational positions continued to be high and remained well above 70 per cent in almost all missions (see figure 2 and tables A.1–3).

Around half of all EU member states seconded more personnel to civilian CSDP missions in 2023 than in 2018 (see table A.7). Some member states substantially increased their personnel contributions—most notably Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain—whereas others maintained relatively high numbers. Yet burden sharing remained uneven as the same eight member states—Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden—continued to provide substantially more personnel than others and continued to account for around 70 per cent of all seconded personnel across all missions (see figure 3). In most individual missions, these countries accounted for an even higher share of the seconded personnel—sometimes up to 90 per cent. France’s personnel contribution, however, has declined sharply in recent years. Forty secondees from France left the EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) in the wake of the military coups in Mali and the breakdown of relations with the Malian junta, which led France to withdraw all its forces from the country in 2022. Following the military coup in Niger in July 2023, France also decided to discontinue its contribution to the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), which had about 25 French secondees at the time. During the first compact, nearly all of France’s secondees were deployed in missions in the Central African Republic, Mali or Niger.

Women’s representation in civilian CSDP

In terms of the commitment to address the under-representation of women in civilian CSDP, the 2018 compact delivered certain concrete results. The number and share of women across all missions increased slowly but steadily among both seconded and contracted personnel (see figure 4). Women

²⁵ Smit, T., ‘Strengthening EU civilian crisis management: The Civilian CSDP Compact and beyond’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2021/5, Nov. 2021, p. 7.



Figure 2. Share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by job category, Dec. 2018–June 2023

CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy.

Note: These numbers do not include Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office personnel.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.

accounted for 24 per cent of all international mission personnel by the end of the compact, compared to 22 per cent at the start. In several missions this share reached substantially higher levels (30–40 per cent on average), namely the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah), the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), the EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and the recently established EUMA (see tables A.4–6).

Women’s representation was higher among seconded personnel than contracted personnel in nearly all missions (see tables A.4–6). The main exception was the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), in which the share of women among seconded personnel was below 15 per cent. This was due to the mission’s 100-strong formed police unit (FPU) provided by Poland, which functions as the second security responder in Kosovo (after the Kosovo Police). FPU members—and gendarmerie-type mission personnel in general—are overwhelmingly men, reflecting the national forces from which they are drawn. Excluding this FPU, women accounted for 30 per cent of the personnel in EULEX Kosovo (instead of 18 per cent including the FPU) and 30 per cent of the seconded personnel across all missions (instead of 26 per cent) in 2023. After the recent withdrawal from EUCAP Sahel Mali of France’s secondees, many of which were gendarmes, the share of women among the seconded personnel in that mission has increased to more than 40 per cent.

The increase in women’s representation was not distributed evenly across different mission levels. Before the deployment of EUMA, the number of women in operational functions barely increased. Most of the additional women personnel recruited in this period occupied non-operational positions in the evaluation, planning and reporting (EPR) departments of missions and in administrative support functions. As a result, the share of women in EPR functions increased to almost 50 per cent towards the end of the compact. The share of women across all operational functions increased from 18 to 22 per cent. While this was below average, there was much variation within this broad category of (mostly seconded) personnel. For example, there continued to be almost no women in EULEX Kosovo’s FPU; the share of women among advisers, experts and trainers increased




Figure 3. Number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by selected groups of EU member states, Dec. 2018–June 2023

CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; EU = European Union.

Notes: These numbers do not include Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office personnel. The largest contributors of seconded personnel (EU-8) were Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden. The largest contributors of women personnel (EU-3) were Finland, Germany and Sweden.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.

from 19 to 23 per cent; and the share of women monitors in EUMM Georgia and EUMA increased from less than one quarter in 2019 to one third in 2023.

