

PRESS RELEASE

Embargo: Not for release until 14 June 2000, 10.00 CET

SIPRI Yearbook 2000

Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

ISBN 0-19-924162-7
c. 770 pages, £60.00

'The novelty of the situation today is that globalization generates interdependence and cooperation. . . .The international security system should be inclusive and security cooperation and mutual reassurance should replace mutual deterrence, associated with balance-of-power politics. . . . Many factors will determine the further development of the international security system. Unlike the bipolarity and ideological clarity of the cold war era, the world today has no clear-cut dividing lines or overriding threat. A critical element of the shaping of a new international system is the ever growing recognition of democratic principles, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and market economy as the common values. . . . International structures, organizations and institutions should be seen as forums in which national security interests can be addressed. This means that the new international system will function only when states find that it ensures their security more effectively than exclusive reliance on national strategies.'

From the Introduction

SIPRI Yearbook 2000 may be obtained from September 2000
through all the main bookshops
or from Oxford University Press.

Orders may also be placed through SIPRI on the Internet at
<http://www.sipri.se/pubs/bookorder.html>

For further information, contact Birgitta Alani, Deputy Director,
E-mail address: alani@sipri.se

HIGHLIGHTS from the SIPRI YEARBOOK 2000

Security and conflicts

- There were 27 major armed conflicts in 1999, all but 2 of which were internal. Seen against the 19 conflicts in 1997, according to the revised statistics, there was a sharp upturn in the last two years of the decade.
- Over 1000 people were killed in 14 conflicts in 1999. In only two other years of the past decade was there such a high incidence of intensive conflict.
- Foreign military intervention occurred in 5 of the 27 conflicts waged in 1999, suggesting that intervention remains the exception and is not becoming the rule.
- The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1998 has involved the armed forces of nine states and at least nine rebel groups. The main parties to the conflict signed a peace agreement in 1999, but successful implementation of the agreement is in doubt. The course of the war and its outcome will strongly influence political stability and economic development throughout central and southern Africa for years to come.
- UN peace operations were massively expanded in 1999, with new missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Each of these complex missions revealed the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction and the constraints on the international community in building sustainable intra-state peace.
- Russia's resolve to fight the threat of separatism, widely supported by Russian public opinion, brought it into a protracted war in Chechnya, causing a massive civilian refugee problem and taking a heavy toll of human life.
- The renationalization of security policies and too-slow progress in shaping a common European security and defence policy are much greater threats than too-rapid change.

Military spending and armaments

- Military expenditure increased in many regions in 1999 and total world military expenditure, amounting to roughly \$780 billion, increased by 2.1% in real terms. This is almost one-third less than in 1990, but represents 2.6% of world GNP.
- Military expenditure in Africa has been increasing since 1997, primarily because of the armed conflicts in the region. Because of the methods of financing these conflicts, official military expenditure data considerably understate the actual cost of military activities in many African countries.
- Restructuring of arms production continued in 1999 but the post-cold war decline in arms production slowed considerably in the latter half of the 1990s.
- SIPRI estimates show a fairly stable level of global major conventional arms transfers from 1995 at about one-half of the cold war peak value.

Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

- The growing controversy over a US national ballistic missile defence system and the future of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty jeopardized the prospects for negotiating deeper cuts in strategic nuclear forces and threatened to reverse the progress made in recent years in reducing those forces.
- The adoption of the IAEA strengthened safeguards system by its Board of Governors in 1997 represented an important step towards limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and enhancing international security, but acceptance of the new provisions by the IAEA member states has been very slow.
- The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons remained a major security issue in 1999, with special concerns regarding biological warfare programmes in Russia.
- Political will appears to be the key to the successful implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the achievement of a meaningful protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
- Incidents of terrorism with chemical and biological weapons are unlikely to occur, but governments cannot ignore the threat and must develop balanced policies in order to avoid a climate in which hoaxes become as efficient for terrorists as the actual use of chemical and biological weapons.
- 1999 marked the end of the UN Special Commission for Iraq (UNSCOM) as a consequence of the divisions in the UN Security Council. Iraq has so far refused to accept UN Security Council Resolution 1284, which created the successor organization, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).
- The 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) crowned the multi-year efforts of the 30 states parties to the CFE Treaty to rid the treaty of its cold war straitjacket and make it better suited to the new cooperative security environment.
- In September 1999 the United States and North Korea reached a new understanding that may halt the development and testing of long-range ballistic missiles by North Korea.
- The 35 states that participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls completed the first five-year review of the operation of the regime. The review led to agreement on expanded transparency measures for conventional arms transfers.

