3 May 2010: Perspectives of non-nuclear weapon states concerning the 2010 NPT Review Conference

In the run-up to the 2010 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), together with the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), has hosted a series of 'dialogue dinners' and bilateral meetings since early 2009 to support dialogue and discussion on issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation among a number of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), the majority of which are outside any extended deterrence agreement.

The initiative of the four senior US statesmen, Kissinger, Schultz, Perry and Nunn, on a Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons has been an integral part of the dialogue project. The project provided an opportunity for feedback and reactions from the NNWS on the initiative - a reality check as well as a forum for discussions between the NNWS and the four statesmen. The conclusions below are SIPRI's assessment of the various positions as the 2010 NPT Review Conference starts.

Dispelling the distrust of nuclear weapon states' intentions
It is clear that the legacy of the Bush Administration's strategy on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and indeed on multilateral affairs in general, had left a deep sense of scepticism and distrust among the NNWS. The United States had an indispensable role to play in overcoming this great mistrust between the NNWS, especially from the developing world, and the P5 nuclear weapon states (NWS) on issues concerning nuclear rights and obligations.

While the messages from the incoming Obama Administration were positive, a clear signal of US intentions was required. That clear signal arrived with the speech by President Obama in Prague in April 2009, but it was still seen with caution since 'actions count more than words' and not much had changed in terms of real efforts. With the delay of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the repeatedly extended deadline of the START follow-up negotiations, it seemed that the doubters were correct in their assessment. However, in April 2010 both the NPR and the New START Treaty were finally presented, with the United States taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its overall national security policy.

Three or four of five desiderata had thus been achieved:
-    a clear signal of US intentions;
-    a new START treaty;
-    an NPR with a reduced role for nuclear weapons;
-    negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT)(although these were then blocked by Pakistan);

leaving only US ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be achieved. It now seems clear that the US positions have shifted, evidenced both in words and actions.

But will this be sufficient to convince the NNWS?
In recent statements in the United Nations General Assembly, a number of NNWS have stated that the strategic force reductions mandated by the New START Treaty will not alone revive the USA's disarmament credentials or provide it with enough leverage to gain more support for its non-proliferation agenda. This indicates that the distrust is still there to some extent and that delegations to the NPT Review Conference need to make real efforts in the negotiations that lie ahead.

The renewed imperative to rebalance the pillars of the NPT
It is clear from the discussions during the project that there is a widespread feeling that the NNWS parties to the NPT are being asked to accept additional abridgements of their sovereignty. This implies new constraints on their right under Article IV of the NPT to receive assistance for developing civil nuclear energy programmes without commensurate undertakings by the NWS in the area of nuclear disarmament and Article VI.

This is deeply frustrating since they see the Article VI obligation for NWS to pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament as being of fundamental importance and believe that failure to make progress on this has already undermined the strength and legitimacy of the NPT.

In short, there has been an imbalance between the NPT's three pillars - disarmament, peaceful use of nuclear energy and non-proliferation efforts - with the emphasis being on the latter.

It is therefore likely that there will be serious efforts by the NNWS to not only restate the progress and actions on Article VI issues that were agreed at the Review Conferences of 1995 and 2000, but also push the disarmament agenda further. This could include agreement on how to more concretely measure the progress by NWS on nuclear disarmament as well as agreements on negative security assurances.

The P5 may argue that, since the first major reduction in several years has just been agreed by Russia and the USA, as well as the previously announced smaller reductions by France and the UK, they have indeed taken concrete steps with regard to Article VI in a way that was not the case in 2000 or 2005.

At the same time it is also clear that the NWS intend to maintain their nuclear weapon capacity for the foreseeable future, investing in new delivery systems and strengthened nuclear infrastructure. While the first development is very positive it is unlikely that it will be sufficient to give the NWS a carte blanche to ignore, or even take lightly, Article VI discussions.

With regard to the proposals to further strengthen the non-proliferation pillar of the treaty by restricting some right of access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Article IV, there is much less of a common view among the NNWS.

Some states, such as Germany, have proposed solutions for multilateral ownership or management of the fuel cycle. Others, such as Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Algeria, Turkey and Indonesia, are more cautious or hostile towards the idea. While the latter group understands and supports the need to strengthen the NPT's capacity concerning non-proliferation, they would expect this to be combined with a strengthening of the disarmament pillar.

There is also a strong scepticism towards the different multilateral nuclear approaches, such as a multilateral fuel cycle or international fuel bank. These proposals are seen as creating more burdens for the NNWS that are already in compliance with the treaty, that it will for the second time divide states between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' in the NPT, and that they are asked to give up some of the sovereign rights that they have under the treaty without getting anything in return.

If any of the various proposals to multilateralize or internationalize the nuclear fuel cycle is to receive support it will not only need to be accompanied by disarmament efforts, but also need to be drafted in a non-mandatory way, allowing for incentives to stay away from the fuel cycle.

These are necessary even if most states parties to the NPT will not exercise their right to develop a fuel cycle for peaceful purposes.
On issues related to Article X - which spells out the right of NPT parties to withdraw from the treaty - there are proposals on how to prohibit or make it more difficult for a state party that withdraws from the NPT to keep the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities (i.e., for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation) that were put in place as part of civil nuclear energy programmes; these facilities are inherently dual-use in nature and can be used for producing nuclear weapons.

