

# 3. Civilian roles in peace operations

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## I. Introduction

The year 2009 marked the 10th anniversary of the seminal Brahimi report, which proposed an overhaul of the United Nations peacekeeping system.<sup>1</sup> The report highlighted for the first time the centrality of the civilian contribution to the effectiveness of UN peace operations and called for a strengthened UN capacity in this area. A decade later, progress in the civilian dimension is mixed. The number of civilian tasks mandated in UN Security Council resolutions for UN peace operations and the number of civilian missions undertaken by regional organizations have increased dramatically in recent years. These increases are coupled with a near doubling of the number of civilians assigned to global multilateral peace operations: they currently exceed 6500 (see figure 3.1).<sup>2</sup>

The imperative for civilian personnel in peace operations came to the fore in 2009, most notably in Afghanistan. A new United States strategy for Afghanistan—announced in March—placed greater emphasis on security, governance and local development, while continuing to prioritize the rule of law and counternarcotics measures.<sup>3</sup> In order to realize the strategy, a ‘civilian surge’ would accompany the planned increased troop levels. The outgoing head of mission for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Kai Ede, supported the change in strategy and cautioned against neglecting the political and civilian aspects of the peacebuilding process in Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup>


Given the strong need and continued demand for civilians, and the persistent challenges of deploying the appropriate people at the right time and in the appropriate numbers, significant attention has been paid to the ‘civilian capacity gap’. This issue is thus at the top of the agenda of several governments and of multilateral organizations, including the UN, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the African Union (AU). In 2009 the UN Secretary-General produced a report

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Brahimi Report), A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 Aug. 2000.

<sup>2</sup> This figure does not include civilian police deployment. See also appendix 3A.

<sup>3</sup> DeYoung, K., ‘Civilians to join Afghan buildup: “surge” is part of larger U.S. strategy studied by White House’, *Washington Post*, 19 Mar. 2009.

<sup>4</sup> MacFarquhar, N., ‘U.N. envoy to Afghanistan warns of peril of emphasizing security over social issues’, *New York Times*, 7 Jan. 2010.



**Figure 3.1.** Number of civilians deployed to United Nations peace operations, 2000–2009

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>>

on peacebuilding that underscores the need for increased civilian capacities and provides the impetus to critically review the UN's civilian capacity.<sup>5</sup> Although the civilian dimension of peace operations has been strengthened by a range of recent institutional innovations, such operations are still not appropriately configured and staffed for their roles. This chapter discusses how the civilian capacity gap should not be viewed or addressed simply as a recruitment or deployment issue, but should take into account, for example, the planning and financing of peace operations. Such an assessment highlights that the operational challenges in the civilian dimension are due to a lack of conceptual clarity.

Section II provides an overview of the state of play of the civilian dimension of peace operations and peacebuilding and surveys some of the ongoing institutional developments and reforms in multilateral organizations and national governments. Section III looks at the operational challenges plaguing the civilian component of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), as well as how the lack of conceptual clarity has affected the mission's efficacy. Section IV offers conclusions. Appendix 3A presents extensive data on the multilateral peace operations that were active for all or part of 2009.

<sup>5</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, S/2009/304, 11 June 2009.

## II. Addressing the civilian capacity gap in peace operations

In the past decade peace operations have taken on a more multidimensional characteristic, integrating the political, humanitarian, development and military dimensions. Thus, a typical multidimensional peace operation is usually mandated to perform a variety of tasks to assist the host country's transition from conflict to sustainable peace. Peace operation mandates now routinely include basic civilian activities, such as demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); public information; rule of law; law and order; justice; human rights; humanitarian relief and rehabilitation; supporting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; elections; constitutional support and institutional reform and capacity building. For many of these activities, the deployment of troops is neither appropriate nor relevant. Moreover, the functions require specific expertise that is predominantly found in the civilian sphere.

The sheer diversity of civilian functions and skills makes it difficult to address the question of capacity without first defining the term 'civilians'. Is the term restricted to the group that administers and manages the mission? Or is it broader? To what jobs does it refer? A number of 'toolkits' describe or seek to categorize the multitude of tasks and functions necessary in peacebuilding contexts. Most of them describe a basic core set of functions but illustrate the point that no common definition exists for the civilian roles and functions used by the AU, the EU and the UN, much less by individual countries<sup>6</sup> The monthly statistics produced by the UN's Department of Public Information on personnel deployment in UN peace operations include a broad category of civilian staff but do not disaggregate between civilians whose jobs range from information technology to the promotion of human rights. This diversity of definitions is further magnified by the difference in institutional mandates within which the civilians must operate. In this chapter, the term 'civilians' refers to non-uniformed personnel working in multilateral peace operations, but excludes 'humanitarian' non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

As mission mandates have grown increasingly complex, the requirement for qualified civilian expertise has grown apace, and with it a proliferation of civilian functions in peace operations, at least in the UN context. In fact, the recent UN Secretary-General report on peacebuilding identified two new core peacebuilding objectives: support for employment generation, in

<sup>6</sup> Chandran, R. et al., 'Recovering from war: gaps in early action', Report by the New York University (NYU) Center on International Cooperation for the British Department for International Development, NYU, New York, 1 July 2008, <<http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/statebuilding.html>>.

particular in agriculture and public works; and sustainable natural resource management.<sup>7</sup> The emergence of numerous peacebuilding objectives has led to the creation of multiple posts by various UN agencies and departments to address a single issue; this can lead to overlapping duties on the ground. Security sector reform is a good example. A dedicated unit in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) addresses SSR issues, but SSR is also dealt with by, among others, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).

While the proliferation of civilian functions may have led to greater awareness of and attention to typical peacebuilding priorities, reflecting the complexity and magnitude of peacebuilding, the purpose of some of the functions is less clear. For instance, civilian protection is one such ambiguous function. A recent study conducted for the DPKO and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) revealed that, despite a decade of including civilian protection in mandates, the UN still struggles with what it means, both definitionally and operationally, for a peace operation to protect civilians.<sup>8</sup> The lack of common understanding of what constitutes civilian protection, and therefore which agency or department within the UN should take the lead, has created inter-agency turf battles. In practice, this has led to a divisive debate on whether protection should be a cross-cutting or a separate civilian function in peace operations, and the division of labour between the military and civilian components has also been affected. A clearer definition of what constitutes 'expertise' and the requirements necessary for each civilian function would prevent duplicative efforts.

### **Common challenges and institutional responses**

The dominance of the civilian agenda for many multilateral organizations and national governments parallels the process of enhancing international effectiveness in peacebuilding efforts. A multitude of institutional development processes that are intended to improve civilian capacity for stability operations, state building and crisis management efforts have been implemented across the spectrum of actors. As international and regional organizations as well as individual states have responded to the rising demand for civilian skills and expertise, a perceived 'civilian gap' has become apparent due to inadequate capabilities and capacities that have hampered

<sup>7</sup> United Nations (note 5), p. 18.

<sup>8</sup> Holt, V. and Taylor, G., with Kelly, M., *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges* (United Nations: New York, Nov. 2009).

implementation.<sup>9</sup> According to one analyst, ‘the single most important limitation has been a lack of civilian capacity for such operations, which has led to an over reliance on military forces.’ Although reform is an ongoing process, the reforms that have been made have been criticized as being ‘marginally successful so far’.<sup>10</sup> However, institutional choices that are made concerning structures, policies and mechanisms will have direct impact on improved civilian capacity. Recruitment and deployment issues have been a top (if not the only) priority driving the civilian agenda. Nascent structures have also faced continuing upheaval because of structural reforms that aim to improve inter-agency processes in the desire to operationalize whole-of-government approaches. These organizations face a remarkably similar set of challenges and constraints—despite their differences in structure, purpose and even national context.

As multilateral organizations and national governments look to alternative solutions to expand and diversify the pool of civilian experts, a contentious issue, but one that deserves more attention, has arisen: the role of private sector actors. The emergence and growing role of these actors in the military dimension of peace operations through the provision of security, logistics and equipment to the EU, NATO and the UN and to some humanitarian NGOs has already received much attention in academic and policy discussions.<sup>11</sup> Critics argue against the use of private sector actors because of legitimacy, accountability and transparency concerns, which are exemplified by the US Government’s recent experience of employing such contractors in Iraq. Concern also exists about a similar encroachment on the civilian sphere by private contractors. For example, the new NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan employs a significant number of private contractors.

Institutional developments in the civilian dimension of peace operations do not occur in isolation. Calls to strengthen civilian capacities raise the important question of financing. In the EU and the UN the planning and financing processes are separate and do not happen at the same pace. Missions are often hampered by slow and cumbersome budgeting cycles (as

<sup>9</sup> Blair, S. and Fitz-Gerald, A., ‘The need for conceptual clarity: evaluating the current stabilisation debate’, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* (forthcoming 2010). See also Serafino, N. M., *Peacekeeping, Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress RL32862 (US Congress: Washington, DC, 5 Feb. 2009).

<sup>10</sup> Bensahel, N., ‘International perspectives on interagency reform: testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on January 29, 2008’, RAND Testimony series, Santa Monica, CA, <<http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT298/>>, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> For a discussion of the issue see Chesterman, S. and Lehnardt, C. (eds), *From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007).

discussed in the context of UNMIS in section III below). At the national level, continued over-reliance on the military is arguably due to the fact that defence departments or ministries often have far larger budgets or discretionary spending authority than the civilian sector.<sup>12</sup> The civilian agenda must therefore take into account broader factors.

However, the issue of the civilian contribution to peace operations has been dominated by the West. Efforts behind the scene are under way to support multinational approaches through widening the debate to include actors from the 'Global South'.

### **The United Nations**

As part of its ongoing broad 'Peace Operations 2010' reform agenda, the UN Secretariat issued two key documents in 2009: the Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding, and a DPKO-Department of Field Services (DFS) non-paper, 'A new partnership agenda: charting a new horizon for UN peacekeeping'.<sup>13</sup> Both aim to improve the efficacy of UN engagement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding and came about, in part, in response to the Security Council's 2008 request to the Secretary-General to provide advice and strategy for more effective UN support and assistance to countries that are in transition from conflict to peace.<sup>14</sup> Much of what was included in the two documents reinforced recurring lessons of the past decade. Their emphasis on better planning, achievable mandates, clarified roles for civilians, strengthened leadership teams in host countries and institutional harmonization within the UN system are recognition that much more needs to be done.

The Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding outlines what is needed in the civilian field and the gaps in the available capacity. It emphasizes the need to strengthen the leadership capacity of the political, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development elements of any future UN presence in a host country. This approach is echoed in the 'New Horizons' paper; its emphasis on strong mission leadership capability is a shift to a peace operation 'that focuses on the skills, capacity and willingness of personnel, as well as material, to deliver required results'. Senior leaders are expected to possess substantial negotiation and mediation expertise, have in-depth regional knowledge with requisite language abilities, and possess vast

<sup>12</sup> Barton, F. and Unger, N., 'Civil-military relations, fostering development, and expanding civilian capacity', Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Workshop Report, Apr. 2009, <[http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2009/04\\_development\\_unger.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2009/04_development_unger.aspx)>.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations (note 5); and United Nations, Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting the New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (United Nations: New York, July 2009).

<sup>14</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2008/16, 20 May 2008.

experience in strategic planning and the management of large, complex organizations. Recognizing that the number of individuals with such credentials is small, the UN proposed to focus on choosing a team of senior leaders. In order to improve the selection and retention process, in 2008 the DFS created a dedicated unit for senior leadership appointments. The 'New Horizons' paper also envisages a second-tier team of experts with similar expertise to support the management team.

However, no unified team of analytical, planning and coordination experts to support the executive team currently exists in the UN, and no structure or mechanism is in place in the UN Secretariat to assess the necessary support and expertise for in-country leadership teams. Instead, individual experts are deployed piecemeal by the respective agencies. Noting that civilian planning capacity is still weak, the DPKO was thus tasked to review the quality and efficacy of existing integrated task forces and the recently established integrated operational teams (IOTs) to determine if the task forces and IOTs could play a role to improve the current situation.<sup>15</sup>

The 'New Horizons' paper notes that considerable progress has been made in building up the reservoir of expertise in areas such as DDR, SSR and the rule of law. Other areas, such as public administration (i.e. public finance and basic monetary and fiscal policy expertise), have not come as far, in part perhaps because such expertise is not readily available in the UN system. The report recommends that, rather than building in-house capacity in these areas, strong partnerships should be developed with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to draw on their expertise.

Building on the lessons learned from previous and ongoing UN multi-dimensional peace operations (see section III), the 'New Horizons' paper articulates the importance of setting out clear operational standards for mission mandate tasks. Such standards would define the core tasks and operational requirements and serve as the basis for identifying the requisite personnel and resources. It appears, however, that the focus would be on uniformed personnel (military and police) instead of on the civilian component.<sup>16</sup> However, it is the latter that requires most, given their overlapping roles.

Both the Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding and the 'New Horizons' paper devote substantial attention to the issue of how to rapidly deploy civilian capacities to the field. Delaying such deployment can severely impede a mission's ability to implement its mandate. A recent

<sup>15</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, 'Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations', Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/615, 17 Dec. 2008.

<sup>16</sup> Jovin, R., United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Division of Policy Evaluation and Training, Interview with author, Jan. 2010.

study recommends that the UN abandon the current model of trying to deploy all civilian staff at once and instead adopt a three-phased approach: (a) deployment of a bare-bones team of up to 30 personnel in the start-up phase; (b) deployment of 'sector specialist teams' of 40–130 personnel in the 'ramp-up' phase; and (c) deployment of long-term personnel.<sup>17</sup> Another approach to the deployment challenge, which appears to be favoured not only by the UN but also by regional organizations and national governments, is the notion of a standing capacity or the creation of rosters (standby capacity).<sup>18</sup> A standing capacity refers to a group of staff that are employed full time with the express purpose of being available for rapid deployment when the need arises. A standby capacity consists of persons pre-identified to be deployed on demand. Staff can be pre-screened, pre-interviewed and even pre-contracted, depending on the level of investment. Another standby option, often referred to as a rostered capacity (i.e. a database of potential candidates), is to make use of people already employed who can be temporarily reassigned when emergency surge capacity is needed.

