Brazil

By Yana Feldman
FirstWatch International (FWI)

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Overview

Past Nuclear Policies

Nuclear Facilities Profile
   Nuclear Mining and Milling and Ore Processing
   Conversion
   Enrichment
   Fuel Fabrication
   Power Reactor
   Waste Disposal
   Research Reactors
   Research and Development

Overview

Brazil possesses one of the most advanced nuclear capabilities in Latin America and is one of very few states with the indigenous capability to produce fissile material necessary to build a nuclear weapon. Alongside its civilian programme, in the 1970s and 1980s the military government pursued a parallel secret nuclear program, focused on enrichment. It has been reported that during this time, the Air Force may have succeeded in designing two atomic bomb devices. Following transition to civilian rule, Brazil renounced any nuclear weapon ambitions, and joined its neighbor, Argentina, in bilateral, regional and international arms control and disarmament.

Currently, Brazil is expanding its nuclear programme, launching a commercial enrichment center and may be seeking to enter the uranium export market. With the sixth largest uranium holdings in the world it is poised to successfully play a role in both markets. Brazil has also expressed interest in increasing its nuclear power capacity, although it is proceeding cautiously. Brazil’s constitution bans the military use of nuclear energy, and the country has joined the Tlatelolco treaty (the Latin American nuclear weapons free zone), the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

While Brazil appears to have solid nonproliferation credentials, some of its positions and decisions have raised concern about the proliferation potential of Brazil’s nuclear programme.

The 1990 parliamentary investigation into the Brazilian military nuclear programme praised the technical successes achieved, but made explicit the peaceful purpose of Brazil’s future nuclear activities. However, military involvement in that programme is not excluded. The military gave up the option to construct a nuclear weapon, but retained a role in nuclear technology development. The involvement of the military in the nuclear programme may continue to raise questions.

Brazil has urged Iran to follow a legitimate route to nuclear power. The reversal of Brazil's position on the future of nuclear power in March 2006 and the postponement of the official launch of the Resende enrichment facility in early 2006 are perhaps examples of a broad concern over attracting negative international attention at a time when there are widespread concerns about the transparency of Iran's nuclear programme. Brazil has not been totally forthcoming about the history of its enrichment programme, as demonstrated by recent refusal to let IAEA inspectors fully inspect the centrifuges at the Resende facility. The apparent decision to set aside plans for nuclear power expansion, while going ahead with the establishment of an enrichment capability raises questions about Brazil’s future intentions.

Brazil’s announcement that the country is expanding uranium production and will offer enriched uranium for export is another issue of potential proliferation concern, depending on the nature of safeguards that Brazil will require on exported uranium.

Brazil’s caution with regard to its own nuclear programme and its position on the case of Iran suggest that Brazil wishes to maintain its status as a responsible member of the international nuclear community.

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Past Nuclear Policies

Brazil's nuclear history is framed around a struggle between the desire for an independent indigenous nuclear capability and an outward-looking strategy of seeking foreign assistance and cooperation in developing its nuclear programme.

First Steps

Brazil embarked on a nuclear road in the early 1930s, when the University of São Paulo began conducting research in nuclear fission. In the 1940s, Brazil concluded several agreements with the United States for transfer of nuclear technology in exchange for providing the latter with monazite. In 1952, Brazil began systematic prospecting and exploration of radioactive materials. In 1957, with support and technology from the U.S., Brazil built a nuclear research reactor. In 1965, it followed up by constructing its first indigenously-built research reactor; medium-grade enriched uranium fuel was supplied by the U.S. In 1970, the U.S. firm Westinghouse won a bid to construct Brazil’s first nuclear power plant. It took more than ten years, and in 1984, Angra I, a 626MW Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), began commercial production of electricity.

The Atoms for Peace Program mandated strict control over technology, and the U.S. came to be perceived by Brazil to be an unreliable partner. In 1975 Brazil concluded a controversial nuclear transfer agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, which called for eight nuclear power reactors (1,300MW each), a commercial uranium enrichment facility, a pilot plutonium reprocessing plant, and joint development of Becker jet nozzle enrichment technology. The deal was met with international opposition, as Brazil was not an NPT signatory and thus was not entitled to the benefits of sharing nuclear technology. International pressure and financial crises brought an end to the deal, which produced only one nuclear power reactor, Brazil’s second nuclear power plant, Angra II. Angra III, also a German reactor, was partially completed. Despite financial and technical difficulties, Brazil maintained that it would pursue a nuclear power programme, finish Angra III, and further expand the country’s nuclear power capacity.