The prime example is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2003. However, given the reluctance of many NNWS to agree on further efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation aspects of the NPT without getting anything in return on the disarmament side, as well as the possibility that states in regions such as the Middle East may in the future decide to explore the nuclear weapon option depending on nuclear weapon proliferation in the region, it is unlikely that efforts to restrict the right to withdraw from the NPT will be successful.

In this context, the damaging consequences of the exception made by the Nuclear Suppliers Group with regard to India need to be emphasized. It is difficult to overstate the intensity of the resentment about discriminatory double standards and the so-called 'NPT trap' that the deal has aroused among many NNWS parties.

In particular, many NNWS have complained that India, which along with Israel and Pakistan is a de facto nuclear weapon state that has never joined the NPT, is reaping the benefits of treaty membership without having to abide by the obligations of parties to the NPT.

Further issues to be discussed
The desirability of the USA ratifying the CTBT had been mentioned repeatedly by several NNWS as constituting a strong signal by the USA that it would be serious on disarmament and that it would increase the chances of a successful Review Conference. Even if the US Administration said early on that it would prioritize seeking ratification, it has not happened due to the difficulties of obtaining sufficient support in the US Senate. The current situation is therefore likely to continue, with the other states whose ratification is necessary waiting to see what happens with the USA. The Final Document of the Review Conference will probably contain text on the need for early ratification and entry into force of the CTBT.

Starting negotiations on a FMCT was part of both the agreement reaching at the 1995 Review Conference and the 13 steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. The situation has now changed after a work programme was agreed in 2009, although it was then blocked again in early 2010, by Pakistan. Although some NPT signatories may be pleased by the Conference on Disarmament's inability to proceed on this matter, it is still the fact that the only state openly opposing the negotiations is outside the NPT. It should therefore be possible to reach an agreement on some sort of action that can be taken to put pressure on the blocking states, in this case Pakistan.

Many NNWS raised the issue of the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons as something that needs to be addressed in the Review Conference. The majority of the NATO members participating in the meetings supported a reduction in the role and numbers of these weapons, while other states as the exception insisted on the importance of NATO nuclear weapons for its security.

The role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in NATO is currently under review and may bring about some policy changes. However, as this process is not finished and since Russia currently appears to be less interested in transparency or reductions in its non-strategic nuclear weapons, it seems less likely that the Review Conference will agree on concrete measures now.

It would be an interesting and important development if states could agree on a process to start examining the consequences - both legal and more practical, security-policy related - of a world moving first towards lower numbers and then the abolition of nuclear weapons. In particular, the central role of deterrence needs to be discussed and studied by state parties in order to fully understand the implications of abolition and to develop alternative methods and structures for ensuring security in the world.

The Middle East
The lack of follow-up on the 1995 resolution on a weapon of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East was one of the reasons why the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed when Egypt declined to agree to the Final Document. Even though many other states had created problems for the Review Conference and Egypt was subsequently unhappy about being seen as responsible for the failure, it did achieve a boost in its credibility on how serious it took this issue.

Thus, when the 2009 NPT Preparatory Comission tentatively agreed on language presented by the Non-Aligned Movement that would create a subsidiary body to promote the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution, that was a success for Egypt and other Arab states.

This will need to be repeated at the 2010 Review Conference and would then help to address two issues: Israel's undeclared nuclear weapons, which remains a constant security concern in the region and a politically sore point, and Iran's nuclear programme, which is of equal concern for the region, including the Arab states of the Gulf. Both are issues that have been contentious at many Review Conferences and PrepComs.

Project background

The dialogue project, a joint SIPRI-NTI venture managed by SIPRI, had its roots in the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons initiative of the four US statesmen Kissinger, Schultz, Perry and Nunn. The Vision initiative has been linked to proposals for urgent steps that can be taken immediately to reduce nuclear dangers.

The four statesmen have been successful in gaining the full and positive attention of the US Government. They have also engaged in high-level contacts with the other four NWS parties to the NPT. The initiative has also been successful in attracting support in Europe, where in several countries groups of four former senior officials have issued national varieties of the Vision (e.g. in Germany, Italy, the UK, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden).

Recognizing that the realization of a nuclear weapon-free world requires a comprehensive approach to disarmament and non-proliferation and cannot be accomplished without engagement by the NNWS, the four statesmen decided to invite the governments of the most influential NNWS to take part in a dialogue. SIPRI coordinated this dialogue in collaboration with the NTI (specifically, its Nuclear Security Project).

The project's target states have been the major non-aligned states, which are playing a leading role in disarmament and non-proliferation affairs, as well as other leading NNWS. The dialogue has taken place in a number of dialogue dinners and bilateral meetings with foreign ministers or senior diplomats, with the aim of encouraging decision makers to consider how to move forward to realize the Vision.

Contact

Rolf Ekèus, Chairman, SIPRI Governing Board, email: ekeus@sipri.org

Daniel Nord, SIPRI Deputy Director, email: nord@sipri.org

Henrik Salander, SIPRI Senior Advisor, email: salander@sipri.org

Shannon Kile, SIPRI Senior Researcher, email: sk@sipri.org   

Theresa Höghammar, SIPRI Project Coordinator, email: hoghammar@sipri.org

SIPRI and NTI gratefully acknowledge the generous financial support provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation to make this project possible.