



# THE CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE OPERATIONS: ASSESSING PROGRESS AND ADDRESSING GAPS

CO-ORGANIZED BY SIPRI AND CSSM

## OPENING REMARKS\*

In describing the working relationship between the civilian and military components of a peace operation, the term ‘integrated action’ is preferable to ‘comprehensive approach’. Integration implies that different actors’ areas of responsibility are clearly demarcated and respected, and that the various actors seek to understand what the others do. ‘Integrated action’ also takes the ‘c’s’ out of ‘command and control’, a term that non-military agencies have found difficult.

In Iraq in 2004 there was a plan for governance, security, development and information outreach. The international mission that was supposed to carry it out—the Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I)—should have been civilian-led, but in reality it was based on a military campaign plan written without consulting Iraqis (in the absence of a democratically elected government) or international civilian actors. The civilian side of the mission suffered severe setbacks, not least following the withdrawal of civilian staff of the United Nations and other agencies from Baghdad after the bombing of the city in summer 2004. Such setbacks show the need for resilience and robustness on the civilian side. The problem in Iraq was not really a lack of funding but a lack of willpower.

The main role of the armed forces is fighting; a secondary role is supporting the efforts of other actors by military means. The civilian contribution to peace operations is crucial from a military perspective. (The term ‘non-military’ may be preferable to ‘civilian’, because it broadens the spectrum of actors to include, e.g. the police and other security providers who are not usually seen as ‘civilians’. At the same time, the term delimits the military’s sphere of responsibility.) Concentration of force and economy of effort—both principles of war—make integrated civilian–military action an absolute necessity. Crisis exercises conducted by the British military over the past four years have included a growing number of civilians of increasing seniority.

Some lessons that have emerged are that civilian capacity is mostly local and that it is crucial to focus on developing this local capacity to the point

\* This report attempts to summarize the contents of each workshop session, including both presentations and discussion. SIPRI would like to thank Andrea Baumann, rapporteur. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of SIPRI or of the majority of the participants.

## ● WORKSHOP SUMMARY

The workshop ‘Civilian Contribution to Peace Operations: Assessing Progress and Addressing Gaps’, held on 15 July 2010 in Shrivenham, United Kingdom, was organized by SIPRI and the Centre for Security Sector Management (CSSM) at Cranfield University. The workshop brought together 20 civilian experts and military personnel, from Europe and North America, to share lessons learned on the civilian dimension of peace operations.

The main objectives of the workshop were to (a) conduct a regional inventory of what policies, mechanisms or structures countries are developing for the civilian dimension of peace operations; (b) observe ‘lessons learned’ about European and North American civilian deployment; and (c) discuss challenges confronting European and North American countries.

The workshop is one in a series of four regional workshops—covering Africa, Asia–Pacific, Europe and South America—conducted as part of the SIPRI project ‘Civilian Contribution to Peace Operations: Assessing Progress and Addressing Gaps’. The project’s objective is to take stock of the international civilian architecture and to map what has been done and by whom.

The project has been generously funded by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) and United States Institute of Peace. This workshop was organized with support from the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom and the British Stabilisation Unit.

**Opening Remarks***Speaker*

Lieutenant General Andrew Graham, CBE, Director General, Defence Academy of the UK

**Welcome and Introduction**

The organizers opened the workshop and introduced the background of the project, the aims and main themes of the workshop.

*Speakers*

Dr Ann Fitz-Gerald, Director, Centre for Security Sector Management (CSSM)

Dr Stephanie Blair, Associate Senior Research Fellow, SIPRI

**Session 1. SIPRI Project Overview**

This session provided an overview of the SIPRI project and introduced its methodology and preliminary findings

*Moderator*

Dr Ann Fitz-Gerald, , Director, Centre for Security Sector Management (CSSM)

*Speaker*

Dr Stephanie Blair, Associate Senior Research Fellow, SIPRI

**Session 2. The Civilian Architecture for Peace and Stability Operations**

A discussion of the developments of the civilian architecture for peace and stability operations. The purpose of this session was to address what has been done to date and the major challenges ahead.

