Indonesia

Past nuclear policies

In 1954, Indonesia established the State Commission of Radioactivity and Atomic Energy and began to study the effects of radioactive fallout from U.S. thermonuclear weapons tests in the Pacific. The commission generated interest over the possible use of nuclear technology in agricultural research and in other fields. The government subsequently established the Institute of Atomic Energy (Lembaga Tenaga Atom, LTA) to conduct nuclear research and to promote nuclear energy. In 1960, Indonesia signed nuclear cooperation agreements with both the Soviet Union and the United States. Under the Soviet agreement, Indonesia received a sub-critical assembly for training purposes, at the Gadja Mada research center. An agreement to transfer a research reactor and $5 million of related equipment and materials was delayed and ultimately abandoned in 1971 due to Soviet annoyance with Indonesia’s inclination toward China. An agreement with the U.S. led to the construction of Indonesia’s first research reactor, a Triga Mark II, at Bandung nuclear research center, and research became an important part of the Indonesian S& T budget.

When Indonesia began its nuclear programme, it had no interest in developing nuclear weapons. However, China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, while touted as a victory for the Socialist revolution, was also interpreted by the Indonesian leadership to mean that China was willing to assist like minded nations to develop weapons of their own.

President Sukarno’s motivation for seeking a nuclear capability is not entirely clear. Despite a perceived external threat, in the form of a strong Malaysia, the most logical explanation for Sukarno’s nuclear aspirations is the domestic instability that he faced while attempting to lead his country into socialist revolution. Earlier he had publicly aligned himself with the Indonesian Communist Party and was rapidly losing support among the Army generals, whose backing was essential for any attempt at reconstructing the government.

After China’s 1964 test Indonesian officials, led by Brigadier General Hartono of the Army Ordnance Department, began publicly announcing Indonesia’s desire and capabilities for building a nuclear bomb. While such developments alarmed Indonesia’s neighbors and the international community, American analysts assessed that Indonesia did not currently and would not have in the future, the capability to construct a nuclear bomb. According to these analysts, foreign assistance remained the key to any Indonesian effort to develop a nuclear bomb.

In early 1965, Indonesia and China held talks on technical cooperation that may have included assistance in the nuclear field, but on 29 September 1965 China announced that, while all socialist states have a right to nuclear weapons, these states should develop such weapons independently. Several days later, as a result of an aborted coup by the September 30 Movement, the military gained control of the government and President Sukarno lost control of the country. On 11 March 1966, he transferred powers to General Suharto who later became the next president of Indonesia. According to the American arms expert Robert Mozley, ‘the idea of an Indonesian bomb had been so closely tied to Sukarno and his vision of a new Indonesian revolution that there was no real chance that Indonesia’s new leader would pursue nuclear weapons.’(1)

To demonstrate its commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons in the future, the government of Indonesia concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the United States for the TRIGA-Mark II reactor that it had purchased from the American firm General Atomics in the 1960s. Although other sources of energy were abundant in Indonesia, Suharto wanted to diversify the country’s resources, and in the late 1960s he began pursuing foreign assistance in uranium exploration (France, Germany) and prospecting for possible locations for multiple nuclear power plants (IAEA, Italy, U.S.). According to plans by Indonesia’s National Atomic Energy Agency, or BATAN, in the early 1970s Indonesia was expected to have 64,000MW of electrical generating capacity by 2000, with 23 to 29 percent of that being generated from nuclear energy. Despite ambitious plans for nuclear power, numerous factors such as inadequate transmission lines, lack of skilled manpower, and the inability to secure financing consistently plagued Indonesia’s efforts to develop nuclear power.

(1) Cornejo, Robert M., ‘When Sukarno Sought the Bomb: Indonesian Nuclear Aspirations in the Mid-1960s,’ The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, p.38, .

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Any reproduction of text and data is authorized only by permission, SIPRI July 2004.