The UN intends to build on the early success of the DPKO's Standing Police Capacity and the mediation standby teams of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). A standing capacity may be appropriate for police personnel, but less so for public administration experts. The two models are still in their infancy and, before rosters for each civilian function proliferate, existing models should be reviewed to assess their applicability to other civilian functions. Currently, no single point exists for national or multilateral actors to request or obtain information on available resources: who should administer a clearing house for the rosters, and where should it be located? The political will, or lack of it, to feed into and maintain the rosters should also be addressed or they may be in danger of becoming empty shells that are not used.

Interestingly, a 2006 proposal by the Secretary-General to introduce 2500 career positions for the development of 'a cadre of highly mobile, experienced, trained and multi-skilled civilian staff to meet the baseline human resources requirements of UN peace operations' has not been realized because the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) of the UN General Assembly's Fifth Committee did not

<sup>17</sup> Chandran, R. et al., *Rapid Deployment of Civilians for Peace Operations: Status, Gaps, and Options* (New York University, Center on International Cooperation: New York, Apr. 2009).

<sup>18</sup> See de Coning, C., 'Civilian expertise: partnership to match supply to demand', Paper presented at 'Cooperating for peace: the challenge and promise of partnerships in peace operations', Seminar co-hosted by Geneva Centre for Security Policy and International Peace Institute, Geneva, 10–11 Dec. 2009, <[http://www.nupi.no/content/download/11498/112274/file/DeConing - Panel 4\\_Civilian\\_Expertise.pdf](http://www.nupi.no/content/download/11498/112274/file/DeConing_Panel_4_Civilian_Expertise.pdf)>.

approve the proposal.<sup>19</sup> Under that proposal, career models would be developed, and selected staff would receive targeted training programmes and rotate between secretariat and field positions in order to gain a well-rounded experience of peace operations. However, the ACABQ argued that the human resource reform under way would address many of the concerns that gave rise to the proposal.<sup>20</sup>

Another initiative in the UN context is the move towards greater reliance on existing capacities in the host country. UN field missions and offices, particularly in developing countries, have been requested to identify qualified national staff, who will be placed on the rosters for potential selection for employment in post-conflict countries. This stems from an emerging consensus that neighbouring countries, countries with similar socio-economic and cultural backgrounds and countries that have previously undergone post-conflict transition can greatly contribute to the international community's peacebuilding efforts by sending civilian experts who may have a better understanding of the specific challenges of post-conflict countries.<sup>21</sup>

### **EU civilian capacity: an ongoing and ambitious transformation process**

The EU's demanding agenda for reforming civilian crisis management operations deserves closer scrutiny. Civilian crisis management is an important tool under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The structures for civilian crisis management, as they are termed in the EU, have endured a year of sustained uncertainty because of the tumultuous upheavals associated with the approval of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty.<sup>22</sup> During the 10 years of its existence the CSDP (previously known as the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP) has undergone profound institutional changes in intense periods of growing demand for civilian crisis management capabilities, including the conduct of 13 civilian operations since 2003.<sup>23</sup> However, 'the institutional structures that support

<sup>19</sup> For details of the Secretary-General's proposal for the 2500 civilian career peacekeepers see United Nations, General Assembly, 'Investing in people', Report of the Secretary-General, Addendum, 'Reforming the field service category: investing in meeting the human resources requirements of United Nations peace operations in the twenty-first century', A/61/255/Add.1, 22 Aug. 2006.

<sup>20</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, 'Fifth Committee takes up \$300 million budget for 2008/09 peacekeeping support account', Press release, 6 June 2008, <<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/gaab3857.doc.htm>>.

<sup>21</sup> United Nations (note 5).

<sup>22</sup> Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed 13 Dec. 2007, entered into force 1 Dec. 2009, <[http://europa.eu/lisbon\\_treaty/](http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/)>.

<sup>23</sup> The EU has conducted 13 civilian crisis management missions: 7 police (EUPM, EUPOL PROXIMA, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPAT, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL Afghanistan, and EUPOL RD Congo); 3 rule-of-law (EUJUST THEMIS, EUJUST LEX Iraq and EULEX Kosovo); 2 SSR (EUSEC

the planning and conduct of these operational activities are yet to come of age'.<sup>24</sup> The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, will shape the EU's structural reform for years to come. It also highlights a sustained high level of ambition to be a global player in both foreign policy and operational terms through the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the merger of civilian and military planning functions. The creation of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in 2007 and of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) in 2009 'mark a departure in ESDP institutional development'.<sup>25</sup> Finally, the ongoing Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) process (discussed below) has continued to undergo significant review and revision since 2004 with the adoption of CHG 2010 in 2007.

### *Civilian Headline Goals*

At the June 2000 European Council, the EU set out its main tasks for civilian crisis management, known as the Civilian Headline Goals.<sup>26</sup> Initially comprising police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection, these were extended in 2004 to include monitoring missions and support to EU special representatives by 2008.<sup>27</sup> Additionally, the EU indicated that it would also contribute to activities such as SSR and support DDR processes. Further demonstrating its high level of ambition, the EU indicated that it 'must be able to conduct concurrent civilian missions at different levels of engagement; to deploy civilian means simultaneously with military means at the outset of an operation and finally, civilian crisis management operations under the ESDP must be deployable autonomously, jointly or in close cooperation with military operations'.<sup>28</sup> Yet critical analysis suggests that the 'following process of civilian capability development by far exceeded general expectations in terms of both speed and quantitative success'.<sup>29</sup> According to one assessment, 'The so-called Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) process . . . was a rigorous attempt to get member states to commit civilians for potential deployment scenarios. Each member state pledged a

DR Congo and EU SSR Guinea Bissau); and 1 border control (EUBAM Rafah). For detailed information see the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>>; and appendix 3A. It is important to note that the EU classifies civilian police operations under the category of civilians. For details of all CSDP missions (including those excluded from the SIPRI database) see CSDP map, <<http://www.csdpmap.eu>>.

<sup>24</sup> Gebhard, C., 'The crisis management and planning directorate: recalibrating ESDP planning and conduct capacities', *CFSP Forum*, vol. 7, no. 4 (July 2009), pp. 8–14.

<sup>25</sup> Gebhard (note 24), p. 14.

<sup>26</sup> Council of the European Union, 'Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy: Presidency Report to the Feira European Council', document 9149/00, Brussels, 15 June 2000.

<sup>27</sup> Council of the European Union, 'Civilian Headline Goal 2008', document 15863/04, Brussels, 17 Dec. 2004.

<sup>28</sup> Council of the European Union (note 27).

<sup>29</sup> Gebhard (note 24), p. 9.

certain number of civilians, and yet the CHG process does not appear to have helped the EU get boots on the ground.<sup>30</sup>

In order to comply with its ambitious objectives, the EU adopted a step-by-step approach to the development of its civilian crisis management capabilities: 'it entails the definition of planning assumptions on the basis of scenarios, the elaboration of capability requirements lists, the assessment of national contributions and the identification of capability shortfalls'. In 2007, building on the results of the CHG 2008 and on the growing body of ESDP crisis management experience, the EU adopted CHG 2010 to 'help to ensure that the EU can conduct crisis management, in line with the European Security Strategy, by deploying civilian crisis management capabilities of high quality, with the support functions and equipment required in a short time-span and in sufficient quantity'.<sup>31</sup>

Recognizing the iterative nature of the CHG process, EU ministers set out an annual plan as part of CHG 2010, launched in 2007, to include the Report on Civilian Preparedness in October 2009 and the Civilian Capability Targets in November 2009. EU ministers agreed to hold 'a yearly conference to assess the state of play, monitor progress and guide future efforts in the field of civilian ESDP. Ministerial Guidelines will be issued at the end of the CHG 2010 process'.<sup>32</sup>

These initiatives highlight the inherently political nature of the EU's efforts in regard to its civilian agenda, with little attention paid to tangible results. Equally, this overly politicized process has overshadowed the challenges of the EU's decentralized approach to harnessing civilian capacity, which relies on seconded staff that have been selected and provided by member states. This leaves field missions overly reliant on member states' contributions and therefore often under-staffed. Finally, in 2009 implementing the Lisbon Treaty took centre stage and has become a significant focus for policymakers, taking scarce civilian capacity away from operations.

### *Structural reforms and implications of the Lisbon Treaty*

The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 provided the impetus for the reorganization of the EU's architecture. This included the creation of the post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is both a vice-president of the European Commission and a member of the Council, and the launch of the EEAS—the EU's new foreign service—to support her efforts. Unfortunately, the treaty provided little direction or

<sup>30</sup> Korski, D. and Gowan, R., *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities* (European Council on Foreign Relations: London, Oct. 2009).

<sup>31</sup> Council of the European Union, 'Civilian Headline Goal 2010', document 14823/07, 19 Nov. 2007, para. 18.

<sup>32</sup> Council of the European Union (note 31).

guidance on the role of the EEAS and the necessary restructuring and merging of functions between the Council and the Commission with implications for civilian crisis management.<sup>33</sup> Recognition is growing that the implementation will be progressive, rather than a single launch, and it is likely to take until 2014.<sup>34</sup> Like reform processes elsewhere, the proposals in the Lisbon Treaty aim to improve the EU's ability to act in a more 'comprehensive' fashion on the international stage, not least in the area of civilian crisis management.

In June 2007 the EU created the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability to oversee the operational level organization and control of missions, which became operational in May 2008. This provides the EU with a unified civilian commander and structural counterpart to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). In December 2008 the European Council agreed on the creation of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate through the merger of former directorates VIII (defence aspects) and IX (civilian crisis management) of Directorate-General E (external and politico-military affairs) in the Council Secretariat, to integrate civilian and military planning at the strategic level, which became operational as of 16 December 2009.<sup>35</sup> However the transition and the modalities of relationships with other structures, in particular the CPCC, will take some time to function smoothly. At the time of writing much effort has been expended by officials on organizational restructuring, and in particular the relationship of the CMPD with the CPCC and how the EEAS will affect the planning of civilian missions.

<sup>33</sup> The Lisbon Treaty in matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy offers only the following guidance: 'In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the member states.' Treaty of Lisbon (note 22), Article 1(30), amending Article 13a of the Treaty on European Union. See also Avery, G., 'Europe's foreign service: from design to delivery', European Policy Centre Policy Brief, Nov. 2009, <[http://www.epc.eu/TEWN/pdf/95967659L\\_Europe's\\_foreign\\_service.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/TEWN/pdf/95967659L_Europe's_foreign_service.pdf)>, p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> Lieb, J. and Maurer, A., 'Creating the European External Action Service: preconditions for avoiding a rude awakening', SWP Comments no. 13, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), June 2008, <[http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/produkte/swp\\_aktuell\\_detail.php?id=9162](http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/produkte/swp_aktuell_detail.php?id=9162)>, pp. 1-8. The authors note that the expiry of the EU budget for 2007-13 would generate a review of the EEAS's establishment in 2013. The period up to the Council's decision on the EEAS (expected in Apr. 2010) can be considered a first stage, to be followed by a second that will last years. A status report, to be produced in 2012, will review the function and organization of the EEAS; if necessary, the initial decision will be revised, possibly in 2014. Avery (note 33), p. 2; and Crowe, B., *The European External Action Service: Roadmap for Success* (Chatham House: London, May 2008), p. 8. For the political, legal and institutional reasons for the time needed to make the EEAS fully operational see Adebahr, C., 'The first will be the last: why the EU foreign service will remain embryonic for some time', *CFSP Forum*, vol. 6, no. 2 (Mar. 2008), pp. 5-9.

<sup>35</sup> Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 11-12 Dec. 2008, Annex 2, Declaration by the European Council on the Enhancement of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Article 6.

One of the main concerns with the creation of the CMPD is the risk that the proposed integration of the civilian and military dimensions of EU crisis management strategic planning could lead in effect to the absorption of the civilian dimension into the military dimension. Merging of directorates VIII and IX could mean that the planning of civilian missions is not conducted by civilians with the relevant political, professional and operational expertise. The increased militarization of the CSDP could, in turn, have a negative impact on civilian crisis management.<sup>36</sup>

### **The African Union**

The African Union has not yet deployed its own multidimensional peace operation or stand-alone civilian mission. However, its experience with the AU–UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and its own commitment to fully operationalize the African Standby Force (ASF), including the civilian component, by 2010—pushed the civilian aspects of peace operations to the top of the AU’s agenda. Interestingly, developments in Africa differ from the European approach, which has focused on creating institutional structures and capacities in the public sector. In Africa, institutional developments do not consist of recalibrating individual governmental department or capacity because African governments often lack the capacity or resources to undertake such institutional changes. Instead, the civilian debate and the development of civilian expertise have been led by training institutions (often funded by external donors) working in support of the AU. This also reflects the militarization of peace operations within national governments and is made evident at the continent-wide level, where the structure of the ASF and the corresponding efforts to build its capacity have largely focused on military aspects.

The need to develop a civilian component in the ASF has also become apparent because it is the least developed or institutionalized of the ASF’s three components. No civilian personnel serve on the AU ASF Planning Element or in a majority of the regional brigades. The development of the civilian policy framework has thus fallen to the training institutions. The absence of a civilian architecture in the AU has several implications: the civilian policy framework is not institutionalized and hence not properly integrated into the overall ASF framework.<sup>37</sup> It is hoped that the civilian dimension will be given greater attention by the UN’s AU Peacekeeping

<sup>36</sup> European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, ‘Statement on civilian–military integration in European security and defence policy’, Brussels, 18 Feb. 2009, <[http://www.eplo.org/documents/EPLO\\_State ment.pdf](http://www.eplo.org/documents/EPLO_State ment.pdf)>. See also Gebhard (note 24).

<sup>37</sup> Dersso, S. A., ‘The need for “civilianising” the African Standby Force’, African Peace Support Trainers’ Association, Peacekeeping This Month, 26 Mar. 2009, <<http://www.apsta-africa.org/news/article260309.php>>.

