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Country Profile 8: Saudi Arabia
By Yana Feldman
FirstWatch International (FWI)
Overview
Saudi Arabia has little experience in developing its own nuclear fuel cycle. At first glance it appears that the country lacks (even at a research level) experience in mining, conversion, uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, or nuclear power production.
While no evidence exists of a concerted effort within Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons, the Kingdom’s considerable oil revenue and its history of cooperation with nuclear states, i.e. China and Pakistan, have led to rumours since the 1970’s that Saudi Arabia had undertaken a clandestine campaign to obtain access to a nuclear deterrent by financing such programmes in Pakistan and Iraq.[1]
The strategic situation of Saudi Arabia is such that the Kingdom might consider a nuclear alliance with a friendly nuclear power or its own nuclear deterrent an attractive option. The Kingdom is situated between two powerful regional rivals – Israel and Iran. Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons while it is strongly suspected that the Iranian nuclear programme has been developed to create the option to develop nuclear weapons. As recently as 1991, Saudi Arabia may have depended on the nuclear umbrella of the United States to deter the possible use of chemical or biological weapons against targets in Saudi Arabia by Saddam Hussein. The continued deterioration of security ties with the United States might well provide an incentive to secure a viable nuclear alternative. Although Saudi Arabia appears to be a low proliferation threat at this stage, given their considerable level of wealth, links to nations that have known nuclear programmes, the possibility that Saudi Arabia would consider a nuclear weapons option for the future remains a concern for some analysts.
Several conclusions with regard to the Saudi potential for developing a nuclear weapon can be drawn.
– It appears that the Saudi Arabian government has determined that a nuclear deterrent would positively augment their national security.
– The Kingdom’s nuclear physical and human infrastructure is not advanced enough to sustain the development of an indigenous weapon programme but it has been rumoured on a number of occasions that Saudi Arabia has supported weapon programmes in other states financially. Saudi Arabia may have received dual-use technology.
In determining its potential for developing an indigenous weapon, one could possibly compare Saudi Arabia’s industrial and human capabilities to those of Libya before it began shopping at A.Q. Khan’s ‘nuclear Wal-Mart.’ Both had a shortage of trained personnel and a rudimentary state infrastructure. Libya began shopping for nuclear-related technology in the mid-to-late 1980s, and it was beginning to assemble a somewhat advanced enrichment capability by 2003 when it chose to abandon its nuclear capability. It could take Saudi Arabia a similar time to develop a nuclear capability.
Saudi Arabia’s plentiful wealth and a more positive standing in international society than Qhadafi’s Libya could accelerate a nuclear programme if the nuclear black market was to continue to function and given the history of Saudi cooperation and exchange with foreign nuclear powers as well as current close ties with the de facto nuclear Pakistan. A nuclear pact with that state, with the possible option of nuclear deployment in Saudi Arabia, may be the most viable option for resolving a perceived security deficit in a region where the number of nuclear and chemical weapons continue to grow.
Sources
[1] Marie Colvin, ‘How an Insider Lifted the Veil on Saudi Plot for an “Islamic Bomb”,’Sunday Times, 24 July 1994, via Lexis-Nexis.