The Parallel Programme

The pace of Brazil’s nuclear programme was conditioned by developments in Argentina, and the desire for technological autonomy befitting a great power. Because the accord with Germany did not require safeguards, Brazil was able to divert technology from its power plant programme to an indigenous and secret nuclear programme conducted by the military. Brazilian military officers as well as civilian scientists were frustrated by what they perceived to be Germany’s unwillingness to fully transfer nuclear technology and by the inefficiencies in the jet nozzle technology. In the mid- to late-1970s, the Brazilian Autonomous Programme of Nuclear Technology (PATN), or the parallel program, was established. The consequent failure of the 1975 nuclear transfer agreement with Germany, and of the jet nozzle enrichment technology, intensified the programme, code-named “Solimões,” after an Amazon river.(1)

The programme was funded by the military services, the National Security Council (CSN) and National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), and was coordinated by CNEN under the direction of CSN. The PATN was engaged in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle, and was centered on development of enrichment technology. The military pursued different enrichment paths, suited for each branch’s specific goals: the Navy worked on ultracentrifuge technology as a means to power submarines (and small reactors); the Air Force worked on laser enrichment for nuclear fuel cells for use in satellites (and on fast breeder reactor technology). The Army worked on a graphite reactor that would produce plutonium. The branches worked independently but complementarily through informal information sharing. While PATN relied on indigenous technology, foreign know-how (training in the U.S.), human resources (technicians from Germany and other countries), nuclear material (200kg UF6 from China) and specialized equipment (from Germany) were also engaged. The Navy also worked closely with researchers and technicians at the civilian Institute of Energetic and Nuclear Research (IPEN), who in general favored development of indigenous capability and opposed the accord with Germany.

The Navy’s project using centrifuge technology to enrich uranium, proved successful. In 1981, they constructed their first centrifuge. A year later the Navy conducted the first isotopic enrichment experiment. In 1986, Brazil mastered the process, successfully enriching uranium to 20%, and in September 1987, they announced their new capability to the world. 

Displacement and Legitimization

In 1985, following the transition from military to civilian government, reviews of national nuclear policy and congressional investigations into PATN and its objectives, PATN was made known and thus legitimized. In testament to its success, it displaced and supplanted Brazil’s official nuclear programme. In 1988, Brazil adopted a new constitution, which explicitly limited nuclear activities to peaceful purposes and assigned the Parliament control over nuclear affairs. In 1990, as part of his broader effort to restrict the role of the military, President Fernando Collor de Mello significantly scaled down and de-militarized Brazil’s nuclear efforts. In September 1990 he symbolically closed a test shaft at Cachimbo, and exposed the military’s plan to build an atomic bomb.(2) According to media sources, a 1990 Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry investigated PATN and found that the Air Force’s Institute of Advanced Studies had designed two atomic bomb devices, one with a yield of 20 to 30 kilotons and a second with a yield of 12 kilotons.(3) The investigation also found that Brazil’s military government secretly transferred eight tons of uranium to Iraq in 1981 and allegedly more than 24 tons of uranium oxide to Iran in the early 1980s.(4)

While some military factions were very interested in acquiring a nuclear weapon capability and research with that aim had been carried out by the Air Force, the parallel programme was not a concerted effort in that direction. In fact a prevalent idea in Brazilian military and diplomatic thinking was of “latent technological deterrence”: obtaining the capability to enrich uranium and thus being able to match the nuclear weapon of an opponent (in this case, Argentina) was presumed sufficient in deterring the opponent from developing the bomb.(5)

Brazil opposed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that the treaty failed to stem nuclear proliferation by leaving nuclear arms in the arsenals of the five nuclear weapon states. While Brazil’s position of opposing the NPT has always been interpreted as preserving the option to develop the nuclear weapon itself, it nonetheless delegitimized the nuclear weapon option domestically and fostered a norm against it.

Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control

As civilian governments gained power in both Argentina and Brazil, the political climate was ripe for a positive nuclear cooperation and disarmament relationship. The Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rapprochement began around 1980, but did not effectively get underway until 1985. Initially, until about 1988, the process was purely bilateral, and centered on individual security and building reciprocal trust. From 1989 forward, the relationship took on legally-binding character and was framed within the international order.(6)

On May 17, 1980, Brazil and Argentina signed the first of many agreements towards bilateral arms control. The Agreement on Cooperation for the Development and Application of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy paved the way for technical cooperation in the nuclear sector and coordination of nuclear policy. In November 1985, the relationship was strengthened by a Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy that emphasized the strictly peaceful nature of both countries’ nuclear programmes. The November 1985 declaration was followed by similar declarations and reciprocal visits to nuclear installations in both countries.

In November 1990 a bilateral nuclear inspection regime, the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, was established by a joint declaration. In July 1991, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created. Soon thereafter, Brazil, Argentina, ABACC and the IAEA began negotiations on an agreement for application of full safeguards to the nuclear facilities of both countries. In December 1991 the Quadripartite Agreement was concluded among the four parties. It consisted of obligations virtually identical to those under the NPT.

In May 1994, Brazil ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty (Latin American nuclear weapons free zone), waiving the requirements of Article 28 of the treaty, so the treaty has entered into force.(7) In 1996 Brazil has joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and assumed its Chair on June 1, 2006.(8) Finally, in 1998 Brazil ratified the NPT and the CTBT. Brazil remains opposed to signing the Additional Protocol (AP).(9)

Sources

1. Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” Center for International Security and Arms Control, August 1997.

2. James Brooke, “Brazil Uncovers Plan by Military to Built Atom Bomb and Stops It,” New York Times, October 9, 1990, via ProQuest.

3. Constantine C. Menges, “Brazil’s Lula da Silva, Castro and China,” The Washington Times, December 10, 2002; “Brazil: Nuclear Weapons Programs,” GlobalSecurity.Org, Updated April 28, 2005.

4. Valerie Lincy and Kelly Motz, “Nuclear Cheating: A well-worn path,” Iran Watch Bulletin, Volume 1, Issue 4, July 22, 2005.

5. Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” Center for International Security and Arms Control, August 1997.

6. Julio C. Carasales, “The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement,” Nonproliferation Review, Sprint-Summer 1995.

7. Article 28 of the Tlatelolco Treaty requires that all of the following conditions be fulfilled in order for the treaty to enter into force: a) ratification by all Latin American states; b) ratification of Protocol I by all countries with possessions in Latin America; c) ratification of Protocol II by all nuclear weapon powers; and d) conclusion of safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Paragraph 2 of Article 28 allows for the waiving of those requirements by any state when ratifying the treaty.

8. “Discurso do Embaixador José Artur Denot Medeiros, Representante Especial para Desarmamento e Não Proliferação, durante a sessão plenária de abertura da Reunião do Grupo de Supridores Nucleares (NSG),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil, June 1, 2006 .

9. Julio C. Carasales, “The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement,” Nonproliferation Review, Sprint-Summer 1995; “Regional Safeguards in Latin America: Implications for the Middle East?” Seminar Sponsored by The Institute for Science and International Security, Washington, D.C., and The National Center for Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt, October 27, 1997, Cairo, Egypt .

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Nuclear Facilities Profile

Nuclear Mining and Milling and Ore Processing

Brazilian uranium reserves rank approximately sixth in the world.(10) As of January 1, 2003, Brazil’s known resources of uranium total 262,000 tons.(11) Estimated additional and speculative resources are 120,000 tons and 500,000 tons, respectively.(12) Only a quarter of Brazil’s territory has been prospected for uranium. Systematic exploration and prospecting for radioactive minerals began in Brazil in 1952. Brazil has been producing uranium since 1982.(13)

Deposits

Primary uranium sites in Brazil are: Poços de Caldas, Lagoa Real Site (Caetité), Itataia, Figueira and Amorinópolis, Quadrilátero Ferrifero with the Gandarela and Serra des Gaiovotas deposits. The majority of Brazil’s uranium is mined by the open pit method (75%), the rest uses the heap leaching method.(14)

In 1982, the Poços de Caldas open pit mine was completed and production began that same year. The mine has a designed capacity of 425 tons annually. In 1995, it ceased operations, as it became economically unfeasible at that time. In 1997, it was shut down and in 1998, decommissioning began.(15)