Support Team in the context of the Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union.<sup>38</sup>

### **National efforts**

Like the EU and the UN, individual states have struggled to close the gap between demand and supply of civilian capacity, while attempting to operationalize whole-of-government approaches through inter-agency integration. It is both a broad and narrow issue. Driven by the civilian deployment challenge, in 2004 three governments in particular—Canada, the United Kingdom and the USA, known as ‘the trilaterals’—created inter-agency units to overcome these challenges. They have all adopted a similar, tiered approach to their deployment pools that combines the skills and experience of people across the public and private sector. However, these three countries face the common challenges of duty-of-care issues, retention and availability. Canada has created the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START); the UK has established the Stabilisation Unit; and the USA has its Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Yet a ‘cultural gap’ in all three countries impedes the integration necessary to realize a whole-of-government approach and deliver a ‘unity of purpose towards a shared goal’.<sup>39</sup>

START was established in 2005 in the International Security Branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs and was ‘created to enhance the Government of Canada’s capacity for international crisis response through a coordinated, whole-of-government approach’.<sup>40</sup> As part of a reorganization of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the offices that dealt with humanitarian affairs, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peace operations, and mines and small arms were incorporated into START. Like its US counterpart, ‘since it remains in a single ministry, it has not made much progress in achieving interdepartmental cooperation’.<sup>41</sup>

In 2004 the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office created a new Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) in order to facilitate government-wide planning, to build a deployable civilian capacity, and to serve as a source of expertise and lessons learned from previous operations. It is a joint office of the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. The PCRU changed its name to the Stabilisation Unit in December 2007. However, coordination has been hard to achieve in practice. It has been called ‘an

<sup>38</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Letter dated 11 December 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly, A/61/630, 12 Dec. 2006.

<sup>39</sup> Blair and Fitz-Gerald (note 9).

<sup>40</sup> For more information see Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, ‘About START’, <<http://www.international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/start-definition-gtsr.aspx>>.

<sup>41</sup> Bensahel (note 10).

orphan with three parents' and said to lack 'a single champion that is invested in its success and that has the power to promote its mission and force coordination among reluctant bureaucrats'.<sup>42</sup>

The S/CRS, created in July 2004, but only signed into law in September 2008, has a mission to 'lead, coordinate, and institutionalize' civilian capacities for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts.<sup>43</sup> Unfortunately, it was initially understaffed and, despite its mission to lead, the 'CRS has not yet been designated as the lead agency for any stabilization or reconstruction missions, and the planning frameworks it has established have not yet been fully utilized'.<sup>44</sup>

Other countries, notably in developed countries—including Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden—have made attempts to contribute to the civilian agenda either through supporting multinational efforts in the EU and the UN or by training their own nationals, often including the creation of units in the relevant ministries or governmental agencies.<sup>45</sup> For example, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has contributed to the budget of the Hiroshima Peace-builders Centre at the University of Hiroshima, the German Government has created the Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF, or Center for International Peace Operations), the Finnish Government has created the Centre for Civilian Crisis Management, and the Swedish Government created the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway have created stabilization units in their ministries of foreign affairs.

### III. The UN Mission in Sudan

The various and ongoing efforts to create structures, mechanisms and policies in multilateral organizations and national governments to augment their civilian capabilities may not translate into concrete or workable solutions in the field. The UN Mission in Sudan illustrates the conceptual and operational challenges facing the civilian sphere in peacekeeping operations. UNMIS is not unique in its difficulty to fill and sustain its civilian component; other UN missions with sizeable civilian components face similar problems, as do EU stand-alone civilian missions. It is nevertheless

<sup>42</sup> Bensahel (note 10).

<sup>43</sup> Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, US Public Law 110-417, signed into law 14 Oct. 2008, <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR5658:>>, title 16. In Dec. 2005 National Security Presidential Directive 44 designated the US State Department as the lead agency for such efforts, and directed the Coordinator to co-chair a new inter-agency Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. White House, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, Washington, DC, 7 Dec. 2005, <<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>>.

<sup>44</sup> Bensahel (note 10).

<sup>45</sup> For an audit of countries' contributions to EU operations see Korski and Gowan (note 30).

useful to look at some of the issues facing the mission as examples of a more widespread set of challenges.

Established in March 2005, UNMIS currently has the second largest civilian component of a UN multidimensional peace operation, with 827 civilian staff deployed and an authorized ceiling of 1440.<sup>47</sup> As with other UN multidimensional operations, Security Council Resolution 1590 mandated the mission 'to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement' (CPA).<sup>48</sup> The implementation of the agreement entailed a comprehensive set of tasks and responsibilities for UNMIS: monitoring the ceasefire; establishing a DDR programme to promote political inclusiveness, including raising awareness and understanding of the ongoing peace process; promoting the rule of law, including the reform of state institutions (judiciary and police); monitoring and promoting human rights; offering electoral assistance; and facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. In addition, Resolution 1590 authorized the mission with Chapter VII powers to use force to protect civilians 'under imminent threat in its areas of deployment and as it deems within its capabilities'.<sup>49</sup>

In the run-up to the elections in 2010, 2009 proved to be a tense period of worsening insecurity in Southern Sudan, particularly in the Jonglei, Upper Nile and Lakes states. This added to the ongoing challenges that UNMIS faced in implementing its mandate. Since its inception, the mission has run into numerous difficulties with getting the necessary number and appropriately skilled personnel in almost every component—military, police and civilian—of the mission. This inevitably affected the mission's ability to implement its ambitious mandate.

## Planning

UNMIS was preceded by an advance mission that was deployed to the field in June 2004. The UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), consisting of 164 civilian staff, was to facilitate the peace process and prepare the ground for an eventual fully fledged multidimensional mission on the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.<sup>50</sup> This was a novel step for the UN in its

<sup>47</sup> MONUC has the largest deployment of civilian personnel. See appendix 3A.

<sup>48</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1590, 24 Mar. 2005. The text of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is available at <<http://www.usip.org/resources/peace-agreements-sudan>>.

<sup>49</sup> Chapter VI of the UN Charter allows the UN Security Council to recommend measures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, including the deployment of peacekeepers, to be taken with the consent of all parties concerned. Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to impose such measures on the parties as are needed to restore international peace and security, regardless of the parties' consent. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, <<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>>.

<sup>50</sup> On UNAMIS see the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (note 23); and Wiharta, S., 'Planning and deploying peace operations', *SIPRI Yearbook 2008*, pp. 97–112.

pre-mission planning process, and in theory it was to have resulted in the establishment of a needs-driven mission based on on-the-ground assessments and consultation with the parties to the CPA. However the escalation of the conflict in Darfur and the concomitant support provided by UNAMIS to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) diverted a considerable amount of UNAMIS resources. UNAMIS's political affairs, civil affairs and human rights components ended up focusing their attention on the political process in Darfur. For example, the first three Civil Affairs field offices were located in Darfur.<sup>51</sup> The unexpected responsibilities in Darfur resulted in a rushed final effort to start up UNMIS.

At the time of UNMIS's establishment, the UN's Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) had not yet been formally constituted but was the framework for planning UNMIS.<sup>52</sup> UNAMIS received a concept of operations (objectives and priorities of the mission) and the basic elements of the mission plan (the mission structure, including the thematic and functional components) from the planning team headquarters in New York. UNAMIS and the existing UN Country Team (UNCT) thus had little influence on the shape of the mission. Essentially, UNAMIS's role was to come up with an organizational chart of the mission and an auditing exercise, specifying how many posts were necessary to implement each mandated task (e.g. human rights) for the comprehensive results-based framework that is submitted to the ACABAQ before the launch of a mission.

The incoming mission's lack of autonomy to recruit the appropriate individuals for the job was further impeded by the apparent politicization at UN headquarters in filling senior positions for UNMIS.<sup>53</sup> The results-based framework is designed to make UN peace operations more accountable—operations are measured against their key objectives, outputs and activities, with the view to adjust their resource requirements as necessary. While the missions have some input into the number of staff required for a particular function, they have little or no say in adjustments to the type of functions necessary, without an explicit change to the Security Council mandate. For instance, if it were deemed that an economic advisor was necessary for the mission, the head of mission would not be able to recruit such a person until the following budget cycle, and only if that were included in the Security Council mandate. Clearly, getting the right configuration for the complex civilian component of a UN peace operation is impeded by the UN's rather rigid bureaucratic architecture. However, the guidelines for the IMPP implementation were further improved in 2009 to ensure that

<sup>51</sup> Schumann, P., UNMIS, Director, Civil Affairs (Aug. 2004–Sep. 2005), Chief of Staff (Oct. 2005–Dec. 2006), Regional Representative and Coordinator in South Sudan (Jan.–Aug. 2007), Interview with the author, Jan. 2010.

<sup>52</sup> For more on the IMPP see Wiharta (note 50), pp. 97–112.

<sup>53</sup> Schumann (note 51).

field missions and the UNCTs play a greater role in designing the strategic framework by drawing up field-level guidelines.<sup>54</sup>

### **Recruitment and deployment challenges**

UNMIS was slow to reach its authorized strength. By the end of 2005, nine months after it had been established, only half of the civilian staff were deployed. In September 2006 the vacancy rate of civilian personnel was reduced to 36.5 per cent but, reportedly, the number of personnel resigning was larger than the number of personnel hired.<sup>55</sup> More critically, it was the middle to senior management positions that were difficult to fill. Part of the problem had to do with the UN's recruitment procedure, which is a lengthy and cumbersome process. Senior mission leadership have indicated that filling all the civilian positions in the first year can be counterproductive and unnecessary. They favour a phased and flexible deployment during the start-up phase and have indicated that the usual recruitment cycle of 6–12 months should be waived so as to allow for more flexibility. For example, given the wide geographical spread of UNMIS field offices and the different priority areas for each of them, a specialist programme planner in the civil affairs section who is recruited for 3–9 months would have been preferable to several generalists for 6–12 months.<sup>56</sup>

Compounding the administrative difficulties is the physical and security environment in which UNMIS operates. UNMIS is considered to be one of the 'harsher' postings. The bulk of UNMIS civilian staff are deployed to the regional offices in Abeyi, Jonglei and Juba, remote parts of the country with harsh living conditions. At the same time, the government in Khartoum has imposed several restrictions on UNMIS personnel, thus limiting their movement and ability to carry out their tasks. These recruitment and deployment challenges refer only to the deployment of international (and to a large extent) Western civilian experts. Little effort has been made to identify qualified Sudanese staff to fill some of the civilian posts. UNMIS has the highest number of national professional officers compared to other UN missions, but such staff still represent less than 1 per cent of UNMIS's total civilian deployment.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Le Roy, A., UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Remarks made to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 23 Feb. 2009, <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/articles/article230209.htm>>.

<sup>55</sup> Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007* (Lynne Reiner: Denver, CO, 2007), pp. 30–34.

<sup>56</sup> Schumann (note 51).

<sup>57</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, 'Financing arrangements for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009', Note by the Secretary-General, A/63/756, 11 Mar. 2009.

### Clarity and coherence in mission mandates

The issue of coordination between different components of a peace operation is an important factor in ensuring that the civilian staff can effectively implement their programming activities. During the mission start-up phase the deployment of UNMIS's mission-support component, in particular the security unit, reportedly lagged behind the rest of the functional components. As a result, many functional components, such as the human rights, civil affairs and political affairs sections, were prevented from making field visits to undertake assessments that ultimately would inform the programming strategy.<sup>58</sup> Consequently, the initial programming priorities were general in nature, and UNMIS was perceived by the Sudanese population to be doing less. Better coordination between the various components could also lead to a more efficient use of mission resources. For instance, joint assessments between the military and civilian components in Juba meant that scarce resources, such as helicopters, were used more efficiently.

While systemic challenges are important in themselves, and need to be addressed to improve the efficacy of the civilian component, the fundamental question concerns the type of functions civilians should serve. In UNMIS, it was decided that civilian protection would be a stand-alone function. In Darfur, however, civilian protection was a cross-cutting function. A rape victim could thus be interviewed by several UN agencies, all with civilian protection as part of their remit. Whether or not this cross-cutting approach translates into tangible gains for the Sudanese population remains to be seen.<sup>59</sup> The lack of clarity of civilian functions also extends to the roles and responsibilities of different sections. For instance, the political and civil affairs sections often have overlapping duties. More importantly, the institutional reforms undertaken thus far by the UN do not adequately address the division of labour between the peace operation and the UN Country Team. Are they to work in parallel or should the UNCT's substantive work be subsumed by the peace operation? In Sudan, the UNCT was already working on issues such as rule of law, demining, DDR and refugee returns when UNMIS was established. This caused considerable confusion to the relevant Sudanese entities, which were already dealing with one UN partner and then had to work with another.

Interestingly, the Security Council resolution that established UNMIS was specific enough to ensure that it would have an adequately sized civilian component to implement the mandated tasks. However, it failed to ensure that the manpower was matched with much needed financial

<sup>58</sup> Schumann (note 51).

<sup>59</sup> McMurry, N., 'Protection in practice: the role of peacekeepers in Southern Sudan', Stimson Center, 7 Dec. 2009, <<http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=912>>.

resources. Thus, despite having well-staffed sections, UNMIS was in a poor position to effectively implement its mandate because it did not have the requisite financial resources to carry out activities.

## IV. Conclusions

Civilians play an ever more central role in peace operations and peacebuilding and, consequently, the growing demand for their expertise is unquestionable. The year 2009 was marked by sustained attention to the civilian dimension. In the past five years political commitment and institutional efforts have expanded, creating structures to support the civilian contribution to peace operations and to overcome the deployment challenges that have plagued past missions. These attempts to address the civilian gap reflect the resolve of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding community to enhance the state of the civilian architecture.

