Key note address given by Linda Jakobson at SIPRI 2008 Yearbook Chinese edition launch event

Honored Guests:
In the Introduction of the 2008 SIPRI Yearbook of which the Chinese edition is today being launched, SIPRI Director Bates Gill writes that “the next one or two years will see far more high-level discussion and debate on the merits of arms control and disarmament.” This prediction has materialized over the past several months for a number of reasons, the main one being the election of Barack Obama as the new President of the United States. Already on the campaign trail Obama pledged that if he is elected president he will vigorously pursue “ a nuclear-free world” though he admits that he might not be alive to see that happen. Within 100 days of his presidency Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev ordered negotiators to start work on a new treaty to reduce  their nuclear stockpiles. And in New York last Thursday senior U.S. and Russian negotiators, with Hillary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov in the lead, actually sat down to work out the details of renewing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the 1991 START pact that cut in half the superpowers' stockpiles of nuclear warheads.
    The talks are the first step in the Obama administration's effort to seek "a world without nuclear weapons.” But in addition to launching talks on the U.S.-Russian strategic-arms treaty, Obama has pledged to make progress on three other fronts: pushing for Senate ratification of an international treaty banning nuclear testing; reaching an agreement on halting production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium; and strengthening the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the so-called grand global bargain in which most nations pledged not to seek nuclear arms  in exchange for a commitment by the five nuclear powers — the U.S., Russia, Britain, France and China — to move toward nuclear disarmament.  Of course next year's NPT conference will be critical for the NPT's future.
    The 2008 SIPRI Yearbook outlines four areas of concern regarding arms control and disarmament which have gained prominence in recent years:
    First, there is a growing need to balance the benefits of greater flows of people, goods, technologies and knowledge with a greater ability to monitor and prevent the misuse towards their illicit and violent ends. In other words, the advantages of globalization must be used to counter the disadvantages of globalization, even in the realm of disarmament. Russia and the United States continue to maintain thousands of nuclear weapons – the two have 90 percent of the world's 10200 deployed nuclear weapons in the world today --  which are capable of being launched at each other within a matter of minutes. Even if nuclear warfare between Russia and the United States is highly unlikely, very remote, the accidental and unauthorized use of nuclear version, as well as the risk of their theft remains a real and dangerous problem. During the past year the instability of Pakistan's regime has forcefully raised this question of the safety and security of nuclear weapons.
    Secondly, conventional armed conflict in the world is taking on a far more complex character than previously presumed. The number of non-state violent conflicts is rising, one of the reasons SIPRI's China Programme, which was launched last week in Stockholm, will focus on both traditional and non-traditional and transnational security threats. In addition,  more money is being devoted to military spending around the world.
    A third concern is the weakness of mechanisms designed to address the previous two concerns. As the 2010 NPT conference approaches, many question the ability of the NPT and its related inspection regimes to address the treaty's long-term goals of disarmament and non-proliferation.
    And fourth and lastly, there is a lack of consensus among the major actors. Rather than de-emphasizing the role of nuclear capabilities, the 2008 SIPRI Yearbook stated – those countries possessing nuclear capability – the US, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea continue to place a strong emphasis on these weapons in their national security apparatus. An undercurrent of distrust continues to characterize security relations among the world's major powers on issue of arms control and disarmament – between Russia and the USA, between China and the USA, and between Russia and Western Europe.
    During the course of 2009 it is likely that we will be able to witness some indications whether the situation which the 2008 SIPRI Yearbook described a year ago is in the process of changing. 
    From all of what has happened in the last four months since President Obama took office one can surmise that nuclear disarmament can be expected to remain high on Obama's foreign policy agenda. In fact, in discussions with advisors to the Obama administration it has become apparent that Obama is seen as having three top priorities for the next four years: 1. transforming the economy, 2. tackling climate change, and 3. making progress on nuclear disarmament. 
    Both the United States and Russia would also like to see China participating in international talks aimed at reducing nuclear warheads. China -- as we all know -- has repeatedly said that due to the significantly fewer nuclear warheads in its arsenal, it has no intention of discussing a reduction in its warheads before the United States and Russia reduce their arsenals to Chinese levels. China has held steadfast to this position for decades and in the short-term China can be expected to remain outside any multilateral nuclear reduction talks and / or agreement. In Europe and the United States, however, there are expectations that China will gradually modify and adjust its position on even this sensitive issue within nuclear disarmament.