*Moderator*

Ms Andrea Baumann, Oxford University

*Speakers*

Kevin Rex, Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), Canada

Mary Ann Zimmerman, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), USA

Hannah Winfield, Stabilisation Unit, UK

Gabriela Elroy, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Mark Singleton, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands

Peter Hedling, EU Council Secretariat, Crisis Management Planning Directorate

where international staff can withdraw, rather than to simply provide aid. So far, the international community has not been good at transferring skills and knowledge to the host country, and huge gaps remain.

**SESSION 1. SIPRI PROJECT OVERVIEW**

Initial findings from the SIPRI project ‘Civilian Contribution to Peace Operations: Assessing Progress and Addressing Gaps’ show that civilian actors have moved from the periphery of peace operations to the core. Demand for civilian efforts has increased and so has the level of civilian activity in these contexts. A survey of UN Security Council resolutions shows a mushrooming of ‘civilian tasks’ within peace operations over time, tasks that often also require administrative and management skills (e.g. decision making, facilitation and communication). Future operations will more likely see a constellation of different actors working together and alongside each other. Hence, the mapping exercise being carried out by the project is vital.

The challenges of coordination, even between civilian organizations (e.g. the African Union (AU), the European Union and the UN in Darfur) make hybrid operations difficult to implement; the division of labour between military and non-military actors is no clearer. A key question will always be: who is in charge?

There is continual debate about the right timing and sequence of military and civilian activities. While civilian contributions are most often viewed as coming late and slowly, this is not always the case; in Afghanistan and Iraq, it might actually have been premature in some instances. A common understanding among civilian and military actors is important to ensure that a joint civil–military approach is right from the start, including in the planning and assessment stages.

The past decade has seen the birth of coordination mechanisms in several states, such as Canada’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), the United Kingdom’s Stabilisation Unit (SU) and the United States’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Many of these new units are concerned with reputational issues and are seeking to increase visibility and raise their profile in the existing institutional architecture. However, the mere fact that a coordination mechanism or unit has been created does not guarantee effective cooperation. In Europe and North America, national governments have been driving the civilian agenda, whereas Africa has seen more of a bottom-up, pragmatic approach



with an emphasis on civil society. Overall, the demand for rapidly deployable civilians with the skills needed largely exceeds the current supply, thereby creating a huge capacity deficit on the civilian side.

The civilian contribution to peace operations is generally under-researched. There are lists of tasks but no clear idea of the role that civilians play in peace-keeping and stability operations. A shift in mindsets is required from both military and non-military actors to understand that such operations have a civilian component. While all sides have learned much in recent years, the temptation to simply stick—or return—to business as usual is evidently still strong. The civilian dimension has often been portrayed as the weakest link—particularly with regard to the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns—but it is doubtful that the military has all the structures necessary to be successful in these operations.

To what extent it is possible now to turn the theory into reality? Are the nascent national coordination structures being tested or do they remain at the conceptual stage? The military sphere has seen the publication of several pieces of doctrine over the past years, such as Field Manual (FM) 3-07 in the USA and Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40 in the UK. If there is a civilian equivalent to these doctrines, it is the Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations published by the US Institute for Peace (USIP) in 2007. The purpose of a ‘theory’, the guide argued, would be to identify the common aspects of all stabilization operations that the different components (military, international non-military and local non-military) understand. Yet ‘stabilization’ is an immature concept. The stabilization agenda has been largely driven by the policy discourse. Where is the theory behind it and can it be turned into practice if it lacks a solid foundation? There are an array of tools and approaches that have been experimented with, but they do not form a coherent theory. In addition, tenuous political will and waning popular support for stability operations hardly facilitate the quest for greater conceptual clarity. Current political debates in the UK over the future place and role of the SU (i.e. whether to place it under military lead or raise its profile within the Whitehall hierarchy) illustrate this climate of continuous uncertainty.

### **Session 3. Operational Issues**

A discussion of operational issues and challenges: leadership, mission staffing, resourcing and funding, planning

#### *Moderator*

Tom Hamilton-Baillie, Programme Manager, CSSM

#### *Discussant*

Gabriela Elroy

### **Session 4: Remaining Challenges: ‘Integration’ versus ‘Interoperability’**

Session four took the form of a joint brainstorming session on the notions of integration and interoperability and obstacles or blockages to interoperability.