Yet, despite the commitment to strengthening the civilian dimension and the range of institutional innovations described here, these nascent structures are still neither appropriately configured nor provided with adequate resources. Enhancing the civilian dimension is a broader agenda and goes beyond expeditiously deploying the right experts in the numbers necessary. It requires revisiting the broader architecture and examining the linkages between inter-related factors, such as financing peace operations and recruitment. It also necessitates critical analysis of the purpose and objectives of each civilian function in order to avoid duplication of tasks within the mission.

At the field level, UNMIS starkly illustrates that the challenges of civilian deployment cannot be resolved by reforms in the DPKO alone. An overhaul of other parts of the UN system, in particular the way in which missions are financed, is necessary if improved efficacy of peace operations is to be felt on the ground. 'Good institutional arrangements will not of themselves deliver the desired result, but their absence certainly makes this more difficult.'<sup>60</sup> More importantly, UNMIS highlights that peacebuilding calls for tailored approaches and, consequently, requires flexible approaches to mission design and staffing that can only be achieved through a more demand-driven and iterative planning process. The lessons learned from UNMIS and other missions have clearly fed into the recent multilateral and bilateral policy initiatives on civilian actors and underscore that, although an overhaul of the global civilian institutional architecture is necessary and timely, it is clearly highly ambitious.

<sup>60</sup> Crowe (note 34), p. 13.

# Appendix 3A. Multilateral peace operations, 2009

KIRSTEN SODER AND KRISTER KARLSSON

## I. Introduction

This appendix describes developments in peace operations in 2009 and draws on data collected in the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database to analyse trends in peace operations in the 10-year period 2000–2009.<sup>1</sup> The data presented here is a year-end snapshot for ongoing peace operations in 2009 and is meant to serve as a reference point to enable comparative analysis between 2009 and previous years.<sup>2</sup> Global trends are presented in section II and regional trends in section III. The sources and methods used when collecting the data are described in section IV, followed by details of all multilateral peace operations active during 2009.

## II. Global trends

A total of 54 peace operations were conducted in 2009, taking place in 34 different locations. Six operations closed during 2008 and no new operation was launched in 2009, resulting in the first fall in the total number of operations since 2002 (see figure 3A.1). However, the upward trend in the number of deployed personnel continued into 2009: deployment totals increased by 16 per cent over 2008 to reach 219 278, 89 per cent of which were military personnel and 11 per cent were civilian staff (see figure 3A.2).<sup>3</sup> The known cost of peace operations reached a new record of \$9.1 billion.


Over the decade 2000–2009, the annual number of peace operations first fell, to a low of 49 in 2002, then rose steadily, to reach 60 operations in 2008. This trend was reversed in 2009: with a total of 54 operations in 2009, the decade ended with the same number as it began in 2000 (see figure 3A.1). The number of deployed personnel initially followed a similar trend, as the 2000 level of 135 000 personnel decreased to the 10-year low of 102 525 in 2002. However, deployment levels then increased continually; in 2009 the total surpassed the 200 000 mark and was more than double the 2002 low (see figure 3A.2).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database can be accessed at <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>>.

<sup>2</sup> The figures for personnel deployments given in this appendix are generally estimates as of 31 Dec. 2009 or the date on which an operation terminated. They do not represent maximum numbers deployed or the total number of personnel deployed during the year.

<sup>3</sup> The number of civilians includes civilian observers, civilian police and civilian staff. See also chapter 3, figure 3.1.

<sup>4</sup> The Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) is considered to have been a peace operation in 2003–2005. However, as a statistical outlier, the 154 000–183 000 personnel deployed with MNF-I are not included in the total personnel figures. Information on MNF-I from 2003 until 2008, when its UN mandate ended, can be found in the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (note 1).



**Figure 3A.1.** Number of peace operations, by conducting organization, 2000–2009

Reflecting these trends, the number of operations with at least 5000 personnel has doubled since 2000, to reach 10 in 2009.


### Principal conducting organizations

In 2009 the United Nations remained the main conductor of peace operations, conducting 21 operations with a total of 105 120 personnel. These accounted for 48 per cent of all personnel deployed. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted only 3 missions in 2009, it deployed 96 979 personnel, or 44 per cent of the total.<sup>5</sup> The European Union (EU), with 12 operations, and the African Union (AU), with 1 operation, each deployed just over 5000 personnel.

Seven of the UN's operations had more than 5000 personnel, including two—the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)—with more than 20 000 personnel. These are the first UN operations with more than 20 000 personnel since the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia ended in 1995.

Despite additional deployments to operations carried out by the UN and the AU, disparities between authorized and actual personnel levels persisted in 2009. The UN missions MONUC, UNAMID and the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) raised their deployment levels in

<sup>5</sup> Following a decision taken at the Apr. 2009 NATO Summit, the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) was launched in Nov. 2009 by integrating with the US-led police training programme Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to form NTM-A/CSTC-A. The combined command of NTM-A/CSTC, tasked to mentor and train Afghan security forces—police and military personnel—comprises 2700 personnel. In Dec. 2009, 220 were NATO personnel from Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, South Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the UK.



**Figure 3A.2.** Number of personnel deployed to peace operations, 2000–2009  
ISAF = International Security Assistance Force.

2009, but still fell short of authorized numbers and contributed in large part to the UN's total shortfall of 15 700 personnel. However, the disparity between UN authorized and actual deployed personnel in 2009 was half the level of 2007. A similar pattern applied to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): even with the additional troops deployed in 2009, the mission's deployment level was still 3000 below its authorized strength.


Three peace operations ended during 2009—one conducted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), one conducted by the UN and one conducted by the EU (see section III).

### Deployment levels

With no new operations in 2009, the increase in the number of personnel deployed was due to troop reinforcement for existing operations, most significantly for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. For the fourth year running, ISAF was the largest operation, and during the year it became the largest ever NATO operation, as its troop level increased from 51 356 to 84 146—an increase of 64 per cent.<sup>6</sup> ISAF was nearly four times larger than the next largest operation, MONUC. In fact, the number of ISAF troops exceeded the total number deployed to the 12 UN peace operations with troops (83 089 troops, including UNAMID) and was also higher than the total number of troops deployed to the 11 operations carried out in Africa (69 757 troops).

The classification of ISAF as a peace operation is contentious and has potentially significant methodological consequences. In addition to the UN-mandated task of providing security, ISAF has taken on the tasks of helping Afghan

<sup>6</sup> The previous largest NATO operation was the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had 60 000 troops in 1995.



**Figure 3A.3.** The top 10 contributors of troops to peace operations, 2009

ISAF = International Security Assistance Force.

authorities to strengthen good governance and the rule of law and supporting reconstruction and development.<sup>7</sup> The latter tasks were a significant, although never dominant, part of ISAF's activities in the first years after its deployment in 2001. However, since 2006, when ISAF expanded its area of operation into the south and east of Afghanistan, it has become more and more engaged in the fight against insurgents alongside the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan (OEF-A).<sup>8</sup> In 2009 nearly 33 000 additional troops were deployed to ISAF—almost 26 000 of them US troops—to 'stabilize the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan' and support the Afghan security forces in counter-insurgency efforts against the Taliban.<sup>9</sup> This shift to counterinsurgency argu-

<sup>7</sup> ISAF's mandate is defined in UN Security Council resolutions 1386, 20 Dec. 2001; 1510, 13 Oct. 2003; and 1890, 8 Oct. 2009. See also International Security Assistance Force, 'Our mission', <<http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/our-mission/>>. On the conflict in Afghanistan see also chapter 2, section III, chapter 4, section II, and chapter 5, sections V and VI, in this volume.

<sup>8</sup> OEF-A, which was launched to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime following the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 Sep. 2001, consisted of c. 36 000 troops as of Oct. 2009. 'Q&A: Isaf troops in Afghanistan', BBC News, 7 Oct. 2009, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7228649.stm>>.

<sup>9</sup> White House, 'Statement by the President on Afghanistan', 17 Feb. 2009, <[http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/)>; and 'US warns of tough Afghan battle', Al Jazeera, 19 Feb. 2009, <<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/02/2009218233411262319.html>>. In Dec. 2009 US President Barack Obama authorized the deployment of 30 000 troops in addition to the extra troops deployed in 2009, following a request by Gen.

ably goes beyond the tactical use of force as employed by a robust peace operation—it is now a core part of ISAF's aims and activities.<sup>10</sup>

The function of peace operations has continuously evolved since they were first deployed in the mid-20th century. Peace operations were originally tasked with monitoring ceasefires and deploying interpositional forces to separate warring parties. In response to the changing nature of conflict since the early 1990s, these tasks have given way to a 'complex model of many elements'.<sup>11</sup> Several recent peace operations have become more involved in continuing hostilities between governmental forces and insurgents; in some cases (e.g. MONUC), peace operations have used force for reasons other than self-defence. The activities of operations such as ISAF or the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) may signal the onset of another phase in the evolution of peace-keeping in which the 'old walls that initially segregated peace operations from war-fighting are crumbling'.<sup>12</sup>

Since ISAF accounted for 38 per cent of all personnel deployed to peace operations in 2009, its classification as a peace operation has a significant impact on the global trend in multilateral peace operations. Excluding ISAF from the data set on multilateral peace operations paints a very different picture for 2009 and the past decade. Excluding ISAF, a total of 135 132 personnel were deployed to 53 peace operations in 2009, and the upward trend in deployed personnel over the decade is much less sharp (see figure 3A.2). Excluding ISAF, there was a slight decrease in deployment numbers in 2009 compared to 2008, and between 2002 and 2009 the number of personnel deployed increased by only 31 per cent (down from over 100 per cent when including ISAF). Excluding ISAF, the UN is by far the largest conductor of peace operations; it accounted for 78 per cent of all personnel deployed (including UNAMID). While personnel deployment to UN operations has increased almost continuously over the past 10 years, the number of personnel deployed to non-UN peace operations other than ISAF has steadily decreased.


The large size of ISAF also influences the ranking of countries contributing military personnel (including troops and military observers) as of December 2009 (see figure 3A.3). When including ISAF, the USA is by far the largest

Stanley McChrystal, Commander of ISAF and US Forces in Afghanistan. White House, 'Remarks by the President in address to the nation on the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan', 1 Dec. 2009, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan>>; and McChrystal, S. A. (Gen.), 'COMISAF's initial assessment', International Security Assistance Force, 30 Aug. 2009, <[http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment\\_Redacted\\_092109.pdf](http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf)>.

<sup>10</sup> On robust peacekeeping see United Nations, Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (United Nations: New York, 2008), pp. 34–35.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, S/2000/809, 21 Aug. 2000, para. 18. See also Wiharta, S., 'Peacekeeping: keeping pace with changes in conflict', *SIPRI Yearbook 2007*, pp. 110–12.

<sup>12</sup> Durch, W. J. and England, M. L., 'The purposes of peace operations', Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009* (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO, 2009), p. 15; and Jones, B. with Cherif, F., *Evolving Models of Peacekeeping: Policy Implications & Responses*, Report to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations: New York, 2003), p. 1. On MNF-I see also note 4.



**Figure 3A.4.** The top 10 contributors of civilian police to peace operations, 2009

contributor of military personnel to peace operations: it provided 47 962 of the total of 194 862 military personnel deployed by 111 countries. Excluding ISAF, a total of 110 716 military personnel from 107 countries were deployed as of December 2009. Eight of the top 10 contributing countries came from either Africa or Asia and sent troops exclusively to UN operations; only Italy and France participated in non-UN missions.

As of December 2009 a total of 14 468 civilian police were deployed on peace operations by 108 countries. UN operations accounted for 88 per cent of deployed civilian police, roughly the same share as in 2008. All of the top 10 contributing countries are in Asia or Africa and these two regions account for 70 per cent of the civilian police deployed (see figure 3A.4). In contrast, countries in the Americas contributed only 3 per cent, the lowest regional share.

### III. Regional trends

The increase in personnel deployments in 2009 was due to deployments to Africa and Asia. Asia replaced Africa as the region to which most personnel on peace operations were deployed. ISAF personnel accounted for 95 per cent of the personnel deployed to Asia.

In Africa, personnel deployed in 2009 increased by 8 per cent over 2008, while the number of operations fell by three (see table 3A.1). The vast majority of the personnel were sent to six operations conducted by the UN, the AU or jointly that had 5000 or more personnel.<sup>13</sup> While 84 per cent of personnel deployed to Africa are military, the relative increases in the numbers of civilian staff and civilian police were much higher: over the decade 2000–2009, the number of civilian staff increased nearly sixfold (from 821 to 4598) and the number of civilian police more than 140-fold (from 65 to 9201).<sup>14</sup> The EU Mili-

<sup>13</sup> These 6 missions were MONUC (21 515 personnel), UNAMID (21 042 personnel), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 11399 personnel), the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS, 11099 personnel), the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI, 8935 personnel) and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, 5271 personnel).

<sup>14</sup> On the role of civilians in multilateral peace operations see chapter 3.

**Table 3A.1.** Number of peace operations and personnel deployed, by region and organization, 2009

Conducting organization	Africa	Americas	Asia	Europe	Middle East	World
United Nations <sup>a</sup>	9	1	4	3	4	21
Regional organization or alliance <sup>b</sup>	6	1	2	14	4	27
Ad hoc coalition	1	0	3	0	2	6
<b>Total operations<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>16</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Total personnel deployed<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>85 562</b>	<b>9 571</b>	<b>88 270</b>	<b>19 750</b>	<b>16 125</b>	<b>219 278</b>

<sup>a</sup> UN figures include peace operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, those led by the UN Department of Political Affairs and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

<sup>b</sup> These figures include the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>>.

tary Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) closed in March 2009, as planned after one year of operation; the mission's mandate was transferred to MINURCAT.