SIPRI Yearbook 2000

Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

CONTENTS

Introduction: In search of a global security system for the 21st century

Part I. Security and conflicts, 1999

Chapter 1. Major armed conflicts

Chapter 2. Armed conflict prevention, management and resolution

Chapter 3. Russia: separatism and conflicts in the North Caucasus

Chapter 4. Europe: the new transatlantic agenda

Part II. Military spending and armaments, 1999

Chapter 5. Military expenditure

Chapter 6. Arms production

Chapter 7. Transfers of major conventional weapons

Part III. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, 1999

Chapter 8. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation

Chapter 9. Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control

Chapter 10. Conventional arms control

Chapter 11. Responses to proliferation: the North Korean ballistic missile programme

Annexes

Annexe A. Arms control and disarmament agreements

Annexe B. Chronology 1999

*Plus a glossary of terms and membership of multilateral organizations,
tables, figures, maps, data appendices and extensive documentation
as well as a detailed account of the conflicts in 1999*

SUMMARIES from the SIPRI YEARBOOK 2000

1. Major armed conflicts

Taylor B. Seybolt in collaboration with the Uppsala Conflict Data Project

The world continued to be afflicted with large-scale violence in 1999, with 27 major armed conflicts in 25 countries. The number of conflicts was unchanged from 1998; the two years together represent an upward trend in the number of wars at the end of the decade. The vast majority of the major armed conflicts in 1999 were in Africa and Asia; there were 11 in Africa, 9 in Asia, 3 in the Middle East, 2 in Europe and 2 in South America. All but two of the conflicts were internal. Most of the major armed conflicts registered for 1999 are protracted (17 have been active for at least eight years) or recurrent (4 conflicts).

Fourteen of the conflicts caused over 1000 deaths in 1999. Only twice in the past decade was there such a high incidence of intensive conflict. Nearly 1000 people were killed in 3 conflicts, while far fewer died as a result of 10 of the conflicts in 1999.

Foreign military intervention occurred in only 5 of the 27 conflicts waged in 1999, suggesting that it remains the exception and is not becoming the rule. In three of the cases—the FRY (Kosovo), Indonesia (East Timor) and Sierra Leone—multilateral coalitions were implicitly or explicitly sanctioned by a regional body or the United Nations. Only in the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo was foreign military intervention entirely unauthorized.

States and non-state actors concerned with the occurrence of violent conflict face a dilemma—persistent intra-state conflicts and the continual eruption of new ones, combined with their own well-justified reluctance to intervene militarily.

- *Appendix 1A, by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, presents data on the major armed conflicts of 1999.*

- *Appendix 1B, by Taylor B. Seybolt, is on the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.*

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the site of one of the world's most complicated and troubling wars. Since 1998 the armed forces of nine states and at least nine rebel groups have fought in the DRC for control of the DRC Government; over control of the governments in Angola, Burundi,

Rwanda and Uganda; over exploitation of vast mineral wealth; and owing to ethnic hatred. The course of the war and its outcome will strongly influence political stability and economic development throughout central and southern Africa for years to come.

Three separate Congolese rebel groups, with the support of Rwandan and Ugandan troops, control about one-half of the country. The government, with the support of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops, controls the other half. After intense diplomatic efforts through the Southern African Development Community, the main warring parties signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999. Successful implementation of the accord is uncertain because of the intransigence of the two sides and the reluctance of other states to provide peacekeeping troops. Continuation of the war risks laying waste to one of the most densely populated and mineral-rich regions of the continent.

