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#### Reminder

A press conference  
will be held at SIPRI  
on 10 June at 10 a.m.

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# SIPRI Yearbook 1998

## Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

*'The post-cold war transnational threats and challenges call urgently for a redefinition of the traditional concept of international security. The security agenda ahead must be founded on a new political philosophy, encompassing a common, institutionalized system of standards and shared values rather than concepts based on the balance of power. . . . It is now commonly understood that security comprises much more than military security, although the military dimension—particularly the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass destruction—is still relevant. Consequently, a new arms control agenda must be set for the 21st century; one of the top priorities must be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, now that the production, possession and use of chemical and biological weapons have been prohibited in international agreements. Only in this way can the intentional and accidental use of weapons of mass destruction be prevented. The success of the new security agenda will require the cooperation of all states and substantive coordination of the work of global and regional security organizations.'*

**From the Introduction**

### **SIPRI Yearbook 1998** **Armaments, Disarmament and International Security**

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## Security and conflicts

- Of the 25 major armed conflicts in 1997, only one—between India and Pakistan—was interstate. All the others were internal conflicts.
- In 1997 the reinstatement of a cease-fire and the commencement in Belfast of the first negotiations in decades between all parties to the Northern Ireland conflict prepared the ground for the historic agreement of April 1998.
- North Korea agreed to enter negotiations on a Korean peace treaty, and in November Japan and Russia agreed to work towards a peace treaty by the year 2000.
- After a promising start with the Hebron Accords, the Middle East peace process suffered a difficult year in which renewed Israeli settlement activity caused a breakdown in the talks, while Israel accused the Palestinians of failing to stop terrorism.
- There was growing concern in Russia about challenges to its role in the space of the former Soviet Union from competing influences, particularly in the oil-rich areas of Central Asia. A new pragmatism entered its relations with Chechnya.
- With the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act and the newly established Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council for enhanced cooperation between NATO and its Partnership for Peace partners, the divide between the states belonging to the Atlantic Alliance and those remaining outside it is becoming less distinct.

## Military spending and armaments

- World military expenditure declined by around one-third over the 10-year period 1988–97 and is estimated to correspond to roughly \$740 billion in 1997. In recent years the decline has slowed down: to an average rate of less than 1% in the past two years, as against an average of 4.5% over the entire period.
- The most significant impact on the trend in global military expenditure was the sharp cut in Russian spending in 1992. Russia's actual military expenditure in 1997 was less than one-tenth of that of the USSR in 1988. There have also been significant cuts in Africa, Central America and the United States.
- In 1988–97 military expenditure increased in some regions, in particular the Middle East and South and East Asia. However, the military budgets of several countries in East Asia are being revised downwards as a result of the financial crisis in the region.
- The arms industry continued to undergo significant restructuring in 1997, mainly in the form of mergers and acquisitions in the US arms industry, which proceeded rapidly, and international joint ventures in Western Europe, a slower process.
- The USA remains the dominant power in terms of military technology—with a military R&D budget more than seven times that of France, the nearest competitor—while Russian military technology is coming under stricter export controls and continues to fall further behind the state of the art.
- India has spent about \$500 million (in 1995 dollars) annually on military R&D since 1993, a figure that will rise significantly if current plans are carried out. This is roughly 28% of Indian Government funding of science and 18% of funding for science in the entire country, a figure exceeded only in the USA. If funding for nuclear and space R&D is included, the amount is \$910 million, or 68% of government-funded science.

- Japan, the USA's only competitor in the realm of civilian technology, cut its military R&D budget—which is only about one-twentieth of that of the USA—for the first time in 30 years in 1997.
- At just over \$25 billion, the global SIPRI trend-indicator value for deliveries of major conventional weapons in 1997 was some 12% higher than the level recorded for 1996. While the US share in deliveries of major conventional weapons had increased to 43%, that of Russia had fallen to 14%.

## **Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament**

- The START II Treaty remained in limbo in 1997, despite agreement between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on a series of measures to boost its chances of being ratified by the Russian Parliament. Proponents of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty faced a difficult struggle to win the ratification of all the 44 states needed to bring it into force.
- In 1997 China, Russia and the USA ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. The convention entered into force on 29 April 1997, and work was started on the establishment of an effective chemical weapon disarmament regime.
- In 1997 membership of the multilateral export control regimes continued to grow. Of greatest significance was China's entry into the Zangger Committee, a regime in which nuclear supplier states can harmonize aspects of their national export control systems.
- On 23 July at the CFE Treaty adaptation negotiations in Vienna, the Joint Consultative Group adopted the Decision Concerning Certain Basic Elements for Treaty Adaptation. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), reductions of heavy weapons were successfully completed under the 1996 Florence Agreement.
- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the APM Convention) was opened for signature in December 1997. By May 1998, 11 states had ratified the convention. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, together with its coordinator Jody Williams, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1997.

