SIPRI Yearbook 2008: summaries in three languages
Syria
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Country Profile 9: Syria
By Jeffrey Fields
FirstWatch International (FWI)
Overview
Syria possesses what appears to be a nascent nuclear programme and limited nuclear infrastructure. Though this country has been mentioned as a potential nuclear proliferation risk, there is little evidence that it has ever had serious nuclear weapons ambitions. Syria is a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) having ratified it in 1969. It possesses only one nuclear reactor, the Chinese-built 30kW miniature neutron source reactor (SRR-1), which is located at the Dayr al-Jajar Nuclear Research Center.(1) SRR-1 is mainly used for the production of medical isotopes and research. Though policy makers in the United States have expressed their suspicions of Syrian WMD ambitions for some time now, they did not object to the 1991 sale of the reactor by China.(2)
There have been allegations that Syria is desirous of a nuclear weapons capability. However, these suspicions are not corroborated by any examination of open sources and are even contradicted by some national intelligence services. Much of the suspicion surrounding Syria’s nuclear intentions are due to other policies that it pursues such as its chemical weapons program, its role in Lebanese politics, and alleged sponsorship of terrorism. Some U.S. officials have issued warnings about a Syrian nuclear weapons program. For example, in 1991 former U.S. Senator Jesse Helms reported before a Senate committee that there were “credible reports” that ‘China is engaged in furthering the nuclear weapons ambitions of Syria and Iran.’(3) Helms did not elaborate on the “reports” or their origins or veracity. To the contrary, CIA director John Deutch testified before the U.S. Senate that ‘Syria’s nuclear research program is at a rudimentary level and appears to be aimed at peaceful uses at this time. It is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. At present, we have no evidence that Syria has attempted to acquire fissile material.’(4)
Over the past decade, disagreements have from time to time emerged in American circles about Syria’s nuclear intentions. The facts in the open source however point to no credible evidence to substantiate charges of a Syrian nuclear weapons programme. In 2003, the CIA disputed planned congressional testimony of then U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control John Bolton regarding Syria’s WMD programs. Bolton had planned to testify that ‘Syria’s development of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons had progressed to such a point that they posed a threat to stability in the region.’(5) CIA analysts objected to Bolton’s interpretations however, and the planned testimony was postponed.
The 2003 version of the CIA’s Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions contained only a single paragraph related to Syria’s nuclear programme, noting that:
“Syria—an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards—has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have continued their long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities and we are looking at Syrian nuclear intentions with growing concern.”(6)
One cause for concern, as the CIA report notes, has been the Russian-Syrian cooperation agreement finalized in 1998. That agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy contained agreements in principle by Russia to construct a 25 MW light water reactor for Syria. In 1999, the two countries signed an agreement formalizing the promise of the reactor. A 2003 agreement again promised delivery of a reactor from Russia, but Russian sensitivity to international concerns may have halted the deal. There has been no delivery or construction of Russian-built nuclear reactors so far.
Overall it can be concluded that although U.S. officials and certain other governments have suspected Syria of developing nuclear weapons, based on a review of open sources, there does not appear to be evidence that corroborate these suspicions. It can furthermore be concluded that Syria’s nuclear program is currently at a level of limited research and development for civilian purposes and will likely remain so in the near future.
Sources
(1) Dayr al-Jajar is transliterated from Arabic in several different ways.
(2) “Syria to get nuclear reactor; U.S. says it won't block deal,” Reuters, 3 Dec. 1991.
(3) Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 23 Oct. 1991.
(4) Testimony of John Deutch, Director Central Intelligence Agency, Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Weapons Proliferation, 20 March 1996
(5) Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay, ‘CIA: Syria's WMD Exaggerated; Objections to White House's Assessment Put Off Scheduled House Panel Testimony,’ Knight Ridder, 16 July 2003. Emphasis added.
(6) U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2003.’