Brazil

Past nuclear policies

Brazil's nuclear history is framed around a struggle between the desire for an independent indigenous nuclear capability and an outward-looking strategy of seeking foreign assistance and cooperation in developing its nuclear programme.

First steps

Brazil embarked on a nuclear road in the early 1930s, when the University of São Paulo began conducting research in nuclear fission. In the 1940s, Brazil concluded several agreements with the United States for transfer of nuclear technology in exchange for providing the latter with monazite. In 1952, Brazil began systematic prospecting and exploration of radioactive materials. In 1957, with support and technology from the U.S., Brazil built a nuclear research reactor. In 1965, it followed up by constructing its first indigenously-built research reactor; medium-grade enriched uranium fuel was supplied by the U.S. In 1970, the U.S. firm Westinghouse won a bid to construct Brazil’s first nuclear power plant. It took more than ten years, and in 1984, Angra I, a 626MW Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), began commercial production of electricity.

The Atoms for Peace Program mandated strict control over technology, and the U.S. came to be perceived by Brazil to be an unreliable partner. In 1975 Brazil concluded a controversial nuclear transfer agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, which called for eight nuclear power reactors (1,300MW each), a commercial uranium enrichment facility, a pilot plutonium reprocessing plant, and joint development of Becker jet nozzle enrichment technology. The deal was met with international opposition, as Brazil was not an NPT signatory and thus was not entitled to the benefits of sharing nuclear technology. International pressure and financial crises brought an end to the deal, which produced only one nuclear power reactor, Brazil’s second nuclear power plant, Angra II. Angra III, also a German reactor, was partially completed. Despite financial and technical difficulties, Brazil maintained that it would pursue a nuclear power programme, finish Angra III, and further expand the country’s nuclear power capacity.

The Parallel Programme

The pace of Brazil’s nuclear programme was conditioned by developments in Argentina, and the desire for technological autonomy befitting a great power. Because the accord with Germany did not require safeguards, Brazil was able to divert technology from its power plant programme to an indigenous and secret nuclear programme conducted by the military. Brazilian military officers as well as civilian scientists were frustrated by what they perceived to be Germany’s unwillingness to fully transfer nuclear technology and by the inefficiencies in the jet nozzle technology. In the mid- to late-1970s, the Brazilian Autonomous Programme of Nuclear Technology (PATN), or the parallel program, was established. The consequent failure of the 1975 nuclear transfer agreement with Germany, and of the jet nozzle enrichment technology, intensified the programme, code-named “Solimões,” after an Amazon river.(1)

The programme was funded by the military services, the National Security Council (CSN) and National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), and was coordinated by CNEN under the direction of CSN. The PATN was engaged in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle, and was centered on development of enrichment technology. The military pursued different enrichment paths, suited for each branch’s specific goals: the Navy worked on ultracentrifuge technology as a means to power submarines (and small reactors); the Air Force worked on laser enrichment for nuclear fuel cells for use in satellites (and on fast breeder reactor technology). The Army worked on a graphite reactor that would produce plutonium. The branches worked independently but complementarily through informal information sharing. While PATN relied on indigenous technology, foreign know-how (training in the U.S.), human resources (technicians from Germany and other countries), nuclear material (200kg UF6 from China) and specialized equipment (from Germany) were also engaged. The Navy also worked closely with researchers and technicians at the civilian Institute of Energetic and Nuclear Research (IPEN), who in general favored development of indigenous capability and opposed the accord with Germany.

The Navy’s project using centrifuge technology to enrich uranium, proved successful. In 1981, they constructed their first centrifuge. A year later the Navy conducted the first isotopic enrichment experiment. In 1986, Brazil mastered the process, successfully enriching uranium to 20%, and in September 1987, they announced their new capability to the world.

Displacement and legitimization

In 1985, following the transition from military to civilian government, reviews of national nuclear policy and congressional investigations into PATN and its objectives, PATN was made known and thus legitimized. In testament to its success, it displaced and supplanted Brazil’s official nuclear programme. In 1988, Brazil adopted a new constitution, which explicitly limited nuclear activities to peaceful purposes and assigned the Parliament control over nuclear affairs. In 1990, as part of his broader effort to restrict the role of the military, President Fernando Collor de Mello significantly scaled down and de-militarized Brazil’s nuclear efforts. In September 1990 he symbolically closed a test shaft at Cachimbo, and exposed the military’s plan to build an atomic bomb.(2) According to media sources, a 1990 Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry investigated PATN and found that the Air Force’s Institute of Advanced Studies had designed two atomic bomb devices, one with a yield of 20 to 30 kilotons and a second with a yield of 12 kilotons.(3) The investigation also found that Brazil’s military government secretly transferred eight tons of uranium to Iraq in 1981 and allegedly more than 24 tons of uranium oxide to Iran in the early 1980s.(4)