Around half of all EU member states seconded more women personnel to civilian CSDP missions in 2023 than in 2018 (see table A.7). However, the contributions of women personnel were more unevenly divided than those of personnel contributions in general. When the first compact ended, three member states—Finland, Germany and Sweden—seconded substantially more women personnel than other member states. The number of women seconded by these three countries increased from 64 in February 2019 to 110 in June 2023, and from 41 to 53 per cent of all seconded women personnel (see figure 3). Meanwhile, the number of women seconded jointly by the other 24 EU member states did not increase much at all. What Finland, Germany and Sweden have in common is that they have well-developed legal frameworks that enable them to subcontract ‘experts outside public service’ and second these to civilian CSDP missions, and dedicated agencies to facilitate this.²⁶

Mitigating circumstances, shifting demand

There are several reasons why EU member states were not able to structurally increase the number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions. For example, during much of the implementation phase, the EU was dealing with the effects of major external shocks. First, the Covid-19 pandemic interrupted what seemed to be a steady increase in secondments, which made many missions more dependent on contracted personnel. Second, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (including the run-up to it) caused a temporary drop in the number of permanently seconded personnel in EUAM Ukraine, one of the largest civilian CSDP missions at the time.

²⁶ The designation ‘experts outside public service’ is borrowed from the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management; see European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management, ‘COE workshop: Frameworks for secondments of experts outside public service (EOPS)’, 27 Sep. 2021.




Figure 4. Number and share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by employment type, Dec. 2018–June 2023
 CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy.

Note: These numbers do not include Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office personnel.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.

Third, EUCAP Sahel Mali lost a substantial number of seconded personnel in the wake of the military coups in Mali and the breakdown of its relations with France in 2022.

Moreover, two trends that contributed to the decreasing number and share of seconded personnel in the years before the compact started, continued to affect the demand for personnel contributions in the years thereafter. First, the demand for personnel contributions from missions in Africa and the Middle East continued to increase relative to the demand from missions in Europe (see figure 5). For various reasons (including the type, number and size of the missions in these regions) the percentage of seconded personnel tends to be lower in the former (see tables A.1–3). Second, the demand for operational personnel continued to decrease relative to the demand for non-operational personnel. The percentage of seconded personnel tends to be high in the former and low in the latter category. There are multiple reasons for this, including the fact that missions are not usually allowed to recruit contracted personnel in operational positions. In contrast, they are usually allowed to for non-operational positions that cannot be immediately filled by secondment.

When EU member states committed to providing more personnel and increasing the share of seconded personnel in missions, they agreed to prioritize operational positions. However, the net increase in the demand for personnel during the implementation phase of the compact seemed to concern mostly non-operational positions (see figure 5). The number of operational personnel across all missions was only marginally higher when the compact ended compared to when it started, whereas the number of non-operational personnel was 32 per cent higher. Meanwhile, the share of seconded personnel remained relatively high among operational personnel



Figure 5. Number and share of posts in civilian CSDP missions, by category and region, Feb. 2019–June 2023

CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy.

Note: These numbers include occupied and vacant posts; they do not include Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office personnel.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.

(around 88 per cent) and relatively low among non-operational personnel (around 36 per cent). Hence, the overall net increase in seconded personnel in missions was minimal, while the net increase in contracted personnel was substantial. Whereas the relative increase in non-operational positions was not conducive to increasing the share of seconded personnel in missions, it was one of the factors that enabled the reported increase in women’s representation during the old compact.

New missions, new momentum?

The overall number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions increased towards the end of the compact. This was a direct result of the establishment and relatively quick deployment of EUMA and EUPM Moldova in the first half of 2023.²⁷ When the compact ended, these missions had started operating but had not yet achieved their full strength. By August 2023, EUMA and EUPM Moldova comprised 85 and 30 international personnel, of which 82 per cent and 67 per cent were seconded, respectively (see table A.1).

The launch of these two missions could indicate that some trends in civilian CSDP have started reversing. For example, it is reasonable to expect that the demand for personnel from missions in Europe (including the South Caucasus) will keep growing relative to the demand from Africa and the Middle East. EUMA and EUPM are relatively small missions that may need additional human resources to implement their tasks. The same applies to EUAM Ukraine, whose mandate was already adapted twice to align better with the needs of its Ukrainian counterparts in the context of Russia’s continued aggression. Meanwhile, the missions in the Sahel remained in place despite military coups in Mali and Niger, but most of their activities have been suspended and downsizing seems inevitable given the political and practical difficulties of working in support of the current military authorities.

