Kazakhstan

Country Profile 10: Kazakhstan

FirstWatch International (FWI)

Overview

At independence in 1991, Kazakhstan was among the four states of the former Soviet Union to inherit nuclear weapons, acquiring with it the status of the fourth largest nuclear power in the world.(1) The new acquisitions included thousands of nuclear warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), cruise missiles, and the world's largest testing facility (where 456 nuclear tests took place over a 50-year period).(2)

Kazakhstan actively pursued disarmament and nonproliferation policies by joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and other international and bilateral nonproliferation initiatives. It participated in international and bilateral projects to improve safeguards and security at its facilities, to avoid becoming a target for nuclear trafficking. Kazakhstan signed the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in February 2004, although it is not yet in force.(3) All acquired nuclear warheads, ICBMs, and cruise missiles were returned to Russia between 1994 and 1996.(4) Similarly by the end of 1999, Kazakhstan had dismantled all missile silos and sealed 194 test tunnels at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site.(5) Kazakhstan continues to make remarkable progress in the area of nuclear safeguards, export controls, and nuclear material accountancy and control. Its cooperation in these efforts has been essential to maintaining stability and security in the region.

Kazakhstan’s nuclear fuel cycle resources include extensive uranium mining zones and fuel processing and fabrication technologies. Kazakhstan aims to become the world’s largest producer and exporter of uranium in the next five years.

The country is taking advantage of its advanced fuel fabrication facilities to offer those services for export. While its overall intent appears peaceful, Kazakhstan has made known its desire to operate all steps of the nuclear fuel cycle. If Kazakhstan decides to undertake enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, that may be of concern to the international community as a potential source of weapon material.

At present, Kazakhstan’s nuclear strategic significance lies not in its capabilities, which are polished by decades of being part of one of the world’s two nuclear superpowers, nor in its intent, which appears to be anti-proliferation, but in the risk of nuclear security and proliferation by virtue of its location and circumstances. Kazakhstan’s geographic position makes it strategically important to current international nonproliferation efforts. It is the only Central Asian country sharing borders with both Russia and China, and with states of nuclear-transit significance such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Kazakhstan continues to make remarkable progress in the area of nuclear safeguards, export controls, and nuclear material control and accountancy. Its continued cooperation regarding these efforts is essential to maintaining stability and security in the region.

Sources

(1) “Politics and Policy,” Embassy of Kazakhstan to the U.S. and Canada, accessed January 25, 2006, <http://www.kazakhembus.com/NuclearDisarmament.html>.
(2) Bruce Pannier, “Kazakhstan: Nuclear Fallout Still Signals Health Hazards,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Library, August 29, 2001, <http://www.rferl.org/features/2001/08/29082001120947.asp>; Vadim Nee, “Can Kazakhstan profit from radioactive waste? Domestic and international legal perspectives on a proposal to import radioactive waste,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Spring 2003.
(3) Maribeth Hunt and Kenji Murakami, “Upgrading Nuclear Safeguards in Kazakhtan,” IAEA Bulletin, 46/2, March 2005, p. 26.
(4) The Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Kazakhstan Nuclear Facilities: Nuclear Weapons,” <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Kazakhstan/Nuclear/4278_4316.html> 20 September 2000.
(5) Jon Brook Wolfsthal et al., “U.S. Nonproliferation Assistance Program,” Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Exports Controls in Former Soviet Union, Vol. 6, 2001, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/print/pdfs/nsr/ch3.pdf>.

Nuclear history and policies

Nuclear fuel-cycle activities

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