Summary

Basic questions were raised in 1993. How should the European security system be transformed? Could Russia and the CEE states be integrated into existing West European security structures, and if so how? What kind of relations would develop between NATO and Russia? Should the CEE states be kept out of NATO and be recognized as a zone of special security interest for Russia? What kind of US or transformed NATO involvement in the security of CEE was possible—common defence or a co-operative security organization? What role was to be played by the CSCE in the functioning of a new European security system? Some of these questions are addressed below.

The new threats call not only for new instruments of action but, first of all, for a new philosophy and a new political strategy adequate to the new challenges. The issue is not only to create new institutions or to agree on new political declarations, however necessary and useful both often prove: it is rather the sufficient adjustment of the mandate and functions of the European security institutions to the new requirements. The multilateral security structures are tools which work of the will of member states, commensurate with their political and military commitment. In other words, the operation of NATO, the EU/WEU and the CSCE cannot be analysed and assessed without an understanding of the policies of the main powers—France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the USA—as well as numerous other small- and medium-sized states. Regrettably, international organizations and states which belong to them attached much more weight to their own areas of action and responsibility than to declarations on `common', `co-operative' and `indivisible' security.

The most serious challenge for the system of regional security in Europe is conflicts—ethnic, national and religious. Some of them can be solved through preventive diplomacy and by means of the peaceful settlement of disputes. Others require determined joint action by the international community if the latter wishes to maintain its credibility. In extreme cases this entails armed intervention. However, acting on behalf of and on the mandate of the international community should not mean legitimizing a carve-up into new zones of influence of the great powers or a policy of hegemonism. The main task of the system that emerges after the breakup of the bipolar world is the final overcoming of the existing divisions, not the creation of new ones.

Neither the Partnership for Peace programme nor NATO expansion nor the strengthening of new CSCE mechanisms will in themselves solve Europe's security problems. Institutional improvements can contribute to the alleviation of tensions and to co-operation between states, but the factors determining security remain the stabilization of the economic and social situation in the region as well as power politics. 1993 brought a foretaste of the opening up of Western structures towards the CEE states. Putting into effect the concept of 'expanded security' would require the adoption of decisions which would cause impotent institutions to become so important that they would be able not only to take new resolutions but even to stave off armed conflicts and aggression.

Appendix 7A. Documents on European security