With two operations fewer than in 2008, Europe was the only region in which there was a significant decrease in deployment numbers in 2009. Deployment numbers decreased by 26 per cent compared to 2008 and by 76 per cent over the decade 2000–2009. The latest reduction in the deployment numbers was due to the termination of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) operations in Georgia in 2008, the restructuring and downsizing of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), and the continued reduction of the UN presence in Europe.<sup>15</sup> The UN Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) decreased its deployment level by 87 per cent (from 1236 to 163 personnel) during 2009, and by the end of the year the UN stationed only 1362 personnel in Europe. This was the lowest number since the UN first deployed a peace operation to Europe, in 1964, and was also the lowest number of UN personnel deployed to any region in 2009.<sup>16</sup>

During 2009, two missions in Europe—one conducted by the UN and one by the OSCE—ended as a consequence of the August 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia. The mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was not renewed by the UN Security Council, and the mission closed in June 2009. Russia, which recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, vetoed the extension of the mission's mandate as the language used in draft resolutions referred to Georgia's territorial integrity.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The number of KFOR personnel fell from 14 411 in 2008 to 12 662 in Oct. 2009 and to c. 11 500 by Dec. 2009.

<sup>16</sup> The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was first deployed in Mar. 1964.

<sup>17</sup> 'Russia vetoes UN mission in Abkhazia', EurActiv, 16 June 2009, <<http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/russia-vetoes-un-mission-abkhazia/article-183214>>.

The OSCE Mission to Georgia finally ended in 2009. Russia had vetoed the extension of the operation in 2008, and the mandate of the unarmed military monitors deployed to the mission in August 2008 under a separate OSCE Permanent Council decision ended in June 2009. With the termination of the two CIS operations during 2008, the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) is now the only multilateral peace operation in Georgia.<sup>18</sup>

The number of operations carried out in the Middle East remained stable at 10 in 2009. The number of personnel was slightly lower than in 2008 due to a reduction in the number of troops of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which accounted for 76 per cent of the personnel deployed in the region.

No significant changes occurred in the Americas in 2009: the two existing operations in the region remained active and the number of deployment personnel was largely unchanged. All but 30 of the personnel in the region were deployed to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The mission's daily operations were disrupted by an earthquake in Haiti on 12 January 2010, which destroyed 50 per cent of the capital, Port-au-Prince, killed over 200 000 people and displaced up to 1 million more.<sup>19</sup> MINUSTAH's headquarters collapsed and 102 UN personnel were killed in what the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, described as 'the single biggest loss in the history of [the UN]'.<sup>20</sup> MINUSTAH immediately responded with rescue teams, emergency relief and the coordination of international assistance.<sup>21</sup> Security Council Resolution 1908 increased the operation's military component by 2000 troops (to a total of 8940) and 1500 police (to a total of 3711).<sup>22</sup> As the lead organization for response and recovery in Haiti, the UN's efforts are scheduled to continue for at least 12 months and are likely to continue for far longer.<sup>23</sup> While MINUSTAH will focus on addressing problems of shelter and sanitation before the onset of the rainy season in May, the remainder of 2010 is likely to be dedicated to working towards the re-establishment of security, stability and state authority, as outlined in the benchmarks of the 2009 consolidation plan.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Soder, K., 'Multilateral peace operations, 2008', *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*, p. 125.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations, UN News Centre, 'Over 60,000 Haitians vaccinated as part of ongoing UN-backed campaign', 23 Feb. 2010, <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33863>>.

<sup>20</sup> United Nations, Secretary-General, 'Secretary-General's press encounter on Haiti, following his briefing to the Security Council', New York, 18 Jan. 2010, <<http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=1371>>.

<sup>21</sup> United Nations, Secretary-General, 'Secretary-General's press conference in Port-au-Prince', Port-au-Prince, 17 Jan. 2010, <<http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=1370>>.

<sup>22</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1908, 19 Jan. 2010.

<sup>23</sup> Holmes, J., UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Remarks, Ministerial Meeting on Haiti, Montreal, 25 Jan. 2010, <<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/VDUX-822NR5>>.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations, UN News Centre, 'Haiti: senior UN official stresses need for realistic goals before rainy season starts', 24 Feb. 2010, <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33887>>; and United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, S/2009/439, 1 Sep. 2009, annex 1, 'Consolidation plan: benchmarks and revised indicators of progress for the period 2009–2011'.

#### IV. Table of multilateral peace operations

Table 3A.2 provides data on the 54 multilateral peace operations that were conducted during 2009, including operations that were launched or terminated during the year. The table lists operations that were conducted under the authority of the UN and operations conducted by regional organizations and alliances or by ad hoc (non-standing) coalitions of states that were sanctioned by the UN or authorized by a UN Security Council resolution, with the stated intention to: (a) serve as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, (b) support a peace process, or (c) assist conflict-prevention or peacebuilding efforts.

SIPRI follows the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) description of peacekeeping as a mechanism to assist conflict-afflicted countries to create conditions for sustainable peace. Peacekeeping tasks may include monitoring and observing ceasefire agreements; serving as confidence-building measures; protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assisting with the demobilization and reintegration processes; strengthening institutional capacities in the areas of judiciary and the rule of law (including penal institutions), policing, and human rights; electoral support; and economic and social development. Table 3A.2 thus covers a broad range of peace operations, reflecting the growing complexity of operation mandates and the potential for operations to change over time. The table does not include good offices, fact-finding or electoral assistance missions, nor does it include peace operations comprising non-resident individuals or teams of negotiators, or operations not sanctioned by the UN.

The operations are grouped in the table by the entity conducting them and listed chronologically within these groups. UN operations are divided into three subgroups: 15 observer and multidimensional peace operations run by the DPKO; 5 special political and peacebuilding missions; and the joint AU–UN mission in Darfur, UNAMID. The next seven groups include operations conducted or led by regional organizations or alliances: the AU (1 operation), the Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC, the Economic Community of Central African States, 1 operation); the CIS (1 operation); the EU (12 operations); NATO (3 operations); the Organization of American States (OAS, 1 operation); and the OSCE (8 operations). The final group includes 6 UN-sanctioned operations led by ad hoc coalitions.

Operations that were launched in 2009 and new states joining an existing operation are shown in bold type. Operations and individual state participation that ended in 2009 are shown in italic type. Designated lead states (i.e. those that either have operational control or contribute the most personnel) are underlined for operations that have a police or military component. The legal instruments underlying the establishment of an operation—UN Security Council resolutions or formal decisions by regional organizations—and the date of first deployment of the operation are given in the first column.

The figures for approved personnel numbers listed are those most recently authorized for 2009. Numbers of locally recruited support staff and volunteers

are not included in the table but, where available, are given in the notes. For EU operations, the approved total civilian personnel number is given in the civilian police row. Complete information on national contributions to the operations can be found in the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database.<sup>25</sup> The category 'observers' includes both military and civilian observers.

Personnel fatalities are recorded since the beginning of an operation and in 2009. Causes of death—whether accidental, by hostile act or through illness—are recorded for fatalities in 2009. As causes of death were not reported for all deaths in the year, these figures do not always add up to the total annual fatality figure. While the UN provides data on fatalities of locally recruited staff, other organizations or alliances do not.

Costs are reported in millions of US dollars at current prices. The budget figures are given for the calendar year rather than for financial years, in order to allow comparison of operations. Costs for the calendar year are calculated on the assumption of an even rate of spending throughout the financial year. Budgets set in currencies other than the US dollar are converted based on the International Monetary Fund's aggregated market exchange rates for 2009.<sup>26</sup> The costs recorded for UN and OSCE operations are the amounts budgeted. The figures provided for other operations represent actual spending.

The costs recorded for UN operations are core operational costs, which include the cost of deploying personnel, per diem payments for deployed personnel and direct non-field support costs (e.g. requirements for the support account for peacekeeping operations and the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy). The cost of UN peacekeeping operations is shared by all UN member states through a specially derived scale of assessed contributions that takes no account of their participation in the operations. Political and peacebuilding operations are funded through regular budget assessments. UN peacekeeping budgets do not cover programmatic costs, such as those for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which are financed by voluntary contributions. The costs recorded for operations conducted by NATO only represent common costs. These include mainly the running costs of the NATO headquarters (i.e. costs for civilian personnel and costs for operation and maintenance) and investments in the infrastructure necessary to support the operation. The costs of deploying personnel are borne by individual contributing states and are not reflected in the figures given here. Most EU operations are financed in one of two ways: civilian missions are funded through the Community budget, while military operations or operations with a military component are funded by contributions by the participating member states through the Athena mechanism.<sup>27</sup> For CIS operations no figures are provided as there is no

<sup>25</sup> SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (note 1). The database also gives full lists of mandated tasks, heads of missions and details of documentation relevant to individual missions.

<sup>26</sup> Details on the budgets of peace operations are available from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (note 1).

<sup>27</sup> The Athena mechanism is an instrument for the administration of common costs in EU operations with military or defense implications. The mechanism was agreed in Council Decision 2007/384/CFSP of 14 May 2007, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L152, 13 June 2007; and updated by Council Decision 2008/975/CFSP of 18 Dec. 2008 establishing a mechanism to administer the

designated common budget and countries participating in the missions bear the cost of troop deployments. In operations conducted or led by other organizations, such as by the OAS or ad hoc coalitions, budget figures may include resources for programme implementation.

For all these reasons, the budget figures presented in table 3A.2 are estimates and the budgets for different operations should not be compared.

Unless otherwise stated, all figures are as of 31 December 2009 or, in the case of operations that were terminated in 2009, the date of closure.

Data on multilateral peace operations are obtained from the following categories of open source: (a) official information provided by the secretariat of the organization concerned; (b) information provided by operations themselves, either in official publications or in written responses to annual SIPRI questionnaires; and (c) information from national governments contributing to the operation under consideration. In some instances, SIPRI researchers may gather additional information on an operation from the conducting organizations or governments of participating states by means of telephone interviews. These primary sources are supplemented with a wide selection of publicly available secondary sources consisting of specialist journals, research reports, news agencies, and international, regional and local newspapers.

**Table 3A.2.** Multilateral peace operations, 2009

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009/ unpaid
		Approved	Actual		
<b>United Nations (UN)</b>					
<b>Total: 15 operations</b>	<b>117 contributing countries*</b>	<b>74 456</b>	<b>67 754</b>	<b>1 128</b>	<b>5 590.2</b>
		2 213	2 081	84	1 529.1
		8 918	8 220		
		6 039	4 826		
* This figure only includes countries deploying uniformed personnel to UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) operations during 2009.					
<i>UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)</i>					
UNTSO was established by SCR 50 (29 May 1948) and mandated to assist the Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the truce in Palestine after the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. In subsequent years it also assisted in observing the General Armistice Agreement of 1949 and the ceasefires in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day Arab–Israeli War. UNTSO cooperates with UNDOF and UNIFIL. A positive decision by the UN Security Council is required to terminate the operation.					
SCR 50	Obs.: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, USA	–	–	50	33.1
June 1948		141	151	1	–
Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria		–	–	(–, –, –)	–
		120	94*		
* The operation is supported by 128 locally recruited staff.					
<i>UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)</i>					
UNMOGIP was established by SCR 91 (30 Mar. 1951) and mandated to supervise the ceasefire in Kashmir under the Karachi Agreement (July 1949). A positive decision by the UN Security Council is required to terminate the operation.					
SCR 91	Obs.: Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Korea (South), Philippines, Sweden, Uruguay	–	–	11	8.5
Mar. 1951		48	43	–	–
India, Pakistan (Jammu, Kashmir)		–	–	–	–
		26	23*		
* The operation is supported by 47 locally recruited staff.					

*UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)*

UNFICYP was established by SCR 186 (4 Mar. 1964) and mandated to prevent fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order. Since the end of hostilities in 1974, the mandate has included monitoring the de facto ceasefire (Aug. 1974) and maintaining a buffer zone between the two sides. SCR 1898 (14 Dec. 2009) extended the mandate until 15 June 2010.

SCR 186	Troops: <u>Argentina</u> , Austria, <b>Brazil</b> , Canada, <b>Chile</b> , Croatia, Hungary, <b>Paraguay</b> ,	860	855	180	55.9
Mar. 1964	Peru, Slovakia, UK	–	–	1	24.7
Cyprus	Civ. pol.: <u>Argentina</u> , Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, El Salvador, India, <u>Ireland</u> , Italy, <b>Montenegro</b> , Netherlands, <b>Ukraine</b>	69	66	(–, 1, –)	
		41	39*		

\* The operation is supported by 112 locally recruited staff.

*UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)*

UNDOF was established by SCR 350 (31 May 1974) and mandated to observe the ceasefire and the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces as well as to maintain an area of limitation and separation in accordance with the 1973 Agreement on Disengagement. SCR 1899 (25 Nov. 2009) extended the mandate until 30 June 2010.

SCR 350	Troops: Austria, Canada, Croatia, India, Japan, Poland	1 047	1 043	43	46.4
June 1974		–	–	–	19.9
Syria		–	–	–	
		49	40*		

\* The operation is supported by 103 locally recruited staff.

*UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)*

UNIFIL was established by SCRs 425 and 426 (19 Mar. 1978) and mandated to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and to assist the Lebanese Government in re-establishing authority in the area. In 2006, following the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, The mission's mandate was altered by SCR 1701 (11 Aug. 2006) to encompass tasks related to establishing and monitoring a permanent ceasefire. SCR 1884 (26 Aug. 2009) extended the mandate until 31 Aug. 2010.

SCRs 425 and 426	Troops: Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, China, Croatia, Cyprus, <b>Denmark</b> , El Salvador, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India,	15 000	11 862	282	635.4
Mar. 1978	Indonesia, Ireland, <u>Italy</u> , Korea (South), FYROM, Malaysia, Nepal, <b>Niger</b> ,	–	–	3	..
Lebanon	<u>Norway</u> , <u>Poland</u> , Portugal, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Tanzania, Turkey	–	–	(–, 1, 1)	
		411	322*		

\* The operation is supported by 660 locally recruited staff.