    After all, China's foreign and security policy is in a state of flux. Those responsible for China's diplomacy and security policy are continuously adjusting policies to changing international conditions and also to the China's own changing needs. This is a natural consequence of China’s growing economic, political and military weight on a global scale. There are more and more voices within China who have diverse views of how China's security policy should be pursued. When the SIPRI new China Programme was launched a last week in Stockholm, Professor Jin Canrong of Renmin University spoke of three new foreign policy actors – the gumin, the wangmin and the junmin, the stockholder-citizens, the internet-citizens and – to quote Professor Jin – the “guys in uniform”. No one yet knows how much these groupings – in Chinese context maybe they should be called lobbying groups – will transform China's international role and strategic thinking.

Change is always challenging because change leads to the unknown. Will we witness positive or negative change? And from whose perspective? Change is challenging not only for the country that is undergoing change because it should manage the process in a way that does not cause alarm in others, but change is also challenging for those watching the change because of the uncertainties, perhaps even fears that it evokes.
    As China adjusts its policies  and adopts new positions outsiders will continuously question China's motives and future intentions. For thirty years now China has built up its military capabilities while at the same time managing its relationship with the United States and developing peaceful and – nearly without exception – constructive ties with its neighbours. Over the years, gradually and incrementally, China has accepted a much-transformed international role for itself. It is impossible to predict how long it will take for China too to be drawn into new forms of international dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. Many of the foreign and security policy activities that China today engages in would have been unimaginable thirty years, even twenty years ago, in some cases a mere five years ago. For example, an official at the Ministry of Defence commented to me recently that he can confidently say that “for the time being” China will not seek a more active relationship with NATO, but based on how quickly events have led to changes in China's position over the past few decades, the ministry official said, it would be foolhardy to say that China will never seek closer collaboration with Nato.
    Who, for example, five years ago would have predicted that China would deploy its naval vessels to participate in an international effort thousands of miles away from China? The Chinese government’s decision last December to deploy three naval vessels off the coast of Somalia to take part in the multi-nation effort to curb piracy is, in my view, an illuminating case study of the contradiction between traditional China's non-interference policy and its desire to take on more responsibility in the international arena, in line with its growing global role.
    As we have all see from Chinese media reports, this mission to the Gulf of Aden off Somalia is a source of immense pride for China. China's decision has been praised by many countries, including the United States, as a welcome development. It has been fascinating for all of us to follow descriptions of  the fleet’s historic journey from Hainan Island to the Indian Ocean, covering a total of 79,000 nautical miles, described by the Chinese media as the longest continuous journey ever made by the modern Chinese Navy.
    Many interesting details have emerged since the first two destroyers, Wuhan and Haikou, returned from the first mission in April and the next two  destroyers were deployed – all accounts indicate that the Chinese naval vessels have step-by-step grown more willing to become integrated into the international operation. The Chinese navy vessels initially kept to themselves, engaging in no or scant communication with the other foreign navies, presumably wanting to attain a degree of comfort with manoeuvres such as under-way replenishment. Week-by-week, Chinese interaction and communication with the other navies increased, and by the end of the four-month mission the Chinese had exchanged visits with several foreign navies, including the United States and Europe. Also initially, the Chinese navy wanted to escort solely Chinese commercial vessels to harbour, but with the start of the second Chinese mission China has indicated a willingness to adopt the more general practices of the multi-nation operation and offer escort assistance to all merchant vessels in the area it commits to patrol, regardless of nationality. Fleet commander Du Jingchen has stressed the importance of the PLA Navy being given the opportunity to test the Chinese facilities, weapons and support functions as well as learn how to deal with military diplomacy at sea. Many Chinese officers have said in public that the Chinese have a lot to learn from other blue-water navies.  