#### *Moderator*

Professor Bob Sharp, National Defense University, USA

#### *Discussant*

Brigadier Sean Crane, Defence Academy of the UK

#### *Facilitator*

Dr Stephanie Blair, Associate Senior Research Fellow, SIPRI

### **Concluding Remarks**

#### *Speakers*

Dr Ann Fitz-Gerald, , Director, Centre for Security Sector Management (CSSM)

Dr Stephanie Blair, Associate Senior Research Fellow, SIPRI



## **SESSION 2. THE CIVILIAN ARCHITECTURE FOR PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS**

The exercise of taking stock of different organizational approaches shows that the various coordination bodies are at different stages with regard to capacity development. While some are quite advanced, others are just starting out and may benefit greatly from an exchange of best practices. The UK has seen considerable ‘organic’ growth in terms of capability, but this has not happened according to plan or design. Different bodies within the British training and policy establishments have been doing different things. There is a desire to use the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review to bring more structure into the approach and to focus on prevention. In the USA, ‘once the money came, there was a lot of pressure to get people and to get them out of the door’. The S/CRS is now catching up with development planning. Supply gaps in the training of civilian experts exist with regard to specific training for planners and training opportunities for international peacekeepers (in order for them to be trained in the same skills and competences, without being overly influenced by the prevailing cultures of the British and US establishments). The SU has a pool of planners drawn from the Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG) and trained specifically for this. The S/CRS has a Level I Planners course that trains people to bring their expertise to bear in an integrated effort.

Thanks to the SU and S/CRS, selection, training and assessment of civilian experts are most advanced in the British and US governments. START staff have taken part in both SU and S/CRS foundation courses. Within the EU, training is the responsibility of member states.

### **The Stabilisation Unit (SU) and the Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG)**

Job profiles for the CSG include behavioural competences, job-specific technical expertise, and personal skills and resilience required when working in a stabilization environment. The CSG includes both deployable civilian experts (DCEs)—technical specialists from outside the civil service—and the Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre, which is made up of civil servants who can be deployed for temporary stabilization assignments. Candidates’ behavioural competences are established through interviews. Selection looks at the technical expertise that they have acquired in their previous careers either externally (in the case of DCEs) or in their parent departments (in the case of cadre members). The required behavioural standards can be described as traditional civil service standards ‘with a tweak’ to take into the account the additional demands of insecure environments. The hostile environment preparation is mostly covered by training organized through the SU. The SU advocates a self-managing approach to career paths and encourages candidates to put together a personal development plan, which for cadre members should ensure that the deployment is integrated into their overall career plan. Selection criteria were elaborated during a six-month consultation within the SU but not through a formal process. Assessment of candidates is carried out via the selection process, interviews and informal feedback from pre-deployment training courses. As the use of this informal feedback has been seen as ‘unfair and opaque’—and in order to preserve the



predeployment training as a learning environment—the SU aims to change this. The SU also works closely with its military counterpart, the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG), to operationalize the civil–military relationship.

### **The Military Stabilisation Support Group**

The MSSG has recently replaced the tri-service Joint CIMIC (Civil–Military Cooperation) Group that initially grew out of the army’s Civil Affairs section. The MSSG delivers all UK military Civil Effect and CIMIC training to provide military stabilization support worldwide. Within the British military, CIMIC is understood as a military function in support of the commander to achieve operational success, not as a separate capability. It was shaped by experiences in the Balkans. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC) still deals primarily with CIMIC, not ‘stabilization’. The MSSG specializes in ‘soft skills’ and seeks influence not only in the wider context but within the military establishment, to inform and educate. MSSG offers courses for staff officers in either the military or civilian chain of command, and for non-commissioned officers to train them for development work (e.g. how to interact with the local community and interpreters and how to implement quick impact projects).

The MSSG includes two groups of regular military personnel: permanent staff on secondments of up to two years to the MSSG and non-permanent ‘individual augmentees’—regular personnel who have volunteered for deployment with the MSSG for one operational tour. The MSSG can also draw on a pool of reservists who have volunteered for deployment. The permanent staff receive six months of individual training on courses and then form into military stabilisation support teams (MSSTs) of between four and eight people, who then train together for another four months before deploying for six months. On their return, these teams train MSSTs that are about to be deployed.

