|  About  |  Contact  |  FAQ  |  Links  |  Jobs  |  

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Skip to content.
Sections

Algeria

Return to project homepage
Return to previous page


Algeria country profile

Country Index

Algeria: Overview

Algeria: Past nuclear policies

Algeria: Nuclear facilities profiles

SIPRI Nuclear arms control project home page

Nuclear facilities profile

Mining and Milling

Algeria possesses approximately 56,000 tons of uranium in deposits found throughout the lower half of the region called the “Targui Shield” or “Hoggar Massif.” These include the Timgaounine, Tinef, and Abankor deposits, and the Tahaggart deposit near the Algerian-Niger border.

In 1969, uranium exploration began in Algeria and in 1971 an aerial radiometric survey was performed over the entire country – an area of 2,380,000 square kilometers. After assessing the resulting data and exploring promising regions, the Tahaggart deposit was discovered. The period 1984-1987 saw a marked decrease in research. However, investigations did continue with positive results and discoveries in the Tesnour zone in the northwest and north of Timgaouine. From 1984 to 1997, uranium exploration focused mainly on investigation of three types of deposits: granite-related deposits; sandstone and continental black shale deposits; and unconformity-related deposits. Ultimately however, exploration activities slowed down between 1998 and 2001 and since then there has been almost no exploration or prospecting activity.

In the late 1980s the IAEA assisted the Algerian government to develop uranium prospecting and analysis capabilities. Specifically, the Agency assisted staff at the Centre de Recherche et D`Exploration des Materiaux Algiers to conduct radiometric surveys for uranium ore in the Hoggar region (See IAEA TEC Project ALG/3/003). As a part of that project, the Agency supplied gamma-ray spectrometers and logging equipment for uranium ore analysis. In 1997, the IAEA assisted in a project to improve these prospecting activities.

In addition to uranium deposits, Algeria has a considerable amount of phosphate ore. The U.S. Geological Survey reports that over 700,000 tons of phosphate rock is produced annually. The Centre de Developpment de Materiaux Algiers researched methods for extracting uranium from phosphate ore. In 1994, as a part of a technical cooperation project, the IAEA and Algeria in investigated methods for the removal and recovery of uranium from phosphoric acid (See IAEA TEC Project ALG/3/004).

Sources

1. “Chemicals Suitable for Extracting Uranium from Phosphate Ore,” by Meddor et al, Centre de Developpment de Materiaux Algiers, 1998.

2. IAEA TechWeb
(http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/tcprogramme/projectsbycountry/query/default.asp)

3. “Mining Potentials,” Ministry of Mining and Energy,
(http://www.mem-algeria.org/mining/index.htm, 2002).

4. Ministry of Energy and Mining
(http://www.mem-algeria.org/fr/index.htm)

5. U.S. Geological Survey 2001 Algeria Report
(http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2001/agmyb01.pdf)

Fuel Fabrication

Algeria has an established fuel fabrication capability which it obtained through a cooperative agreement with Argentina.

UDEC Fuel Fabrication Facility

Location: Draria (alternate spelling Dourera)
Provided by: Argentina
Managed by: Unite De Recherche En Genie Nucleaire (Urgn)
Status: Unknown
Function: Fuel fabrication

Description: Argentine contractors began constructing the UDEC fuel fabrication facility in the late 1980s, but they may not have completed the facility until 2000. The reason for the delay may be due to the changing security environment in Algeria during this period. UDEC appears to be a small pilot plant. The plant may be able to assemble fuel elements for a variety of reactors. Some sources state that it is capable of producing elements for the Chinese built Es Salam reactor. If this is the case, the plant would be involved in UO2 cladding, probably in a Zircaloy. According to open-sources, it may also be capable of producing fuel for future plants such as HWRs and PHWRs. The facility may be comprised of a plant for MTR-type plates, a powder metallurgy plant, a fuel element plant, an assembly plant, a machinery and maintenance room, and a project and engineering office.

Sources

6. Roberto Mario Ornstein, “Argentina As an Exporter of Nuclear Technology: Past Present and Future,” CARI, 2001.
(http://www.cari1.org.ar/pdf/nucleareng.pdf)

7. IAEA 2001 Annual Report, Table of Facilities under Safeguards, IAEA, September 2002,
(http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Documents/Anrep/Anrep2001/table_3.pdf)

Reprocessing

Algeria has been suspected of exploring spent fuel reprocessing processes since the early 1990s. In 1995 Leonard Spector wrote, “Several unconfirmed reports indicate that Algeria has begun to construct a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant next to the reactor (located at Ain Oussera), a facility that presumably could have been used to separate weapons-usable plutonium from the reactor’s spent fuel.” In 2001, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein analyzed satellite photographs of the Ain Oussera facility and identified several buildings that could be part of a reprocessing program. These include a hot cell laboratory, an isotope production facility, and a suspected reprocessing plant.

Reprocessing Facility

Location: Ain Oussera
Supplied by: China
Managed by: Centre de Development des Systèmes Energétiques
Status: Unknown
Function: Reprocessing spent fuel

Description: Algeria may have constructed the suspected reprocessing facility and associated facilities with the assistance of China. China may have given Algeria blueprints for these facilities, and possibly provided experts and equipment. The alleged reprocessing facility may be connected to the Es Salam reactor by underground pipes or tunnels. It may also be connected to a waste two storage site with tanks suspected to be used for storing high-activity liquid waste. The facility is made of heavy concrete and may contain hot cells. Next to this facility is a laboratory containing an indeterminate amount of hot cells. The larger facility is adjoined by another facility containing several large stainless steel tanks with metal pans below them.