# SIPRI Yearbook 1998

Armaments, Disarmament and International Security

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*Plus a glossary of terms and membership of multilateral organizations,  
tables, figures, maps, data appendices and extensive documentation*

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# SUMMARIES from the SIPRI YEARBOOK 1998

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## 1. Major armed conflicts

**Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen**

In 1997, 25 major armed conflicts were waged in 24 locations around the world. This represents a decline in the number of conflicts—there were 27 major armed conflicts in 1996—and a continued downward trend for the period covered in the conflict statistics, 1989–97. The number of conflict locations remained the same in 1996 and 1997. By the end of 1997, after the re-establishment of the cease-fire in the Northern Ireland conflict, there were no active major armed conflicts in Europe. After the resolution of the conflict in Tajikistan, there were no active major armed conflicts stemming from the breakup of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, although the underlying political disputes remain to be resolved.

All the new conflicts in 1997 were on the African continent, and Africa was the only region which showed an increase in the number of conflicts. Africa was also the region with the largest share of conflicts with a high level of intensity, that is, with more than 1000 battle-related deaths in one year. The conflict between India and Pakistan was the only interstate conflict recorded in 1997, all others being internal. However, as in previous years other states contributed regular troops in some of the recorded conflicts.

• *Appendix 1A, by Margareta Sollenberg and the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, presents data on the major armed conflicts of 1997.*

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## 2. Armed conflict prevention, management and resolution

**Trevor Findlay**

There were several major successes in armed conflict prevention, management and resolution in 1997, with peace accords concluded in some lesser-known conflict situations. Historic all-party negotiations began over the Northern Ireland conflict, agreement to begin talks on peace treaties was reached by the two Korean states and by Japan and Russia, and peace accords were achieved in Bangladesh, Liberia, Nicaragua and Tajikistan. In contrast, military coups unravelled the peace settlements in

Cambodia and Sierra Leone; the peace processes in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya and the Middle East remained deeply troubled, and diplomatic efforts failed to prevent or halt wars in Central Africa. Fighting erupted in the Central African Republic, western China and Comoros; the beginnings of armed resistance appeared in Kosovo; and fighting continued or was resumed in a number of other countries.

Since the end of the cold war the international community's capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution has shown steady improvement, although professional conflict resolution and prevention capabilities at the UN and in regional bodies remain underdeveloped and underfunded. The largest peace-enforcement/peacekeeping mission, involving 31 000–36 000 troops, was the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While most of the regional initiatives continued to stem from Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), there were also a number from African, Latin American and Asian organizations.

• *Appendix 2A, by Susanna Eckstein, presents a table of multilateral peacekeeping operations in 1997.*

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## 3. The Middle East peace process

**Peter Jones and Gunilla Flodén**

After what could have been a breakthrough in early 1997 over Israeli withdrawal from Hebron, renewed Israeli settlement activity stalled the Israeli–Palestinian talks. The peace process was further marred by new outbreaks of terrorist activity. There were no official talks between Israel and Syria, and the level of violence in Lebanon remained high. Internal fighting in Algeria worsened; conflicts in the Kurdish regions of Turkey and Iraq continued; and Islamic terrorists struck in Egypt, calling into question the government's assertion that it had defeated them. One hopeful indication came in Iran, where the pragmatic Mohammed Khatami was elected president by a wide margin. Although the new president has widespread popular support, he will face an uphill battle in trying to effect change against the wishes of the religious élite.

• *Appendix 3A contains excerpts from the 1997 Hebron Accord.*

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#### 4. Russia: conflicts and peaceful settlement of disputes

**Vladimir Baranovsky**

In 1997 Russia intensified its efforts to promote settlement of the unresolved conflicts over territory and status across the former Soviet Union. At the same time there was growing concern in Moscow about challenges to its position from competing influences, particularly in the oil-rich areas of Central Asia.