While some military factions were very interested in acquiring a nuclear weapon capability and research with that aim had been carried out by the Air Force, the parallel programme was not a concerted effort in that direction. In fact a prevalent idea in Brazilian military and diplomatic thinking was of “latent technological deterrence”: obtaining the capability to enrich uranium and thus being able to match the nuclear weapon of an opponent (in this case, Argentina) was presumed sufficient in deterring the opponent from developing the bomb.(5)

Brazil opposed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that the treaty failed to stem nuclear proliferation by leaving nuclear arms in the arsenals of the five nuclear weapon states. While Brazil’s position of opposing the NPT has always been interpreted as preserving the option to develop the nuclear weapon itself, it nonetheless delegitimized the nuclear weapon option domestically and fostered a norm against it.

Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control

As civilian governments gained power in both Argentina and Brazil, the political climate was ripe for a positive nuclear cooperation and disarmament relationship. The Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rapprochement began around 1980, but did not effectively get underway until 1985. Initially, until about 1988, the process was purely bilateral, and centered on individual security and building reciprocal trust. From 1989 forward, the relationship took on legally-binding character and was framed within the international order.(6)

On May 17, 1980, Brazil and Argentina signed the first of many agreements towards bilateral arms control. The Agreement on Cooperation for the Development and Application of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy paved the way for technical cooperation in the nuclear sector and coordination of nuclear policy. In November 1985, the relationship was strengthened by a Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy that emphasized the strictly peaceful nature of both countries’ nuclear programmes. The November 1985 declaration was followed by similar declarations and reciprocal visits to nuclear installations in both countries.

In November 1990 a bilateral nuclear inspection regime, the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, was established by a joint declaration. In July 1991, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created. Soon thereafter, Brazil, Argentina, ABACC and the IAEA began negotiations on an agreement for application of full safeguards to the nuclear facilities of both countries. In December 1991 the Quadripartite Agreement was concluded among the four parties. It consisted of obligations virtually identical to those under the NPT.

In May 1994, Brazil ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty (Latin American nuclear weapons free zone), waiving the requirements of Article 28 of the treaty, so the treaty has entered into force.(7) In 1996 Brazil has joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and assumed its Chair on June 1, 2006.(8) Finally, in 1998 Brazil ratified the NPT and the CTBT. Brazil remains opposed to signing the Additional Protocol (AP).(9)

Sources

1. Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” Center for International Security and Arms Control, August 1997.
2. James Brooke, “Brazil Uncovers Plan by Military to Built Atom Bomb and Stops It,” New York Times, October 9, 1990, via ProQuest.
3. Constantine C. Menges, “Brazil’s Lula da Silva, Castro and China,” The Washington Times, December 10, 2002; “Brazil: Nuclear Weapons Programs,” GlobalSecurity.Org, Updated April 28, 2005.
4. Valerie Lincy and Kelly Motz, “Nuclear Cheating: A well-worn path,” Iran Watch Bulletin, Volume 1, Issue 4, July 22, 2005.
5. Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” Center for International Security and Arms Control, August 1997.
6. Julio C. Carasales, “The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement,” Nonproliferation Review, Sprint-Summer 1995.
7. Article 28 of the Tlatelolco Treaty requires that all of the following conditions be fulfilled in order for the treaty to enter into force: a) ratification by all Latin American states; b) ratification of Protocol I by all countries with possessions in Latin America; c) ratification of Protocol II by all nuclear weapon powers; and d) conclusion of safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Paragraph 2 of Article 28 allows for the waiving of those requirements by any state when ratifying the treaty.
8. “Discurso do Embaixador José Artur Denot Medeiros, Representante Especial para Desarmamento e Não Proliferação, durante a sessão plenária de abertura da Reunião do Grupo de Supridores Nucleares (NSG),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil, June 1, 2006 .
9. Julio C. Carasales, “The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement,” Nonproliferation Review, Sprint-Summer 1995; “Regional Safeguards in Latin America: Implications for the Middle East?” Seminar Sponsored by The Institute for Science and International Security, Washington, D.C., and The National Center for Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt, October 27, 1997, Cairo, Egypt .

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