One year ago in Munich at the annual Wehrkunde security conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin stunned the audience with his very sharp critique of US foreign policy. At the core of Putin’s ire was his view of the United States dangerously intervening into the sovereign affairs of others. This speech and subsequent remarks by Putin and other Russian leaders later in 2007 sparked a furore in Western policy circles and endless commentary about an alleged ‘new cold war’. Policy differences over European security issues mounted in 2007, including ballistic missile defence deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland, independence for Kosovo, the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and others.

Jumping to conclusions about the imminence of a new cold war, however, is at best premature and is most likely misguided. First, the structure of today’s international system differs fundamentally from the bipolar confrontation of the second half of the 20th century. Today, arguably, the world is multipolar economically and unipolar militarily, although there are serious questions about the fungibility of military power.

Second, the Russians understand that the over-militarization of the Soviet economy after World War II was a grave mistake that made a powerful contribution to the collapse of the Soviet Union. No serious political figure in the Russian elite wants to rerun that exercise; economic development, including building modern infrastructure, will be the main task for the next generation or so.

Third, Russia does not realistically face any military threats from the West. Its near-term threats are instability and radical Islam to its south and potentially an increasingly powerful China to its east. Neither threat can be met through hostility to the West—just the contrary.

Instead, 2007 may be regarded as the nadir in post-Soviet Russia–West relations. One big reason for this view is that in 2007 the West avoided—at least temporarily—overt confrontation on several issues on the international security and arms control agenda, any of which could have brought about a crisis.

Iran     The Russians’ greatest worry, a US or Israeli military strike on Iran, appears to be far less likely after the publication in November 2007 of the US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear programmes. At a minimum the West has bought time to press more fully on the diplomatic, economic and political fronts with partners including Russia in the next year.

Missile defence     The possible deployment of radar and interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland, respectively, is the issue that really pushed Putin over the top to make such a strong speech in Munich. The Russians have subsequently made interesting proposals on cooperation, and discussions to find a way to bring them in on deployment of any theatre or global system, starting with incorporation of shared early-warning radar information, should continue. The West should engage with the Russians on a joint assessment of the ballistic missile threat coming from their south.

Kosovo     This issue certainly still has the potential to develop into a much bigger problem, but that seems unlikely at this stage. The UN deadline for agreement on the Ahtisaari plan came and went in December, and Kosovo is primed to announce its independence any day now. The USA, most of Europe and many other countries will recognize it; Russia and Serbia will not. But Russia does not have an interest in promoting the re-emergence of conflict in the Western Balkans. Indeed, Russia’s economic interests in Serbia, which outweigh its security interests, should be well served if EU–Serbian ties worsen in the near term. The Russian argument that Kosovan independence can serve as a precedent for other ‘frozen conflicts’—like those in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and Trans-Dniester in Moldova—is a red herring as Russia has no interest in seeing any of these regions becoming de jure independent or joining the Russian Federation.

Arms control treaties     Russia’s moratorium on complying with the CFE Treaty, its threat to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and the possible expiration of verification measures for the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START Treaty) have still not been resolved. Russian unhappiness with CFE Treaty is old news, but the door is open for negotiation. The USA should seriously discuss with Russia the future of the INF Treaty, given that the realities of missile development and proliferation are quite different today than when that treaty was signed, 20 years ago.

Recent comments by Russian leaders also support a cautious optimism. The First Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, led the Russian delegation to the 2008 Wehrkunde conference, and both the tone and content of his message differed greatly from Putin’s a year earlier. He strongly endorsed enhanced Russian–US leadership on nuclear security and non-proliferation, in particular calling for cuts in nuclear arsenals. Although Putin caused headlines again by commenting on the USA fuelling a new arms race in his speech to the Russian State Council in early February 2008, that speech was largely devoted to the ambitious Russian development goals up to 2020. Concerning future Russian military spending, he emphasized that ‘our spending on these projects will be in keeping with our possibilities and will not be to the detriment of our social and economic development priorities’.

Putin’s anointed successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, has also repeatedly talked about Russia’s need for stability in the international environment in order to focus on development goals. While Medvedev’s imminent ‘election’ seems to make a farce of democratic procedure, his perception of what the Russian people want resonates. In a ‘campaign’ speech in Moscow on 22 January, he said,

And therefore the most important thing for the development of our country is the continuation of peaceful and stable development. We need decades of stable development. Namely, what our country has been deprived of in the twentieth century. Decades of normal life and focused work. I am sure of this.

He is surely right, and hopefully serious. These words should be heartening to those in the West looking to promote mutual security with Russia in the years ahead.