The Lagoa Real Site (Caetité) is presently the only operating uranium site in Brazil. Uranium was discovered there in 1977 with known resources estimated at 85,000 tons, averaging 0.30% U3O8. The deposits are mined by open pit method. The design capacity of the production center is 340 tons per year, with planned expansion to 670 tons per year. The processing plant uses solvent extraction and heap leaching methods. In 2005, the projected production was expected to be 340 tons.(16)

The Itataia deposit was discovered in 1976. It accounts for almost 50 % of the total known low cost uranium resources in Brazil. The deposit is suitable for open pit mining and estimated uranium recovery stands at 70%. The U3O8 content varies from 500 to 9,000 parts per million (ppm), with P2O5 grade of 12-37%.(17) Uranium at Itataia’s Santa Quiteria mine will be recovered as a byproduct of phosphate, using heap leaching and solvent extraction methods. As of June 2006, activities have not yet started. The mine is expected to begin operations in late 2006. It will have the capacity to produce between 680 and 800 tons of uranium per year.(18)

Industry

Brazil’s uranium industry is fully owned by the government, through state-owned Industrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB). Brazil currently produces uranium solely for domestic consumption. Present requirements are around 450 tons/year (120 tons/year for Angra I nuclear power plant, 310 tons/year for Angra II nuclear power plant). Angra III nuclear power plant is expected to have similar uranium requirements as Angra II.(19) In June 2006, the INB announced that Brazil will triple its uranium production from approximately 400 tons per year to about 1,200 tons. Brazil plans to export surplus uranium to Asia, particularly China. According to INB Director, Luiz Filipe da Silva, Brazil would prefer to export the uranium in the enriched form.(20)

Black Market

In May 2006, Brazilian media sources reported that Brazilian Federal Police and Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office are investigating a clandestine operation of to extract and illegally market uranium. The investigation has uncovered connections with the government, specifically a senator, a federal prosecutor and a state deputy.(21)

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Conversion

Brazil’s present conversion capabilities are at a research-scale. As part of Brazilian Navy’s nuclear propulsion programme, a UF6 pilot plant is under construction at the Navy research Institute, at Iperó (100 km from São Paulo). The plant will have a nominal production capacity of 40 tons/year.(22) From 1999 through 2001, IAEA experts assisted CNEN and IPEN scientists to develop a process of reduction of UF4 to obtain metallic uranium and on synthesis of U3Si2 fusion.(23) As of 2005 there appear to be no plans for expansion of conversion activity to commercial level.(24)

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Enrichment

The roots of Brazil’s enrichment programme lie in the 1975 nuclear technology transfer agreement with Germany. The programme is currently undergoing expansion from research to commercial-scale with the commissioning of the Resende enrichment facility.

Development of the Becker jet nozzle enrichment technology was part of the 1975 nuclear accord with Germany.(25) The technology proved inefficient and was abandoned in favor of centrifuge technology developed by the Navy as part of the secret parallel programme.

As part of that programme, the Brazilian Navy installed a pilot enrichment centrifuge plant at Iperó. In 2000, the Navy was commissioned to construct a commercial centrifuge enrichment facility.(26) On May 5, 2006 Brazil inaugurated the first of four planned modules of the Resende uranium facility. The plant is meant to enrich uranium to less than five percent.(27) Each centrifuge has a capacity of producing 5-10 separative work units (SWUs). They appear to be based on improved technology developed by Brazilian Naval scientists that uses two electromagnetic bearings with rotors spinning frictionlessly. The plant is expected to produce approximately 20-30 tons of enriched uranium per year or 60% of the country’s enriched uranium needs, for Angra I and Angra II reactors, by 2008-09.(28) Once all four modules are installed, around 2015, the Resende plant is expected to supply all of Brazil’s enriched uranium. According to Palmer and Milhollin, the Resende plant will initially have the potential to produce enough material for up to six implosion-type warheads per year; as the plant’s capacity rises, the weapons potential will rise to 63 warheads per year.(30)

In 2004, Brazil initially denied the IAEA inspectors access to the Resende facility, citing the need to protect proprietary information. Following international concerns, Brazil reached an agreement with the Agency on a safeguards approach to verifying the Resende facility. The approach included the partial shielding of enrichment equipment.(31) There are suspicions that Brazil’s actions were motivated by its desire to hide the origin of its centrifuge technology. Some allege that the Resende centrifuges are based on technology provided by the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market,(32) others point to Urenco G-2 centrifuge designs technology obtained covertly from Germany.(33) Brazil denies these allegations and insists that the technology is fully indigenous.