Individual augmentees (around 40) are drawn from all services. They are trained to pass a basic assessment and then take part in MSST and mission-readiness exercises. These individuals go back into the services on return from the field. The reservists come from the national Territorial Army and are not formed into units but selected for their individual expertise. The MSSG has international links with the US Marine Corps.

In the past, the focus on soft skills—which participation in a comprehensive approach implies—has not been seen as particularly attractive in terms of military careers. This has changed with the MSSG and the focus on stabilization. Career managers within the army also have to be trained to select the right people in order to send out positive signals that soft skills enhance career prospects. The MSSG does not want to develop stabilization as a separate career stream but rather as a specialization that officers ‘dip in and out of’ in the course of their careers. Ultimately, the military profession is about arms. Professionalism in the military means using force and the threat of force. Stabilization training was not seen as having any adverse effect on war-fighting capacity.



## **The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization**

The S/CRS first offered a course in the US State Department in 2005. The Civilian Response Corps (CRC) has officially three components: active and standby (both composed of civilian federal employees) and reserve (composed of volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments). The reserve has not yet materialized. The aim is to arrive at a capacity of 250 active and 2000 standby experts. Current levels are around 120 active and 1000 standby experts from seven departments and agencies. These experts are deployed in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere.

The CRC training cycle contains four stages:

1. Prior to CRC entry: assessing what people bring to the job from previous experience and mapping the skills that are required;
2. Readiness preparation (on entry into CRC): SNOW training course for non-traditional environments. People are hired for their technical expertise but usually have little inter-agency experience and limited knowledge about reconstruction and stability environments;
3. Pre-deployment preparation: Most people receive context-specific briefings, while some receive more robust training (for deployments in the DRC and Sudan) and cultural awareness training (for deployments in Afghanistan). Those who deploy with military units in Afghanistan and Iraq receive different training; and
4. Deployment: competences for essential tasks have been worked out in consultation with the US Marine Corps.

### **Similarities and differences**

The presentations showed a number of common concerns and some interesting differences.

Common concerns included

- the development of expertise;
- the identification of skill sets; and
- the design of appropriate recruitment, assessment and training programmes for deployable civilian staff.

Differences were highlighted with regard to

- the role and influence of coordination units within the government architecture;
- the degree of involvement in or ownership of policy; and
- outreach to other (multilateral) bodies and the ability to partner with others both in a whole-of-government and a whole-of-system approach.

All coordination mechanisms are confronted with the challenge of demonstrating their relevance and added value and of selling their services to existing institutions within and outside government.



## People

Capacity building on the civilian side is not just about increasing numbers but crucially about deploying people with the right skills and character. This raises important questions about how to assess people, how to train and educate them, and how to create career paths that attract and retain people with relevant experience and qualifications. Quality has to come before quantity, not least because the comparatively small number of civilians deployed in a peace operation in the field inevitably places them in the spotlight and does not allow for redundancy. Interpersonal and management skills are as important as technical competence.

There are big differences in the numbers of DCEs that governments have invested in. In the UK, the number of civilian experts deployed through the SU has grown considerably, backed by a strong political commitment by former prime minister Gordon Brown to build a database of 1000 experts. S/CRS has grown from around 20 DCEs in 2004 to around 200 in 2010. START, on the other hand, only has four DCEs. While 200 police officers can be drawn directly from the reserve, no other government departments in Canada have so far seconded their staff. Thus, Canada is somewhat lagging behind others in terms of the development of its human resources, and unlike in the UK there is no explicit political commitment to the process.

The Dutch Government is only now starting to work on a more centralized approach to identifying DCEs in the form of a roster. Capacity building in the Netherlands has suffered from a shortage of experienced candidates who are willing to be deployed. Stabilization is seen as a 'career killer' and people 'are just not keen to go'.

## Policy

To different degrees, the newly created coordination structures are entrusted with policy development in the areas of stabilization and peacekeeping. The SU is explicitly not a policy unit. START sets policy on stabilization within the Canadian Government and has an entire section dedicated to its development. Sweden's Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) also has its own policy research and development unit. S/CRS has not led coordination efforts (apart from the CRC), but rather works with others who have the policy lead. Coordination in Washington, DC, is often led by regional bureaus in the State Department, while the humanitarian element is done by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The Dutch approach is decentralized and fragmented. While formal coordination started in 2002, several departments have come up with their own approaches and systems and are keen to retain ownership of budgets and policy. Policy priorities vary considerably and departments are not always consulted to the same extent. The government seems to have subscribed to the idea of coordination as a whole but 'living it is a different issue'. The lack of standardization (e.g. administrative procedures) and the stove-piped, or siloed-, nature of government has led to high transaction costs.



