Brazil

Country Profile 11: Brazil

Introduction

Brazil possesses one of the most advanced nuclear capabilities in Latin America and is one of very few states with the indigenous capability to produce fissile material necessary to build a nuclear weapon. Alongside its civilian programme, in the 1970s and 1980s the military government pursued a parallel secret nuclear program, focused on enrichment. It has been reported that during this time, the Air Force may have succeeded in designing two atomic bomb devices. Following transition to civilian rule, Brazil renounced any nuclear weapon ambitions, and joined its neighbor, Argentina, in bilateral, regional and international arms control and disarmament.

Currently, Brazil is expanding its nuclear programme, launching a commercial enrichment center and may be seeking to enter the uranium export market. With the sixth largest uranium holdings in the world it is poised to successfully play a role in both markets. Brazil has also expressed interest in increasing its nuclear power capacity, although it is proceeding cautiously. Brazil’s constitution bans the military use of nuclear energy, and the country has joined the Tlatelolco treaty (the Latin American nuclear weapons free zone), the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

While Brazil appears to have solid nonproliferation credentials, some of its positions and decisions have raised concern about the proliferation potential of Brazil’s nuclear programme.

The 1990 parliamentary investigation into the Brazilian military nuclear programme praised the technical successes achieved, but made explicit the peaceful purpose of Brazil’s future nuclear activities. However, military involvement in that programme is not excluded. The military gave up the option to construct a nuclear weapon, but retained a role in nuclear technology development. The involvement of the military in the nuclear programme may continue to raise questions.

Brazil has urged Iran to follow a legitimate route to nuclear power. The reversal of Brazil's position on the future of nuclear power in March 2006 and the postponement of the official launch of the Resende enrichment facility in early 2006 are perhaps examples of a broad concern over attracting negative international attention at a time when there are widespread concerns about the transparency of Iran's nuclear programme. Brazil has not been totally forthcoming about the history of its enrichment programme, as demonstrated by recent refusal to let IAEA inspectors fully inspect the centrifuges at the Resende facility. The apparent decision to set aside plans for nuclear power expansion, while going ahead with the establishment of an enrichment capability raises questions about Brazil’s future intentions.

Brazil’s announcement that the country is expanding uranium production and will offer enriched uranium for export is another issue of potential proliferation concern, depending on the nature of safeguards that Brazil will require on exported uranium.

Brazil’s caution with regard to its own nuclear programme and its position on the case of Iran suggest that Brazil wishes to maintain its status as a responsible member of the international nuclear community.

Nuclear history and policies

Nuclear fuel-cycle activities

Return to country profile index

Return to top

Any reproduction of text and data is authorized only by permission, SIPRI July 2006.