²⁷ Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/162 of 23 January 2023 on a European Union mission in Armenia (EUMA), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L22/29; and Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/855 of 24 April 2023 on a European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova), L110/30.

**Box 2. Selected commitments under the 2023 Civilian CSDP Compact**

Under the 2023 Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Compact, the Council of the European Union (EU), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU member states have agreed to the following deliverables and commitments, among others:

‘From 2023, Member States commit to provide an increased contribution to civilian CSDP, which can take the form of personnel, equipment, training, exercise support, financial contributions or otherwise.’ (Deliverable 13)

‘The Council and the member states commit to increase jointly the number of seconded experts **across all missions and all levels**, aiming to raise their total share to at least 70 percent of international staff, **while aiming for 100 percent seconded personnel in all management, operational and key functional positions.**’ (Commitment 13)

‘The Council and the member states commit to strengthen the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and subsequent resolutions, to, among other things, **ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of peace and security, with the goal of achieving gender parity.**’ (Commitment 11)

‘In 2025, Member States will **increase the number of female candidates** to civilian CSDP, **with the aim of collectively increasing women’s participation to at least 40 per cent among international staff while striving for gender parity at all levels and, in particular, in senior leadership positions** by the end of this Compact. To this end **the EEAS will update the Strategy and Action Plan to Enhance Women’s Participation in Civilian CSDP Missions.**’ (Deliverable 16b)

‘From 2023, the EEAS and Member States, in line with the selection procedures for international staff, will continue to strive for a **wide representation of Member States’ experts** in civilian CSDP missions.’ (Deliverable 16c)

Note: Bold marks the author’s own emphasis.

Source: Council of the EU, Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, 9588/23, 22 May 2023.

IV. The ‘new’ compact: Continuity and innovation

The Strategic Compass was the first EU document that made reference to the new Civilian CSDP Compact. It confirmed that EU member states would adopt a new compact by mid 2023 to further increase the effectiveness of civilian CSDP missions and support the development of necessary capabilities.²⁸ To this end, the compass contains a deliverable to establish a civilian capability development process (CCDP) by 2024.²⁹ Furthermore, it stated that the new compact should define objectives on the type, number and size of civilian CSDP missions.³⁰ This was meant to encourage strategic reflections about the purpose and appropriate level of ambition for civilian CSDP and to inform the CCDP.³¹

When EU member states adopted the new compact on 22 May 2023, they were calling for a renewed impetus towards civilian CSDP.³² Similar to the old compact, the new compact contains 14 strategic guidelines and 20 political commitments to strengthen civilian CSDP missions and increase their effectiveness, in line with the relevant objectives of the Strategic Compass. One difference is that the new commitments are clustered around the four pillars of the Strategic Compass: act, secure, invest and partner. Another novelty is that the new compact has an annex of deliverables and timelines, although most of these require action from the EEAS rather than from member states. The deadline for delivery of the compact is early

²⁸ Council of the EU, 7371/22 (note 2), pp. 3, 16, 20.

²⁹ Council of the EU, 7371/22 (note 2), pp. 16, 37.

³⁰ Council of the EU, 7371/22 (note 2), p. 16.

³¹ EU official, Interview with author, Sep. 2023.

³² Council of the EU, 9588/23 (note 1), p. 2.



summer 2027, which aligns well with the mid-term review of the Strategic Compass and the end of the 2021–27 multiannual financial framework for the EU budget.