2. Armed conflict prevention, management and resolution

Renata Dwan

1999 marked the end of the UN's retrenchment with significant expansion of the number and scope of United Nations peace operations. The international community's limitations in conflict resolution and peace-building were, however, demonstrated in the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone.

The financial and technical demands of reconstruction have prompted new coalitions between the UN, regional organizations and international financial institutions, but these are falling far short of meeting the needs of devastated societies.

An even more difficult challenge is securing the commitment of all parties to peace. Economic and political incentives for the continuation of conflict, particularly in Africa, have become depressingly clear.

- *Appendix 2A, by Renata Dwan, Thomas Papworth, Marta Reuter and Henry Wathen, presents data on the multilateral observer, peacekeeping, peace-building, and combined peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions in 1999.*

3. Russia: separatism and conflicts in the North Caucasus

Gennady Chufrin

The contemporary separatist movements are one of the most dangerous threats to Russian national security and territorial integrity. This is particularly the case in the North Caucasus, where separatist forces often act under the guise of ethnic or religious movements. Although the Russian federal authorities attempt to fight separatism by political means, in Dagestan and Chechnya they resorted to the use of force in 1999 in order to defeat the Chechen-led armed rebellion. By the end of the year the federal forces had re-established their control over most parts of Chechnya lost in the previous war, in 1994–96, but they failed to achieve a decisive military victory over the separatists. Nor was there any political resolution of the conflict.

As the conflict in Chechnya caused numerous casualties and a massive refugee problem among its civilian population the Russian Government came under strong criticism from the West on humanitarian grounds. These disagreements, although a major irritant in relations between Russia and the West, are unlikely to affect the central issues of their relationship, such as their interaction on global security issues.

4. Europe: the new transatlantic agenda

Adam Daniel Rotfeld

The future of transatlantic relations is dependent on how the differing interests of the United States and Europe on three planes—economic, political and military—can be resolved. European states face the dilemma of deciding how to secure the United States' politico-military commitment and leading role without acquiescing in US domination of and hegemony in Europe. For the USA, on the other hand, the dilemma concerns how it can help to consolidate the European Union's independent capability to act in the field of security and defence policy without undermining NATO and its own leading role.

The 1999 Washington NATO summit meeting and the Cologne and Helsinki EU summit meetings gave a new quality to the transatlantic agenda: the EU gained recognition in Washington as a partner on defence matters, although it may take a long time before the EU's politico-military dimension is complemented with a defence union. The OSCE Charter for European Security codified a set of arrangements for closer cooperation between all security-related international institutions in Europe.

For regional and global security, the renationalization of security policies and too-slow progress in shaping a common European security and defence

policy are much greater threats than too-rapid change.

- *Appendix 4A consists of documents on European security: the NATO Washington Summit Communiqué, the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the OSCE Charter for European Security and the EU Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council.*

5. Military expenditure

Elisabeth Sköns, Evamaria Loose-Weintraub, Wuyi Omitoogun and Petter Stålenheim

Military expenditure increased in many regions during 1999. This came after a long period of declining military spending that largely coincided with the post-cold war period. Total world military expenditure increased by 2.1% in real terms in 1999 and amounted to roughly \$780 billion. While this is almost one-third less than 10 years earlier, it still represents a significant share of world economic resources: 2.6% of world gross national product (GNP).

The rise in military expenditure in 1999 is primarily the result of increases in major spender countries, including the USA, France, Russia and China. Their military expenditure has a great impact on the world total, since they account for a major share of it—the USA 36%, France 7%, and Russia and China 3% each. Russian military expenditure increased sharply in 1999, by an estimated 24% in real terms. In a longer-term perspective, the level of Russian military expenditure in 1999 was 53% lower than in 1992, while most other countries have reduced their military expenditure by less than one-third over the entire decade of the 1990s.