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009/ unpaid
		Approved	Actual		
<i>UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)</i>					
	MINURSO was established by SCR 690 (29 Apr. 1991) and mandated to monitor the ceasefire between the Polisario Front and the Moroccan Government; to observe the reduction of troops; and to prepare for an eventual referendum concerning the integration of Western Sahara into Morocco. SCR 1871 (30 Apr. 2009) extended the mandate until 30 Apr. 2010.				
SCR 690	Troops: <b>Ghana</b> , Malaysia	27	27	15	50.6
Sep. 1991	Obs.: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, <b>Jordan</b> , Kenya, <b>Korea (South)</b> , Malaysia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, Yemen	203	199	-	54.2
Western Sahara		6	6		
		108	97*		
	Civ. pol.: Egypt, El Salvador				
	* The operation is supported by 157 locally recruited staff and 18 UN volunteers.				
<i>UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</i>					
	UNOMIG was established by SCR 849 (9 July 1993) and SCR 858 (24 Aug. 1993) and mandated to verify the ceasefire between the Georgian Government and the Abkhazian authorities. In 1994, following renewed fighting and the signing of a second ceasefire agreement, its mandate was expanded to include monitoring and verification of the implementation of the agreement by SCR 937 (27 July 1994). In 2009 Russia, having recognized the independence of Abkhazia, rejected specific language regarding the territorial integrity of Georgia in UN Security Council draft resolutions and subsequently vetoed an extension of the UNOMIG mandate. The mission closed on 16 June 2009.				
SCRs 849 and 858	Obs.: Albania, Austria, Bangladesh, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea (South), Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Yemen	-	-	12	36.1
Aug. 1993		136	132	1	14.5
Georgia		20	14	(-,-,-)	
	Civ. pol.: Czech Republic, Germany, Ghana, Israel, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine	115	93*		
	* The operation was supported by 201 locally recruited staff.				

*UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)*

UNMIK was established by SCR 1244 (10 June 1999) and mandated to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; perform civilian administrative functions; maintain law and order; promote human rights; and ensure the safe return of refugees and displaced persons. Following Kosovo's declaration of independence and the deployment of EULEX Kosovo, UNMIK's mandate altered to monitoring and supporting local institutions. A positive decision by the UN Security Council is required to terminate the operation.

SCR 1244	Obs.: <i>Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, Czech Republic,</i>	-	-	54	127.0
June 1999	<i>Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain,</i>	8	9	-	..
Kosovo	<b>Turkey, Ukraine</b>	8	8		
	<i>Civ. pol.: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Malawi, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, Zambia, Zimbabwe</i>	176	146*		

\* The operation is supported by 285 locally recruited staff and 88 UN volunteers.

*UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)*

MONUC was established by SCR 1279 (30 Nov. 1999) and mandated by SCR 1291 (24 Feb. 2000) to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe; to supervise and verify the disengagement of forces; to monitor human rights violations; and to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. The operation was given UN Charter Chapter VII powers by SCR 1493 (28 July 2003). By SCR 1856 (22 Dec. 2008) the mission was mandated to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel and UN personnel and facilities; to assist the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of foreign and Congolese armed groups; to assist security sector reform (SSR) and train and mentor Congolese armed forces; to contribute to the territorial security of the DRC; and to support the strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law. SCR 1906 (23 Dec. 2009) extended the mandate until 31 May 2010.

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009/ unpaid
		Approved	Actual		
<i>MONUC continued</i>					
SCR1279	Troops: Bangladesh, <b>Belgium</b> , Benin, Bolivia, China, <b>Egypt</b> , Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Tunisia, Uruguay	19 815	18 646	155	1 294.7
Nov. 1999		760	705	15	606.8
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Obs.: <i>Algeria</i> , Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, <b>Cameroun</b> , Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, <b>Mongolia</b> , Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, <b>Norway</b> , Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia	1 441	1 158	(-, 2, 9)	
		1 234	1 006*		
	Civ. pol.: <i>Argentina</i> , Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, <b>Egypt</b> , France, Guinea, India, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Romania, Russia, <b>Senegal</b> , Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen				
	* The operation is supported by 2636 locally recruited staff and 648 UN volunteers.				
<i>UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)</i>					
	UNMIL was established by SCR 1509 (19 Sep. 2003) under UN Charter Chapter VII and mandated to support the implementation of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement; to assist in matters of humanitarian and human rights; to support SSR; and to protect civilians. UNMIL cooperates with UNOCI and UNIPSIL. SCR 1885 (15 Sep. 2009) extended the mandate until 30 Sep. 2010.				
SCR1509	Troops: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Jordan, <i>Kenya</i> , Korea (South), Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, <b>Pakistan</b> , Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Togo, UK, Ukraine, USA, Yemen	8 202	9 505	143	596.3
Oct. 2003		133	118	20	68.4
Liberia		1 343	1 324	(-, 6, 10)	
		546	452*		
	Obs.: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, <i>Kenya</i> , Korea (South),				

Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, Moldova, Montenegro, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Togo, Ukraine, USA, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Civ. pol.: Argentina, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Iceland, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

\* The operation is supported by 993 locally recruited staff and 228 UN volunteers.

#### UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

UNOCI was established by SCR 1528 (27 Feb. 2004) under UN Charter Chapter VII and mandated to monitor the cessation of hostilities, movement of armed groups and the arms embargo; to support DDR and SSR; to assist with the creation of law and order, human rights and public information; to facilitate humanitarian assistance and rebuild state institutions; and to assist in the holding of free elections. In 2007 the mandate was expanded to support the full implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (4 Mar. 2007) and of the Supplementary Agreements (28 Nov. 2007). UNOCI cooperates with UNMIL and Operation Licorne. SCR 1911 (28 Jan. 2010) extended the mandate until 31 May 2010.

SCR 1528	Troops: Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Chad, Egypt, France, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Yemen	7 915	7 202	64	494.6
Apr. 2004		200	189	10	132.2
Côte d'Ivoire		1 200	1 145	(-, 3, 5)	
		467	399*		

Obs.: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Chad, China, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Ireland, Jordan, Korea (South), Moldova, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Civ. pol.: Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Dem. Rep. of), Djibouti, France, Ghana, Jordan, Libya, Madagascar, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen

\* The operation is supported by 692 locally recruited staff and 304 UN volunteers.

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009/ unpaid
		Approved	Actual		
<i>UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)</i>					
MINUSTAH was established by SCR 1542 (30 Apr. 2004) under UN Charter Chapter VII and mandated to maintain a secure and stable environment to ensure that the peace process is carried forward; to support SSR, including a comprehensive DDR programme, building the capacity of the national police and re-establishing the rule of law; to assist in the holding of free elections; to support humanitarian and human rights activities; and to protect civilians. SCR 1892 (13 Oct. 2009) extended the mandate to 15 Oct. 2010.					
SCR1542	Troops: Argentina, Bolivia, <u>Brazil</u> , Canada, Chile, <u>Croatia</u> , Ecuador, France, Guatemala, <u>India</u> , Jordan, <u>Korea (South)</u> , Nepal, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, USA	6 940	7 032	59	606.7
June 2004		–	–	20	132.8
Haiti	Civ. pol.: Argentina, <b>Bangladesh</b> , Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, <i>Congo (Dem. Rep. of)</i> , Côte d'Ivoire, <u>Croatia</u> , Egypt, El Salvador, France, Grenada, Guinea, India, <i>Italy</i> , Jamaica, <u>Jordan</u> , Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Togo, Turkey, Uruguay, USA, Yemen	2 211	2 025	(1, 13, 4)	
		552	484*		
* The operation is supported by 1246 locally recruited staff and 215 UN volunteers.					
<i>UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</i>					
UNMIS was established by SCR 1590 (24 Mar. 2005) under UN Charter Chapter VII, following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and mandated to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement; to protect and promote human rights; to facilitate the DDR process; and to protect civilians and UN personnel. SCR 1870 (20 May 2009) extended the mandate until 30 Apr. 2010.					
SCR 1590	Troops: Australia, Bangladesh, <b>Brazil</b> , Cambodia, Canada, China, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, <b>Greece</b> , Guatemala, <u>India</u> , Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, <b>Nigeria</b> , Norway, Pakistan, <b>Romania</b> , Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Turkey, UK, Yemen, Zambia	9 450	9 093	50	908.6
Mar. 2005		525	476	8	397.9
Sudan		715	693	(1, 3, 3)	
		1 142	837*		
Obs.: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, <i>Botswana</i> , Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, China, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji,					

*Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe*

*Civ. pol.: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe*

\* The operation is supported by 2626 locally recruited staff and 367 UN volunteers.

*UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)*

UNMIT was established by SCR 1704 (25 Aug. 2006) and mandated to support the Government of Timor-Leste in post-conflict peacebuilding, capacity building and training of the East Timorese national police. SCR 1912 (26 Feb. 2010) extended the mandate until 26 Feb. 2011.

SCR1704	Obs.: Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Fiji, India, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Singapore	-	7	193.4
Aug. 2006		34	2	77.7
Timor-Leste	Civ. pol.: <i>Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Gambia, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Korea (South), Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe</i>	1 605	(-, 1, -)	1 517
		457		362*

\* The operation is supported by 895 locally recruited staff and 198 UN volunteers.

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009/ unpaid
		Approved	Actual		
<i>UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)</i>					
SCR1778	Troops: Albania, Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Congo (Rep. of), Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Malawi, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Togo, Tunisia, USA	5 200	2 489	3	502.9
Sep. 2007		25	24	3	..
Central African Republic, Chad	Obs.: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia	300	264	(1, 1, 1)	
	Civ. pol.: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Finland, France, Guinea, Jordan, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Yemen	595	432*		
* The operation is supported by 474 locally recruited staff and 148 UN volunteers.					
<b>United Nations political and peacebuilding operations</b>		<b>298</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>367.3</b>
<b>Total: 5 operations</b>		<b>113</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-</b>
		<b>22</b>	<b>13</b>		
		<b>1 125</b>	<b>858</b>		

*UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)*

UNAMA was established by SCR 1401 (28 Mar. 2002) and mandated to assist with the protection of human rights, the rule of law and gender issues; to support national reconciliation and rapprochement; and to manage humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities. Its mandate was expanded by SCR 1806 (20 Mar. 2008) to coordinate international assistance; to strengthen cooperation with ISAF; to manage all UN humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan; to support efforts to improve governance and the rule of law and to combat corruption; and to promote human rights and provide technical assistance to the electoral process. SRC 1868 (23 Mar. 2009) extended the mandate until 23 Mar. 2010.

SCR 1401	Obs.: Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, <b>Canada</b> , Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Korea (South), New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Romania, <b>Sweden</b> , UK, Uruguay	-	-	16	170.2
Mar. 2002		20	17	5	-
Afghanistan	Civ. pol.: Bangladesh, Canada, Norway	8	3	(-, -, 4)	
	Civ. staff: Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo (Dem. Rep. of), Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe	425	339*		

\* The operation is supported by 1328 locally recruited staff and 53 UN volunteers.

*UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)*

UNAMI was established by SCR 1500 (14 Aug. 2003) and mandated to support dialogue and national reconciliation; to facilitate humanitarian assistance and the safe return of refugees and displaced persons; to coordinate reconstruction and assistance programmes; to assist in capacity building and sustainable development; and to promote the protection of human rights, judicial and legal reform and strengthen the rule of law. UNAMI cooperates with US Forces-Iraq (formerly the Multinational Force in Iraq). NTM-I and EUJUST LEX. SCR 1883 (7 Aug. 2009) extended the mandate until 7 Aug. 2010.

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009/ unpaid
		Approved	Actual		
<i>UNAMI continued</i>					
SCR 1500	Troops: Fiji	298	221	11	128.8
Aug. 2003	Obs.: Australia, Denmark, <b>Jordan</b> , <b>Nepal</b> , New Zealand, UK, <b>USA</b>	13	11	1	-
Iraq	Civ. staff: Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Congo (Dem. Rep. of), Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (South), Lebanon, Liberia, Lithuania, FYROM, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palestinian territories, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan	-	321*	(-, -, -)	-
* This operation is supported by 457 locally recruited staff.					
<i>UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)</i>					
BINUB was established by SCR 1719 (25 Oct. 2006) and mandated to assist the Burundian Government in consolidating peace and democratic governance, supporting the national DDR programme, promoting and protecting human rights, and coordinating donors and UN agencies. SCR 1902 (17 Dec. 2009) tasked the mission, working in close cooperation with the Government of Burundi, to support the electoral process, democratic governance, the consolidation of peace, sustainable reintegration and gender issues. In carrying out its mandate, BINUB cooperates with MONUC. SCR 1902 (17 Dec. 2009) extended the mandate to 31 Dec. 2010.					
SCR 1719	Obs.: <i>Bangladesh</i> , <i>Croatia</i> , <i>Egypt</i> , <i>Ghana</i> , <i>Netherlands</i> , <i>Niger</i> , <i>Pakistan</i> , <b>Senegal</b> , Switzerland, <i>Tunisia</i>	-	-	-	37.9
Jan. 2007	Civ. pol.: Benin, <i>Burkina Faso</i> , Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, <i>Madagascar</i> , Nigeria, <b>Turkey</b> , Yemen	7	5	-	-
Burundi		14	10		
		144	123*		

Civ. staff: Angola, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Congo (Rep. of), Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Italy, Kenya, Korea (South), Lebanon, Liberia, FYROM, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, UK, Ukraine, USA, Zambia, Zimbabwe

\* The operation is supported by 240 locally recruited staff and 50 UN volunteers.

#### *UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)*

UNMIN was established by SCR 1740 (23 Jan. 2007) and mandated to assist monitoring the ceasefire arrangements; to implement and monitor the agreement on the management of arms and armed personnel; and to support the electoral process. SCR 1825 (23 July 2008) tasked the mission with monitoring arms and armed personnel and assisting the parties in the implementation of the agreement. SCR 1909 (21 Jan. 2010) extended the mandate to 15 May 2010.

SCR 1740	Obs.: Austria, Brazil, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea (South), Malaysia, Nigeria, Paraguay, Romania, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe	-	-	6	18.6
Jan. 2007	Civ. staff: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, China, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Palestinian territories, Philippines, Russia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Uganda, UK, Uruguay, USA	73	72	-	-
Nepal		56	46*		

\* The operation is supported by 120 locally recruited staff and 19 UN volunteers.

#### *UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)*

UNIPSIL was established by SCR 1829 (4 Aug. 2008) and mandated to monitor and promote human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law; and to support efforts to identify and resolve potential conflict threats. SCR 1886 (15 Sep. 2009) extended the mandate until 30 Sep. 2010.

