Ireland’s ‘No’ vote in the referendum on the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty is certain to dominate France’s six-month Presidency of the EU, which starts in July. But while the vote is certainly a setback for the planned development of the EU, the failure (or at least the delay) of the treaty has opened up new opportunities for enhanced cooperation on security and defence by EU members.

By rejecting the Lisbon Treaty, Ireland has plunged the EU into a serious crisis. The fears expressed by those who voted ‘No’ were only remotely related to the treaty, but its incomprehensible text would have discouraged even the most ardent supporter of Europe. The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, backed by France and Germany, has stated that the ratification process will continue and the British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, has insisted that the treaty will be debated in the British Parliament this week. Meanwhile, President Václav Klaus of the Czech Republic, which will hold the EU Presidency in the first half of 2009, has declared the treaty dead. The debate on the reform of EU institutions that was launched in 2001 is now back to square one. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the result of intense and painful negotiations in 2007 to find a substitute for the failed 2004 Constitutional Treaty, was already a Plan B, there is no obvious way out of this crisis—the only option that can be excluded seems to be a full renegotiation.

The Irish ‘No’ represents a major embarrassment for French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who with German Chancellor Angela Merkel was one of the key architects of the Lisbon Treaty. It is also a serious distraction for the agenda of the forthcoming French Presidency, whose overall theme was to bring a ‘protective’ Europe closer to its citizens. France had articulated an ambitious programme to that effect, with initiatives on immigration, energy security and a more robust European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Instead, Sarkozy will find himself presiding over a Europe in crisis and negotiating another round of talks to save a treaty already approved by 18 countries.

In the meantime the Lisbon Treaty’s innovations will be put on hold. In foreign policy, the position of ‘foreign minister’, which was supposed to bring more coherence to Europe’s external actions, and the External Action Service, the diplomatic corps that was designed to supplement it, are once again postponed. In the area of defence, the Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism, whereby a reduced number of members could decide to deepen their defence cooperation through the pooling of resources or specialization of capabilities, is now in legal limbo.

After the dust settles following the Irish rejection, and notwithstanding the looming challenges, a strong leadership under France’s EU Presidency could be pivotal in moving Europe forward in certain areas. The Irish vote may trigger renewed interest in a more cohesive security and defence policy, a clear priority for France. Because these issues remain essentially a matter for intergovernmental action, the looming institutional crisis may stir up countries to achieve progress in areas where political willingness matters more than institutional fixing. A few months ago, speculation abounded about a possible ‘Saint-Malo 2’, in reference to the original 1998 British–French Saint-Malo agreement that led to the ESDP. France and the United Kingdom remain the natural and uncontested leaders in security and defence in the EU. No treaty is needed in this area, and a renewed entente cordiale between Paris and London would certainly channel energies in the rest of Europe.

Overall strategic conditions push for a ‘Saint-Malo 2’. In 1998 the stated ambition was to increase the EU’s military capability, in order to increase its security autonomy. At that time, the debate essentially revolved around the question of the degree of the United States’ involvement in European security. Since 2001, however, the terms of the debate have changed dramatically: the relevant question has became the level of Europe’s contribution to a US global strategy. Since the divide over the 2003 invasion of Iraq, European strategic preferences have largely become congruent. European Council officials are currently debating an update of the 2003 European Security Strategy and, despite some divergent political sensibilities, an overall consensus on the nature and acuteness of the threats surrounding Europe seems already clear. Furthermore, President Sarkozy’s willingness to reintegrate France into NATO’s military structure—the official return will be announced at NATO’s 60th anniversary summit in Kehl and Strasbourg in April 2009—has basically ended theological discussions about the ESDP as a competitor of or counterpart to NATO. The USA no longer regards the development of European autonomous capabilities with suspicion but with interest. This should reassure the UK. Finally, security and defence is one area where European citizens unambiguously demand more, not less, Europe. Eurobarometer opinion polls regularly show 75 per cent support for a bigger role of Europe in foreign and security policy.

Alas, as always with the rotating EU Presidency, the timing and the context are less than auspicious. Budgetary constrains remain a major obstacle to increased EU defence capabilities. France itself is going through a serious reform of its defence spending: its armed forces will be reduced to 30 000 deployable forces, a cut of 20 000; the air component of France’s nuclear deterrence will be cut by one-third; and a decision about acquiring an aircraft carrier is to be postponed until 2011. France’s oft-delayed Defence White paper has now been presented, focusing on basic equipment modernization and intelligence capabilities reforms. While the UK is still Europe’s strongest performer in defence by far, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have seriously dented British operational capacity and, here too, budgetary constraints will impose painful adjustments. More importantly, the domestic debate about the EU is not conducive to any public initiative on Europe that could further weaken the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. Germany suffers from a different, but crucial, problem: its risk-averse culture remain a major obstacle to greater responsibilities and Germany seems uninterested in Africa, the ESDP’s theatre of choice so far. Other capable actors such as the Netherlands and Denmark seem to prefer an ad hoc approach with the USA.

At the very moment when pragmatic and much awaited French initiatives in defence could have led to a more efficient and capable Europe, diplomatic energies are once again diverted to inward-looking institutional debates. A strategically more conscious Europe needs to deliver. The United States is impatiently waiting for a more balanced burden-sharing in international security. Despite the Irish ‘No’, a huge majority of European citizens wish the same.