    Africa is – as is well-known – the area of the world where China has increasingly assumed more and more international responsibility. Of the 11 UN peacekeeping operations in which China is participating, six are in Africa. Just the mere scope and breadth of Chinese peace-keeping operations would have been unimaginable 15 years ago. Now there is speculation that China is even ready to commit infantry forces on the ground to the next peace-keeping mission it undertakes. 18 months ago a Chinese national was for the first time ever appointed as force commander of a UN Peacekeeping Mission when General Zhao Jingmin took up the position of force commander of the UN Mission for the referendum in Western Sahara. In Africa too Chinese diplomats have received praise from many countries, including the United States, for their initiatives and work, also – or perhaps I should say even – in Sudan where China on the other hand, faces ongoing harsh criticism from human rights groups and many Western governments for the government's continued support fr the al-Bashir government and Chinese arms sales to Sudan.
    Many in the West tend to view China’s deepening engagement in Africa  as driven solely by the country’s growing need for resources to ensure economic growth. Oil is without question the leading commodity that China imports from Africa, and China increasingly needs more imported oil. But, in reality, China’s Africa policies encompass strategic goals other than merely securing oil and other natural resources, and new export markets. China’s heightened level of activity in Africa should, I think, be viewed by the outside world as part of China’s overall strategy to promote an image of a peacefully rising, constructive, and responsible major power. Moreover, African nations – not only the resource-rich ones – are extremely important to China because of their support for the “one China” principle and deterrence of Taiwanese independence – which after all continues to be paramount among China's strategic foreign policy objectives. Only four African countries at present maintain ties with Taipei and not Beijing. Besides relying on the large African voting bloc on all issues related to Taiwan and to China’s human rights record at the United Nations and its sub-organizations, Beijing counts on the large number of African nations to support it in numerous other multilateral settings.
Now to return to the subject of China's transforming international role:
One significant question that is continuously asked by outsiders is how long can China continue to adhere to its long-standing principle of non-interference when de facto China has over the last decade or so, on many occasions, taken action that does indeed entail interference in another country's internal affairs. To start with, a country the size of China inevitably interferes in another country's affairs on the basis of substantial financial investments. Furthermore, China's hosting of the six-party talks to find a solution to the nuclear stand-off in North Korea and China's broadening peacekeeping operations are all activities that call into question the principle of non-interference.
    As China's commercial interests grow in other countries, especially in, for example, Africa that is plagued by fragile states, weak states or dysfunctional states, the Chinese government will undoubtedly feel the need to interfere in the internal affairs of another country in order to try and protect the large investments made by Chinese companies if these are at risk. Over the past couple of years the Chinese government has already been faced with the complications that arise when Chinese companies invest abroad following the kidnapping and killings of Chinese oil field and mine workers in Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Sudan.
    Chinese academics speak openly and publicly of the problems that Chinese large investments entail for the Chinese government -- Zhu Feng of Beijing University has gone as far as saying to the Financial Times that Chinese oil companies have hijacked Chinese diplomacy. Officials speak about the dilemma only in private conversation. A think tank president with high connections to the policy-making establishment in Beijing told me in January of last year that China will in five years pursue a “constructive interference” policy.  Other academics, for example Wang Jisi of Beijing University have spoken in more vague terms about the necessity to accept a more “flexible” approach to the non-interference principle. Wang Jisi recently wrote that ''From the diplomatic point of view, non-interference of domestic affairs will still be an important principle. We should, however, see that the stability of other countries has become more and more related to our rights and interests in those countries, including the security of our overseas organizations and civilians. Therefore, China will contribute to the construction of harmonious society of other countries through diversified means of cooperation, consultation, aid, communication and so on.''
    Outsiders ask, what precisely does “diversified means” entail? Will it include the possibility of military intervention, as China becomes stronger and if China's national interests are at stake? Outsiders also ask, will China become more and more prone to define its national interests in ideological terms, as does the United States? At present China's national interests in the international sphere are viewed by many Chinese as well as non-Chinese analysts as entrenched in practical and pragmatic considerations. China has not tried to force its own economic or political development model on others.  Chinese academics and officials say that they do not favour seeing a discussion of the Beijing consensus versus the Washington consensus. 
    China's national interests stem from pragmatic reckoning. For example, China is adamant that it will not tolerate Taiwanese independence. Therefore, continuously securing assurances of other countries that these will continue to adhere to  the One China policy remains a national interest of utmost importance and a cornerstone of Chinese diplomacy.