In June 2006, the INB announced that Brazil plans to export surplus uranium to Asia, particularly China. According to INB Director, Luiz Filipe da Silva, Brazil would prefer to export the uranium in the enriched form.(34)

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Fuel Fabrication

The three-unit Nuclear Fuel Factory is Brazil’s only commercial fuel fabrication facility. It is located at Resende. The factory’s Conversion Unit produces uranium dioxide (UO2) powder at the rate of 160 tons/year, using ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC) process. The Pellets Production Unit converts the powder into UO2 pellets at the rate of 120 tons/year. The Components and Assembly Unit produces fuel rods and fuel elements for Brazilian nuclear reactors. Its nominal capacity is 250 tons/year of uranium.(35) The factory also produces other fuel element components, such as top and bottom nozzles, spacer grids and end plugs for export.(36)

From 2001 to 2004, researchers at the Department of Fuel Cycle, IPEN, CNEN, worked with the IAEA to upgrade two fuel fabrication laboratories: the Metallic Uranium Laboratory and the Fuel Thermophysical Characterization Laboratory. The project assisted in validation of chemical and metallurgical steps to prepare YU-Mo alloys and mini-plate fabrication, including U-Mo alloy for research reactor fuel element.(37)

Presently, the INB, the Nuclear Materials Laboratory at the Brazilian Navy Technological Center (CTMSP) and the Moesbauer Spectroscopy Laboratory at the Universidade Estadual de Maringa are engaged in a project with the IAEA to strengthen the competence and know-how of the sintering process of (uranium, gadolinium) oxide pellets and the chemical analysis of rare-earth elements in order to develop a fabrication process for uranium-gadolinium nuclear fuel compliant with the requirements of Angra I and Angra II nuclear power plants. The project is ongoing.(38)

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Power Reactor

Because of abundance of hydro-electric power in Brazil there has been little investment in other energy sources, including nuclear. However, in 2001, a severe drought prompted the Brazilian government to revive plans for nuclear energy. Brazil currently has two operating plants (Angra I and Angra II) and one partially completed (Angra III).

Historical Development

In 1970, Brazil decided to build its first nuclear power plant. The bid went to U.S. firm Westinghouse, with construction underway the following year. In 1982, the Angra I plant reached criticality. In December 1984, it began commercial operations. It is a 626MW pressurized water reactor (PWR). The plant, has been plagued by technical and legal challenges, and is expected to be torn down in 2009.(39)

As part of its 1975 nuclear technology transfer programme with Germany, an agreement was concluded for eight 1,300MW PWR reactors (Biblis B type). Under the agreement, two of the eight units (Angra II and Angra III) would be built with mostly Germany’s Kraftwerke Union’s (KWU) components; the other six units would have 90% Brazilian-made parts. Due to mostly financial, but also political reasons, the Brazilian-German programme faltered, with power plant construction interrupted several times.

In November 1999, Angra II (1270MW), built by KWU (construction took place on and off for over 20 years), went critical. In February 2001, Angra II began producing electricity.(40) Angra III is expected to be completed in five years (43% of its equipment is already in Brazil, stored in 24 sheds in the Nuclear Central office).(41)

Current Plans

In March 2006 Brazil announced and then immediately backtracked from plans to construct seven new nuclear power plants in the next 15 years.(42) This sequence of events hints at a struggle between pro-nuclear advocates in the Ministry of Science and Technology and President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva.(43)

The Brazilian Navy appears to be continuing with its plan to develop and build a reactor for a nuclear-powered submarine. In January 2006, the Sao Paulo Technology Center has successfully assembled the pressure vessel and internal components of the prototype of the reactor that will fuel the submarine. The prototype, of the PWR type with 50 thermal MW (11 electric MW), is built entirely in Brazil. According to Navy Captain Leonan dos Santos Guimaraes, the mastery of this technology gives Brazil the capability to construct low- to medium-powered nuclear power plants.(44)

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Waste Disposal

The majority of radioactive waste in Brazil is generated by the country’s two nuclear power plants, Angra I and Angra II. Pending decision on Brazil’s reprocessing program, the spent fuel from Angra I is temporarily stored on site, in the reactor basin. In 2002 a new compact storage rack was installed at Angra I, with a planned capacity of 1,252 fuel assemblies. As of December 2000, 180.9 tons of spent fuel (506 fuel elements) had been stored.