## **Partnering**

Few of the new coordination mechanisms have reached out to other multilateral institutions in a consistent or formal manner. The SU and START have some links with the EU and NATO. The FBA is a government agency subordinated to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with a strong mandate to coordinate domestic agencies and to ensure that the Swedish contribution is coordinated with other bilateral or multilateral actors. Some degree of cooperation is taking place in the training courses for deployment in hostile environments organized by SU and S/CRS, which practitioners from other countries and organizations can attend. There is a lot of potential for further outreach and coordination, which is crucial in terms of pooling limited resources, exchanging best practice, ensuring common basic standards of training, and avoiding duplication and overlap.

## **SESSION 3. OPERATIONAL ISSUES**

### **Leadership**

The call for greater professionalization of civilian leadership raises several questions: what skills and attitudes do civilian leaders in stabilization environments need in order to be effective, and are these skills and attitudes the same as those needed by military leaders? Should the focus be on field staff and task force personnel, who play a crucial role in stabilization operations, rather than on the top leadership in each organization? Leadership is not necessarily a generic set of skills or qualities but may depend on what is to be led and in what context. From a military perspective, civilian leaders often look more like senior managers than leaders. Status and rank, which may be considered secondary in organizations with flat leadership structures, are important when working with strongly hierarchical organizations such as the military (and often foreign ministries). In order to stand up to military leaders, civilian leaders need not only the right personality traits but also adequate rank and standing.

Adapting ways of doing business, including styles of leadership (e.g. command-driven versus consensus-oriented styles), is all the more difficult when people find themselves in an unfamiliar and inhospitable environment. Leadership in a stabilization environment requires feeling comfortable in different agency cultures, being able to work across stove-pipes and possessing the necessary interpersonal skills. Openness to cultural differences among organizations should not be taken as a licence to bring the worst attributes of an agency's culture to the table. A degree of predictability and commonly agreed rules are important. Getting the right leaders is partly a matter of providing the right incentives to encourage people to embark on cross-departmental careers. Appointing someone with a multi-agency background to a senior position (e.g. head of S/CRS or SU) can send out an instant message. If these positions are seen as career stepping stones, they will increasingly attract the right people.



## **Mission staffing**

Mission staffing varies across the different units that were represented at the workshop. Nevertheless, common themes emerged in terms of human resources management, legal issues (duty of care) and the integration of flexible, deployable job profiles with the day-to-day jobs of the parent departments. In most contexts a mix of civil servants and external consultants forms the pool of deployable civilians. Gaps in human resources exist more among civil servants than among external consultants and contractors. Investing considerable time and resources in training is good and necessary, but this approach is not generally accepted within civilian departments. There might be a civilian ‘surge’ capacity within the private sector that is easier to tap than taking civil servants out of their daily jobs, but this easier route comes with additional risks or costs (e.g. security clearance, continuity of training, retention of lessons learned and maintaining standards). Benefits such as per diems and compensation arrangements are not harmonized across the different departments and governments. This may well promote ‘bidding wars’ among government departments and agencies in order to secure the best experts.

The SU does not have a standing capacity but a pool of external consultants with an availability ratio of 1 : 5 (200 out of 1000). There is not enough funding available to train the whole roster of 1000 DCEs. Key individuals in each functional area are selected to undergo security clearance and training.

In the USA, the Department of Defense, with its enormous budget, is often quicker to outbid other departments and hire civilian experts. A small core of whole-of-government people are ready to deploy within 48 hours.

## **Resources and funding**

There are questions over what stabilization should cost and what governments and electorates are willing to pay. Organizations entrusted with stabilization tasks must be properly resourced and in control of the funds they need in order to carry out their work effectively. Military deployments are inherently more expensive than civilian deployments. There is a case to be made for shifting resources to the civilian side for prevention and similar.