    For example, China is increasingly reliant on imported energy and other natural resources to fuel its economic growth. Therefore, the country's officials all the way up to the top leaders are mobilized to offer economic and diplomatic support to countries that Chinese companies strike major deals in.
    For example, China needs peace and stability to pursue its modernization drive. Therefore it avoids conflict with the United States – or any other country for that matter – so it can concentrate its efforts and resources on domestic issues.
    And lastly, a fourth vital national interest seems to be assuring the rest of the world that its rise will be peaceful and there is no need for others to fear a strong China.  
    But what if other countries do fear China as it rises? With the publication last week of Australia defence paper “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century” one country has clearly indicated it will substantially upgrade its naval and cruise missile capabilities due to concerns over China's rising military capabilities and the risks of conflict in the region. Australia will become the first country in South-East Asia capable of launching long-range cruise missiles. It will also replace six submarines with larger ones with greater range and endurance, plus acquire three destroyers and eight frigates. The debate in Washington DC between neo-conservatives and “middle-of-the road engagement proponents” on the so-called China threat issue is well-documented and well-known, especially here in China. The Australian government's articulation in the defence white paper of the need to boost Australia's military capabilities can be seen in another light. China analysts in Australia are no longer debating. A conclusion has been reached. An action-plan has been approved. There has been less finger-pointing and back-n-forth bickering in Australia which  is typical of the “China threat” debate in Washington.
    Will the Australian reaction to China's increased military spending and military modernization efforts lead to other countries in the region adopting similar action plans?  Will we witness an arms race in the Asia-Pacific which risks spiralling out-of-control?
    These are all uncertainties that everyone -- China, the Asia-Pacific region at large, and the rest of the world – must acknowledge and try their best to deal with. An arms race is not in anyone's interests. By increasing its willingness to engage in dialogue with other countries about its military build-up and by increasing its transparency on military affairs China would have the chance to address many of the concerns that its increase in military spending, its place as the world's top arms importer, and its military modernization efforts have instigated. The more outsiders know and understand the motives and driving forces behind these trends the less uncertainties there will be, and the less room for misunderstandings and miscalculations.
The Defence White Papers that China has started to publish regularly and China's willingness to increasingly engage in military discussions with other countries are all steps in the right direction. For example, the inaugural nuclear dialogue between the United States and China last April has been warmly welcomed by the Americans. But China must go much, much further in transparency, if it genuinely wants the world to rest assured of its peaceful intentions. For example, many outsiders ask, why does China need an aircraft carrier? Or maybe two of them. An aircraft carrier enhances offensive capabilities, not defensive ones which China has always wanted to emphasize. In China's neighbouring countries there are those who ask: Will the coming aircraft carrier be needed in the South China Sea? There have yet to be any answers from the Chinese side.

The past year saw increasing threats to security, stability and peace in  nearly every corner of the globe, as will be evident from the articles in the upcoming SIPRI 2009 yearbook. The effects of the global financial crisis  will be likely to exacerbate these challenges as governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) struggle to respond with effective resources.  China continuously stresses the peaceful nature of its rise. As I mentioned earlier China has been remarkably successful in its adopted strategies, especially when one thinks back and looks at history and the way rising powers have previously behaved. But at present there are a lot more questions than answers regarding China's future role and intentions. China has continuously emphasized that it wants to concentrate on the modernization of it economy and society and shirks a leadership role. This desire for a low international profile is what we outsiders hear repeatedly. Yet, China is simultaneously building up – in part it already has built up – a sizeable military force with offensive capabilities.
    In conclusion, I return to the beginning of my talk, to President Obama's visionary pledge of a world without nuclear arms. China too needs a visionary goal. In the realm of disarmament and arms control China needs to leapfrog as dramatically as it needs to in the realm of clean energy in order to build a low-carbon economy. Experts here in China and outside of China agree that when it come to energy security China must pursue a path that no one has pursued before it – and succeed. Also when it comes to nuclear disarmament and arms control the China's top leadership needs to think outside the box, to be as courageous as Obama. This is necessary to ensure that China's promises of peaceful development and a peaceful rise are indeed credible.

Thank you, and I look forward to your comments and questions.