The new compact does not define objectives on the type, number and size of civilian CSDP missions, as had been foreseen in the Strategic Compass. Member states agreed that the EU should be able to conduct all the types of civilian crisis management missions and tasks it has been doing so far. According to the new compact, the number and size of these missions will depend on the needs on the ground, but also on the availability of (financial) resources and capabilities, as well as the priorities of the EU and the member states.³³ In line with the Strategic Compass and the aim to increase the EU's ability to act 'rapidly and robustly', member states did renew their commitment from the first compact to be able to deploy a civilian CSDP mission with 200 personnel within 30 days, including in complex environments.³⁴ In order to achieve this capability by 2027, the EEAS will define a civilian level of readiness by 2025.³⁵

In the preamble of the new compact, EU member states acknowledge the political relevance of civilian CSDP and its increased importance as a crisis management instrument. They also underline that enhancing the effectiveness of missions is conditional on capability availability and reiterate that it is their responsibility as EU member states to develop and provide the capabilities that are required for the implementation of the CSDP. Accordingly, EU member states used the new compact to renew their commitment to increasing—individually and jointly—their contributions to civilian CSDP and raising the number and share of seconded personnel in missions, including the number and share of women. As was the case with the old compact, these remain critical expected outcomes that several other commitments of the new compact are designed to contribute to, either directly or indirectly. The commitment to establish a regular and structured CCDP is the most notable example of this.

Renewed commitments: Towards a more capable and gender-balanced civilian CSDP (again)

Although the new commitments to increase personnel contributions are similar to the ones from the old compact, they have been further refined and clarified. EU member states' commitment to increasing their contributions to civilian CSDP (which may include personnel but also other forms of support) remains unchanged. However, their commitment to increasing the number and share of seconded personnel in missions contains several new elements (see box 2). First, it clarifies that this commitment applies to 'all missions and all levels', which was not explicit in the first compact.³⁶ This is relevant because the ratio of seconded to contracted personnel varies between missions and within them (depending on job function and professional grade). Second, the target that 70 per cent of all personnel must be seconded is supplemented with the target that 100 per cent of all

³³ Council of the EU, 9588/23 (note 1), p. 5.

³⁴ Council of the EU, 9588/23 (note 1), pp. 7, 16.

³⁵ Council of the EU, 9588/23 (note 1), pp. 7, 16.

³⁶ Council of the EU, 9588/23 (note 1), p. 10.



personnel in ‘management, operational and key functional positions’ should be seconded.³⁷ These specific positions are critical for mandate implementation, and the share of seconded personnel in them is already well above 70 per cent in most missions. Third, the new deliverable to strive for a wide representation of member states among mission personnel can be seen as an implicit commitment to more equitable burden sharing.

The commitment on women’s representation in civilian CSDP missions has also been refined and is sharper than in the first compact. Instead of merely promoting an increased representation of women, the new compact includes explicit references to the goals of ensuring equal participation of women and achieving gender parity. According to the associated deliverable, by 2025 EU member states will nominate more women candidates for positions in missions, and the EEAS will update its strategy and action plan to enhance women’s participation in civilian CSDP, which covers the period 2021–24.³⁸ Notably, the new compact endorses the main target of this strategy by stating that EU member states will aim to increase women’s representation to at least 40 per cent of international mission personnel, at all levels and especially in senior leadership positions, while reiterating that gender parity remains the long-term objective.

Turning commitments into results: Towards a structured CCDP

The first compact has shown that political commitment and good intentions are necessary but may be insufficient for increasing EU member states’ contributions to civilian CSDP.³⁹ The regular and structural CCDP that the EEAS and EU member states will set up in 2024 must ensure that political will is coupled with appropriate capability development at the national level and translated into more capable missions. To this end, the CCDP will assess the capability needs for the implementation of civilian CSDP; define the requirements of civilian missions; perform gap analyses to identify shortfalls; and review progress through an annual civilian capability conference (ACCC). This will inform similar capability development processes at the national level to ensure that increased contributions to civilian CSDP by EU member states are aligned with the actual needs of missions. In other words, the CCDP is about matching supply and demand in a market where EU member states control both. The CCDP is an important priority for the EEAS because in addition to the compact, it is one of the deliverables of the Strategic Compass.⁴⁰

V. Reviewing progress and looking forward

One of the strengths of the old compact was that there was a structured annual review process attached to it. With the new compact and the forthcoming CCDP, this review process will look somewhat different. There

³⁷ Council of the EU, 9588/23 (note 1), p. 10.