Russia played a prominent role in launching and promoting a political reconciliation process in Tajikistan. It increased pressure for negotiations between the conflicting parties in the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova, Abkhazia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, where the peace process remained fragile. Russia and Chechnya moved towards a practical *modus vivendi* in their postwar relations, although the future status of Chechnya remained an open question.

While Russia continued to place a high foreign policy priority on developing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a reliable Russian-centred power pole, the viability of this policy was called into doubt as CIS member states increasingly sought to distance themselves from Russia.

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#### 5. Europe: the transition to inclusive security

**Adam Daniel Rotfeld**

With the absence of an external threat to Europe the main challenges and risks are now of a domestic nature, stemming from economic and social problems. For this reason, the non-military elements of stability are gaining in importance, in particular the attempts to institutionalize the changes taking place in NATO 'from defence of member territory to defence of common interests'. Developments in 1997 in the parallel processes of enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the NATO Alliance brought Europe a step closer to establishing a system of inclusive security. While there was no real breakthrough in the shaping of such a security system, the potential for enhanced Europe-wide cooperation was advanced by the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In addition, the

1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act offers a basis for a lasting and inclusive peace. While the tasks defined for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) during the cold war period have been largely fulfilled or have outlived their relevance, it has conducted significant activities in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and resolution of disputes.

• *Appendix 5A contains the NATO–Russia Founding Act, the Basic Document of the EAPC, the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, excerpts from the Amsterdam Treaty, and the text of one of the three identical Protocols of Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty.*

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#### 6. Military expenditure and arms production

**Elisabeth Sköns, Agnès Courades Allebeck, Evamaria Loose-Weintraub and Reinhilde Weidacher**

World military expenditure, which has been declining since 1987, corresponded to roughly \$740 billion in 1997. The decline has averaged 4.5% per year during the 10-year period 1988–97, but the rate of decline has slowed down in recent years and was only 1% in the past two years.

The deepest cuts over the 10-year period were made by Russia and other successor states of the USSR. Their combined military expenditure in 1997 was around one-tenth of that of the USSR in 1988. Spending has also declined significantly in Africa, North America and Central America, where there have been cuts by around one-third over the 10 years.

The Middle East and Asia have been exceptions to the trend. Military spending in the Middle East has increased by 9% but there have been considerable fluctuations over the period, with a peak around 1991 as a result of the Persian Gulf War. In both South and East Asia, military expenditure increased by around 25% over the 10 years. However, in several East Asian countries the military budgets adopted for 1997 were cut as a result of the financial crisis in the region, and future expenditure plans are being revised downwards.

The arms industries in most of the 20 major arms-producing countries have been forced to cut their capacity in response to the sharp fall in domestic arms procurement expenditures. This has led to an intensive restructuring of the industry. In spite of the return to growth in the arms purchases of many countries, this adjustment process is

expected to continue. The rate of concentration remained high in the US arms industry in 1996 and 1997. The restructuring process in Western Europe progressed more slowly, but there were indications in 1997 that the process of international concentration was speeding up in Europe. No data exist on global arms production. SIPRI estimates for the top 100 arms-producing companies in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the developing countries (excluding China) show that the value of sales in 1996 remained virtually unchanged from 1995, at \$156 billion. Among the top 100 companies in 1996 US companies accounted for 55% of the combined arms sales, while 40 West European companies accounted for 35%, and 14 companies in other OECD countries and 8 in non-OECD countries (India, Israel and South Africa) together accounted for the remaining 10%.

In appendix 6D **Julian Cooper** shows that it is possible to estimate Soviet and Russian military spending, with an extended time series for the military expenditure of Russia and the former USSR. The problems involved in making such estimates include lack of transparency (particularly before 1992), 'military' items placed under other budget heads, and the huge difference between adopted military budgets and actual expenditures during the 1990s. Estimates are presented in current roubles, as a proportion of GNP and in US dollars using purchasing-power parity rates. The conclusion is that military expenditure has fallen from an estimated \$257 billion in the USSR in 1987 to \$24.1 billion in Russia in 1997, and as a proportion of GNP from 16.6% in 1987 to 3.8% in 1997.

