9. Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan

Summary

While the 1998 nuclear tests may have focused international attention on the problems of war and nuclear risk in South Asia, they may have served more as a reminder or warning of related problems than a cause of instability in themselves. The greatest risk of nuclear war in South Asia arises from Pakistan's long-standing strategy of using the threat of early first use of nuclear weapons to deter conventional war, even as it tries to use this deterrent to preserve its freedom of action in Kashmir. As long as Indian military planners believe that their own nuclear capability will deter Pakistani first use and therefore leave them the option of launching a punitive conventional war, the risk of nuclear escalation is not only real but also stems directly from the perfectly logical designs of the states involved. It is not necessary to postulate an accident or an officer prepared to use nuclear weapons without proper authorization to envision nuclear war in South Asia. All that is required is for the Indian and Pakistani militaries to do what the public record strongly suggests they intend to do in a crisis. 

No clear decision to expand their nuclear capabilities has yet been made by either government. There are encouraging signs that India will limit the size of its arsenal and may not change the nature of its deployment immediately. With a policy of not using nuclear weapons first, India seeks mainly to deter Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons and preserve an option to respond appropriately if relations with China deteriorate. The situation in Pakistan is less clear, but the indications are that the military continues to exaggerate the value of nuclear deterrence and may move more decisively towards deployments of a provocative sort.