There have also been significant increases in other regions, including Africa and South Asia, and in other parts of Western Europe. The countries with the heaviest economic burden of military expenditure are generally poor countries, involved in armed conflict and/or located in areas of tension. In many of the countries at war, official military expenditure figures significantly understate the economic burden of military activities.

- *Appendix 5A contains tables of military expenditure in local currency and constant dollars, and as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) for the period 1990–99.*

- *Appendix 5B shows the military expenditure of NATO countries on personnel and equipment.*

- *Appendix 5C explains the sources and methods for the data collection.*

- *Appendix 5D, by Wuyi Omitoogun, examines military expenditure in Africa.*

Military expenditure in Africa has been increasing since 1997 after a relatively long period of decline. The increase is due primarily to the involvement of many countries of the region in armed conflict, either directly or indirectly. The costs and methods of financing armed conflict vary but usually involve legal or illegal appropriation of national resources outside the official defence budget, making it difficult to accurately report the amount of economic resources committed to military activities. While African military expenditure represents a small share of the world total, it constitutes a heavy economic burden in many African countries where social needs are competing for scarce economic resources.

6. Arms production

Elisabeth Sköns and Reinhilde Weidacher

The restructuring of arms production continued in 1999, while the decline in the general level of arms production appears to have ceased towards the end of the 1990s. The aggregate arms sales of the 'SIPRI top 100' arms-producing companies in the OECD and developing countries, which account for roughly three-quarters of total world arms production, declined by 29% during the first half of the 1990s, but by only 3% during the period 1995–98. In 1998 their total arms sales amounted to \$155 billion.

Since 1997 the Russian Government has assigned a higher priority to arms production in an effort to stop the deterioration of its defence industrial base. The decline in Russian arms production ceased in 1997; in 1999 it increased by 37% but it still amounted to only 13.5% of Soviet arms production in 1991. A significant part, although it is not known how much, of Russian arms production is for export.

The restructuring process in the OECD arms industries in the 1990s has resulted in greater concentration, particularly among the larger companies, and in diversification from military to civilian products in industries and in individual companies. A few companies have tended instead to specialize in military production, thereby increasing their dependence on arms sales and often also on arms exports.

- *Appendix 6A, by Reinhilde Weidacher and the SIPRI Arms Industry Network, is a table of the 100 largest arms-producing companies in 1998.*

- *Appendix 6B presents tables showing major acquisitions by arms-producing companies in Western Europe and the USA between 1998 and January 2000.*

7. Transfers of major conventional weapons

Björn Hagelin, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman

Overall, major conventional arms transfers in 1999 remained at a much lower level than during the cold war. The generally dominant position of the USA is reflected in its position as the major arms supplier, accounting in 1995–99 for almost as much as all other suppliers combined. Russia followed with less than 30% of the US level. France, the UK and Germany were the next largest suppliers in 1995–99. However, France was a larger supplier than Russia in 1997 and 1998.

The largest recipient in 1995–99 was Taiwan, followed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The USA was the major supplier for all three countries.

On the basis of government and industry reports, SIPRI estimated the global financial value of the international arms trade in 1998 to be in the range of \$35–\$49 billion. Several considerations affect a decision to supply, or not to supply, major weapons. For most arms producers, commercial considerations are or have become more important. This is clearly one factor which complicates the creation of a balanced transatlantic military trade that is politically, economically and otherwise acceptable on both sides of the Atlantic.

The increasing importance of commercial considerations has led to more competition and therefore recipient leverage. This is part of the explanation why arms embargoes, while reducing arms transfers, are not sufficient to stop such transfers. In 1999 six of the main recipients of weapons from the major suppliers were involved in major armed conflicts. Suppliers are not reluctant to re-supply parties located in areas of, or even involved in, conflicts, whether allies, friends, or old or new customers.