Brazil’s uranium mining and milling activities (at Poços de Caldas) also produce radioactive waste. Currently there are 2.0 x 106 tons of solid material. It is stored in a specially designed, 29.2 hectares dam system.(45)

From 1997 to 2002, the IAEA assisted Brazil to develop a plan for the management of nuclear radioactive wastes; to upgrade waste processing and storage capability; and to strengthen the capability to perform safety assessment of waste facilities. The IAEA also assisted Brazil to construct a hot cell for dismantling spent sources and installed a gamma spectrometer.(46)

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Research Reactor

Notes

(a) “Brazil,” Nuclear Research Reactors in the World Database, IAEA, Accessed June 1, 2006, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb/>.

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Research and Development

The National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) is responsible for the direction, planning, supervision and control of the country’s nuclear programme. CNEN’s Research and Development Directorate conducts research into the use of the nuclear technology in medicine, agriculture, industry and environment and produces radioisotopes for use in nuclear medicine. The Directorate is composed of five nuclear centres: the Institute of Energetic and Nuclear Research (IPEN), in São Paulo; Center of Nuclear Technology Development (CDTN), in Belo Horizonte; Institute of Nuclear Engineering (IEN), in Rio de Janeiro; the Institute for Radiation Protection and Dosimetry (IRD), in Rio de Janeiro; and, the Nuclear Sciences Regional Centre (CRCN), in Recife.

IPEN is Brazil’s most important research facility. It is engaged in the development of reactor and fuel cycle technologies. It conducts materials analyses, produces radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals, and mechanical and electronic equipment used in the nuclear area. IPEN has a broad infrastructure of laboratories and centres, i.e. the Laser and Applications Centre, the Nuclear Engineering Centre, the Nuclear Fuel Centre, irradiation laboratories; a research reactor (IEA-R1); and, two isochronal Cyclotrons for research and radioisotope production.(48) In 1993 five new beams were installed in an IPEN cyclotron, to allow production of iodine-123 and a more efficient production of other radioisotopes.(49)

Sources

10. Alfredo C. Gurmendi, “The Mineral Industry of Brazil,” Minerals Yearbook 2003, U.S. Geological Survey, 2003, ; “Brazil,” 2003 Country Nuclear Power Profiles, IAEA, 2003 .

11. As in situ resources recoverable at less than $80/kgU.

12. “Brazil,” Uranium 2003: Resources, Production and Demand (OECD/IAEA, 2004).

13. “Brazil,” 2003 Country Nuclear Power Profiles, IAEA, 2003 .

14. “Brazil,” Uranium 2003: Resources, Production and Demand (OECD/IAEA, 2004); “Brazil,” 2003 Country Nuclear Power Profiles, IAEA, 2003 .

15. “Brazil,” 2003 Country Nuclear Power Profiles, IAEA, 2003 .

16. “Brazil,” 2003 Country Nuclear Power Profiles, IAEA, 2003 ; “Brazil,” Uranium 2005: Resources, Production and Demand (OECD/IAEA, 2005).

17. “Brazil,” 2003 Country Nuclear Power Profiles, IAEA, 2003 ; “Brazil,” Uranium 2003: Resources, Production and Demand (OECD/IAEA, 2004).

18. Ivonete Dainese, “Brazil Plans to Increase Uranium Production for Domestic Use, Export,” Sao Paulo Gazeta Mercantil, June 20, 2006, via FBIS, FEA20060621024458; Uranium 2005: Resources, Production and Demand (OECD/IAEA, 2005).

19. “Brazil,” Uranium 2003: Resources, Production and Demand (OECD/IAEA, 2004); “Brazil,” 2003 Country Nuclear Power Profiles, IAEA, 2003 .

20. Ivonete Dainese, “Brazil Plans to Increase Uranium Production for Domestic Use, Export,” Sao Paulo Gazeta Mercantil, June 20, 2006, via FBIS, FEA20060621024458.

21. “Brazilian Police, Intelligence Agencies Investigating Uranium-Smuggling Network,” Istoye, May 17, 2006, via FBIS, Document No. LAP20060516340001.

22. “Brazil,” 2003 Country Nuclear Power Profiles, IAEA, 2003 .

23. “BRA/4/047: Fuel Improvement for the IPEN Research Reactor,” Technical Cooperation Project Database, IAEA, Project Completed April 27, 2001, .