- *Appendices 6A and 6B contain tables of military expenditure by region, country and income group and for NATO countries by function.*

- *Appendix 6C explains the sources and methods for the military expenditure data.*

- *Appendix 6D, by **Julian Cooper**, is a study of the military spending of the USSR and the Russian Federation in 1987–97.*

- *Appendix 6E, by **Elisabeth Sköns, Reinhilde Weidacher and the SIPRI Arms Industry Network**, contains financial and employment data on the top 100 companies in the OECD and developing countries in 1996.*

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## 7. Military research and development

### Eric Arnett

Global military research and development (R&D) expenditure continued to decline in 1997, mainly because of reductions in the US budget, which will be cut by another 14% by the year 2001. Critics claim that US forces are vulnerable to new threats, particularly ballistic and cruise missiles, but these fears are exaggerated. US investment in military R&D is more than seven times that of France, the nearest competitor. It is unlikely that a global challenger to US power will emerge before 2020. Rather, the international system will increase its dependence on US technology and military intervention. By the mid-1990s most members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) were spending less than 110% of their 1983 R&D funding levels. The fear commonly expressed that science would be irreversibly militarized by the build-up in the 1980s has not been borne out, the military share of government and national R&D having returned to its 1983 level or lower in most cases. Contrary to expectations, the

1991 Persian Gulf War did not lead 'second-tier' arms producers to increase their R&D budgets in the hope of developing or countering technologies demonstrated by the USA, which itself cancelled several programmes at that time.

Russia is allowing its design bureaux to sell their expertise abroad, but has promised to limit technology transfer. Japan reduced its military R&D investment for the first time since 1976.

• *Appendix 8C explains the sources and methods for the data collection.*

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## **8. Transfers of major conventional weapons**

**Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman**

The global SIPRI trend-indicator value of international transfers of major conventional weapons in 1997 was just over \$25 billion. There has been a clear trend of increasing arms transfers since 1994, but the volume is still only 62% of the volume in 1987, when the highest level since 1950 was reached. There were no major changes in the ranked list of arms exporters in 1997. The USA remained the dominant exporter, increasing its share of deliveries to 43%. Nearly all the transfers originate from a small number of supplier countries. The leading suppliers for the period 1993–97 were the USA, Russia, the UK, France, Germany and China. Among the arms recipients, countries in North-East Asia and the Middle East are the leading importers.

While plagued by many serious armed conflicts, the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are not major recipients of major conventional weapons and there seems to be no indication that these weapons have played an important role in the outbreak or outcome of these conflicts.

With some important exceptions, most arms exporters provide official data on weapon exports. However, much of this information is aggregated and there is no common definition of arms transfers upon which countries base their figures. Generally, the official data are difficult to analyse or to compare. In 1997, several countries released, for the first time, data on arms exports or promised to do so in 1998. In 1997 a group of government experts evaluated the UN Register of Conventional Arms but failed to reach a consensus regarding changes or improvements.

• *Appendices 8A and 8B, by Ian Anthony, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, provide data on the transfers of major conventional weapons in 1997.*

## 9. Multilateral security-related export controls

Ian Anthony and Jean Pascal Zanders

In 1997 China became a member of the Zangger Committee, a continuation of the gradual inclusion of China into the multi-lateral nuclear non-proliferation effort. This is the first time that China has participated in any multilateral export control regime. Turkey became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and continued uncertainty about the status of chemical and biological weapon (CBW) programmes in some countries drew attention to export controls as they apply to goods and technologies that can be used in the production of CBW. Multilateral export controls can create conditions for more effective non-proliferation efforts. In specific cases where actual or alleged proliferation creates a security concern—notably in the Middle East—the triangular relationship of China, Russia and the United States is the main focus of political activity.

• *Appendix 9A presents the Memorandum of Understanding on Implementation of 'Dual-Use' Guidelines.*

The nuclear weapon-free zones in Asia and Africa are discussed by **Amitav Acharya and Sola Ogunbanwo** in appendix 10B. The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

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## 10. Nuclear arms control

Shannon Kile

In 1997 there were a number of positive developments in strategic nuclear arms control. The US and Russian presidents agreed on a set of measures to boost the prospects for START II Treaty ratification by the Russian Parliament; they also agreed on the outline of a follow-on treaty that would further reduce nuclear arsenals and help to make those cuts irreversible. The USA and Russia also reached an agreement in their stalemated negotiations to clarify the application of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to theatre missile defence systems. The implementation of the START I Treaty continued to proceed ahead of schedule. Despite these accomplishments, key items on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda remained unresolved. START II continued to face an uncertain fate in the Russian Parliament. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty had yet to enter into force and at the Conference on Disarmament no progress was made towards negotiating a global convention banning the production of fissile material for military purposes.