³⁸ Council of the EU, ‘Draft Strategy and Action Plan to Enhance Women’s Participation in Civilian CSDP Missions 2021–2024’, 14885/21, 10 Dec. 2021.

³⁹ European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management, Baseline study on the civilian capability development plan, 2023 (on file with author).

⁴⁰ Council of the EU, 7371/22 (note 2), p. 37.



will continue to be a civilian annual report on capabilities (CARC) and an annual review conference (ARC) every year in the autumn, in which the EEAS and EU member states can take stock of progress made in terms of their implementation of the compact and national implementation plans. The CARC and ARC will continue to feed into forward-looking Council conclusions on civilian CSDP at the end of every year. However, in addition to all this, there will be a separate review process for the CCDP, including an ACCC every year in the spring. It would be advisable if the ACCC concentrated on stocktaking and more technical discussions on capability development and the contributions to civilian CSDP by EU member states, in line with the relevant commitments and deliverables of the new compact. The CARC and ARC could then focus more on the political and strategic aspects of implementing the new compact.

Reviewing contributions: Re-establishing baselines, re-thinking indicators

The new compact is an opportunity to recalibrate the measures and indicators that have been used to assess personnel contributions to civilian CSDP. There are several reasons why it would be useful to agree on a common understanding of this before the start of the CCDP and the associated review process in 2024.

First, the commitment to increase the number and share of seconded personnel in missions contains several new elements, which need further clarification. For example, the addition ‘across all missions and all levels’ can be interpreted in different ways. The same applies to the part where EU member states aim for 100 per cent seconded personnel among ‘management, operational and key functional positions’. Being able to monitor progress towards this objective, and holding EU member states accountable for it, requires that it is clearly defined which positions belong to these personnel subcategories in missions, and that these definitions are applied consistently. It is also opportune to revisit which missions should be included in aggregated statistics on personnel in civilian CSDP missions. The main issue in this regard is whether such statistics should include the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (KSC & SPO). The KSC & SPO employs few seconded personnel and a large number of contracted personnel. It is not a civilian CSDP mission; its legal basis is the constitution of Kosovo and it is based in the Netherlands, an EU member state. However, the KSC & SPO is financed from the budget of EULEX Kosovo and its personnel are recruited by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). KSC & SPO personnel are included in the CPCC’s bimonthly statistics on civilian CSDP missions and often also in aggregated figures and statistics from the EEAS.

Second, temporary positions have become increasingly common, but are not included in the regular human resources statistics on civilian CSDP. The main tables in the bimonthly reports from the CPCC only include personnel in permanent positions in missions. However, EU member states sometimes provide personnel for positions that are limited in time and scope, such as visiting experts or specialized teams. The number of temporary positions in civilian missions used to be quite limited but has increased substantially

in more recent years. For example, EULEX Kosovo has been reinforced multiple times since 2022 through the temporary deployment of reserve FPU's consisting of up to 70 police. Temporary personnel and staff exchanges between missions also played critical roles when EUAM Ukraine was adapting its activities and posture in 2022 and during the start-up phase of EUMA in early 2023.

Given the renewed emphasis in the new compact on modular and scalable mandates, responsiveness and flexibility, and specialized teams, non-permanent personnel will likely remain an important feature of civilian CSDP missions. These types of personnel should therefore not be neglected in assessments of EU member state contributions to civilian CSDP. This also applies to personnel contributions to the CPCC, given its role as the operational headquarters of the civilian CSDP missions. There is no public information available on the number of seconded national experts within the CPCC, which had around 80 personnel in 2023.⁴¹ According to the new compact, the capacity of the CPCC will be increased in 2024, including through contributions from EU member states.