SCR 1829	Civ. staff: Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, USA	-	-	1	11.8
Oct. 2008		-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone		41	29*		

\* The operation is supported by 29 locally recruited staff.

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009/ unpaid
		Approved	Actual		
<b>African Union–United Nations</b>					
<b>Total: 1 operation</b>	<b>59 contributing countries*</b>	<b>19 315</b>	<b>15 114</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>1 584.1</b>
		<b>240</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>200.0</b>
		<b>6 432</b>	<b>4 575</b>		
		<b>1 524</b>	<b>1 093</b>		

\* This figure only includes countries deploying uniformed personnel to UNAMID during 2009.

#### *AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)*

UNAMID was established by the AU PSC's 79th Communiqué on the Situation in Darfur (22 June 2007) and by SCR 1769 (31 July 2007) under UN Charter Chapter VII. The operation is mandated to contribute to the restoration of a secure environment, protect the civilian population, facilitate humanitarian assistance, monitor the implementation of related ceasefire agreements, and promote the rule of law and human rights. SCR 1891 (13 Oct. 2009) extended the mandate until 15 Oct. 2010.

SCR 1769 Troops: *Australia*, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, *Canada*, China,

Oct. 2007 Egypt, Ethiopia, *France*, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, *Guatemala*, Indonesia, Italy,

Sudan Jordan, Kenya, **Korea (South)**, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Nepal,

Netherlands, *Nigeria*, Pakistan, *Rwanda*, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,

Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, *Togo*, Turkey, *UK*, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Obs.: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, **Cameroon**, China, Egypt, Ethiopia,

Gambia, Ghana, **Guatemala**, Indonesia, Jordan, **Kenya**, Malawi, **Malaysia**, Mali,

*Mozambique*, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, *Rwanda*, *Senegal*, **Sierra Leone**,

South Africa, Tanzania, **Thailand**, *Togo*, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia, **Zimbabwe**

Civ. pol.: Bangladesh, *Botswana*, *Burkina Faso*, **Burundi**, **Cameroon**, Côte

d'Ivoire, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, *France*, Gambia, Germany, Ghana,

Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, **Kyrgyzstan**, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, *Mali*,

*Mauritania*, **Namibia**, Nepal, *Niger*, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palau,

Philippines, *Rwanda*, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, *Sweden*,

Tajikistan, Tanzania, **Togo**, Turkey, Uganda, *UK*, **Vanuatu**, Yemen, Zambia

\* The operation is supported by 2517 locally recruited staff and 410 UN volunteers.

19 315

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4 575

(15, 1, 9)

1 524

1 093\*



Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009
		Approved	Actual		
<b>Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC)</b>					
<b>Total: 1 operation</b>	<b>7 contributing countries</b>	-	<b>500</b>	..	<b>40.6</b>
		-	<b>30</b>	..	..
		-	..	..	..
		-	..	..	..
<i>Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX)</i>					
MICOPAX was established by a decision of the 2002 Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) Libreville Summit (2 Oct. 2002) in order to secure the border between Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). The mandate was expanded at the 2003 Libreville Summit (3 June 2003) to include contributing to the overall security environment, assisting in the restructuring of the CAR's armed forces and supporting the transition process. Coinciding with the transfer of authority on 12 July 2008 from CEMAC to CEEAC, the operation's mandate was expanded again to include promotion of political dialogue and human rights. The operation is mandated for 6-month periods, renewable until 2013.					
Libreville Summit, 2 Oct. 2002	Troops: Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Dem. Rep. of), <u>Congo (Rep. of), Gabon</u>	-	500*	..	40.6**
Dec. 2002	Obs.: Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Rep. of), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon	-	30	..	..
Central African Republic	Civ. pol.: Equatorial Guinea	-	..	..	..
* The operations is supported by and co-located with a detachment of c. 240 French soldiers (Opération Boali).					
** This figure is approximate. The mission is financed by contributions from CEEAC, the EU (€14 625 000) and France.					
<b>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)</b>					
<b>Total: 1 operation</b>	<b>3 contributing countries</b>	<b>1 500</b>	<b>1 278</b>	..	..
		-	<b>10</b>	..	..
		-	-	-	-
		-	-	-	-

*Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (JCC)*

The JCC Peacekeeping Force was established pursuant to the Agreement on the Principles Governing the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Trans-Dniester region, signed in Moscow by the presidents of Moldova and Russia (21 July 1992). The Joint Control Commission—a monitoring commission comprising representatives of Moldova, Russia and Trans-Dniester—was established to coordinate the activities of the joint force.

Bilateral agreement,	Troops: Moldova, Russia, (Trans-Dniester)	1 500	1 278	..	..
21 July 1992	Obs.: Ukraine	–	10	..	..
July 1992		–	–		
Moldova (Trans-Dniester)		–	–		

**European Union (EU)****Total: 12 operations 41 contributing countries**

<b>6 200</b>	<b>3 034</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>420.2</b>
<b>323*</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>1</b>	
<b>2 835**</b>	<b>1 422</b>		
–	<b>893</b>		

\* The figure for total approved observers applies to EUMM only and includes civilian police and civilian staff.

\*\* The figure for total approved civilian police includes civilian observers and civilian staff.

*EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)*

The EUPM was established by CJA 2002/210/CFSP (11 Mar. 2002) and tasked with the establishment—through monitoring, mentoring and inspection—of a sustainable, professional and multi-ethnic police service in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Bosnian ownership. At the request of the Bosnian authorities, the mandate was modified to focus on the police reform process, strengthening of police accountability and efforts to fight organized crime. CJA 2009/906/CFSP (8 Dec. 2009), which further strengthened the mission's mandate to assist the fight organized crime and corruption within a broader rule-of-law approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina, extended the mandate to 31 Dec. 2011.

CJA 2002/210/CFSP	Civ. pol.: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic,	–	–	3	17.3
Jan. 2003	Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,	–	–	–	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine	205	82		
	Civ. staff: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK, Ukraine	–	25*		

\* The mission is supported by 152 locally recruited staff.

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009
		Approved	Actual		
<i>EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA)</i>					
EUFOR ALTHEA was established by CJA 2004/570/CFSP (12 July 2004) and was endorsed and given UN Charter Chapter VII powers by SCR 1575 (22 Nov. 2004). It is mandated to maintain a secure environment for the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Agreement; to assist in the strengthening of local policing capacity; and to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress towards EU integration. By SCR 1895 (18 Nov. 2009) the mandate was extended for a further 12 months.					
CJA 2004/570/CFSP and SCR 1575	Troops: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYROM, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, UK	2 500	2 024**	21	27.2
Dec. 2004					
Bosnia and Herzegovina*					
* A multinational manoeuvre battalion (made up of troops from Hungary, Poland, Spain and Turkey) is stationed in Sarajevo. Other elements of the mission are the integrated police unit (IPU) and the liaison and observer teams (LOTS), deployed to 5 regional coordination centres.					
** The figure for actual troops deployed is as of Jan. 2010.					
<i>EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo)</i>					
EUSEC RD Congo was established by CJA 2005/355/CFSP (2 May 2005). The mission's initial mandate was to advise and assist the authorities of the DRC, specifically the Ministry of Defence, on security matters, ensuring that their policies are congruent with international humanitarian law, principles of democratic governance and the rule of law. In 2009 the mission's mandate was broadened to include advising and assisting in SSR by facilitating the implementation of the guidelines adopted by the Congolese authorities in the revised plan for reform of the Congolese armed forces. In carrying out its activities, EUSEC operates in close coordination with MONUC and EUPOL RD Congo. CJA 2009/709/CFSP (15 Sep. 2009) extended the mandate until 30 Sep. 2010.					
CJA 2005/355/CFSP	Civ. staff: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK				10.9
June 2005					
Democratic Republic of the Congo					43*

\* The majority of the deployed personnel are military advisers. The mission is supported by 34 locally recruited staff.

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*EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX)*

EUJUST LEX was established by CJA 2005/190/CFSP (7 Mar. 2005), in accordance with SCR 1546 (8 June 2004), to strengthen Iraq's criminal justice system through the training of magistrates, senior police officers and senior penitentiary staff. The operation cooperates with NTM-I and UNAMI. CJA 2009/475/CFSP (11 June 2009) extended the mandate to 30 June 2010.

CJA 2005/190/CFSP	Civ. staff: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, UK	-	-	-	12.4
and SCR 1546		-	-	-	
July 2005		50	47**		

Iraq/Europe\*

\* During 2009, for the first time EUJUST LEX carried out activities in Iraq, providing training, strategic advice and mentoring.

\*\* The mission is supported by 2 locally recruited staff.

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*EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah)*

EU BAM Rafah was established by CJA 2005/889/CFSP (12 Dec. 2005) on the basis of the Agreement on Movement and Access between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (15 Nov. 2005). It is mandated to monitor, verify and evaluate the performance of Palestinian Authority border control, security and customs officials at the Rafah Crossing Point with regard to the 2005 Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing; and to support the Palestinian Authority's capacity building in the field of border control. Following riots in 2007, the Rafah Crossing Point was closed and only to be opened under exceptional circumstances. However, EU BAM Rafah retains full operational capabilities. CJA 2009/854/CFSP (20 Nov. 2009) extended the mandate until 24 May 2010.

CJA	Civ. pol.: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Spain, Sweden	-	-	-	3.5
2005/889/CFSP		-	-	-	
Nov. 2005	Civ. staff: Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Sweden, UK	96	10		
Egypt, Palestinian territories (Rafah crossing point)		-	9*		

\* The mission is supported by 11 locally recruited staff.

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009
		Approved	Actual		
<i>EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)</i>					
EUPOL COPPS was established by CJA 2005/797/CFSP (14 Nov. 2005). It is mandated to provide a framework for and advise Palestinian criminal justice and police officials and coordinate EU aid to the Palestinian Authority. CJA 2008/958/CFSP (16 Dec. 2008) extended the mandate until 31 Dec. 2010.					
CJA 2005/797/CFSP	Civ. pol.: <b>Austria</b> , Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, <b>Netherlands</b> , Norway, Sweden, UK	-	-	-	8.7
Jan. 2006	Civ. staff: Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, <b>Ireland</b> , Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK	52	23	-	-
Palestinian territories		-	20*	-	-
* The mission is supported by 23 locally recruited staff.					
<i>EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)</i>					
EUPOL Afghanistan was established by CJA 2007/369/CFSP (30 May 2007) at the invitation of the Afghan Government. The operation is tasked to strengthen the rule of law by contributing to the establishment of civil policing arrangements and law enforcement under Afghan ownership. The current mandate expires on 30 May 2010.					
CJA 2007/369/CFSP	Civ. pol.: Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, <b>Latvia</b> , Lithuania, Netherlands, <b>New Zealand</b> , Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, UK	-	-	-	100.8
June 2007	Civ. staff: <b>Austria</b> , Belgium, <b>Canada</b> , Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, <b>Lithuania</b> , Netherlands, <b>Norway</b> , <b>Poland</b> , Portugal, Romania, <b>Spain</b> , Sweden, UK	400	163	-	-**
Afghanistan		-	104*	-	-

\* The operation is supported by 163 locally recruited staff.

\*\* One locally recruited staff member died in an accident.

*EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo)*

EUPOL RD Congo was established by CJA 2007/405/CFSP (12 June 2007). CJA 2009/769/CFSP (19 Oct. 2009) mandated the mission to assist the Congolese authorities in reforming and restructuring the Congolese Police; improving interaction between police and the criminal justice system; supporting efforts against sexual violence; and promoting gender, human rights and children aspects of the peace process. The mission cooperates with EUSEC RD Congo and MONUC. CJA 2009/466/CFSP (15 June 2009) extended the mandate until 30 June 2010.

CJA 2007/405/CFSP	Civ. pol.: Angola, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Spain	-	-	7.8
July 2007	Civ. staff: Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland	-	-	-
Democratic Republic of the Congo*		59	20	
		-	12**	

\* A permanent presence in eastern DRC (Goma and Bukavu) was established by CJA 2009/769/CFSP (19 Oct. 2009).

\*\* The mission is supported by 15 locally recruited staff.

*EU Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)*

EUFOR Tchad/RCA was established by CJA 2007/677/CFSP (15 Oct. 2007), with endorsement and UN Charter Chapter VII powers given by SCR 1778 (25 Sep. 2007). It was mandated to support MINURCAT, contribute to the protection of civilians and UN personnel, and facilitate humanitarian aid efforts. The mission closed on 15 Mar. 2009. MINURCAT took over, deploying a military component authorized by SCR 1861 (14 Jan. 2009).

CJA 2007/677/CFSP and SCR 1778	Troops: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK	3 700	1 010**	1	33.7
Jan. 2008		-	-	-	-
Central African Republic, Chad*		-	-	15	

\* Operational headquarters were at Mont Valérien, France. Rear Force Headquarters were located at N'Djamena, force headquarters at Abéché, and 3 multinational battalions at Iriba, Forchana and Goz Beïda, all in Chad. The operation was supported by a detachment in Birao, CAR.

\*\* The personnel figures include personnel assigned to the operation headquarters in Mont Valérien, France.