## **Planning**

The necessity of a coordinated approach to planning is equally recognized across the different institutional contexts. Many setbacks in stability operations have been attributed to insufficient planning. The conceptual imperative of joint planning and the difficulties encountered in practice raise questions over the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of planning. To what extent do the activities and tasks that are implied in stability and peacekeeping operations lend themselves to planning? Which frameworks or tools are available (and appropriate) to plan in a joint fashion? Just as in other areas of cooperation, different organizational approaches can complicate or hamper joint planning. It is a common belief that the military excels in planning while civilian organizations ‘do not plan’. While the military is uniquely optimized for crisis leadership, not every stabilization mission may require the same set of



skills and plans. Military participants admitted that the military tends to be ‘too precious about our planning tools . . . We couch them in terms that put others off’. Not forcing others to act out of character to comply with plans or processes may be the key to successful cooperation. Organizational change is often more difficult than changing individual mindsets.

The SU works as a planning team among different agencies. It recognizes that planning methodologies necessarily vary among different agencies and units (‘English is not a common language in the United Kingdom’). On the ground, however, joint planning is not always the reality. The civilian contribution has often been treated as an add-on to the military plan rather than part of a truly integrated process. This has much to do with the command-and-control structure in place. Nevertheless, in terms of terminology, there is a trend to move away from (purely military) campaign plans to shared ‘stabilization plans’ or templates.

#### **SESSION 4. REMAINING CHALLENGES: ‘INTEGRATION’ VERSUS ‘INTEROPERABILITY’**

Session four took the form of a joint brainstorming session on the notions of integration and interoperability and obstacles or blockages to interoperability.

Discussions showed the differences between how people understand the modes of interaction implied by ‘integration’ and ‘interoperability’. For many participants, integration had a more organic quality of immersion or absorption while interoperability came with mechanical connotations that allowed each individual component to retain a greater degree of autonomy. Interoperability might be a step on the path towards greater integration, but integration (at a more individual level) may also be a precondition for successful interoperability. A comprehensive approach requires for all mindsets to be reflected in the planning and implementation without absorbing one component into the other or others. The question was raised of whether an integrated approach can be based on equal partnership—or is that only possible with interoperability?

Some participants understood interoperability to mean being able to sign up to a common goal. This is an issue not only between military and non-military organizations but also among civilian organizations. Humanitarian agencies may, for instance, find it difficult to sign up to the explicitly political end state that UN integrated missions are meant to promote. Hence, there might be a difference between a condition of interoperability among many different agencies and a single integrated mission. Is there a potential for hybrid peace operations? As long as resources are as skewed as they are at the moment, it is very difficult to imagine a hybrid approach working well. The military clearly outstrips others in terms of capability and size of deployments and is likely to ‘absorb’ other approaches to some extent.

Potential blockages to interoperability include an array of issues, such as

- staff arrangements (tour lengths, terms of service, conditions of leave, accommodation and rules of conduct);
- ‘knowledge’ (intelligence in military terms, expertise or understanding in civilian speak);



- logistics;
- communications; and
- resources.

Is standardization the prime solution to interoperability? While it would undoubtedly make certain things easier, it is associated with large costs and requires enormous commitment from all sides. Common standard operating procedures and protocols may ease the coordination of different actors, but they come with a risk of flattening the wide spectrum of expertise that is needed in stability and peacekeeping operations.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The following is a summary of the key points the participants felt were important to take forward in other discussions and to develop further.

### **Conceptual**

- Determining the optimal role of civilians in stability and peace operations (including timing and sequencing);
- Division of labour: integration or interoperability;
- Identifying which modes of planning, leadership and decision-making work for both the military and the non-military components of a stability or peacekeeping operation.

### **Capacity development**

- Local: knowledge and skills transfer from international experts to local communities;
- National: harmonization of standards for deployable civilian experts across different institutional contexts (benefits, compensation, safety and security conditions);
- International: partnering and outreach among national coordination mechanisms and international/multilateral bodies (AU, EU, NATO and UN);
- Training and education;
- Common standards for basic training and assessment for civilians deployed in hostile environments;
- Training opportunities for international peacekeepers (without the national 'flavour' of a specific government); and
- Training courses across different institutional contexts: increased flexibility, exchange, and some degree of standardization to ensure quality control and avoid duplication.

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