- *Appendices 7A, 7B and 7C provide data on the transfers of major conventional weapons.*
 - *Appendix 7D explains the sources and methods for the data collection.*
 - *Appendix 7E is a table on government and industry statistics on national arms exports.*
-

8. Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation

Shannon Kile

In 1999 the controversy over ballistic missile defence and the future of the ABM Treaty moved to the fore of the nuclear arms control agenda. In the USA there was an emergent consensus in favour of developing a limited national missile defence (NMD) system designed to protect US territory against attack by a small number of ballistic missiles launched by 'rogue states'. Proposals from the US Administration for amending the ABM Treaty to permit the deployment of a limited NMD system were rejected by Russia, which warned that the entire Russian-US nuclear arms control framework was in danger of collapse. China also expressed concern about the implications of US missile defence plans for its nuclear deterrent.

The other major development was the US Senate's vote in October 1999 to reject ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The decision marked a setback for efforts to bring that treaty into force. It did not in itself undermine the no-testing norm codified in the treaty, since President Clinton reaffirmed the USA's intention to continue to observe its nuclear weapon testing moratorium. However, the Senate vote heightened international concern about the health of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which continued to face a number of serious challenges from both inside and outside the regime.

• *Appendix 8A, by Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, contains tables of the nuclear forces of the USA, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel.*

• *Appendix 8B, by Nicholas Zarimpas, on Nuclear verification: the IAEA strengthened safeguards system, reviews the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) strengthened safeguards system, aimed at providing increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and material, with the ultimate aim of reinforcing the global non-proliferation regime. The international safeguards community and the IAEA reacted swiftly to a number of challenges that confronted the global nuclear verification regime in the 1990s: a growing list of responsibilities combined with limited resources, the ambitions of some states to acquire nuclear weapons, exemplified by the case of Iraq, and a longer agenda resulting from the nuclear disarmament process. The adoption, in 1997, by the IAEA Board of Governors of a Model Additional Protocol for strengthening safeguards measures represented a step of fundamental importance towards limiting the spread of*

nuclear weapons and enhancing international security. However, progress with acceptance of the new provisions by the IAEA member states has been disappointingly slow. Universal acceptance and full implementation of the new system are imperative for guaranteeing the political assurances necessary for advancing the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda.

9. Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control

Jean Pascal Zanders and Maria Wahlberg

More than anything else, political will appears to be the key to both the successful implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the achievement of a meaningful protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In 1999 agreement on a range of technical matters ensured the steady advancement of the CWC treaty-building process and the negotiation of the protocol to the BTWC.

Russia's internal political, social and economic problems raised questions about its ability to meet and enforce its treaty obligations. Russia was the only declared possessor not to have started the destruction of its chemical weapon stockpile. Taking Russia's domestic situation into consideration, the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the CWC (meeting on 15–19 May 2000) agreed to the Russian request to have the first destruction deadline extended. Serious international concern persists that Russia still has illegal biological weapon programmes.

During 1999 the USA was increasingly perceived as not fully committed to multilateral chemical and biological weapon (CBW) disarmament. It strongly opposed compliance mechanisms for the future BTWC regime and was in technical non-compliance with the CWC regarding initial industry declarations. Prior to the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the CWC the United States submitted the required declarations, which eased tensions among the states parties. In 1999 the US Congress reduced the appropriations for assistance programmes that provide funding to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of CBW in Russia.

Proliferation of CBW remained a major concern in 1999. Some states are unwilling to join the CWC despite the effect on their national economies in terms of reduced access to certain key chemicals for their industry as of 29 April 2000. This may indicate a determination to maintain major CBW armament programmes in the face of strengthening international norms.

- *Appendix 9A, by Jean Pascal Zanders, Edvard Karlsson, Lena Melin, Erik Näslund and Lennart Thaning, presents a risk assessment of terrorism with chemical and biological weapons.*

In the light of the potential consequences of a terrorist attack with chemical and biological weapons (CBW), no government can remain unprepared. CBW represent a new qualitative element in the terrorist threat. Applying a multi-disciplinary approach to the question of CBW terrorism, the authors analyse the requirements for setting up terrorist CBW acquisition programmes, profile terrorist organizations and present computer models of the release of chemical or biological warfare agents using realistic parameters.