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009
		Approved	Actual		
<i>EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)</i>					
EULEX Kosovo was established by CJA 2008/124/CFSP (4 Feb. 2008). With certain executive responsibilities, the operation is tasked to monitor, mentor and advise Kosovan institutions in the wider field of the rule of law. It cooperates with UNMIK and OMIK. The current mandate expires on 14 June 2010.					
CJA 2008/124/CFSP	Civ. pol.: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, <b>Canada</b> , Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, <b>Malta</b> , Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA	-	-	1	158.7
Feb. 2008*		-	-	1	
Kosovo		1 951	1 124	(-, 1, -)	
		-	443**		
Civ. staff: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, <b>Canada</b> , Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, <i>Luxembourg</i> , <i>Malta</i> , Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA					
* EULEX Kosovo became operational by 9 Dec. 2008; the mission's full operational capability had been achieved by 6 Apr. 2009.					
** The mission is supported by 1030 locally recruited staff.					
<i>EU Advisory Mission for Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau)</i>					
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau was established by CJA 2008/112/CFSP (12 Feb. 2008) and mandated to assist local authorities in planning the restructuring of the national security and armed forces and to advise in training and equipment procurement. CJA 2009/841/CFSP (17 Nov. 2009) extended the mandate to 31 May 2010.					
CJA 2008/112/CFSP	Civ. staff: France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, <b>Sweden</b>	-	-	-	4.5
June 2008		-	-	-	
Guinea-Bissau		-	-	-	
		22	16*		
* Eight of the deployed personnel are military advisors. The operation is supported by 17 locally recruited staff.					
<i>EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM)</i>					
The EUMM was established by CJA 2008/736/CFSP (15 Sep. 2008) in accordance with an EU-Russia agreement of 8 Sep. 2008, following the conflict in South Ossetia in Aug. 2008. The operation is tasked with monitoring and analysing progress in the stabilization process, focusing on compliance with the					

6-point peace plan of 12 Aug. 2008, and in the normalization of civil governance; monitoring infrastructure security and the political and security aspects of the return of internally displaced persons and refugees; and supporting confidence-building measures. CJA 2009/572/CFSP (27 July 2009) extended the mandate to 14 Sep. 2010.

CJA	Obs.: Austria, <b>Belgium</b> , Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, <b>Estonia</b> , Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, <b>Slovenia</b> , Spain, Sweden, UK	-	-	-	34.6
2008/736/CFSP		323	179	-	-
Oct. 2008	Civ. staff: Austria, <i>Belgium</i> , Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, <b>France</b> , Germany, Greece, <i>Hungary</i> , Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK	-	-	124*	-

\* The operation is supported by 74 locally recruited staff.

#### North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and NATO-led

<b>Total: 3 operations</b>	<b>43 contributing countries</b>	<b>10 000</b>	<b>96 808</b>	<b>971</b>	<b>487.0</b>
		-	-	<b>310</b>	
		<b>300</b>	<b>171</b>		

#### NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)

KFOR was established by SCR 1244 (10 June 1999). Its mandated tasks include deterring renewed hostilities, establishing a secure environment, supporting UNMIK and monitoring borders. In 2008 NATO expanded the operation's tasks to include efforts to develop a professional, democratic and multi-ethnic security structure in Kosovo. A positive decision of the UN Security Council is required to terminate the operation.

SCR1244	Troops: Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, <b>Croatia</b> , Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, <u>USA</u>	10 000**	12 662***	128	45.2
June 1999		-	-	1	
Kosovo*		-	-	(-, -, -)	

\* Along with KFOR headquarters in Pristina, KFOR contingents are grouped into several multinational task forces (MNTFs): MNTF Centre (Lipljan), led by Finland; MNTF North (Mitrovica), led by France; MNTF South (Prizren), led by Germany; MNTF West (Pec), led by Italy; and MNTF East (Urosevac), led by the USA. A Multinational Specialized Unit (Pristina) is led by Italy. A Tactical Reserve Manoeuvre Battalion (KTM) is also stationed in Pristina.

\*\* At the end of 2009 KFOR continued to reduce its troop numbers in anticipation of a new authorization level of 10 000 personnel by early 2010.

\*\*\* Numbers are as of October 2009. Coinciding with the downsizing and restructuring of the operation at the end of Dec. 2009 approximately 11 500 troops were deployed. The restructuring of the operation was completed at the end of Jan. 2010.

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009
		Approved	Actual		
<i>International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)</i>					
	ISAF was established by SCR 1386 (20 Dec. 2001) under UN Charter Chapter VII as a multinational force mandated to assist the Afghan Government to maintain security, as envisaged in Annex I of the 2001 Bonn Agreement. NATO took over command and control of ISAF in Aug. 2003. ISAF has had control of all 26 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan since 2006. SCR 1890 (8 Oct. 2009) extended the mandate to 12 Oct. 2010.				
SCR1386	Troops: Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, <b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b> , Bulgaria, <u>Canada</u> , Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYROM, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, <b>Singapore</b> , Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, <u>USA</u>	-	84 146	843	416.0
Dec. 2001		-	-	309**	
Afghanistan*		-	-	(287, -, -)	
		-	-		
* The territory of Afghanistan is divided into 5 areas of responsibility: Regional Command (RC) Centre (Kabul), currently led by Turkey; RC North (Mazar-e Sharif), led by Germany; RC West (Herat), led by Italy; RC South (Kandahar), led by the UK; and RC East (Bagram), led by the USA.					
** The number of fatalities is as of Sep. 2009.					
<i>NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)</i>					
	NTM-I was established pursuant to SCR 1546 (8 June 2004) and approved by the North Atlantic Council on 17 Nov. 2004. It is mandated to assist in the development of Iraq's security institutions through training and equipment of, in particular, middle- and senior-level personnel from the Iraqi security forces. In 2007 the mandate was revised to focus on mentoring and advising an Iraqi-led institutional training programme.				
SCR 1546	Civ. staff: <b>Bulgaria</b> , <i>Czech Republic</i> , Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, <i>Portugal</i> , Romania, <i>Slovenia</i> , Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA	-	-	-	25.8
Aug. 2004		-	-	-	
Iraq*		-	-	-	
		300	171		
* Activities of the NTM-I are carried out in Baghdad's secure 'green zone' and in undisclosed locations outside Iraq.					



Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009
		Approved	Actual		
<i>OSCE Mission to Georgia</i>					
The OSCE Mission to Georgia was established at the 17th CSO meeting (6 Nov. 1992). It was authorized by the Georgian Government through an MOU on 23 Jan. 1993 and by South Ossetia's leaders through an exchange of letters on 1 Mar. 1993. Its initial mandate was to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties. The mandate was expanded at the 14th PC Meeting (29 Mar. 1994) to include monitoring the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia, ensuring liaison with UNOMIG in Abkhazia and promoting human rights and institutional development throughout Georgia. PC.DEC/450 (13 Dec. 1999) and PC.DEC/522 (19 Dec. 2002) expanded the mandate to include observing and reporting on cross-border movement between Georgia and the Russian republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan. In 2008 Russia vetoed the extension of the operation, asking for a separate mandate for the office in South Ossetia. PC.DEC/883 (12 Feb. 2009) extended the mandate of the additional unarmed military monitors who were authorized on 19 Aug. 2008 until 30 June 2009, when they withdrew.					
CSO 6 Nov. 1992		Civ. staff: <i>Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA</i>	-	-	8.3
Dec. 1992			-	-	-
Georgia			-	-	33*
* The mission was supported by 34 locally recruited staff.					
<i>OSCE Mission to Moldova</i>					
The OSCE Mission to Moldova was established at the 19th CSO meeting (4 Feb. 1993) and authorized by the Moldovan Government through an MOU (7 May 1993). Its tasks include assisting the conflicting parties in pursuing negotiations on a lasting political settlement, and gathering and providing information on the situation. PC.DEC/909 (24 Nov. 2009) extended the mandate to 31 Dec. 2010.					
CSO 4 Feb. 1993		Civ. staff: <i>Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Tajikistan, UK, USA</i>	-	-	2.7
Apr. 1993			-	-	-
Moldova			13	-	13*
* The mission is supported by 39 locally recruited staff.					



Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009
		Approved	Actual		
<i>OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)</i>					
OMIK was established by PC.DEC/305 (1 July 1999). Its mandate includes training police, judicial personnel and civil administrators and monitoring and promoting human rights. The operation is a component of UNMIK. PC.DEC/835 (21 Dec. 2007) extended the mandate until 31 Jan. 2008, after which the mandate is renewed on a monthly basis unless one of the participating states objects.					
PC.DEC/305	Civ. staff: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, <i>Lithuania</i> , FYROM, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, <i>Switzerland</i> , <i>Tajikistan</i> , Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan	-	-	9	37.6
July 1999		-	-	-	-
Kosovo		224	163*		
* The mission is supported by 586 locally recruited staff.					
<i>OSCE Mission to Serbia</i>					
The OSCE Mission to Serbia was established by PC.DEC/401 (11 Jan. 2001). It is mandated to advise on the implementation of laws and to monitor the proper functioning and development of democratic institutions and processes in Serbia. It assists in the training and restructuring of law enforcement bodies and the judiciary. PC.DEC/912 (24 Nov. 2009) extended the mandate until 31 Dec. 2010.					
PC/D/DEC 401	Civ. staff: <i>Austria</i> , Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, <b>Greece</b> , Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA	-	-	-	11.0
Mar. 2001		-	-	-	-
Serbia		-	-	41*	
* The mission is supported by 138 locally recruited staff.					
<b>Ad-hoc coalitions</b>		<b>900</b>	<b>1 900</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>359.7</b>
<b>Total: 6 operations</b>		<b>2 180</b>	<b>1 710</b>	<b>6</b>	
		-	246		
		-	274		

*Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)*

The NNSC was established by the agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea signed at Panmunjom (27 July 1953). It is mandated with the functions of supervision, observation, inspection and investigation of implementation of the armistice agreement.

Armistice Agreement	Obs.: Sweden, Switzerland	-	-	-	2.8*
July 1953		-	10	-	
North Korea, South Korea		-	-	-	

\* The yearly costs figure does not include unknown contributions from Poland and the USA.

*Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)*

MFO was established on 3 Aug. 1981 by the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, signed on 26 Mar. 1979. Deployment began on 20 Mar. 1982, following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai but the mission did not become operational until 25 Apr. 1982, the day that Israel returned the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. The mission is mandated to observe the implementation of the peace treaty and to contribute to a secure environment.

Protocol to Treaty of Peace	Apr. 1982	Obs.: Australia, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Italy, France, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Uruguay, USA	2 000	1 678	66 4	74.8
Egypt (Sinai)		Civ. staff: Australia, Canada, France, Norway, UK, USA	-	-	(-, 1, 2)	

\* The mission is supported by 474 locally recruited staff.

*Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH 2)*

TIPH 2 was established by the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (17 Jan. 1997) and the Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (21 Jan. 1997). It is mandated to contribute to a secure and stable environment and to monitor and report breaches of international humanitarian law. The mandate is renewed every 6 months subject to approval from both the Israeli and Palestinian parties.

Hebron Protocol	Feb. 1997	Obs.: Denmark, Italy, Norway, Turkey	-	-	2	3.0
Palestinian territories (Hebron)		Civ. staff: Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey	180	22	-	

\* The mission is supported by 8 locally recruited staff.

Legal instrument/ Deployment date/ Location	Countries contributing troops, observers (Obs.), civilian police (Civ. pol.) and civilian staff (Civ. staff) in 2009 <sup>a</sup>	Troops/Obs./ Civ. pol./Civ. staff		Deaths: to date/ 2009/ (by cause <sup>b</sup> )	Cost (\$ m.): 2009
		Approved	Actual		
<i>Operation Licorne</i>					
Operation Licorne was deployed under the authority of SCR 1464 (4 Feb. 2003) and given UN Charter Chapter VII powers to support the ECOWAS mission (2003–2004)—in accordance with UN Charter Chapter VIII—in contributing to a secure environment and, in particular, to facilitate implementation of the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. SCR 1528 (27 Feb. 2004) provides its current authorization and revised the mandate to working in support of UNOCI. SCR 1795 (15 Jan. 2008) expanded the mandate to support implementing the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (4 Mar. 2007) and the Supplementary Agreements (28 Nov. 2007), in particular to assist in the holding of free elections. SCR 1911 (28 Jan. 2010) extended the mandate to 31 May 2010.					
SCR 1464	Troops: France	900	950*	24	97.8
Feb. 2003		–	–	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire		–	–	–	–
* The mission is supported by a naval attachment in the Gulf of Guinea (Mission Cormybe, 300 personnel).					
<i>Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)</i>					
RAMSI was established under the framework of the 2000 Biketawa Declaration (28 Oct. 2000). It is mandated to assist the Solomon Islands Government in restoring law and order and in building up the capacity of the police force.					
Biketawa	Troops: Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Tonga	–	160	6	28.9**
Declaration	Civ. pol.: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu	–	–	2	–
July 2003		–	246	(–, 1, 1)	–
Solomon Islands		–	191*	–	–
Civ. staff: Australia, Canada, Fiji, India, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Tonga, UK					

\* The operation is supported by a staff of 80 locally recruited professionals.

\*\* This figure reflects only Australia's financial contribution to the operation.

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**International Security Forces (ISF)**

ISF was deployed at the request of the Government of Timor-Leste to assist in stabilizing the security environment in the county and endorsed by SCR 1690 (20 June 2006). Its status is defined by an exchange of letters (25 May 2006) and status of forces agreement (26 May 2006) between Australia and Timor-Leste and an MOU between Australia, Timor-Leste and the UN (26 Jan. 2007). The operation cooperates with UNMIT.

Bilateral agreement, 25 May 2006, and SCR 1690	Troops: <u>Australia</u> , New Zealand	-	790	1	152.4**
May 2006	Civ. staff: Australia	-	-	-	-
Timor-Leste		-	3*		

\* The mission is supported by approximately 350 local personnel.

\*\* This figure reflects only Australia's financial contribution to the operation.

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- = not applicable; . = information not available; CJA = EU Council Joint Action; CP/RES = OAS Permanent Council Resolution; CSO = OSCE Senior Council (previously the Committee of Senior Officials); DDR = disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; FYROM = Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; MC = OSCE Ministerial Council; MOU = Memorandum of Understanding; PC.DEC = OSCE Permanent Council Decision; PSC = AU Peace and Security Council; SCR = UN Security Council Resolution; SSR = security sector reform.

<sup>a</sup> Bold text = new in 2009; italic text = ended in 2009; underlined text = designated lead state.

<sup>b</sup> Where cause of death can be attributed, the 3 figures in parentheses are, respectively, deaths due to hostilities, accidents and illness in 2009. As causes of death were not reported for all deaths in the year, these figures do not always add up to the total annual fatality figure.

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/>>.