Third, the establishment of the CCDP is an opportunity to introduce additional indicators relating to the staffing of civilian CSDP missions. Indicators and data for measuring such things as retention, turnover and post-occupancy rates would be useful for the requirements and gap analyses that will be conducted as part of the CCDP.

VI. Policy recommendations

1. EU member states should endorse an ambitious CCDP and establish similar civilian capability development processes at the national level, with the support of the EEAS and the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management.
2. EU member states should endorse a new set-up for the review processes of the new Civilian CSDP Compact and the CCDP, with a CARC and an ACCC each spring and an ARC each autumn. The ACCC should facilitate more technical discussions, whereas the ARC should facilitate more political and strategic discussions.
3. EU member states should contribute to the strengthening of the CPCC's human resources capacities, including through direct contributions in the form of seconded national experts, in line with deliverable 16 of the new Civilian CSDP Compact.
4. Before the first ACCC, the EEAS should propose clarifications of the new Civilian CSDP Compact's commitments relating to the human resources of missions, with a view to agreeing on a common understanding of these commitments and what is being measured in the new review process.
5. Before the first ACCC, the EEAS should propose options for a more comprehensive and standardized approach to assessing member state contributions to civilian CSDP, which would

⁴¹ According to the official directory of the EU; see Publications Office of the EU, 'EU Whoiswho', accessed Oct. 2023.



also cover seconded personnel in temporary positions and seconded national experts at the CPCC. All data on personnel contributions that is produced for this purpose must be gender-disaggregated.

6. The EEAS should develop indicators for measuring retention, turnover and post-occupancy rates. It should conduct a baseline study of these indicators for 2019–23, based on the available data in its human resources databases, and then suggest targets accordingly.
7. The EEAS should invest in additional analytical and technical capacity at the CPCC to ensure that it can make full use of the potential of its human resources databases. This will be necessary for reporting on and measuring progress against any new indicators and targets, as well as for supporting the products that are integral to the CCDP such as capability needs assessments, requirement lists and gap analyses.




Abbreviations

ACCC	Annual civilian capability conference
ARC	Annual review conference
CARC	Civilian annual report on capabilities
CCDP	Civilian capability development process
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EUAM Iraq	EU Advisory Mission in Iraq
EUAM RCA	EU Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic
EUAM Ukraine	EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine
EUBAM Libya	EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya
EUBAM Rafah	EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point
EUCAP Sahel Mali	EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali
EUCAP Sahel Niger	EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger
EUCAP Somalia	EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia
EULEX Kosovo	EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMA	EU Mission in Armenia
EUMM Georgia	EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia
EUPM Moldova	EU Partnership Mission in Moldova
EUPOL COPPS	EU Police and Rule of Law Mission for the Palestinian Territories
EUSDI Gulf of Guinea	EU Security and Defence Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea
FPU	Formed police unit
KSC & SPO	Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office



Annex A. Statistical data for civilian CSDP missions, 2018–23


Table A.1. Average number and share of personnel in civilian CSDP missions in Europe, by employment type, job category, mission and year, 2018–23



Notes: Annual averages are based on bimonthly data and rounded to the closest integer. The averages for 2023 are based on data up until 31 Aug. 2023. These numbers do not include temporary positions or national staff.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.

Table A.2. Average number and share of personnel in civilian CSDP missions in the Middle East and North Africa, by employment type, job category, mission and year, 2018–23




Notes: Annual averages are based on bimonthly data and rounded to the closest integer. The averages for 2023 are based on data up until 31 Aug. 2023. These numbers do not include temporary positions or national staff.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.



Table A.3. Average number and share of personnel in civilian CSDP missions in sub-Saharan Africa, by employment type, job category, mission and year, 2018–23




Notes: Annual averages are based on bimonthly data and rounded to the closest integer. The averages for 2023 are based on data up until 31 Aug. 2023. These numbers do not include temporary positions or national staff.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.