Sources

8. Leonard Spector, Mark G. McDonough with Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: a guide in maps and charts (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995).

9. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies SIPRI, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1997).

10. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Algeria: Big deal in the desert?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May-June 2001, (http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/mj01/mj01albright.html).

11. Mark Hibbs, “China Attends Zangger Meeting, Might Join Committee after Talks,” Nuclear Fuel, 2 June 1992.

Waste Disposal

Algeria’s waste disposal facilities were constructed with Chinese assistance and are mainted by the Algerian nuclear authorities.

Nuclear Waste Storage facility

Location: Ain Oussera
Supplied by: China
Managed by: Centre de Development des Systèmes Energétiques
Status: Unknown

Function: China constructed this facility as a part of the second phase of a nuclear cooperation agreement with Algeria. The facility consists of multiple sections. The first contains five tanks, set in reinforced concrete and brick. The second area is a liquid storage building containing six storage tanks. This area expanded the liquid waste storage capacity of the site to twice its original size. Analysts believe that it was built to store waste from the hot cell and associated facilties.

Sources:

12. “Spain: Intelligence report warns against Algerian nuclear program,” WISE News Communiqué, September 25, 1998,
(http://www.antenna.nl/wise/498/4918.html).

13. “Mark Hibbs, “China Attends Zannger Meeting, Might Join Committee after Talks,” Nuclear Fuel, June 2, 1997, p. 8.

Research and Development

Algerian nuclear research after 1985 was to include training for Algerian nuclear scientists, technical support, and fuel for the reactor. The Argentine-built Nur reactor is used for production of radioisotopes, materials testing, and training. It went critical on 24 March 1989.

According the Spanish intelligence service CESID, Argentina also agreed to build a fuel fabrication plant. Construction and payment problems allegedly have delayed the completion of this project.

China became Algeria’s main supplier of nuclear technology. The Es Salam reactor uses low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The project was initiated in 1983 with construction beginning in 1986. The reactor went critical on 17 February 1992. In 1996 Algeria signed a draft agreement with China for the “second stage” of cooperation in nuclear technology and is continuing to develop a large research complex at Ain Oussera that includes an isotope production plant, hot cell laboratories, and waste storage tanks. In October 1996, Algeria and China signed a letter of intent for a third phase of cooperation including construction of facilities for the production of medical isotopes as well as expertise in operating the hot cell facility.

Algeria’s motivations in obtaining the Es Salam reactor are still debated by analysts. It appears that work started and then stopped on a suspected reprocessing facility at the Ain Oussera site. Some analysts have noted the dearth of nuclear-related publications coming out of Algeria for a program that was estimated at around 2,000 people especially when compared to publications from other developing countries with civilian nuclear research programs. However, the current disposition of Algeria’s nuclear program whether peaceful or otherwise may be a reflection of Algeria’s economy which is now recovering from the effects of declining oil revenues and high-debts interest payments in the early 1990s.

Sources

14. Richard Kessler, “Argentina to Start Algerian Research Reactor in Late March,” Nucleonics Week, 16 March 1989.

15. Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, Joseph Cirincione, with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002, pp. 299-303.

Reactors

NUR Multipurpose Reactor
Type: 1MW pool type research reactor
Location: Draria (alt spellling Dourera)
Provided by: INVAP, Argentina
Managed by: Unite De Recherche En Genie Nucleaire (Urgn)
Status: Operational
Function: Isotope production and training

Description: Nur is a 1MW pool type reactor that uses 19.75% enriched uranium. In 1985, Argentina’s INVAP and the Algerian authorities signed a contract for Nur. Construction began in 1986 and the reactor became operational in 1989. Its design is similar to Argentina’s RA-6 reactor, but has significant improvements to its human interface capabilities. Nur is used for laboratory scale production of radioisotopes, applied research in neutron physics, and training of reactor-operating personnel. Within the reactor is a hot-cell, neutron beam extraction channels, and a supplementary control console for training purposes.

Sources

16. IAEA Research Reactor Database (RRDB)
(http://www.iaea.org/cgi-bin/rrdb.page.pl/rrdeta.htm?country=DZ&site=NUR&facno=114)

17. INVAP Nuclear Project Page
(http://www.invap.net/nuclear/nur/intro-e.html)

Es Salam

Type: 15MW Heavy-water Reactor
Location: Ain Oussera
Provided by: China
Managed by: Centre De Development Des Systemes Energetiques
Status: Operational
Function:

Description: In 1988, China and Algeria signed a secret contract for China to construct this reactor at the Ain Oussera facility. The reactor uses uranium elements enriched to 3 percent. The reactor has been at the center of heated debates since Western intelligence agencies first discovered its existence. Some analysts believe that it may be capable of producing up to 3 kilograms of plutonium per year from spent fuel and possibly more if uranium blankets are used.

Sources

18. IAEA, Research Reactor Database (RRDB),
(http://www.iaea.org/cgi-bin/rrdb.page.pl/rrdeta.htm?country=DZ&site=ES-SALAM&facno=115).

19. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Algeria: Big deal in the desert?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May-June 2001,
(http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/mj01/mj01albright.html).

20. “Algeria: Nuclear Reactor Update,” The Risk Report, Volume 1 Number 5 (June 1995), p. 12,
(http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/algeria/reac-updt.html).




Return to top

Any reproduction of text and data is authorized only by permission, SIPRI July 2004.