The processes for manufacturing and disseminating CBW in large quantities are complex. There is little likelihood of the recurrence of an event like the 1995 release of sarin in the Tokyo underground by a religious sect. Governments thus face a threat that is possible but unlikely to occur. The key issue is to devise and execute balanced policies. Over-reaction can easily lead to country-wide anxiety and paranoia. In such an atmosphere, hoaxes may become as efficient as actual attacks with CBW.

- *Appendix 9B, by Maria Wahlberg, Milton Leitenberg and Jean Pascal Zanders, looks at the future of Iraq's chemical and biological weapon disarmament: from UNSCOM to UNMOVIC.*

Despite efforts between 1990 and 1999, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was unable to complete the total elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapon capabilities and failed to set up a long-term monitoring mechanism to ensure that Iraq does not acquire these weapons in the future. The UN Security Council, succumbing to the short-term interests of some members, was unable to deal with Iraq's blatant and determined violation of the UN's rules. Serious doubts therefore exist as to whether the UNSCOM successor organization, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), will be able to complete UNSCOM's tasks in Iraq. As of 1 June 2000 Iraq has not accepted UN Security Council Resolution 1284, which created UNMOVIC and established the future disarmament and monitoring regime. Thus no inspections have taken place.

10. Conventional arms control

Zdzislaw Lachowski

A long-awaited breakthrough in the European conventional arms control regime came about in 1999. The Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Vienna Document 1999 on Confidence- and Security-building Measures were signed at the Istanbul OSCE Summit Meeting in November. This stood in contrast to growing divergences between NATO and Russia regarding the latter's opposition to NATO enlargement, their worsened relations in the wake of the Kosovo intervention and the war in Chechnya. The intervention in Kosovo also marred regional arms control endeavours in the Balkans, but some progress was reported in the latter part of the year.

The modernization of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe was concluded after a two year-long negotiation. The most important element, regional approaches included in the Vienna Document 1999, should help to better handle contingencies below the pan-European level. The Kosovo crisis and the conflict in Chechnya became a test for the 'foul weather' relevance of CSBMs. The regional CSBM experiment in the Balkans is proceeding fairly well, although still under the umbrella of international institutions and military forces. Hopefully, the evolving network of various arms control-related agreements in the region will inject enough stability and security to help make the Balkan peace process irreversible.

Conventional arms control outside Europe was rather uneventful in 1999, reflecting the general stalemate in this field.

- *CSBMs in Europe are reviewed by Zdzislaw Lachowski in Appendix 10A.*

- *Appendix 10B contains documents on conventional arms control: the Vienna Document 1999, the Amended CFE Treaty and the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.*
-

11. Responses to proliferation: the North Korean ballistic missile programme

Ian Anthony

In the 1990s North Korea accelerated the development of large rockets. These rockets have been tested in various configurations and could provide the capability to deliver a warhead over inter-continental ranges.

North Korea has not met its obligations under bilateral safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, strengthening the suspicion that it has a clandestine nuclear weapon programme. Given the continued state of high tension on the Korean Peninsula, there is widespread concern about the implications of weapon development in North Korea for regional and international security.

In September 1999 the United States and North Korea reached an agreement by which North Korea is expected to suspend its long-range ballistic missile testing programme.

The chapter describes the international responses to the North Korean ballistic missile programme.

- *Appendix 11A, by Ian Anthony, examines recent developments in the multilateral weapon and technology export control regimes. It places particular emphasis on the review of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls conducted by participating states five years after the arrangement began to operate.*
- *Appendix 11B contains the text of the Wassenaar Arrangement 1999 plenary meeting statement.*

Annexe A, by **Ragnhild Ferm**, summarizes the major arms control and disarmament agreements and lists the states parties as of 1 January 2000.

Annexe B, by **Ragnhild Ferm and Christer Berggren**, is a chronology of the major arms control and security-related events of 1999.