Table A.4. Average number and share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions in Europe, by employment type, mission and year, 2018–23




Notes: Annual averages are based on bimonthly data and rounded to the closest integer. The averages for 2023 are based on data up until 31 Aug. 2023. These numbers do not include temporary positions or national staff.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.



Table A.5. Average number and share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions in the Middle East and North Africa, by employment type, mission and year, 2018–23



Notes: Annual averages are based on bimonthly data and rounded to the closest integer. The averages for 2023 are based on data up until 31 Aug. 2023. These numbers do not include temporary positions or national staff.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.



Table A.7. National contributions of personnel to civilian CSDP missions, average per year, 2018–23

	No. of missions 2018–23	No. of seconded personnel 2018–23	No. of women personnel 2019–23	Share of women personnel 2019–23 (%)
Austria	4 → 6	12 → 15	1 → 2	8% → 13%
Belgium	6 → 11	22 → 28	7 → 12	41% → 43%
Bulgaria	3 → 2	22 → 6	6 → 1	33% → 17%
Croatia	2 → 1	2 → 2	1 → 0	20% → 0%
Cyprus	2 → 1	4 → 2	1 → 0	25% → 0%
Czechia	4 → 9	22 → 18	5 → 5	24% → 28%
Denmark	9 → 9	47 → 41	13 → 7	30% → 17%
Estonia	4 → 6	6 → 5	2 → 2	33% → 40%
Finland	9 → 12	38 → 60	19 → 32	43% → 53%
France	9 → 7	59 → 37	4 → 2	7% → 5%
Germany	10 → 13	75 → 102	19 → 36	26% → 35%
Greece	3 → 7	14 → 19	0 → 2	0% → 11%
Hungary	4 → 4	13 → 15	2 → 6	15% → 40%
Ireland	8 → 8	18 → 20	5 → 4	33% → 20%
Italy	10 → 12	45 → 39	15 → 17	35% → 44%
Latvia	2 → 3	8 → 15	2 → 3	17% → 20%
Lithuania	3 → 3	10 → 7	2 → 3	25% → 43%
Luxembourg	2 → 2	1 → 2	0 → 0	0% → 0%
Malta	1 → 0	2 → 0	0 → 0	0% → 0%
Netherlands	9 → 11	37 → 49	9 → 10	26% → 20%
Poland	4 → 4	119 → 127	6 → 9	5% → 7%
Portugal	5 → 6	9 → 13	0 → 2	0% → 15%
Romania	6 → 6	28 → 23	7 → 6	35% → 26%
Slovakia	3 → 5	11 → 14	1 → 0	10% → 0%
Slovenia	2 → 4	6 → 6	1 → 0	17% → 0%
Spain	5 → 7	9 → 23	1 → 3	13% → 13%
Sweden	10 → 12	86 → 81	33 → 38	40% → 47%
Non-EU	6 → 3	32 → 7	5 → 4	25% → 57%

Notes: Annual averages are based on bimonthly data and rounded to the closest integer. The averages for 2023 are based on data up until 31 Aug. 2023. These numbers do not include personnel in temporary positions or from the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, accessed Oct. 2023.



SELECT RELATED SIPRI PUBLICATIONS

Women in Multilateral Peace Operations 2023: What is the State of Play?

Claudia Pfeifer Cruz

SIPRI Fact Sheet

2023 October

Map Multilateral Peace Operations, 2023

Claudia Pfeifer Cruz and Timo Smit

SIPRI Map

May 2023

Considering the Future of Gender and Peace Operations: Strategic Debates and Operational Challenges

Gretchen Baldwin

SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security

December 2022

Delivering the Compact: Towards a More Capable and Gender-balanced EU Civilian CSDP

Timo Smit

SIPRI Policy Report

November 2022

Strengthening EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Civilian CSDP Compact and Beyond

