International Nonproliferation and Disarmament Assistance in the Bio sector

In the early 1990s a number of programmes were initiated to help the former Soviet Union secure and eliminate nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The best known and most important activity was the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme implemented by the United States Department of Defense. Biological-related programmes represent a relatively minor part of the overall activities carried out since the early 1990s.

The initial focus of nonproliferation and disarmament assistance activities was Russia and the newly independent states (NIS) as part of the post-Cold War effort to address the problems arising out of the military legacy of the former Soviet Union. However, few activities have been possible in Russia in the field of biological weapons given that Russian authorities deny having had an offensive biological weapons (BW) programme. A lack of mutual trust and transparency has contributed to difficulties in developing cooperation with sensitive biological facilities.

Outside Russia a number of projects have focused on the approximately 40 facilities in the countries that emerged on the territory of the former Soviet Union that the United States has identified as former biological weapons facilities. After the end of the Cold War the United States funded the dismantling of infrastructure at facilities that are believed to have been used to perform biological weapon related research and/or to produce biological weapons. These projects were carried out under the CTR Programme and they are coming to an end.

In April 2007 the US-financed project to eliminate a war-readiness anthrax production plant in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan was scheduled to be completed with the dismantling of two former production buildings. A project to remove and destroy dual-use equipment at Biokombinat in Tbilisi, Georgia, was also scheduled to be completed in early 2007. This facility was used to produce vaccines (against foot and mouth disease and rabies) but had a production capacity much larger than needed. Original plans to demolish buildings at this site were cancelled as costs associated with asbestos removal became clear, but dual-use production equipment was removed and destroyed. With the completion of these projects the US Department of Defense no longer requests financing for infrastructure elimination.

The BioIndustry Initiative (BII)

Since 2003 the United States has channelled a growing number of activities into the BioIndustry Initiative (BII) which has become the most important international effort to counter the threat of bioterrorism through targeted transformation of former Soviet biological weapons research and production capacities.

The BII programme, managed by the US Department of State, is now the only US government nonproliferation effort devoted to the sustainable reconfiguration of large-scale biological production facilities and in general the emphasis in assistance programmes has progressively shifted from reducing the proliferation risks arising out of past military programmes and towards promoting biological non-proliferation in relevant industrial and scientific communities.

Bio risk reduction and non-proliferation is promoted through different intra-state, institutionalized and ad hoc activities. The geographical scope of preventive efforts is expanding beyond the former Soviet Union to include worldwide cooperation in areas such as joint disease surveillance, the development of bio-security and biosafety standards and guidelines, training scientists in Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) and Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), and trying to build a non-proliferation culture in the scientific community.

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Any reproduction of text and data is authorized only by permission, SIPRI April 2007.