(Treaty of Bangkok) entered into force in 1997. Since no South-East Asian countries currently possess nuclear weapons, the main purpose of the treaty is to regulate the policies of the nuclear weapon states. As of 1 January 1998, owing to disagreement over certain provisions and language, none of the nuclear weapon states had signed the protocol to the treaty, which prohibits these states from using or threatening to use nuclear arms not only against the parties to the treaty but also anywhere within the zone. During 1997 progress was made towards securing the entry into force of the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). It was signed by 47 and ratified by 2 African states as of 1 January 1998, and another 4 states had ratified it by April 1998. The treaty represents an important achievement for the continent in regional security cooperation and is the only accord of this kind that establishes a zone that includes a former nuclear weapon state—South Africa.

• *Appendix 10A, by Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, contains tables of nuclear forces.*

• *Appendix 10B, by Amitav Acharya and Sola Ogunbanwo, is a study of the nuclear weapon-free zones in Africa and Asia.*

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## 11. Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control

**Jean Pascal Zanders and John Hart**

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force on 29 April 1997. Progress in the negotiations on a verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was modest. Despite efforts to establish or strengthen disarmament regimes for chemical and biological weapons, concerns about their proliferation or use increased through the year. Cuba formally accused the United States of waging biological warfare and initiated a procedure to investigate this type of allegation—the first time this has occurred since the BTWC entered into force in 1975. Measures to counter proliferation increased in Western countries. In Iraq, the crisis between the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and Baghdad escalated to the point that military intervention became a serious possibility.

• *Appendix 11A, by Robert J. Mathews, presents the developments of 1997 after entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention.*

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## 12. Conventional arms control

**Zdzislaw Lachowski**

Challenged by the fact of NATO enlargement and the need for a new approach to military security, the states parties to the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) pursued businesslike negotiations in 1997 on the adaptation of the treaty, which led to the July Decision by the Joint Consultative Group Concerning Certain Basic Elements for Treaty Adaptation. The implementation of the 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (the Florence Agreement) effected reductions in heavy armaments of the former warring parties in the former Yugoslavia and created a militarily stable environment which it is hoped will enable further steps towards stability in the Balkans as a whole.

Russia pledged a 40% reduction in its land and naval forces and proposed confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) for the Baltic Sea region, offering good prospects for a regional security dialogue. Outside Europe, the most promising regional security dialogue was in the Asia-Pacific region, with moves towards increased security-related confidence building and maritime cooperation.

CSBMs in Europe are reviewed by **Zdzislaw Lachowski** and **Patrick Henrichon** in appendix 12A. The OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation agreed on a number of amendments and undertook to launch a process of general 'modernization' of the Vienna Document 1994. The 1996 Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was in its second year of successful operation. Elsewhere in Europe, regional confidence- and security-building efforts are shown to have had a mixed record: in one area raising hopes for progress (the Baltic Sea region), while in the south-eastern part of the continent failing after a short-lived accord (on Greek-Turkish relations).

• *Appendix 12A by Zdzislaw Lachowski and Patrick Henrichon deals with CSBMs in Europe.*

• *Appendix 12B contains the 1997 Decision of the Joint Consultative Group Concerning Certain Basic Elements for Treaty Adaptation.*

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### 13. The ban on anti-personnel mines

**Zdzislaw Lachowski**

In 1997 the issue of a ban on anti-personnel mines was raised in two forums: the Ottawa Process and the Conference on Disarmament (CD), proceeding from different perspectives—humanitarian versus arms control. The Ottawa Process swiftly achieved its goal and the text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the APM Convention) was agreed on 18 September and opened for signature in Ottawa on 3–4 December. The convention requires 40 ratifications to enter into force. By May 1998, 11 states had ratified it.

The attempt to negotiate a ban on landmines in the CD failed in 1997, but the CD may have a role to play in negotiating and elaborating an enhanced verification regime and at the same time engaging reluctant participants, especially China and Russia, in the convention.

• *Appendix 13A contains the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the 1981 Inhumane Weapons Convention and the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.*

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**Annexe A**, by **Ragnhild Ferm**, summarizes the major arms control and disarmament agreements and lists the states parties as of 1 January 1998.

**Annexe B**, by **Ragnhild Ferm**, is a chronology of the major arms control and security-related events of 1997.

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