Timo Smit

SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security

November 2021

Increasing Member State Contributions to EU Civilian CSDP Missions

Timo Smit

SIPRI Policy Brief

November 2020

Increasing Women's Representation in EU Civilian CSDP Missions

Timo Smit

SIPRI Policy Brief

November 2020

Towards a More Capable European Union Civilian CSDP

Timo Smit

SIPRI Policy Brief

November 2019

Towards a More Gender-balanced European Union CSDP

Timo Smit

SIPRI Policy Brief

November 2019



RECENT SIPRI PUBLICATIONS

The Role of Space Systems in Nuclear Deterrence

Nivedita Raju and Dr Tytti Erästö
SIPRI Background Paper
September 2023

Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Lora Saalman, Fei Su and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security
September 2023

Integrating Gender Perspectives into International Humanitarian Law

Nivedita Raju and Laura Bruun
SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security
August 2023

Improving the Prospects for Peace in South Sudan: Spotlight on Measurement

Marie Riquier
SIPRI Report
June 2023

Russia's Military Expenditure During Its War Against Ukraine

Julian Cooper
SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security
June 2023

The Role of Umbrella States in the Global Nuclear Order

Tytti Erästö
SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security
June 2023

Improving the Prospects for Peace in South Sudan: Spotlight on Stabilization

Caroline Delgado
SIPRI Report
May 2023

The World Food Programme's Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace in Sri Lanka

Simone Bunse and Vongai Murugani
SIPRI Report
May 2023

Comparing Responses to Climate-related Security Risks Among the EU, NATO and the OSCE

Anniek Barnhoorn
SIPRI Policy Report
April 2023

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

GOVERNING BOARD

Stefan Löfven, Chair (Sweden)

Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas
(Ghana)

Ambassador Chan Heng Chee
(Singapore)

Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France)

Dr Radha Kumar (India)

Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/
United Kingdom)

Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews
(United States)

DIRECTOR

Dan Smith (United Kingdom)



**STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

Signalistgatan 9

SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden

Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00

Email: sipri@sipri.org

Internet: www.sipri.org

SIPRI RESEARCH POLICY PAPER

NEW COMPACT, RENEWED IMPETUS: ENHANCING THE EU'S ABILITY TO ACT THROUGH ITS CIVILIAN CSDP

TIMO SMIT

CONTENTS

I. Introduction	1
II. The EU's evolving role as a civilian crisis management actor	2
III. The 'old' compact: Mixed results and messages	5
IV. The 'new' compact: Continuity and innovation	12
V. Reviewing progress and looking forward	15
VI. Policy recommendations	16
Abbreviations	18
Box 1. Selected commitments under the 2018 Civilian CSDP Compact	6
Box 2. Selected commitments under the 2023 Civilian CSDP Compact	12
Figure 1. Number of authorized and actual personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by employment type, Dec. 2018–June 2023	7
Figure 2. Share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by personnel type, Dec. 2018–June 2023	8
Figure 3. Number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by selected groups of EU member states, Dec. 2018–June 2023	9
Figure 4. Number and share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions, by employment type, Dec. 2018–June 2023	10
Figure 5. Number and share of posts in civilian CSDP missions, by category and region, Feb. 2019–June 2023	11
Table 1. Active EU civilian CSDP missions as of Oct. 2023, by region	4
Annex A. Statistical data for EU CSDP missions, 2018–23	19
Table A.1. Average number and share of personnel in civilian CSDP missions in Europe, by employment type, job category, mission and year, 2018–23	19
Table A.2. Average number and share of personnel in civilian CSDP missions in the Middle East and North Africa, by employment type, job category, mission and year, 2018–23	20
Table A.3. Average number and share of personnel in civilian CSDP missions in sub-Saharan Africa, by employment type, job category, mission and year, 2018–23	21
Table A.4. Average number and share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions in Europe, by employment type, mission and year, 2018–23	22
Table A.5. Average number and share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions in the Middle East and North Africa, by employment type, mission and year, 2018–23	23
Table A.6. Average number and share of women personnel in civilian CSDP missions in sub-Saharan Africa, by employment type, mission and year, 2018–23	24
Table A.7. National contributions of personnel to civilian CSDP missions, average per year, 2018–23	25