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Syria: Past nuclear policies

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Past nuclear policies

In 1976, the Atomic Energy Commission was established in Damascus. It was around this time that the feasibility of nuclear power reactors was first considered. Syria and the IAEA began a feasibility study in 1979 to advise the Syrian Ministry of Electricity on options for nuclear power.(7) In the 1980s more serious discussions were held that envisioned six 600 megawatt reactors that would be completed by the early 1990s.(8) However, Syria has only recently begun to take steps to establish a credible nuclear infrastructure.

Beginning in the early 1980s Syria began to look for assistance in constructing a power reactor in earnest. Bids were solicited from 36 mostly European firms. The four finalists were Belgatom of Belgium, Sofratome of France, Sweconuclear of Sweden and Electro-Watt of Switzerland.(9) According to then electricity minister A.O. Youssef, a U.S. firm was among the original bidders but was eliminated because of its uncompetitive bid. Youssef asserted that Syria wanted to have a reactor in operation by 1991. Syria’s annual electric power consumption was increasing at a fast rate at that time and its capacity to generate electricity from oil and hydroelectric power was not seen as sufficient. Sofratome would eventually win the contract. However, for reasons that are unclear, but likely financial, the project did not progress beyond a feasibility study. Syria also approached the Soviet Union for power reactors during this time and for a time considered a 5 MW research reactor from India. U.S. officials pressured India – who was also considering a nuclear reactor deal with Iran – to abandon the deal.

In 1990 Argentina concluded negotiations with Syria for the sale of a $100 million 10MW isotope production reactor (research reactor) and “related facilities.” Under the deal Argentina’s state-controlled company INVAP would supply the reactor and the Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica (CNEA) would supply Syria with uranium hexafluoride enriched to a maximum of 20 percent as reactor fuel.(10) The “nuclear centre” was to include a radiological protection centre and a hot cell for producing radioisotopes. However, the deal ran into problems when the Argentine government blocked the sale. According to some accounts this was an effort by Argentina to be seen as a responsible actor in the nuclear field in a bid join the nuclear suppliers group (NSG). Other accounts alleged that Argentina assured Israeli government sources that the deal would not be completed until Syria signed a peace agreement with Israel. Some reports also allege that the U.S. was opposed to the deal and pressured Argentina not to complete it. Lending credence to information of Israeli pressure, was a Jerusalem Post article which reported that then Argentine foreign minister Guido Di Tella said that his country was mindful of objections by any party who deemed a sale of nuclear technology as a potential security threat: ‘Not only (do) we have to judge that it is not interfering with the process or with security, but both Israel and Syria (must) believe the same.’(11)

In 1991, as a part of an IAEA technical assistance project for Syria, China began constructing the SRR-1 miniature neutron source reactor. A safeguards agreement was concluded with the IAEA in 1992. The reactor went critical in March of 1996. In May 1999, Syria and Russia signed a cooperation deal for the peaceful use of nuclear power. The two countries agreed to expand ‘scientific, technical, and economic links.’(12) Under the 10-year accord, Russia agreed to supply Syria with a 25 MW light water reactor. Little work progressed, however, in the years following its signing.

In 2003, Russia surprised many observers when news of a deal to construct for Syria a $2 billion nuclear facility that would include a nuclear power plant and nuclear seawater desalination facility was revealed on the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Russia was already sensitive to the criticism it was receiving from some circles for continuing construction on Iran’s nuclear reactors at Bushehr. The announcement was quickly removed from the website and both Minatom and the Russian Foreign Ministry backed away from the deal.

Some analysts assess that Syria’s mostly unsuccessful drive to build up its nuclear infrastructure derives from the prestige and status that a nuclear reactor has, and its desire to eventually possess a nuclear weapons capability.(13) However, some of these assessments ignore Syria’s electric power needs. Syria’s oil production is around 410,000 barrels per day and is used mainly to generate export revenue. According to the World Bank, during the 1980s Syria’s energy consumption grew at a rate of over 10 percent per year. This contributed to a reduction in net earnings from oil exports and a shortage of foreign exchange which in turn reduced economic growth.(14)

Beginning in the mid-1980s Syria’s electricity demand exceeded production forcing power rationing for several hours a day. According to a U.S. Library of Congress country study, ‘[e]lectricity shortages, blackouts, power cuts, and rationing remained a prominent feature of Syrian life in the late 1980s, frustrating industrial development and impeding economic growth.’(15)

Sources

(7) See the IAEA Technical Cooperation Database,
http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb.
(8) Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p. 67.
(9) Rob Laufer, ‘Syria Plans Nuclear Power Unit by 1991; Belgian Firm Likely Vendor,’ Nucleonics Week, 18 June 1981.
(10) Richard Kessler, ‘Argentina to Ink Research Reactor Deal Soon with Syria, Says CNEA,’ Nucleonics Week, 31 May 1990.
(11) David Makovsky, ‘Argentina: We won't sell reactor to Syria,’ Jerusalem Post, 24 July 1995.
(12) ‘Russia, Syria Sign Nuclear Agreement,’ AP, 19 May 1999.
(13) See for example Michael Eisenstadt, ‘Russian Nuclear Assistance to Syria: Scam or Scandal?’ Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, January 2003.
(14) Syria - Issues and options in the energy sector, World Bank, 31 May 1986.
(15) Thomas Collelo, Syria: A Country Study (Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987).

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Any reproduction of text and data is authorized only by permission, SIPRI July 2004.