24. Sharon Squassoni and David Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” Arms Control Today, October 2005.

25. Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1987), pp. 198-216.

26. Mark Hibbs, “Brazil to Build Centrifuge Plant at Resende Fuel Processing Complex,” Nuclear Fuel, Vol. 25, No.14, July 10, 2000.

27. “Brazil Officially Starts First Uranium Enrichment Facility,” Environment News Service, May 8, 2006 ; “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” Arms Control Today, October 2005.

28. Erico Guizzo, “How Brazil Spun the Atom,” IEEE Spectrum, March 2006; Mark Hibbs, “Brazil to Build Centrifuge Plant at Resende Fuel Processing Complex,” Nuclear Fuel, Vol. 25, No.14, July 10, 2000; Sharon Squassoni and David Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” Arms Control Today, October 2005.

29. “Brazil Officially Starts First Uranium Enrichment Facility,” Environment News Service, May 8, 2006 .

30. As cited in Liz Palmer and Gary Milhollin, “Brazil’s Nuclear Puzzle,” Science, October 22, 2004, p. 617. Calculations are based on the assumption that the plant’s first cascade will produce 20,000SWU’s per year, and that 16 kg of uranium enriched to 93.5% are needed for an implosion device.

31. “Brazil Officially Starts First Uranium Enrichment Facility,” Environment News Service, May 8, 2006 . The inspection regime agreed upon by Brazil and the IAEA will allow the IAEA inspectors to examine material coming in and out of the centrifuges but not the equipment itself. See, Jack Chang, “Brazil Poised to Join the World’s Nuclear Elite,” Knight RidderNewspapers, February 10, 2006.

32. Carmen Gentile, “Brazil Finalizing Nuclear Deal with U.N.,” UPI, November 26, 2004.

33. Sharon Squassoni and David Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” Arms Control Today, October 2005.

34. Ivonete Dainese, “Brazil Plans to Inrease Uranium Production for Domestic Use, Export,” Sao Paulo Gazeta Mercantil, June 20, 2006, via FBIS, FEA20060621024458.

35. “FCN Nuclear Fuel Plant,” Industrias Nucleares Do Brazil webpage, Accessed June 27, 2006.

36. “Brazil,” 2003 Country Nuclear Power Profiles, IAEA, 2003 ; “Nuclear Power in Brazil,” Briefing Paper #95, Uranium Information Center, June 2006 .

37. “BRA/4/053: Development of Alternative High-Density Fuel Based on Uranium-Molybdenum Alloys,” Technical Cooperation Project Database, IAEA, Project Completed October 29, 2004 .

38. “BRA/4/052: Fabrication Process Development of the Uranium-Gadolinium Nuclear Fuel for Nuclear Power Plants,” Technical Cooperation Project Database, IAEA, Accessed June 1, 2006 .

39. “Brazil: Nuclear Weapons Program,” GlobalSecurity.Org, Updated April 28, 2006.

40. “Brazil,” 2003 Country Nuclear Power Profiles, IAEA, 2003 .

41. “Brazil: Nuclear Weapons Program,” GlobalSecurity.Org, Updated April 28, 2006.

42. “Brazil Officially Starts First Uranium Enrichment Facility,” Environment News Service, May 8, 2006 ; “Brazil Nuclear Program Remains on Hold Amid Cabinet Debate,” Open Source Center (OSC) Analysis, April 5, 2006.

43. Jack Boureston, “Brazilian Nuclear Debate Highlights Parallels and Contrasts with Iran,” WMD Insights, Issue No. 7, July/August 2006 .

44. Jose Maria Tomazela, “Navy Completes Key Phase in Nuclear Submarine Program,” Sao Paulo O Estado de Sao Paulo, January 27, 2006, via FBIS, Document No. LAP20060127032004.

45. “Brazil,” 2003 Country Nuclear Power Profiles, IAEA, 2003 .

46. “BRA/4/046: National Waste Management Programme,” Technical Cooperation Project Database, IAEA, Project Completed September 10, 2002 .

47. “Brazil,” Nuclear Research Reactors in the World Database, IAEA, Accessed June 1, 2006, .

48. CNEN Webpage, . Accessed June 7, 2006.

49. “BRA/4/040: Radioisotope Production with a Cyclotron,” Technical Cooperation Project Database, IAEA, Project Completed August 26, 1993 .

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